ISSUE EVOLUTION Race and the Transformation of American Politics . EDWARD G. CARMINES JAMES A. STIMSON PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEYTHE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION Bvolution is one of the halfduen shattoring ideas that ‘science haa developed to overturn pant hopes and assump. tions, andl to enlighten our current thonghts, —Stephen day Gould, The Flamingo's Smile ‘Reflections in Natural History ‘Tho theory of the generation of (issue) alternatives de serves, and requires, «treatment that is just as definitive and thorough as the trentmont we give to the theéry of ‘The Dinlogue of Paychology with Palitical Science” ‘Where do issues come from? Why, when most da not matter, are ‘some the leading themes to the story of. most do not. Why that too? Some issues, lil not, ‘These are familiar sorts of questions in the worlds of biology, ‘geology, paleontology. There we ask about species. But the ques. tions are much the same. Why do they arise in one rather than another form? Why do some persist, others not? Why do whole Broupa of similar species thrive and then die out? These are all ‘questions about change, organic change. ‘The preeminent theoretical problem of thia book ia the expla- hation of change. We have turned to the biological theary of nat- ural selection because it addresses that problem. It carries with ita powerful system of reasoning. The analogy directs our think. ing to cortain kinds of questions and leads us to look for distine tive patterns, It isa useful organizing framework for considering 8CHAPTER 1 the question of organic change. We discuss the abuses—of grafting such a on Some issues—a minute proporti 1 potential—are well fitted into new niches provided by an evolving political enviren- ment. New environmental oppartunities can e read But the evolution of the ni number of possible outeor ‘events in which chance play to influence the life of THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION ies, can evolve to fit new niches as old ones disappear. But, unleas they evelve to new forms, all issues are temporary. Most vanish at their birth. Some have the same duration as the wars, reces- sions, and sea . Some become highly as- i with the party system and ‘And some last ao long as I systern that produced them: these are chore issues come from, why some thrive in ted public attention and others do not, development of new istues ia capable of transforming the organic system in which that development oc- ‘urs, These are our nert items of business: origina, developments, and transformations, ‘Sounces oF Issue Comprrrion Accounting for “ultimate” issue: atory problem. Lil lime and interaction at the boundary ened is an engine: than can ever gain space on the small stage of ‘we must know what processes filter the possi ‘ny potential issue confliets to the fer that. 5CHAPTER 1 nificant public attention, what maehaniams promote some and not others, Strategic politicians play the most obvious and perhaps most in- fluential role in determining the relative competition among po, litical issues. Al successful po fit them and the party and which do not. The , deemphusize the latter. ‘bution of power ical conflicts. After all, the ex: lted precisely in success in the first place, Of course, ploiting is to continue to em- phasize the original aligning issues; another in to treat all now issues as logical outgrowths of the original agenda. In both cases {the idea ia to fight current political battles within the framework existing majority Not so with the THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION the vast majority of new issue proposals ing an unresponsive cord in the mass public and leaving the cur rent majority party's coalition intact. Political losers may occupy ‘an even more disadvantageous position than they did before in- trodueing the proposal. Nor are new issues the only mechanism for undermining the majority coalition. The minority may also emphasize performance on old issues or attempt nonissue ap- , even to the point of completely reshaping the environ- in which they aros External Disruptions Potential istues exist always on the periphery of awareness Some are called to the center when the world outside a particular political system intrudes upon it. The external world causes dis- aand shocks, raises challenges and opportunities, and, in general, prevents any organic system from being driven entirely by internal imperatives. Most evident in the ease of crises, wars, depressions, terrorism, and invasions of the economic sort, the external world is always a source of problems to be solved, oppor- tunities to be exploited. Matters requiring public discussion gen- erate issue conflicts over how best to deal with them. Thus, the relevant set of potential issue conflicts in the domain of intrusion {a selected for greater attention, greater debate, and greater ean- flict. 7CHAPTER 1 Local Variations continue to interbreed wi adapt more readily to Jocal environment than to the common ee the o1 nal Population. After a faw generations of isolated adaptation and sufficient variation in environmes ions, the isolated Population may diverge quite substantially from the aneccny Population. Given enough time and variation, sere ne of arty cleavage can be seen . with much the same impact on the party aystem that 4 new line born of who Pathetlcat ant line born of wholly new iasues might hy. Internal Contradictions THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION then move to the fore from their tie ta a growing consciousness of policy problems in need ‘Thus, by their very all party alignments contain the seeds of their own destruction. The various groups that make up one issue away. ‘A sense of predestination or inevi ‘any of these paths to insue development. That is a central theme of the literature on natural selec ur approach one that did im fact occur, has a prior probability so low as to be all but unpredictable. That view of history and evolution, in ‘marked contrast to much theorizing on party aystems and re- alignment, will run through our treat 3@ issue evolution of race, Many et nts and deci iat mark the path of political response ‘were margi sy could easily have tipped differently than they did, Any could have altered the path of racial issue evolution, Outcomes oF Issux ConperinoN re suggested that four sources determine the differentia! of iamues in their competition with ane ansther through e. But the ultimate object of our inquiry is not just to under- stand the pattern of competition among issues. We algo want to understand the outcomes of this competition, to model the impact that evolving issues have on the larger party system of which they are the most dynamic part. We s¢¢ three distinct outcomes— associated with three respective issue types—of this competition for public attention and influence, Organic Extensions ‘The first is perhaps the most easily understood, Some new issues fit into the same niche that has previously existed. These are 9CHAPTER 1 sort of reactions as did 's Now ;ordanie extensions" are likely to reinvige, rate old issues and old confi ta, them: ireetic of more current issue debates. sail a ™ it short-term ; They may influence system change tho system, These issues hi f being unable i maght them into portance ofthese issues is thus more than eon, ‘erbalanced ky their inanasquential longtrm eles iene, 10 ‘THE DYNAMICS OF 18SUB BVOLUTION stem. Vietnam and Watergate are two recent examples poliey type, 8 a8 those issues capable of altering the an lead to fundamental and permanent change in the party sy=- tem. Isaue evolutions, by which we always mean partisan issue ev- lutions, possess the key characteristies absent from ‘unique combination of short- and ‘Thus, they may result ‘but more important, they also alter the ith another and transforming the charaetor of the parties themselves ‘How much cogniti: fully with an issue Stimson 1980) is a cri ‘mass response undifferenti ‘knowledge, awareness, altentiveness, or interes of these is a requisite of response. “Hard” issues, by far the more common type, require conten-CHAPTER L 5 tions, for they can genrate neither large nor sustained public response. * The one pomsle exception in the passing of the dinagaur, whieh seve comtro- ‘rial interpretations view aa the result of eatalyamic adaptation Raup 1988), 2 THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION A.second type of issue evolution is based upon Darwinian pure gredualism, The change effected im” notions in biology are the origin of growth," model of thange. It is dy- ‘Tue Evouron or Ractat Issues We intend our three sets of typologies to provide an analytic framework within which the evolution or life history of any ienue can be analyzed. But itis obvious that not all issues are equallyCHAPTER 1 ‘THE DYNAMICS OP ISSUE EVOLUTION attention and the dif ‘through time, single-issue cehosen th quiry, Although numerous isa 8 have in sustaining themselves tems ean accommodate only a during a given period. In any euse we have awe dimension of race aa the focus of our in- sen to promote if intent were present. But, 1 prediction we would make as rican poli is most likely to revolve around the issue of race. ‘THE Actons 1 Issue Evouurion 5 motive, and eal ‘Human emotions and calculations are the stuff counts of politics. Some emphasize the emotional: Power that drives politicians, the electorate's mn 1's great insights is that the natu ‘driven by human emotion and 8 a natural consequence of its logic. Behav- saders are central figures of Chapter 2, where we take that tend to promote survival are selected, ‘up the issue of conscious calculation of party istue positions as 4 16CHAPTER! expressed in party platforms, Parties themselves are dif American politics; a very large proportion of all poli av ‘or is partisan politieal behavior. Thus, parties loom large in our ‘treatment of all other actors aa well, Senators and congressmen and ins also, ‘when not on center stage given the quality af their acts, i our integrating treatment of how issues evolve. And in light of what we have learned from the racial case, we look, in Chapter 8, at the issue evolution process generally, ‘Metaphor, it is well known, is no stranger to scientific reasoning of all kinds. Quite explicit in Burnham's Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, the explanation of change 16 Stren ur removal fe Us gion in biology. See ‘sed Riceron (1868, Rigdon Glee) Neon and Wier Satan f87 WwWCHAPTER 1 Senetic superiority for white male Northern Europeans (Gould icka these abusive pseudoscientific bly reluetant to test many of the imaginations. biology and Aare quite irrelevant to issue evolution. Puri ‘any other) metaphor sometimes leads ane to certain questions and not others. Probably it shapes in part. what an- ‘swers are found to be satisfactory. In some cases the application is so limit it it has little effect a strue- ture, chance is the fundamental driving force in producing ‘change. That does not imply that change is either chaotic or un- it neither determined nor here most particularly which unlike other Marxist no- ‘be more akin to Tolstoy battle scenes, where force, confusion, and chance commingle to produce . the appearance of which is orderly only after the We expect change tobe dynamic—a process, not an e implies subtle movements aver time. That daca not com: gradualism; the punctuated equilibrium mode from Gould and others allows for bursts of rapid change, at scale. The notion of subtle dy: 18 ‘THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION tension over time, followed by & great shearing cataclysm, is ap- pealing. But whether observed political changes resemble those suggested by such a model is an empirical isaue, and fo the case at hand we have found that they do not. Finally, we borrow the notion that resultant change i ‘unidirectional nor permanent. The species succoeds by being ‘adapted to a niche but not in any absolute sense superior were a lucky adaptation perust. ‘These assertions—that change i its form is dynamic, and essentially biologieal. Highly ith Darwinian ports of reascning, they can be stated nonetheless as abstractions with- out organie content. We began this research scious theories of change. They developed from of squaring the sarts of processes we observed with the available mechanical-deterministic modes of explanation. Much of that conflict and quandary is captured in the nation of electoral ré- alignment, to which we now turn, Issue Evouwtion: A Sprews oF REALIGNMENT? Realignment notions were a natural means of conceptualizing the transformations we will soe to be asoociated with the infusi of racial issues into American politieal life. Ank work on the question (Carmines and Stimso 19to explain was not so much in conflict with ita original terms but extrancous ta them that the amendments are far more weighty than the original core of the theory. Because those amendments 20 THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION behaviors is absent, From the fully de- Toe work of Burnham (1870) and others wha rely bevily an ayeropate elec: ‘on ortenmen data comes elauont to being an exception. The outcomes data are ‘ot righ enough for complex interpretations a1CHAPTER 1 ignment, such as in Sundquist (1989), lar election was @ realignment is 3 veloped time acale of to ask whether a senseless question sons, and none are rea whether a particular w: anawer is always, " ssion from one party to a here is controversial, but a ‘realignments withos Ie pol- ley change and notable policy changes without realignment. Although we can treat realignment: as a unified concept, two ig charncteritie of "reall gnsent” fil mich a ast hey. fre inatond historical partculare af the New Deal cso, 22 ‘THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION major strands or emphases can be seen in the literature. Some authore— ple, Key (1955, 1959), ier (1960), end Sundquist (1982)—emphasize the “al aspect of arty realignment. For them a party realignmer ‘overlaid new issue cleavage along party lines, New issue cleavages may oF may not have other consequences for party aystems, policy out- 10 forth, The second strand— and Stokes (1960), Burnham izes changing party fortunes ignment. For this approach, and for popular use of the term, realignments are manifested when reversals of the majority and minority party status result from sharp and largely permanent movementa of the electorate. from one party ta the other. We may avoid conflict between the two uses by presuming them two sides of the same coin, in effect by assuining that move- ments of elesvages produce changes in majority party status ot that changes in majority party statue must presume underlying the roots of which are as alignment, causes con ust conceptual discord, the realign long string of amendments by have ay conversion versus mobilization na eausal process and gradual versus eataclysmic (or secular versus critical) accounts of the pace of change. Some accounts emphasize social cleavages (Petro- cil 1981), where others see issue cleavages (Flanagan and Dalton central phenomenons of party conflicts; sometimes seen as the same, sometimes different, More recent accounts distinguish between realignmants aa overlays on old alignments and realignments as exclusive cloavages, between the sort of national realignment implied by the simple account See Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (4980) foe an explicit treatment ofthis i 23CHAPTER 1 ‘or of the election outcome ty- - then the number of passible exceeds the num! ments might performance-based, all of which would the nation of change by an electoral up rising. There is instead a considerable tolerance fer the introduc. tion of new forms and types, ‘Tolerance is a goad thing in politics, but it ean be quite another in theory building. Its effect is to make genuine unresolved con- i instead to be only minor disagreements about de- ignment theory as refined lacks most ‘of the drama and theoretical power that first stimulated interest 24 ‘THE DYNAMICS OF ISSUE EVOLUTION in the concept. Another part, we will suggest, is that political scientists and other scholars do not “own” the eoncept and s0 can- not mold its usage. We would suggest realignient belongs ta that clans of pre- scienti It is thus a safe prediction that the next decisive el American politics—and decisive elections are not by at are events—will produce a debate, both public and scholarly, about whether it waa or was not a realignment. And both question itself and the terms of the debate will be the ori simplistic idea of realignment. The matter is beyond schol trl contra, Weare left with a scholarly morass. To take up the our section title, we cannot know whether issue evolut sand strengths, But if our analysis is correct, no additional work fon the concept is ealled for because no additional work will extri- ‘ete ts from the morass. Issue evalution, despite its other atrengths or weaknesses a5 a ‘concept, can be scientifically defined and controlled. It allows us ‘to proceed to the business of theory, model, and empirical analy- 25CHAPTER 1 sis without the burden of a contenti egies a ious and uncontrollable eon- demonstrate that the ompirical terme." "Nan a thin sap, f ee hat ar mer om de = i sa xpi provocation ats orcad ae he rw ah sun staan Bet nae aa i rl mae segue riche ar 28 THE POLITICS OF RACE: FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN In Chapter 1, we presented a general theory of issue evolution. This theory specifies the sources, processes, and outcomes of issue competition, The theory is necessarily dynamic; issues do not ap- pear fully developed on the political agenda. Instead, they evolve through time as they initially emerge, develop, mature, and are i ot all issue conflicts have long-lasting, life histories. Most are as fleeting as they are inconsequential. The vast majority af issues becomes ex- tinct as quickly as the iasues appear on the politieal scene, and, fas a consequence, they lack capacity for transforming the politi- cal system, is not surprising that our attention as to the few exceptions to the rule, to licts that truly matter to the long- yyatem, Raco, as we painted out ‘in party platforms. How did party leaders respond to the salience of racial concerns? This is the theme we shall r 2. earlier slavery issue, it became a particularly salient concer during Reconstruction, as white Ameriea first confrontedCHAPTER 2 Her period, albeit briefly, 6-that the later reemergence of race as ‘national political iasue can be sen in historical perspective, RaciaL Pourries Dunne ReconsTRuction ‘or previous condition of servitude,” Between 1866 and 1875. Con. gress enacted five major civil rights and recanstruction acts to enforce these amendments, For the first time, course, blacks had little choice, for the al- ternatives offered them were "between a party that gave them THE POLITICS OF RACE and conservative Democrats gained eventual control of southern politics. ‘Tax Decumena Saumnce oF Ractat Insuns ‘politi able to acquire during Reconstruction, Po: litical influence, they were unable to effectively oppose the im- the national agenda, leaving it as.m matter for the states to de- cide. in the Slaughterhouse cases (1872) and the Civil Rights ‘cases (1889) the Supreme Court took the position that the Four. {The Compromise of 1877 allowed Republican Rutherford Hayes to win the Presidential lecton of 1876 onthe baa connie stern elacloral voto in ‘exchange fora protan to remeve the las federal trooe for the South 29‘CHAPTER 2 teenth Amend: hot place under federal protection “the entiro domain rights heretofore belonging ex tho states” and Fourteenth and Fifteenth a Offered protection against state, but not private, action, Thus, in declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional, the Court maintained that: Until some State Law has been passed, of some State action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the righta of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, (quoted in Pritehett 1984, 253) What constituted “state action” thus became a crucial issuo in deciding civil rights eases. The Caurt clarified the scope of appro. priate state action in Plessy v, Ferguson (1896) by helding that a Louisiana statute requiring segregation 0 facilities was constitutional so long as "separate ‘were extended to blacks. That black fs invariably in- ferior to those provided far whites was a fact the Court persis. tently ignored. In Williams v. Mississippi (1898) the Supreme Court upheld a state law that hough it-was clear that such tosts were being widely used to disenfran. tiring thers to answer impossibly difficult Questions not. asked of whites, the Court held the law to be con- stitutional because on its face it did not discriminate against it was also institutions, After Reco piece of civil rights legi No president until Harry Truman in 1948 had even sont # major eh ta program to the Congress. And bath political parties, ially Democrats, were also willing to see racial issues kept off th ion Congress did not pass a single tion until the Civil Rights Act of 1957. 30 ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE nated by their southern wing during this period, were perfectly ‘to be treated solely as a state and local matter. modest proposal. condemning some activities of the Ku Klux Klan was removed from the 1924 Democratic platform at jistence of southern delegates (Johnson and Porter 1973, most important civil rights issue of the day. But Republicans were not able to make thesa platform promises the Inw of the land Frawxuin Roosevent AND THE AvOIDANcE oF Race ‘Racial issues could not, howe for ever. For blacks and thei period. One main reason fos ness to either take public : ould in the Northeast, gave thom a majority calition without the South. They ‘fled ioe las attentive to the pile situation of southern blacks, aLafter World War Il. As Table 2.1 shows, a steady and very sub- stantial increase in the proportion of blacks in these regiona o¢- a2 ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE antral City ‘Teale larotsncans 1990 odo 1801960070 All twetve mwa New Yorke ‘Lon Angelee-Long Beach ‘Souee: Adapted from Lao F. Schnoro, Carvlyn D. Andre, and Harry Sharp, “Black Suburbanination, 1990-1990" The Changing Face af the Suburbs, ef ‘amy Schwarte (Chicago: University of Chleage Pree, 178, p. bt; the figures there were transposed to yl deta on black pervenngee ing this period. With the Democratic party | party with national aims lition depended critically upon its Dixie. And winning the elector 33CHAPTER 2 found in Harry 8. Truman a man far more committed to eivil rights than his predecessor. TRUMAN ano THE AnorrED (Crmicar Mowe oF 1048 In 1946 President Truma: Rights to examine Ameri ‘ernment must show the way, (Truman In February 1948 President Truman legislation to Congress since Reconstruct legislation in the areas identified in the Ons factor thot made it possible for the Democrats to neminate aumeooe aa ‘racially progreaive aa Truraan in 1943 was the it ty rule for the nomination of « Democrat cand ‘hough little nckiced at the tre, this change fn ‘eduted the influence of the South onthe nomi 34 | sructare markedly Democratic presidential ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE the Alabama delegation bolted the convention, eventually lead- ing to the formation of a third party, the States' Rights Demo- ‘eats, to contest the presidential election. The Democrats won the election by a very slim margin, but lost the electoral votes of Ale abana, Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina to the States! Rights Democrats (Sitkoff 1971), During the 1950s bath parties took relatively moderate stands on racial issues, but Republicat tion of being more supportive tion of the 1952 Democratic p plank that appeared in 1948. It called fruarantee equal rights in voting parti Fortunity, and pe is was pledges itself to ed support of those sound principles of local government ‘will best serve the welfare of our people and the safety of our Democratic rights” (Johnson and Porter 1973, 538), ‘The platform made only the vaguest and most general refer- ence to the recent Brown v, Board of Education of Topeka deci- sion (1954), which decisively overturned the "separate but equal doctrine” of Plessy. Without offering any support f segregation whatsoever, the platform simply noted deciai the Supreme Court of the United States brought consequences of vast importance to our Nation as a ‘whole and especially to communities directly affected’ (Johnson and Porter 1973, 542), ‘These changes in the party platform reflected the Democrats’ ‘attempt to steer a more conciliatory course on eivil rights after the near disaster of 1948. The choice of a presidential nominee was also a reflection of this change in direction, Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois was a solid New Deal Dernocrat, but he ‘was not deeply committed to civil rights (Martin 19) ‘andidates Ie alio allowed the pnsbiliy for inmuen of vce to gan = Football on ‘he matcnal Dernoeratie agenda (Rabin 1975)CHAPTER 2 Tthink—indeed, [kknow—that there are leaders in the South who are just as anxious as we are to move ahead. But we ‘must frankly recognise their local difficulties. We taust rex ognize, too, that further government interference with free ‘men, free markets, free istasteful to many people ‘of good will who dislike racial diserimination ue muchas ve do, (Stevenson 1953, 26-27) In a later speech given in Richmond, Virginia, Stevenson com: ‘mended southern political ideas to the rest of country, aasurting. Among the most valuable heritages of the Old South is its political genius, time, Even today some. ae ceptance which they have so long deserved. A classic exam, he. it seoms to me, ia the Constitution of the Confederacy, ‘(Stevenson 1955, 163) Yiews. The 1948 Republican platform on race was just as strong ‘and outspoken as its Democratic counterpart.’ Bui whereas the Not coy did the 1948 sus bit the Republican {Obs Republic tad 38 ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE -The ‘work of the courts [must be] supported in every legal manner hy all branches of the Federal Gevernment, (Johnson and Porter 1973, 564) ‘This stronger Republican commitment to civil rights could also te acon in the pasenge of the Civil Rights Acts of 1057 and 1980—the first civil rights laws passed since Reconstruction. The 1957 Act created the temporary Commission on Civil This was further evidence, if any were needed, thut the Republi- can party was not yet a viable alternative for segregation vat~ Keniteoy, Jomvson, ano ‘rex rusts o Civi ftrcnms ‘The 1960s witnessed the full maturation of the struggle for racial ‘quality. As both parties groped to find a way to deal with this Highly viele ison, aie eountry itself was becoming increas- a7CHAPTER 2 ingly polarized by antithetical racial forces, Civil rights leaders ‘turned to protests and mass demonstrations to press their politi- cal claims. From the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955, to the luneh counter sit- 3¢ Inte 1950s, to the Freedom Riders in 1961, to the Birmingham demonstration and the great March on ‘Washington in 1969, to the Montgomery march in 1966, the coun- try was faced. with a mass civil rights movement thet would no longer accept second-class status and treatment for black Amer- jcnna, But the segregationist forces would not give in without a protracted struggle. Their protests were conducted in the halls of Congress and were reflected in the brutal manner of local police uusing fire hoses and attack dogs to quell nonvialent demonstra. tors, ‘The campaign of the 1960 presidential election was conducted in this atmosphere of heightened racial concerns. Both parties respective candidates took progressive positions on rights plank in the 1956 Demo- cratic platform wa offend southern De specific support for olina introduced mo the platform committee to delete por- that called for establishing a per- the Civil Rights Commission adopt a strong civil rights plank even if it meant overriding the strong objections of the southern wing af the party and possibly leading to a new split in the New Deal coalition. But the Republicans would not be outdone on civil rights, Led by Senator John Tower of Texas, the platform committee initially adopted a fairly weak civil rights plank that did not expresa eup- ort for civil rights demonstrations or promise federal efforts to gain job equality for blacks, But Richard Nixon and Nelson Rock feller met during the convention and reached consensus on sey_ gral major policy issues, Their agreement, informally dubbed the “compact of Fifth Avenue,” included a much stronger eivil rights 38 THE POLITICS OF RACE plank on which Nixon threatened to wage a floor fight if it were not accepted by the platform committee. ‘The commitiae adopted the stronger plank by a margin of fifty-six to twenty-eight (Congressional Quarterly 1983, 1 extensive array of civil rig for equal voting rights, establishment of a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity, and a prohibition against discrimination in fed- eral housing and in the operation of foderal facilites, ‘We oppose the pretense of fixing a target date 3 years from ‘how for the mere submission of plans for school desegrega~ tion, Slow-moving school districts would construe it as three-year moratorium during which progress would cease, Postponing until 1963 the legal process to enforce compli- ance, We believe that each of the pending court actions should proceed as the Supreme Court has directed and that in no district should there be any such delay. (Johnson 1978, 61 ough the Democratie-controlled Congress watered them we GoP platform also stated, “the Republican Adminiatra- tion's recommendations resulted in significant and offee rrights legistation in both 1957 and 1960—the first ci statutes to be paased in more than 80 years 618. In short, the Republican platform statement on civil rights was At least as progressive as its Democratic counterpart. During the campai followed their While the 1960 Democratic p called for strong action on Civil rights, President Kennedy initially took a very cautious ap- Proach to racial issues. Like Roosevelt before him, civil rights uugh he made a num- he was unwill- tive scope of his a9‘THE POLITICS OF RACE On June 19, Kennedy sent a comprehensive civil rights bill to mest memorable ney, placing his administration squarely on ‘of the civil rights forces, He concluded his televised acl. ‘dress with an emotion-filled plea: open Public vote for the public officials who represent he cannot enjoy the full and free life which want, then whe among us would be content to have the color of hig ‘skin changed and stand in his place? Who among us would ‘then be content with the counsels of patience and delay? we have no class or caste system, no ghettos, no master race ‘*xcent with respect to Negrogs? (Kennedy 1964, 469-70) 40 aCHAPTER 2 dent Lyndon Johnéon had assumed the presidency. Jahnaon's rec- ord on civil rights was mixed. When he ran for Senate in 1948, he made clear sition to eivil rights in racially conserva, sham—an effort to whom you must hire, (Miller 1980, sonal commitment to civil rights. seek a compromise on the pending stronger features for possible aauth- iis friends and foes were show no signs of hesita- ton; he quickly graspod the mantle of civil rights leadership. “We have talked long enough in this eountry about equal ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE Republicans, 138 voted for the bill and 34, including 12 southern Republicans, against. EY ‘Senate voted 71 to 29 to cut off debate 44 Democrats and 27 Republicans voted are while 23 Democrats and 6 Republicans opposed lature paved the way for the bill's approval on public schools that practiced segregat bade job discrimination by employers or unions, extended Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 interrelated developments in American strated that the national government co am bringing about equal rights. ‘The mild and largely ineffective 1957 and 1960 civil rights Inws had led many to believe that op- too powerful to allow the national ‘influence in this area. ‘The 1964 ‘was no longer the case. Passage of this legislation also revealed just how far the Democratic party hhad enme on eivil rights. The party had finally taken up the chal- lenge issued by President Truman in 1948. Democrats had al- 43‘CHAPTER 2 tered their historic position on this iseue and become the princie pal Diack civil rights. And they had dane ao not only with Proposals but also with aetion, ‘Tux GoLowaren Response the Democratic party continue to champion civil would the political implications be if it did so? Into this political void marched Barry Goldwater and the mod- erm conservative movernent of the Republican party. Neither ‘conservative movement he led had their (TThe federal Constitution does nat require the States to maintain racially mixed schools. Despite the recent holding af the Supreme Court, | ata firmly convinced—not only that integrated echools are not required—but that the Constitu. “a ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE platform committee, Republican Senator Hugh Scott from Pennsylvania introduced an - i li it in percent in Alabama, 59 percent in South Carolina, 57 percent i Louisiana, and 64 pereent: in Georgia. Republican presidential candidates had not carried these states since Reconstruction, 45CHAPTER ® THE POLITICS OF RACE 02 186080 tare vean Figure 2.1 Vote for Democratic Presidential Candidates in tho Black Preiscla of ‘Twenty-four Southern Cites, 1952-1972, Source Bartley nnd Graham (1976), ‘again demonstrating the potency of Geldwater’s appeal to south: em white constituencies, Although Goldwaters attraction to southern whites was im- pressive, his candi ture of American politics. ‘Tur Pos-1964 Penson 46 47omarrer 2 Johnson's Racial Policy Agenda ‘One possible course of action ford Victory in 1964 wan o be conciaeeer oy Similar, if eas spectacular, increases in the other southern states ‘ss well. The increases. were especially impressive in precisely 43 THE POLITICS OF RACE Tama 22 Proportion of Blacks Roglatered to Vote in Southern States, 180-1870 ABA eam 6290 Arkona part oe Flortia 0390 ower ‘oxoncrs ma 4s otra 0.300 30 sarsenstrrs 0.081 9.087 North Carotinn 0K 0488, ura eaxnntena Me 0368 ‘Tennese- ose aa Tena 0.399 og Virgie 0.230 0487 ‘Source: Congressional Quarterly (1967; 1970), ‘Now: States in nmall capital letter cast thoi sleetortl vous foe Barry Gal. water in 1864 ‘The 10 proportion for Tennecne ibased upon data frum 63 sounten “The 1880 proportion for Twas is based upon data from 213 counties those five deep southern states that had ter in 1964, There was a certain logic to this ‘These tates were most angered by the racial id Johnson and found a sympathetie voice re to 1965, Given the opportunity, large numbers of blacks in theso states registered ta vote for probably the first time in their lives, 49CHAPTER g Precisely the effect of the voting rights act. That this stra Ultimately did not succeed says Ines about the wiodocn of the 50 THE POLITICS OF RACE ‘of downplaying the racial policies of the Johnson admit n, the 1968 Democratic platform spoke in glowing terms about ‘those policies: hts Act of 1964 ... and the Voting Rij peed under the vigerous leadership 0 to » the most consistently liberal wajor American party, contained a ike of a renewed effort to bring mitted to resuming theCHAPTER 2 Moreover, in one of its most controversial stat cont tements the 1972 platform offered support for busing ans inate school desegregation: "Transportation of students is another ‘tool to accomplish jgregation. It must cont to be +: to eliminate: imy Tol are a cninat legally imposed segregation’ " (Johnson and Por- Jimmy Carter's candidacy in 1976 is especially revealis it confirmed the new reality of Democratic politics in the sasr, 52 ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE racial conservatism to that extent. But one can say with x fair degree of certainty that Republican presidential nominees in the post-1984 period were always more conservative on racial issuea sue 4 course of action on racial issues that had great appeal to white southerners. During his first term, he nominated three southern conservatives to the Supreme Court, foreed the liberal ‘chairman of the Civil Rights Commission to resign, opposed the ‘extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in its original form, and directed the departments of Justice and Health, Edueation, and Welfare to request a federal court to postpone the desegre- {gation of Mississippi's publie schools. In 1972, Nixon followed these steps by requesting that Con- ssveas place # moratorium on school busing orders by federal courts, The Republican platform of that year echoed Nixon's po- sition, stating that" ‘we are irrevocably opposed to busing. .. we regard it ag unnecessary, eounter productive and wrong’” Wohn- 53.CHAPTER 2 ‘son and Porter 1973, 862). Nixon, in sum, made a special effort to court the white South in his comeback bid in 1968 and espe- cially in his reelection in 1972, when he pursued a visible “south- ern strategy.” His actions aa president, moreover, more than ful- filled his promise to white southerners that president of ‘the United States, I'll find a way to ease up on tl federal pres sures forcing achoot desegregation—or any other kind of deseg. rogation’ * (Murphy and Gulliver 1971, 2), Although Nixon and later Ford were not Goldwaters in the ex- segregation. He opposed the Civil Rights ct of 1864, the Voting Rights Act of 1985, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Dugger 1988, 197-98). During the Reagan administration, the federal government haa put hundreds of school desegregation cases on hold, tried to weaken the Voting Rights Act, supported tax breaks for segre- gated achools, and molded the Civil Rights Commission, before a bastion of racial liberalism, into an open opponent In short, Reagan has been a chief apostle of contemporary conservatism, breathing new life into the Republican's southern strategy. After winning the electoral votes of the southern states by very narrow margins over Carter in 1980, Reagan seared a landalide in the region against Mondale in 1984. At the same on a varlety of racial issues. The Republican party, by contrast, having moved to the racial right in 1964, more or leas stayed 54 PARAGRAPHS ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE i oemocaars Do rersiicans Yoo2 TOME T9K0 1944 1988 1952 1058 18D TOA TeeR 1672 TOME HD PLATFORM AND YEAR igure 22 Number of Paragraphs on Race in Party Platforms, 1952-1960 Sows: Computed ky the authors from Jehmon (1978, 1982) and Jehason and Porter (1973) there after 1964. Republican party elites learned at least one cru- cinl lesson from Goldwater's 1964 candidacy: there are millions of southern white votes ta be won by positioning the party to the right of the opposition. ‘A Monx Sysrascaric Loox arr PARTY PLATFORNS We have traced to this point the changing responses af the Dem- ccratic and Republican parties to racial concerns by examining ‘the rhetoric and actions of presidents and presidential candidates this more systematic analysis of the racial content of the plat- forms.CHAPTER? PRIORITY INDEX ‘SRE 1836 sMA0 Od SOM 1952 1066 186d 1968 1968-1877 S970 a0) PLATFORM AND YEAR Pew 24 Ratt Piity Ind Paty Frm 1 pra, 180-90, Sac Cm ‘ued tba thor to dob 108 10) a Fae ae ene cae ‘One simple measure of the importar devoted to it. In Figure 2.2 we exa Republican counterparts " subtle concept "importance" is wh in thelist of competitors fer tn, ten gts tooecoaa crude saat that Besition in the program isan indicate, albeit « ‘one, of relative priority amiing issue domains. We define a A second measure of the 56 ‘THE POLITICS OF RACE “priority index” ag 1.0 minus the number of the paragraph com: jon of racial policy {Le., the number of farm preceeding the first race paragraph) her of paragraphs in the platform. Thus, ginning of the program and declines to smaller ve toward the end, If the issue is not mentioned at index 1 zero. 1964 racial concerns were positioned at the end of the party plat- forms, Beginning in 1964 and continuing through 1960 issues of this pattern changes dramatically and permanently begi 1964, Although the post-1960 Republiean party gives rel more emphasis to race than the pre-1960 Republican part ‘secondary position to the post-1960 Demo- 1964 and in each succeeding year, Dem- prominent position in their platforms ‘than Republicans do in theirs ‘Trtts QUANTITATIVE ANALYSI ‘was a critical moment in the partisan evolution of racial issues. Jt was critical not merely because it marked fundamental change in the parties’ response to itewes of race but, more impor- tant, because the transition was permanent. ‘water in thia partisan transformation, publican party was dominated by candidates and party leaders ‘committed to racial progressivism. The party's history and lack of support in the South made this « natural stance. But a party comniitted to progressive racial ideas and policies was not going to be able to take advantage of the growing split between the 57CHAPTER? national Democrats and white southerners. In this case, racial conflict would lie outside the two-party aystem, leading the white South to support third-party efforts as in 1948. Goldwater's can- didacy fundamentally altered the likelihood of this ‘ans could develop a powerful appes! in the white South without becoming outright segregationists. ‘No one individuel represents the transformation in the Demo- static party in the way Goldwater does for the Republican party. ‘were key figures who moved the , as was Carter, who sustained it ‘The American party aystem, in sum, was fundamentally trans- formed during the mid-1960s. The progressive racial tradition in the Republican party gave way to racial conservatism, and the Democratic party firmly embraced racial liberalism. These dof the materials of presidents, See ‘and platforms, is familiar in its general contours, and it provides a useful starting point, But issue evolution is much more routine business, involving the daily behaviors of a host of political leaders, mast more or less unknown, and the multitudes {that constitute the mass electorate. This history is perhaps the shell of a story of issue evolution, To get inside the shell we look ‘now to the behaviors of others. We begin with Congress. 58 235 ‘THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF RACE IN CONGRESS sometimes it sanctions policies with the stamp of law. ofthese roles, Congress claims. central position in issue ive foot dragging through ‘to racial activists, pres- ‘The unmistakable message was forms was not the business of the it by 1964 Congress had written ra often been the case with race. Taken together, the string of congressional actions on racial issues comprise the old struggles yn majorities man- ers. The drama built |, probably the single ‘aged at last to threaten the Southern fi to a peak in the Civil Rights Act of 59