[G.R. No. 125687.

December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN RONDERO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
When an accused appeals from the judgment of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for review of the appellate
court, which is then called to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable.[1] With this precept in mind, this Court as the ultimate dispenser of
justice, will not hesitate to render the proper imposable penalty, whenever it sees fit, even the
supreme penalty of death.
Before us is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
Branch 41, sentencing herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the crime of homicide.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he
noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to
inquire about his sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo
Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for
Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance
and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene.
The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of March 26,
1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They
even returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and
distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was about five (5) meters away from
his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin
Rondero pumping the artesian well about one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice
pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.[2]
Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without,
however, revealing that the person he saw was the latters own son.[3] Maximo and Andong
continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go
home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again
sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro
Elementary School where they found Mylenes lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement
near the canteen.[4] Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed,
and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had
several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right
hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found
beside her body while the other slipper was found behind her back.
Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation.
They found a pair of shorts[5] under Mylenes buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers.
Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-
appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered
with blood.[6] After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to
their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylenes
body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.[7]
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant.
An autopsy of the body of the victim conducted by the Assistant City Health Officer of
Dagupan City, Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, revealed the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Contusion hematoma, anterior chest wall, along the midclavicular line, level of the 2nd
intercostal space, right.
2. Contusion hematoma, along the parasternal line, level of the 1st intercostal space, left.
3. Contusion hematoma, posterior aspect, shoulder, left.
4. Contusion hematoma, anterior axillary line, level of the 3rd intercostal space. left.
5. Contusion hematoma, anterior aspect, neck.
6. Contusion hematoma, lower jaw, mid portion.
7. Contusion hematoma, periorbital, right.
8. Lacerated wound, 1x x , maxillary area, right.
9. Contusion hematoma, temporal area, left.
10. Contusion hematoma, mid frontal area.
11. Lacerated wound x x , frontal area, left.
12. Contusion hematoma, occipital area, right.
13. Abrasion, medial anterior aspect, elbow, left.
14. Abrasion, lateral aspect, buttock, right.
15. Abrasion, antero lateral aspect, iliac crest, right.
16. Contusion hematoma, upper lip.
17. Avulsion, upper central and lateral incisors.
18. Fresh laceration of the hymen at 1:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock position. Fresh
laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock position.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intracranial hemorrhage with brain tissue injury. Fracture of the right occipital bone.
Note:
Vaginal smear was done at the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Provl Hosp. Laboratory and the
result showed no sperm cell seen. (March 26, 1994)
Cause of death: Cardio Respiratory Arrest
Due to: Massive Intracranial Hemorrhage Traumatic[8]
For Mylenes burial, her parents spent P5,043.00 during her wake,[9] P9,000.00 for funeral
expenses[10] and P850.00 for church services and entombment.[11]
On March 28, 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victims right hand and at the
scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-
appellant, were sent to he National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination.
[12]
Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special
complex crime of rape with homicide in an information which reads:
The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, of Pugaro
District, Dagupan City, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1994, in the city of Dagupan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally, and forcibly have carnal knowledge with
one MYLENE J. DORIA, a 9-year old girl, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with
intent to kill, criminally and unlawfully employed violence against her person, thereby causing
the death of said MYLENE J. DORIA, as evidenced by the Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas
G. Cornel, Asst. City Health Officer, this city, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
said deceased, MYLENE J. DORIA in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. In the meantime, the NBI sent a fax
message to the Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination
on the hair strands because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI
suggested that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the
four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be
presented.[13] Thereupon, accused-appellant, who executed a waiver of detention including a
waiver of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution on the rights of the
accused during custodial investigation,[14] was allegedly convinced by a certain Major Wendy
Ocampo to give sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Dorias residence to
get hair samples from Mylene, who had not yet been interred. The hair strands taken from
accused-appellant and the victim were later indorsed to the NBI for laboratory testing.[15]
Comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands
found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-
appellants, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics
to those of the victims.[16] Alicia P. Liberato, the NBI Senior Forensic Chemist who conducted
the microscopic examination on the hair samples, later reiterated the aforesaid findings in
court.[17]
At the trial, Dr. Cornel, the physician who conducted the autopsy on Mylene at around 9:30
oclock in the morning of March 26, 1994, testified that the victims death probably occurred
before 11:00 oclock in the evening of March 25, 1994 judging from the rigidity of her lower
and upper extremities. He explained that the contusions and hematoma found on Mylenes
body were possibly caused by a blunt instrument, a clenched fist or a piece of wood.[18] The
lacerated wounds on her face may have been caused by a bladed instrument, not necessarily
sharp, or by hitting her head on a concrete wall with jagged edges. The abrasions on her
elbow, right buttock and upper hip may have been caused by a rough object that came in
contact with her skin.[19] Dr. Cornel also explained that the victims upper and lateral incisors
may have been avulsed by a sudden blow in the mouth using a blunt instrument, stone or
wood. He added that the fresh hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00
oclock positions and the fresh laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock
positions could have been caused either by sexual intercourse or by an object forcibly
inserted in Mylenes vagina.[20]
Accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his
father as witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the gruesome incident.
Christine Gonzales, wife of accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1994, at around
7:00 oclock in the evening, she had a quarrel with her husband. Accused-appellant was then
slightly drunk and apparently irked when supper was not yet ready. He slapped his wife and
shouted invectives at her, causing a disturbance in the neighborhood and prompting his
father, who lived just a house away, to intervene. When accused-appellant refused to be
pacified, his father hit him in the nose, mouth and different parts of the body.[21] His father
left accused-appellant profusely bleeding. Accused-appellant then changed his blood-stained
clothes and went to bed with his wife. It was a little after 8:00 oclock in the evening.
Christine woke up the next day at around 7:00 oclock in the morning. She washed some
clothes including the blood-stained ones her husband wore the night before. After doing the
laundry, she went out to pay her father a visit. On her way back home, Christine was informed
by a child that her husband was arrested by the police. Christine rushed home and found
some policemen taking the newly washed undershirt and short pants of accused-appellant
from the clothesline. The policemen brought Christine with them to the police headquarters
for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husbands clothes, Christine told them
about their quarrel the night before.[22]
Accused-appellants father, Leonardo Rondero, corroborated Christines story. He testified that
on the night in question, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, he was resting at home,
located only a house away from his sons, when he heard the latter having a heated discussion
with Christine. Embarrassed at the scene that his son was creating at such an hour, Leonardo
went to he couples house to pacify the slightly inebriated accused-appellant. Accused-
appellant ignored his father and continued shouting at his wife. Leonardo then hit him several
times causing his nose and mouth to bleed profusely that it stained his sando and short pants.
Startled at the injuries that his son sustained, Leonardo went home. Early the next morning,
March 26, 1994, at around 1:30 oclock, Leonardo was awakened by his neighbor, Maximo
Doria, who sought his assistance to search for his missing nine-year old daughter Mylene.
Leonardo willingly obliged. Thus, Maximo, Leonardo and the barangay secretary searched the
nearby houses for hours but failed to find Mylene.[23]
On October 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment[24] convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE:
For the crime you had wilfully and deliberately committed, this court finds you guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and punished by Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 7659, in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all its attendant
aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance of whatever nature.
You, Delfin Rondero, are hereby therefore sentenced to die by electrocution pursuant to Article
81 of Republic Act No. 7659, for your heinous crime as charged in the information as a
punishment and as an example to future offenders.
You are hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by paying to them an
amount of P60,000.00 for the loss of life of Mylene J. Doria; P15,000.00 for consequential
damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
May God have mercy on your soul.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued
an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that
under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, the penalty for homicide is
reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.[26]
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER AMENDED TO HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic)
AND TO INDEMNIFY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF P175,000.00 BASED ONLY ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
HOMICIDE.
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY TO (sic) THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE DESPITE ILLEGAL ARREST AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.[27]
The appeal has no merit.
Accused-appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
not strong enough to sustain his conviction, asserting that Maximo Dorias testimony that he
saw him about a meter away washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well was highly
improbable inasmuch as it was dark at that time. Accused-appellant also considered it strange
that when Maximo saw him, he did not bother to ask if he had seen Mylene. Finally, accused-
appellant alleges that the slippers presented in court as evidence are not the same ones
which were recovered at the scene of the crime since the pictures presented in court did not
show the leaf painted in red on the left slipper.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference.[28] Such evidence is founded on experience
and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.[29] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction in criminal cases when there is more than one circumstance, derived from facts
duly given and the combination of all is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is: the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that
each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with
his innocence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution avers that there are several circumstances availing which,
when pieced together, point to accused-appellant as the author of the gruesome crime
committed on the night of March 25, 1994, to wit:
1. A few hours after the victims probable time of death, Maximo saw accused-appellant, with
an ice pick clenched in his mouth, washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well.[30]
2. A pair of slippers which Maximo identified as belonging to accused-appellant was found at
the scene of the crime. One was found beside the victims body while the other was under her
buttocks.[31] Maximo positively pointed to accused-appellant as the owner of the pair of
slippers because of a distinguishing mark of the painting of a red leaf on the left slipper.
Maximo said accused-appellant used to frequent their house wearing the same pair of slippers
for over a year.[32]
3. The hair strands which were found on Mylenes right hand and the hair strands taken from
accused-appellant were shown to have similar characteristics when subjected to microscopic
examination.[33]
4. Accused-appellants undershirt and short pants which he wore on the night of March 25,
1994 had bloodstains. His wife admitted having washed the undershirt and short pants in the
early morning of March 26, 1994.[34]
Contrary to the allegations of accused-appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient to sustain his conviction. Maximo stated on the witness stand that he was able to
identify accused-appellant because he focused his flashlight on him while he was washing his
bloodstained hands at an artesian well located only a meter away from where Maximo was
standing.[35] Maximo considered it wise not to talk to accused-appellant because at that time
he had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and looked slightly drunk. As to the allegation that
the slippers presented in court were not the same ones recovered at the scene of the crime,
suffice it to say that the photographs taken of the crime scene were not focused only on the
pair of slippers; hence, the red leaf may be too minuscule to be noticed. In any case, the pair
of slippers shown in the photographs corroborate the testimony of the prosecutions witnesses
that a pair of rubber slippers were indeed recovered at the scene.
It might not be amiss to note that Maximo was not shown to have had any motive to impute
so grave a wrong on accused-appellant. Prior to the incident, accused-appellant used to
frequent Maximos house for a visit.[36] On the night of the incident, Maximo even sought the
help of accused-appellants father to search for Mylene.
On the other hand, the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are incredulous, to say
the least. Leonardo Rondero, accused-appellants father, testified that he mauled his son in an
effort to pacify him during a heated altercation with his wife, Christine. Leonardo said that he
felt embarrassed because his son was shouting invectives at Christine and was causing a
scene in the neighborhood so he hit the accused-appellant several times. Leonardos curious
way of pacifying his son resulted in bodily injuries on the latter. Strangely, despite his
sustained injuries and profuse bleeding, accused-appellant and his wife just went to sleep
after Leonardo left.[37] We find it unnatural that a father, a barangay kagawad, would
repeatedly hit his son in an effort to pacify him in the middle of a marital spat. We find it even
more unnatural that one who was bleeding profusely would act so insouciant as to just to go
to sleep without attending to his injuries.
Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were
taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of
his right against self incrimination. Aside from executing a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant executed a waiver of the provisions of
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution regarding the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation.[38] It appears, however, that the waivers were executed by the accused
without the assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission
without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under
Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the
psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of
procedural safeguards is inherently coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice
Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,[39] Compulsion does not necessarily
connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure
which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice or
impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion
tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. Needless to say, the
above-mentioned provisions are an affirmation that coercion can be mental as well as physical
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.
[40]
It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually
proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness[41] and morphine forced out of the mouth of the
accused may also be used as evidence against him.[42] Consequently, although accused-
appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband
in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority.[43] This was
never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit
of the poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain
other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having been seized in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as
corroborative evidence, the circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant are sufficient
to establish his guilt.
Having disposed of the foregoing, we now come to the issue of whether accused-appellant
should be convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
It is a jurisprudential rule that an appeal throws a whole case to review and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed
from whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not.[44]
The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven
due to the absence of spermatozoa in the victims private part. It is well settled that the
absence of spermatozoa in the victims private part does not negate the commission of rape
for the simple reason that the mere touching of the pudenda by the male organ is already
considered as consummated rape. Mylene Doria was naked from waist down when she was
found. Her private organ had hymenal lacerations at 1:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock
positions. There were fresh lacerations in the labia minora at 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock
positions as well. The trial judge even noted that it can be conclusively deduced that her sex
organ was subjected to a humiliating punishment. While the examining physician speculated
that the lacerations could have been caused by a piece of wood or rounded object, he did not
rule out the possibility of forcible sexual intercourse.
The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on
her person. Contusion was found on Mylenes face, arms and thighs. In rape cases, when a
woman is forcibly made to lie down, she will utilize her elbow as the fulcrum so that abrasions
will be observed. In an attempt to stand, the victim will flex her neck forward. The offender
will then push her head backwards, causing hematoma at the region of the occiput. To prevent
penetration of the male organ, she will try to flex her thighs and the offender will give a strong
blow to the inner aspects of both thighs so that the victim will be compelled to straighten
them.[45]
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, aside from the hymenal lacerations, the examining
physician testified that Mylene sustained abrasions on her left elbow, right buttock and right
upper hip and contusion hematoma at the occipital area, i.e., back part of the head, right side.
[46] Indeed, the physical evidence indubitably tells a harrowing crime committed against
nine-year old Mylene Doria in a manner that no words can sufficiently describe.
Anent accused-appellants third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellants
warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His
warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating
facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on Maximos suspicion that he was
involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early
morning of March 26, 1994.[47] Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity
attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to
the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in
the proceedings.
Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open
to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of
assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused
who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.
Accused-appellants guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and
brutal slaying of Mylene Doria, this Court has no other recourse but to impose the penalty of
death upon accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. At this juncture, it should be stated that
four justices of the court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in
line with our ruling in People vs. Mahinay.[48] The award of moral damages in the sum of
P100,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum
of P15,000.00 as consequential damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City finding
accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide committed
against Mylene J. Doria and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as consequential damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba,
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of
P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a
certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use
of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of
the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan
West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her
husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the
letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for
their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed,
Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be
able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt,
Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the
back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing
there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant
descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and
black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as
appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he
was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not
be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that
appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he
had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant
immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her
house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground
floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that
day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn
was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife.
While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body
of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel
was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the
floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had
arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found
in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and
found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside
her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer
Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running
away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when
Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he
was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the
former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing
their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the
result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long
as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt
that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitms body was complete when Dr.
Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death
may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of
rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence
of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr.
Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were
noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of
the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the
vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it
is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the
victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating
resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene
type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A persons
DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA
in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly,
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same
DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice
in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva
which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the
assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or
assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the
crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied
exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to
that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant
showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily,
a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by
the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in
the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has
proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar,
the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal
canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to
sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the
house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants
wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim,
Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4)
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998
near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white
shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black
shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7)
Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house
of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a
pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and
"J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive
with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the
appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-
incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which
was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-
post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA
profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence
and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel
Dawangs house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the
June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an
impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two
places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius
from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from
the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed
reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted
on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on
mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more
than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain
a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by
matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It
is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the
likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a
conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the
whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense
charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present
case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the
identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last
saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She
witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the back
of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and
killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from
the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape
her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmothers house
on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar,
wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49
According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and
the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If
you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not
contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case.
It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony
of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or
reason for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and
by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed
the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by
means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52 However, in rape
committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law
spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that
the victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry
by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of
hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender
age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older than
the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to
the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws
house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of
this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not
unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the
family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral
damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death
for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
he be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the
amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages.
The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant.
Rtcspped
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch
51, finding accused-appellant Radel Gallarde[1] (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter
EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages.[2]
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy.
Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent,
and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her
death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA
TALAN.[3]
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pre-trial conference.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy
Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and
Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are
faithfully summarized in the Appellees Brief as follows: Korte
In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Radel
Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta,
Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer (TSN
dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As they
partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate.
Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other. Jaime
whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading
to his house (Id., pp. 4-6).
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her
and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon
Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 oclock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin
and Rose regrouped at Renatos place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger
arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for
her (Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughters
disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie
Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for
the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire (TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-
10 and 24).
When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away from appellants house,
one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Edithas left foot slipper (TSN dated October 22,
1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the
toilet about 6 meters away from appellants house. The searchers found appellant squatting
with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-
kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was relieving himself (Id., pp.
11-16).
Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." When
told "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha," appellant responded "I let her go and
brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where did you come
from since a while a go you were not yet in this toilet?" appellant answered "I was with Kiko, I
was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
appellants statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking (Id., pp. 16-20).
Sclaw
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy. Captain
Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen talking with
the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22).
Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her slipper,
she saw Edithas right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found near the house of
appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).
Around 3 meters farther from Edithas right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was old,
8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day (TSN
dated Sept. 25, 1997, pp. 25).
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole
among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted rubber
tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this loose
soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Edithas hand
pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here
already dead!" Mindful of appellants safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant
to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He
flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in
the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN
dated Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-5).
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of
the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she
was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).
The cause of Edithas death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed "suffocation
of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with
laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated Oct. 23, 1997, pp. 22-
23)."[5] Sclex
On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial
and the alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime
occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He knew
EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a sister because she used to come to his house.
They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither raped not killed Editha.[6]
On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court,
GALLARDE admitted that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parents house,
particularly in the kitchen. He was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as
he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he
returned to the drinking place and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk.
He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did not see Kgd.
Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallardes) toilet on the night of May
6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to the
PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and
killing of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan
residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police
headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a
hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was recovered near his house.
When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented by any lawyer.
GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he
considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner.
When he came to know that Edithas parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on
friendly terms with them. However, he did no go to them to tell them he was innocent
because they brandished a bolo in anger.
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was
still alive when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home. From the
time he arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact.
[7]
On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of
carnal knowledge. It observed: Xlaw
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangins testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained slit
wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion of
her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina was blood, coupled
with dirt. Had there been observed the presence of even just a drop of seminal fluid in or
around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and rupture resulted
from phallic intrusion. Without such observation, however, "carnal knowledge" as element of
rape would be an open question.
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
because GALLARDEs alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily
proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27
October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the
matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to
award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 6
May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected child."
Accordingly, in its decision[8] of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court hereby
convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha
Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00.[9]
His motion for reconsideration,[10] having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution[11]
of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us.
We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.
In his Appellants Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court
committed the following errors:
1.......In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide. Xsc
2.......In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was
responsible for the death of Editha Talan.
3.......In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[12]
We sustain GALLARDEs contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an
information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the
information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is
true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed
by reason or on the occasion of rape,[13] it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component
offense, the accused can be convicted of the other.[14] In rape with homicide, in order to be
convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged.[15]
It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[16]
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance,
GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is
tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or
information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.[17] Scx
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although
circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for
the death of EDITHA.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[18] The prosecution is not always tasked to
present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence
does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability.[19] Even in the absence of
direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that
the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.[20]
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be
more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the
accused.[21]
The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of
rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and
the rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex
crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against
the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are
usually circumstantial.[22]
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no
other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty
therefor. We quote with approval the lower courts enumeration of the circumstantial evidence
in this case: Scmis
1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to frequent his
place.
2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged
themselves in beer.
3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5) meters
east of the Talan kitchen.
4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of Edithas
hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and that Editha returned to
the kitchen.
5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp. She told
him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the same direction Gallarde
took.
6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he was
seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.
7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her
lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind Gallardes residence.
8. Before Edithas body was discovered, a searcher found a girls slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6 inches
long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallardes house.
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and size as the first
one. Both slippers were Edithas, the searchers recalled.
10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C") was thereafter found in the field, near Exh. "B-1." It was
an old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers. Missc
12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta told
them that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.
13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and beside
the thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and knees were soiled.
14....... At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he answered
revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go and brought her back to the
dike and let her go home."
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he was
with Kiko and he slept at the latters house, which answer Mario Bado promptly refuted saying,
"Vulva of your mother Kiko was with me drinking." Bado and Kiko were not at the place of the
Talans that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez
sans protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Edithas cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from her
nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.
......From the lower portion of Edithas vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.
......Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.
......The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Edithas nose
and mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her face, and that in
30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the vaginal injuries contributing to
her death.[23] Misspped
As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecutions evidence
therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of
spermatozoa in EDITHAs private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of
spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape.[24] Our doubt
on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the
laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of
coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin disclosed
that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the
penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any object other
than the penis of a person.
We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the
assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not
follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said to
have positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity
and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as
for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of
all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a
suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there
is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and
unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it
is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[25] If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then
felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. Spped
As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case
and enumerated by the trial court positively established the identity of GALLARDE, and no one
else, as the person who killed EDITHA.
We cannot agree with the trial courts rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K")
taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken
while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an
accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination[26] proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.[27] The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act.[28] Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;[29] and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken
from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which
was contracted by his victim;[30] to expel morphine from his mouth;[31] to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;[32] and to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.[33]
There is also no merit in GALLARDEs argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will
justify his acquittal. Jospped
The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the
crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a
woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was
committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime provided it
appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of
the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and within the
jurisdiction of the court.[34]
The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court.[35]
The rule merely requires that the information shows that the crime was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even take judicial notice that said place is
within its jurisdiction.[36]
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the
information does not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or time," but may
prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the
defendant."[37]
Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time
of the commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left
the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found.
This was further corroborated by the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the
degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997.[38]
Likewise, GALLARDEs alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present
witnesses who could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated
him on this matter. The defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be
given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[39] Sppedjo
Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDEs claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude
his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body
of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi
and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[40]
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that
might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that
when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their
testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit.[41] Testimonies of witnesses who have no
motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence.[42]
With respect to GALLARDEs claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that
any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea.[43] The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment
and trial.[44] GALLARDEs assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged
illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as
manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by
his active participation in the trial thereafter.[45] It is settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.[46] It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a
valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and
completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.[47] Verily, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused.[48] Nexold
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any
modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This
should be construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum
of P50,000, per current case law, should be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan,
in Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty of the crime of
murder is hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years of the medium period of of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual damages and
P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan.
Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.
SO ORDERED. DAVIDE, JR.J
G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.
Filemon Flores for J. Lorenzo Vergara.

PUNO, J.:
The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has
been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance are important
rights in conflict: the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative
to be silent to the State to be exempt from further prosecution; the right of the State to
prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke
the immunity it has granted to an accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity
extended by the PCGG to an accused.
First, the facts.
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with Gregorio
Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando
Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019) as amended, docketed as Case No. 11960 in the respondent court,
as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and March 1986, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan, accused Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., J. Lorenzo Vergara, Ramon F. Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag,
Jr., Jose C. Crisanto, Jr., acting in various capacities as management officials of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and/or
Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI), all government-owned and controlled corporations, as
well as Dolores Potenciano of BLTB, acting in concert in the performance of their duties, in
utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities, and with intent to gain, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, son-in-law of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by
affinity within the third degree, and Fernando Balatbat, did then and there, willfully and
unlawfully, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board resolution and
in disregard of better offers, promote and facilitate the sale of a major portion of the public
utility assets of the Pantranco Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-
FIVE MILLION (P775,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the North Express Transport,
Inc. (NETI), which the accused knew to be a newly organized paper corporation with a
purported paid-up capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS and owned and
controlled by accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, by misleading, inducing and/or unduly
influencing the Board of Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI into approving a Memorandum of
Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
terms and conditions which made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI
without any down payment, and which, inter alia, allowed NETI to operate PNEI's franchises
and utilize, even before the execution of the said Purchase Agreement, not only the PNEI
assets subject of the proposed sale, but also other utility buses and properties of PNEI not
covered by the sale, thereby allowing NETI to derive an income from said operation between
the period of actual delivery and execution of the Purchase Agreement of the sum of EIGHTY-
FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(P85,689,180.00) PESOS before the actual payment of the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION
(P55,000,000.00) PESOS down payment, thereby giving accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III
unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the
damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED MILLION
(P400,000,000.00) PESOS, and such other amounts as may be awarded by the Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for petitioner Araneta, all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11960 were arraigned. Their trial started on September 20, 1988.
In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged
in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
by transporting to the United States and concealing the investment of money through cronies
and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited
the testimonies of witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa.
Petitioner Vergara was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and
by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November
14, 1988 and August 11, 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas. After their interviews,
petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First Couple.
They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. They agreed.
On May 16, 1990, the Philippine Government through the PCGG, and the petitioners
formalized their separate agreements in writing. The agreement with petitioner Mapa
provided:
WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself available as a witness in the case
entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in the on-
going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil and criminal cases which the
REPUBLIC has filed or intends to file in relation to this participation in various contracts that
are alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos in violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make himself available as witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to file
against MAPA under the terms and conditions herein below set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as
follows:
1. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants MAPA immunity from investigation,
prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and
information are given, including any offense and commission of which any information,
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis
thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLICs review of the
cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against MAPA within the
purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal or
exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and
criminal proceeding or investigation.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and relying on
MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of his commitment to
fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be
deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to MAPA and his
exclusion from PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigations has been
undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as an admission by MAPA of any criminal
or civil liability.
The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated:
WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make himself available as a witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in
the on-going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. 11960 entitled "People vs. Gregorio
Ma. Araneta, et al.", now pending before the Sandiganbayan, Second Division;
WHEREAS, on the basis of VERGARAs express intent to make himself available as witness in
the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in the light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC
approved to grant immunity to VERGARA under the terms and conditions hereinbelow set
forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as
follows:
1. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants VERGARA immunity from investigation,
prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his testimony and
information are given, including any offense and commission of which any information,
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis
thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLICs review of
VERGARAs participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal
of VERGARA from Criminal Case No. 11960.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to VERGARA on the basis of and relying
on VERGARA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of h is
commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled
"United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall
forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution to
VERGARA and his exclusion from Criminal Case No. 11960 has been undertaken in the
exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly,
nothing herein shall be construed as a admission by VERGARA of any criminal liability.
On the same day, May 16, 1990, former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote to petitioner
Mapa the following letter:
Dear Sir:
With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the Republic of the
Philippines on May 16, 1990, we would like to confirm
that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to cause the dismissal of the case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, et. al., " Criminal Case No.
11960 of the Sandiganbayan. We understand that in that case the prosecution is in the
process of closing its evidence with the submission of its offer of documentary evidence and
that it is your intention thereupon to submit a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the prosecution
to prove its case. We affirm that if, because of the situation of the case, it would not be
possible for the Republic to file the necessary motion to cause the dismissal thereof, then we
shall upon submission of your Motion to Dismiss offer no objection to its favorable
consideration by the court in relation to you.
We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the U.S. prosecutors the grant of
immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive than that granted to Mr. Jaime C. Laya.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) M.A.T. Caparas
A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.
The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to
testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished
by the PCGG. But despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors
decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result was a debacle for the US prosecutors
and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former President Marcos
was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.
The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960
before the respondent court. On the basis of the immunity granted to them, petitioners filed a
Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22, 1990. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio B. Dionido
and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no objection to petitioners' Motion, viz:
That herein accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara were granted immunity by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government from criminal liability arising from cases which
PCGG had or intends to file against them;
The PCGG, therefore, interposes no objection to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by accused
Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara in Criminal Case No. 11960-PCGG by reason of the
immunity aforestated.
Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, by a
vote of 4-1. 1 Petitioners were undaunted. On April 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. This was followed on May 23, 1991, by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation reiterating PCGG's
acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent court, however, refused
to budge from its prior position. It denied petitioners' motions.
Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of
discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration. They pose the
following issues:
2.00.a. Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No. 11960 make the
immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No. 11960?
2.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG, which would become basis of the
grant of immunity, be submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it may determine
whether such information is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or liability of a
respondent, defendant or an accused in an action involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth?
2.00.c. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present
petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them?
2.00.d. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that when it was
granted, the prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 11960 had already rested its case?"
The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of Atty. David Castro as
Chairman of PCGG. In its Comment dated January 6, 1992, the PCGG somersaulted from its
stance supporting the petitioners. Its Comment states:
1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has indeed granted Messrs. Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., and Jesus Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation, prosecution and
punishment for any offense for which civil and criminal cases have been or to be filed against
them within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A but such immunity is
conditional.
2. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said petitioners shall give to
said Commission by way of information and testimony in cases now pending or to be filed
before the Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to prove the latter's acquisition or
accumulation of property or properties in violation of existing laws.
3. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa, Jr. and Jesus Vergara to testify in favor of the
government and against other defendants on matters referred to in the immediately
preceding paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both defendants (emphasis supplied).
It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply of petitioners dated
June 10, 1992, where it adopted the respondent Sandiganbayan's questioned Resolution and
Concurring Opinions dated
March 6, 1991. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity' from criminal liability
and/or prosecution is a matter subject to the court's judicious determination and approval,
after applying the test of compliance and the standard of reasonableness with the rigid
requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14-A, as amended." The
Solicitor General defended the stance of the PCGG and the respondent court.
We find merit in the petition.
The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents immunity
from suits, has a long history.
We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. Article XVI,
section 3 provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent." The classic
justification for the non-suability of the State is that provided by Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes: ". . . there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which
the right depends." 2 Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary
immunities, viz: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains the rationale for this immunity in
the following manners: ". . . The first is intended to ensure representation of the constituents
of the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its
sessions. The second enables the legislator to express views bearing upon the public interest
without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to support his
statements with the usual evidence required in the court of justice. In other words, he is given
more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged
for the public good." 3 The President was also immunized from suit during his tenure in the
1973 Constitution.
Aside from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to
facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact against the
people. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. Thus, PD 749
provides:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210,
211, 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions
of the said codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned;
and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of
official abuse; and who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or
punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given,
and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided, That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the
information and the testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who
is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned
violations: Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice
for such gift or bribe-giving; And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above- mentioned
provisions of law, rules and regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public
officer;
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Likewise, under PD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created to conduct a fact-finding
inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder case, was given the power to compel testimony
of a witness. In exchange for his testimony, such a witness was extended transactional
immunity from later prosecution. Section 5 of said PD No. 1886 states:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the
Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence
produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall
he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
Indeed, as early as April 16, 1951, R.A. 602, establishing a minimum wage law, extended
transactional immunity to persons who testify or produce books, papers or other records and
documents before the Secretary of Labor or a Wage Board. A similar but not identical power is
given to the prosecution under section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to
discharge an accused to be utilized as a state witness.
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the used-
and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection.
By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of
the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. 5 In
Kastigar vs. US, 6 the rationale of these immunity grants is well explained, viz:
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and
other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The
power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth
Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .
xxx xxx xxx
But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions from
the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations,
and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it
protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has
been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege.
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence, are not
incompatible with these values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to
testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that
many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful
testimony are those implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such
offenses, and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses . . . (E)very State in the
Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The
commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have characterized immunity statutes as
essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .
We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended,
to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. The pertinent sections provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes
that such testimony or provision of information would tend to incriminate him or subject him
to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or
provide information.
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'
Sec. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity
from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any
investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any
respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in
question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove
the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to
protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to
do so by the latter or by the Commission.
There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and
5. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling witness to
testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure
information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness compelled to testify is
not immunized from prosecution. He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is completely immunized from
prosecution.
The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under
section 5, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is not disputed that they
furnished information to the PCGG during their interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers and US
prosecutor La Bella. Due to their cooperation, they were extended immunity from prosecution
by the PCGG. In return, they flew to New York to testify in the RICO trial of Imelda Marcos. As
they were witnesses for the prosecution, their expenses were shouldered by the PCGG itself.
At the last minute, however, US prosecutor La Bella decided to dispense with their testimony.
The rest is history. The prosecution failed to convict Mrs. Marcos.
The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity
granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent
court. To be sure, we have grappled with this once slippery issue in the case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81, and we held:
We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to look into the validity
of the immunity granted by the PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was extended to his son,
petitioner-intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.
xxx xxx xxx
The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten
wealth must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14. Necessarily, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases must
include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant
immunity pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No.14.
It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired jurisdiction to try and
decide Case No. 11960 where petitioners stand accused of violating RA 3019. It has started
receiving the evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners, with the
conformity of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a motion to dismiss addressed to the
respondent court. The motion to dismiss is thus a mere incident well within the jurisdiction of
the respondent court to resolve.
The next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range of the power of the
respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting immunity to
petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended.
Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of review
is plenary in reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to
reverse the grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter's judgment. The
submission will warrant the respondent court in examining the intrinsic quality of the given
information or testimony, i.e., whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the
respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in
question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the respondent court to change the judgment
made by the PCGG that the witness' information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or
prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.
We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the
texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In instances, where the
intent is to endow courts of justice with the power to review and reverse tactical moves of the
prosecution, the law confers the power in clear and certain language. Thus, under section 9 of
Rule 119, the prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge
an accused to be a state witness but its decision is made subject to the approval of the court
trying the case. It has to file a proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the
prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the requirements of the rule on discharge of a
witness. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere
with the discretion of the prosecution on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as
amended, is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the
respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5
immunity. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and
unlimited power to reverse PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity.
Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.
We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as
amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority.
The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to
the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The basic reason for vesting
the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. The decision
to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a
higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who
appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of
the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who
should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the
sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine
who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court
is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the
prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts
to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness
demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants.
Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly
even and perpetually level.
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section
5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go
no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only
ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in
any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions;
(b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would
establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide
judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the
guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot
substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution
and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.
Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted
by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.
The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the information in
the course of interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US
prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.
Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as
mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not limit said
information to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a
respondent. Such a reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly restrictive of the
intendment of section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.
It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the
judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or
accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the
circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after their interview, the PCGG was
obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. It
forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from
prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or
exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and
criminal proceeding or investigation." In the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall
cause the dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was
reiterated by former Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the
petitioners, as related above. The parties' agreements were then implemented. Petitioners
travelled to New York to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses. It was even the PCGG
that shouldered their expenses. All these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that
the pieces of information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with
which the Marcoses acquired their wealth.
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO
cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the
requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements. Under section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they did.
Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as
witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were
not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of
their own making. It was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have
thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since petitioners' failure to
testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and
equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the
PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be
disturbed. It joined the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. When
the respondent court denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined
the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this petition for review on
certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.
We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to
petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of
E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already
charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the
judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal
grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees
and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked
at any time after its acquisition and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an
accused dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that decriminalize an
act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They constitute a bar against the
further prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. To be
sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 has yet to be established beyond
doubt. The PCGG itself does not appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence
against the petitioners in said criminal case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was
granted immunity not only because of the information he gave to the prosecution but also
". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or
intends to file against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". . . in
light of Republic's review of Vergara's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960 . . . ." After
reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PCGG appears to have sensed the sterility of its
efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its former chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that
petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 after PCGG rest its
evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to prove its case." In his May 16, 1990 letters to the
petitioners, he assured them that "we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable
consideration." This is a patent admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and
that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.
Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be
strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as special
privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the
raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity
statutes.
The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not
the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine
even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right
against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries.
Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime
for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate
the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity
statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness
to testify despite his plea of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a
witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use
immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza
from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it the
surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right
against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and
protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be
given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve
crimes but it must do it, rightly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated March 7, and June 3, 1991
are annulled and set aside and the Amended Information against the petitioners in Criminal
Case No. 11960 is ordered dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002]
JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being
challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right
to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the
Constitution.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs,
follow.
In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks,
namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and
Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no.
464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds
while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who
promised to replace the dishonored check.
When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the
private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.
On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against
petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail
recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch
217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of
herein petitioners, thus:
It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining
witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed
and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.
No Bail Recommended.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of
Arrest which was denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners motion for bail filed on July 24,
2001 was denied by the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City
Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post
bail pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which
amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified
theft. Said Circular specifically provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum,
pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional
of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total
amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.
In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be
discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19
of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. x x x.
We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section
19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can
be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to
petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on
the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction
of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.[2] Based on this principle, the Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment
authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
In People vs. Tongko,[3] this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed
in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to
those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient
basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it
cruel and inhuman.
Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa
committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the
amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in
the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have become
negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.
This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and
categorically stated in the following:
WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed
by means of bouncing checks;
WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in
the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently
result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system
of the country;
WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by
increasing the existing penalties provided therefor.
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a
laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the
countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter
people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed
by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was
decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.
Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[4] The burden of proving the
invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present
clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be
rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity
of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders.[5] PD 818 was published in the Official
Gazette on December 1, 1975.[6]
With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:p
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed
a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the attendant
details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another burning issue,
we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-
appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and
bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for
the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the
fact that the same was commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the
complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA.
No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10
years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW 2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on
September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5
and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo
Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a
small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in
their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her
father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-
11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa
and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the
appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13,
ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed himself
on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ
causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While appellant was pumping on her, he
even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa,
masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After
satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what
had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself
the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time,
was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time
and this usually took place when her mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However,
after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn
told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain
where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to
the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her
mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However,
when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo,
nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B.
Preyna, 3 the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by
the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9). 4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE
charge against the accused was only the figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her
daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn
statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's
grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado
Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an
affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was
substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came
to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of
the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband
poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification issued
by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh.
3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is
her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her mother. That
Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the accused in
consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the
love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very
strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the
sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project.
That he could not have committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa as his
own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of
the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro
Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours
considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document
denominated "Contract of Services" duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He
asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa,
the said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the imputed
commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing
earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the
judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation
Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be
meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's
grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become the sole
owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted
that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own
daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of
the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry
woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa
reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the
vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation
took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last
witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of
Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa
according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the
testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the
room of her house. 5
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the
lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony
of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant
can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the
accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into
the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the
lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE,
HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7
O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE
VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN
PARAAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. 6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires
a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court
remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a)
An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall
on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the
scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting
that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot
situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion
Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so
that, in the event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the
lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-
appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the
records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to
believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the
accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners would have the property for
their own. 8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to
instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on
account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. 9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible
where she has no motive to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which
the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not
surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made
her cry. 11 Once again, we rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the
circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and immature rape
victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of
tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra).
12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious
and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when
he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said
accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room.
Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that,
while the accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ
from her testimony in court wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis
from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother,
Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see
her to apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in
court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to
see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. 13 These alleged discrepancies merely pertain
to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room
where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she
was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever
words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole.
A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother
learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of the witness
do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and
intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth
and has not been rehearsed as it is not to he expected that he will be able to remember every
single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear
and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that
be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00
o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped
Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This
Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light
of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra, 17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of
distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited
only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female
reprodructive canal being capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no
difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive
organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-
term fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he vaginal wall,
though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate traumatic
injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At
pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the
doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of
rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In the
case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations
of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of
the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no law
expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no
motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case,
uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly,
the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive
identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim,
Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some
painting job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paraaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from
April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years
old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory
Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous
and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly
inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal
grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant
and worth reiterating, thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and
immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on
its, part to tend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The
state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on
the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into
account It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for
such institution There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law
with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that
with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies
explanation, much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal,
self-restraint should even be more marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed
by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa
although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination, he
admitted that before the charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated Rodessa as his
real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The Court
notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's
maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother
stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children,
including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate, even if he were not
the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the
abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering
that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely
within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason
enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus,
the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the
more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral
ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the
accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances
of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we
AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999]
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public
respondents that:
"(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order x x x creates dangerous precedent as
there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may
repeal a law.
(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain,
whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress
within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully
debated upon x x x.
(4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the
judge looks at the past, x x x the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its
power of judicial review.
(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that
of Senator Pimentel."
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents
attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review
Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law
to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one
hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order x x x is within the
scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was
reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or
arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be
repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and
bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not
incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on
automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case,
G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its
implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R.
Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5,
1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that
the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court
lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the
petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no
longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be
a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation."[1] To start with, the Court is not
changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the
metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds
are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was
filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
`WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed
statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and
19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are
hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide
for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including
the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or
corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.'
and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippines.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office"
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he
submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance
with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation
informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and
Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this
Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A.
No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until
sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It
is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2]
xxx
"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case.
By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it.[3] There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.[4] x x x For after the
judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible.[5]
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly
pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case
of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,[6] viz:
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause
has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that
the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and
writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out
of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at
the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King;
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction
of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought
to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing
the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and as to
who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution[7] vests the entirety of
judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To
be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice.[8] For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when
by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out
by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court
restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonble time to check
its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court,
contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court
has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the
independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have
been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules
are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental
power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs
execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in
criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence,
for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose
that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."[9]
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent
with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In
re Cunanan[10] Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953[11] which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946
up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question."[12] The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article
X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar.[13]
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxxxxxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the
manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it
is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the
process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since
time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court
to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated,
our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after
November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized
the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial
judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x x a
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or
announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the
public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by
the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxxxxxxxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein
respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the
non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern,
and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of
Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of
Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules
relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of
execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to
Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article
81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out `without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency
powers at all times." (Underscoring supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant
reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such
clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the
purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by
the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to
herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28,
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
read:
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
9. The `right to information' provision is self-executing. It supplies 'the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by
the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III,
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter."
(Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA
530, 534-535 [1987]."
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner
Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his
client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as
counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this
Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted
the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its
Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public
respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the
convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case
having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of
the executive department x x x. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function."[14] Public respondents cite as their
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
"Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public
respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.[15]
As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent
the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time
of execution."[16] The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is
the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein,
it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress
of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President
to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and
the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend
execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they
infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents
therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in
its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a
living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on
December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been
concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator
Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law;
(b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4)
Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding
review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and
would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1999[17] at 10. a.m. to deliberate on
petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's
motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend
the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good
reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere
speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading
under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty
(130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present
Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A.
No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt
that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify
petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did
not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary - - - "until June 15, 1999, coeval with
the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner
becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme
caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the
Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all
rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste
and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was
believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to
take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the
crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The
public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt
the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these
supervening events as follows:
xxx
"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law repealing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that
of Senator Pimentel."[18]
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited
House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing
the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which
provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the
Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter and
urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressmen as of January 11, 1999. In
a marathon session yesterday that extended up to 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House "x x x
does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated
that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of
heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be
lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x x the question of capital
punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so
long as men believe in punishment."[19] In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue
to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has
been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-
death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate,
even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the
debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens
to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x x x
it is the very purpose of the Constitution - - - and particularly the Bill of Rights - - - to declare
certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."[20] Man has
yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will
bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.
The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is
the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can
pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by
society.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the
Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in
accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 139413-15 March 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENDRICO GALAS, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Endrico Galas was charged with three counts of rape upon the complaint of his 15-year old
daughter Sharon under the following informations1:
"CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0333
That on or about the 5th day of February 1997 in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of
Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the father of one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of
force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have
carnal knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0334
That on or about the 28th day of February 1997, in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of
Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the father one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of
force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have
carnal knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0335
That on or about the month of July 1997, in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
being the father of one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have carnal
knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on April 28, 1998. At the hearing on May 7,
1999, accused manifested through counsel his desire to change his plea of not guilty in the
three cases to a plea of guilty only in Criminal Case No. 0334, which referred to the rape
incident on February 28, 1997. His desire to change his plea was reiterated at the hearing on
June 3, 1999. Re-arraigned on February 28, 1997, the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 0334.
The prosecution presented the complainant as witness. Sharon recounted in detail the rape
incident that occurred on February 5, 1997 and on February 28, 1997 in the house of her
grandmother, where she was then living with her father2 She testified that her father again
had intercourse with her in July 1997 in the same house, but she could not recall the time, and
that the accused would have intercourse with her anytime he likes3 Her menstruation stopped
in May 1997; the accused gave her medicol and boiled malunggay and her menstruation
occurred again on July 4, 19974. She was brought to the social worker and later to the police
station where her statement was taken. A medical examination conducted on August 7, 1997
at Guimaras Provincial Hospital by the rural health physician confirmed loss of virginity and
healed hymenal lacerations.
The accused was found guilty in Criminal Case No. 0334. Criminal Cases Nos. 0333 and 03355
were ordered dismissed thus:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his daughter and is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of DEATH.
Accused is also directed to indemnify the complainant the amount of P100,000.00, broken as
follows:
P70,000.00 - by way of indemnity;
P30,000.00 - as moral and exemplary damages.
Criminal Cases Nos. 0333 and 0335 are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
Criminal Case No. 0334 is before us on automatic review.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in his brief:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF
GUILTY.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."6
Accused-appellant claims that his plea of guilt was improvidently made as he was not fully
appraised of the consequences of his change of plea of not guilty to guilty. The trial court
failed to inform the accused that the imposable penalty is still death despite his change of
plea. Accused-appellant further claims that the prosecution failed to prove the true age of the
victim.
The contention that the accused-appellant made an improvident plea of guilt is correct. The
record of the proceedings upon his re-arraignment shows that when the accused entered a
plea of guilty on the February 28, 1997 incident, he was informed that because of his plea "he
will be punished by reclusion perpetua or death".
"COURT:
Re-arraign the accused on the February 28, 1997 incident.
INTERPRETER:
(Reading the Information before the accused in the local dialect which he understood)
Q: Did you understand what has been read to you?
ACCUSED:
A: Yes, ma'am
INTERPRETER:
Q: Do you admit what is being charged or what has been read to you. What is your plea?
ACCUSED:
A: I am admitting the charges against me. I enter a plea of guilty on the 28 February 1997
incident.
INTERPRETER (to court)
Your Honor, the accused pleads guilty.
COURT:
Atty. Calanza, have you informed your client of the effect and import of his plea?
ATTY. CALANZA:
Yes, Your Honor. In fact the accused had been arraigned on three (3) informations where he
entered a plea of not guilty. After pondering on the charges against him, the accused changed
his mind and told me that he will enter a plea of guilty on the 28 February 1997 incident only.
We are in fact thankful to the prosecutor and the complainant because they agreed to our
bargaining. The delay on the trial, Your Honor, is because of our haggling with the prosecutor
and the complainant to agree on our bargaining.
COURT:
But did you inform your client on the possible penalty which shall be meted to him?
ATTY. CALANZA:
Yes, Your Honor. I told him that because of his intended plea of guilty he will be punished by
reclusion perpetua or death.
COURT:
Did he understand what reclusion perpetua is and what death is?
ATTY. CALANZA:
Yes, Your Honor, I explained it to him exhaustively.
COURT:
(to the accused in the local dialect)
Q: Did you understand the information which was read to you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you understand that the information tells you that the complaint was filed against you
by Sharon Galas, your daughter?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you understand that the information which was read to you says that you have carnal
knowledge with your daughter Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you also understand that you have a carnal knowledge with your daughter by means of
force and intimidation as read in the information?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know that because of your plea of guilty you may be meted a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you lawyer inform you about this?
ACCUSED:
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to accused)
Despite that you entered a plea of guilty?
ACCUSED:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Now, after having been informed of that effect and import of your plea of guilt wherein you be
meted a penalty of reclusion or death, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
ACCUSED:
Yes, Your Honor, I admit.7
Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that the penalty imposable is
death even if he pleads guilty. We are inclined to agree with the accused-appellant that had
he been so informed, he would not have changed his plea and voluntarily accept the
imposition of a death penalty. This Court has held8 that it is mandatory for the trial court to
accomplish three things to avoid an improvident plea of guilt, namely: 1) conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's
plea; 2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise decree of his
culpability and 3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires. It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the
plea; the court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted, he could be meted the
death penalty. Death is a single and indivisible penalty and will be imposed regardless of the
presence of a mitigating circumstance.9 The importance of the court's obligation cannot be
overemphasized for one cannot dispel the possibility that the accused may have been led to
believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilt, he may be imposed the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua and not death10
Moreover, the record also does not show whether the accused was asked whether or not he
wished to present evidence in his behalf and that if desired, he was allowed to do so. After the
presentation of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely Sharon Galas,11 Dr. Tomas Saiton,
Jr.12 and Dra. Cynthia Amatril13, the prosecution presented its documentary exhibits14, and
promulgation of judgment was forthwith set for June 22, 1999.
Accordingly, we hold that the plea of guilt entered by accused-appellant on June 3, 1999
should be disregarded and set aside.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is believed that the evidence for the prosecution adequately
established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has held
that the manner by which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its
legal significance where the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission of
the accused of the offense charged15. Complainant Sharon recounted in clear detail the rape
incident that occurred on February 28, 1997, thus:
"PROSECUTOR NIELO: (to witness)
Q: On the night of February 28, 1997, can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you?
A: There at our house.
Q: While you were at your house was your father also there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the evening, did your father tell you anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me to turn off the lamp and then he ordered me to take off my dress.
Q: Where were you when your father told you to turn off the lamp?
A: There inside our house.
Q: Was that in the room where you were sleeping or in the sala?
A: There inside our house because we were about to sleep.
Q: When you were about to sleep and your father who were the other person in the night of
February 18 in the room or the portion of the house where you were sleeping?
A: In our room only the two (2) of us and in the other room my aunt and her husband.
Q: So, there were only the two (2) of you in the night of February 28, 1997?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of lamp was that when your father told you to put off?
A: A kerosene lamp.
Q: And did you put off the lamp?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said he ordered you to undress. Did you undress?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you not resist?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not resist?
A: Even if I will resist I could not overcome him because he is big and he had a bolo.
Q: When you undressed yourself, what did your father do?
A: He (took) off his clothes.
Q: What else?
A: He straddled on me.
Q: When you said undressed, you removed you shirt. What kind of clothes you were wearing
when your father ordered you to undress?
A: T-shirt and short.
Q: And did you remove your t-shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you remove your short?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about your panty? Were you having a panty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was your father wearing trouser when you said he removed his shirt?
A: No, he was wearing short.
Q: What did your father do with his short? Did he remove his short?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was your father wearing a brief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do with his brief? Did he remove his brief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you undressed yourself as ordered by your father and when he was already naked or
after he removed his shirt and brief, what did your father do?
A: He straddled on me and kissed me and then inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: While kissing you, did he fondled your breast?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was he able to insert his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after inserting his penis what did he do? Did he push and pull?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he was making that motion, was his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you not push him?
A: I pushed him but I cannot overcome him.
Q: And then when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina were you on the bed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, after your father inserted his penis and have that push and pull motion, what did he
do?
A: Something warm came off from him and then there is blood in the blanket and he turned
his back.
Q: Did you say anything to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I asked him, "Tay, why are you doing this to me?"
Q: And what did he say?
A: None."16
Sharon's testimony was corroborated by the rural health physician, Dr. Saiton, who testified
on his findings in the medical certificate17 that the victim had "hymenal laceration old healed
at 12, 3, 6 and 9 o'clock position", and his assessment "physical virginity lost".
We affirm the trial court's findings that the accused-appellant's culpability was established by
the evidence, particularly the clear and positive testimony of the child victim herself. Although
there was admittedly no physical resistance, Sharon testified that the accused always had a
bolo with him and although complainant pushed him she could not overcome the accused.
The court correctly observed that this being a crime committed by a father against his
daughter, the moral ascendancy and influence of the father substitutes for violence or
intimidation18
Anent the imposable penalty, Section 11 of R. A. No. 7659 provides that the death penalty
shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the following attendant circumstance:
"When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The information in Criminal Case No. 0334 alleged that the accused-appellant was the father
of Sharon and that Sharon is fifteen (15) years old. Sharon testified that she was seventeen
(17) years old on June 3, 1999 when she testified in court19 and that the accused-appellant is
her father.20 The accused-appellant admitted that he was the father of Sharon when the
information was read to him upon his arraignment21
However, no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove Sharon's age at the time she
was raped other than her statement in court while describing her personal circumstances,
that she was seventeen (17) years old at the time she testified on June 3, 1999. Such casual
testimony of the victim as to her age is not sufficient.
To justify the imposition of death, proof of the victim's age is indubitable. There must be
sufficient and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the accused.22 A duly
certified certificate of his birth accurately showing the complainant's age or some other
authentic documents such as a baptismal certificate or a school record, has been recognized
as competent evidence23
While it may be true that the testimony of a person as to her age, although hearsay, is
admissible as evidence of family tradition24, we cannot consider Sharon's statement at the
beginning of her testimony describing her personal circumstances as proof of age beyond
reasonable doubt that we have considered indispensable in the criminal prosecution of cases
involving the extreme penalty of death. No corroborative or supporting evidence was
presented by the prosecution. Although a "certified transcription copy" of a certificate of live
birth of Sharon Galas is found on page 10 of the Record of the preliminary investigation held
by the 16th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jordan, Guimaras, this document was not presented
in evidence during the trial. Accordingly, it does not form part of the record of the case25 and
not having been formally offered nor marked as an exhibit, it cannot be considered as
evidence nor be given evidentiary value26
Accordingly, the accused-appellant may only be convicted of simple rape, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. With respect to civil liability the court reduces the award of civil
indemnity to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and increases the moral damages to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), an award inherently concomitant to and resulting from the
odiousness of rape27. An award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of exemplary
damages is likewise justified to deter similar perversities as the rape of one's own daughter.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Endrico Galas is convicted of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 0334 and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify Sharon Galas in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152895 June 15, 2004
OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.
x--------------------------x
G.R. No. 153151 June 15, 2004
GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution are two consolidated1 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining order. Both
assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.
In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, to cease and desist from hearing Criminal Case
No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No.
153151, petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC of Caloocan City to
cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 212183, and subsequently dismiss
the case against her. In fine, however, we find that what both petitioners seek is that the
Court should revisit and abandon the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,2 which upheld
the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of these cases are not in dispute.
1. G.R. No. 152895
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P. Blg.
22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory
portion of said Information reads:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account
or for value the check described below:
Check No.:
00082270
Drawn Against:
The Region Bank
In the Amount of:
P740,000.00
Date:
December 21, 1998
Payable to:
Cash
said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient
funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for reason "DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said
check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on
the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano
doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely
that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.
On October 21, 2002,4 Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However,
she manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to
any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.
Arceta then filed the instant petition.
2. G.R. No. 153151
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal
Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense in this wise:
That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against
PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value
in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check was subsequently dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and with intent to
defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite
receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been dishonored and had not been
paid.
Contrary to Law.5
Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that B.P. Blg.
22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the
indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling.
Instead, she filed a petition with this Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the
said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:
[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the
bank for lack of funds?
[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section 2 of BP 22?
[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?
[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment?
[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment
of debt?
[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state?6
After minute scrutiny of petitioners submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in
these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus concern the
unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise put, the petitions constitute an
oblique attack on the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed
upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost two decades ago.
Petitioners add, however, among the pertinent issues one based on the observable but
worrisome transformation of certain metropolitan trial courts into seeming collection agencies
of creditors whose complaints now clog the court dockets.
But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it
is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2)
a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question raised is the very lis mota of the case.7 Only when these requisites are satisfied may
the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of
Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to
agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.
Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 18 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that
may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.9 Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that
the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is
manifested.10
Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in
the form of a copy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as
to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the petitions
are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these
petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and
appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this
Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners
have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.
Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse,
figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule
65, Section 411 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest
opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest
opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have
been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should
have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the
proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the
records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless
to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that
issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.12 Taking into account
the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.
Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in
the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.13 We have examined the contentions
of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its
implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy
that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing
Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we stressed in
Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to
strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy
confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the
trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be
burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged
invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies
elsewhere.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998]
RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his
petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second
information against him, although a first information charging the same offense had been
previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat,[2]
Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he
was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel
of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information
against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.
11542, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal.
Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried
outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] (Emphasis petitioners.)
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the
Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the
fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and
not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of
Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal
cases involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56
of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a
Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the
Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that
the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga[4] and that the Provincial Prosecutor had
filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations
for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the
motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April
3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground
that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence,
petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was
no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have
been convicted under the first information as the same was defective. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES
CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH
BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x. Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that (w)hen an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, x x x.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense
or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5]
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove
the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(c) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[6]
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded not
guilty therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his
opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two
requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for
jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals
and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal
Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional,
being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof
took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in
Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.[7]
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it
must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction.
Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated
January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are
hereby defined as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
PAMPANGA
xxxxxxxxx
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the
municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
xxxxxxxxx
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City
RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the
doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial
court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed
in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.
1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
xxxxxxxxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take
oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone
authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[9]
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor
in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.[10] As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash
may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a
long line of uniform decisions,[11] questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured
by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[12]
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty
to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.[13]
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all
too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of
its officials and employees.[14] To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free,
deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance
between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal,
should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[15] has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an
amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition
against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the
simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information
meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the
instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129874 December 27, 2002
JOAN M. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO C. JOVEN, Presiding Judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur,
and EMMANUEL NAVARRO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
complainant Joan M. Flores assailing the Order dated March 4, 1997 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Bislig, Surigao del Sur (Branch 29) in Criminal Case No. 1736-B, granting
respondent-accused Emmanuel Navarros Motion to Quash the Amended Information, and the
Order dated May 6, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.1
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On January 23, 1996, petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against
respondent Navarro and nine other persons, namely, Alex Taag, Ramil Toledo, Benjie Pasukin,
Marcial Plaza, Jr., Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie", Robert Piodo, Daniel Equibal, Judy Duron and
Jorge Azaria, as principals by direct participation.2 After preliminary investigation, an
Information dated June 14, 1996 was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro and his other
co-accused of the crime of Rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1736-B.
On October 18, 1996, before all the accused can be arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1736-B on the ground that it does not sufficiently
describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.3
On October 23, 1996, the trial court issued an order re-setting the arraignment as the
prosecution intends to file several other cases of rape against the accused.4
On November 27, 1996, an Amended Information for Rape was filed in Criminal Case No.
1736-B against Navarro, as the principal accused, committed as follows:
"That on or about the hours from 8:30 oclock to 11 oclock in the evening of January 18, 1996
at Purok 7, Gordonas Village, John Bosco District, Barangay Mangagoy, Municipality of Bislig,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
"the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other for a
common purpose, with lewd and unchaste designs, and by means of force, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) to wit: accused EMMANUEL NAVARRO has(sic) sexual
intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters will, while accused Alex Tanag, Ramil
Toledo, Benjie Pasokin y Madis, Marcial Plaza, Jr. y Cubil, Rodulfo Codira alias Babie, Roberto
Plodo y Ampalayo, Daniel Equibal y Degorio, Judy Doron y Quita and Jorge Azaria y Tino held
the victim and stood as guard, to the damage and prejudice of the afore-said Flores.
"CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659)"5
Similar Informations for Rape were likewise filed against the other accused, except Judy
Duron, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B, 1799-B, 1800-B,
1801-B and 1802-B, the only difference being that the accusatory portion of each Information
individually named each of them as principal in committing the crime of rape while the other
co-accused held the victim and stood as guard.
Respondent Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended Information in Criminal Case
No. 1736-B on the grounds that: (1) the Amended Information does not comply with the Order
dated October 23, 1996; (2) the allegations in the Amended Information is in conflict with
petitioners affidavit in that the Amended Information named respondent Navarro as the only
one who had intercourse with petitioner while her affidavit mentioned only Rodulfo Codira
alias "Babie" as the culprit; and (3) the Amended Information does not sufficiently describe
the event on the night of January 18, 1996.6
On March 4, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting the motion to quash,
finding that Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that
the Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime.7 Navarro, however,
was not released from detention as Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B to 1802-B were still pending.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court per Order dated May 6, 1997
denied the same.8
Hence, petitioner, through her private prosecutors, filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari.
Meanwhile, Navarros other co-accused were arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges against them. Trial commenced as regards their respective cases.9
On October 3, 1998, Navarro escaped from detention10 and has remained at large per
manifestation of his counsel in his "Memorandum for the Respondents" filed with this Court on
November 5, 1999.11
On November 25, 1998, before the prosecution could present its evidence, it filed a motion to
withdraw the respective Informations against the six principal accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B, 1800-B and 1801-B for insufficiency of evidence.12 The
motion was granted by the trial court in its Order dated November 26, 1998, but the other
accused whose cases were withdrawn remained as co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B
(against Navarro), 1799-B (against Rodulfo Codira) and 1802-B (against Jorge Azaria).13
On September 1, 1999, the Court gave due course to herein petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.14
Petitioner argues:
"9.a that during the clarificatory hearing conducted in the course of the preliminary
investigation of the case by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, respondent/accused Navarro
was identified as one of those nine (9) persons who sexually abused petitioner, the latter upon
seeing respondent, spontaneously cried and declared, right then and there, that he was even
the one who burned her hand;
"9.b that on the alleged ground of insufficiency of the information (i.e., the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because it failed to state with particularity respondent/accused
Navarros participation in the act complained of), public respondent should have realized that
to resolve the issue, he need only determine whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law;"15
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the private prosecutors who initiated the
instant petition have no personality to file the same as it is vested with the public
prosecutors,16 and that the assailed order of the trial court finds support in the records of the
case as petitioner herself testified during preliminary investigation that she became
unconscious after she was sexually abused by Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie" and she did not
know who took turns in abusing her.17
Anent the issue whether or not the petitioner has the personality or the right to file herein
petition for certiorari We rule in the affirmative. A perusal of the petition filed in this case
shows that petitioner herself caused the preparation and filing of the present petition and filed
the same through the private prosecutor18. It is beyond question that petitioner has the right
or personality to file the petition, through her private prosecutors, questioning the dismissal of
the criminal case against respondent Navarro. For obvious reasons, the public prosecutors
who filed the motion to dismiss which was granted by the trial court would not initiate the
action.
As early as 1969 in the case of Paredes vs. Gopengco,19 it was already held that the offended
party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality as a "person aggrieved" to file a
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in line with
the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules in order to promote its object.
Later, in Mosquera vs. Panganiban,20 we recognized the right of offended parties to appeal an
order of the trial court which deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they
cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Citing Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held:
"Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a
final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to any party, except when the accused
is placed thereby in double jeopardy.
"In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word party must be
understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who
may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured
by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is
derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. The right of the
offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an [interlocutory]
order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco
[29 SCRA 688 (1969)] and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that offended
parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved to
file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in
line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object. . . ."
More recently, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,22 we held that the private respondent
therein, as private complainant, has legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.23 This is so because a special
civil action for certiorari may be filed by the persons aggrieved, which, in a criminal case, are
the State and the private offended party or complainant. Having an interest in the civil aspect
of the case, the complainant may file such action, in his name, questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.24
We further ruled in the Perez case that while it is only the Office of the Solicitor General that
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari
in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.25
Finally, double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused.26 The third requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro
has not been arraigned.27
The next issue to be resolved is whether or not the writ of certiorari should issue in this case.
Again, we rule in the affirmative. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the Information filed against Navarro in
Criminal Case No. 1736-B.
First, contrary to the finding of the trial court, the records of this case adequately show that
respondent Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually abused petitioner. In her
Sworn Statement executed on January 23, 1996 before MCTC Judge Antonio K. Caon,
petitioner, while admitting that it was only Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie" whom she personally
knew, nevertheless stated that she knew by face her other perpetrators as they "once in a
while" pass by her residence or frequent their neighborhood. She further declared under oath
that she was able to identify them later at the police station during line-up, viz.:
"7. Q - How do you come to know that it was they Emmanuel Navarro alias Tawing, Marcial
Plaza, Jr. alias Dodong, Bengie Pasokin, Rodolfo Codera alias Babie, Jorge Azaria alias
Cocoy, Robert Piodo, Judy Duron and Daniel Equibal sexually abused you.
"A - Beforehand, I only know personally one of them Rodolfo Codera alias Babie all others
were only familiar through their faces because once in a while they will passed(sic) by our
residence as they were residence(sic) or frequenting our neighborhood. There at the police
station, the police lined them up for my identification with whom I have identified one by one
according to their individual participation."28 (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioner later confirmed respondent Navarros identity when, during clarificatory questions
propounded by Fiscal Caedo at the Bislig Municipal Jail on March 25, 1996, she pointed to
Navarro as one of those who came into the room after "Babie" left. She also tagged Navarro
as the one who burned her hand. Thus:
"Q : After he left you, what happened?
"A : After Babie left me, there were others who entered the room.
"Q : Those who entered the room, can you recognize their faces?
"A : Yes.
"Q : If you see these persons who entered the room, can you recognize them:
"A : Yes.
"FISCAL CAEDO: We will request the private complainant to see the inmates inside Cell No. 1
and Cell No. 2, for her to identify the accused.
"INMATES INSIDE CELL NO. 1 AND CELL NO. 2 were presented one by one.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q : Is he the one? (inmate no. 8)
"A : He is the one, he burned my hand (witness spontaneously pointed to inmate no. 8 while
crying.)
"Q : What is your name?
"Inmate No. 8 - Emmanuel Navarro."29
The Court cannot fathom how the trial court concluded that respondent Navarro was not one
of those identified by petitioner as one of her perpetrators when the Sworn Statement
executed by petitioner, as well as her response to the clarificatory questions of the Fiscal, not
only narrated the facts and circumstances surrounding her ordeal, but also explicitly and
categorically identified respondent Navarro and his other co-accused as her alleged rapists.
Secondly, we find the Amended Information against respondent Navarro to be sufficient.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a complaint or
information, to be sufficient, must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given
by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense
was committed.30 In addition, it must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a
bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense.31
Particularly in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is the fact of carnal knowledge under
any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e., (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented.32
In this case, the Information sufficiently alleged that respondent Emmanuel Navarro, by
means of force, had sexual intercourse with petitioner against her will. It contained all the
essential elements of rape as defined by law. The allegations describe the offense with
sufficient particularity such that respondent Navarro will fully understand what he is being
charged with. The Information also sufficiently alleged respondent Navarros criminal
culpability/liability for the crime, to wit: "accused EMMANUEL NAVARRO has (sic) sexual
intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters (sic) will." This is based on petitioners
own account of the incident wherein she stated that her perpetrators, including respondent
Navarro, took turns in sexually abusing her33.
One final point. We observed that the original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B34, 1799-
B35 and 1802-B36 pending with the trial court were elevated to this Court. However, the
records of the said cases do not show any resolution of this Court requiring the elevation of
the records thereof. The Order dated July 26, 2002 purportedly requiring the elevation of the
original records of the above criminal cases to the Supreme Court, referred to in the
transmittal letter dated August 14, 2002, signed by Clerk of Court Domingo P. De Castro, is
not found in the records of herein case. In effect, the trial judge was unnecessarily precluded
from proceeding further with the other pending cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and
1802-B. Although Navarro was a co-accused in said cases, he is not the principal accused
therein. He is only one out of the nine other co-accused. In addition, Navarro had not been
arraigned for the reason that he jumped bail and remains at large up to the present.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. The assailed Orders of the trial court dated
March 4, 1997 and May 6, 1997 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
1736-B is REINSTATED and the trial judge is directed to proceed therewith and immediately
issue a warrant of arrest against accused Emmanuel Navarro.
Considering that Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B are still pending trial with the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Bislig City, the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to
cause the return of the original records thereof with immediate dispatch to the said trial court
for further proceedings.
Atty. Domingo P. de Castro, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Bislig City is
required to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of herein decision why he
should not be cited for contempt of court and administratively charged in elevating the
original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B without proper authority, thereby
unduly delaying the trial of said cases which are not involved in the present petition which
concerns accused Navarro only.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 151912
Petitioner,
Present: Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Chairman,
Quisumbing,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY Promulgated:

and GLORIA BERMOY,
Respondents. September 26, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 14 November 2001 of the Court of
Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and its Resolution dated 24
January 2002 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents

Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of
a public document in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 (trial court). The Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154193, alleged:

That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a banking institution, duly
organized and existing under Philippine Laws xxx, thru falsification of a public document in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be
prepared, forged and falsified an owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434,
which is an imitation of, and similar to the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by
the Regist[er] of Deeds for the City of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and
there typing on the blank spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel of land
containing an area of 350 square meters, located in Malate, this City, the names of the
accused as the registered owners thereof, and then signing, falsifying and simulating the
signature of ALICIA D. GANZON, Register of Deeds, appearing on the lower right hand portion
of the 1st page of said document; the name EDGARDO C. CASTRO, Actg. Deputy, appearing
on the right hand middle portion of the 3rd page, and imprinting thereon several entries
purportedly showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C. Aguila and
Sons, which was cancelled on February 17, 1994, thereby making it appear, as it did appear,
that accused are the registered owners of the said property, under said TCT No. 207434 which
purportedly is the owners copy of said title, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully
well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as the owners duplicate copy of said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 207434 is in possession of the spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO by
reason of the previous mortgage of the said property in favor of the latter since February 17,
1994 and which was later sold to them on June 19, 1995; that once the said document has
been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused presented the same
to the Philippine Savings Bank and used the said title as collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they
did obtain a loan in the sum of P1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of
the said amount of P1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid
amount of P1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.[3]

Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on that day, the trial court
issued the following Order (11 June 1997 Order):
When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion Puruganan, who entered her
appearance as private prosecutor and Atty. Albino Achas, defense counsel, appeared and
upon their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the
accused.

Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public prosecutor Antonio
Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the initial hearing for the reception of the
evidence for the prosecution be set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as previously scheduled.[4]
(Emphasis supplied)

The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten
notation under the heading remarks: Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels.[5] This
was the only notation made under remarks. Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing
did it state that any of the accused made any stipulation or admission.

During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo (Crisostomo), manager of petitioners Libertad Manila Branch,
and one Hermenigildo Caluag (Caluag), also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified
that she came to know respondent spouses when they applied for a loan in February 1994.
Crisostomo stated that respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No.
207434 (TCT No. 207434) issued in their name over a parcel of land in Malate, Manila (Malate
lot) which they offered as collateral for the loan. Crisostomo further stated after the approval
of respondent spouses loan application, respondent spouses executed in her presence a real
estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner as security for their loan. Caluag
testified that he was tasked to register petitioners certificate of sale over the Malate lot[6]
with the Register of Deeds of Manila but the latter refused to do so because the Malate lot had
been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.[7]

After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to
evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the
accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor,
opposed the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent spouses.
The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent
spouses stipulated on their identity during the pre-trial.[8]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order of 21 April 1998 (21 April 1998 Order), the trial court granted respondent spouses
motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and acquitted respondent spouses. The 21
April 1998 Order reads:

The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination of whether the accused
were identified by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the act complained of
during the trial of the case and whether they admitted their identities as the accused named
in the information.

After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of the two prosecution
witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which would slightly indicate that they identified
the accused as the persons who obtained a loan from the Philippine Savings Bank and
executed the corresponding documents. The identification of an accused [by the witness] may
be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or [by] stepping down from the stand
and tapping his shoulder. If the accused is not present during the trial, his identification may
be effected through his pictures attached to the bail bond or some other means. The
identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense is essential in the successful
prosecution of criminal cases. By the accuseds entering a negative plea to the allegations in
the information, he denies that he committed the offense. He cannot even be compelled to
give his name during the arraignment and for which the Court may enter a plea of not guilty
for him.

As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction of the court and the
identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the Order of June 11, 1997 reveals that their
express conformity to the stipulation of facts entered into by their counsel with the private
prosecutor was never asked of them. Considering that the admission of the identities of the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime here charged is a matter which adversely affects
their substantial rights, such admission must have to involve their express concurrence or
consent thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial order containing such
admissions. As to the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it to state that
there is nothing to it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED
and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.[9]

The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial
court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined
the petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, denied the
petition. It held:

In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as allegedly those
who committed the crime they were prosecuted for.

xxx

Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they presented
identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxx

We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple purporting to
be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained the loan. Whether
they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The
failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of the accused as the same
persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal omission. They could be impostors
who, armed with the fake title, presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in
the title. The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused
as the same couple who appeared before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been
no doubt on their criminal liability.

Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to identify the
accused, xxx [.]

True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused. Jurisprudence
and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the witnesses, prompted by
the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the witness stand and tapping him on
the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial court correctly pointed this out. How else
can identification be done, it may be asked.

The petitioner also argues that the identities of private [respondents] were clearly established
as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru the private prosecutor) and
the defense. It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the
accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by them and their counsel as
required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to
this argument. If ever stipulations were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in
writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their conformity to such
stipulations. The records, however, show that the Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated
what transpired during that particular hearing and what the counsels signed was the minutes
for the same hearing. Hence, the identities of the accused were not stipulated upon for failure
to comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court correctly ruled that
there [was] nothing xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.

xxx
In fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer
to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the
accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. xxx

In the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the judgment of the trial
court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the persons of this case.
The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either
by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient evidence. If the demurrer is
granted, resulting [in] the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this
can no longer be reviewed unless it can be shown that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case, assuming the trial court
committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack [or] excess xxx of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of
judgment.[10]

Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals contradicted itself when it
held, on one hand, that the trial courts error did not amount to grave abuse of discretion and
stated, on the other hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be
reviewed without violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy. Petitioner also
contended, for the first time, that it is the trial courts duty to insure that the accused sign the
pre-trial order or agreement embodying respondent spouses admissions and that its failure to
do so should not be taken against the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion in the Resolution of 24 January 2002 which
reads:

The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the issue on double
jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that our ruling has
been contradictory for saying on one hand that even assuming that the trial court erred, the
acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either by appeal or on petition for
certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy while saying on
the other hand assuming that trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown
that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner asks: Which is which then? meaning, it has not understood what a
petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read the decision carefully, in between the above-
quoted statements of the decision is the case of People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December
8, 1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the Supreme Court explicitly explained that review of the
sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused [as a result of
the grant of the demurrer to evidence] lies outside the function of certiorari. True, a petition
for certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision did it mention that
the trial court in this case committed an error. We merely made an assumption, without
saying that there was an error committed by the trial court, to make a point. We meant that if
the trial court did commit an error in ruling that there was insufficient evidence resulting in
the acquittal of the accused, such error can no longer be reviewed since it would be one of
judgment, which is not within the ambit of a certiorari. xxx
The petitioner again asks us: Who has the duty of requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial
order, the prosecution or the trial court itself? It answers that it is the trial court because it
has the sole and exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in such proceedings be
duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the act of requiring or compelling the accused
to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly fundamentally erroneous to suppose that such
duty can be delegated by the trial court to the prosecution. The petitioner further argues that
the respondent Court was right off ousted of jurisdiction when it deliberately and without legal
basis refused to consider the stipulation of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial
order x x x despite the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial order.

The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on Pre-Trial on the Revised
Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it require the prosecution or the accused to sign the
pre-trial order. All that is required for the trial court to do is to hold a pre-trial conference and
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated upon by the parties, and
evidence marked. And if there were any agreements or admissions made or entered into by
the parties during the pre-trial conference, these should be reduced in writing and signed by
the accused and his or her counsel. Otherwise, such agreements or admissions may not be
used against the accused. xxx

Hence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to sign the pre-trial order
to make the agreements and admissions as evidence against the accused. If the parties made
such admission as to the identities of the accused in this case, it is the look-out of the
counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require the accused to sign. Why should the trial
court remind the counsels what to do? If the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an
evidence against the accused, then she should have required the admission in writing [sic]
and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules. But, as the records
show, all that was signed was the minutes of the pre-trial conference. As already discussed in
our decision, the trial court committed no error on this point.[11]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:

I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO REQUIRE THE
ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER;

II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11 JUNE 1997 PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS
STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES AND SHOULD THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;
III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WERE SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED
DURING THE TRIAL BY THE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION; [AND]

IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED IN THE CASE.[12]
In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner. The Solicitor General
contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On Whether Double Jeopardy is

Applicable Here

Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 (Section 7) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[14] on
double jeopardy provides:

Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal
case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
[15]
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of
the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two
exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of
the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception.[17] Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.[18]

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in
Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public
document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas.
Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
became vested on respondent spouses.

The Extent of the Right Against

Double Jeopardy

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same
offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same
offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution
appeals from a judgment in the same case.[19] The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court[20] which provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order,
except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By
mandate of the Constitution[21] and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such
appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting
the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent
acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal
of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon
his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In
the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to
the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally
barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any basis. As
the Court explained in People v. Velasco[23]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen,
when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x Thus, Green [v. United States]
expressed the concern that (t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty.

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively
to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the
exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in
a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ocietys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement
of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its
voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, (t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able
to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of
the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes
that a second trial would be unfair.

On Petitioners Claim that the Trial Courts

Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire into the
merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving
respondent spouses identity.[24]

The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal
admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the
trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
due to a violation of due process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case xxx or that the trial was a sham xxx.[25]

None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution, through
petitioners counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its day in court. Neither is there any
question that the proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as
basis for the trial courts alleged grave abuse of discretion really concerns its appreciation of
the evidence. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the
trial court on this point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this
Court held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals[26] applies with equal force here

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the People of the Philippines cannot
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. The argument that the
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed
because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is
the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how
obvious the error may be xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner

The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner on who has the
responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement is signed by the accused, on the effect of
the 11 June 1997 Order, and on whether respondent spouses were identified during the trial.
All these entail an inquiry into the merits of the 21 April 1998 Order, which, as earlier stated,
cannot be done without violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127777. October 1, 1999]
PETRONILA C. TUPAZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE BENEDICTO B. ULEP Presiding Judge of RTC
Quezon City, Branch 105, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before us is a special civil action for certiorari with application for temporary
restraining order seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and to nullify
respondent judges order reviving the information therein against petitioner, for violation of
the Tax Code, as the offense charged has prescribed or would expose petitioner to double
jeopardy.
The facts are as follows:
On June 8, 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and
her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for
nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979, amounting to
P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977.
[1] On September 11, 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On
November 16, 1990, the trial court denied the prosecutions motion for reconsideration.
On January 10, 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, two (2)
informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-17321[2] and Q-91-17322,[3] against
accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate
income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105,[4]
presided over by respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86,
then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. The identical informations read as follows:
That in Quezon City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and upon
verification and audit conducted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the 1979 corporate
annual income tax return and financial statements of El Oro Engravers Corp., with office
address at 809 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila, it was ascertained
that said corporation was found liable to pay the amount of P2,369,085.46, as deficiency
corporate income tax for the year 1979 and that, despite demand of the payment of the
aforesaid deficiency tax by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and received by said corporation,
which demand has already become final, said El Oro Engravers Corp., through above-named
accused, the responsible corporate-officers of said corporation, failed and refused, despite
repeated demands, and still fail and refuse to pay said tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On September 25, 1991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of P1,000.00 each, for
their provisional liberty.
On November 6, 1991, accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a
motion to dismiss/quash[6] information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the
same as the information against the accused pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105
(Q-91-17321). However, on November 11, 1991, Judge Solano denied the motion.[7]
In the meantime, on July 25, 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City.
Subsequently, accused Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated August
30, 1994.[8]
On September 5, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez stated that no new
issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and no cogent reasons existed to alter,
modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the
reinvestigation as terminated, and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the
accused.[9]
On September 20, 1994, the trial court (Branch No. 105) arraigned accused Petronila C. Tupaz
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein.
On October 17, 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case No. Q91-17321 to allege
expressly the date of the commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or
subsequently thereafter. Despite opposition of the accused, on March 2, 1995, the trial court
granted the motion and admitted the amended information.[10] Petitioner was not re-
arraigned on the amended information. However, the amendment was only on a matter of
form.[11] Hence, there was no need to re-arraign the accused.[12]
On December 5, 1995, accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a
motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial court granted the
motion in its order dated December 13, 1995.
Prior to this, on October 18, 1995, Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to
withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322, pending before Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, after discovering that said information was identical to the one
filed with Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On April 16, 1996, State Prosecutor
Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to withdraw information in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-17321. Prosecutor Agcaoili thought that accused was charged in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-17321, for nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax, but found that accused was
exempted from paying said tax.
On May 15, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
86, a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case No. Q-91-
17321 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date,
the court[13] granted the motion for consolidation.
On May 20, 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the
motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 and dismissed the
case, as prayed for by the prosecution.
On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321,[14] stating that the
motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the result of
excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 was identical to Criminal
Case No Q-90-12896, wherein accused was charged with nonpayment of deficiency
contractors tax, amounting to P346,879.29.
Over the objections of accused, on August 6, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321
reinstated.[15] On September 24, 1996, accused filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial court denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
On July 9, 1997, we required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from notice. On October 10, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his comment.[16]
On October 26, 1998, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. The parties
have complied.
Petitioner submits that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating
the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 because (a) the offense has prescribed; or
(b) it exposes her to double jeopardy.
As regards the issue of prescription, petitioner contends that: (a) the period of assessment
has prescribed, applying the three (3) year period provided under Batas Pambansa No. 700;
(b) the offense has prescribed since the complaint for preliminary investigation was filed with
the Department of Justice only on June 8, 1989, and the offense was committed in April 1980
when she filed the income tax return covering taxable year 1979.
Petitioner was charged with nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year
1979, which tax return was filed in April 1980. On July 16, 1984, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) issued a notice of assessment. Petitioner contends that the July 16, 1984
assessment was made out of time.
Petitioner avers that while Sections 318 and 319 of the NIRC of 1977 provide a five (5) year
period of limitation for the assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 700, enacted on February 22, 1984, amended the two sections and reduced
the period to three (3) years. As provided under B.P. Blg. 700, the BIR has three (3) years to
assess the tax liability, counted from the last day of filing the return, or from the date the
return is filed, whichever comes later. Since the tax return was filed in April 1980, the
assessment made on July 16, 1984 was beyond the three (3) year prescriptive period.
Petitioner submits that B.P. Blg. 700 must be given retroactive effect since it is favorable to
the accused. Petitioner argues that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, regarding the
allowance of retroactive application of penal laws when favorable to the accused shall apply in
this case.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the prescriptive period for assessment
and collection of petitioners deficiency corporate income tax was five (5) years. The Solicitor
General asserts that the shortened period of three (3) years provided under B.P. Blg. 700
applies to assessments and collections of internal revenue taxes beginning taxable year 1984.
Since the deficiency corporate income tax was for taxable year 1979, then petitioner was still
covered by the five (5) year period. Thus, the July 16, 1984 tax assessment was made within
the prescribed period.
At the outset, it must be stressed that internal revenue taxes are self-assessing and no further
assessment by the government is required to create the tax liability. An assessment, however,
is not altogether inconsequential; it is relevant in the proper pursuit of judicial and extra
judicial remedies to enforce taxpayer liabilities and certain matters that relate to it, such as
the imposition of surcharges and interest, and in the application of statues of limitations and
in the establishment of tax liens.[17]
An assessment contains not only a computation of tax liabilities, but also a demand for
payment within a prescribed period. The ultimate purpose of assessment is to ascertain the
amount that each taxpayer is to pay.[18] An assessment is a notice to the effect that the
amount therein stated is due as tax and a demand for payment thereof.[19] Assessments
made beyond the prescribed period would not be binding on the taxpayer.[20]
We agree with the Solicitor General that the shortened period of three (3) years prescribed
under B.P. Blg. 700 is not applicable to petitioner. B.P. Blg. 700, effective April 5, 1984,
specifically states that the shortened period of three years shall apply to assessments and
collections of internal revenue taxes beginning taxable year 1984. Assessments made on or
after April 5, 1984 are governed by the five-year period if the taxes assessed cover taxable
years prior to January 1, 1984.[21] The deficiency income tax under consideration is for
taxable year 1979. Thus, the period of assessment is still five (5) years, under the old law. The
income tax return was filed in April 1980. Hence, the July 16, 1984 tax assessment was issued
within the prescribed period of five (5) years, from the last day of filing the return, or from the
date the return is filed, whichever comes later.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case for the simple reason
that the provisions on the period of assessment can not be considered as penal in nature.
Petitioner also asserts that the offense has prescribed. Petitioner invokes Section 340 (now
281 of 1997 NIRC) of the Tax Code which provides that violations of any provision of the Code
prescribe in five (5) years. Petitioner asserts that in this case, it began to run in 1979, when
she failed to pay the correct corporate tax due during that taxable year. Hence, when the BIR
instituted criminal proceedings on June 8, 1989, by filing a complaint for violation of the Tax
Code with the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation it was beyond the
prescriptive period of five (5) years. At most, the BIR had until 1984 to institute criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General avers that the information for violation of the Tax
Code was filed within the prescriptive period of five (5) years provided in Section 340 (now
281 in 1997 NIRC) of the Code. It is only when the assessment has become final and
unappealable that the five (5) year period commences to run. A notice of assessment was
issued on July 16, 1984. When petitioner failed to question or protest the deficiency
assessment thirty (30) days therefrom, or on August 16, 1984, it became final and
unappealable. Consequently, it was from this period that the prescriptive period of five (5)
years commenced. Thus, the complaint filed with the Department of Justice on June 8, 1989
was within the prescribed period.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the offense has not prescribed. Petitioner was
charged with failure to pay deficiency income tax after repeated demands by the taxing
authority. In Lim, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[22] we stated that by its nature the violation could
only be committed after service of notice and demand for payment of the deficiency taxes
upon the taxpayer. Hence, it cannot be said that the offense has been committed as early as
1980, upon filing of the income tax return. This is so because prior to the finality of the
assessment, the taxpayer has not committed any violation for nonpayment of the tax. The
offense was committed only after the finality of the assessment coupled with taxpayers willful
refusal to pay the taxes within the allotted period. In this case, when the notice of assessment
was issued on July 16, 1984, the taxpayer still had thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to
protest or question the assessment. Otherwise, the assessment would become final and
unappealable.[23] As he did not protest, the assessment became final and unappealable on
August 16, 1984. Consequently, when the complaint for preliminary investigation was filed
with the Department of Justice on June 8, 1989, the criminal action was instituted within the
five (5) year prescriptive period.
Petitioner contends that by reinstating the information, the trial court exposed her to double
jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court obtained her permission before the case
was dismissed. She was placed in jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid
complaint filed before a competent court and the case was dismissed without her express
consent. When the trial court reinstated the information charging the same offense, it placed
her in double jeopardy.
Petitioner also asserts that the trial court gravely erred when, over her objections, it admitted
the amended information. She submits that the amendment is substantial in nature, and
would place her in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that reinstating the information does not
violate petitioners right against double jeopardy. He asserts that petitioner induced the
dismissal of the complaint when she sought the reinvestigation of her tax liabilities. By such
inducement, petitioner waived or was estopped from claiming her right against double
jeopardy.
The Solicitor General further contends that, assuming arguendo that the case was dismissed
without petitioners consent, there was no valid dismissal of the case since Prosecutor Agcaoili
was under a mistaken assumption that it was a charge of nonpayment of contractors tax.
We sustain petitioners contention. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to
double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for
which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against
him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed
against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the
instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent. This consent
cannot be implied or presumed.[24] Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as
to the accuseds conformity.[25] As petitioners consent was not expressly given, the dismissal
of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.[26]
Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the
information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against
double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We enjoin the lower court, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 and order its dismissal.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO,
petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court.
In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a
former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years
old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who
was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army,
Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal
of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held
therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused;
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-
year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing
of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there
were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7)
whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or
beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or
from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-
year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said
time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not
precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-
year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of
March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings
filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion
to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of
the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge
Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion
and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC
to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The
records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy
of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor
Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private complainants to
represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the
purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations
therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and
the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases
should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it
was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived,
the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of
the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.[7] Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence
of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to
a provisional dismissal[10] does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On
the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.[14]
However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a
new preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original
accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has
been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of
Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this
Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued
against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by
the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals,
respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the
said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case.
On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2)
that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime
until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case
was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.[19]
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel,
categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss
the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a
judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon
the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their
affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause
for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement, which
would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other
provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the
accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir,
who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the
matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I
have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the
accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer
for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not
agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional
dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration
of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been
arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your
Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in
addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could
prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan
without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle,
the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not
be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs
claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions
absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or
make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This
the Court cannot and should not do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes
involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the
heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs
of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor
who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of
such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of
the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the
victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on
valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process;
(b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with
the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill
the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction,
provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence
and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by
his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and
examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims
were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on
March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was
served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by
them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in
the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the
hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private
prosecutor,[25] he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely,
Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna
Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective
affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico
Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the
victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or
the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the
hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs
were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their
interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all
the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon
and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases,
the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit
retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate
the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal
complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years
from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the
cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple
murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the
former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair
warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive
application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of
May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive
right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question
since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the
prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for
them to do so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive,
may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-
year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is
given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State
because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year
periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a
provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he
claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate the
operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription
under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8,
Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against the accused,
which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.[32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes
of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to
prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as
equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be
allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses
and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are
essential elements of the offenses covered.[34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the
given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or
waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso
facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime
necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the
expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-
year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.[39] By the
same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code
are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred
by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is
basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state
to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of
his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had
acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the
offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil
remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially
is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such
remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has
against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred,
and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence
of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the United States
Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a
holding of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious
consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces
absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided.
[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the
reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in
Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining
whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or
prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year
or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on
first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of
the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice
to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and
of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period
for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-
bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved
by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system
and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the
prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when
such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the
public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public
prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in
his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is
hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.[56]
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not
for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-
year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to
revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new
rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.
This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus
prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of
the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the
State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the
State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent
for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused.
It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-
bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of
hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a
case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date
of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the
new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given
a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the
criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case
before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not
be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v.
Villon,[59] this Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court
further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice;
and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the
party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the
Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being
moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to
forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132374 August 22, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of this appeal, which we find meritorious, is the judgment1 dated August 21, 1997, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, convicting Lucio Alberto of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October 1993 at about 7:30 oclock in the evening at
Barangay Gandiangan, Municipality of Imelda, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to
gain and by means of violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take
and rob one Teresa2 Semic of cash money and by reason and on the occasion of said robbery,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab said Teresa Semic thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
caused her death immediately thereafter.3
During his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits then
followed.
The prosecution presented as its first witness VIRGILIO ALAP-AP, barangay captain of
Barangay Israel, Imelda, Zamboanga del Sur. He testified that on the morning of October 19,
1993, he was informed by members of his Bantay Bayan that there was a killing at Barangay
Gandiangan. He was also informed of the suspicious acts of Lucio Alberto, who would take out
his bag from a sack whenever there was no one around but would place it back when people
were around. On the basis of this information, he brought Lucio Alberto and Titing Medel to
the house of the barangay captain of Barangay Gandiangan, where they were investigated.
He was informed by Titing Medel that the slippers which were recovered near the body of
Teresa Semic used to belong to him before he exchanged it for a necklace from Alberto by
way of barter. Alap-ap then accompanied Alberto to the PNP Police station of Imelda where he
was turned over to SPO1 Francisco dela Cruz. He alleged that he was present when the police
conducted a physical examination on Alberto. They discovered blood-stained currency bills
amounting to a total of P950, believed to be stolen from the victim.4
JOEL MEDEL @ TITING followed on the witness stand. He testified that on October 18, 1993, he
saw appellant Lucio Alberto outside the store of Teresa "Isang" Semic. Appellant stayed
behind, said the witness, when he went home at around 6:00 P.M. He was at the house of the
barangay captain of Gandiangan when he found out that Aling "Isang" was already dead. He
stated that the slippers found near the body of Aling "Isang" were originally his, but he
bartered them to Alberto for a necklace. He was present when the police recovered several
bloodied bills in the amount of P950 from the shoes of appellant Lucio Alberto.5
SPO1 FRANCISCO DELA CRUZ testified that he was in his house in the evening of October 18,
1993 when he received a report that there was a killing in Barangay Gandiangan. He
immediately went to the place of the incident and saw below the stairway of her kitchen
outside her house the body of Teresa covered in her own blood. He saw a pair of slippers
about three meters away from the body. He brought the slippers to their station. The following
day, October 19, 1993, he went back to Barangay Gandiangan, talked with the barangay
captain, and arrested appellant on the request of the barangay captain. Upon reaching the
police station, he asked appellant to open the bag which he brought with him. Inside was a
pair of short pants with bloodstain near the zipper, a bandana, and a medallion necklace. He
then asked appellant to take off his shoes wherein an envelope was found containing P950 in
different blood-stained denominations. Three days later, he also recovered a knife from a
certain Payna. Witness Dela Cruz admitted that he was not sure whether the slippers he
recovered really belonged to the person who killed Teresa.6
On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the
prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order was lifted after the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the prosecution
continued to present its evidence.
ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), testified that he assisted
appellant at the time he executed his extrajudicial confession7 on January 14, 1994. He
identified said extrajudicial confession8 which was placed into the record of the trial by the
court.
The last witness for the prosecution, ERNESTO PAYNA, testified that he was informed of the
death of his aunt, Santiaga Theresa9 at around 7:00 P.M. of October 18, 1993. He saw the
body of his aunt at the balcony near the stairs of her kitchen. He also saw a pair of slippers
about one meter from the body of the victim.10
On March 26, 1997, the defense orally asked for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On April
25, 1997, the demurrer was filed but it was denied on May 13, 1997. On June 25, 1997, the
trial court issued an order declaring that the accused should be deemed to have waived his
right to present evidence for the defense, and that the case be considered submitted for
decision.
On August 21, 1997, the trial court promulgated its judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.1wphi1 He is hereby sentence (sic) to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
to pay the private offended party as indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal. In his brief, appellant assigns the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REINSTATING THE CASE AFTER JUNE 26, 1996 AFTER IT
HAS DISMISSED THE CASE FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO
SUBMIT ITS FORMAL OFFER OF EXHIBITS FOR ALMOST A YEAR WHEN REQUIRED TO BY THE
TRIAL COURT OVER THE OPPOSITION/OBJECTION OF THE ACCUSED AS THE SAME HAD PLACED
THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
Appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered
its order dismissing the case against him. More importantly, he contends that without the
extrajudicial confession placed on record,13 the evidence of the prosecution would not be
able to meet the needed quantum of proof to establish his guilt. He assails said extrajudicial
confession on the ground that it was not duly established that it was he who signed it. He also
argues that at the time said confession was executed, he was not assisted by a competent
counsel of his choice.14
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the appellee, counters that there was no violation of the
right of appellant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The OSG argues that the order of the
trial court dismissing the case was illegal and void for being issued with abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not afford any opportunity to the prosecution to be heard before it decided
to dismiss the case, contrary to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.15 It did
not even consider that even without the said formal offer of exhibits, the prosecution could
still prove its case on the basis of the testimonial evidence alone. Being void, the said order
cannot have the effect of terminating the trial and, hence, cannot serve as basis for the claim
of double jeopardy.
On the claim of the defense that the needed quantum of proof to convict appellant has not
been met, the OSG maintains that appellants extrajudicial confession and the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution are more than enough to convict appellant.
However, the OSG recommends that the appellant should be convicted of two distinct crimes
of homicide and theft, not robbery with homicide, because from the tenor of the extrajudicial
confession, it was clear that the appellant intended to kill the victim and that the taking of the
P950.00 was a mere afterthought.16
The pertinent issues for resolution in this case are: (1) whether or not appellant was placed in
double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order dismissing the case; (2) whether
or not the extrajudicial confession was admissible against appellant; and (3) whether or not
the guilt of appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is
an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.17 As to the first jeopardy, it only
arises (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or
the case was dismissed.
In our view, it is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this case. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not valid and cannot be
used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of
law. As held in People vs. Navarro: 18
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity
to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to
the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending
court action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information
deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its
day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and,
therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that
is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double
jeopardy
We agree with the OSGs contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a
violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a
ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could
still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial
court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
On the second and third issues, appellant asks this Court to disregard the extrajudicial
confession which he had allegedly executed before and with the assistance of Atty.
Cimafranca, but which confession he denies. If disregarded, he claims that the prosecutions
evidence would not be sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A counsel-assisted and voluntary confession is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
especially when it is corroborated on material points by the prosecution witnesses.19
However, it is essential that the person making the confession must be assisted by a
"competent" counsel. The meaning and standards of a "competent counsel" were explained in
People vs. Deniega20 as follows:
[T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished
in the accuseds behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e.,
that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished
from one who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individuals constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay,21 this Court stressed that an accuseds
right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and
law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn
of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
On this score, we are constrained to hold that the standards of "competent counsel"
elucidated in Deniega were not met in this case. In the first place, it is clear that the appellant
was not given the option to choose his own lawyer. On its face, the preliminary statement in
the extrajudicial confession22 executed on January 14, 1994, bears this out:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF LUCIO ALBERTO ASSISTED BY ATTY. PACIFICO T.
CIMAFRANCA, THIS JANUARY 14, 1994 AT PAGADIAN CITY, PHILIPPINES.
Preliminary Statement I am informing you that you are under investigation in connection to
(sic) the killing of one Teresa Semic, do you need the assistance of a lawyer.
ANSWER: yes.
Additional preliminary statement Atty. Pacifico T. Cimafranca, is a Lawyer of the Public
Assistance Office, do you need his legal services to assist you.
ANSWER: Yes.
(SGD.) Lucio Alberto
The appellant was not asked whether he wishes and can afford to retain his own lawyer. He
was just told that Atty. Cimafranca was a lawyer and asked whether he needs his services. He
was not made aware that he could choose his own lawyer other than those assigned by the
police or the prosecutor. To all intents and purposes, Atty. Cimafranca can be described as a
lawyer engaged by the police since PAO lawyers are generally assigned to police stations and
prosecutors offices as part of their regular duties. As such, it cannot be denied that the
relationship of Atty. Cimafranca with the police and the prosecutor could be symbiotic. In fact,
we take note that the office of Atty. Cimafranca was even located at the provincial capitol
where he was at the beck and call of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Aside from this, we are not satisfied that Atty. Cimafranca dutifully and faithfully assisted
appellant during the course of the investigation. This is clear from his testimony in court, to
wit:
Q: While in the course of taking confession you did not even give advice to Lucio Alberto when
not to answer the question and when to answer the question propounded?
A: I did not give him anymore further advice before taking down the confession into writing
because I have already warned the accused of the consequences of his confession.
Q: You did not advice Lucio Alberto?
A: No, I have warned the accused.
Q: You did not tell the accused which question are incriminating to him?
A: No more.23
It is clear from the above that Atty. Cimafranca was merely satisfied in just warning appellant
of the consequences of his confession. He did not take an active part during the actual taking
of said confession. Further, it was evident that Atty. Cimafranca did not give appellant a
complete picture of what may befall him once he executed the confession:
Q: Did you tell him that the penalty impose (sic) would be death penalty?
A: I cannot remember unless it is included there in the affidavit.24
In our view, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial investigation
failed to meet the exacting tests laid down in People vs. Deniega, supra. Thus, we must
conclude that the so-called extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence
for the prosecution.
Moreover, we find that the prosecution did not even take any effort to establish that the
person who executed the said confession was the appellant. Atty. Cimafranca was not made to
identify appellant in court. Nor were the signatures or initials therein identified as appellants
own.
Without said confession, the prosecutions evidence is weak. It is insufficient to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
First, the ownership of the slippers found near the body of the victim was not sufficiently
established. The prosecutions evidence seems to indicate that the owner of the slippers was
Joel Medel and not appellant. Medel testified that he bartered the slippers for a necklace.
However, he was not able to satisfactorily explain why the necklace was still in the possession
of appellant and not with him at the time the former was apprehended. Second, even the
money allegedly found in the possession of appellant was not established by the prosecution
as belonging to the victim. Third, the blood allegedly found on the money and the shorts of
appellant was not examined so that a comparison with the victims blood could be made.
Fourth, the prosecution also failed to establish the time and cause of death of Teresa Semic.
All in all, the prosecution miserably failed to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor
of appellant.
The fact that appellant was not able to use his turn to present evidence in his defense and
rebut the prosecutions evidence should not be the sole determinant of his guilt. Moreover,
whether the accused decided to present evidence on his behalf or not, the burden of the
prosecution to prove its case remains. Among the fundamental rights of an accused under the
Bill of Rights is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, the prosecution must establish his guilt with proof beyond reasonable doubt.25
Even if the accused should choose to remain silent, if the prosecution failed in discharging its
burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the courts
constitutional duty to acquit him.26 Where it was not properly and sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the one who killed the victim, as in this case, his
conviction could not be lawfully sustained. His appeal should be considered favorably, and his
conviction annulled. Appellant should be freed forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant LUCIO ALBERTO is ACQUITTED on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release
from New Bilibid Prison is hereby ordered, unless there is another lawful cause for his
continued detention. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is directed to
report compliance with this order within five (5) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March 13, 1991,
respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y
Ohide" for violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. The information against him reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin
Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On
November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change
his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17,
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer,
wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the
violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge issued an
order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991.
On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to
February 18, 1991 to give private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of
the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order (Annex
"D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of decision to February 25, 1991 to give private
respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991,
the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex
"E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November
21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged
was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which
the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991,
private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead
guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a
decision granting the accused's motion, to wit:
It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing of the
"voluntary plea of guilt" as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under Article 13, paragraph
7 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply wants to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the PAO, there is nothing in the said
provision which requires that the same be availed of prior to the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out by the prosecution, that such is a
waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and of the Court,
nonetheless, this Court, having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that the rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also for
humanitarian considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at bar.
Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission to the law and a
moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30,
1966)
Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on the change of
heart of the accused in mid-stream.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny guilty beyond reasonable-
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he
is hereby sentenced to a straight prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional, to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let the 0.08 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of according to law.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated decision but the
same was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which states:
It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules should not be
interpreted to the letter in "victimless crimes" such as this case, possession of regulated
drugs, which is more of a "social disease" case so to speak and in the light of (the) provision
itself that "with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal." Is the fiscal the offended
party?
Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not been very consistent
on this "lesser offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be in consonance with justice that a
guideline be laid down by the said Office, if only to apprise the public, the Court and the
accused on when said consent is to be given by the fiscal as a matter of course and when it
will be withheld. For to leave the same undefined is in the mind of this Court, not conducive to
a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT
OF TIME AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS
NOT OBTAINED.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF
THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED,
INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE SAME
LAW, IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid criminal case
(Rollo, p. 86).
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted
rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732,
February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided
the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which their discretion may
be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450),
We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v.
Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio
Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale of the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his former plea of not guilty to murder
to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence
already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule
116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been
intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of
the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the
fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial
court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon
which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the
public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review
dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by
the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be
recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested
its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime originally
charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in
crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to
speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial
court could allow the accused to change his plea.
We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal
and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
(see Manuel v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos.
92362-67, October 15, 1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the
former (see People v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then Justice Barredo, p. 377; also
Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425
as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are
made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs
against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale,
G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by
the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered
because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is,
therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the
government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal
who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by
crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (see
United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended
party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the
government.
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change
of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as
amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double
jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent
and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information
under any of the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of
the offended party;
xxx xxx xxx
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13, 1991,
respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on
the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch
I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive
associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive"
organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March
10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie
case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse
Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of
the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are
present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE
alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for
violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed
as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of
Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or
remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of
the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or
seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious
conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or
seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to
unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit
and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the
Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM
alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in
San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid
of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds
that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not
expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15,
1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague
and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government
appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law
shall be enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History
in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The
singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice
to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present
and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said,
Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the
accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has
expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership
in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body,
business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its
members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the
Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power
under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In
section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution.
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in
Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and
leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified
acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms
the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office
without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT
1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the
Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization,"
under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq.
(1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist
movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning
that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the
Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the
Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion,
that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, comes within
the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it
is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at
87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by
force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination
of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be
knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have
been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former
requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is
not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of
securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the
basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to
commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member
of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if
in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor
unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they
are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization
which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified
those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during
the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited
the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding
that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of
the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain
as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is
not needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring
every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register.
While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku
Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and
the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of
the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the
conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest
tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and
(b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included
class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its
members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the
minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of
them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation
of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter
of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly
a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of
our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of the other
class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in
the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted
special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than
harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college
fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have
on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available
including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the
Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted evidence that the order was
a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the
Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to
native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United
States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;"
and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous
ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and
stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs;
and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its
members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing
scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an
illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the
"overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines
a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More
recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously
reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a
sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have
thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within
the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a
bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the
historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute]
is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the
reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the
service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or
appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of
or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught
the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of
the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the
petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that
under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from
the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate,
or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any
group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to
protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the
State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed,
the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards
of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any
further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial
magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S.
Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of
1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which
it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come
within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as
harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons
or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the
regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse
of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval
of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves
with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those
whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the
enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability
byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly
provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34
The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist
Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is
inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party
butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and
freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation
on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why
before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then
stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only
by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose
of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but
international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these
findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd
failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.
Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would
raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto
public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would
raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within
the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution.
Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on
underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to the
legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital
of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the
foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate
primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly
cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we
mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United
States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to
regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the
Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain
to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so
aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion
against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government
provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental
helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical
conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4
thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen
held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as
has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks
of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means,
misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4.
Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for
the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the
Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow
contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and
other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an
oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal
means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments,
and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the
use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an
alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The
language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence,
and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended
to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the
accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed
toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which
the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by
force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist
Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of
democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the
membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such
society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and
shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof, for
the five years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally
protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy,
albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies
of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation
described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the
safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of
judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation,
"whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at
compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the
legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step
removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of
section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing
such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power,
shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties
provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to
overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to
establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place
the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe
United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan,
Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines
and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short
title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally
indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental
purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government
and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the
details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope,
and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction
isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the
legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot
overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it
does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the
following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government,
in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following
elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines,
(a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the
Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of
aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so
knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue
the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under
thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter
to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two
cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.