Jack N. Peterson Trial

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTY
PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s
Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property
(Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. No response has been filed and
the time to respond has expired.
Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff.
Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM-
36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any
further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant
plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant’s
motion.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Plaintiff may file one response to defendant’s Motion for
Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432)
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is
received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of
a response and without further notice.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of
July, 2010.
Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of record
-2-
41 F.3d 1490 Page 1 of 4
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41 F.3d 1490
WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.
Cooper,
for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach County,
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.
Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.
Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.
Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.
Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1 After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants
raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in
the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.
2 The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)
offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976
instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other
Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local
Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xHNX0cXI3CoJ:bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/4... 4/30/2009
41 F.3d 1490 Page 2 of 4
"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in

property originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," the
County issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferred
ownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the County
attempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that,
according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County.
3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms
(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an
unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their
property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;
but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the
dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the
County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The
district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple
owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the
Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.
Defendants appeal.
4 The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not
possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given
plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record
supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case
because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district
court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were
successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a
decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their
property.
5 But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33
Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing
that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the
district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had
the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's
order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this
case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the
burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's
citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining
landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).
6 And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting
ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which
transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County
applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable
application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).
7 The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'
claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in
41 F.3d 1490 Page 3 of 4
district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial
stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...
jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it
should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the
stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for
declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.
8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation
as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to
make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of
motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's
conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."
The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.
And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of
pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th
Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the
stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's
post-verdict motions.
9 Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation
Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title

because title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee.
Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued
to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.
Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's
argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could
not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this
claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v.
16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'
ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government
expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,
we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We
do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.
Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested
if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th
Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was
stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that
41 F.3d 1490 Page 4 of 4
the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues
frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--
that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of
title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in
interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
CC∅ | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG
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PS USE CODE
ADDRESS WETLANDS
SITE INSPECTION
REMARKS ACQUISITION DATE
AGENDA DATE
GRANTOR
BLUE SHEET
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INSTRUMENT
LEGAL DESC SEARCH TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE
PURCHASE PRICE 1 AGENDA DATE 2 AGENDA DATE 3
PRICE/ACRE BLUE SHEET 2 BLUE SHEET 3
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LEE COUNTY DIVISION OF COUNTY LANDS

RESOL~JTIOX PERTAZNIdC TO PUBLIC ws
--p--m IN CAS’O COSTA SUSO!V3S3$y-c-
WHEREAS, there’ appears in the Public H~COK~S of tie
County, Florida, in Plat Book 3 at page 25 the Second Revised
Plat af Cayo Coata Subdivision: and
WHEREAS. there spycar Upon sitid plat certain designated
lot and block areas and other undesignated areaa: and
WHEREAS, there appears upon said plat certain un-numbered
and unlettered iwcas lying East of tho Easterly tier of blocks
in said m&division and West of the Westerly tier of blocks
in said subdivision: and .
“!‘EREAS, tho County clnims slid lands aa public Iandr
together with all accretions thereto.
NOW, THEREFORE, idE IT RESOLVED By THE BOARD OF C0Vm’y
COHMISSXONERS OF LEE COUN’IY, FLORIDA does by this Resolution
claim all of raid lands and accretions thereto for the use
and benefit of the public for public pucposes.

,
DONE ANR ADOPTED this dday of ,< , u &cL~, 1969.
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AGENDAITEMSUMMARY BLUESHEETNO:~~O~M
. REoUESTEDMOTIOl'J
ACTIONREOUESTED~ Ap rove conveyance of any interest in land, \?rhich has accreted to ro erty of rivate landowner
on Cayo Costa Island, ancfnow bein purchased by the State of Florida for preservation. KutRorize CRairnxm to execute
County Deed; authorrze County Lan%s Division to handle and complete conveyance.
WHY ACTION IS NECESSARY: To clear title on land which has accreted to property owned by private landowner, which is
being conveyed to the State of Florida.
WHAT ACTION AcCOMPLISHE!$ ,Clears potential cloud on title to property.
LDE A TMENTALCATEGORY: 17 in/ 3. MEETJNGD-3c;ll+ya a

COp~ISSIONDISTRIcT#: 1 /7
bAGENDA 5.REOUIREMENT/PURPOSE
.?
Y_CONSENT
,ADMlNlsmTlvE .
_ APPEALS
-PUBLIC _ ADMIN. CODE
-=REQuIRED:-
7. BACKGROUND:
I
The State of Florida, Board of Trustees of the Internal Im rovement Trust Fund, is in the recess of purchasing land on
Cay0 Costa Island from a private landowner through the 8tate CARL Pro A list of %e properties being purchased is
attached. From the title search and title commitment issued, it has been r eter&ned that Lee County ma have an interest in ’
land which has accreted to the lots being conveyed to the State of Florida by Alice MS. Robinson. A 1J69 Resolutron b
the Board of County Commissioners pertaining to ublic lands in Cayo Costa Subdivision, recorded m Official Record Jook
569 Pa e 875 created a claim to all accretions to Pots lyin within the area of the Subdivision now bemg conveyed. As a
resdlt ofthis Resolution, the State of Florida is requesting &, ee County to convey any interest it may have m these accreted
R~~a~ore private property owner, Ahce l$.S. Robmson, m order to clear trtle for its purchase of the propertres from Ms.
.
Due to the ongoin of ac uisition on Cayo Costa Island by the State of Florida and Lee+Countythrpugh the CARL
Matching Funds tI!YTF
. .P. elect, an8 the ongoing cooperation of the State and County to accomphsh acquisrtron of land on the
Island, staff recommends approval of the requested motion.
County funds are not needed to complete this transaction.
8,MANAGEMENTRECOMMENDATIONS:
.
COUNTY LANDS
9. RECOMMENDEDAPPROVAL i .
'. - e.
*
i@\OFFICEELS\CAYCOSTA.LWC’~sf
' *
'&is ?nstruntent Prepared by:

PUBLIC WORKS/COUNTY LAND8 DIVISION
Post Office Box 398
Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0398 30P6.
Docuentrrr Tax $
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TXIS DEED, executed this 21th day of Warch , A.D., 1998, by
Ltt COtlNTY, PLORZDA, A POLITNAL SWBDIVISIOU OF THE STATB OF FLORIDA, z:
._
whose address is Post Office Box 398, Fort Myers, Florida 3300.?-0398
first party, LO -Alice M.S. Robinson, whose address is 4&l North z p
Seminole Avenue, No. 2516, Tampa, Florida 33601, second party.
,' NITNESSETII : That the said first party, for and in consideration
I: of the sum of Ten~(510.00) Dollars to it in hand paid by the said second
party, receipt.whereof is hereby acknowledged, ha@ granted, bargained
and sold to the said second party, its heirs and assigns forever, the
following fsbac~~lbed land, lying and being in Lee County, Florida:
SEE ATTACRED BXBZBIT "A*

This grant conveys only the interest of the Count; and its Board
:,s df County Commissioners in the property herein described, and shali not '$;
g be deemed to warrant the title or to represent any state of facts
I; concerning the same.
"\
EN WITNESS NBERBOI the said first party has caused these presents
to be executed in its name by its Board of County Commissioners acting
by the Chairman or Vi.ce Chairman of said Board, the day and year
aforesaid.
(OFFICIAL SEAL)
ATTEST: LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, BY ITS
'. CHARLIE GREEN,'GLERK
: -'
By:
APPROVED AS TO LEGAL FORM:
&,[$' ;.',I $;&,y,,:

Office/of' County Attorneys
‘~
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E x h i b i t HAp’
Eage 1 of 2
A l l af t h e f i r s t p a r t y ’ s i n t e r e s t , i f any, i n thOS@ c e r t a i n l a n d s w h i c h
‘ h a v e accreted t o t h e followinq d e s c r i b e d lots6 said l o t s being located
wifthi~n that Certain Suk$iv.ision knowi as .%cond Rev-is& play of Cay0
Cwta, accordinq t o t h e - - m a p o r p l a t t h e r e o f f i l e d apd r e c o r d e d i n t h e
Office of the Clerk Of the Circuit Court of Lee County, Florida, in plat
Book 3, Page 25, P u b l i c R e c o r d s ,of L e e C o u n t y , F l o r i d a , t o wit:
Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00013.0020

Lot 2, Block 131 CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to ths! map or plat thereof as
recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax ID# 12-44-20-O I-000 13.0030
Lot 3, Block 13, CAY0 COSTA SUl3DIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as
recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida
%
Tax IDH 12-44~20-01-00014.0010 s:
Lot I, Block 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDlVlSION, according to the map or plat thereof as cm
recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. 4
Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00014.0070 -2-
Lot 7, Block 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as
recorded in Plat Book 3, Pa;ge 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. z
CJl
Tax ID# 12.44-20-Ol-Q0014.014~
Lot 14, Block 14, CAYU COSTA SUBDlVISION, accordiny lo the map or plal thereof
as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax IDD# 12-44-20-o l-000 15.0060
Lots 6,7,&p, IO, 1 I, 12, & 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map
or plat thereof as recorded in Plaf Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County.
Florida.
Tax ID# 12.44-20-OI-0OOl5.0lOk
Lot iOA, CAYO,COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as
recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00015.0160
Lots 16 and 17, Block 15, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according lo the map or plat
thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00015.0180
Lot 18, Block IS. CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according lo the map or plat thereof
as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax IDIt 12.44.20-Oi-00015,OlSA
Lot 184 CAYU COSTA SIJBDI~ISION, according to the map or plat thereof as
recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Ftor*da.
Tax IDS 12-44-20-01-00015.0220
Lot 22, Block 15, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according Io the map or plrt thereof
as recorded in Plal Book 3, Pege 2$, Public Records of Lee Cow&y, PlorIda,
Tax ID# 12-44.20.Ol-00015.034A .

Lots 34A and 354 Block IS, CAY0 COSTA WBDIVISION, according to the map or _ -
plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee Count); Florida.
Tax iD# 12-44~20-OJ-OOO16.0030
LOO 3 and 6, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat
thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida,
Tax ?D# J Z-44-20-0 I-000 16.0070
Lots 7,8 sod Jo, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUJ3DIVISlON, according to the map or pJat
thereof at recorded in PJat Book 3, Page 25, P&Iii Records of Lee County, Florida.
Tax I‘D# 12-M-20-01~oroO16.0120 ‘.‘.:
I>2, I Lots 12,13,15 and 16, Block 16, CAY0 CUSTA SUBDJVISION, according to the map
“-Z‘. or pfat thereof as worded is PJat Book 3, Page 2S, Public Records of Lee Cwnty, ‘_
;. .‘>’
F. Florida.
$‘,;,y,~ : i” ‘!j
” .’ B.,.1
:;; Tax IDI 12-44-20-01~OOQ16.0140 0
5”
i ‘. Lot 14, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or piat thereof W *j;
as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lea County, Florida. sit
Tut IDar t2-44.20-01.06016.0178
Lots 17 and 20, Hock 16, CAY0 COSTA WElDIVISIDN, according to the map or pfat
thcweof as recorded in Plat Book 3, P%gs 25, PubJlc Records of Lee County, FIorJda,
Tax ID# f2-44-20-01-00016.02~0 m
Lots 2 1 and 24, Block 16, CASO COSTA SUBDIViSION, according to the map or plat
thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records oFLee County, Florida.
Tax ID# 1%44*20-01=00016.022Q .:i!j
,Lot 22, Bfock It?, CAYU COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or pJat thereof I!
as recorded ia Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. -si3
Tax ID# 12-44-2f!-O1-00042.03$A
Lots 38A and 4 J A, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISJON, according to the map or plat thereof
as recorded in Plat Book 3. Paac 211. Pubtic Records of Lee Countv. Flnridr
66
67
68
69
70
71
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M.
WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTY
APPRAISER’S OFFICE; STATE OF
FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT]
TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT
TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND DIVISION OF
RECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTY
ATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON,
Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:
(1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File
(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)
defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of
Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.
#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)
defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an
attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee
County, Florida adopted the “Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands
in Cayo Costa Subdivision”, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution).
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo
Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas
and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that
the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying
East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying
West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The
Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and
west of the tier of blocks as “public lands together with all
accretions thereto” and “does by this Resolution claim all of said
lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public
for public purposes.” (Doc. #288, p. 9.)
Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is
the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and
-2-
accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiff describes Lot
15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of
Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million.
(Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his
property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both
federal and state law.
Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights,
private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the
United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the
undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution
was unenforceable and in violation of the United States
Constitution. (Doc. #288, ¶13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants
confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at
¶14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more
than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to
the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at ¶15.) Further,
plaintiff asserts that “Defendant State Actors” claimed riparian
rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby
unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled
to equal rights as the State property owner. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 27.)
-3-
Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under
color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was
never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution
and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be
recorded and must be stricken from the public record. (Id. at
¶17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision
was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the
State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances,
and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and
the County capriciously grabbed private accreted land and
easements. (Id. at ¶18.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants took
his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without
authority, justification, due process of law, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized
unconstitutional taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his
property value. (Id. at ¶19.)
Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass. Plaintiff
alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted
that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have
induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches
and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiff’s property. (Id.
at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise
power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of
the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of
Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at ¶22.)
-4-
Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and
malfeasance. Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property
Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to
ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has
admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.
(Id. at ¶23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face
did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the
County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of
the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence
of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block
and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at ¶24.)
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant denied agricultural
classification to his accreted lot. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that
defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of
private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection
in a land grab scheme. (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as
being to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the
accretions. (Id. at ¶25.) Plaintiff also asserts that the County
Appraiser made incompetent valuation reports which were
controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation
of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander
plaintiff’s perfect title. (Id. at ¶26.) As a result, plaintiff
received purchase offers far below market value and the County
Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position. (Id.)
-5-
Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and
defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to
the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has
been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession.
(Id. at ¶29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee County’s claims of
ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax
revenues which could have been received from the private accretions
and easements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired
to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers’
authority over his lagoon. (Id. at ¶32.)
Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant
Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution
despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)
The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction
based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments
4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403)(id. at ¶8),
the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine
of Accretion and Erosion (id. at ¶10), the Federal Appraisal
Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12
U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28
U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
-6-
III.
The Court will first address the federal claims, since these
claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given
plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended
Complaint liberally.
A. Takings Clause Claims:
A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiff’s
counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo
Costa island.1 The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude
plaintiff’s takings claim.
Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended
Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the
Takings Clause.
State law defines the parameters of a plaintiff’s property
interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is
a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.
1
See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning
history of the island since 1978.
-7-
v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law
a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high
water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral
property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to
the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);
Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These
rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the
government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key
Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,
1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “By now it is beyond question that a
permanent physical occupation of private property by the state
constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.”
New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th
Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his
property, “a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .”
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule
that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
-8-
takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe
until the state has denied the would-be plaintiff’s compensation
for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state
court proceeding.” Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,
F.3d , 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008). Without having
pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiff’s Takings
Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at
195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162
Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least
1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse
condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,
563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d
1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have
pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA . STAT . §
86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of
State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or
a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute.
Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff
pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested
that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or
receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
-9-
Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings
Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to
violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without
prejudice.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim:
A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest
that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property
rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is
no independent substantive due process taking cause of action.
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14
(11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects
only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the
Constitution, and do not include property rights. Greenbriar
Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2003). Merely asserting that the government’s actions were
arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the
protection of the substantive due process provision. Greenbriar
Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. Therefore, those portions of counts
in the Third Amended Complaint which attempt to assert a
substantive due process takings claim or conspiracy will be
dismissed.
-10-
C. Procedural Due Process Claim:
Plaintiff’s counts may also attempt to state a procedural due
process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had
no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa
subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was
and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking
was without authority, justification, due process, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at ¶19).
“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.”
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural
due process claim. The County’s action in passing the Resolution
constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state
a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade
County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200
acres other than his 2.5 acres. This is sufficient to constitute
a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is
impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act
applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a
legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist
-11-
merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First
Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla.,
20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the
allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the
Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution
attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was
signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and
plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining
claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not
arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state
a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that
Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation
remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as
discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate
post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on
procedural due process will be dismissed.
D. Equal Protection Claim:
Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal
protection rights. “To properly plead an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly
situated persons have been treated disparately.” Boyd v. Peet, 249
Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any
similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The

-12-
Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200
acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres.
The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned
by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights
taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be
compared to a public owner such as a government unit. Therefore,
no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be
dismissed without prejudice.
E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction:
Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended
Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of
federal jurisdiction.
Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of
the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the
discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may
be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal
courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a
congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate
Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore
Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal
jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Article IV of
the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address
the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
-13-
courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create
a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232
Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiff’s
federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343
is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 is misplaced. Section 403
relates to the creation of an obstruction not authorized by
Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this
case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, cannot form
basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976. Assuming
there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it
cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The
Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. § 3331-3351, also do not create
federal jurisdiction. These standards relate to real estate
appraisals utilized in connection with federally related
transactions, 12 U.S.C. § 1331, and no such transaction was
involved in this case. Additionally, in Florida the county
property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose
appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA . STAT . §
193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by
the International Association of Assessing Officers and the
-14-
Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2
(11th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the Court finds no other basis of federal
jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint.
F. Remaining State Law Claims:
The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint
are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended
Complaint may be read to allege a claim to invalidate the
Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law
claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent,
a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a
state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of
title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims
where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been
dismissed.) The dismissal of the state claims will be without
prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Having found that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the
Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
-15-
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the
extent set forth in paragraph 5 below.
2. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and
Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot.
3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection
and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board
of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Joint Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in
paragraph 5 below.
4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County
Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Peterson’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph
5 below.
5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice as to all defendants and all claims. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot,
and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 5th day of
May, 2008.
Copies: Parties of record
-16-
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81
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE,

Plaintiffs,
versus Case # 2:10-cv-00390-JES-AEP
CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL; SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL;

JOHN EDWIN STEELE; JENNIFER WAUGH CORINIS; A. BRIAN ALBRITTON,
Defendants.
INDEPENDENT ACTION
FOR RELIEF FROM GOVERNMENT CRIMES, CORRUPTION,
AND FACIALLY FRAUDULENT WRIT OF EXECUTION
____________________________________________________________________________/
MOTION TO STAY PRIMA FACIE ILLEGAL ‘EXECUTION’ AS A MATTER OF LAW
PUBLISHED NOTICE OF ILLEGAL EXECUTION UNDER FLORIDA LAW
1. The purported “execution” issued illegally. See § 56.15, Fla. Stat.; Case No. 2:2007-cv-
00228.
NO $5,048.60 JUDGMENT WAS EVER RECORDED
2. “No execution or other final process shall issue until the judgment on which it is based has
been recorded nor within the time for serving a motion for new trial or rehearing.…
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.550. Here, no “judgment in the amount of $5,048.60” was ever “recorded”,
Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. Here, no evidence of any such judgment ever existed or could
have possibly existed as a matter of law.

DEFENDANT CLERKS’ FALSIFICATIONS OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
3. On 07/16/2010, Defendant U.S. District Clerks Drew Heathcoat and Diane Nipper again
falsified and altered official documents and records for criminal and unlawful purposes of
obstructing justice and Plaintiffs’ court access.
4. In particular, the Clerk obstructed, and conspired with other Defendants to obstruct,
electronic court access, court access, and the filing of Plaintiffs’ pleadings, Case No. 2:2007-
cv-00791; 2:2009-cv-00791. In particular, Defendants Nipper and Heathcoat deliberately
deprived the Plaintiffs of their express fundamental rights to redress Government grievances,
and file their Motions for new trial and rehearing, and Notices of Appeal.
DIRECT INDEPENDENT ATTACKS OF CRIMINAL & ILLEGAL “EXECUTION”
5. Here on the record, the Plaintiffs have been directly attacking the prima facie criminality,
illegality, and nullity of the fraudulently procured “execution”, which issued illegally. See §
56.15, Fla. Stat.; Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228; 2:2010-cv-00089; 2:2010-cv-00791.
PRIMA FACIE LACK OF RECORD, FED.R.CIV.P. 44
6. On 07/16/2010, Defendant Corrupt U.S. District Clerk Drew Heathcoat obstructed to issue
“a written statement that a diligent search of the designated records in Case No. 2:2007-cv-
00228 revealed no “writ of execution” and no “judgment” awarding “$5,048.60” to
Defendant K. M. Wilkinson.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.
PRIMA FACIE ORGANIZED PUBLIC CORRUPTION
7. The fake “writ of execution”, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, is another publicly recorded
element of organized Government and judicial corruption with corrupt intent to extort fess
and property from the Plaintiff corruption whistleblowers.
PRIMA FACIE GROUNDS TO STAY ILLEGAL “EXECUTION” OF RECORD

8. Repeatedly, the Plaintiff public corruption victims stated several grounds as good cause to
stay the illegal execution. Grounds for the motion appeared on the face. Here, e.g., no
judgment had existed. See Docket Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. The purported basis for the
non-existent judgment had never existed, because Def. Forger Wilkinson had never filed any
“Rule 38 motion”. See Docket for Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228.
RECORD EXTORTION AND FORGERIES BY DEF. APPRAISER WILKINSON
9. Because, e.g., Def. Forger Wilkinson had criminally and illegally forged “land parcels”
“12-44-20-01-0000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”, Plaintiffs’ Appellants’ Appeal
had been highly meritorious, and no “frivolous appeal” could have possibly existed.
RECORD FABRICATION OF “FRIVOLITY” AND “JUDGMENT”
10. No “frivolity” was ever determined in the “judgment”, Doc. # 365, Case ## 2:2007-cv-00228;
2008-13170-BB. Here, no monetary penalty had ever been awarded to Defendant
Government Crook Wilkinson.
PUBLICLY RECORDED FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS
11. For criminal and unlawful purposes of obstructing justice and court access and perpetrating
fraud on the Courts, Defendants John E. Steele, Sheri Polster Chappell, Charlene E.
Honeywell, Mark A. Pizzo, and Richard A. Lazzara falsified and altered, and conspired to
falsify and alter, public records.
12. Said judicial Crooks knew and fraudulently concealed that no “regulation”, “resolution”,
“resolution 569/875”, “law”, “legislative act” had ever existed, and that as a matter of
supreme Florida and Federal law, no “law” could have possibly divested the Plaintiffs’ of
their unimpeachable record title to Parcel # 12-44-20-01-00015.015A, PB 3, PG 25 (1912).

13. Doc. # 386-2, Case No. # 2:2007-cv-00228, evidenced an illegal “motion” filed on
08/20/2008 under fraudulent pretenses. Here, the deadline for any hypothetical “Rule 38
motion” had terminated on or around 08/08/2008, and Def. Wilkinson had never filed
anything prior to said deadline to justify any judgment or monetary punishment. Therefore
here, no lawful basis could have possibly existed, and the illegal “execution” has been
fraudulent on its face.
PRIMA FACIE ILLEGAL “writ of execution” - AFFIDAVIT
14. Here, no lawful writ of execution had ever been issued. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs made an
Affidavit that the “execution” is illegal and stated as grounds, e.g., the lack of any
supporting judgment, the lack of any falsely alleged “Rule 38 motion” by Defendant K. M.
Wilkinson.
PLAINTIFFS’ COMMUNICATIONS OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND FELONIES
15. Plaintiffs again contacted Defendant Crooked Attorney Jack N. Peterson for Def. Forger
Kenneth M. Wilkinson and reported said publicly recorded public corruption, extortion,
coercion, and fraud, Tel. 239-533-2236.
07/19/10 COMMUNICATIONS TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
16. On 07/19/2010, Plaintiff public corruption victim Jennifer Franklin Prescott updated the
Federal Bureau of Investigation about the public corruption, extortion, fraud, and fraudulent
“writ”.
PRIMA FACIE FRAUD ON THE COURT AND EXTORTION
17. Furthermore, the Plaintiff corruption victims move this Court to “set aside“ the non-existent
judgment and “writ” in accordance with, e.g., Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b), 1.500, and/or 1.540(a).
18. In the prima facie record absence of any recorded judgment, any writ of execution, and any
“Rule 38 motion”, Defendants illegally and fraudulently procured an illegal “writ”.
19. Furthermore here, there were other pending actions affecting the subject matter and
conclusively evidencing the prima facie illegality of the fake “writ”, direct attacks upon its
criminality, as well as fraud, extortion, and corruption. See also Daytona Enterprises, Inc. v.
Wagner, 91 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1956); Childs v. Boats, 112 Fla. 282, 152 So. 214 (1933);
McGee v. Ancrum, 33 Fla. 499, 15 So. 231 (1894); Fair v. Tampa Electric Company, 158
Fla. 15, 27 So.2d 514 (1946); Viggio v. Wood, 101 So.2d 922 (3 D.C.A. 1958).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand
1. An Order enjoining the publicly recorded illegal “execution”-scheme under Florida law;
2. An Order granting the Plaintiffs summary remedies against the record public corruption
and non-existent “writ of execution”, and non-existent “Rule 38 motion”;
3. An Order staying the illegal and null & void “writ of execution” and any “execution”;
4. An Order enjoining any further public corruption and the record falsification of “land
parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”;
5. An Order enjoining Defendant Forger K. M. Wilkinson from forging and falsifying official
records and documents for criminal and unlawful purposes of, e.g., extorting unrecorded
fees and property under facially false pretenses of a non-existent “5,048.60 judgment” and
fictitious “writ of execution”.
__________________________________
/S/JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT
Governmental Corruption & Fraud Victim, Plaintiff, pro se
P.O. BOX 845, Palm Beach, FL 33480; T: 561-400-3295
____________________________________
/S/JORG BUSSE, M.D., M.M., M.B.A., C.P.M.
Judicial Corruption & Crime Victim; Plaintiff, pro se
State Cert. Res. Appraiser, Licensed Real Estate Broker, Mortgage Broker, Appraisal Instructor
7/17/2010 Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes…
Select Year: 2009 Go
The 2009 Florida Statutes
Title XLVI Chapter 838 View Entire Chapter

CRIMES BRIBERY; MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE
838.022 Official misconduct.--
(1) It is unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm
to another, to:
(a) Falsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document;
(b) Conceal, cover up, destroy, mutilate, or alter any official record or official document or cause another
person to perform such an act; or
(c) Obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to the commission of a felony that
directly involves or affects the public agency or public entity served by the public servant.
(2) For the purposes of this section:
(a) The term "public servant" does not include a candidate who does not otherwise qualify as a public servant.
(b) An official record or official document includes only public records.
(3) Any person who violates this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.--s. 5, ch. 2003-158.
Copyright © 1995-2010 The Florida Legislature • Privacy Statement • Contact Us
www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm… 1/1
Case 2:10-cv-00089-CEH-TGW Document 29 Filed 06/30/10 Page 4 of 8
B. Plaintiffs yet again fail to articulate a plausible claim

upon which relief can be granted.
As this Court noted in the sound and cogent analysis of the
Busse litigation contained in its June 23, 2010, Order [Busse
VII, DE-213, at pp. 20-21], Plaintiffs’ allegations, to the
extent any sense can be made of them, are essentially criminal in
nature. In that same Order, the Court has already analyzed and
explained why Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under the
various constitutional provisions upon which they rely. The only
other vehicle for charging essentially criminal conduct in a
civil forum is a suit under the civil provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“civil RICO”), 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c).1
Complaints asserting civil RICO claims “must comply not only
with the plausibility criteria articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
but also with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard.” American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283,
--- (11th Cir. 2010). As the Court previously noted, Plaintiffs’
repetitious and voluminous pleadings are “convoluted and
incomprehensible,” “contain[] incoherent and rambling claims of
alleged wrongdoing,” and consist of “conclusory” statements
1
The case of Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 Fed. Appx. 231 (11th
Cir. 2008), a matter to which the Busse cases have frequently
been analogized [see, e.g., Busse V, DE-17], was a civil RICO
case filed against every judge and other governmental official
(totaling 129 defendants) that plaintiff “imagine[d to] have done
him wrong.” Id. at 235.
4
Case 2:10-cv-00089-CEH-TGW Document 29 Filed 06/30/10 Page 7 of 8
to the performance of his duty to serve Busse with the writ of
execution. [Busse I, DE-429.] Accordingly, Deputy Jessup would
be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and the claim arising out
of his acts should likewise be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that the
Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Date: June 30, 2010 Respectfully submitted,
TONY WEST
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: /s/ Matthew L. Fesak

MATTHEW L. FESAK
Special Attorney and
Assistant United States Attorney
Civil Division
310 New Bern Avenue, Suite 800
Raleigh, NC 27601-1461
Telephone: (919) 856-4530
Facsimile: (919) 856-4821
E-Mail: matthew.fesak@usdoj.gov
N.C. Bar No. 35276
7
Select Year: 2009 Go
The 2009 Florida Statutes
Title VI Chapter 55 View Entire Chapter

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JUDGMENTS
55.10 Judgments, orders, and decrees; lien of all, generally; extension of liens; transfer of liens to
other security.--
(1) A judgment, order, or decree becomes a lien on real property in any county when a certified copy of it is
recorded in the official records or judgment lien record of the county, whichever is maintained at the time of
recordation, provided that the judgment, order, or decree contains the address of the person who has a lien
as a result of such judgment, order, or decree or a separate affidavit is recorded simultaneously with the
judgment, order, or decree stating the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment,
order, or decree. A judgment, order, or decree does not become a lien on real property unless the address of
the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree is contained in the judgment, order,
or decree or an affidavit with such address is simultaneously recorded with the judgment, order, or decree. If
the certified copy was first recorded in a county in accordance with this subsection between July 1, 1987, and
June 30, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period of 7
years from the date of the recording. If the certified copy is first recorded in accordance with this subsection
on or after July 1, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period
of 10 years from the date of the recording.
(2) The lien provided for in subsection (1) or an extension of that lien as provided by this subsection may be
extended for an additional period of 10 years, subject to the limitation in subsection (3), by rerecording a
certified copy of the judgment, order, or decree prior to the expiration of the lien or the expiration of the
extended lien and by simultaneously recording an affidavit with the current address of the person who has a
lien as a result of the judgment, order, or decree. The extension shall be effective from the date the certified
copy of the judgment, order, or decree is rerecorded. The lien or extended lien will not be extended unless the
affidavit with the current address is simultaneously recorded.
(3) In no event shall the lien upon real property created by this section be extended beyond the period
provided for in s. 55.081 or beyond the point at which the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first.
(4) This act shall apply to all judgments, orders, and decrees of record which constitute a lien on real
property; except that any judgment, order, or decree recorded prior to July 1, 1987, shall remain a lien on real
property until the period provided for in s. 55.081 expires or until the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first.
(5) Any lien claimed under this section may be transferred, by any person having an interest in the real
property upon which the lien is imposed or the contract under which the lien is claimed, from such real
property to other security by either depositing in the clerk's office a sum of money or filing in the clerk's office
a bond executed as surety by a surety insurer licensed to do business in this state. Such deposit or bond shall
www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm… 1/2
be in an amount equal to the amount demanded in such claim of lien plus interest thereon at the legal rate for
3 years plus $500 to apply on any court costs which may be taxed in any proceeding to enforce said lien. Such
deposit or bond shall be conditioned to pay any judgment, order, or decree which may be rendered for the
satisfaction of the lien for which such claim of lien was recorded and costs plus $500 for court costs. Upon
such deposit being made or such bond being filed, the clerk shall make and record a certificate showing the
transfer of the lien from the real property to the security and mail a copy thereof by registered or certified
mail to the lienor named in the claim of lien so transferred, at the address stated therein. Upon the filing of
the certificate of transfer, the real property shall thereupon be released from the lien claimed, and such lien
shall be transferred to said security. The clerk shall be entitled to a service charge of up to $15 for making
and serving the certificate. If the transaction involves the transfer of multiple liens, an additional service
charge of up to $7.50 for each additional lien shall be charged. Any number of liens may be transferred to one
such security.
(6) Any excess of the security over the aggregate amount of any judgments, orders, or decrees rendered,
plus costs actually taxed, shall be repaid to the party filing the security or his or her successor in interest. Any
deposit of money shall be considered as paid into court and shall be subject to the provisions of law relative to
payments of money into court and the disposition of these payments.
(7) Any party having an interest in such security or the property from which the lien was transferred may at
any time, and any number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county where such
security is deposited for an order:
(a) To require additional security;
(b) To require reduction of security;
(c) To require change or substitution of sureties;
(d) To require payment or discharge thereof; or
(e) Relating to any other matter affecting said security.
History.--s. 1, ch. 10166, 1925; s. 1, ch. 14749, 1931; ss. 1-3, ch. 17998, 1937; s. 2, ch. 19270, 1939; C GL
1940 Supp. 4865(3); s. 9, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 71-56; s. 1, ch. 77-462; s. 2, ch. 87-67; s. 7, ch. 87-145; s. 12,
ch. 91-45; s. 10, ch. 93-250; s. 15, ch. 94-348; s. 1357, ch. 95-147; s. 7, ch. 2000-258; s. 1, ch. 2001-130; s.
68, ch. 2003-402; s. 47, ch. 2004-265.
Copyright © 1995-2010 The Florida Legislature • Privacy Statement • Contact Us
www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm… 2/2
7/23/2010 Statewide Grand Jury on Public Corrup…
Home FAQs The Law Press Releases Additional Resources Annual Reports
Search: This Site Web Enter search criteria Report Corruption
The links below provide information On November 30, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist filed a petition
regarding the Grand Jury. requesting that a Statewide Grand Jury be convened in order to Please report information to help
Supreme Court Order “examine and evaluate public policy issues regarding public in the fight against public
Previous Grand Jury Reports coruption.
corruption and develop specific recommendations regarding
Grand Jury Handbook
improving current laws.” On December 2, 2009, the Florida File a Complaint On-line
Supreme Court issued an Order to convene the Nineteenth
Statewide Grand Jury for the purpose of investigating crimes,
Press Releases
returning indictments, and making presentments.
February 1, 2010
Attorney General: Statewide
In Florida, the responsibility to conduct statewide grand juries is given to the
Grand Jury will Help Restore
Statewide Prosecutor. The Statewide Prosecutor designates Assistant Statewide Trust in Government
address: Statewide Prosecution Office
Prosecutors to ensure a statewide grand jury is selected and that a grand jury is
The Capitol, PL-01 December 2, 2009
Tallahassee, FL 32399 presented with testimony and evidence. Starting in February of 2010, the Nineteenth Statement from Attorney General
Grand Jury will be convened in Ft. Lauderdale and shall initially run for twelve on Supreme Court's Order to
phone: 1-800-646-0444
months. The Grand Jury’s investigation of public corruption is not limited to any Convene a Statewide Grand Jury
website: www.myfloridalegal.com
particular region of the State, however, any criminal offenses investigated shall be October 14, 2009
news: Weekly Newsletter multi-circuit in nature. Attorney General’s Statement on
Call for Statewide Grand Jury
The Office of Statewide Prosecution has established a public corruption hotline for
anyone who believes they have information concerning a criminal offense involving
public corruption or wishes to suggest issues the Statewide Grand Jury should
investigate regarding public corruption. A link to the Petition for a Statewide Grand
Jury and the Florida Supreme Court Order Directing Impanelment of a Statewide
Grand Jury has also been provided under the section titled The Grand Jury.
© 2009 Office of the Attorney General of Florida Privacy Policy
myfloridalegal.com/19thstatewidegran… 1/1
(Doc. #418) on January 11, 2010. The one page document is
essentially a Notice of Filing and will be construed as such and
denied. The attached Motion has the case number 2:09-cv-791-FTM-
36SPC, which case is currently pending in the Fort Myers Division.
Any motions seeking relief in that case should be filed in that
case only.
(31) Plaintiff filed a virtually identical one page document
as Document #418 which attaches a filing for case number 2:09-cv-
791-FTM-36SPC. (Doc. #419.) Any motions seeking relief in that
case should be filed in that case only. This document is construed
as a Notice of Filing and denied.
(32) Plaintiff filed a virtually identical one page document
as Documents #418 and #419 which attaches a filing for case number
2:09-cv-791-FTM-36SPC. (Doc. #420.) Any motions seeking relief in
that case should be filed in that case only. This document is
construed as a Notice of Filing and denied.
It is accordingly
FURTHER ORDERED:
1. Until further Order, the Clerk shall no longer accept any
further filings, related or unrelated to this specific case, by Ms.
Prescott or Mr. Busse, for filing in this closed case, except for
a single Notice of Appeal from this Order.
2. The Emergency Motions for Relief From Extrinsic Fraud,
Fraud on Courts, and Fraudulent Judgment & Execution Emergency
-17-
Motion to Enjoin Fraudulent Judgments and Execution of Fraudulent
Judgments Pursuant to Independent Action(s) for Relief Such as Case
9:09-cv-82359-KLR, FLSD Notice of No Authority to Enforce
Fraudulent Judgment” (Doc. #389) is construed as response to the
pending Motion for Writ of Execution.
January, 2010.
Copies:
Parties of record
-18-
7/23/2010 Statewide Grand Jury on Public Corrup…
Home FAQs The Law Press Releases Additional Resources Annual Reports
Search: This Site Web Enter search criteria Report Corruption
The links below provide information On November 30, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist filed a petition
regarding the Grand Jury. requesting that a Statewide Grand Jury be convened in order to Please report information to help
Supreme Court Order “examine and evaluate public policy issues regarding public in the fight against public
Previous Grand Jury Reports coruption.
corruption and develop specific recommendations regarding
Grand Jury Handbook
improving current laws.” On December 2, 2009, the Florida File a Complaint On-line
Supreme Court issued an Order to convene the Nineteenth
Statewide Grand Jury for the purpose of investigating crimes,
Press Releases
returning indictments, and making presentments.
February 1, 2010
Attorney General: Statewide
In Florida, the responsibility to conduct statewide grand juries is given to the
Grand Jury will Help Restore
Statewide Prosecutor. The Statewide Prosecutor designates Assistant Statewide Trust in Government
address: Statewide Prosecution Office
Prosecutors to ensure a statewide grand jury is selected and that a grand jury is
The Capitol, PL-01 December 2, 2009
Tallahassee, FL 32399 presented with testimony and evidence. Starting in February of 2010, the Nineteenth Statement from Attorney General
Grand Jury will be convened in Ft. Lauderdale and shall initially run for twelve on Supreme Court's Order to
phone: 1-800-646-0444
months. The Grand Jury’s investigation of public corruption is not limited to any Convene a Statewide Grand Jury
website: www.myfloridalegal.com
particular region of the State, however, any criminal offenses investigated shall be October 14, 2009
news: Weekly Newsletter multi-circuit in nature. Attorney General’s Statement on
Call for Statewide Grand Jury
The Office of Statewide Prosecution has established a public corruption hotline for
anyone who believes they have information concerning a criminal offense involving
public corruption or wishes to suggest issues the Statewide Grand Jury should
investigate regarding public corruption. A link to the Petition for a Statewide Grand
Jury and the Florida Supreme Court Order Directing Impanelment of a Statewide
Grand Jury has also been provided under the section titled The Grand Jury.
© 2009 Office of the Attorney General of Florida Privacy Policy
myfloridalegal.com/19thstatewidegran… 1/1
LEE COUNTY COMMISSION – PUBLIC CORRUPTION
DEFENDANT JOHN E. MANNING

DEF. LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
JOHN E. MANNING
LEE COUNTY PUBLIC CORRUPTION
“SIX COMMISSIONERS FACED CRIMINAL CHARGES”
NEWS-PRESS, July 9, 2010, www.news-press.com
By Gabriella Souza, gsouza@news-press.com
“Manning comes with …”
“At the time, the board [of Lee County Commissioners]

was in turmoil. Commissioners and county staff came
under fire for illegal dealings and between 1983 and
2000; six commissioners faced criminal charges.
"It was a revolving door of county commissioners and
county managers," Manning said.
Manning, who had decided not to run for re-election, was
prosecuted in 2000. He said he wanted to end his time as
a commissioner so he could go back to the private sector.”
LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONER JOHN E. MANNING
CHARGED IN RECORDS CASE
NEWS-PRESS, May 11, 2000, www.news-press.com
Failure to disclose meetings alleged …

By Lee Melsek
“Prosecutors filed criminal charges against Lee County

Commissioner John Manning on Wednesday for failing to
disclose years of private meetings with lobbyists seeking
such things as land-use changes, roads and multimillion-
dollar county contracts.
Manning, who voted to approve the county law he's
accused of violating, claims he misinterpreted the law. He
is charged with a second-degree misdemeanor …”
NEWS-PRESS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
July 10, 2010, www.news-press.com
“The News-Press exposed his failure to obey that law,

local prosecutors then charged him with violating the
disclosure law and the courts fined him after he pleaded
no contest.”
LEE MELSEK
Fort Myers Beach
14
15
DEFENDANT CORRUPT LEE COUNTY COMMISSION
NEWS-PRESS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
July 10, 2010, www.news-press.com
Recall Past Actions
“Don’t you just love the integrity of politics? John Manning

back as commissioner because he has experience? John
Manning is the commissioner who wrote an ordinance,
then broke his own ordinance, and his attorney then called
Manning’s ordinance a stinky little law or something to that
effect. I wonder if Charlie Crist was aware of this when he
appointed Manning back to the Lee County Commission?”
RON SMILEY
Fort Myers
NEWS-PRESS, July 13, 2010, www.news-press.com
TRANSPARENCY ABOVE ALL ELSE: EDITORIAL
“We expect our elected officials to be law-abiding citizens

who seek to uphold the rules they create. When they
don’t, we question their integrity and ability to serve.
Recently, criticism has surfaced about newly appointed
interim Lee County Commissioner John Manning’s
decade-old no contest plea and $1,000 fine for violating
the county’s lobbyist disclosure ordinance. He had a been
a three-term county commissioner at that point and helped
craft the ordinance.
That no contest plea has come back to haunt him in
letters to the editor, for example, as he was appointed to
the post and is seeking election to it.
At least one of his opponents, former Cape Coral
Economic Development Director Mike Jackson, sees it as
old news, and after 10 years, it likely is. Manning’s also
facing former Cape Coral Councilman Chris Berardi and
former Lee County School Board Member Bob Chilmonik.
This issue should still matter, however. Voters have a right
to take into consideration the whole record of a candidate.
In a questionnaire for The News-Press Editorial Board,
Manning affirmed his support for the Sunshine Law —
open records and open meetings laws — opposing
exemptions to it and looking to expand it further.
That’s a good sign, and redemption certainly is an
American value. Manning has a chance to correct his past
error by striving to be the most transparent public official in
our community.
Anything less than that should be grounds to vote for one
of his opponents in the Aug. 24 primary election.”
Sunshine Dimmed
“Re: “Manning comes with polished reputation,” July 9.
Only a single sentence in an otherwise fawning profile of
Manning hinted that something was not quite right during
his earlier time on the commission.
Alas, there was no attempt whatsoever to detail to readers
and voters the betrayal of the public trust Mr. Manning
committed while a commissioner in the late ‘90s. Only this
vague reference to the fact “he pleaded no contest for not
following the county’s lobbyist disclosure law and paid
$1,000 in fines and court costs.”
The law, which Manning voted to adopt in the early ‘90s, is
an important Lee County addendum to the state’s open
government requirements. The Lee County law requires
commissioners to keep logs of their private meetings with
lobbyists. They must disclose the names of the lobbyists,
the dates of the meetings, the issues they discussed and
the people and companies those lobbyists represent. It’s a
noble attempt to prevent government in the shadows
much like other counties have adopted.
It lets the public know who is influencing, or attempting to
influence, our elected commission behind closed doors.
While the other four commissioners were dutifully obeying
that law and filing their disclosure logs every three months
with the Clerk’s Office Minutes Department, John Manning
chose to ignore it for the entire four years of his last term
in office. He chose government in the shadows as he met
with companies and their high-priced lawyers and
lobbyists seeking votes and favors in the privacy of his
office or theirs.”

FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTY
PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s
Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property
(Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. No response has been filed and
the time to respond has expired.
Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff.
Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM-
36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any
further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant
plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant’s
motion.
ORDERED:
Plaintiff may file one response to defendant’s Motion for
Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432)
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is
received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of
a response and without further notice.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of
July, 2010.
Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of record
-2-
PUBLIC CORRUPTION COMPLAINT
AGAINST DEFENDANT BEVERLY B. MARTIN
CORRUPT U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE
CERTIFIED DELIVERY
Federal Bureau of Investigation
5525 West Gray Street
Tampa, FL 33609
Phone: (813) 253-1000
DEFENDANT BEVERLY B. MARTIN

RECORD LACK OF IMMUNITY - PERPETRATION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS
1. The Plaintiff public corruption victims are suing Defendant Beverly B. Martin (“Martin”) in
her private individual capacity and official capacity as U.S. Circuit Judge. Defendant
Martin’s unlawful and criminal acts on record were outside any immunity and official
capacity.
FELONIES OUTSIDE ANY “official” CAPACITY
2. Under color of undocketed and/or falsified Cases ## 2010-10963 and 2010-10967, Def.
Martin falsified official records and documents and caused others to falsify for criminal and
illegal purposes of extorting money and property under fraudulent pretenses of “frivolity”.
3. Def. Martin knew and concealed that the only paid judgment of record had been in the
amount of $24.30. When the Plaintiffs conclusively proved the prima facie criminality,
illegality, and nullity of a falsified “$5,048.60 judgment”, which could nowhere be found,
Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Def. Martin retaliated with further case fixing on “Jul 19 2010”.
COERCION, EXTORTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, AND COVER-UP
4. Def. Martin coerced the Plaintiff corruption victims to refrain from redressing their
grievances of a facially falsified and un-recorded “$5,048.60 judgment”, fake “writ of
execution”, Doc. # 425, and forged “land parcels”. No court had ever reviewed the record
forgeries of said fake “land parcels”, and Def. Martin conspired with other Offenders to
keep it that way and keep Plaintiffs out of Court. Just like a Government whore, Def. Martin
procured her order through brazen fraud on the Court, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540; see also 1.550.
CONTEMPT OF FLORIDA LAW, CHAPTERS 55, 56, 71, 73, 74, 95, 712, FLA. STAT.
5. Def. Martin concealed that here nothing could have possibly become a lien on Plaintiffs’
property under Ch. 55, 56, 71, Fla. Stat.
MARTIN’S KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMES AND UNLAWFUL ACTS
6. Defendant Corrupt Martin had knowledge of the actual commission of felonies such as, e.g.,
the falsifications of
a. a “$5,048.60 judgment”;
b. an appeal [see Case ## 2010-10967, and/or 2010-10963];
c. a “writ of execution” [Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Doc. # 425];
d. “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”;
e. a “regulation”, “resolution 569/875”, “legislative act”, and/or “O.R. 569/875”.
However, Def. Martin concealed and conspired to conceal said record falsifications. Here
even though Def. Martin had knowledge of, e.g., judicial Co-Defendant Polster Chappell’s,
Steele’s, Pizzo’s, and Lazzara’s obstruction of justice and fraudulent concealment of
facially forged “land parcels”, a falsified “writ of execution”, falsified “$5,048.60
judgment”, Corrupt Martin did not make the same known to some judge or person in
authority, but covered up for said Offenders in exchange for bribes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
7. Defendant Crook Martin knew that Defendant principal Offenders Steele, Chappell, Pizzo,
and Lazzara had committed record offenses and assisted said Offenders, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
In particular, Martin assisted said Offenders with a facially fraudulent “writ of execution” and
the falsification and/or destruction of official records.
DELIBERATE DEPRIVATIONS UNDER COLOR OF FAKE “writ” AND “resolution”
8. Defendant Martin deliberately deprived the Plaintiffs, e.g., under color of a fake “writ of
execution”, “resolution 569/875”, and “frivolous appeal”, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.
RECORD RETALIATION UNDER COLOR OF WRIT OF EXECUTION & SANCTIONS
9. With the intent to retaliate, Corrupt Martin knowingly took actions harmful to the Plaintiff
public corruption victims, which included interference with Plaintiffs’ livelihood and record
land ownership, because the Plaintiff landowners had provided truthful information relating
to the commission of Federal offenses to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513.
EXTORTION ASSISTANCE UNDER COLOR OF “FRIVOLOUS APPEAL”
10. Knowingly, Def. Martin assisted the extortion of Plaintiffs’ property and/or threatened to do
so, with corrupt intent to retaliate against the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs had blown the
whistle on public corruption; in particular, because the Plaintiffs had produced records and
testimony conclusively evidencing Government corruption and fraud, and information about
the commission of Federal offenses by Government Officials. Here, Plaintiff Government
crime and corruption victims had the right to be reasonably protected from the Government
Offenders and Judges of record, 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE AND COURT ACCESS
11. Def. Martin conspired with other Defendants and Officials to “restrict Appellant’s ability to
pursue future appeals” for, e.g., criminal and unlawful purposes of concealing:
a. Facially forged “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-
00001.0000”;
b. Falsification of [a recorded “$24.30 judgment” into] an un-recorded“$5,048.60”-
extortion-and-execution scheme;
c. Falsification of a “writ of execution” in the absence of a recorded “$5,048.60”
“judgment”;
d. Destruction and falsification of official Court records.
EXACTION OF MONEY BY THREAT OF, E.G., ARREST AND CIVIL CONTEMPT
12. Def. Martin conspired to exact money from Plaintiffs under color of, e.g., “frivolous appeal”
even though Martin knew that no legal basis for and justification of “frivolity” had ever or
could have possibly ever existed.
CONSPIRACY TO ASSIST EXTORTION AND BLACKMAIL
13. In particular, Def. Martin conspired and assisted to extort $5,048.60 and property in the
absence of any recorded authentic judgment and justification. Martin caused other
Government Officials to falsify, alter, and destroy official records for criminal and illegal
purposes of concealing other Defendant Officials’ extortion, coercion, obstruction of
justice and other crimes of record.
2
14. Def. Martin made unlawful communications and threatened Plaintiff public corruption
whistleblowers with obstruction of court access and deliberate deprivations of Plaintiffs’
express fundamental rights to redress Government grievances, own property, and exclude
Governments.
MISCONDUCT AND EXTENSION OF RECORD CRIMES AND FALSIFIED “WRIT”
15. Under prima facie fraudulent pretenses of “frivolous appeal”, Def. Martin recklessly
extended the record Government crimes, and FIXED and “DISMISSED AS
FRIVOLOUS”. Def. Martin assisted and conspired the reckless perversion and
falsification of a recorded “Judgment” and “Bill of Costs” in the amount of $24.30 “issued as
mandate on 06/11/2009” for criminal and illegal purposes of extortion, coercion, and
retaliation against the Plaintiff corruption whistle blowers. In order for the record fraud
under said fake “land parcels” to continue and for illegal purposes of silencing the Plaintiff
landowners, Def. Martin “SUSPENDED” and perverted the Rules and caused the Clerk to
“discard” more documents.
FALSIFICATION OF APPEAL NUMBERS
16. The payment records regarding Plaintiffs’ multiple appeals conclusively proved the
falsifications and fabrications of “Appeal Number 10-10963 and/or 10-10967”. See U.S.
District Court payment records and receipts. The U.S. Clerk refused to certify and
authenticate the payment record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.
17. Def. Martin pulled “frivolity” out of her ass without any explanation and/or justification
whatsoever. Review of the recorded judgment patently clearly evidenced that the District and
Circuit had fabricated “lack of jurisdiction” for illegal purposes of concealment and cover-
up. Plaintiffs were entitled to defend their unimpeachable, unencumbered, and marketable
record title against Government extortion and fraud, which of course had invoked Federal
jurisdiction directly under the express guarantees of the Federal and Florida Constitutions.
18. Here with wanton disregard for the law, and including Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540, 1.550, Ch. 55,
56, 71, 73, 74, 95, 712, Fla. Stat., Def. Martin conspired to oppress Plaintiffs with prima
facie non-existent and/or illegal orders, judgments, and/or mandates…
/s/Jorg Busse, M.D., M.M., M.B.A.

c/o International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague, Netherlands
/s/Jennifer Franklin Prescott

c/o International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague, Netherlands
CC
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
U.S. Department of Justice
The Florida Bar
Real Property Probate and Trust Lawyer Section, The Florida Bar
Barack Hussein Obama
Eric Holder
3
17
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Number From Case
09-16202 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Appellant
09-16201 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Appellant
09-14715 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Appellant
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09-14297 Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Appellant
09-14291 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of FL Appellant
09-14285 Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Appellant
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE CORRUPT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
No. 10-10963-I
____________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:07-00228-CV-FtM-JES-SPC
DR. JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
KENNETH M. ROESCH, J.R., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
versus
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,
STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND,
KIENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
Not Docketed in Violation of Law
Nazi-style Mock U.S. Proceedings Without any Due Process

___________________________________
APPELLANT(S)’ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM VEXATIOUS NAZI STYLE 04/06/10 “ORDER”
(April 14, 2009)

PETITION FOR AND JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
1. Hereby, Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s) petition for a Writ of Certiorari and supervisory
review of the fraud on the Court by U.S. Judges since 2007 on the record(s).
2. “A petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States
court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will be granted only
upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify
deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination
in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(e); Rule 11, Certiorari to a United States
Court of Appeals before Judgment.
NAZI STYLE JUDICIAL CRIMES ON THE RECORD
3. Here, the Nazi-style crimes by U.S. District and Circuit Judges and their
fraudulent concealment of Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were shown
and conclusively proven to be “of such imperative public importance as to justify
deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate
determination” in the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, the (extra)judicial crimes
in these Case(s) & Appeal(s) destabilized real property ownership in America and
any confidence in the American judicial system, where on the record, Federal
Judges corruptly fabricated that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were
purportedly “law” and/or “authorized” Government to criminally seize and
confiscate private property without any due process and equal protection of the
law. Here just like Nazi Officials, U.S. Judges extended record facial forgeries
“O.R. 569/875” and facially forged “land” “parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0”
and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”, which never legally existed, Lee County Plat
Book 3, Page 25 (1912).
COMPELLING REASONS SUCH AS MASSIVE JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
4. Here, said U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, entered facially idiotic decisions in
conflict with its own decisions, other U.S. Appellate Court, and Supreme Court
decisions on the same important matters. Here, judicially fabricated
condemnation, eminent domain, and/or involuntary alienation by forged
“resolution”, “legislative act”, “legislative” “claim” and/or Governmental
forgeries such as, e.g., “O.R. 569/875” were criminal acts prohibited by law and
violative of Constitutional checks and balances. Here, U.S. Judges criminally
retaliated and conspired to criminally “deter”, “sanction”, and “punish” pro se
Plaintiff(s) with an illegal “writ of execution” and criminal seizure of Plaintiff(s)
riparian Gulf-front property, Parcel # 12-44-20-01-00015.015A”, Accreted Gulf-
front Lot 15A, as legally described in reference to the 1912 “Cayo Costa”
Subdivision Plat of Survey in Lee County Plat Book 3, Page 25.
CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION OF MEANINGFUL “JUDICIAL REVIEW”
5. Just like Nazi Government Officials, the corrupt Judges in the Eleventh Circuit
obstructed justice and court access by fabricating a “resolution”:
2
“On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County,
Florida (“the Board”) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the
Cayo Costa subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9.”
See corrupt March 5, 2009 Appellate “Opinion”, No. 08-13170, District Court
Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC, p. 2.
RECORD JUDICIAL CRIMES & FRAUD ON THE COURT(S)
6. Here, U.S. Judges perpetrated fraud on the Court(s), procured another unlawful
“order” through trickery & malice, and fabricated a “resolution”. Here, no
evidentiary support of a “resolution” had ever existed, and the Governmental
concoctions of condemnation by Governmental facial forgeries “O.R. 569/875”
were record crimes.
RECORD PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL LIES OF “RESOLUTION” & “CLAIM”
7. Here, no “resolution” had ever legally existed, and Defendant “Board” never
“adopted” Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. Here, no name of any
“Board” member appeared on Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. Here, no
“resolution” had ever been legally recorded. Here, no original of any “resolution”
ever existed. Here, there was rampant judicial corruption and fraud on the Court.
Therefore, any and all Federal “opinions” and “orders” since 2006 were null and
void from the outset.
PERVERSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS OF “CLAIM”
8. Florida and Federal Constitutions expressly prohibited confiscating and/or
“claiming” “land” by “adoption” of a “resolution” and/or any “law”. Here, the
Nazi-style Judges in the 11th Court lied and criminally perverted said
Constitutions’ checks and balances. Here, the law did not recognize criminal
confiscation and seizure by any “resolution”, “law”, and/or Governmental
forgeries “O.R. 569/875”.
9. Here, said outlaw Judges were out of control when they brazenly concocted a
“resolution” and/or “legislative act” and then punished the pro se Plaintiff(s)
merely for “redressing their Governmental grievances” and opposing the
psychopathological judicial lies and Governmental crimes on the record.
10. Just like Nazi Judges fabricated that Nazi Government could “claim” the property
of Jews and Nazi opponents, here criminal Judges idiotically concocted that
Defendant Governments could “claim” Plaintiff(s) “raid lands” Nazi style and by
criminal means of forged “O.R. 569/875”.
THE JUDICIAL CROOKS COULD NOT ANSWER PLAIN QUESTIONS:
11. When asked plain and short: Who adopted what, where, when, and how, the
criminal Judges in this corrupt Court imposed” “sanctions” just like Nazi Judges
did when asked why Jews and Nazi opponents were murdered in Nazi
concentration camps.
THE NAZI STYLE CRIMES OF “SICK” FEDERAL JUDGES
3
12. When the pro se Plaintiffs demanded to see the original of the forged “resolution”
and/or authenticated copies, the crooked Judges “deterred”, “sanctioned”, and
“punished” the Plaintiff(s) just like Nazi Judges “deterred” Nazi opponents in
death camps and pedophile priests “punished” raped children when they reported
the priests’ rape.
PREMEDITATED JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD
13. Here, U.S. Judges fraudulently concealed that Governmental forgeries “O.R.
569/875” were “paste-ups”. Here, the illegible fake “recording” stamp(s) on said
Governmental forgeries were pasted by Governmental con men. Here for years,
U.S. Judges conspired with the Defendants to fraudulently conceal the criminality
of Nazi style forged “claims” of “raid lands”, Governmental forgeries “O.R.
569/875”.
FRAUDULENT JUDICIAL PRETENSES OF “REVIEW” & “FRIVOLITY”
14. Here in the absence of a docket, criminal Judges “faked” “judicial review” and
“frivolity”:
“these appeals have been reviewed and determined to be frivolous.”
See fraudulent “04/06/2010” 11th Circuit “order”.
Here, the Case Docket(s) disappeared just like Nazi court records disappeared at
the hands of Nazi judges. Here, sick Judges criminally concocted a “resolution”
and “frivolity”.
NAZI-STYLE “RESTRICTIONS” ON JUSTICE & FRAUD ON THE COURT
15. In their criminal “order”, post stamped “04/06/2010”, the objectively corrupt and
partial Judge(s) in this Court again “imposed” Nazi-style “restrictions”:
“As part of its Order, the Court imposed restrictions on Appellant’s ability…”
POLICY & CUSTOM OF NAZI-STYLE “RESTRICTIONS” & TERROR
16. Just like Nazi Government Officials maliciously “restricted” the “abilities” of
Jews and Nazi opponents, the crooked Judge(s) in this Court premeditated
obstruction of justice, “deterrence”, “punishment”, and “judicial concentration
camp” for the pro se Plaintiff(s), because the pro se Plaintiff(s) opposed, e.g.,
Governmental forgeries and scam “O.R. 569/875” and forged “Lee County”
“land” “parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0”, and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE & FRAUD ON THE COURTS, DOC. # 338
17. Here for years, the vexatious U.S. judicial policy and custom on the record was
obstruction of justice of the adjudication of the pro se Plaintiff(s)’ “claims”:
“The copy of the Resolution [Governmental Forgeries “O.R. 569/875”]
signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff
will not be allowed to assert otherwise.”
See vexatious and facially fraudulent “Opinion and Order”, Doc. # 338, p. 12,
Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-JES-SPC, by crooked District Judge John Edwin
Steele.
4
NAZI-STYLE ANARCHY INSTEAD OF ADJUDICATION
18. Even though the Defendants had ADMITTED that Lee County, Florida, and/or its
Commissioners had never “signed” and/or “executed” Governmental forgeries
“O.R. 569/875” as conclusively evidenced by the true and correct copies of said
fake “claims” on record, the Federal Judges conspired to uphold lawlessness and
judicial corruption.
JUDICIAL FAILURE TO “SHOW CAUSE” – FRIVOLITY FRAUD SCHEME
19. Here, the conspiring U.S. Judges in this Court never “showed any cause” for the
“punishment” and “sanctions” of the pro se Plaintiff(s) under fraudulent pretenses
of “frivolity” just like Nazi Official never “showed any cause” why they murdered
Jews and Nazi opponents.
20. Just like Nazi Officials made the crime records of Nazi killings disappear, here the
criminal Judges in this Court made dockets and records of oppression disappear.
See Case Dockets. Here, crooked U.S. Judges covered up for other outlaw Judges
in said U.S. Judicial Gang just like Nazis covered up for Nazis, and Catholic
bishops for priests.
NO AUTHENTICATION OF JUDICIALLY FABRICATED “RESOLUTION”
21. Even though the vexatious Judges in this Nazi-style Appellate Court had been
“unable” to authenticate any “resolution”, “legislative act”, “land use regulation”,
and/or “law”, they criminally continued to fraudulently pretend a “resolution” and
torture, terrorize, punish, and oppress the pro se Plaintiffs just like Nazi Officials
terrorized and oppressed Jews and Nazi opponents.
22. Just like Nazi Officials used forged papers to confiscate property of Jews in
concentration camps, here U.S. Judges used prima facie forgeries “O.R. 569/875”
to criminally confiscate pro se Plaintiff(s)’ riparian property.
FACIALLY IDIOTIC JUDICIAL “ARGUMENTS” ON THE RECORD
23. Here, prima facie Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were not any
“resolution”, because no “lawmaker” had ever “signed” and/or “executed” said
scam. Just like Nazi Government Officials seized the property of Jews and Nazi
opponents by criminal means of forged Nazi “claims”, here U.S. Judges fabricated
a “resolution” and/or “legislative act”. Here, District and Circuit Judges agreed
and conspired to “cover up” for crooked Judge Steele and conceal the idiotic
criminal fabrication that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were purportedly
“law”. The law did not recognize said Nazi-style “claim”.
SCIENCE & FORENSICS CONTROVERTED OUTLAW JUDGES:
FORENSICS vs. NAZI-STYLE “FRIVOLITY” “CLAIM”
24. Here on the record, the Defendants themselves had CONTROVERTED the outlaw
Judges’ fabrications of a “legislative act” and/or “resolution”. Furthermore,
forensic examinations had conclusively proven that Governmental forgeries “O.R.
569/875” were not any “legislative act” and/or “resolution”. Here, U.S. Judges
5
kept lying, concealing, and covering up for crooked Judge Steele, his oppressive
Nazi style, Doc. # 338, and judicial crimes.
VEXATIOUS JUDICIAL FARCE & MOCKERY OF “ORDER” (“04/06/2010”)
25. Here, said 04/06/2010 “order to show cause” was a facial farce and mockery. On
their faces, Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” patently clearly portrayed the
facts and evidence of Governmental fraud, extortion, and crimes. Here, the law
expressly prohibited Governmental scam “claim all of raid lands”.
26. Here, only Nazi-style Judges needed “cause shown”. Just like Nazi Judges did not
comprehend the criminality of murdering Nazi opponents in concentration camps,
here these Nazi-type Judges did not “get” the patently clear criminality of
Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”, but needed “cause shown”. Just like the
Pope needed “cause shown” for the prosecution of rapist priests, the Nazi-type
Judges in the Eleventh Circuit needed “cause shown” why “disallowing” the pro
se Plaintiffs to “assert” Governmental fraud & corruption and concealing the
criminality of said Governmental forgeries was not criminal.
27. Just like Nazi Judges staged fake “proceedings” for Jews and Nazi opponents, and
were utterly unable to “show” any Nazi wrongdoing and/or “cause” for
prosecution for murder of innocent Nazi opponents in concentration camps, this
“order” is a criminal charade.
TIME FOR “NUREMBERG TRIALS” OF “JUDICIAL TERRORISTS”
28. Here, the time for “Nuremberg Trials” has come. Here under public policy, said
“judicial terrorists” in Atlanta are on trial for fraudulently concealing
Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”, fraud, and eminent domain extortion…
6
CROOKED U.S. JUDGES CONTROVERTED BY SCIENCE
WORLDWIDE PUBLICATIONS OF U.S. JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
U.S. GOVERNMENTAL FORGERIES “O.R. 569/875”:
IDIOTIC GOVERNMENTAL FABRICATIONS OF “LAW”
http://www.scribd.com/Judicial%20Fraud
531 Documents
11 Subscribers
43,962 Reads
183 Downloads
mail@handwritingexpert.org.uk,
pnina555@bezeqint.net,
kim@kimwasley.com,
forgeryhelp@sandrabasyefde.com,
nadepres@handwriting-examiner.com,
send2lorrie@yahoo.com,
teresa@teresadeberry.com,
forgeryhelp@sandrabasyefde.com,
sheila@sheilalowe.com,
• Fraudulent alterations of words and letters in more than one forgery
• Writing in more than one font type
• Writing in more than one font size
• Writing in more than one writing style
• Misspelled words
• Misaligned typing
• Uneven spacing in the writing
• Missing portions of writing and/or printing
• Fraudulent paste-ups
• Incorrect vertical, horizontal and/or margin spacing
• Unclear and illegible fake stamp
• Smudged and illegible time stamp
• No signatures by any “lawmaker”
• No name(s) of any “lawmaker”
• Illegible and unclear fake handwriting
• Smeared and smudged imaging
• Inconsistent “trash marks”
• Different ink densities ….

FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M.
WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTY
APPRAISER’S OFFICE; STATE OF
FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT]
TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT
TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND DIVISION OF
RECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTY
ATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON,
Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:
(1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File
(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)
defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of
Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.
#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)
defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an
attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
I.
On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee
County, Florida adopted the “Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands
in Cayo Costa Subdivision”, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution).
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo
Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas
and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that
the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying
East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying
West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The
Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and
west of the tier of blocks as “public lands together with all
accretions thereto” and “does by this Resolution claim all of said
lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public
for public purposes.” (Doc. #288, p. 9.)
Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is
the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and
-2-
accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiff describes Lot
15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of
Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million.
(Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his
property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both
federal and state law.
Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights,
private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the
United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that
Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the
undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution
was unenforceable and in violation of the United States
Constitution. (Doc. #288, ¶13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants
confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at
¶14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more
than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to
the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at ¶15.) Further,
plaintiff asserts that “Defendant State Actors” claimed riparian
rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby
unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled
to equal rights as the State property owner. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 27.)
-3-
Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under
color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was
and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be
recorded and must be stricken from the public record. (Id. at
¶17.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision
was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the
State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances,
and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and
the County capriciously grabbed private accreted land and
easements. (Id. at ¶18.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants took
his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without
authority, justification, due process of law, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized
unconstitutional taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his
property value. (Id. at ¶19.)
Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass. Plaintiff
alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted
that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have
induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches
and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiff’s property. (Id.
at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise
power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of
the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of
Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at ¶22.)
-4-
Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and
malfeasance. Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property
Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to
ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has
admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.
(Id. at ¶23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face
did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the
County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of
the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence
of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block
and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at ¶24.)
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant denied agricultural
classification to his accreted lot. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that
defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of
private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection
in a land grab scheme. (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as
being to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the
accretions. (Id. at ¶25.) Plaintiff also asserts that the County
Appraiser made incompetent valuation reports which were
controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation
of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander
plaintiff’s perfect title. (Id. at ¶26.) As a result, plaintiff
received purchase offers far below market value and the County
Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position. (Id.)
-5-
Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and
defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to
the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has
been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession.
(Id. at ¶29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee County’s claims of
ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax
revenues which could have been received from the private accretions
and easements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired
to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers’
authority over his lagoon. (Id. at ¶32.)
Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant
Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution
despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)
The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction
based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments
4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403)(id. at ¶8),
the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine
of Accretion and Erosion (id. at ¶10), the Federal Appraisal
Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12
U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28
U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
-6-
III.
The Court will first address the federal claims, since these
claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given
plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended
Complaint liberally.
A. Takings Clause Claims:
A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiff’s
counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo
Costa island.1 The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude
plaintiff’s takings claim.
Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended
Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the
Takings Clause.
State law defines the parameters of a plaintiff’s property
interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is
a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.
1
See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning
history of the island since 1978.
-7-
v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law
a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high
water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral
property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to
the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);
Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These
rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the
government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key
Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,
1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “By now it is beyond question that a
permanent physical occupation of private property by the state
constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.”
New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th
Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)).
Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his
property, “a property owner has not suffered a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .”
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule
that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
-8-
takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe
until the state has denied the would-be plaintiff’s compensation
for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state
court proceeding.” Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,
F.3d , 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008). Without having
pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiff’s Takings
Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at
195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162
Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least
1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse
condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,
563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d
1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have
pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA . STAT . §
86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of
State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or
a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute.
Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff
pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested
that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or
receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
-9-
Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings
Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to
violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without
prejudice.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim:
A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest
that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property
rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is
no independent substantive due process taking cause of action.
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14
(11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects
only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the
Constitution, and do not include property rights. Greenbriar
Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2003). Merely asserting that the government’s actions were
arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the
protection of the substantive due process provision. Greenbriar
Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. Therefore, those portions of counts
in the Third Amended Complaint which attempt to assert a
substantive due process takings claim or conspiracy will be
dismissed.
-10-
C. Procedural Due Process Claim:
Plaintiff’s counts may also attempt to state a procedural due
process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had
no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa
subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was
and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking
was without authority, justification, due process, public notice,
hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at ¶19).
“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.”
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural
due process claim. The County’s action in passing the Resolution
constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state
a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade
County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200
acres other than his 2.5 acres. This is sufficient to constitute
a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is
impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act
applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a
legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist
-11-
merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First
Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla.,
20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the
allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the
Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution
signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and
plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining
claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not
arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state
a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that
Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation
remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as
discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate
post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on
procedural due process will be dismissed.
D. Equal Protection Claim:
Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal
protection rights. “To properly plead an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly
situated persons have been treated disparately.” Boyd v. Peet, 249
Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any
similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The

-12-
Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200
acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres.
The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned
by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights
taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be
compared to a public owner such as a government unit. Therefore,
no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be
dismissed without prejudice.
E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction:
Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended
Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of
federal jurisdiction.
Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of
the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the
discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may
be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal
courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a
congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate
Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore
Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal
jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Article IV of
the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address
the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
-13-
courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create
a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232
Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiff’s
federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343
is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 is misplaced. Section 403
relates to the creation of an obstruction not authorized by
Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this
case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, cannot form
basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976. Assuming
there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it
cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The
Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. § 3331-3351, also do not create
federal jurisdiction. These standards relate to real estate
appraisals utilized in connection with federally related
transactions, 12 U.S.C. § 1331, and no such transaction was
involved in this case. Additionally, in Florida the county
property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose
appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA . STAT . §
193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by
the International Association of Assessing Officers and the
-14-
Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2
(11th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the Court finds no other basis of federal
jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint.
F. Remaining State Law Claims:
The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint
are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended
Complaint may be read to allege a claim to invalidate the
Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law
claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent,
a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a
state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of
title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims
where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been
dismissed.) The dismissal of the state claims will be without
prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Having found that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the
Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
-15-
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the
extent set forth in paragraph 5 below.
2. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and
Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot.
3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection
and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board
of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Joint Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in
paragraph 5 below.
4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County
Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Peterson’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph
5 below.
5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice as to all defendants and all claims. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot,
and close the case.
May, 2008.
Copies: Parties of record
-16-
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 5, 2009
No. 08-13170
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC
JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
KENNETH M. ROESCH, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,
STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND,
KENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 5, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorg Busse, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
third amended complaint in his civil rights action against various state and local
governmental entities and officials in Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985. The district court dismissed Busse’s federal claims because he had either
failed to adequately plead them or had not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction. In the absence of any viable federal claims, the court declined to
retain jurisdiction over Busse’s state law claims. Based on our review of the
record and the parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM the dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida
(“the Board”) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the Cayo Costa
subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9. In the Resolution,
the Board identified the relevant lands by reference to a map of the subdivision
which showed that, along with a number of designated land parcels in the
subdivision, there were also a number of unidentified areas on the eastern and
western edges of the subdivision. Id. The Board laid claim to all of these non-
designated parcels “and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for
public purposes.” Id.

Busse asserts that he currently owns Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa subdivision
along with all accretions thereto and that the Resolution violates his property rights
under both federal and state law. Id. at 1. To vindicate his rights, he brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against an
array of state and local parties, including the Lee County Board of Commissioners,
the county property appraiser, and the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.1 Id. In his third amended complaint, Busse made six claims:
unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; unconstitutional temporary
takings; trespass; conspiracy, fraud, and malfeasance regarding the designation of
certain unplatted lots; conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud; and
oppression or slander of title. Id. at 3–8. He asserted that an array of statutory and
constitutional provisions supported the exercise of jurisdiction: two civil rights acts
— 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343; Articles Three and Four and the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution; the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33
U.S.C. § 403); the 1862 Homestead Act, the federal common law doctrine of
1
The full list of defendants includes: Lee County, Florida; the Board of Lee County
Commissioners, in their official and private capacities; Kenneth M. Wilkinson, the Lee County
property appraiser, in his official and private capacity; the State of Florida Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida, in their official and private
capacities; the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Florida Division of
Recreation and Parks, and the Cayo Costa State Park staff, in their individual and private
capacities; and Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorney, in his official and private capacity. Id.
accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Id. at 2–3.
The defendants subsequently filed separate motions to dismiss Busse’s third
amended complaint, primarily based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. R10-285, 291, 303, 304. The district court granted these
motions and dismissed Busse’s third amended complaint. R11-338. In so doing,
the court first found that Busse had made out a valid takings claim but that it had
no jurisdiction over that claim since he had failed to show that he had pursued all
available state remedies before bringing suit. Id. at 7–10. The court then
concluded that Busse had not made out a valid claim under any of his other alleged
federal bases. Id. at 10–15. Given that the court did not have jurisdiction over any
of Busse’s federal claims, it chose to dismiss his state law claims. Id. at 15. Busse
now appeals the dismissal of all of the claims in his third amended complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding subject
matter jurisdiction, including the determinations that a claim is not ripe or that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc.,
536 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204
(11th Cir. 2006). We also “review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d
823, 826 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).
Since Busse is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
On appeal, Busse argues that the district court erred in dismissing his federal
claims. He asserts that his Takings Clause claim was ripe for review and that he
had properly stated claims involving violations of his procedural due process,
equal protection, and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 Additionally, we read Busse’s brief liberally to argue that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his state law claims. We address these arguments in turn.
A. Takings Clause Claims
2
Busse’s brief on appeal does not discuss the other jurisdictional bases cited in his third
amended complaint — Articles Three and Four of the United States Constitution; the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act; the 1862 Homestead Act; the federal common law
doctrine of accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act. Generally arguments not raised in a brief on appeal are deemed abandoned. See
Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we agree with the
district court’s analysis of these provisions and find that none of them could serve as a potential
jurisdictional basis for Busse’s claims. See, e.g., Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302, 1303 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts can and should sua sponte inquire into
subject matter jurisdiction whenever it appears to be lacking).
Busse contends that the Resolution constituted an unconstitutional taking of
his property rights in Lot 15A. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of
private property “for public use, without just compensation” — a condition made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V;
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001)
(noting that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Takings Clause applicable to the
States). A plaintiff can bring a federal takings claim only if he can show that he
did not receive just compensation in return for the taking of his property. See Eide
v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720 (11th Cir. 1990). As a result, for a takings
claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he unsuccessfully “pursued the
available state procedures to obtain just compensation” before bringing his federal
claim. Id. at 721.
In this case, Busse’s claim would not be ripe because he has not shown that
he attempted to obtain or secure relief under established Florida procedures. Since
at least 1990, Florida courts have recognized that an inverse-condemnation remedy
is available for alleged takings violations. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Busse contends that his claim would still be ripe
since that remedy was unavailable in 1969 when the Board of Commissioners
enacted the Resolution. However, our past circuit precedent dictates “that a
Florida property owner must pursue a reverse condemnation remedy in state court
before his federal takings claim will be ripe, even where that remedy was
recognized after the alleged taking occurred.” Id. Accordingly, regardless of
whether Busse has a valid property interest in Lot 15A, because he has not alleged
that he sought and was denied compensation through available state procedures, his
Takings Clause claim would not be ripe for review. We thus conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Busse’s Takings Clause claim.
B. Procedural Due Process Claims
Busse asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated since Lee
County had no authority to take his land nor jurisdiction over it and because the
Resolution was improperly executed. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A plaintiff could make a procedural due
process claim by challenging the procedures by which a regulation was adopted,
including the failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing. See Villas of
Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th Cir. 1997); Zipperer
v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). For such a claim to be
valid, however, the plaintiff would have to allege that state law failed to provide
him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378,
382 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

Based on these standards, we find that Busse has failed to state a valid
procedural due process claim. Florida provides him an adequate post-deprivation
remedy, inverse condemnation, and he makes no argument that this procedure is
inadequate. Even if it was inadequate, though, Busse still would not have a valid
procedural due process claim. The Resolution constituted a legislative act since it
was a general provision that affected a large number of persons and area, 200 acres
in all, rather than being specifically targeted at Busse or his immediate neighbors.
See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir.
2003). Since alleged problems with the adoption of such acts cannot serve as the
basis for a procedural due process claim, Busse could not cite them as the basis for
his claim. See id. (noting that “if government action is viewed as legislative in
nature, property owners generally are not entitled to procedural due process”).
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Busse’s
procedural due process claims.
C. Equal Protection Claims
Busse also argues that his equal protection rights were violated because the
Board, in adopting the Resolution, treated differently privately-owned property and
state-owned property.3 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “deny[ing]
3
In his brief on appeal, Busse argues that he experienced different treatment than other
landowners in Lee County. However, we need not address this argument since he did not
mention this in his third amended complaint and we find that none of the exceptions that would
allow us to consider an issue not raised before the district court would apply here. See Narey v.
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. “[T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need
only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated
disparately.” Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000)
abrogated on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
Under Florida law, counties can exercise eminent domain over any land that
is not owned by the state or federal government. See Fla. Stat. § 127.01(1)(a)
(2006). Since a state landowner would not be subject to the eminent domain power
but Busse, as a private landowner, would be, Busse could not be similarly situated
to a state landowner. Busse therefore cannot rely on his disparate eminent domain
treatment vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim.
Since Busse made no other allegations of disparity in his third amended complaint,
we find that he has failed to plead a valid equal protection claim and that the
district court correctly dismissed this claim.
D. Substantive Due Process Claim
Busse also appears to allege that the Resolution denied him his substantive
due process property rights. Substantive due process protects only those rights that
are “fundamental,” a description that applies only to those rights created by the
Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing the exceptions to this general rule).
United States Constitution. See Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook,
City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Property rights would
not be fundamental rights since they are based on state law. See id. Busse thus
could not bring a viable substantive due process claim based on the alleged denial
of a state-defined property right. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district
court properly dismissed his substantive due process claims.4
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Busse also contends that the court abused its discretion in not hearing his
pendent state law claims. “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Since the
district court “had dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it
therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s
state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage
district courts to take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed pre-
trial. See Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
4
The district court, in addressing Busse’s substantive due process claim, mentions that
assertions of irrational and arbitrary government action could not serve as the basis for such a
claim. Even under a liberal reading of Busse’s complaint, though, we do not think he made such
allegations. In the third amended complaint, he discusses takings violations and procedural
problems with the enactment of the Resolution but never questions the rationale for its passage.
Accordingly, we need not address whether he has a valid substantive due process claim based on
arbitrary and capricious government action.
its discretion when it chose not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s
state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Busse contends that the district court incorrectly dismissed his federal claims
regarding alleged takings and deprivations of property rights. Since Busse’s
takings claim was not ripe because he had not pursued available state remedies and
he failed to adequately plead his other federal claims, the district court correctly
dismissed all of these claims. As a result, despite Busse’s objections to the
contrary, the district court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in not
exercising jurisdiction over his state law claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
district court’s dismissal of Busse’s third amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
David Souter
U.S. Supreme Court Justice
RE: Lee County [FL] O.R.569/875 – An eminent domain scam of giant proportions
Case-fixing in the U.S. Court of Appeals
We are writing to you in the matter of the corruption and case-fixing in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit.
Common intelligence dictates that residents use designated streets to get to their lots.
Unintelligently, the 11th Circuit cannot tell the difference between a designated street and
“unidentified areas”. See Plat Book 3, p. 25 at www.leeclerk.org.
In West Peninsular Title Co.1, corrupt Chief Circuit Judge Edmondson co-wrote:
“And, plaintiffs’ “arbitrary and capricious” due process claim is ripe. Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action ..
Plaintiffs’ claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance … See Eide v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.13(11th Cir. 1990).”
“But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Acres.”
For Appellees’ bribes, Edmondson now changed his mind and conspired to pervert a platted
designated street into an “unidentified area” in order to fix Appellants’ Cases. Here for bribes,
ripeness vanished, and justice is for sale in the 11th Circuit.
The Appellant(s) also own property in N.H. and wish you the best for your retirement.
/s/ Jennifer Franklin Prescott /s/Dr. Jorg Busse
1
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-4449.93-4104.html
Volume 41, The Federal Reporter, 3d Ed. [Nov., 1994 – Jan., 1995]
41 F.3d 1490 Page 1 of 4
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41 F.3d 1490
WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.
Cooper,
for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach County,
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.
Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.
Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.
Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.
Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1 After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants
raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in
the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.
2 The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)
offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976
instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other
Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local
Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the
41 F.3d 1490 Page 2 of 4
"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in

property originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," the
County issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferred
ownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the County
attempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that,
according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County.
3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms
(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an
unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their
property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;
but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the
dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the
County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The
district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple
owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the
Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.
Defendants appeal.
4 The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not
possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given
plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record
supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case
because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district
court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were
successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a
decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their
property.
5 But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing
that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the
district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had
the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's
order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this
case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the
burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's
citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining
landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).
6 And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting
ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which
transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County
applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable
application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).
7 The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'
claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in
41 F.3d 1490 Page 3 of 4
district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial
stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...
jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it
should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the
stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for
declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.
8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation
as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to
make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of
motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's
conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."
The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.
And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of
pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th
Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the
stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's
post-verdict motions.
9 Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation
Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title

because title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee.
Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued
to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.
Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's
argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could
not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this
claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v.
16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'
ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government
expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,
we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We
do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.
Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested
if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th
Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was
stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that
41 F.3d 1490 Page 4 of 4
the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues
frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--
that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of
title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in
interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
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Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s

Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property

the time to respond has expired.

Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff.

Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM-

further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant

plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant’s

Plaintiff may file one response to defendant’s Motion for

Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432)

within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is

a response and without further notice.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of

This is Google's cache of http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-

"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in

Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title

REMARKS ACQUISITION DATE

LEGAL DESC SEARCH TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

PURCHASE PRICE 1 AGENDA DATE 2 AGENDA DATE 3

PRICE/ACRE BLUE SHEET 2 BLUE SHEET 3

PURCHASE PRICE 2 PURCHASE PRICE 3

LEE COUNTY DIVISION OF COUNTY LANDS

WHEREAS, there’ appears in the Public H~COK~S of tie

County, Florida, in Plat Book 3 at page 25 the Second Revised

Plat af Cayo Coata Subdivision: and

WHEREAS. there spycar Upon sitid plat certain designated

lot and block areas and other undesignated areaa: and

WHEREAS, there appears upon said plat certain un-numbered

and unlettered iwcas lying East of tho Easterly tier of blocks

in said m&division and West of the Westerly tier of blocks

in said subdivision: and .

“!‘EREAS, tho County clnims slid lands aa public Iandr

together with all accretions thereto.

NOW, THEREFORE, idE IT RESOLVED By THE BOARD OF C0Vm’y

COHMISSXONERS OF LEE COUN’IY, FLORIDA does by this Resolution

and benefit of the public for public pucposes.

LDE A TMENTALCATEGORY: 17 in/ 3. MEETJNGD-3c;ll+ya a

'&is ?nstruntent Prepared by:

SEE ATTACRED BXBZBIT "A*

APPROVED AS TO LEGAL FORM:

&,[$' ;.',I $;&,y,,:

Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00013.0020

Tax ID# 12-44.20.Ol-00015.034A .

vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:

(1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File

(Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2)

defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal

Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of

Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc.

#291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)

defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

#317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.

#318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an

attorney and will be liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d