G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 1.
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20,
1990 1 which affirmedin toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review oncertiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six
(6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before
the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated
February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly
published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker
assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in
the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the
testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles,
and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken
and admitted in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON
CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the
child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the
child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the
aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following assignment
of errors:
cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida
C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision
which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses
Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both
of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on
appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August
3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be
dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It
argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as
the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition
for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro
Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on
that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner
must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special
proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on
appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in
its aforestated assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which
in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title
to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for
adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition,
she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof,
her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter
of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do not find in the present
case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign 5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since
remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in birth;
the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future
actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal
their enactment. 13
and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care,
concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes
are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this
procedural steps taken after their enactment.14
minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA
BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice;
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and (Emphasis supplied.) 18
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
xxx xxx xxx
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises. 15
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in
his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his
nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure
part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit.
to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the
eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must
time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of
case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
pleadings.
the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases,
once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17 We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and,
for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as
matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold
granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not
that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain
being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the
the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical
same.
construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate
proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope
made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child.
to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a
The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to
approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a
xxx xxx xxx substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be
stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition
should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to
interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6)
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging
years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay,
all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 21
also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court,
now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my
lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the
child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount
consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another,
and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of
protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to
make rules to accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests
of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the
absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will
not be disturbed. 24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for
the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the
trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with
the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written
consent of the children of the adopters.

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we
find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the
facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We
are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a
long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities
for a useful and happy life." 29

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in
the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not
one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, 2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation
at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 a month 8 a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and
sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that
because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the
children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and
that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the following
reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United
States and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid
detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
separation with alimonypendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Cebu 4 which rendered a decision 5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They further
meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
agreed:
parental authority over his beloved children."

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
(P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over
proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the
the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then
parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any

On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
contract or agreement with any person or persons,
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
natural or juridical without the written consent of the
husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily
requires husband's consent as the parties are by this WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors
agreement legally separated; 6 Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the
petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is
hereby granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be known
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the
and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that
D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
 (1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights
and duties as though they were in fact the legitimate
children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by
nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed
"close filial ties with the Clavano family, especially their
maternal uncle," petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless
and, with their printing press, real estate business,
export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets
and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie,
nicknamed "Menchu," approved of the adoption
because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in
1981, and the fact that she could not provide them a
secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and
spiritual direction as they would go to church together
and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to
be adopted by the Clavanos Keith had testified and
expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos
while the two younger ones were observed by the court
to have "snuggled" close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on "a very
shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his
children" on account of his being "an improvident father
of his family" and an "undisguised Lothario." This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged
paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of
Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house
of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of
"comparatively recent dates" were "attempts at
verisimilitude" as these were joint deposits the
authenticity of which could not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his
reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if not nil"
because it was petitioner who "devised, engineered and
executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada
Washoe County court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is
now an alien from the standpoint of Philippine laws"
and therefore, how his "new attachments and loyalties
would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open
question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute
as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza,
163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption
will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against
his opposition(Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80;
Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis,
83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W.
160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St.
Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep.
17.) 9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it
would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to
the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly
give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit
vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having
abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any
conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish
parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's presence, his care
and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His
duty to provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first,
the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children
P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the
Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show
compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22
cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children's names
totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45).
His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree on
May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53
remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were
shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And
since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father,
contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in
different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Virginia, U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name as
trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In
other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The
second is an "or" account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang.
Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only
by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of
evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better future and security
of his family." 10
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and
his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact
that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's parents.
Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the
"joint complaint" for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was belied
by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to
the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody
over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he "is still a father to
his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he had always
denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it
true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in
Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it
was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald,
came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for
monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos
to claim that they could love the children much more than he could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging
that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a
natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age
or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian
of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly
licensed child placement agency under whose care the
child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of
the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age
or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian
after receiving counselling and appropriate social
services from the Ministry of Social Services and
Development or from a duly licensed child-placement
agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or
any duly licensed child-placement agency under whose
care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of
the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such,
when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable
law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides
for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or
over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of
age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of
the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of
age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by
each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate
or has not abandoned the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper
officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but
if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent
is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition
for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition
should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition
for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as
follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has
given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14
years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the
children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had
already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada,
U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal
immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by
his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. 17 This Court
is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority
to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that these do not conform to the
evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is
on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence,
the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, withoutfinancial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to
"Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated
therein that it had been "a long time since the last time you've heard from
me excluding that of the phone conversation we've had." She discussed
petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension
over risks that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the
"last phone conversation" she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma,"
she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he had become a
"bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's cards.
She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative "almost dalaga"
who could carry on a conversation with herangkong and how pretty she was
in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de
Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that
she was worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as
she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that
the boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the youngest of the
children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom
he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about the
children-because they might not have informed petitioner of "some
happenings and spices of life" about themselves. She said that it was "just
very exciting to know how they've grown up and very pleasant, too, that
each of them have (sic) different characters." She ended the letter with the
hope that petitioner was "at the best of health." After extending her regards
"to all," she signed her name after the word "Love." This letter was mailed
on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of
"a note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we"
wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very
excited when petitioner "called up last time." She told him how Joeton would
grab the phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to
order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed
petitioner's call because she also wanted something that petitioner should
buy. Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-
colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie
informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs.
She told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about the children's needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription
of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would
incur, she would "replace" these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that
Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be thought of
at X'mas. Thanks again.
Sincerely
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose
Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to
tell their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes
start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I
and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner school and "something else." She, promised not to spend so much and to
about it and "we'll see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for save some. She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!"
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, to petitioner. After ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she
headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they asked for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
had been going to Labug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been
mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the
writing him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them;
evening. He wished his father "luck and the best of health" and that they
that he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around;
prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love
that he would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his
Keith."
Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the
"official altar boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for
the Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told
Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the amounts following his
petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because
father's instructions and promise to send money through the mail. He asked
he was the only one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that
his father to address his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his
Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to
own letters. He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season
Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton,
that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He
too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed
apprised him of his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely
petitioner that he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom
supervising them, instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their
would drive for his group. He asked him to call them often like the father of
pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while
Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they could wait for
Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother.
it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He
Because their mother was leaving for the United States on February 5, they
hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long
would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
to write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
"things" and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added
he would make the sign of the cross even when they would pass by
that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead
because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine
had become "very maldita" who was not always satisfied with her dolls and 11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated October
things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
son, Keith." The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the year '83
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and Charmaine and Joeton.
$50.00. She reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she would
turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even
feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on
when their Mom "was there" where she bought them clothes and shoes.
January 9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6. They would
Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to
feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped
buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00.
petitioner would keep writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
He informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends
but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence.
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his
had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to desire that petitioner would come and visit them someday.
Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date
one week. He informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her
January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred
the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
asked for his "reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton.
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-
He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner
heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that
that he was saving the money he had been sending them. He said he
would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown
missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should
taller and that he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the
call them on Sundays.
grocery even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.

8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by

Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing
the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the
that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit
of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from
1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts below
simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the emotional
exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized
the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank
deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a high
premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his seeming
steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards
his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith's
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have
engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle
he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is hardly
surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their presence.
Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to private
respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their father.
Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor
when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person
simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural
parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate
child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his affluent father
who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his mother. The Court
said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award custody
of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived
mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable
memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should
not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child
even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so
that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her
dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child
turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for
him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done
and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even
rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts
and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost
and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her
child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a,
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either
parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not
miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him
and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but
also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager"
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the
process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the country, as
she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking
abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because
Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. 31 In his testimony, private
respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came
home twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her
children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when
he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed
the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the
task upon private respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could "take care of the children while their parents are away," 35 thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the children's surname changed
to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult
for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that
he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister Anna
Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep
the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was
allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and
suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not
that serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to
physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38
she could not have been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the
Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children
would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to the
sons of Wilma Soco. 40As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine
society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in
orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a premium
on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless,
the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient
basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom
and common human experience show that a "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad"
father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground
to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. 42 Petitioner
has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a
telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after
learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his
love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement with
his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As
such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute
petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal
home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case.
Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of
his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample
evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent
his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court's position,
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not
to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the manifestation/compromise
agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal
separation. According to private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by
that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and,
therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however,
anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into
contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements
leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private
respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's
consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing
the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the "exercise" of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of which is
vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as
the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare
of the minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of
parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, 53 there
was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible
person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the
law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court
thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner.
The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon.
The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such
that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for
adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escao 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American
citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has
no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established customs
and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial
rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not
the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and
care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code,
the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care
and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with
love, care, understanding and security towards the full
and harmonious development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and
adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets
set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Rights of the Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation
from his/her biological parent(s).62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular
relevance to instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities
of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child
of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 63
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one
or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best
interests. 64
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . 65
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 66
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with
respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of
the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent
or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--visthat of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to
the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal
age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be
endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding
their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law
and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR
ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the
writ returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12
October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and
recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig submitted to the
Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and
Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for
adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-
Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she
was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein
petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein petitioners over
the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20
August 1987, rendered a decision 2 granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie
Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural
parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be,
for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners
and capable of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the
demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina
Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the
pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the
child to her house in Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that
the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent
word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid
the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and
submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case, testified on
27 October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in connection with
the present petition. She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24
June 1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. During the interview, said
respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the
petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded
person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by
another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her
and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose
"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon
the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural
mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit
relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent
of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse
of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody
of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 9
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and
respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan,
Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he
bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed
a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the
then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing,
however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of
hearing both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28
April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning
the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June
1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to
appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1)
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant
Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through
petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption,
insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child,
for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed
before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and
Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions,
not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper
which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is
mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of
hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period
for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the
policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules
of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. if
d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
 xxx xxx xxx Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which
reads as follows:
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the
of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied) Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental
supplied)
authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for
the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in
the following terms: The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation
to Article 39 of the same Code:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether
of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on
xxx xxx xxx
the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined
xxx xxx xxx
exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise (Emphasis supplied)
due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
conduct. 7(Emphasis Supplied) Petition for adoption was filed.

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code
upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption
can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption
was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that
the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to
be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however,
to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody,
parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then
with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by
the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, concur.

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to
take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At
the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made
known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the
feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until
the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx xxx xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from
a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her
once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when
petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all
the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were
only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition
against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent,
rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for
its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552,
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law
the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with
the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure
to comply with parental obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by
the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the
proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482of the Civil Code and
Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No.
8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M.
No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to
rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face
of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions
of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972,
said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From
the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the
filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
 "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered
dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises
the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In
ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The continuity
of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically
focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve
inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7 It was only much later
when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became
a paramount concern.8 Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike
most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.9 In the
early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, 11 were written
instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code
of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted
the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and
privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child,
not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the
legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul
the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being
vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process15 that expresses apresent fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No.
603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had
rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took
effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by
Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at
the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. InRepublic vs.
Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On
29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been
taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to
adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family
Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the
argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be
resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action
for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of
the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including
the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to
an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO
ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate childStephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of
any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is
qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition
would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to
the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother
as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence,
her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that"the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of
the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use
of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or
a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surnameemployed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use
such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as
"An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he
belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child
but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will
his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the
case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him
Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname
in the appropriate chapter. (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
xxx
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which
is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with
her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Liberal Construction of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
Adoption
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the
issuance of the decree of adoption.14 adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.27
The Underlying Intent of

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Adoption Is In Favor of the

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
Adopted Child
body intended right and justice to prevail."

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
interpreting the law."28
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, be allowed to do so.
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname "GARCIA" as her middle
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the name.
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section
1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
SO ORDERED. Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner, As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
vs. support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996.4
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, Respondents.
Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as
DECISION represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set
forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which
represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial courts
GARCIA, J.:
decision5 reads:

Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban Lacson,
has come to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in 1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the amount of TWO
CA-G.R. CV No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of October 18, 2001 denying his motion MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which
for reconsideration. amount shall be deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which
they received from defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support
pendent lite;
From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and other pleadings, the Court
gathers the following facts:
2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees;
and
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December
4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, 3) Pay costs.
petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas
SO ORDERED.
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban.
After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As
the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No.
eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. 60203.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001,6 dismissed Edwards
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to appeal, disposing as follows;
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the
appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.
years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small
amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up
nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].
daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court in
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.7
1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had,
from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred -
had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 toP600,000.00.
I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs.
He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he
inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY RESPONDENTS
blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide theP12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed UNCLE NOEL DABAN.
for in the complaint.
III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO RESPONDENTS.
IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX RESPONDENTS
EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN
COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and
Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in
arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his
point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who
has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil
Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for
support was made upon him.
Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the
fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could
celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters
during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the
fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch
with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in
1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand
in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter.
Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to
comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand
because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to
sustain an award of support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision,
thus:
From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal] grandmothers house by
their father and asked for support; this notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this
purpose which the latter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years
that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two (2) years.
xxx xxx xxx
Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children, the
[respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked extrajudicially for her childrens support
since 1976, when she went to her mothers house. .8 (Words in bracket and underscoring
added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in the
following wise:
We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture of trying to evade his
responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did not make a
"formal" demand therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from
his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with
such obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will "sustain his
two daughters Maowee and Maonaa"] also stated "as requested by their mother" thus practically
confirming the fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial court
thus correctly ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from
1976.9(Words in bracket added).
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory
of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for
the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are
accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. 10 Not one of
the well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain
in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs
findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial
demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975
note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as
here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule
that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below,11 except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a
review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.
Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding that
respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioners
lament on the matter is a veritable call for review of factual determinations of the two courts
below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close
relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban.
Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa
token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education,12 or, in short, whatever is necessary to
keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel
Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing
which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been
established, it is not amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who,
owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to
support her children.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from
the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the
petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,13 an equitable principle enjoining one from
unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures
arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper.
Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the
doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based
on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the
financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of
law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient.14

Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a
transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by
Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner
would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million
proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from
the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with- the
underlying judgment for support, assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support in
arrears.

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it
assumes as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property. But, as
the CA aptly observed, "there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction
mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property," as in fact
"[respondents] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective
shares on said property."15

Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners
suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for
what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous
and self-serving.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents
with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been
deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been
born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the
herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and resolution are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.