Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association

2005, Vol. 11, No. 4, 245255 1076-898X/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1076-898X.11.4.245

The Psychological Price of Media Bias

Elisha Babad
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Media bias was investigated through the effects of a TV interviewers preferential behavior on the image
of the interviewee in the eyes of the viewers. Judges viewed a political interview with either a friendly
or a hostile interviewer then rated their impressions of the interviewed politician, whose behavior was
identical in all conditions. The preferential nonverbal behavior of the interviewer (controlling for
recognition and comprehension of verbal content) systematically influenced viewers ratings of the
politician. The effect consisted mainly of damage to the politician in the hostile interviewer condition.
Describing the interviewee as a professor yielded a similar preferential behavior effect. A strong halo
effect was identified, but it was ruled out as the mechanism accounting for the interviewer effect.

Keywords: nonverbal behavior, media bias, TV interviewers, ecological validity, halo effect

The present research examines whether the preferential nonver-
bal (NV) behavior of a TV interviewer (friendly vs. hostile) can
influence the image of his interviewee in the eyes of the viewers.
In most societies, social norms prohibit manifestations of favorit-
ism by holders of social power, and yet differential, or preferential,
behavior is common.
The study of differential behavior grew out of the research on
teacher expectancies (Babad, 1993, 1998; Brophy, 1985, 1998;
Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; Rosenthal, 1989). Teacher expectancies
are transmitted via differential behavior, which is perceived and
internalized by its targets. The teachers pet phenomenon
(Babad, 1995) is an extreme example of teachers favoritism, and
it evokes negative reactions among students (ranging up to r .36
in 80 elementary classrooms). Weinstein (2002) concluded that
teachers differential behavior has been the main cause of failure
of underperforming populations in American education. Babad,
Avni-Babad, and Rosenthal (2003) reported that students were
critical of and upset with high school teachers who manifested
differential behavior (correlations between teacher differentiality
and indices of students evaluations of their teachers reaching r
.63). In a subsequent study (Babad, 2005), students keen sen-
sitivity to teacher differentiality was demonstrated in their ability
to identify (r .40) differential teachers (who were unknown to
them) after viewing brief clips (10 s) of their NV behavior when
lecturing to their entire classrooms.
Elisha Babad, School of Education, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, Israel.
This research was supported by a grant from the Israel Science
Foundation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Elisha
Babad, School of Education, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus,
Jerusalem 91905, Israel. E-mail: elisha@vms.huji.ac.il
I thank Robert Rosenthal, Arie Kruglanski, Dale Miller, and David
Funder for invaluable advice; John Darley for joint thinking about the idea;
Moshe Alafi for professional TV help; Peter Caryl in Edinburgh and Hank
Kaplowitz in New Jersey for enabling the administration; Eyal Peer for
technical and statistical assistance; Moshe Inbar for his participation; and
Dinah Avni-Babad for extensive help and partnership at all stages.
245
Similar concerns about unfair treatment and its effects on ap-
plicants were investigated by Ployhart and colleagues in organi-
zational settings (Ployhart & Harold, 2004; Ployhart & Ryan,
1998). People appear to have a substantial degree of tolerance for
preferential treatments that are to their benefit and to be more
likely to be upset when they are on the unfavored side of prefer-
ential treatment.
Much of the research on differential behavior has focused on
NV behavior because of its irrepressible nature, its links to emo-
tion, its accessibility to observers, and its speed (DePaulo, 1992).
Nonverbal research is focused on the expression of affect, and
differentiality (of teachers: Babad, Bernieri, & Rosenthal, 1989a,
1989b; of judges: Blanck, Rosenthal, & Cordell, 1985; Blanck,
1993; Hart, 1995; and of TV broadcasters: Friedman, DiMatteo, &
Mertz, 1980; Mullen et al., 1986, and Babad, 1999) is often
concentrated in the affective domain. In recent years, research on
thin slices of NV behavior (e.g., on judgments after raters expo-
sure to very brief instances of NV behavior) has become quite
prevalent (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000; Ambady &
Rosenthal, 1992).
More than other public media, TV emphasizes the importance of
the visual aspect. In Lewis (1984) words, the picture is there on
the screen, and all the viewer has to do is to impose his or her inner
meaning on the image and to partake of the subtle insinuations of
face and body language. Attempts to influence viewers attitudes
or behavior (by broadcasters and advertisers) are enacted not only
through verbal content but also in numerous NV methods varying
in their degree of subtlety. The presumed influence of the NV
aspect in the KennedyNixon TV debate in 1960 is well remem-
bered, and much of the impact of TV advertising is based on NV
components. Two American studies analyzed the differential facial
expressions of news anchorpersons when they uttered the names of
the two presidential candidates in the 1976 (Friedman et al., 1980)
and 1984 campaigns (Mullen et al., 1986), and reported detectable
differences for some anchorpersons. In NV research, media fair-
ness or preference is sought in subtle nuances of emotional tone
and body language rather than in verbal content.
Ethical concerns about agenda setting, hidden biases and undue
influence, and demands to set norms for fairness in broadcasting
246
are frequently raised in various forums (see, e.g., Cohen, 1987;
Elliott, 1986; Lewis, 1984). In Israel, these norms are stated
explicitly in the Nakdi Document (Rogel & Schejter, 1995), a
legally binding set of ethical directives in the two Broadcasting
Authorities. To provide fair, impartial expression of divergent
views, interviewers are required to act neutrally and to refrain from
expressing personal views, to avoid demonstrating solidarity with
some interviewees or ambushing others.
Preferential behavior in TV interviewing is particularly volatile
because (unlike teachers in isolated classrooms) it can affect a
large audience. Politicians and public figures interviewed on TV
are given a legitimate public stage to try to impress and influence
a wide audience, but interviewers are required to maintain a fair
and neutral stance and to refrain from any attempt to support a
particular view or person. But it appears that often they do try to
win over the audience for a particular position, either facilitating or
hindering the legitimate impact of the interviewees.
The investigation of media bias in this project was focused
exclusively on NV behavior, eliminating any verbal comprehen-
sion of the political content and any prior acquaintance with the
interviewer and interviewees. Media bias can be construed on two
levels. The first level consists of evidence on the existence of
differentiality in interviewers behavior. According to their per-
sonal views and preferences, interviewers would deviate from fair
and equal treatment, and would demonstrate a preferential attitude
toward certain interviewees compared with other interviewees.
This level of media bias was investigated in the previous set of
studies (Babad, 1999). The second level of media bias concerns the
actual effects of interviewers differential behavior on viewers
impressions of the interviewees, that is, the gains or losses caused
to the receivers of preferential treatment. That level of meaning is
investigated in the present study. The first level of media bias is
necessary, but not sufficient, for demonstrating media bias of the
second level. If we cannot show empirical, causal effects of
interviewers differentiality on the impact of the interviewee on the
audience, we could not argue that media bias in its fullest sense has
been demonstrated.
In Babads 1999 research, all clips in which only the interviewer
was seen and heard were isolated from videotapes of political TV
interviews that had been broadcasted in Israel. Each of seven
interviewers was recorded interviewing at least two public figures,
and the clips from the various interviewees for each interviewer
were mixed. The clips ranged in length from 2 to 15 s, averaging
6.82 s. They were shown to nonHebrew-speaking students out-
side of Israel, who did not know the interviewers and did not
understand the verbal content. They judged each clip on a global
impression scale (1 negative, 9 positive, with 5 as a neutral
midpoint). The ratings were subsequently averaged to yield the
judges ratings of interviewers conduct toward each interviewee.
The results showed that the judges indeed detected differential
treatment of different interviewees, with various interviewers dem-
onstrating varying levels of differentiality (rs ranging from .22 to
.80).
One interviewer (labeled here A) stood apart from the other
interviewers of the 1999 research in the length and the importance
of his interviews. Conventional TV interviews with politicians and
public figures last 4 6 min and include three or four instances
showing the interviewer alone. This interviewera prominent
Israeli TV personality conducted two separate but parallel
BABAD
lengthy interviews (90 min each) with the two candidates for prime
minister, marking the onset of a national election campaign. These
two interviews were unprecedented in their length, they were
highly promoted as parallel interviews, and they were widely
watched. They were considered by many as the most important
political interviews ever broadcasted in Israel.
All instances in which A alone was seen and heard in these two
interviews143 clipswere mixed and shown in the 1999 study
to 109 nonHebrew-speaking American students. The difference
between the means of all ratings for the two politicians (70 clips
for one, 73 for the other) was highly significant, with an extremely
high effect magnitude (d 2.67). An analysis of the first five
interactions with each politician (to counteract the argument that
the politicians caused As conduct by their own behavior) revealed
the very same differential effect in his behavior. Later on, this
interviewer admitted in a book he authored that one of the two
politicians was his favorite, whereas his attitude toward the other
politician was negative. Thus, As differential behavior toward the
two politicians was clearly preferential. Clips selected from those
interviews served as the stimulus materials for the interviewer
condition (friendly vs. hostile) in the present research
Overview and Hypotheses of the Present Research
The research is presented in four stages, each focusing on a
particular applied or conceptual aspect of the overall research
question. The parts are not separate or independent studies, but
rather unfolding stages of one study, each based on the previous
stage and adding new foci.
Stage I: The Basic DesignIdentification of Media Bias
The basic design was focused on the central issue of media bias,
testing whether the friendly versus hostile NV behavior of a TV
interviewer would influence the image of the interviewed politi-
cian in the eyes of the viewers. Students in a nonHebrew-
speaking country viewed a 4-min TV interview without compre-
hending the verbal content and subsequently rated the interviewed
politician on a series of personality and social attributes and
assessed his chances of being elected. Unbeknownst to them, the
interviewees behavior was identical in all versions of the inter-
view, and only the interviewers behavior was varied. In this basic
(between-subjects) design, groups viewed either a friendly or a
hostile interviewer.
The simulated interview appeared like a typical political TV
interview. The lack of verbal comprehension made it possible to
create smoothly parallel interviews while holding the interviewee
constant, because it did not matter at all what the interviewer and
interviewee had actually said. The interviewer conditions depicted
real and important TV behavior of high ecological validity, and the
dependent variables represented the kinds of impressions that
interviewed politicians try to make on their audiences. The admin-
istration of the study outside of Israel guaranteed that there would
be no recognition of interviewer and interviewee and that viewers
would not be influenced by their own political views or by the
political stand of the interviewee and would therefore be totally
unbiased. Thus, in this experimental design, any differences in
judges impressions of the interviewed politician could be causally
attributed to the differences in the interviewers NV behavior.
 MEDIA BIAS
The question in this part of the research is really an applied
question. Complaints about media bias are often heard, especially
in politically tense periods, but it is difficult to prove empirically
that interviewees might actually benefit from preferential behavior
or pay a psychological price as its victims. My hypothesis is that
differences would be found between the friendly and hostile in-
terviewer conditions in personality and social ratings, in attributed
chances of being elected and in the tendency to personally vote for
the interviewed politician, despite the fact that the behavior of the
interviewee is identical in both conditions.
Stage II: Gain Versus Loss
This part of the research centered on the directionality of media
bias, asking whether a favored politician would make psycholog-
ical gains in the eyes of the viewers because of the interviewers
preferential treatment or whether the victim of hostile interviewer
treatment would be hindered and would pay a psychological price.
The directionality issue is separated from the basic design, because
the very existence of media bias (i.e., difference between friendly
and hostile conditions) is a highly significant issue in its own right,
regardless of its direction.
Methodologically, gains and losses can be determined only by
comparison to a neutral control condition. Three control conditions
were examined, two involving a neutral interviewer (see later
discussion) and one presenting a no-interviewer control. As will be
seen, each of these conditions had methodological faults. My
hypothesis is that media bias would be demonstrated most strongly
through damage to the image of the politician in the hostile
interviewer condition. Hostile, aggressive treatment would proba-
bly be more salient and would stand out more vividly in viewers
eyes.
Stage III: Framing the Identity of the Interviewee
Because of the suspicion that contemporary university students
(the judges in this research) might have a negative attitude toward
politicians, and might perhaps even welcome the harsh treatment
given to the interviewed politician, the framing was changed in this
part of the research, introducing the interviewee to the judges as a
university professor rather than a politician. The basic design
and the two versions of the interview serving as the stimulus
materials were kept intact, and only the disclosed identity of the
interviewee and the wording of the questionnaire were changed.
Methodologically, two new experimental groups were added to
the basic design of Stage I to create a 2 2 factorial design, with
interviewer NV behavior (friendly vs. hostile) and framing (pol-
itician vs. professor) as the independent variables. The framing
question would probably carry more interest for cognitive social
psychologists, whereas the primary question concerning the effects
of media bias on the image of politicians must be seen in a wider
framework of mass communication research.
My hypothesis is that the main effect of the interviewer condi-
tion (friendly hostile in judges ratings) would remain intact in
both framings, and the negatively treated professor would pay a
psychological price compared with the favored professor in a
similar fashion as the negatively treated politician. It seems quite
plausible that the professor would receive higher ratings than the
politician irrespective of the interviewer condition. Therefore, I
247
predict finding one or two main effects in the 2 2 ANOVA, but
no interaction effects.
Another methodological feature of the framing study is the fact
that it provided a replication of the basic design with fresh groups
of judges. This made it possible to examine the stability of the
patterns of results obtained in the first stage.
Stage IV: The Mediation of Media Bias
The last stage centers on conceptual aspects of the persuasion
process that might mediate the formation of media bias. From a
societal perspective, media bias through interviewers preferential
behavior violates ethical norms, illuminates potential undue influ-
ence of the mass media, and cannot be justified. But if interviewer
influence would be found empirically to exist, we should try to
understand its underlying cognitive and affective processes.
The literature on source credibility in persuasion does not dis-
cuss TV anchorpersons and interviewers, because they are sup-
posed to maintain neutrality and objectivity and would not be
considered legitimate sources of persuasion. However, we can
speculate about the TV interviewer as a source of persuasion. In
the two salient dual modelsPetty and Cacioppos (1986) Elab-
oration Likelihood Model (ELM) and Chaikens (1979) Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM, see also Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly,
1989)the potential influence of the TV interviewer would be
concentrated in the model that does not deal with systematic and
focused information processing. In the ELM, source characteristics
are likely to impact persuasion in the peripheral route, under
considerations of low elaboration, so that people would be influ-
enced without thinking. In the HSM, source characteristics would
be regarded as heuristic information, related to simple and general
rules of thumb like expertise implies correctness.
Kruglanskis lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglan-
ski et al., 2004) presents a unimodel of persuasion, in which the
central concept dealing with source credibility is epistemic au-
thority. A recent chapter summarized a host of studies on epis-
temic authority (Kruglanski et al., in press), but the influence (or
bias, as framed here) of TV interviewers is not included, and the
conceptualization rested on source credibility deriving from ver-
bal, rather than NV communication. Still, it can be reasoned that if
viewers regard the interviewer as a high epistemic authority, they
would follow his lead, either assuming that the interviewee is to be
regarded positively (in the friendly interviewer condition) or as-
suming that the interviewee is not a positive character (in the
hostile interviewer condition).
These ideas derive from cognitive models dealing with persua-
sion. On the other hand, more affective models are available in the
literature on impression formation, and these are no less relevant in
accounting for viewers impressions of the interviewed politician
as a function of the interviewers behavior. The most relevant
conception concerns the halo effect phenomenon (Nisbett & Wil-
son, 1977), in which peoples overall feeling of liking or disliking
for the target person influences their more specific judgments of a
variety of traits and characteristics. To apply this conception to the
present research, it could be assumed that the interviewer has
source credibility and epistemic authority in the eyes of the view-
ers that derives from his media status. Therefore, his friendly or
hostile treatment of the interviewee would be a signal of his liking
or disliking that would be learned vicariously and adopted by the
248 BABAD
viewers. The dependent variables in this researcha variety of
personality traits and social attributes, judges personal liking or
disliking of the interviewee, their attributions about his chances of
being elected, and the decision of whether they would have per-
sonally voted for himmade it possible to examine a halo effect
hypothesis in which the interviewers behavior would determine
the halo, compared with a more cognitive line of thinking that
would not be focused on liking.
Stage I: The Basic DesignEffects of Interviewers
Preferential Behavior
Groups of students (judges) in a nonHebrew-speaking country
viewed a 4-min political interview and subsequently rated the
interviewed politician on a variety of scales. Randomly assigned,
half of the judges viewed an interview with a hostile interviewer,
and the other half, with a friendly interviewer. The behavior of the
interviewee was identical in all conditions.
Method
Participants. The judges in all stages of this research were 193 uni-
versity students, 71 males and 122 females (37% and 63%, respectively).
They ranged in age from 19 to 27 years.
The basic design (Stage I) was administered to 83 judges, 27 males
(33%) and 56 females (67%). They were students in a British university in
Scotland (51 judges) and a comparable college in the U.S.A. (32 judges).
Comparison of means for the main dependent variable (overall compos-
ite) showed that the British and American samples were equivalent and
the respective means were quite similar. (For the friendly interviewer
condition, the means (and SDs) for the two locations were M 4.98 (0.9)
and M 4.94 (1.2), t(41) 0.10, ns, d .03; for the hostile interviewer
condition, the means were M 4.63 (1.3) and M 4.42 (1.2), t(38)
0.51, ns, d .16). Therefore, all judges were grouped together for data
analysis. Only Scottish students served as judges in all subsequent stages
of the research.
The means of the male and the female judges on the overall composite
were compared. No significant gender differences were found, and the
means were quite similar in both comparisons. (For the friendly interviewer
condition, the means (and SDs) of the gender groups were M 4.91 (1.1)
and M 4.97 (1.1), t(41) 0.14, ns, d .03; for the hostile interviewer
condition, the means were M 4.46 (1.2) and M 4.54 (1.4), t(38)
0.20, ns, d .06). Therefore, the results of male and female judges were
combined for data analysis.
Judges were randomly divided into all conditions at all stages. The
experimental conditions were mixed, and there was no systematic order of
administration of stages in the data collection period. (The American
sample was an exception, because all American participants were assigned
to the two conditions of the basic design). Participants were recruited by
notices on bulletin boards in various departments and also were personally
recruited in the university library (to participate in an interesting nonver-
bal video study lasting 12 minutes).
The videotaped interview was shown on a regular TV monitor in small
university classrooms to groups of 4 7 judges. Respondents could not see
each others ratings and were not allowed to discuss the interview with
each other until they completed the ratings. Full debriefing of the study and
its objectives was presented at the end of the session.
Preparation of the stimulus interview. The interviewer clips were
selected from As 143 clips in the two interviews in Babads (1999) study.
All clips were rated then by 109 American judges on a 9-point scale, from
very negative (1) to very positive (9), with 5.0 serving as a neutral
midpoint. For the hostile and friendly interviewer conditions in this study,
clips were selected with means around 4.0 and 6.0, respectively (actually
3.9 4.1 and 5.9 6.1). More extreme clips were not used, to prevent
exaggeration in interviewer friendliness or hostility.
The actor posing as the interviewee was a geology professor in his
sixties. He was aware of the intended purpose of the clips that would be
taken from his interview. He was interviewed in front of the camera for
about 1520 min and spoke fluently and assertively about geological
phenomena and issues of university life. Short excerpts from this interview
were used in the final simulated interview. Because the judges of the
simulated interview would not understand the verbal content of the inter-
view, there was no need to coordinate the intermittent speech content of the
interviewer and the interviewee, and the major concern in editing the final
interview was its technical quality. With help from the Israeli Broadcasting
Authority, background and lighting conditions identical to the original
interviews were created, so that the pasted segments of the interviewer and
the interviewed politician would merge and give the appearance of a
natural TV interview in full flow.
The final interview serving as the stimulus material in all conditions
lasted 4 min 3 s. The opening picture of the studio with music and the
program title took 13 s (5% of the time). The remaining 230 s included
seven interchanges of question and answer, the answers lasting twice as
long as the questions, as customary in TV interviews. The interviewer had
eight intermittent clips (hostile or friendly) lasting 8 to 16 s each, with an
average length of 10.4 s. His clips summed up to 83 s (34% of the total
time). The interviewee had seven identical clips in all versions, lasting 14
to 27 s, with an average of 21 s. His clips summed up to 147 s (60.5% of
the total time). The shifts from one figure to the other were smooth, and the
interviewees face was shown shortly a few times while the interviewers
voice was heard, seemingly listening intently to the interviewer. A wide
picture of the studio was shown three times, at the beginning, middle, and
end of the interview.
Questionnaire for judges ratings. The questionnaire was constructed
from several sources, including previous studies on media bias and of
students judgments of instructors, studies of accuracy in personality judg-
ments and person perception, and especially the Big 5 (NEO 5) conception
and personality measurement. The form was entitled Non-Verbal Percep-
tion Study. The opening sentences explained that research has shown that
people can form relatively accurate impressions after a brief exposure to
the NV behavior of another person and that in this research their impres-
sions of a politician who was interviewed in an election campaign are
sought. The interview would be conducted in a foreign language, and
therefore respondents perceptions would be based on NV aspects only
facial expressions, body language, and tone of voice. Participants were
requested to fill out all the ratings, and to make guesses when they were not
sure, becauseit was explainedwe are interested in first impressions,
even if they are only half-formed. All ratings were made on 9-point scales
ranging from 1 (low) to 9 (high).
Participants first rated the politician on 18 personality attributes,
presented in alphabetical order (active, cheerful, competent, confident,
convincing, credible, dogmatic, emotional, enthusiastic, flexible, genuine,
hostile, humorous, intelligent, optimistic, relaxed, trustworthy, and warm).
Next, they rated a list of six communication skills (ability to express
himself clearly, to cope with stress, to convince others, to inspire confi-
dence, leadership ability, and forcefulness). Two ratings of personal ap-
pearance followed (physical appearance: 1 plain, 9 handsome; and
health: 1 poor, 9 very healthy). Three general ratings of the politician
followed: What are the politicians chances of being elected? Would you
personally (hypothetically speaking) vote for him? How much did you,
personally, like the politician? Two last ratings in the questionnaire focused
on the interviewer, for the purpose of a manipulation check: How much did
you like the interviewer? How did the interviewer treat the politician in the
interview (from hostile to friendly)? An open question at the bottom of the
form asked for advice the respondent would give the politician to improve
his appearance or presentation, and at the bottom of the page, participants
wrote down their age and gender, and whether they understood any of the
 MEDIA BIAS 249

content spoken. It was ascertained that none of the judges understood the M 2.20 [1.5] for the friendly and hostile conditions, respec-
verbal content (except for picking up a random word such as New York tively; t[81] 2.32. p .05; d .52).
or Rabin). These results provided clear evidence for the existence of media
bias of the second, causal level. Although the interviewees be-
Results and Discussion havior was identical in both conditions, the preferential NV be-
havior of the interviewer influenced the judges and caused them to
Manipulation check, internal consistency reliability, and depen-
view the politician more favorably as a function of the interview-
dent variables. The interviewer conditions manipulation was
ers friendly behavior.
checked via the two last items in the questionnaire, which focused
The significant effects were found for judges attributions about
on the interviewer. The interviewer was indeed perceived as being
the politician. In contrast, judges personal reactions to the politi-
friendlier in the friendly condition and more hostile in the hostile
cianpersonally liking him and tending to personally vote for
condition (the means [and SDs] were M 5.10 [1.5] and M 4.26
him did not show differences between the experimental condi-
[1.6] for the friendly and hostile conditions, respectively, t[79]
tions. Perhaps it makes sense that one would not commit oneself to
2.52, p .01, d .56). The interviewer was also better liked by
vote for a politician (even a hypothetical one) without knowing the
the judges in the friendly condition (M 5.27 [1.8] and M 4.53
politicians views and ideas. As to personal liking, the failure to
[2.1], respectively, t[79] 1.70, p .05, d .39).
find a relationship with the experimental conditions (r .04
The internal consistency reliability of the questionnaire was
between liking and conditions) was surprising and led to subse-
examined via Cronbach alpha coefficients and was found to be
quent analyses. Later discussion in Stage IV is focused on the
very high ( .92). All items (except dogmatic, because some
liking issue and the mediation of media bias.
respondents did not understand this term and asked about it while
filling out the questionnaire, and reversing hostile to nonhos-
tile) were averaged into an overall (negativepositive) impression Stage II: Benefit to Favorite or Damage to Victim? The
composite that was used in subsequent analyses. Search for a Control Group
Effects of preferential behavior. Four dependent variables
Having established the effect of interviewers preferential be-
were examined in data analysis: the overall impression composite
havior in causing media bias, the next arising question concerned
averaging 23 personality and social attributes, chances of the
the direction of the difference. Do favorites gain from interview-
politician being elected, personally vote for the politician, and
ers friendliness, or do victims of hostile treatment suffer psycho-
personally liking him. Table 1 presents the differences between the
logical losses (as is usually claimed in complaints about media
mean ratings of the politician in the friendly and hostile conditions.
bias)? In the teacher expectancy literature, the controversy started
The results supported the central hypothesis: The judges viewed
with evidence of favorites gains (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968),
the politician differently as a function of the interviewers hostile
but the common claims centered on presumable damages caused to
or friendly NV behavior (d .41) and attributed to him better
recipients of negative differential behavior (Weinstein, 2002;
chances of being elected in the friendly interviewer condition (d
Wineburg, 1987). Scarce empirical evidence (Babad, Inbar, &
.49).
Rosenthal, 1982) actually demonstrated damage to low-expectancy
Specific analyses of the various ratings yielded the highest
students.
effect magnitudes for the politicians credibility and positive emo-
To measure benefits and losses in the present experimental
tionality: genuine (d .54), convincing (.49), relaxed (.47), flex-
design required a control condition with which the hostile and
ible (.45), cheerful (.43), humorous (.43), and optimistic (.41).
friendly experimental conditions would be compared. A control
Probably most interesting was the difference in judges ratings of
group supposedly represents a neutral context, typically either by
physical appearance: The politician was perceived as more hand-
the creation of a neutral treatment or by the examination of a
some in the friendly interviewer condition (M 3.00 [1.7] and
no-treatment condition. Both possibilities were explored here.
The task of creating a neutral interviewer condition appeared
straightforward at first. Much as clips with averaged ratings of
Table 1 5.9 6.1 (friendly) and 3.9 4.1 (hostile) were selected from
Effects of Interviewers Preferential Behavior on Judges among As 143 clips from his broadcasted interviews (Babad,
Ratings of the Interviewed Politician (Media BiasStage 1) 1999), clips averaging around 5.0 should replace them in the
neutral interview. But the 143 clips mixed NV behaviors from two
Interviewer t Effect
interviews, one very friendly (from which the clips averaging 6.0
conditions tests size
were selected) and another very hostile (from which the clips
Friendly Hostile averaging 4.0 were selected). Thus, two parallel subsets of clips
rated 5.0 (actually 4.9 5.1) were available. One subset represented
Dependent variable M SD M SD t(81) d a situation in which an interviewer was hostile toward a politician
Overall composite of personality he disliked, but on several instances during that 90-min interview
and social attributes 4.96 1.1 4.50 1.3 1.78* .41 his negativity was reduced and he acted in a nonhostile manner.
Chances of being elected 5.33 1.5 4.50 1.8 2.25* .49 The other subset represented a situation in which the same inter-
Personally like the politician 4.38 1.7 4.28 2.2 0.24 .05 viewer was very friendly toward a favorite politician, but in a few
Personally vote for the politician 3.79 2.4 3.25 2.1 1.09 .24
instances he was somewhat less friendly. Statistically speaking,
Note. N 83. ratings averaging 5.0 indeed represented the middle of the scale.
* p .05 Psychologically speaking, perhaps neither subset really repre-
250
sented a neutral state, instead depicting situations in which A
transmitted affect that contradicted his real feelings. Given existing
knowledge about peoples sensitivity to deceitful affective trans-
missions in NV research (Ambady et al., 2000; Ambady &
Rosenthal, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1969), it is quite conceivable
that judges would detect the unique nature of these subsets of
5.0-rated clips.
Therefore, two separate control interviews were created for this
study one consisting of clips rated 4.9 5.1 from the hostile
interview (labeled the nonhostile condition), and the other, clips
rated 4.9 5.1 from the friendly interview (the nonfriendly con-
dition). If the ratings of the politician by two groups of judges
viewing these conditions were not identical to each other, these
conditions would not be considered to represent a neutral control
condition.
A no-treatment control condition was created as well. In this
condition, the interviewer could not be seen at all, and the judges
viewed only the clips of the interviewed politician. Judges were
told that they would watch excerpts from a political interview, but
because the focus was only on the interviewee, the interviewer
parts were taken out. However, this control condition might also
have been a bit problematic, because it showed a solo appearance
with no interaction at all.
Method
Participants. The judges were 64 university students in Scotland, 25
males (39%) and 39 females (61%), ranging in age from 19 to 27 years.
The study was administered as described above for the basic experiment.
Preparation of the stimulus interview. Three cassettes were prepared,
following the procedures of the basic studytwo with interviewer clips
rated 4.9 5.1 from each of As two interviews (Babad, 1999), and one
depicting the interviewee alone. For the nonfriendly control condition,
clips rated 4.9 5.1 were selected from 70 clips from As interview with his
favorite politician. For the nonhostile condition, clips rated 4.9 5.1 were
selected from the 73 clips from As interview with his disliked, rival
politician. In the video lab, these clips replaced the original friendly and
hostile interviewer clips from the basic study, whereas the politicians clips
remained identical in all cassettes. For the no-interviewer control condi-
tion, a new cassette was prepared, presenting all clips of the politician from
the basic master cassette, with a pause of 2 s between clips. The interviewer
was not shown at all in that cassette.
Results and Discussion
Means for the overall impression composite were computed for
the nonfriendly and nonhostile conditions, and an independent
samples t test examined the difference between these means. The
assumption was that if both conditions represented a common
neutral interviewer state, the two means would be very similar or
identical to each other. The results showed that the means of the
two presumably equivalent control conditions differed signifi-
cantly from each other, t(32) 1.68, p .05, d .58. The
politician received higher ratings from the judges in the nonhostile
condition (M 4.96, SD 1.1) than in the nonfriendly condition
(M 4.27, SD 1.4).
The means of the overall composite ratings for the two control
conditions were more extreme and further apart from each other
than the means of the friendly and hostile conditions of the basic
design. Clips depicting nonfriendly behavior toward the favored
politician yielded very negative ratings, and clips depicting non-
BABAD
hostile behavior toward the disliked politician yielded very posi-
tive ratings. Thus, the unavoidable conclusion was that these
conditions could not be considered to represent neutral interview-
ing and could not be used as control groups in this study. (This
reversal of impressions when the interviewer [unbeknownst to the
judges] acted against his true feelings is fascinating and warrants
future research. As mentioned above, people are extremely sensi-
tive to deceptive affective NV messages.)
The second part of the control group inquiry dealt with a no-
interviewer condition as a potential control group. The mean
ratings for the overall impression composite and the ratings for
chances of being elected in the no-interviewer condition were
compared with the means for the friendly and hostile conditions of
the basic design.
When appearing alone without an interviewer, the politician
received, for both dependent variables, higher ratings than those he
received for both friendly and hostile conditions in the basic design
(M 5.37, SD 1.1 recorded for the overall composite in the no-
interviewer condition, and M 5.48, SD 1.7 for the chances of
being elected rating). T tests indicated that the ratings of the no-
interviewer condition were not significantly higher than the ratings
for the friendly interviewer condition (t[72] 1.62, ns, d .39 for
the overall composite, and t[72] 0.42, ns, d .10 for election
chances). On the other hand, the ratings for the no-interviewer
condition were significantly higher than the ratings for the hostile
interviewer condition, with substantial effect sizes, t(69) 3.04,
p .01, d .72 for the overall composite, and t(69) 2.35, p
.05, d .56 for election chances.
The tentative conclusion is that hostile behavior of a TV inter-
viewer can probably cause damage to the image of the interviewee
in the eyes of the viewers, but it was not found that friendly
interviewer behavior improved the image of the interviewee. Thus,
the direction of the evidence confirms the claimed damage poten-
tially caused by media bias. This conclusion is tentative because
the no-interviewer condition was not fully equivalent to the
interactive-interviewer conditions.
Stage III: Framing the Identity of the Interviewee:
Politician Versus Professor
In the first few days of data collection, some judges said in the
postexperimental debriefing that they and their friends had a
built-in bias against politicians, and they were predisposed to
have negative feelings toward the interviewed politician. With the
contemporary overexposure of the audience to politicians in the
mass media, and with the frequent sights of harsh and aggressive
interviewing on TV, perhaps some people view hostile interview-
ing of politicians as quite normal. Therefore, the basic study was
extended in Stage III by changing the presumed identity of the
interviewee and framing him as a professor instead of a politician.
Because the judges viewing the stimulus interview had no com-
prehension of the verbal content, the very same interview could be
readily presented as an interview with a professor, focused on
scientific issues and university life. Thus, professor conditions
(friendly and hostile interviewing) were added to the ongoing
randomized schedule in which the various conditions in this
project were administered.
The resultant 2 2 experiment, with interviewer NV behavior
(friendly vs. hostile) and the framing of the identity of the inter-
 MEDIA BIAS
Figure 1. Effects of friendly versus hostile interviewers nonverbal behavior condition on judges rating of
politician and professor (Stage III). Means and 95% confidence intervals for overall composite and chances of
being elected.
viewee (politician vs. professor) as the independent variables, was
an extension of the basic design. The original groups of judges
from the basic experiment were used for the politician condition,
and two new groups of Scottish students (drawn from the same
subject pool) viewed the same 4-min interview, but the interviewee
was introduced to them as a university professor, and the ques-
tionnaire was rephrased to fit a professor.
Method
Participants. The added judges were 46 university students in Scot-
land, 19 males (41%) and 27 females (59%), ranging in age from 19 to 26
years.
The modified questionnaire. For the professor conditions, the question-
naire and the instructions were modified, presenting the interviewee as a
professor interviewed on TV rather than as a politician. In the question-
naire, all references to the politician were changed, including chances of
being elected chairman or dean. The experiment was administered as
described earlier in Stage I.
Results and Discussion
The ratings of the four groups of judges for the four dependent
variables were subjected to two 2 2 ANOVAs.1 Figure 1
presents the ratings of the four groups for the overall impression
composite and for the election chances ratingthe variables for
which significant media bias effects were found in the basic design
(see Table 1). Table 2 presents the results of the 2 2 ANOVAs.
The patterns in Figure 1 show parallel differences (main effects)
between the two interviewer conditions for both professor and
politician. The results in Table 2 show that no significant interac-
tion effects were found and that the F values for the interaction
terms were negligible (F[1, 125] 0.11 in both ANOVAs). The
professor was indeed rated more favorably than the politician in
the overall composite (r .32). As to the chances of being elected,
the strong main effect was found for the interviewer condition (r
.25). Separate t tests were computed for the professor, parallel to
the tests for the politician in Table 1. (Because they are redundant
analyses, reusing degrees of freedom from the earlier analyses,
251
only effect sizes are reported for these analyses). The effect size
for the overall composite was d .33 and the effect size for
chances of being elected was d .54.
A similar pattern was found for the ratings measuring the
tendency to personally vote for the interviewee, but here only the
framing condition yielded a significant effect (MS 85.20,
F[1,125] 15.92, p .01, r .34), the professor receiving higher
ratings than the politician (means of 5.57 [SD 2.4] and 4.87
[SD 2.4] for the professor in the friendly and hostile conditions,
respectively, compared with means of 3.79 [SD 2.4] and 3.25
[SD 2.1] for the politician). For personally liking the inter-
viewee, again (like the findings in Table 1) there was no difference
between the interviewer conditions, but the professor was gener-
ally better liked than the politician (MS 20.01, F[1, 124] 5.33,
p .05, r .20).
In summary, the analyses in Stage III showed similarity between
the patterns of results for the politician and the professor, although
the professor received systematically higher ratings than the pol-
itician. The assumed stigma of politicians was indeed supported,
and the same interviewee was more favored and better liked when
he was framed as a professor. But the patterns of findings recorded
in the basic design in Stage I were generally replicated in the
professor groups. In this way, the framing study provided inde-
pendent support to the media bias findings of the basic design with
fresh groups of judges.
The combined results of Stage I and Stage III systematically
demonstrate media bias, in which an interviewee whose behavior
is identical in all experimental conditions is perceived in a more
positive or a more negative manner as a function of the preferential
1
The comparisons reported in Stage III are not independent because half
of the data (for the politician) had already been reported in Stage I. The
separation of stages derives from the fact that Stage I was focused on the
central hypothesis of this research, namely, the existence of media bias,
whereas Stage III (with the addition of the professor) is focused on a
secondary issue, namely, the effects on the viewers of framing the identity
of the interviewee.
252 BABAD

Table 2 tone of voice. Second, the presumed epistemic authority of the TV

Effects of Friendly and Hostile Interviewers Nonverbal interviewer was role-related rather than personal, because the
Behavior on Judges Ratings of the Politician and the Professor judges had never heard nor seen this particular interviewer before,
(Stage 3) and they could not even understand his speech.
In the context of the mass media, ethical constraints dictate that
Effect TV interviewers (Babad, 1999) or TV anchorpersons (Friedman et
Source MS df F(1, 125) size r
al., 1980; Mullen et al., 1986) should refrain from becoming
Overall composite rating epistemic authorities and should not let their own views and
Interviewer Conditions (A) 4.47 1 3.60 .17 preferences influence their audience. Thus, interviewer influence
Framing of Interviewee (B) 17.54 1 14.14** .32 is presented as expressing media bias rather than legitimate per-
AB 0.13 1 0.11 .03
suasion. Still, evidence showing media bias would attest to the
Error 1.24 125
Chances of being elected epistemic authority of the interviewer.
Interviewer conditions (A) 25.84 1 8.10** .25 To analyze the viewers information processing, the halo effect
Framing of interviewee (B) 4.54 1 1.42 .11 conception appeared most relevant, because the judges were asked
AB 0.35 1 0.11 .03 to rate the interviewee on a variety of personality and social
Error 3.19 125
attributes. The halo phenomenon involves an internal network of
Note. Values derived from 2 2 analyses of variance for dependent correlations that individuals apply over their impressions (a heu-
variables (overall composite and chances of being elected). ristic rather than systematic system in Chaikens 1979 terminol-
** p .01 ogy), triggered by an overall positive or negative impression. In his
article about halo effects in ratings and evaluation research, Feeley
(2002) wrote that intercorrelations between various traits and di-
NV behavior of the interviewer. This is true for a variety of mensions are inflated as a function of a general impression, and he
personality and social attributes and also for judges attributions argued that the phenomenon of halo error hinders the accuracy of
about the interviewees chances of being elected. However, media human communication research. He cited three models that ac-
bias was not found for judges personal reactions to the interviewee count for those inflated correlations: the general impression model;
their personal liking and tendency to vote for him. Framing the the salient dimension model, and the inadequate discrimination
identity of the interviewee also influenced judges ratings, and a model. According to Nisbett and Wilson (1977), the general im-
professor was more positively appreciated than a politician. The pression can consist of the targets general attractiveness or phys-
framing effect was independent of the interviewer effect. ical attractiveness, general liking or disliking, or a particularly
salient attribute such as warm-cold. Global evaluations may be
Stage IV: The Mediation Process: Media Bias and capable of altering perceptions of even relatively unambiguous
stimuli, about which the individual has sufficient information to
Halo Effect
render a confident judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 250).
In this part, additional analyses are presented in an attempt to They cited a persons appearance as an example of an unambig-
understand the observed media bias effects. As mentioned earlier, uous stimulus, and indeed results for the interviewees appearance
the persuasion literature would lead to an analysis of source in this study are well in line with their idea.
credibility to understand the influence of the interviewer, and the The internal set of intercorrelations between attributes is a
impression formation literature would lead to an analysis of cognitive phenomenon, but the trigger that activates these corre-
judges information processing. It must be kept in mind that during lations in the halo effect conceptualization is mostly affective. This
the 4 min of the interview, the judges viewed the interviewee for fits quite well with the focus on NV behavior in this research,
147 s and the interviewer for 83 s. They presumably processed all because NV behavior is quite affective and tied to emotions
of that information to yield their final ratings. (DePaulo, 1992). I conceptualized the hypothesized interviewer
As mentioned earlier, the behavior of the interviewer would be effects in a halo perspectiveassuming that the interviewers
considered to influence judges through a peripheral route of low epistemic authority would lead viewers to vicarious identification
elaboration in the ELM model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), or with his overall feelings toward the interviewee, the friendly and
considered as operating in the heuristic rather than the systematic hostile conditions signaling generalized liking or disliking. The
model of information processing in the HSM (Chaiken, 1979). The viewers would then like the interviewee in the friendly interviewer
interviewer would be considered as a sort of cultural informant condition and dislike him in the hostile interviewer condition. A
who has high epistemic authority (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et positive and negative halo effect would subsequently be mani-
al., in press) to provide viewers with the correct signals about the fested in judges ratings of the various personality and social
politician. Because TV interviewers are supposed to be impartial, attributes (represented by the overall impressions composite). This
perhaps the preferential behavior of the interviewer might have hypothesis could be tested empirically, because the questionnaire
been perceived as providing viewers with secret information in included a general liking item: How much did you personally like
strict confidence, without saying anything explicitly. That might the politician/professor?
have boosted his credibility! A halo effect explanation of the influence of interviewers NV
Two important points must be emphasized about the TV inter- behavior would have been demonstrated by a high correlation
viewer in the present study: First, the interviewers influence was between judges liking of the interviewee and the experimental
not expressed in words and verbal political content, but rather in conditions. Surprisingly, this was not the case. Liking was unre-
NV behaviorfacial expressions, body language, gestures, and lated to the experimental conditions and was evenly distributed in

the hostile and friendly interviewer groups. In the basic design
(politician), the correlation between liking and experimental con-
ditions was r .04 (and the means for liking in Table 1 did not
significantly differ from each other), and likewise, the correlation
for the professor in Stage III was also r .04. Thus, the effects of
the interviewers preferential behavior on judges ratings of the
interviewee could not be explained by a vicarious halo effect.
The design of this research made it possible to examine halo
effects independent of interviewer conditions in several replica-
tions of separate groups of judges: The basic design (Stage I)
included two groups of judges (N 83) who watched the inter-
view with the politician in both interviewer conditions; the framing
study (Stage III) added new groups of judges (N 46) who
viewed the same interview with the professor in both interviewer
conditions; and Stage II added another group of judges (N 29)
who watched all clips of the interviewed politician with no inter-
viewer. The next analysis is presented in correlational terms,
because the liking measure was a continuous variable. Media
effects were examined via correlations between the two inter-
viewer conditions and each of the three outcome ratings (mostly
the overall impressions composite, but also chances of being
elected and the tendency to personally vote for him). Halo effects
were examined via correlations between personal liking of the
interviewee and the three ratings across the interviewer conditions
in each substudy.
Table 3 shows the correlations representing interviewer bias
effects and halo effects for each independent set of judges. The
media bias effects, that is, the influence of interviewer conditions,
was expressed in correlations ranging from r .16 to r .26 for
the overall composite and for election chances (where only one of
the four correlations was not significant), but the correlations of
interviewer conditions with personal vote were lower (r .12 to
.15) and nonsignificant. Thus, judgments of the interviewees traits
and attributions of how other people would potentially vote were
influenced by the interviewers preferential behavior, but the re-
sults did not show that judges liking of the interviewee and their
personal choice to vote for him were significantly influenced by
the interviewer conditions.
Halo effects in Table 3 were manifested in more intense asso-
ciations. The correlation between liking and the overall composite
was r .57 for the politician, r .63 for the professor, up to r
.75 for the group who did not see the interviewer at all. The
correlations for voting tendency were equally high (r .57 to .76),
Table 3
Correlations Representing Media Bias Effect (Via Interviewer Conditions) and Halo Effect (Via
Liking the Interviewee) with Three Ratings (Overall Impressions Composite, Election Chances,
and Personal Vote) for Politician Groups, Professor Groups, and No-Interviewer Groups
(Stage 4)
Media bias effects
Rating Politiciana
Overall composite .20*
Chances of being elected .24*
Personally vote for him/her .12
a
df 81. b
df 44. c
df 27.
* p .05. ** p .01
MEDIA BIAS 253
but the correlations for attributions about election chances were
lower (r .35 for both politician and professor, up to r .47 for
the no interviewer group). A comparison of the halo effect corre-
lations and the media bias correlations for the overall composite
indicated that the halo effect was significantly stronger than the
media bias effect (for the politician, comparing the correlations
r .57 and r .20, t(80) 2.98, p .01, effect size r .32; and
for the professor, comparing the correlations r .63 and r .16,
t(43) 2.91, p .01, effect size r .41).
The last analysis to be reported here was intended to ascertain
the independence between the halo effects and the media bias
effects. This independence was indicated by the r .04 correla-
tions reported above between interviewer conditions and liking
(where its 95% confidence interval ranged from r .18 to .26).
Here, the independence was further examined by partial correla-
tions, controlling for either conditions or liking. For media bias,
partial correlations were computed between interviewer condition
and overall composite, controlling for liking. The partial correla-
tion for the politician remained unchanged (r .20), and the
partial correlation for the professor increased from r .16 to r
.24. For halo effects, partial correlations were computed between
liking and the overall composite, controlling for interviewer con-
ditions. Again, the partial correlation for the politician remained
unchanged (r .57), and the correlation for the professor changed
negligibly (from r .63 to r .65). Thus, it can be argued with
reasonable confidence that the halo effect influence and the inter-
viewer conditions influence on judges ratings of the interviewee
were independent of each other.
General Discussion
This research deals with a significant social issue that has
accompanied the mass media for many years, much as it has been
raised again and again in educational contexts. Even if differential
and preferential behavior of TV interviewers or anchorpersons
(Babad, 1999; Friedman et al., 1980; Mullen et al., 1986) and of
teachers (Babad, 1998; Brophy, 1998; Harris & Rosenthal, 1985)
is documented, it is difficult to collect conclusive data that would
lead to unshakable conclusions about causal influence of teachers
or interviewers bias on its receivers.
The present studies were focused on NV behavior in the TV
interview. Political content and prior acquaintance with inter-
viewer and/or interviewee were eliminated. And yet, the stimulus
Halo effects
Professorb Politiciana Professorb No Interviewerc
.16 .57** .63** .75**
.26* .35** .35* .47**
.15 .57** .76** .71**
254 BABAD
material (interviewer behavior) was taken from real political in-
terviews that had been considered among the most important
interviews ever broadcasted in Israel, and the dependent measures
consisted of the exact impressions that politicians and public
figures wish to impact upon their audiences. The results demon-
strated a causal link between preferential NV behavior of the
interviewer and viewers impressions and judgments of the inter-
viewee, the receiver of the preferential behavior. Analysis of
potential control conditions hinted that the main thrust of this
effect was probably the damage caused to the image of the inter-
viewee by interviewers hostile behavior. The measurement was
sensitive to nuances in social judgment, like the fact that professors
were perceived more positively than politicians, despite the fact
that similar patterns of media bias resulting from interviewer
behavior were recorded for both framed identities.
TV interviewers are probably indeed epistemic authorities
(Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et al., in press) who can be persua-
sive in affecting viewers impressions and judgments. This status
appears to be generalized, as applied to a foreign and unknown
interviewer, whose NV behavior was not accompanied by any
political or verbal content. Therefore, ethical directives intended to
guarantee equal treatment in broadcasting and to protect the audi-
ence from undue influence are important, and complaints about
violations of the ethical code in TV interviewing might often be
well grounded. And yet, the effect size of the (significant) media
bias was moderate, and reality conditions (such as acquaintance
with the involved personalities, similarity or dissimilarity in polit-
ical views, etc.) might further reduce this effect.
Side by side with the causal effect of interviewers preferential
NV behavior, judges ratings were also influenced, in a much
stronger intensity, by their general feeling of liking or disliking for
the interviewee (halo effect). Liking was found to be independent
of the interviewer conditions, evenly distributed in the groups
exposed to a friendly and to a hostile interviewer. Thus, judges
impressions were probably influenced by the conduct of both the
interviewee (seen for two thirds of the 4-min interview) and the
interviewer (seen for one third of the time). The halo effect is a
generalized human (or cultural) bias, but because it was not
influenced by the interviewers behavior, it cannot be considered a
media bias. The analyses indicated that the influence of the
interviewer was not mediated through judges identification with a
generalized feeling of like or dislike. Judges probably used their
interpretation of the interviewers hostile behavior as informa-
tion about the character of the interviewee.
It is rare to find in the research literature a combination (perhaps
an additive one) of different and independent cognitive and affec-
tive factors influencing impression formation and social judgment.
Investigators usually conceptualize about one given sort of mech-
anism or bias, and they design their studies so that the measured
effect of that specific factor would be distinguishable. But it is
clear that numerous different factors actually influence impression
formation in daily social reality. In the present research, the results
made it possible to cleanly separate between halo effects and
media bias effects and to compare their independent impact on the
viewers. Those analyses made it possible to put the investigated
phenomenon of media bias, with its systematic but moderately
sized effects, in a proper perspective, compared with the stronger
intensity of the universal phenomenon of halo effect.
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Received April 1, 2005
Revision received August 26, 2005
Accepted August 26, 2005

Call for Nominations

The Publications and Communications (P&C) Board has opened nominations for the editorships
of Behavioral Neuroscience, JEP: Applied, JEP: General, Neuropsychology, Psychological
Methods, and Psychology and Aging for the years 2008 2013. John F. Disterhoft, PhD; Phillip L.
Ackerman, PhD; D. Stephen Lindsay, PhD; James T. Becker, PhD; Stephen G. West, PhD; and
Rose T. Zacks, PhD, respectively, are the incumbent editors.
Candidates should be members of APA and should be available to start receiving manuscripts in
early 2007 to prepare for issues published in 2008. Please note that the P&C Board encourages
participation by members of underrepresented groups in the publication process and would partic-
ularly welcome such nominees. Self-nominations also are encouraged.
Search chairs have been appointed as follows:

Behavioral Neuroscience: Linda P. Spear, PhD, and J. Gilbert Benedict, PhD

JEP: Applied: William C. Howell, PhD
JEP: General: Peter A. Ornstein, PhD
Neuropsychology: Susan H. McDaniel, PhD, and Robert G. Frank, PhD
Psychological Methods: Mark Appelbaum, PhD
Psychology and Aging: David C. Funder, PhD, and Leah L. Light, PhD

Candidates should be nominated by accessing APAs EditorQuest site on the Web. Using your
Web browser, go to http://editorquest.apa.org. On the Home menu on the left, find Guests. Next,
click on the link Submit a Nomination, enter your nominees information, and click Submit.
Prepared statements of one page or less in support of a nominee can also be submitted by e-mail
to Karen Sellman, P&C Board Search Liaison, at ksellman@apa.org.
Deadline for accepting nominations is January 20, 2006, when reviews will begin.