Case Digest: People v.

CFI of Quezon
May 23, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CFI OF QUEZON, et al.

G.R. No. L-46772, February 13, 1992

FACTS

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They entered the privately-owned land of
one Felicitacion Pujalte, then illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom,
without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license
agreement, lease license or permit, 60 logs of different species, consisting of about
541.48 cubic meters, with total value of P50,205.52 including government charges. The
trial court dismissed the information.

ISSUE

1. whether the information charged an offense

2. whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING

1. Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the
state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not
from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainants
deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license
agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and
timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private
woodlands.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D.

No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest
products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any
authority or license from the government.
2. Yes, with the exception of the so-called private crimes and in election offenses,
prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed
by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not
divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest
officers the right of preliminary investigations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA

G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a
few months old. BBB is married to appellant, whowas working
abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with
AAA and BBB. BBB was workingas a restaurant supervisor from
4pm to 2am for six days a week.In February 1999 at around 9:30
pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she
felt and sawappellant touch her thighs. The following day, at
around the same time and while BBB was at work, appellantagain
touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.Two weeks after the
incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up
and saw appellant holding aknife, then appellant was able to
penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA
recounted thatappellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the
same time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old.RTC
rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA affirmed thefinding that AAA was
raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the
victim even without court authorityWhether that the
qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable.
HELD:
To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically
allege in the information and prove during the trialthe qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender.Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a
person who has a legal relationship with his ward. The theorythat
a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the
early case of People vs. Dela Cruz whichheld that the guardian
referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as
understood in the rules on CivilProcedure.The law requires a legal
or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicialappointment which impresses upon the
guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him
fromviolating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered
as the guardian falling within the ambit of theamendatory
provision introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact
conjointly demonstrate that he is actuallyonly a custodian, that is,
a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited
degree of authorityfor a temporary period, we cannot impose
death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659,
sincehe does not fit into that category.Be that as it may, this
qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even
mentioned in the Information.
What was clearly stated was that appellant was the adopting
father of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless
failed to establish.For failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only
beconvicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.