DEFINITIONS; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS; ART. 1732
, that now or hereafter may own, operate, managed,
1. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN PIACO,
VENTURA ESTUYA, PEDRO HOMERES, MAXIMINO
GALSA and EMILIO LEOPANDO, defendants. TAN
PIACO, appellant.
G.R. No. L-15122 March 10, 1920
Facts:
Piaco rented two automobile trucks and was using them upon
the highways of the Province of Leyte for the purpose of
carrying some passengers and freight. He carried passengers
and freight under a special contract in each case. He had not
held himself out to carry all passengers and all freight for all
persons who might offer passengers and freight. Said
defendants were charged with a violation of the Public Utility
Law (Act No. 2307 as amended by Acts Nos. 2362 and 2694),
in that they were operating a public utility without permission
from the Public Utility Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether the appellant was a public utility under the foregoing
definitions, and was therefore subject to the control and
regulation of the Public Utility Commission.
Held:
No. In support of the conclusion of the Attorney-General, he
cites the case of Terminal Taxicab Co. vs. Kutz (241 U. S..
252).
Section 14 of Act No. 2307, as amended by section 9 of Act
No. 2694, provides that: "The Public Utility Commission or
Commissioners shall have general supervision and regulation
of, jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities. . . . The term
'public utility' is hereby defined to include every individual,
copartnership, association, corporation or joint stock company,
etc., etc.
or control any common carrier, railroad, street railway, etc.,
etc., engaged in the transportation of passengers, cargo, etc.,
etc., for public use."
Under the provisions of said section, two things are necessary:
(a) The individual, copartnership, etc., etc., must be a public
utility; and (b) the business in which such individual,
copartnership, etc. etc., is engaged must be for public use. So
long as the individual or copartnership, etc., etc., is engaged in
a purely private enterprise, without attempting to render
service to all who may apply, he can in no sense be
considered a public utility, for public use.
"Public use" means the same as "use by the public." The
essential feature of the public use is that it is not confined to
privilege individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is
this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public
character. In determining whether a use is public, we must
look not only the character of the business to be done, but also
to the proposed mode of doing it. If the use is merely optional
with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is
not a public use, authorizing the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the public utility commission. There must be, in general, a right
which the law compels the power to give to the general public.
It is not enough that the general prosperity of the public is
promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public interest.
The true criterion by which to judge of the character of the use
is whether the public may enjoy it by right or only by
permission.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the appellant was not
operating a public utility, for public use, and was not, therefore,
subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission.

2. Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship, 23 SCRA
24
Facts:
"Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America" shipped
freight pre-paid at Chimbate, Peru, 21,740 jute bags of
Peruvian fish meal through SS Crowborough, covered by
clean bills of lading Numbers 1 and 2.
The cargo, consigned to San Miguel Brewery, Inc., now San
Miguel Corporation, and insured by Home Insurance Company
for $202,505, arrived in Manila on March 7, 1963 and was
discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring Company.
When the cargo was delivered to consignee San Miguel
Brewery Inc., there were shortages amounting to P12,033.85,
causing the latter to lay claims against Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, Home Insurance Company and the American
Steamship Agencies, owner and operator of SS Crowborough.
Home Insurance Company paid the consignee P14,870.71
the insurance value of the loss, as full settlement of the claim.
Having been refused reimbursement by both the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation and American Steamship Agencies,
Home Insurance Company, as subrogee to the consignee,
filed against them on March 6, 1964 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila a complaint for recovery of P14,870.71 with
legal interest, plus attorney's fees.
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation alleged that it delivered with
due diligence the goods in the same quantity and quality that it
had received the same from the carrier. It also claimed that
plaintiff's claim had prescribed under Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce stating that the claim must be made within 24
hours from receipt of the cargo.
American Steamship Agencies denied liability by alleging that
under the provisions of the Charter party referred to in the bills
of lading, the charterer, not the shipowner, was responsible for
any loss or damage of the cargo. Furthermore, it claimed to
have exercised due diligence in stowing the goods and that as
a mere forwarding agent, it was not responsible for losses or
damages to the cargo.
Issue:
Is the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's non-liability
valid so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from
liability for loss?
Held:
The bills of lading,1 covering the shipment of Peruvian fish
meal provide at the back thereof that the bills of lading shall be
governed by and subject to the terms and conditions of the
charter party, if any, otherwise, the bills of lading prevail over
all the agreements.
Accordingly, the charter party contract is one of affreightment
over the whole vessel rather than a demise. As such, the
liability of the shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain
and crew, would remain in the absence of stipulation.
Section 2, paragraph 2 of the charter party, provides that the
owner is liable for loss or damage to the goods caused by
personal want of due diligence on its part or its manager to
make the vessel in all respects seaworthy and to secure that
she be properly manned, equipped and supplied or by the
personal act or default of the owner or its manager.
Said paragraph, however, exempts the owner of the vessel
from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other
source, even from the neglect or fault of the captain or crew or
some other person employed by the owner on board, for
whose acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said
paragraph..
Court of First Instance declared the contract as contrary to
Article 587 of the Code of Commerce making the ship agent
civilly liable for indemnities suffered by third persons arising
from acts or omissions of the captain in the care of the goods
and Article 1744 of the Civil Code under which a stipulation
between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting
the liability of the former for loss or destruction of the goods to
a degree less than extraordinary diligence is valid provided it
be reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.
A common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or
chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier.8
As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from
liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public
policy,9 and is deemed valid.
The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be
applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner
from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would
be void only if the strict public policy governing common
carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public
at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally
chartered for the use of a single party.
Appellant is absolved from liability to plaintiff
3. De Guzman v. CA
Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys
scrap materials and brings those that he gathered to Manila for
resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to
Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo
which various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower
than the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970,
petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for
the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1,
1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were
delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes
was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an action
claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues
that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private
respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he
could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled
against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the
goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity.
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service
on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population. It
appears to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely
"back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to
Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a
periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's principal
occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is
no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a
fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below
commercial freight rates is not relevant here. A certificate of
public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability
under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster
or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of
the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article
1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of
extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.
We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried
are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery
which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force."
We hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be
regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier
and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute
insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods,
and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be
foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
4. BASCON VS CA
FACTS:
Rodolfo Cipriano, representing CIPTRADE, entered into a
hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation
whereby the former bound itself to haul the latters 2000m/tons
of soya bean meal from Manila to Calamba. CIPTRADE
subcontracted with petitioner Estrellita Bascos to transport and
deliver the 400 sacks of soya beans. Petitioner failed to deliver
the cargo, and as a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair the
amount of goods lost in accordance with their contract.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the
latter refused to pay. Cipriano filed a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage. Petitioner denied that there was no
contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck,
and that the hijacking was a force majeure.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner a common carrier
(2) Whether or not the hijacking referred to a force majeure
HELD:
(1) YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common
carrier as "a person, corporation or firm, or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public." The court
held that the test to determine a common carrier is whether the
given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the
carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted." In this case, Bascos has admitted that she was in
the trucking business hence the petition is a common carrier.
(2) NO. Article 1734 enumerates exception on the instances
where common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods: (1) Flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)
Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4)
The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
thus they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. In
those cases where the presumption is applied, the common
carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in
order to overcome the presumption. Bascons failure to
adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made shifted
the burden of proof against her.
5. Planters Products Inc. vs CA
Facts:
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) purchased from Mitsubishi
International Corporation (Mitsubishi) 9, 329. 7069 metric tons
of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk aboard
the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned by Kyosei Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha (KKK) from Alaska, USA to San Fernando,
La Union, Philippines.
Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel pursuant
to the Uniform General Charter was entered into between
Mitsubishi as shipper/charter and KKKK as shipowner.
Before landing the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four of her
holds were presumably inspected by the charterers
representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk
pursuant to par. 16 of the charter-party.
After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by the stevedores
hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel
hatches were closed with heavy in lids, covered with three
layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches
remained closed and tightly sealed through the entire voyage.
Upon the arrival of the vessel at her port of call, the steel
pontoon were opened with the use of the vessels boom.
Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its
steelbodied dump trucks which were parked alongside the
berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the charter-partly (which provided for
an F.I.O.S. clause). The hatches remained open throughout
the duration of the discharge. Each time a dump truck was
filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it
was transported to the consignee's warehouse located some
fifty (50) meters from the wharf. Midway to the warehouse, the
trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale where
they were individually weighed for the purpose of ascertaining
the net weight of the cargo. The port area was windy, certain
portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and the
weather was variable, raining occasionally while the discharge
was in progress. The petitioner's warehouse was made of
corrugated galvanized iron (GI) sheets, with an opening at the
front where the dump trucks entered and unloaded the
fertilizer on the warehouse floor. Tarpaulins and GI sheets
were placed in-between and alongside the trucks to contain
spillages of the fertilizer. It actually took 11 days for PPI to
unload the cargo.
According to the report of the private marine and cargo
surveyor (Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI) hired
by PPI, there is shortage in the cargo of 106. 726 M/T and that
a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating 18 M/T were
rendered unfit for commerce, having been polluted with sand,
rust and dirt. PPI then sent a claim letter to Soriamont
Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier
KKK for 245, 969. 31 php representing the cost of the alleged
shortage in the goods shipped and the diminution in value of
that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt. SSA did
not respond to the claim for payment because according to
them, what they received was just a request for shortlanded
certificate and not a formal claim which was denied because
they had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment
RTC: It was incumbent upon the SSA to prove that the
shortage of contamination sustained by the cargo is
attributable to the fault or negligence on the part of the shipper
(PPI) in the loading, stowing, trimming and discharge of the
cargo. SSA failed to destroy the presumption of negligence
against them, thus, they are liable.
CA: Reversed the ruling of the lower court. It is an old and well
settled rule that if the plaintiff (PPI), upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim,
the defendant (SSA) is under no obligation to prove his
defense. PPI failed to prove the basis of its cause of action
ISSUE:
Whether or not a time charter between a shipowner and a
charterer transforms a common carrier into a private one as to
negate the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss
or damage to its cargo
HELD:
No, petition is dismissed.
Points:
When the petitioner chartered the vessel M/V Sun
Plum, the ship captain, its officers and compliment were
under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to
be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then we can
charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship
with the duty of caring his cargo wen the charterer did not
have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident in
the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the
manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the
voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation
were all consigned to the officers and crew who were
screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. It is therefore
imperative that a public carrier remain as such notwithstanding
the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more
persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in
the case of time charter or voyage charter.
It has been proven that the respondent carrier has
sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima
facie presumption of negligence. The hatches remained close
and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of
the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open
without the use of the ships boom.
The Supreme Court agreed with respondent carrier
that bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries
with it the risk of loss or damage. More so, with a variable
weather condition prevalent during its unloading, as was the
case at bar. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the
goods has to face. Clearly, respondent carrier has sufficiently
proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it
highly vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of
its packaging which further contributed to the loss. On the
other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing
that the carrier was remise in the exercise of due diligence in
order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.
6. FABRE v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a
1982 model Mazda minibus. The couple had a driver, Porfirio
J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two
weeks. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the
World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with
petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in
consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the
amount of P3,000.00. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the
minibus.
Petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The
road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus,
which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to
skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel
brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side,
coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus
came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on
it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline
Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down
by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It
took three persons to safely remove her from this position. She
was in great pain and could not move. She then brought this
case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the
accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is
permanently paralyzed from the waist down.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered
by private respondents.
HELD:
Yes. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of
carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged
in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the
Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court
has held:
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the general public,
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders
of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The circumstances supporting the finding of the trial court and
of the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts.
2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty
of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and
1759 of the Civil Code.
7. ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE
AND ASSURANCE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 147246. August 19, 2003]
Facts:
Petitioner Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc gained custody of
the cargo containing Better Western While Wheat to be
delivered to General Milling Corps (GMC) warehouse at Pasay
City. The cargo, however, was not able to reach its destination
as multiple mishaps happened along the way.
First was that the delivery was initially suspended due to an
incoming typhoon, forcing the petitioner to seek shelter in
Engineering Island off Baseco. The barge eventually
developed a list due to a hole it sustained after hitting an
unseen protuberance underneath the water. The whole was
patched with clay and cement afterwards. Then, upon
reaching Sta. Mesa spillways the barge again ran aground due
to strong current and to avoid the complete sinking of the
barge, a portion of the goods was transferred to three other
barges. Later, the barge sank completely resulting in the total
loss of the remaining cargo.
A bidding was conducted to dispose of the damaged wheat
retrieved and loaded on the three other barges, amounting to
P201,379.95. Prudential Guarantee and Insurance
indemnified the GMC in the amount of P4,104,654.22.
Thereafter, it sought recovery of said amount from the
petitioner, but to no avail.
The private respondent then filed a complaint against the
petitioner for recovery of the amount of indemnity, attorney's
fees and cost of suit to which the Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of.
Asia Lighterage and Shipping elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals insisting that it is not a common carrier. CA ruled in
favor of private respondent, thus this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
(1) Whether the petitioner is a common carrier; and,
(2) Assuming the petitioner is a common carrier, whether it
exercised extraordinary diligence in its care and custody of the
consignees cargo.
Ruling:
(1) Petitioner is a common carrier.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as
persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code
makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The court
also did not distinguish between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Further, it was ruled that Article 1732 does
not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the general public, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
In the case at bar, the principal business of the petitioner is
that of lighterage and drayage and it offers its barges to the
public for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Petitioner is clearly a common
carrier. Therefore hold that petitioner is a common carrier
whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather
than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A
common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue
tickets.
The petitioner also fits the test of a common carrier as laid
down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to
determine a common carrier is whether the given
undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the
carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the
business transacted. In the case at bar, the petitioner
admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and
lighterage, offering its barges to the public, despite its limited
clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.
(2) The petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence
in its care and custody of the consignees goods.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. They are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if
the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the
presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that
it exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence
does not attach:
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is
due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the total loss of its cargo. Petitioner
claims that this was caused by a typhoon, hence, it should not
be held liable for the loss of the cargo. However, petitioner
failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only
cause of the loss of the goods, and that it has exercised due
diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the
typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss. The evidence shows
that, even before the towing bits of the barge broke, it had
already previously sustained damage when it hit a sunken
object while docked at the Engineering Island. It even suffered
a hole. Clearly, this could not be solely attributed to the
typhoon. The partly-submerged vessel was refloated but its
hole was patched with only clay and cement. The patch work
was merely a provisional remedy, not enough for the barge to
sail safely. Thus, when petitioner persisted to proceed with the
voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage.
Further, the petitioner still headed to the consignees wharf
despite knowledge of an incoming typhoon. During the time
that the barge was heading towards the consignee's wharf on
September 5, 1990, typhoon Loleng has already entered the
Philippine area of responsibility. Accordingly, the petitioner
cannot invoke the occurrence of the typhoon as force majeure
to escape liability for the loss sustained by the private
respondent. Surely, meeting a typhoon head-on falls short of
due diligence required from a common carrier. More
importantly, the officers/employees themselves of petitioner
admitted that when the towing bits of the vessel broke that
caused its sinking and the total loss of the cargo upon
reaching the Pasig River, it was no longer affected by the
typhoon. The typhoon then is not the proximate cause of the
loss of the cargo; a human factor, i.e., negligence had
intervened.
8. Crisostomo v. CA, 409 SCRA 528 (2003)
FACTS:
Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan
Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her
booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed
"Jewels of Europe". The package tour cost her P74, 322.70.
She was given a 5% discount on the amount, which included
airfare, and the booking fee was also waived because
petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was formers companys
ticketing manager.
Menor went to her aunts residence on a Wednesday to deliver
petitioners travel documents and plane tickets. Estela, in turn,
gave Menor the full payment for the package tour. Menor then
told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
on Saturday, two hours before her flight on board British
Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, Estela went to NAIA
on Saturday, to take the flight for the first leg of her journey
from Manila to Hongkong. She discovered that the flight she
was supposed to take had already departed the previous day.
She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled
on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon Estela to take another
tour the "British Pageant, which cost P20, 881.00. She gave
caravan travel and tours P7, 980.00 as partial payment and
commenced the trip in July1991.
Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from
respondent the reimbursement of P61, 421.70, representing
the difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of
Europe" and the amount she owed respondent for the "British
Pageant" tour. Despite several demands, respondent company
refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same
was non-refundable. Petitioner was thus constrained to file a
complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage
and damages
Trial Court: Respondent was negligent in erroneously
advising petitioner of her departure date through its employee,
Menor, who was not presented as witness to rebut petitioner's
testimony. However, petitioner should have verified the exact
date and time of departure by looking at her ticket and should
have simply not relied on Menor's verbal representation. The
trial court thus declared that petitioner was guilty of
contributory negligence
RTC: Caravan was negligent in erroneously advising
Crisostomo of the wrong date. Crisostomo incurred
contributory negligence for not checking her travel documents.
Caravan should reimburse Crisostomo but with deductions
due to her contributory negligence.
CA: Both parties were at fault. However, Crisostomo is more
negligent because as a lawyer and well-traveled person, she
should have known better than to simply rely on what was told
to her. This being so, she is not entitled to any form of
damages. Crisostomo appealed to SC. She contended that
Caravan did not observe the standard of care required of a
common carrier when it informed her wrongly of the flight
schedule. She could not be deemed more negligent than
Caravan since the latter is required by law to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment of its obligation. If she
were negligent at all, the same is merely contributory and not
the proximate cause of the damage she suffered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a travel agency is a common carrier and is
therefore required to exercise extraordinary diligence
HELD:
No. By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one
whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one
place to another for a fixed price. Such person or association
of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified as
private or special carriers and common or public carriers. A
common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code
as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public. It is obvious from the above definition
that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore,
neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not
undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another
since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent's services as a
travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel
permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and
respondent is determinative of the degree of care required in
the performance of the latter's obligation under the contract.
For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of
carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far as human
care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons and with due regard for all the
circumstances. As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a
common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound under
the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance
of its obligation.
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for
services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of
a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.
NATURE OF BUSINESS; POWER OF STATE TO
REGULATE; ART. 1765
9. PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 47065. June 26, 1940.
Facts:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in
the business of transporting passengers in the Province of
Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Province
of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles
commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued
in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission.
Petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an
application for authorization to operate ten additional new
Brockway trucks, on the ground that they were needed to
comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates
and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law.
The Public Service Commission granted the petitioner's
application for increase of equipment.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus
incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public
Service Commission.
The 2 conditions are : (1) that the Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) would be valid for only 25
years and (2) that the service can be acquired by the
government upon payment of cost price of its useful
equipment less reasonable depreciation.
Pantranco challenged the constitutionality of Article 15,
Commonwealth Act 146 as an undue delegation of legislative
powers.
Issue:
Whether or not the Public Service Commission may prescribe
the 2 conditions as a prerequisite to the issuance of the CPCN
Held:
Yes. Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the
organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part
of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to
operate a franchise" in the Philippines. The business of a
common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public
interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public
regulation. When private property is "affected with a public
interest it ceases to be juris privati only." When, therefore one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use,
but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control.
Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it
is well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative
control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of
commissioners.
This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded
upon the police power, and statutes for the control and
regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the
protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves.
Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either as
impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without
due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws,
especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private
property shall be devoted to a public use and the consequent
burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if
he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot
complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of
the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9, 10.) This is the more so in
the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public
convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract,
confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.
10. PAZ FORES, petitioner, vs. IRENEO MIRANDA,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959
Facts:
Miranda was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by
Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta.
Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost
control, causing it to swerve and to his the bridge wall. Five of
the passengers were injured, including Miranda who suffered a
fracture of the upper right humerus. The driver was charged
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish
the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the petitioner
was rejected by the appellate court which found, among other
things, that its carried plate No. TPU-1163, was registered in
the name of Paz Fores, and that the vehicle even had the
name of "Doa Paz" painted below its wind shield.
Fores contented that on March 21, 1953, or one day before
the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep
that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman.
Issue:
Whether or not the approval of the Public Service Commission
is necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even
without conveying the authority to operate the same
Held:
Yes. The ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No.
146) provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and
saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any
public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof,
without the previous approval and authority of the Commission
previously had
xxx xxx xxx
(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property,
franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part
thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises,
privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other
public service. The approval herein required shall be given,
after notice to the public and after hearing the persons
interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just
and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or
encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or
the sale, alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be
approved and that the same are not detrimental to the public
interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is
to be consummated shall be fixed in the order of approval:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or
completed before its approval or to prevent the sale,
alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property
in the ordinary course of its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we
have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs. Ignacio, Timbol
vs. Osias, et al, and Medina vs. Cresencia, that a transfer
contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite
approval of the Public Service Commission, is not effective
and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under
the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. The
provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale,
alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise,
certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner
or operator of the public service Commission. The law was
designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and
until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained
the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of
the owner or operator standing in the records of the
Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that
nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction
from being negotiated or complete before its approval", means
only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and
binding between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The
phrase "in the ordinary course of its business" found in the
other proviso" or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by
any public service of any of its property". As correctly observed
by the lower court, could not have been intended to include the
sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such
property that may be conceivably disposed or by the carrier in
the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or
spare parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only
general supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction
and control over all public utilities including the property,
equipment and facilities used, and the property rights and
franchise enjoyed by every individual and company engaged i
the performance of a public service in the sense this phrase is
used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108). By virtue of
the provisions of said Act, motor vehicles used in the
performance of a service, as the transportation of freight from
one point to another, have to this date been considered and
they cannot but be so considered-public service property; and,
by reason of its own nature, a TH truck, which means that the
operator thereof places it at the disposal of anybody who is
willing to pay a rental of its use, when he desires to transfer or
carry his effects, merchandise or any other cargo from one
place to another, is necessarily a public service property.
(Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor
co. vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil., 244, that
there may be a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the
effect of having the approval retroact to the date of the
transfer; but such outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening
in the meantime. It appears that no such approval was given
by the Commission before the accident occurred.
NATURE AND BASIS OF LIABILITY; ART. 1733
11. Cangco v. MRR, 38 Phil. 767
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he
was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his
position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.
Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got
off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the
platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the
train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco
stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact
with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body
at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came
to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark
night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single
light located some distance away, objects on the platform
where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially
to a person emerging from a lighted car.
He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the
city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another
hospital where a second operation was performed and the
member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It
appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of the
servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks
of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to
be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains
The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance.
To the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based
upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that
the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a
rebuttable presumption
That the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason
of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of
authority or superiority existing between the person called
upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for
the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to
the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption
of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and
proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this
regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach
of his contract.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it,
by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide
safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate,
and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that
the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that
even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in
placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its
contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence
in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop
before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in
the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact
guilty of negligence.
Issue:
W/N the railroad company was negligent and can be liable for
damages
Held:
Court: that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted
is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of
person alight from trains under these conditions every day of
the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason
to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever
in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent
failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has
been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving
railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,
sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the
train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so,
the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure
so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by
the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier
to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its
trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear.
The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly
lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the
plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right
to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the
placing of them adequately so that their presence would be
revealed.
There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to
take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he
was not guilty of contributory negligence.
a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25
for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
12. ISAAC v. A.L. AMMEN, 101 PHIL. 1046
See pdf file in the chat group
13. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.
FACTS:
Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda
Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida
Parejas boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses
and driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales
Pangasinan. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlac, the right
rear wheel of the truck was detached so the driver steps on
the brake as a result of which, the jeep who is running
unbalance made a u-turn. The Rabbit Bus driven by Delos
Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the three
passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others. The two
drivers were charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of
Tarlac. The case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo
was convicted by the court of first instance of Pangasinan.
Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint
for recovery of civil damages before the court of first instance
impleading both the defendant and the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
HELD:
NO. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers
are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In
the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee
and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind
the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication,
the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil
liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result
in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard
to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.
The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of
the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept
of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of
the primary civil liability.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that
is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest
therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to
the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.
14. Light Rail Transit Authority vs Navidad
Facts:
On 14 October 1993, around 7:30 in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token. While he was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin (security guard)
approached Navidad. Thereafter, a misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. There was no evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow and how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by Rodolfo Roman (petitioner) was coming in and the
former was struck and died as a result.
A year later, Marjorie Navidad, widow of Nicanor, along with
her children, filed complaint for damages against Escartin,
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc (Metro
Transit) and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied
liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent
and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer
contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was
negligent in his assigned task.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the widow and against Prudent and
Escartin ordering the latter to pay the plaintiffs damages.
Complaint against LRTA and Roman are dismissed for lack of
merit.
Prudent: appealed to the CA exonerating Prudent from any
liability for the death of Nicanor and instead holding the LRTA
and Roman jointly and severally liable.
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and
Roman liable
Issue:
Whether or not LRTA and Roman should be liable according to
the contract of carriage
Held:
Yes, LRTA is liable. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or
avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm
to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
No, Roman is not liable. There is no showing that petitioner
Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus,
Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
Take note of the following provisions:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the formers employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
LAWS APPLICABLE ART. 1766, 1753
15. EASTERN SHIPPING v. IAC
FACTS:
Sometime in or prior to June, 1977, the M/S ASIATICA, a
vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
(referred to hereinafter as Petitioner Carrier) loaded at Kobe,
Japan for transportation to Manila, 5,000 pieces of calorized
lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned
to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare
parts valued at P92,361.75, consigned to Central Textile Mills,
Inc. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for
their stated value with respondent Development Insurance and
Surety Corporation.
During the same period, the same vessel took on board 128
cartons of garment fabrics and accessories, in two (2)
containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and
two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise. The 128 cartons were
insured for their stated value by respondent Nisshin Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., for US $46,583.00, and the 2 cases by
respondent Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., for US
$11,385.00.
Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to Manila, the vessel caught fire and
sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. Respondent
Development Insurance & Surety Corporation, having been
subrogated unto the rights of the two insured companies, filed
suit against petitioner Carrier for the recovery of the amounts it
had paid to the insured.
Petitioner-Carrier denied liability mainly on the ground that the
loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event, hence, it is
not liable under the law.
ISSUE:
(1) which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on
Common carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? and
(2) who has the burden of proof to show negligence of the
carrier?
HELD:
(1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case
of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in
question were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the
liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil
Code. However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the
rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by
the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to
the provisions of the Civil Code.
(2) Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than
those mention in Article 1734,the common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary
diligence required by law. The burden is upon Eastern
Shipping Lines to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law.