Michael Addaney and Lamoussa Sawadogo, Fragility and Democratic Governance in Africa: Critical

Analyses of the Malian Situation

Fragility and Democratic Governance in Africa: Critical Analyses of the Malian Situation

Michael Addaney* and Lamoussa Sawadogo**

1. Introduction

There has been a growing international attention to the challenges of fragile states in Africa as a
result of the consequences of these states on regional and international security, good governance
and poverty alleviation. The OECD defines a fragile state as a nation with weak capacity to
carry out basic governance functions and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive
relations with society.1 This phenomenon makes fragile states vulnerable to internal and
external shocks such as natural disasters, armed conflicts, famine and diseases. In 2012 the
African Development Bank (AfDB) classified Mali as one of the 26 fragile states in Africa.2 This
follows the military coup on 22 March 2012 that toppled a constitutionally elected government
and a secession attempt by the Tuaregs in the north of Mali.

Leading Mali on a path of recovery and building long-term peace after the 2012 military coup
which has led to years of decline and turmoil in the country is not an easy task. 3 Therefore the
fragility of Mali demands a more coordinated and carefully planned tailored-made response to
deal with the issues of political leadership, security and economic stresses that make the country
and the citizenry vulnerable.4 The crux of this paper is to critically analyse the challenges of the
fragility of Mali with its impact on governance and the democratisation in the country. The paper
is structured into five parts as follows the first part presents an overview of fragile states in
Africa, the second and third part deals with the characteristics of fragility in Africa and the
causes of fragility in Mali respectively. The fourth part presents critical analyses of the influence

*
Michael Addaney is an MPhil Candidate at the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Pretoria South
Africa.
**
Lamoussa Sawadogo is an LLM Candidate at the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Pretoria South
Africa.

1 OECD (2013) Fragile states: resource flows and trends in a shifting world.
2
Asian Development Bank (2012) Working differently in fragile and conflict affected situations: The ADB experience.
3
C Barrios & T Koepf Building peace in Mali: the elections and beyond (2013) NOREF Ssue Brief 28.
4
J Basil Fragile States: taking part in Africas inclusive growth take-off(2013) 4 Chief Economist Complex AEB 4

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 Michael Addaney and Lamoussa Sawadogo, Fragility and Democratic Governance in Africa: Critical
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of fragility on governance and democratisation in Mali. The final part briefly joins together the
conclusion and recommendations for building a more resilient Mali.

2. Characteristics of fragile states in Africa

Cilliers and Sisk view African states that lack the ability to cater for the security and
developmental needs of their citizens as fragile. They opined that most citizens in fragile states
are poor and have experienced repeated violence, socio-economic exclusion and poor
governance.5 Basil observes state fragility as a critical development challenge that faces Africa
since 80 percent of the worlds fragile states are located in Africa. 6 State fragility in Africa is
fuelled by rapid urbanisation and urban sprawl, youth unemployment, poverty and socio-
political exclusion, climate change, environmental degradation, poor natural resources
governance and irresponsible political leadership.7 States inability to successfully manage these
weighty burdens creates security threats and increases the risk of violence. When these threats
and risks are not properly dealt with by the state then they spill over into violence either as civil
war or tribal conflict. According to the AfDB, sub-Saharan Africa alone experienced 271 non-
state conflicts between 1989 and 2009 resulting in over 60 000 direct casualties.8 In this instance,
African states that lack strong institutions, resilient economies and socio-political systems
become the most assailable to fragility.

Most of these states are associated with high levels of political instability, weaken institutional
capacity, deplorable infrastructure, poor human development, rising youth unemployment and
acute poverty.9 This reinforces the concept that state fragility in Africa converges on the premise
that these countries lack the political goodwill and the requisite capacity to deliver on essential
public goods.10 Stewart has observed that most fragile states in Africa have continually failed to
deliver in one or all of the four essential functions of state being security, political leadership,

5
J Cilliers & TD Sisk Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 more fragile countries {2013) 188 ISS
Monograph 5.
6 n4 above.
7
African Development Bank (AfDB) Ending conflict & building peace in Africa: A call to action high level panel on fragile states
2014 5.
8 n7 above.
9
AfDB Fragile States Unit Public sector operations in fragile states: lessons learnt and recommendations World Bank 2011 vi.
10
OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee) Do no harm:
international support for state-building Conflict and Fragility Series 2010 146f, 150.

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 Michael Addaney and Lamoussa Sawadogo, Fragility and Democratic Governance in Africa: Critical
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economic management and social services provisioning.11 This is because armed conflicts in
Africa negatively affects economic performance, standard of living and hence the quality of life
of the citizenry.12

The complex nature of fragile states in Africa requires context-specific policy intervention to set
the states on a path of recovery. The challenges associated with state fragility are pressing which
requires urgent attention and practical solution from the international community particularly the
United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the Bretton Woods institutions. It can therefore
be deduced that one major reason for the poor socio-economic and political development in
fragile states in Africa is the lasting consequences of armed conflicts and poverty. 13 From the
discussions it becomes obvious that fragile states in the African context are characterised by
cyclical patterns of violence and poverty which makes fragility itself become self-reinforcing.
With more than 340 million of the worlds extreme poor living in about 50 fragile countries
mainly located in Africa without a strengthened international consensus and engagement these
states will continuously fall behind.14

3. Mali as a fragile state: the causes

3.1 Fragility in the Malian context and recent conflicts

Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. The country experienced rapid economic
growth after the 1990s with a thriving democracy and relative social stability. 15 This came to a
halt when the state lost control of the Tuareg dominated north which resulted in a military coup
on 22 March 2012 toppling the constitutionally elected government. The Tuareg nomads of
northern Mali began an insurgency in the 1990s with grievances on land and cultural rights
which ended without any conclusive negotiated agreement till this day despite efforts by the then
government in that regards. This resulted in the rebirth of the insurgency in 2007 which grew in
momentum in 2011 due to the influx of weapons from the political uprising in Libya and terrorist
activities in Algeria. Hence, the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took advantage of the
11
P Stewart US policy toward fragile states: An integrated approach to security and development (2012)
12
A Hoeffler & M Reynal-Querol Measuring the costs of conflict 2003. http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin (accessed 22 February
2015).
13
H Ghobarath, P Huth & B Russett Civil wars kill and maim people long after the shooting stops American Political Science
Review 97(2) (2003) 189.
14
P Collier The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it Oxford University Press 2007.
15 Mali profile BBC 2 January 2015 www.bbc.come/mali (Accessed on 28 February 2015).

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 Michael Addaney and Lamoussa Sawadogo, Fragility and Democratic Governance in Africa: Critical
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increased lawlessness in northern Mali and seized political control of the Tuareg-dominated
north immediately after the military coup in March 2012 seceding from the rest of Mali and
establishing an Islamic state governed by the Sharia.

Alarmed by the threat posed by the advancement of the militancy, the government requested for
a military intervention from former colonial master France. The French military swiftly
overpowered the insurgents in the north ending the insurgency. Despite this victory the situation
in the north of Mali is still tense with infrequent attacks from the Tuareg separatists and the
Islamist militants.16 Even though there was a return to civilian rule in the summer of 2013, the
fragile agreement between the government and the Tuareg separatists broke down amid resumed
conflict after a year of relative peace. This followed the inability of the government to fulfil the
details of the ceasefire agreement that was signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in June 2013
that outlined negotiation plans with the aggrieved north including options for accelerated
decentralisation and some form of self government. These prevailing conditions have further
worsened the already fragile situation of Mali. Freedom in the World, an organisation that rank
countries annually based on seven democratic indicators released its 2014 report dubbed
discarding democracy: return to the iron fist which classified Mali among four African
countries as not free the worst position in the ranking.17

Prior to this, the 2010 Failed States Index (FSI) stated Mali as one of the twelve African states
that risk collapsing.18 This labelling received wide acceptance by many policy analysts and
scholars since the situation in Mali is underpinned by institutional incapacity and lack of
progress; of poverty, exclusion, violence and poor governance.19 In 2014 the AfDB classified 26
African states as being more fragile including Mali.20 The March 2012 military coup in Mali has
further fuelled an armed violence which threatens the lives of the citizens hindering them from
making decent living. There are about 200 000 internally displaced people within Mali and 175

16 n 16 above.
17
Freedom in the World Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist 2015 www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2015 (Accessed on 24 February 2015).
18
The FSI is a joint effort of the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy that produces an annual ranking of world states based on 12
measures of weakness and the risk of collapse: www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com/ Accessed on 22 February 2015.
19
J Cilliers, TD Sisk & J Korbel Africa's fragile States need extra help ISS today 4 December 2013 http://www.issafrica.org/iss-
today/africas-fragile-states-need-extra-help (Accessed on 22 February 2015)
20
n7 above.

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000 who have fled to neighbouring countries.21 The current political situation in Mali has
created socio-political and security environments that enhance the leverage of Islamist extremists
in their ongoing struggle with moderates for influence in the Sahel region. The country is
currently faced with instability due to its inability to provide security, enforce laws and deal with
political turmoil.22 This randomised insecurity undermines all dimensions of ordinary lives and
forces people to stay indoors and close their businesses for fear of violence.

Moreover the sharp economic inequality and prevalent socio-political exclusion with majority of
the population particularly the Tuaregs in the north remaining very poor despite the abundance of
natural resources deposits makes the situation direr. Gutelius asserts that the establishment of
democracy in Mali during the 1990s after years of autocracy has created space for segments of
the society to extend their influence in social and political life.23 Through these happenings
some Islamists have been challenging successive governments inability in handling inequality
and poverty. According to Gutelius, the history of the country is replete with deep and abysmal
governance with successive governments unable to deliver on basic services like healthcare,
education and road infrastructure. Terrorist groups in the Sahel region have capitalised on the
internal situation in Mali to advance their cause creating security threats and increased crime.

3.2 The main causes of fragility in Mali

The first is the contested state legitimacy and authority which has weakened essential state
institutions. This has created hybrid political orders and political transitions that repress political
competition. Multiparty democracy in Mali strengthens patronage politics due to the high
poverty level and low level literacy in the country. The various governments that have ruled Mali
have remained soft and unable to initiate appropriate steps to build and maintain integrity in the
public sphere. This is partly due to the nature of the prevailing social structures with multiple
horizontal ethnic groupings which is very uncongenial for an all-inclusive political system.24 The
second is structural and socio-economic factors prevailing through abject poverty and rapid
economic decline.

21
n3 above.
22
Z Devlin-Foltz Africas fragile states: empowering extremists, exporting terrorism (2010) 6 Africa Security Brief
23
D Gutelius Islam in Northern Mali and the war on terror (2007) 25(1) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 64.
24JD John Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states: a critical review of literature (2014) CRISE Working paper
25.

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This is characterised by high levels of horizontal inequality and severe identity fragmentation
that has promoted social exclusion and poor social cohesion at all levels of national life. The
effects of these are a weakened civil society, frequent armed violence and poor management of
natural resource wealth and the governments inability to manage the rapid urbanisation in the
country. The third factors are basically external and international factors including the legacy of
colonialism, pressure from climate change and the global economic crises.25 These causes are
often self-reinforcing and therefore sparking the argument that Mali is caught in a negative cycle
of perpetual poverty and socio-political instability creating doubt in the states likelihood of
recovery.

Both the immediate and remote causes of state fragility in Mali have created a mixture of
complex grievances by multiple and diverse players in the country. This was firstly sparked by
the secessionists revolts by the Tuaregs in the north who are fighting for independence which
created the platform that led to the military coup that toppled a democratically elected
government occasioning constitutional and political crises. These crises and the increased
lawlessness in the country prompted Islamic radicals to attempt to establish an Islamic state
governed by Sharia law. From the foregoing, it can be argued that the fragility of Mali is
featured by poor governance, poverty, non-existent social service provisioning, ethnically
heterogeneous and polarised populations.

4. The Influence of fragility on governance and democratisation in Mali

4.1 Effects on democratic culture and institutions

Under the current fragile state of Mali, there is low impetus for the rule of law and hence
increased violation of human rights.26 This has dire consequences on democratisation since there
is a weakened public confidence in the judiciary, parliamentary and the electoral institution
which play essential and critical role in democratic governance. This impinges the credibility of
elections and, robust multiparty pluralism which create political tension and instability as
demonstrated by the 22 March 2012 military coup. The key role of the electoral commission in

25
European University Institute (2009) Fragility: drivers and consequences European Report on Development
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3355 (accessed on 22 February 2015).
26 Freedom House Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic breakthroughs in the balance www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-

world-2013 (accessed 28 February 2015).

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the country requires that the citizens respect them as they function under the laws of the country;
and hence it should act in a manner that is accepted by the citizenry.27 However, this is not the
case; for instance the Prime Ministers visit to Kidal in May 2014 resulted in a riot because the
people saw it as foreign aggression due the contested results of the 2013 election. Some minority
tribes particularly in the north have often accused the Electoral Commission of being bias. These
tribes perceive that the electoral commission do not follow the laid procedures in ensuring
transparency and credibility in the electoral process and henceforth impeding the efforts of
building a vibrant democratic culture in the country.

Even though there are about 100 political parties in Mali, they are characterised by constant
alliances. This is perceived by most Malians as feckless collection of people who are interested
in government jobs making it difficult to have a vibrant and constructive opposition.28 Most of
these parties are deficient of visionary leadership and pragmatism in terms of formulating
alternative development policies as well as political ideologies different from the ruling party
making Mali virtually a one-party state.29 Political parties are a form of schism from previous
government and developed along ethnic lines that promote factionalism and hence resulting in
frequent political violence and electoral conflicts. These negatively affect democratic governance
because a strong public debate and policy alternatives from strong political parties are needed to
enhance democratisation. The 2013 presidential elections were to be followed by regional and
local elections to elect parliamentarians but this is still yet to take place due to the ongoing
conflict in the country. However the government in Bamako has resolved to organise the
elections in April 2016. Another serious implication by the recent position of the government is
that organising these elections in the country without the northern regions means that the
government of Bamako implicitly accepts the partition of the country.

4.2 Increased Islamic extremism and low political legitimacy

The fragile condition of Mali has led to an increased Islamic radicalism and extremism especially
in the north posing a serious threat to democracy and secular state as established by the 1991

27 SD Wing Constructing democracy in Africa: Mali in transition (2008) NOREF policy brief.
28 n 26 above.
29
R Pringle Democratization in Mali: Putting history to work (2006) 58 United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks

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constitution of Mali.30 This has made Mali a haven for terrorist groups and their activities
undermining the central authority of the government which finally led to the military coup on 22
March 2012. The crises caused by the military coup and the secessionist revolt of the Tuareg
occasioned the spreading of terrorist groups and rebellious political movements with notable
ones being the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Ansar ed-Din
(Movement of the Defenders of the Faith), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the
Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). Another serious issue is the international as well as local
intellectual and financial support enjoyed by these radical Islamic groups and hence increasing
their influence over the tolerant Muslims. The activities of these radical groups have negatively
affected the establishment and smooth administration of democratic institutions in Mali making
it very difficult for the central government to have full political legitimacy and control in the
north. Therefore the central government lacks legitimacy and enjoys limited support from the
people posing serious threat to rule of law and constitutional rule.31 The security problem in the
north with the long standing unrest and near anarchy in the desert north is a constant threat to
social cohesion and national unity.32 The prevailing poor security due to ineffective and under-
resourced security forces also makes it difficult for the country to have any success in tackling
increased terrorism and crime rates in the country.

4.3 Ineffective public administration, corruption and service failure

Pervasive corruption and effective social administration remain one of the greatest challenges of
democratisation in Mali.33 This has led to service failure since the state is unable to provide basic
services to the citizens. The ambitious middle class see their aspirations hindered by poor
remuneration by the government due to a completely out of synch salary system. This
undermines confidence in democracy leading to widespread cynicism. Growing corruption in the
public administration system has received particular attention due to its effect in crippling the
quality of public service delivery especially education and healthcare coupled with inefficient
judicial system. With education and health as essential sectors, substantial progress in these areas
requires rapid economic growth which remains elusive to Mali due to its fragility.

30 M Clarke Response to Sahel terrorism: music to jihadist ears (2013) RUSI analysis.
31 F Stewart & G Brown Fragile States (2010) CRISE overview 3.
32
J Keegan Mali is not another African war New Africa 12 January 2013 524.
33 H Armstrong Crisis in Mali: Root causes and long-term solutions (2013) USIP peace Brief 149.

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The ineffectiveness of public institutions also undermines the governments effort to improve the
standard of living hence subjecting the growing democracy to undue pressure. Most Malians are
distressed and angry at the heightened growth of corruption and the failure of the successive
governments to deal with it. According to Francis the growth of a visible wealthy class of
politicians in Bamako, the political capital and the continuous widening of the gap between the
rich and the poor have increased public perception of corruption.34 Similarly, Pringle observed
that corruption in Mali has been democratized and extends to every level of business and
government services.35

4.4 Poor citizenship participation in governance, social exclusion and social cohesion

The slow pace of socio-economic development and widespread poverty with heightened levels of
economic exclusion between the south and the Tuareg dominated north have resulted in poor
citizenship involvement in governance. Poverty has marginalised and disempowered the people
and has promoted patronage politics that is not based on issues but along ethnic and factional
lines. The inability of the political class to deal with the issue of poverty has also discouraged
citizens from participating in public elections. Democratic governance and democratisation
thrives on popular participation.36

Henceforth, poor involvement and in some cases non-involvement of the citizenry especially
women and the youth particularly in the north of Mali and other minority communities in the
hinterland have affected active engagement of these people in the governance process. This
phenomenon impedes constitutional democracy and it is a recipe for political disaster due to the
critical role that these groups of people play in the development of the country. This also disables
citizens from choosing the right people to represent them at various levels of government.
Without an all-inclusive government, political accountability and responsibility become difficult
and ineffective because citizens and other relevant stakeholders including traditional and
religious leaders are denied the opportunity to hold political leaders and government officials
accountable.37

34 DJ Francis The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali NOREF Policy report April 2013.
35 n 28 above.
36 n 28 above.

37 n 29 above.

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As a result of the conflict and social violence Mali is polarised through ethno-religious lines
characterised by class systems. This has dislocated communities from the state and caused
fragmentation resulting in the state lacking essential cooperation, confidence and promotion of
social wellbeing which are critical in creating a realistic and reputable social contract.38 This has
affected mostly the poorest and marginalised groups in the country particularly women and
children making them prone to increased risk of violence, exploitation, loss of livelihood and
constant threats to personal safety. The situation has crippled the willingness of the citizens to
engage in active politics and the overall democratic process in the country.39

The lack of authority has made it difficult for the government to protect its citizens from
different forms of violence. This has increased the already worsened social exclusion in the
country based on ethnicity, class and religion where most communities and political groups are
excluded from key state institutions causing them to challenge the state at any given
opportunity.40 The fragility of the Malian state has made the government unable to manage these
challenges through negotiations resulting in socio-political violence. There are also reports of
human rights violations based on discrimination. This has further increased the risk of further
violence worsening the fragility of Mali.

5. State-building in Mali: corrective measures to build resiliency

State building implies an ongoing process of developing efficient and legitimate state institutions
and improving state and society interactions. The OECD-DAC describes state-building as an
intentional strategy to improve the capacity of state institutions and state legitimacy for an
effective political process to craft mutual demands between the state and social groups.41 From
this perspective, state building in Mali should focus on promoting endogenous processes of state
formation and economic growth with major consideration on the concept of statehood in the
Malian context. To facilitate a speedy recovery from fragility these policy measures are
proffered;

38
S Kaplan Fragile states, fractured societies in fixing fragile states: a new paradigm for development (2012) Praeger Security.
39
L Tim Six reasons events in Mali matter CNN 17 August 2013.
40 P Douma Poverty, relative deprivation and political exclusion as drivers of violent conflicts in sub Saharan Africa (2006) 2(2)
Science and World Affairs 59.
41 n 39 above.

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5.1 Building effective state institutions and establishing state legitimacy through dialogue

After the successful elections in 2013, there should be concerted state efforts through well
designed national policies, programmes and activities that support the legitimacy of the ruling
government and promote accountability through establishing appropriate and relevant
democratic institutions as well as constitutional processes in Mali. Formal dialogues between the
government and non-state actors should be strongly encouraged to ensure more inclusive
governance. Therefore a stable policy environment should be created due to the fragile context to
minimise the constraints of mistrust, lack of credibility and cohesion as well as legitimacy
through allowing some level of autonomy to these actors which should lead to other forms of
engagement.42 This dialogue should be an entry point to a more effective partnership between the
state and all relevant stakeholders for state-building and sustainable peace.

The international community and the Malian government should encourage and facilitate
informal dialogue between ethnic and religious leaders as well as communities to create
synergies to complement the efforts at the national level. Through this the government should
focus on effective and quality service delivery health, education and security while ruthlessly
dealing with corruption. This will undeniably build public confidence in the institutions of the
state and restore trust and legitimacy in the machinery of government. According to Berry et al
performance-based service delivery would be very successful in this regard since that has been
very effective in some fragile and post-conflict contexts in Africa.43 Henceforth government
institutions particularly the ministries and departments should embark on institutional
arrangement and frameworks that promote accountability, responsibility and transparency in the
public sector.

6.2 Improving security and tackling Islamic radicalism

In building resiliency in Mali, a sustained peace and security are indispensable with justice as an
essential basic service. Improving the security and sustaining peace would play critical role in
restoring state authority and reduce the activities of terrorists and Islamist radicalism. The failure
of Operation Serval by the French military to repel the terrorist groups in the north has created

42 J Goldstone 'Pathways to State Failure'(2008) 25(4) Conflict Management and Peace Science 285.
43 C Berry, A Forder, S Sultan & M Moreno-Torres Approaches to improving the delivery of social services in difficult environment
PRDE working paper 3 DFID 2004.

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lawlessness for human and drug trafficking and other high profile crimes to thrive. Therefore, the
military and other security forces should be well resourced with defined roles under a democratic
rule to strengthen the rule of law, create a fertile climate for economic recovery and social
reconstruction.44 After the defeat of the Malian army at Kidal, neither the French forces (now
called Barkhane) nor the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA) has been able to prevent the army groups from surrendering the arms.

Experience has shown that the United Nations stabilisation force may not be withdrawn from the
conflict zone soon but the crises can lose its importance in the eyes of the international
community and hence fall into oblivion.45 Therefore the rising social violence and sporadic
armed conflicts in northern Mali demand a state-building that focuses on making the government
effective and accountable with the ability to protect the citizenry from both internal and external
security threats. Moreover this would require citizens who have strong will and determination for
the country to return to the path of sustainable economic and political development.46 Sustained
peace and national reconciliation that address the long standing grievances of the northern
Malians would be a great impetus in restoring investors confidence to boost foreign direct
investment in the country.

6.3 Rapid shared economic growth and social development

Mali has a vast amount of natural resources and therefore the government should unreservedly
focus on building a strong and resilient economy through diversification and prudent
management of these resources. This will require the restructuring of the Malian economy
through value addition to primary raw materials, increased patronage of local goods and services
to make the country self-reliant.47 Through this the country will become an export-led economy
to generate more decent jobs for the growing populations especially women and the youth, to
stabilise the economy as well as improve the Gross Domestic Product of the country. The
underlying commitment should be poverty alleviation and social empowerment.

44 D North Limited access orders in developing the world: a new approach to the problems of development World Bank WPS 4359.
45 F Grunewald & L Tessier Grey zones, lasting crises and forgotten conflicts: humanitarian challenges (2001) 83(842) IRRC 351.
46 n 43 above.
47 L Anten, L Briscoe & M Mezzera The political economy of state-building in situations of fragility and conflict: from analysis to
strategy Netherlands Institute of International Relations 2012.

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Berry et al observe that complex policies to improve the economic performance of state become
irrelevant in state-building where the government lacks commitment to poverty eradication.48
This shared economic growth and social development agenda should aim at creating a common
national interest and provide adequate financial resources for the realisation of these goals
without any contingencies. More efforts should also be channelled towards promoting a more
inclusive economic growth - economic policies targeting critical areas such as keeping down
prices of basic necessities, creating jobs, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor and
improving the living standards of the people.

7. Conclusion

The fragility of Mali suggests the possibility that the efforts of the new government and the
international community in getting Mali on the path of recovery may eventually came to a halt.
Malians may lose hope in democracy unless it is accompanied with accelerated and shared
economic growth. It becomes obvious through the study that the struggle for independence in
Mali did not translate into democracy and rule of law but only state sovereignty. Therefore there
should be an conscious transformation agenda to reform political leadership backed by a prudent
economic management and rule of law principled on human rights. This would create a convivial
atmosphere for an all inclusive economic growth to reduce poverty in the short term and promote
social cohesion and tolerance.

On the political front, there should be devolution of political power, structures and institutions to
promote self government in the north especially as a strategy to reduce political tension and
socio-political exclusion. Malian democracy is driven by culture and history therefore efforts
should be targeted at encouraging the preservation of traditional values and institutions relevant
to democracy such as tolerance, robust media and strong civil society. Finally, democratisation
takes time and hence learning from experience should be encouraged not only in Mali but for
countries transitioning from fragility towards resiliency particularly in Africa.

48 n 44 above.

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