Sison v.

COMELEC (di mugawas)

Facts:

It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon
CityBoard of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitionercommen
ced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes
and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was
supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous
thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns
and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect."

While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
he winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice
mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the
petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient
evidence, and (2) the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166

Issue: WON the grounds are valid?

Ruling:

Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3)
instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during
the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof
such election result in a failure to elect on account of force majuere, violence, terrorism , fraud,
or other analogous causes. We have painstakingly examined
petitioner'spetition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support an
action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were
either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as
a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the
failure to elect came about.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

(pg 401; Print; Fitz slides)

BEDOL V COMELEC; ATIENZA v COMELEC

(scribd election law case digest)

CODILLA v De VENECIA
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
 EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as
Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4 th district of Leyte as
against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved
for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioners
proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and
consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the
resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondents proclamation as null and
void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while
petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been
disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner
was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis.
Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent
the electorates choice.
2. Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and
that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become
final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter,
that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits
recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.

SARMIENTO V COMELEC (SCRIBD)

SANTIAGO V COMELEC; LOONG V COMELEC ( Election Cases Digest SCRIBD)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Francisco v HR (742, 747)

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_108072_1995.html

Facts:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor
Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There
respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as
amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of
the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers).
The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the
allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them
since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose
administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had
now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed
and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent
enactment of RA 7160.

Held:

No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code
of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute
must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective
provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21
and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution
of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.