erserderce end fayond Afoctocdoen Angyiry sbeied Wy Wen D pa und Midbad & wander Gheawiim ond Inianpeis + Indio Univesity fe, 200 The Impossible for Man—God Jean-Lue Marion 1. What Transcendence Does Not Transcend Transcendence —the concept will not take us very far, nor truly “beyond.” Not, at leas, ifwe take itn the two ways admitted by philosophy. First, according to phenomenology ranscendence is defined with respect to consciousness, precisely as what surpasses the immanence of consciousness to itself. In particular, we speak of transcendence with regard to what inten. tional consciousness targets, when consciousmiess makes itself the “conscions ness of something,” namely of something other thaw itself—"that universal routid-property of consciousness, which is to be the cunsciousness of some- thing, tb camy within as watt i own cogitatunn "| What docs conscious ness reach by aiming for it It reaches of course a meaning, which appears in the end as a phenomenon in is awn right when consciousness is adequately filled by intuition, dn this eas, intentional consciousness transcends itself to fgrsp the phenomenon ofa thing, since indeed “the thing names itself as simply transcendent”? The thing transcends consciousness in that it stands ulside of consciousness, even though it never stands without it. Faras tan Fiandation by A DacaJean-Lue Marion se ofthiskind may lead, consciousness never overcome itself, on this node. except for what remains, more offen than not, an object, Taken in this Fest way (Hussel), transcendence never goes beyond the entitaive object Tianscenilence therefore remains immanent tothe borizon of being. And if wwe radcalize this fist level of transcendence by directing it, not only to the totiative object, but, by reducing being in its totality, to Being itself Heide ger) then by definition transcendence will never each beyond Bein, On the anita, erected henceforth as the “transcendent pure au simple,” Being ean of every intentional aimingand every advance of every posible tanseendence “The transcendence of Being does not disclose transcendence, butinstead closes and limits, The paradox involved doesnot single ont pheriomenatogy Phenomenology, in all likelihood, may have inherited it from the very fist cxplvt formolations of the concept of metaphysiea, such as those found, for example, in Duns Scotus. Seolus affirms thatthe first division of being, divides beinginto nite and infrt, thereby rang onthe dstinction between God and ereatuce. follows iexmdiatlyfrom ths ruling that whatever com- ples with “enti ut infferens a finitu et infinitum” —which i to say ens— transcends the difference and is therefore “ranscendens et est extet ome ‘genus. Transcendental, of course (as opposed to predcation by categorie), do notspeak of God as belonging to a genus, which God transcends, yetll of them, starting with the chiefarnong them, namely being (or rather enti ens), iranscend the difference between finite and infinite: “sunt talia guae conve rin enti ut est indiferens ad finitum et infinitum.”* Consequently, the tan Seerudence of tanscendentalsich as these transcendentals determine God asthe infinite being, and therefore determine God in his ranscendence—sill boil dow to being and locks itself inside being: “de rationetranscendentsest now habure praedicatum supraveniens, nisi en. * In other words, not oul does ‘2 transcendental still contain God's transcendence within is own hhoundaries itis actually called upon to define it—in both senses ofthe term: It tables Goes tanscendence, but at the price of giving it dition. One night, of couse, wish to radicalize divine transcendence by inereasing its density tothe point of “ipsum ene” (allowing St. Thomas} instead of depos ing it within the confines ofthe concept of entity (following Duns Scotus, ad Inter Siter).One might and, [sppese. one should. Such a move, however dloes not chance the fundamental situation with regard to transeendence Since ipsum esse cannot tself be conceived, at least fom on standpoint (guoad ras), except asthe real composition of essence and ese. This composition de~ Finesall that is created positivelyand, by contast, defines the divine exception “God, or what isin such a way that in hian alone the essence coincides with the act of being to the point thal esse absorbs essence and, soto speak dispenses God of the need to have an essence at all: "Deus igitur non abet esentian, quae non sit suum ese."? The fact that God!’ tra Tonger stakes itself within a concept of entity (which always tars out to be “The Impossible for Man—God univocal since iti the first transcendental, if nota supertranscendentalis)| does not suffice to set it free, since it emains coiled within the chasin of essence and esse and therefore deiitvely within the horizon of being, “Thus the tv0 chief meanings of teanscendence in philosophy different as they are, share a common feature: Neither transcends the horizon of entity: uinch les the horizon of being. Transcendence, in philosophy, even and ‘specially the transcendence that we nould like to assign to God a his proper mark, is defined as what docs not rise beyond being—into which it un, instead, head on, asthe ultimate transcendental 2. A. Question Outside of Being This ultimate transcendence, however, must be transcended iF God is whom wwe have in mind, supposing atleast that we have not buried the question beforehand in onfortheology, but are prepared to lt it exercise its privilege— namely its freedom with regard to being, Of course, we may tailor the question of God to ft coumon usage and frame it an the model of questions conceming the things of the word according to their being. We tpicaly fee that we do justice to what we call ‘God" when we reduce the question of Gos to an inquiry into Gods existence Hence the widespread formula: “Ibelieve in God i he exist; bute doesnot ais, [reser the right not to believe in him.” Yet it should be immediatly apparent that transposing this particular question to the realm of existence, innocent and rational a the move may seem, fails to hold up to analysis. The reasons are many. Fist, out mode of reasoning may tn out, in the privacy of ‘our decisions, tobe the inverse of what it present itself tobe, so thatthe true form of our argument actually is: “Since I dont believe in God anyway, I wil conduct myself as though he did not exist.” Or, converse: “Since T have decided to believe in God regardless, I will conduct myself as thongh he ccxisted” Adhering to one ofthe other postion no longer results fom the reasons innoked but precedes them and inakes instramental use of then When it comes to God, the relationship between belie and existence is likely to invert tse, It fells fom this that being, insofar as it cams the tte of horizon of transcendental, offers no privileged access to the question of God anid provides no ground fra decision procedure. Rather it disconnects Cod and bemg absolutely. Hence a new alternative emerges, puradusical perhaps, bout perfectly rational. ln this particnlar case, it ight well be that God (to my {noiledge exists without my believing in hin o, conversely, that God {to may Invrsedge) doesnot exis, without this preventing me from believing in him, Tete is nothing absurd about this way of framing the problem: For indeed if God by definition surpasses the egime of common experience and the cond tion it sets on whats posable in a worldly sense fand God would not, other- te "Cod”sitec he would bea worldly phenomenon among others), i what way would his existence (which isto say his being inseribed wise, deserve the wJean-Luc Marion » ong phenomena existing inthe work) serve as the eiterion for rns belie or rejection? Moreover, identifying the question of Cod with an belie be no inns selFevident. To do so is characteristic of a very pecuiar theoretical Stance, hic assumes thatthe question of God sequite that a preliminary question fst be answered regarding his existence, and therefore that proof This existence be supplied. The underlsing assumption is nothing les than. the perfeet hegemony, without exception, of the horizon of being, such 28 metaphysis understands it based on the principle (which doesnot take over sre) that “absolute Deus cai sub objctum hujus eientia [meta phisica | quia haee scientia ext perfectissina sapientia natal ergo com Siderat de ebus et causs primis et uriversdissmi,et de primis prncipis ger sralissis, quae Deum ipsun comsprehendunt.”? We need only articulate this Principle to see the opposite hypothesis spring forth: Natural scence can only Faclude natural entities among its general causes and universal prineples, taken accordingto their conditions of intelligibility to finite intellects. Far fom tnctaphyses heingable, however transcendental (or rather precisely because etaphisics is transcendental according to transcendental es), to define con- Aitions of intelligibility and possibilty for “God” by means of a glaringly un- (questioned univocity, Cex] can oly be instaurated as God on the basis of his Prentaogical covktion and pretranscendental feedow. As log 28 the Diflerens zwischen Sein und Seiendem ersceint dann |... als die Tanszen- den, dh. als das Meta Physiseke,"® transcendence remains metaphysical, feven when i overcomes metaphysics. Transcendence tht is taken according to these meanings does nol open up transcendence but instead slams it shut efor the world comes into being, and thus before being unfolds its horizon, God poses the question of Gada question thal no one i fre to avoid see Gor defines hinsel, prior oan proof of existence, ay “the one whom even toe knows, by anne Tt follows thatthe end of metaphysics and even the ‘eptition of Scnsfrage fiom ruling oot or relativizing the question af God, frag instead and by means of contrasts reducible character tight: Do we have aceess toa transcendence without condition or meas? ‘at then the difficulty deepens and mutates fon the ane hand, the hori zon of heing doesnot allow ws to tage what i propel at take ithe Fnosl- ‘edge we have of God's name; fom the other hand, nothing appear within this Ton that isnot certificate-bearingenfit: Mast we not conclude that there ie possible phenomenalization of God and, moreover, tha this very impo “Siblty defines God? Are we not inthe er ofilsm, led by our inner fidelity tnd devotion to thought to admit God in philosophy strictly as what is empiri- {ally itnposible and les outside phenamenalizaton a2 matter of principle? 3. The Impossible Phenomenon ‘We must as, fst: What do possible and impossible mean here? ‘The terms referto experience, namely to what experience allows and excludes—therefore ‘The Impossible for M: to what may or may not appear and let itself be seen, the phenomenon. How, in futn, isa phenomenon defined? It seems resonable hereto privilege the tanswers, for the most part convergent, that Kant and Huser] have given us, Since these two thinkers lave almost single-handedly established the postive concept that we have of the phenomenon, A phenomenon is defined Through the adequacy ofan intuition which gives and fulfils) toa concept or ‘neaning (which is empty and tobe filled and validated). Based on this prem iss a thing can appear fo me in two ways: Fither T determine what [have received in intuition by identifying it with some concept that Timpase on it, xo that itis no longer an aninteligible event of consciousness (ora case ff intuition) but precisely such and suels an object or deseribable entity; or the concept that I might have actively formed (through spontaneous under- standing or through conscious intentionality) ow my own initiative ends up finding empirical validation i some intuition, which comes subsequently to fill it and to qualify it as such-and-such an objector entity. Ht matters litle ‘which one af he two serves as the starting point for achieving adequacy, since inv all cases the phenomenon only appears by intemally conjugating intuition and concept ‘What about God? It scems immediately clea that Ihave neither an int ition nor a concept at my disposal in this case. Ihave no intuition at my disposal, atleast if by intron 1 mean what is susceptible to be experienced ‘vith te parameters ofspace and ime. Forby “God” I mean above all and by {efinition the Eternal—or at least what no more begins to endure than it finishes enduring since it never begins at all ¥ mean, also as a matter of definition, what i nonspatial—what is located nowhere, aecupies no exten- sion, admits of no limit {what has its center everywhere and its circumference nrowhete, escapes all measure (the immense, the ineommensurable), a therefore is not divisible or susceptible of being multiplied. ‘Tis twofold im- possibility of entering intution rests neither on any doctrinal preference nor fr any arbitrary negatvly, but results ftom the unavoidable requirements of the simple posibility of something ike God. The most speculative theology agrees with the most urlateslatlism to postulate that, in God's ase all formal conditions of intuition nus be transggessed: If intuition implies space and time, then there can never be any intuition of God because ofthe even rote radical requirement that there must not bean intuition, if God i ever to be considered “Atheism snot alone in denying even the slightest intuition in Gods case, since Revelation also insists that "No one hasseen God” (Jolin 1:18). Adstine- tive mark of God is thus the nupossibility of receiving an intuition of him, But there is more (or maybe les). If peradventure {suppose myself to have re {ceived anintition exceptional enough to beasigned to something like God, trol ave to have at my disposal a concept that allows ve to identify this Intuition of, what amounis tothe same, a concept that this intuition would salidate and which in return would confer on ita form and meaning, But | GodJean-Luc Marion cannot-again by definition—legiimately assign any concept to God, since vers concept, by implying delimitation and comprekension, would contra dit God's sole posible definition, namely that God transcends all d tation and therefore all definitions supplied by my finite mind. Incompre- hhensbilty, which in every other case atest: either to the weakness of mv Knowledge orto the insufficiency of what ito be know, ras, here and here only, as an epistemic requiternent imposed by that which must be thowght— the infinite, the conditioned, and therefore the inconceivable, "Isa in comprehensiilta in atione infiniti continet ‘While none ofthe concepts that use to designate Goi hae the power by definition io reach God, al of them nonetheles eran to some extent tele- ‘ant, insoae as they can be turned from illegitimate affirmations into legiti- nate negations Indeed if my eventual concepts desigaating God say nothing about God, they say something about me insofar as Tam confionted by the incomprehensible; ‘hey say what is that Iam able to consider, at leat ata given moment, san acceptable representation of God they aticate, there fore, the conception that I make for myself ofthe divine—a conception that ‘imposes ef on me asthe best since it defines precisely what is maximal or ‘aptimal for me. In short, the concepts that I asian to God, like so many invisible minrors, send me back the image that I make up for myself of divine perfection, which ate thus images of myself, My concepts of God tum out in the end tobe idols—idols of myself “The radical failure of conceptualization with respect to God gives rise toa double consequence. int, the “death of God,” estingasit does necessarily on the premiss ofa particular concept of “Gas {anoral God, final canse, eau sui, et.) only disqualifies each time what actually corresponds tothe concept leaving ll olher concepts ‘an open-ended series, but each new concept sas inadequate as the fist sill to be cessed and eitiqued. fn other words, evers specific form of conceptual atheism remains regional and provisional, while ang claim to a universal and final atheism betays ipso fact its failure to rach the conceptual level in the fst place, and therelore fills into ideology and violence. In short, the “death of God” gives immediate rise tothe “death of the death of God.” Secondly the same difculty applies, numerically, to every fora of theism, Whenever theism ties to reach conceptual formations that ate definitive and dogmatic it condemns itll to idolatry no less than does atheism. The two differ foi on another only asa positive idolatry ders from ‘anegative idolatry. Whether or not we decide in favor of at ist blush to make meaningful diference, but the difference tues out teuth, tobe indilferent, a 30 as we ecoanize tat in boty eases the conch sion is reached only on the basis of defining or conceptualizing God's pre- sumed “esence.” Both conelusious thus ratify the same dogmatic idolaty Both cases alo assume that “being” or “existing” signify something that is Knowable to us even when applied to “Goul”—which is not selEevident inthe least and betrays a second idolatry, namely the chief idolatry, which isthe ls existence seems ‘The Impossible for Man—God idolatry of Being itself. The impossibility of assigning a concept to God thus stems rom God s very defntion,narels that he admis ofa concept Such a acteristic ofa particu lar philosophy: Revelation isthe fst to prohibit the conceptualication ofthat ‘which "bears the name which isabove every name” (Philippians 2.9), which is to say “the love which sugpasses all knowledge” (Diphesians 3:19), God there fore is distinguished as wel by the impossibility of being conceptualized. ‘onclusion, once again, is nol unique to atheism or ch 4. The Impossible Experience ‘Confronted with this double impossibility, we have no choice but to proceed from the common determination of phenomenality othe conclusion thatthe plienomenon of God is impossible. As we saw, speculative theology admit this result in metaphysics to the same extents does atheism. Speculative theology, hhowever, which condues its thought within faith and in view of belief, di ‘verges radically fom atheism when it comes to interpreting this phenomenal {impossibility For speculative theology the very impossibility ofa phenomenon (of God belongs toa real and indubitable experience of God. Indeed if God teannot not be thought as beyond phenomenal conditions—unintuitable and Jnconceivable—this impossibility results directly fom bis infinity, taken as the huallmatk of his incomprehensibilty. What belongs propery to Go {for phi- Tsaphy; this isthe infinite) characterizes him as what by definition surpasses the finite, Now for ns, phenomenal conditions remain at al ines finite (the sensory nate of intuition implies is nitude and our concepts belong to our Fite understanding}, to the point that it has been posible to conclude that Being deploys self as finite. Consequently, Gods infinity can only contra- dict ourfinite knowledge ofthe phenosnenon. Translated into epistemological terms, this takes the following form: Irincomprehensibilty attests to the im. possibilty of pheiomenalzing the infinite, st nonetheless postulates, on a hegative mode, a postive experience of the infinite. In otter words, the epist- {nie impossibility ofthe phenomenon of Gav (xamely his ineomprehensibi iy) isitself experienced asa counterexperience of God. “This inversion—the imposible plkenomenon as the paradexial possi- bility of a connterexpericnee—may be contested and has in fact been con- tested offen enough. One can argue for example that incomprehensibilty no tote offers a formal account of Gud than des infinity, since i offers nothing to the understanding except the genesal impossibility of experience as such, “Phe fact that [am unable inthis ease to compechend anything is not enough to infer, on the sly, the verifiable but actual presence of anything what soexer On the contrary, and ina more trivial way the fact that understand nothingconfiemsstraghtaway the ontc incousistency ofan object ofany kind. ‘The failure of the ratio eognoscendi simply reproduces the failure ofthe ratio ceserdi- ail to understand anything because there i, precisely, nothing there generally (iberhaupt) to understand or even to be conceived. Experience asJeancLue Marion such becomes impossible. Nor is there any question of a noumenon, since Some apparition might well appear (an idol, an illusion) without anything appearing in and of isl Tn short, if we reject the ontological argument because it rests on the simple possibility of passing fom concept to existence, rst we nota frtion taclude passing fom impossibility lnomeoncept,nomititon) to evstence? ‘We ill have to conclude, regarding God, that all we ever find ia triple iimpossibilty—impossbility with regard to intuition; impossibility with re gat to concept; and impossibility, therefore, wih regard to experiencing the slightest phenomenon. 5. The Imprescriptible “There remains nonetheless something that cannot be preseribed'"—some- thing that remains forever an open question, which cannot be classified avay assetled, which ass for its case to be pleaded without cease—the causa Dei, a8 4 matter of fact. The question of God has the characteristic feature of always making a comeback of being incessantly rebor from al attempts to put ito death, sn theory as well as in fal. We must recognize asa rational atu that the question of God remains enticly pertinent even if God sexstence as uch is poblematc,or downright impossible to establish, Even on the supposition that transcendental illusion is involved or thatthe question i ilramed, we ‘must sill confront it, and confront it all the more. The very fact that the ilusion of God survives the phenomenal impossibility of God and any experi- ence of him, is what constitutes the question. The question isimply 3 rational fact since no rational mind, especially not the most reticent, can pretend not to understand the question of God, even aad especially ithe inherent impos. sibility ofthe question is claely grasped. The paradox s this: How are we to “understand the sense of what we cannot but afr to be impossible? In other Wvords, we may well proscibe the knowledge of God (of his esence, of bis existence, of his phenometon) birt nol the question as such of God, which lluags remains to be ineshaustibly deconstructed everytime it makes itself be hieard whic isto say ata tines, This quesfion alone seems to enjoy the exorbitant but ireducible privilege of having the ability (and therefore the {duty to pose ise cin spite of (or because of} our impossibility of answer- ing, The question of Gad survives the impossibility of Gad. Reason itself requires therfore that we give a rational account ofthis paradox: We must cither explain it, or give upand give in tot! Ttgoes without saving that having recourse a his pint tosome psycholog- ical explanation or presumed “religious nced” would be of no avail, The problem i not to guess how the impresritibility ofthe question is experi {ned but to explain low the imposible endues as a possiblity—in other swords, to conceive fiw the thought of the impossible remains, in the end, ‘The Impossible for Man—God posible. The whole dificult lies in the statu ofthis posible impossibility The question at stake thas concems the limits of modality and, therefore, the Tnnts of our rationality How can we conceptualize what eseapes us? The aporia comes no doubt from the fact that we seek an answer outside ofthe question iselE Let us stick to our starting point—to the fact, namely, that God impossibility in no way umuls the possibility ofthe question of Cod, How ae we rightly to.conceive of this paradox? Precisely by recognizing Gods prvilege—God, ond Gad alone, lets himself be defined by impossibility as suck. Indeed we enter the realm ‘shere it becomes posible to raise the question of God, and thetefore ofthe incomprchensible,as soon as we confront the imposible—and onl then. God bhgins where the possible for us ends, where what human reason compie- Ihends as posible fort comes oa halt a the precise limit where our thought ‘ean no longer advance, or ee, or speak where the inaccessible domain of the impossible bursts open, What is impossible to human reason does not place the question of God under interdict, but rather inicats the threshold beyond ‘which the question canbe posed and actually be about God—tanscending, by the same token, what does not concem him inthe leas. In God case, and in Gad!s case alone, impossibility does not abolish the question but actually makes it posible ‘Now regarding this conclusion, we note a unique convergence: Atleast Lee points of view, which otherwise largely stand opposed to one another, explicitly endorse this trial-by-impossbility method of determining the ques- tion of God |. Metaphysies tothe extent that it eonsiuets the "God ofthe philoso phers and scientists,” construes God as the omnipotent ease, the casein which power is possessed over all things, including over what remains impossible Tor us. Pagan philosophy concurs: "Nihil es, inguiunt, quod deus effcer= nian posit” (Cicero.” Mesval thought agiees; “Deut diitur omnipotens, (quia potest omnia possbilia absolute, quod est alter modus dicend posible” Thnomas Aquinas)" And both eatend into modem metaphysics “nfxa quae dam est meae menti vetus opin, Dewn ese qui potest omnia” (Descattes) This determination has such deep sotsthat not even efforts to marginalize the question of God fil to endorse and privilege divine omnipotence. Thus Tlacke: "This eternal soe, then, of all being, must also be the source tu corgin ofall power; and so this etal Being must Be also the most powerful” 2. Unexpectedly, moreover, attempts to “destroy” metaphscs, have Aeptintaet the determination of God as “the one for shom the extraordinary ddoes not exist” (Kierkegaard) Phenomenology (Huse, Levinas, Henry, ‘le. and also the philosophy of history (Bloch, Rosenzxicig,et.)—both of tihich approach the question of God from the standpoint of possiblity and of the futue~have abundantly confined this choice Noteven the feu intoJean-Lue Marion w philosophy by the “end of wictaphsics” seems to jeopardize the paradox that God comes fo thought only as the possibility of impossibility. stead, the paradox is radicalized 5. ‘This fist evel of agreement, surprising in self, provokes nothing short of astonishment once we recognize a second double-convergeice, this time between these two philosophical erason the one baud, and Revelation on the other Jewish and therefore Christian), For indeed here as well—or rather here ‘especially—the impossible defines man's Himit with respect to God, Man bas fis domain and rls his word as fa asthe possible extends; but as soon asthe impossible emerges, there God's proper realm emerges, where holiness eins (cally his unique holiness), tanscending whatever is possible for us. ‘The impossible gives man the only indisputable sign by means of which God allows himself to be recognized: “Nothing is impossible on Gods part” (Gen- esis 18:14), The distance imposes itself so radically that even Christ before the Cross invokes tin the form: "Father, all Uuings ate possible to thee” (Mark 14:36). The impossibility for us of seeing the phenomenon af God, and of cexperiencingit is precisely and specifically radicalized by the recognition that God alone has power overall that is possible and therefore also over the imposible. His impossibility for si part and parcel of his ow proper pos ity: He appears as the “only sovereign (moos dua [...] who alone i Jimmortal and dell in inaccessible light, whom no man has ever sen or a see" (I Timothy 6:15-16} “Thice standpoints, which otherwise diverge—namely metaphysics, phi losophy that overcomes metaphysics, and Reveation—thusagiee at least on this one point The impossible, asthe concept above all concepts, designates shat we know only by name—Cod.* Impossibility, no doubt, defines the proper place ofthe question of God only with variations and atthe price of equivocity (hich will have to be asessed), vet always according to the same principle: The threshold between possibility and impossibility for us is sect ‘what unfolds impossibility as what is possible for God. It comes down to thinking what Nicols of Cusa formulated ina simple and powerful paradox “Unde eum Deo nihil sit imposible, portet er ea quae int hue mundo sunt Jmpossbila nos ad ipsum respicere, apud quem impossibiltas est necesita.” To pit it another way- Since possibility for us exclusively defines the world and since God's eventual regi betins with impossibility (for ws and acco ng tothe word), then to proceed toward God means to advance to the outer marches of the world, o step bevond the borders of the posible and tread at the edge of impossibility. The only possible pathway to God emerges in, and g0es through, the impossible in order to embark on it, we must return to the tens that impose this paradox and attempt to think conceptually about three veres ofthe synoptic ospels. Two ofthese coincide: "With men, this isimpossble, but wth Gadall ‘The Impossible for Man—God things are posible” (Matthew 1926), and "With men itis impossible, but not with God forall things ate possible with Gd” (Mark 10:27). Whats involved is nota simple contrat between certain impossbiliies which ae supposed to ‘be found om man’s side, and other possibilities, found in ods side Indeed the same exaet things change from being imposible with men to being possible with God: “Ta adunata pera anthropois dunata para to Theb estin— What is impossible with men is posible with God” (Laike 16:27). What we inst probe is how the impossible is converted into the posible when we pass from man to God. 6. God's Operational Name Before continuing further, let us pause to consider for moment the still very abstract determination of God that we have reached: God manifests himself in such a way that nothings impossible with hi. “The fis implication concems the inversion ofthe possible and the inn posible, or more exactly the conversion of the impossible for us int the pos- sible for God, The only region that we havea right toasign to God stars pre~ cisely when we run into an impossibility, when we factually stumble against what i impossible for ws Let us be precise: The impossible delineates onl the region offisitude—namely ours—and indicates this region alone, The experi- ence of the impossible therefore unlocks as of yet no access to Gods own proper region, so fongas we have not erased the threshold, And how could we ros it, confined s we are within fnitude? Indeed we earmot do o effectively speaking (ve will never accomplish the impossible, nor i this asked of ws, yt ‘we eros it by mentally considering what remains ineamprehensible for us, imely by conceiving that what is iteduciby impossible for us ea or could came posible in ils own right if we were fo pass over to God’ standpoint We must mentally conceptualize what remains inconsprehensible for us— hhantely conceptvalize that God start where the impossible translates into the posible, preeisely where the imposible appears as though it were possible Conversely, ifn impossibility were to remain irreducibly impossible (fo our logic o in our experience), we nmstnot, on this ground, impose closure t the (question of Cod bat instead eonclude only that we have not yet reached Gods ‘owt proper region but dvell, stil, inside our awn, As Tong indeed a8 we are dealing with what is imposible, we ate dealing only with ourselves, Hot yet with God. In prineiple, God cannot come up agains the impossible, since, i an impossible remained impossible for him (i it remained possible than any thing were impossible to him), fe would not be God —but some “god” aficted with impossibility, like ws, fiuman beings—for shom alone the impossible remains posible. Contrary to us, God defines hse as that to which {or rather a he for whom) thete is no possibility of impossibility. ‘Tis leads toa second consequence: If no impossibility operates or hasine Marion. sway over God, then nothing can ever make God himself impossible, It turns sul as.a matter of principe, that itis impossible for Gud to be impossible, We have now reached the point where the objection according to whic the ine possibility of Go is proved on the grounds of intuition, meaning, and there fore phenomenality, collapses. Exen ance itis granted, the inupossbility of cexpetiencing the phenomenon of God obviously concerns us only and our Standpoint, where alone the impossible ean (and uns) ianpose tell. The impossibility of God has meaning only for ws, who alone ae capable of exper teeing the imposible (in particular the impossibility for us of acceding to the imposible [thas no meaning or God, Sucl an impossibility specifically des hol concer him, for whom the impossble is by definition impossible. The impossibility of God turns outta be posible only for ws, wot for God. Ife seriously consider that God lets himself be thought only in the form of the jmpossibilit or him of impossibility, then it tars ut that is inmpossible for ‘God notto tum outto be atleast always possible and thinkable—if nothing ese asthe impossible. Nor ean anyone abject that, inthis case, the impossibility of impossibility for God remains inaccessible to us and teaches nothing aboot mr since we conceive the hiats, ireducible asi is, by understanding why and how God remains impossible for us—which isto sa, specifically for us but not for him. We thus conceive God insofar as he is not confused with tus and insofar as the difference is forever drawn. Which is what hal to be demonstrated Finally, it follows tht the so-called “ontological” argument becomes sib- ject to revision, which radically transom The argument, in metaphsies And according to Kant’ formulation, consists in deducing God's existence from the concept of God's essence and other pure concepts (without recourse to experience)” The chie dificuly, contrary to-what is stubbornly claimed and repeated, does not lie in the ilegtimacy of passing from a concept t0 testence a8 2 postion external to the concept It lies instead, far more radically in assuming that a concept adequately defines the divine esence in the fst place The argument inestably results in forging an idol of “God” {sec. 3 above). How is this aporia overcome? By renouncing all presumed ‘concepts of God and rigorously sticking to his incomprehensibility. Yet how fe werto conceive this incompechensibility in such a vay a til to beable to think all? By conceiving it not only a: the impossibility af every concept but ko a the concept of impossility-—impossibility, namely, asthe distinebe hallmark of God ference with regard toman. Concerning God, indeed, we ‘cannot without contradiction assume any concept other than the concept of Jmpossbilityto mark his specific diferenee God, or what is impossible fo us. From the moment that we substitute, for a comprehensible concept, the in- comprehensible concept of the imposible, the whole argument is turned tuple down: It no longer proves Gods existence, but the impossibility of his possibility, and thereloee his possibility, God tans out abe the one whose poral remains forever possible, precisely becase it turns oat that nothing ‘The Impossible for Man—God posible for him, especially not himself."The necessity of God's possibility Rows from the imposiility of his impossibility uch a revesil ofthe argument into a proof of the unconditional pos sibility of God based on his concept (as impossible), strange a it may seem, his already teceived a formulation —by Nicholas of Cusa. Let our starting point be the thematization according to which St. Thomas Aquinas famed the dite ence between God and what is created: Inthe created case, esence always remains really dstnet from ess, just as potency differs fom act; on the con tray, in God, essence i not only always identified inact with ese but atleast according to certain passages) disappears into esse tothe point that in God the ‘whole essence, which is to say the whole power and potency, is accomplished in act, as actus estendi. Nicholas of Cusa affirms this distinction, but reverses the way in which itis applied: A ereated entity can only actuaize its potency, ‘which, in itself limited, all the more exhausted qua potency that iis tar Dilized in act, whichis also limited; consequently no created entity accedes to the level of infinite posi, since both its essence and its act instante its finitude. God, onthe contrary, actually sal that hei potentially, according to a double infinity of act and of posbility: “Ita ut solus Deus id sit quod ese potest, nequaquam autem quaecumgue ereatura, cum potentia et actus non snt “dem, nisi in principio." God and creature are opposed less by at (relative to essence) than bythe privilege in God of possibility, ofthe possiblity of act alizing infinite posibilty—in other word, by posses. Thus, whereas “nulla treatura est posses,” God transcends ercation first and above all by a defin tive, itedueible and eteral possibility, in short by an uncreated posi “inereata possibilila est ipsum posest.”® God's omnipotence, whichis to say hhisdenomination based on the impossibility fr hira of impossibility, ests in a possibility thats eternal and infinite oiginary and ultimate. God's omnipo- tence mans here less an unlimited efficient power than the perfect actuality of posibility as suc Esto enim pod aliqu detio signlice simplicisimo siznficatu ant hho comipewunn: poss es, sclcet quod ipsum pss sit quis, quod et, ‘et ete pose ese es tatu quanta pose esse ac. Pla vocetar posses [| dei sais popinguum neuen secundum humana de e0 onceplum, Est en nomen omni et singuloruin nominum, ate tls patter le dun Desa ele nositia primo revel dicebat 1g sm Devs omnipntens i est Sum actus ons polenta” God lets himself be named according tothe actuality ofthe possibility of power, not according to the simple assumption of power in act, even in finite. In God, possibility trumps active efficiency because God's highest efficiency consists in surpassing impesibilty (or ws) by making it posible— which he does by sitae of the necessity in him of the impossibility of impossibilityJean-Lae Marion Ww 7. From the Impossible as Self-contradictory to the Impossible as Advent Teremains for us to understand the two terms that ate inverted in God's case— the posible and the imposible, We will mark the inversion heucefrth by -wtting "the [im Jposibl.” Metaphysics indeed has its own way, oo, of under standing the relation and mutual interplay ofthese terms fas a matter of fact the “highest principle with which we vsually tart a transcendental philosophy isthe standard division into posible and impos: sible," God wil sil be defined in teas of his telationship tothe imposible precisely under the figure of omnipotence. ‘Through a strange reflexivity, this ‘ery omnipotence can only deploy itself by letting itself always be bound bythe Timits of impossibility, not by transgressing them. God can certainly make (effectuate) all things, but on the express condition that things be inscribed within the domain ofthe possible and not ura out tobe contradictory Deus dicitar omnipotens, quia potest ona pssibilis absolut, quod ext aller modus dicend porsbie. Deir autern aliquid posse vel impos Sibile absolute ex habitdine tenninanum (pcedicatun eepugnat sub jecto | Quaecurmsyieigiturcootraditionem von implicant, sub iis possiillus continent, respecte quorum Deus dcitur omnipotent “The postion will quickly show itself oe untenable, for obvious reasons. Namely: (1) In the end it reduces God to the role of an efficient laborer, ‘working on behalf of some possibly, esence of fornula “to which, s0 t Speak, God submits himselE” The arder of Reason imposes itself on God sit dies on creates, la: of “all intelligences and uf God himself" The oad is ‘open to determining Cod within the liits of ordinary reason, pute and sins ple, But there is more: (2) If the pssble, which limits divine omnipotence, ts defined as what isnot selfconteaditors—adopting Wolf's definition, that “Possible ext quod nulla contadictionen:imolit seu quod non ext impos siile”™ ten the norecontradictory a such remainsto be defined. How docs {concept contradict itself? Accoedng, obsiously, to the nora, rules and {nouns of conceplualization. One cannot speak of absolute contradiction, but only abvays of eontadito in concept New what concept other than one oF fu ow representation ean be at stake lee? "Nihil neyativum, inrpresen. table, impossible, repugnans(absuedum),contaditionem involoans, impl- cans eontaditrium”; herece "Non niet liquid: epraesentable, guid uid nom invovitcontradictonem,quidguid non ext Aet non, ext possibile "” ‘The representable and the non-epresentable come into ply only within our conceplualization; therefore within our finite conception; therefore within tur fnitude. There i no cantadetion other than what is coneesable, and hothing is conceivable that is not within our own. conceptualization—and therefore quoad ns, for, for our finite mind, HF the point isto assign 3 ‘The Impossible for Man—God contradiction (and therefore an impossibility} to God, we must come up with an absolute contradiction, contradictory for an infinite understanding, The ‘demand obviously makes wo sense, since our understanding is by dehnition finite. We will never know the slightest thing about what is impossible or contradictory from the point of view of God's infty. These will remain perfvcth- undecidable see we will never have access tothe conditions ofthe question. The notion of contradiction as such supposes fnitade: Therefore if God is God-ahich isto sav infinite—no contradiction, by definition, can apply to him With God, nothing is imposible—even, or rather especialy, in the sense ofa metaphisicalimposibiliy, which does not even concern him, ‘What sort of imposible is transgressed by God—beyond the impossible that is limited to non-contadition remain, however, tobe understood. Hei degger unquestionably deserves credit for having challenged the metaphysical distinction between possible and impossible by affirming that, “Higher than actuality stands possibility"® The mere inversion ofthe terms as such does nia, however, suffice to redefine them—especally not to redefine possibilty In order fr possibility to fice itself it mast, by definition, escape all condition ‘of possibilty that advenes to it externally. This is trae othe point that radical possibility rast, paradoxically but necessarily, eschew the slightest definition, because any finitude limiting it would indeed contradict it, Radical posbility would, assuch, transcend all limit and, being thus completly unconditioned, ‘would give us acces, Finally, tothe transcendence which we seek Foray, such possibility would define itself asthe transcendence of ll impossibility taking its point of departure notin some non-contradiction concocted within the limits of representation and postive conceptuaization, but negatively, in transgressng these very limits, namely within what remains impossible for conceptualization and representation, Posilty taken in the radial seme ‘would take its point of depatare in the impossible, by transcending i, which is to say by annulling it through effetively bringing it about, Radical post bility would start with the impossible and, without passing through concep- tuahization of a non-contradictory posible for finite representation, would ose it within effectivity. Radical posibiity or effecting the imposible. In contrast to possibility as deyined by metaphysis, radical posiility would rot transform possible things into effective things, but impossible things into cfectve things, dict If would effectively bring about {in- possibilities hitherto unthinkable How can this be, if know of no such [in-jposible? But am I sure that | know of rac? No doubt [know of no such [inrjposible as long as t define myself as ego cogitans, thinking acording to my own representation and con cept. By adopting this posture, indeed, I submit everything that can advene through the screen, so to speak, of my awn conceptnalzation and fiitude Hence causality (whether stats with me as causal agent or with some cause self) never b ing, by definition, except what my ‘eancept has foreseen for it as posible, according to what is non-contraditoryJean-Lue Marion for my representation. 1 do not, however, define myself abways, or even pri- marily, as ego cgitas, according toa concept representation, [emerge oF rather | have emerged into existence through a very different mode—on the inode of an exent in which [ myself advene to ryself without having either predicted it, or understood it, or represented it, precisely because Iwas not yet thete—nor vas Ia frtior, alteady thinking atthe advent ofthe event. Betore being, in short, T had fo be bor, Birth, or rather my birth, precedes any’ thought of my own. Consequently, it precedes all possibility as defined by ‘concept and representation. Even if, retroactively, Lam quite able, based om someone elses testimony, to reconstitute what came before me and even reduce ittoa representable possibility, even a predictable one, such an inter pretation does not retroactively establish a non-contradictory posibilty that positively precedes the event of my advent. Rather the interpretation starts with the fact self, without cause or predictability, inorder to assign tot alter the fact and always only very partially, a coherence and coneeivability through which absurdity isavoided and plausibility insured. Whats mote all forms of genealogy and romanticized memories only come after the fact; not only belatedly relative to the event, which advenes without waiting for them, but also arrested in their tracks, suddenly mute, before the obscure moment, the silent and inaccessible moment of birth, gestation and conception period without speech, consciousness or memory. Birth, my birth—which delivers me, bears me int the world and makes me—happens without me.I wll never be able to join up with it Birth made me without me, without my conscions- ness, of my concept, all uf which follow thereafier. Advent of the event be cause origina, brought about without me, Brought about—advened,rather— ‘without me, my bith advenes ftom itself without cause, or presupposition, or concept-in short, without possibilty. My birth adveresto me inthe form ofa dlectly effective impossibility “Thus Lam forced to adnitthat the ease of my birth provides me with the experience of radical posshilitynatnely the one fom which ¥ come and ‘which has ellectively made me. Bette, by beecming effective precisely as an impossibility, my birth has unlocked possibles for me which are defined, not bby my concepis, but by my bitth—annd which theceore unlock as many con cepts in ils wake. ‘The impossible, tumed elective, imposes possibles and allows concepts of possbles to be prevoed, in eevee udev than the arder of rnon-contraditory possibility Stil, based onthe fim posible that is my bie, how isan [impossible for God to be imagined? Does the disproportion between the two domains (nite and infinite) not forbid transition and assimilation? It probably does, i we cling tothe division that remains internal tothe horizon ofthe concept of being, But not if we focus on the advent of the [imeJpossible as such. Indeed what bitth accomplishes for each living being, creation brings about from God!’ standpoint—as long of course as we understand creation here in the theological sense, not as a mete taking of efficient causality tothe limit. The “The Impossible for Man—God point is that for us creation theinatizes and gathers together the totality of vents that advene of themselses—without concept, without predictions, and thetefore without cause—radical posible, i short, which we not only receive frown within it bt fom which, fist and foremost, we receive ourselves, Cer tainly, for me, eration start always and only with my birth. Yet by the samme token my birt expases me to the whole of eration, giving me acces 10 every [impossible in its primordial fim-[possibliy. God, the master ofthe imposs- bile, effectuate creation by making the (im-[possibilty ofeach bith effective, starting with my own, ‘We thus have access to radical posbility through the {im-Jpassbility of cour own bith Through it, moreover, we have access as well (by way of an ‘analogy that deserves further srutiny on some other occasion) to the radical {im-[possbility accomplished by God in the event which, paradigmaticaly, advenes for us from himself, cation. God, who initially aimed at uncondt tioned transcendence (secs. |~4, above), for whom nothing remained impossi- ble (ces, 5-6, above), is fromm now on certified asthe one who unlocks radical possi. As the master ofthe possible—not asthe one who effectually brings bout possible things and predicts them, but as he who makes them spring forth from fim-Jpossiblityand givesthem to themselves. 8. What God Recognizes (to Himself) as His Own Proper [Im-JPossible and therefore as the Possible for Him TThe whole question ow bathes ina new light, We remain fren grounded in God's operational name: With hitn nothing is impossible that remains impos sible with human beings. Since, however, the [impossible in question be Jorug to radical possibility, unconditioned by any possibility of representation ‘or concept (both of which ae inte by definition, it am no longer be under. stood as the outcome of a simple efficient act. God’ relationship to radical possibility, therefore, can no Longer be thought in terms of omnipotent ef Ficiency. Metaphysially speaking, omnipotence corresponds only to Gods {Knowledge of eternal possibles. Omnipotence as related to possiblity im a metaphysical sense is coextensive with the domain ofthe non-contraditony as represented in concept. follows that abstract and therefore abitary oronipo- fence no mote suits the transcendent God of radical possibility than the repre- sentation of eternal posible defies his overture of possibes. The problem x thus to charactetize Gods posture with regard to the [im jposible without reducing ot degrading ito the level of omnipotence. In other words, we must tonceive of haw God chooses his fimm]posibles for himsel, How does the master ofthe [im- possible determine what remains impossible for human beings, bt is possible for him? ‘We ae all the mote entitled to ask the question that itstems dicey fom biblical texts. Let us consider the dificult narrative of the Annunciation, To theangel who announces the possibilty of motherhood to her, Mary responds 8Jean-Lare Marion fist with factual impossibility: “I know no man’ (Laake 1:34). Against this fetal impossibility. the angel then asserts the principle of adel possibility asa right, petaining to [im posible: “ou adunatsei para tow Theou pan ‘hema —literlly, “For on God's pat, no saying, no word, shall be impossible" {Luke 1:37). When Mary then accepts the aurciatow that is made to er, she emphasizes the “sn ing” ofthe angel ("Let it be to me according to your word}, which announced God's “saying, rhéme.” Man’ decision and faith concerning the [im-]possible is therefore notaklressed to God’ omnipotence {whieh the teat never tray invokes) but to God's “saying, ln what therefore ‘does she really have faith? She has faith inthe “saying, fiema” that God has said, and thus inthe commitment he has made. She believes God's word. She takes God “at his word” because she knows that every one of his words com- zits him once and forall. The point is not to acknowledge simple omnipo- {ence (which commits to nothing and permits, on the contsary, every Tie) but to have fith in God's good faith, To have recourse to Gea!s omnipotence is useless, since it stil remains immanent to onrown finite point of view (ike the reverse face of possibility according to represented 1ion-contadiction) In- stead, the task sto transcend our own finite point of view inorder to pass over to Gods point of view-—or at leas to im for it to admit it a an intention. Jn contrast tous, where saying commit to nothing (we li}, on God pat, ay and carrying out what is sud coincide absolutely. More than the power to do anything, God has the power to say anything not in virtue of his omnipotence but in vitue ofhis felity. God ean say whatever and all that he wants because what he say, he docs. ‘Thus hema here signifies invisibly both word and fact Inthe lace ofthe {in-posible, idly in God transcends and replaces ‘omnipotence. God is all-powerful because he always keeps his word, not the inverse. Tivo details of the txt, moreover, confirm this, (1) Rather thats 2 simple assertion, we find a double negation: Negation of the possible, and negation ofthis negation onthe side of God. This implies that nothing will Come about that stands opposed to Gods word. (2) The ves is conjugated in the future (“nothing shall be imposible” = adunatései, suggesting thal, as soon as Mary gives ler consent, God will act, keep his promise, ake it his busines and that we wil se the efeot The possible, or rather the carving ‘out ofthe impossible (in the world that human beings know, namely vinginal birth wll open up a proper possible for God alone—the Incamation, which lunches Redemption. Not only is the possible not the same for ns and for God, the [impossible is not ether. ‘We see indeed thal the case is not simply one of contradicting, by means ofan abstact omnipotence the laws ofthe world and of being (eventhough it fact this happens); but rather to bring into play, at this price, an arty of possibilities that are until then unthinkable and unimaginable, possibilities Such that only God could foresee them and want them. Its aot enough to recognize omnipotence as one of Gods proper names—"Dominus quasi vir pugnator. Omnipotens nomen ejus” (Exodus 15:4, Vulgate)—rather, we mst ‘The Impossible for Man~Goa onceive that God docs not il enactments of ontlandsh and ridiculous tnonstrosities, In contrast to the sort of omnipotence that we human beings dream of td, the impossibility ofthe impossibility that God exercises does hat bring aboot just ating by his power he makesall that he wants, but he ‘wants onl by loving. Recotnse to divine otiipotence pare and simple, moreover, stack peo ple from the very beginning as somershat fragile, abstract, insuficient. Cel sus already reproached Cutistians for “taking refge in the absurd escape that "nothing is imposible with God’ when they had nothing to answet"— namely concerning the resurrection ofthe flesh. Origen, in turn, fond him self obliged to specify that “we Know fall well that we ndersand al of this namely, Luke 1:37] to apply neither to what does not exist at all (adianaton) hor to what cannot be thought (adianoton}." The answer isa cautious one, Jput once again insufficient, since what right do we have to oppose unthink- ables and non-existentthings to God i" with him nothing smposible"? More “ssentaly, the question no longer consists in fixing a limit beyond whieh divine omnipotence would be going to fr in some abstract sense (relative to ‘what list?) but in determining what i is that God ean indeed want as his ‘word a word which he conmits himself to keep, allowing hiniselfto be taken “this word.” Neither ogi, no contradiction, nor the priniple of dently, or efficacy, nor the principle of sficient reason, retains the slightest relewaney There, namely when the task is to conceive tat to which Gods word commits itself and counits Cod. Obviously, if God is Gad, he can do whatever he swants—that isnot the question, The question, rather, is what God i able to veant and sans to be able todo. What does he want, without restriction, to be able to do? What contesponds to him and therefore comes fom hi Si Augustine explicate this remarkably: "Negatise ipsum non pots, Fl son potest (2'Vinoty 213). Quan ula ‘non potest et omnipons= et ideo ommipotens est. quia a on potest Nam si mn posse non eset onanipotens si ments fli, 5 allere, inique agete, non eset eisnipotens quia si hoe in eo eset, om fuset dighus gui eset omnapotens, Prous enipotens Par noser peceae non potest Fact quid sult pst st omnipotent, Fait quidguid bene val, quid juste vu guidguid stern male ft, non val Gaal ches whatever he wants, bt the moi thing is that he wane only what bhecomes hin to want-which istosay only what comes fron him and answers to his love. God makes what it becomes God to make, Such ithe impossible for man hat becomes Gos. 9. The Radical Impossibility: Forgiveness In order to determine what it becomes God to want, and then to be able to lo —ashich isto sy to determine what God alone is able to have the power toJeanie Marion do, since he alone isable to want it—we must en once again to biblical texts Jn particular, we must consider the passages in which Christ himself pre schat remains impossible for us but is posible for God. Let us eousid pattiular: "With men this is impossible [namely that a ich man enter Gods Kingdom], but with God all things are posible ara anthripois tout aduna ton estin, para de Thebi panta dunata” (Matthew 19.26 = Mark 10:27 = Luke 18:27, cited in sec. 5, above} ‘What [imposible does Christ here bring to lght as the criterion separat- ing man from God? “Its easier fora camel to go through the eye of necdle than fora rich man to enter the kingdom of God” (Matthew 19:24), Physica, worldly impossibility serves here as a sign to expose a much loftier impos. sibility, but which cannot be directly seen by the human eye ox in broad daylight. Why does thi specific impossibility for men (and not for Gos fil 10 appear to men (but only to Chiist, and therefore to Gad)? Because a far as men are concerned namely the spectators ofthe dialogue, as wel asthe nich ‘young man—the youth in question has alread entered God's kingdom, since hee has already kept the counmandments. “All these {have observed"—henee his astonishment that he should fall short. “What do I still lack?” (Matthew 19:20), What indced does he lack? Still speaking, he lacks nothing—except, precisely, having nothing: Owning nothing and keeping nothing outside of Christ himself Come, fallow: me) which means becoming one with God through Christ, becoming holy ike him (“Ifyou would be perfect.” Mat- thew 19:21); and thas falling the highest commandment, “You shal there- fore be holy, for Lam holy” (Leviticus 11:45; 19:2), in the form in which Christ reiterates it, "You, therclore, must be perfect, as your heavenly father is per- fect” (Matthew 5:48)* What is impasible for man (‘the rich young man”) is the lack of lack ithe lack of poverty and therefore of identifsing, with Christ alone!—a lack which cannot appear in a world in which we se only what is ("riches"). "The impossible thas remains inaccessible to anyone who lacs the powcr to lack and canmot even see what he nonetheless knows is beyond his power. Only Chaist ses this, even though he points t it anly indirectly, We fap at eat that what i nnpossible here for rear but from Gods viewpoint, consists in what men do not even consider—a genuine conversion to God— infntely more dificult than worldly impossibilties ae or us.” ‘We read about this reversal ofthe posible and the impossible for men and for Crist and thereore trom God s viewpoint), namely the very way in whicl the fim-]possble comes into play, in the story ofthe paralti’s cure (Matthew 921-8: Matk 2:1-12 = Luke 5:17~26). A paralyzed man is brought before Chris, but Chris, strangely enough, instead of curing the physical ailment las everyone expected since he had telesly done so before, declares the man ‘cued spintaly. "Your sins are forgiven” (Matthew 9:2), Chis thus ageome plishes what is posible to Geel and supremely imposible to men. Some ofthe ‘men, orat least some “among the scribes,” understand it in precisely this way, bat only to denounce its “blaspherny” (Matthew 9:3}—namely as claim by “The Impossible for Man—God Christ to have Gods rank. Nor ate they wrong in this regard: To clon to be able to do the impossible is, on the part of men, indeed to claim to be God How is Christ able to sustain his elaim before men? When he accomplishes relative impossiblity—the physical and worldly eure of physical paras, an imposibility which is both effective for us and visible fo us inthe world—he tests that nothing is impossible with him in our work and therefore that he holds the rank of God, fom whic in tur it fellows that nothing is imposible with him even outside the world. By asking the question “Which is easier, cekopateron?” (Matthew 9:5), he forees men to decide about God in hit Since for men nothing seems more difficult in the world than to cure a physical paralysis, Christ by accomplishing this feat accomplishes the impos- Sible, which is Gods prerogative. The choice, then, is either to deny the ‘evidence ofthe world, which indeed establishes that he cores fom Cod and §s Cod; orto admit the visible evidence that he is indeed God, and therefore dnt also that he has power over the true fim-Ipossible—namely, to forgive sins. Christ thus makes manifest what is impossible from God's viewpoint, namely to heal he heart ‘What is at stake in the question, “which is eases, eulopateron?” now comes to light. What is harder, indeed what requites, from God's own view point, his power and transcendence, does wot stem form what appears fo us to bbe most difficult (namely modifying the a priori conditions of phenomenal experience), but whal seems to hi to be leat within our reach (even ifwe are rot even able to sec tis leveljto convert our hearts to God. The [in-}pos- sible for God lies within the stone-hard human heart. God’ operational and untranseralle name—his ultimate transcendence —is articulated in his power to convert the hardened hearts of men, to remit ther sins, to forgive them. Only God has the power, precisly to forgive, because only Tove is able to forgive and has the right to do so. Now “there is only one who is good” (Matthew 19:17), and “No one is good but God alone” (Mark 10:18). Man cannot forgive because he has neither the power to forgive (in his heat, he remains a murderer), nor the right to forgive (every sin is ulimately against God). vil remains impreseriptible for man, who is powerles to forgive itand therefore must recognize himself tobe its prisoner. in onder to grasp this ore cleatly, let us consider an unexpected text: ‘The brutally corrected, almost blaspheanous, reformation by V.Jankévitch of Christ words onthe ros. “Thus we might well ay, reversing the teres ofthe prayer addressed to God by (Christin the Gospel according to St. Latke: Lord, do not forgive ther, for hey [know what they do." Let us amit thatthe magnitude here ofthe evil—that of the Sho, the genocide ofthe Jews by the Nazis—explains, even justifies, such a bold reversal, Let us note as well thatthe reversal amounts to restoring a ‘metaphysical (Aristotelian) definition of moral responsbility—a responsiblity ‘which is fll and inescapable when we know what we are doing But we wil ao, inthe end, ratify the correction: Does it not simply recogeize a evident that we, human Beings, in fact, are not able to fngive—any more than we are AJear-Lare Marion able to conver, oF free ourselves of nr sins on our own? There isa sort of Second-order piely inthis quasé-blasphemy: namely, the piety of stating clearly and directly that iis impossible in principle for man to foxgive or even to ask for forgiveness, and that on the contrary this is posible only with God, a the ogative of his radical transcendence. Only God has the power to forgive Sins which i fo sa the sins that all of us (cho alone sin count in the final analysis against Ga (even when we iit them fist on other human being ‘The imposible for man has the name God, but God as sucha the one who alone forgives the respasses made against him. “The raical and non-anetaphysical transcendence for which we have beer seeking ths reveal sel with great clarity in the impossble—but in the only [impossible worthy of God, which i charity: Only with lve, and therefore wilh “God who is love" (1 John 48, 16), isnothing impossible. Gest denice manifest itself in charity, and only thus does ranscendence reveal itself tobe worthy of God NOTES 1 Hise, Cutesiasohe Meditationon, Hua lp. 72 2. Huser. “So heist dav Ding selbst und schlechin transcendent” deen 1 Hua p96) 3. Heidegger, “Senin das uanscendens schlecht" (Sein und Zeit, vec. 7, p38). 4. Respectively: “being insofar ait i indfevent to finite and init,” and “ranscendent and is mse of every gemms"—Ti 5. [They are such that ther transcend being insofar as being i inlifferent of rite snd infinite”—Ti,| Das Scotus, Ordinal d. 8, n-L13, in Opera Ora, 6 C Bale (Rone Vatican Post, 1956, vl 4.206. 16. [The definition of anscendentals i that no predicate stands above them, except being "Te bid p. 206 God thus doe a havea essence that snot his very being] Aquinss Summa contra Gentiles, bk. 1, chap. 2. See J-L. Maron, “Saint et ont-theulgie: Revue thomiste 95/1 (1995h which appeats in translation in pss: Presence nd Aporia, ed M. Keserand C. Sheppatd (Chicago and London: Universiy of Chieags Press, 2003 ‘8. The formula iuentionc by Petes Fonseca nstitutionum Dialetiearum br ‘cto (Lyon, 1611) Bk. L-chap.28;and ie cited and divesed by Jean-Frangois Courtine in Suarez ele sytome dela actaphysique Paris: Presses Universities, 1990), p. 267. (On the doctrine of runscendenta, see Courtine, Suarez ef sstime,p. 39547; and Lager Honrefeldet, Ens inguantum ene: Der Begitf des Scien als sehen ule Gegenstand der Metaphysiknach der Lee von Johonnes Dus Seotus, Beitrige 208 Geschichte der Phileas und Theolagie des Matelaters, ns. 16 (Minster: Ascher ov, 1979, ay well as Theo Kebusch, "Das Sciende al tansrendeutales oder super tuanszendentaler Begin Joh Duns Scots Metph sce and Ethis, ed. L Home felder,R Wond and M, Diese Leiden: Bil, 1996 9, Francisco Suitez, Dispulationes mtaphyric, disp. 1s. 1.19, in Opera Omnia, ed. C. Berton (Pats Vist, 1866), vol 25, p 8, my emphasis ['Gad in an “The impossible for Man—God solute manner fll under the eject ofthis scence [[aetaphyses. J becanse this Sesenee is the most perfect natural wisdom; Mherefore i treats ofall fst and ‘universal things ned eases, and ofthe most genera fst principles, which hinnsell’—Tr| See my analysis in -L, Marion, Sr la théolgie Blanche de Descarte: Analog, eration dex wt étemlies et fondement, 2nd ed. (Pais: Presses Univer States, 1991), p, HO. 10, Heidegger, "Zo Seisfiage,” Weymarken, Gesamtansgabe, ol. 9 (Fanhfurt Klosterman, 1967), p. 395 1. Jules Renard, Journal 1887-1910, ed. L. Guichard and L. Signaus (Pais: Plead, 1960), 9.227 12, [ncomprehensiiliy as ch s contained i the definition of infinity.”—Te. Descartes, Vue Responsones, in Oeuvres de Descartes, . C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vein, 1964-1976) henecefoath AT}, vol 7, pp. 368, 3-4, 7 13, Hobbes says it with great lai: Whatsoover we imagine is Pinte. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call Infiite. No wan can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite saifines, infinite finite power: When we say anything infinite, we signify ony, that we are notable to conceive the ends and bounds ofthe thing named: having no conception of the thing butof our own inability. And therfore the Name of God suse not to rtke 0s conceive him; for he & lncomprehensible, and his greatness, al power ate unconceivble;) but hat we may honour hin. (Leviathan, bk Leap. 3) 14, Heidegger has establstiod not oly th itu of Dan: “Urnpingicher als der mensch ist die Endichit dex Danis in thm’ (Kant und das Problem der Metphysh 5. Se Jocelyn Benois is his xitge of my is works: “sit enmugh not tobe in conderto bea concept of Gol?” Andis hardy suficientes be an object in ander to be Col (Lid deta penoménaloge, Pars: Beauhesne, 201, p. 85, 951.1 Sw hvu arguing aeint my oa thes concerning the nanoidable neces of thecountec-experienceas the only mode of experience appropiate the phenomena iy of strated phenomena. See J-L. Mason, Blan donné: Esai dae phénoméno- Fre de la dont Pai Poses Univertais, 1997) tanto s Bing Give “word @ Phenomerlogy of vere, tans ees 1. Kosky (Stnfo Stanord Unvery Pres 2002) 16 [nthe leg ce of rendered ia by preseription "Te 17, Descartes: “Qui autem epot se here dam Dee vie ils eformant aligud idolum ee, nomen negate tem cncedunt Secundae Resorsions, AT 7, 59.5.7) 18. (The French here imelves ply on worl tht cannot easly Be rendered in Englih—Te] 19, [Thee i ting, they sy hat god cannot ffectst”Te] Cicero, De Divination, bs. 2, se Tsim De sence; De anita; De divination el. and tas. WA. Fleoner Cambridge, Mas {lorvatd Univesity Pres, 1923, p68 3 Aquinss Summa Theologica, Bk. 9.28.3, esp-"Coa ele onmipoent tecae he can dal ings tha ate possible abso, which ise secon way of sjingthata Hig posibleJeane Marion 21 Deseares, Mditationes, med. in AUT, pp. 21, 1-2: "Infned, soto speak, ‘ny mind anol opinion, that thee is a Gd who car do all things” 22. Hue, An Essay concerning Human Undertanding, bk. 4 sec. 10; eH Nidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 620. "The emergence of moder athcnn has naturally had to ase sil residual definition uf the nonewsing or supposed nonexising “God”: this ws precise the notion of “inversa cans.” as W Schroder has established in Uspinge des Atheism: Untersuchungen zur Metuplysik tnd Religionsrtit des 17. und 18, Jahrhuederts(Staigant, 1998), p. 20%. On the rvilegeof causality (asthe most abstract and empty of determination) see aso JL. ‘Marion, “The Idea of Gord” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Pilso py, ed. M. Ayers and B. Garber (Cambridge: Cambie Univesity Pres, 1998) fol 1, pp. 265-304, this atic x repraduced a5 chap. 10 of J-L, Marion, Questions catéiennes I: Lego et Diew (Pais Preses Universitates, 1996), 23. Kieskeoard, Semfede Vaeker, 2d ed, e. A.B. Drachman, JL: Heibergand 1H. OLLange (Copenhagen: Nordisk Forlag, 1920-1936), vo. 9, p. 81; the French translation appeats as Las Oetores de Tamour inthe Oeurres Completes, et PH ‘Tisseau and BM, Tsea (Pars, 1980), vol 14 p. 62 CF. Augustine: “omnipotens, gui fais mirabiia vols” (Confessions, bk. 4, chap. 13, pat. 24), 24."The cleatest indication of this conclusion is found in the recent work of Jolin D. Caputo, for example: "teat be said in defense ofthe Kingdon of God that its not simply imposible, but rather, essa, the impossible” Tiss frm “The Poetic of the Impossible andthe King of God,” in The Blackwell Companion to Posters “Theology (Onford: Oxford Univesity Pres, 2001}; which is reprinted in Rethinking Phitsopy of Religion: Approaches fiom Continental Philosophy, i. Philip Goodchild (New York Fordham University Press, 2002), See also A Passion forthe Impossible: Jol: D. Caputo in Focus, ed. M. Dooley (New York: SUNY Press, 2003) and “Apostles ofthe imposible: On God and the Git in Derrida and Marion ia Gad, he Cit and Pactmoderism, ed John D. Caputo and Michael J. Seanfon (Bloomington: Indina Univesity Press, 1999), whieh uppeaced alo in Philosophie 78 (2003), 15. Ci. Geoiges Bataille, Le petit in eure completes (Pri Gallimard 1971), sol 3,40: "Ala plae de Diu ily a que Fimposble et non Dieu.” (Instead of Gon theres only the impossible and not God”. 36. Nicholas of Cust, Twalogus de possest, in Werke, ed. Paal Wilpest (Bech 1967), vol. 2, p. 6; or in the Philosphisl-theoloische Selrfien, el. L. Gabriel 1. Dapré and W. Dupré (Viera, 1966), vo. 2, p. 340: “Hence, as noting i impo sible wih God, we mut, by means of whats impensible im the word, nase ourseles to conteinpate God, with whom impossibility isecesiy 27, Kant, Ctiqueof Pure Reason, A590/B619, oF A602/B630. 28, One cou andeed argue that Descartes aid Hegel answer Kant corect: In the case ofall other entities, we ne sgh! to distinguish concept and existence, but this uit” no longer holds God's case, who by defrationconsitates an exception tothe general ile goveruing common beige. (For Descates, cf. Meditaones, med. 5.in AAV, pp. 2-15; Lae Responsiones,in NT, pp 116,819 and Prineipia pilosophie 1,16. For Hegel, cf. Winenachaft der Logi ed. C. Lason, Hamburg: Meine, 1934, soll p-75.) 239. [°So tha God alone is what he ca be, which no creature ca, since poteney ad act are not the sane, excep in the fst peinciple"—Ti] Nicholas of Cus, Tra ‘The Impossible for Man—God Jgus de posses, in Wilpst,p. 646; in Cael etal, p. 274, Alo: “Deus sit absolta polenta et cts aque ubriusque nese den sit actu ome possi ese.” 3i(*Unereated possibility chs wer posses” In other words, Cod is necessarily sible Tr Nicholas of Cus, Trialogu depose, in Wilpest, p. 654; in Gabriel et all pp. 300.32, 1. Nichols of Cus, Tialogus de post in Wiper, p- 649; in Gabriele a 284, See alo, “sup ome nomen qua id, quod pest ese, es nominal, immo Supra ipsum ese et non esse on modo quo ill inteligiposant” (Wilpet, p. 653) Powiility here i exactly equivlent to indilleence with regard tothe ference be- tween being ud nonbeing 531, Kant, Critique of Pure Reawon, A290/B 46, 33, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, bk. 1, 25,2. 3,105. ‘Goo is called omnipotent because he cand all things that ae posible abso Fately; whieh i the second way of saying thing is posible. For a thing ssid to be possible or impossible according tothe relation im which the very terms stand to-one another {..,) Therefore, everthing that does not imply a contr Gietion is numbered among those posible things, in respect of which God is ‘omnipotent {For Aquinas, see also the Summa contra Gentile, Dk. 1 chaps. 2,25.) This imitation of divine omipotence to wha slgiall possible remains Duns Scotus poston: lio medo ‘onmipotens aceite propiethevlgice, prout omnipotens dir {qui potest in omne efecinn et quodeumaue possibile (hoe est in quodeumnque {Guol non estexse neces nec inchuit eontadictionesn).(Ordinatio kd 42, 1h in Opera Onin, ed. C. Bali, ore: Vatican Polyglot, 1963, vl. 6,p. 343, ind even byway of fsentia about sce Ondinato Id 44,1. 7p. 365) And even Ockbum’postion—see Quod Iq. 3: Vlg. 6. On Oekhar, see abo Philothens Boehner, Collected Avtices on Ockham, edt M. Bustact (New York Francisca lash, 1958p. ISTE; a wel the texts tarsated by Elizabeth Karger in her artic "Causalié Disine et ToutPuisance” in La puisance et se ombe: de ier Lambard Lather, ed O. Boulos Pats: Aubier, 194), pp. 321-356, “4. Malebrincie,Tnaé de Merale, bk 2, pt 9, chap 12, i Oeore comptes de Maiebranehe, ed A. Robinet (Paris Viin, 1955-1984), vol 11 ted. M. Adam, 196), Cluintin Wal, Phibsophia prima sve Ontlogia (Frankfurt and Leipzig 1730), 979. 34, Descartes, eter to Amand of 29 July 1648, in AT, pp. 225, 229; see my clareation in JL. Marion, Sur ta thologe Blanche de Descartes: Analog, eeation thes vies elereles et fondement, 2nd ed. (Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1991), pp. 296-308 37. A.C, Baumgaten, Metaphysica (Halle, 1739}, § 7; inthe recent edition {Huldeshein ad New York Ons, 1982) se 8. 18. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, set. 7,p.38. 39, On birt, se some clarifications n J. Marion, De Surat Etudes sur fos phéwontnes stuns (Pats Presses Universities, 2001); i Wansation a In Excess: Studies in Saturated Phenomena, tans Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New 4JeanLne Marion York: Fordham University hie 8 2005): p. 17 46, “Para to Theat.” fllosing the Nedle-Aland text, in the genitive not the dative: Not only for hin” but “fom his standpoint, is sde™ (Nov Testament Grace et Latie, 5th of ed. E, Nestle and K. Aland, Stuttgart: Wintterergische Bihelanstal, 1967, ad hac}. See, at both extremes: Steak Billesbeek, who translates yon vor Catt her” (Komnmeatar suns NeusunTestsment, Munich, 1924, vl. 2, p10): and C. Tresmontant, who translates “coming on God!’ part” (Fvungile de Lue, Pats, 1967, p. 10. (The Vuleate translates: “quia on ert imponbile apud Deuon omne serbuin; andthe Revised Standard Veesion gives: “For with God nothing will be innponsible” Tr] “AL. Av at Fake 1:42 (ef Act 1037} and sce H. Sebirmann’srematks in Das Lakazevangelivn (Fiesburg and Viens: Herder, 1969), p. 57. tn contat, Thomas [Aquinas upesingly tedaces the Lan fouls, “nan ent imposible apud Deum ome serburn (Vulgate) tothe posible as non-

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