THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180169

Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING,* J.,
CARPIO,**
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,***
Acting Chairperson,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

AGUSTINO TAMOLON and ANTONIO Promulgated:

CABAGAN,
Appellants. February 27, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 23, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming, with modification, the judgment [2] dated
February 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, Davao
del Sur, convicting Agustino Tamolon[3] and Antonio
[4]
Cabagan (appellants) of Multiple Murder.

The relevant facts and proceedings:

Appellants, with several others,[5] were charged with Multiple Murder,

docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-377 (93), before the RTC, Branch
21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, in an Information which reads:

That sometime last March of 1984, in the Municipality of Magsaysay,

Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with guns and
bolos, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot,
hack and massacre Jaime Malabarbas, Ely Malabarbas, Judith
 Malabarbas, Wilfredo Panton and Gerry Panton, the herein
victims/offended parties[,] which gunshot and hack wounds caused to
their instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
parties.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty.

The case was tried jointly with four other cases, where the appellants
were likewise charged under separate informations, viz.: for arson,[7] for
other forms of arson,[8] and for two counts of grave threats.[9] However,
except for the herein appellants, all the other accused in these criminal
cases remain at large.

The conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense on the

antecedent facts of the case, as summarized by the appellants in their
brief, follow:

Evidence for the prosecution tend to establish that at about 8:00 p.m. of
March 15, 1984, the group of ERNESTO DAMALI alias ALANG,
AGUSTINO TAMOLON, ANTONIO CABAGAN, SAMSON
CABAGAN, KIMPO ANGGA, JOSEPH WAGIA, and MODESTO
LANDAS were supposed to conduct a roving patrol. When they
reached the house of the MALABARBAS in Sitio Maibu,
Magsaysay[,] Davao del Sur, except for LANDAS, they opened fire at
the MALABARBAS family and then hacked them which resulted to
the death of JAIME, ELY, JUDITH, all surnamed MALABARBAS,
WILFREDO and GERRY, both surnamed PANTON (T.S.N., pp. 8, 11
& 13, December 1, 1993).

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:

Accused-appellant AGUSTINO TAMOLON who testified on April 5,

1995 stated that at the time of the massacre of the Malabarbas family
in Sitio Maibu, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur on March 15, 1984, he was
a resident of Santa Felomina, Makilala, North Cotabato, which is far
from the boundary of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. He lived as a farmer,
and in 1984, he was engaged in honey gathering in the mountains of
Makilala, North Cotabato. He does not know the Malabarbas family
nor does he know anything about their massacre. He met MODESTO
LANDAS in 1989 in Barangay Laya where he was assigned as a
CAFGU. He also knows that LANDAS was arrested and detained at
the Magsaysay Municipal Jail in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, Landas
was promised by the Municipal Mayor that he will help him
(LANDAS) if he would name all those who participated in the
commission of the crime.
 Accused-appellant ANTONIO CABAGAN denied having participated
in the massacre of the Malabarbas Family. He was arrested and
detained in 1993 in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, where MODESTO
LANDAS was also detained. During their detention, VILMA GANAD
(whose rubber plantation and copra dryer were set on fire) and
ANTONIO MALABARBAS, came to see him and LANDAS, and
asked them to testify against DAMALI and TAMOLON, and in
exchange, they will help them get out of jail and GANAD promised
them money and support in the form of rice subsidy. He, however,
refused because he did not actually see the persons who did the crime,
but LANDAS agreed (T.S.N., pp. 6-9, 11-13, June 8, 1995).

GREGORIO SUMAKBANG, the Barangay Captain of Magbuk,

Tulunan, from 1965 to 1987, testified that CABAGAN and
TAMOLON were never linked to the massacre of the MALABARBAS
Family in 1984, and that it was only in 1993 that he came to know that
they were linked and arrested for the massacre. He knows MODESTO
LANDAS and was a sponsor of LANDAS at his wedding. LANDAS
came to see him twice in 1993 and requested him not to get involved in
the cases. He further stated that LANDAS testified against Tamolon
and ANTONIO CABAGAN to free himself from jail and who was
subsequently released in February, 1993. He also knows that
MODESTO LANDAS died in September 1994, during the fiesta of
Malungon (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, September 15, 1995).

SUNGKADAN AMIT, a pastor of the Christian Missionary alliance in

Sta. Felomina, Makilala, North Cotabato, testified that he knows
AGUSTINO TAMOLON. During the years 1983 to 1984, TAMOLON
was a farmer and a honey gatherer, and that during these period he was
not a member of any armed group in Makilala, North Cotabato (T.S.N.,
pp. 12-13, September 15, 1995).[10]

After trial, on February 12, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision
convicting both appellants of multiple murder. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby pronounces

Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the death of Ely Malabarbas,
Wilfreda Panton, Judith Malabarbas, Jaime Malabarbas and Jerry
Panton and hereby sentences each accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Ely Malabarbas; Reclusion
Perpetua, for the death of Wilfreda Panton; Reclusion Perpetua, for the
death of Judith Malabarbas; Reclusion Perpetua, for the death of Jaime
Malabarbas and Reclusion Perpetua, for the death of Jerry Panton
subject to the limitation provided for under Article 70 of the Revised
 Penal Code and to indemnify the heirs of each victim the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS pursuant to recent
jurisprudence. x x x.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The RTC decision was elevated directly to the Supreme Court for
automatic review. However, conformably with our ruling in People v.
Mateo,[12] the case was, by Resolution dated December 13, 2004, referred
to the CA. Parenthetically, no appeal was taken by the appellants in the
other cases against them.[13] Accordingly, insofar as the other criminal
cases are concerned, the Decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur had
become final and executory.

On August 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its Decision, disposing as

follows:

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Judgment dated

February 12, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Davao del
Sur in Criminal Case No. XXI-377(93), is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs
of each of the victim[s] P50,000.00 as indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Thus, this appeal, assigning the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AGUSTINO TAMOLON AND
ANTONIO CABAGAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER ON THE LONE,
FABRICATED, ILL-MOTIVATED, AND POLLUTED TESTIMONY
OF MODESTO LANDAS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF EACH
OF THE FIVE (5) VICTIMS THE SUM OF FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS.[15]

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The appellants cast aspersion on the credibility of lone prosecution
witness, Modesto Landas, who admitted having been with the armed
group that massacred the Malabarbas family. Moreover, they question the
motive of Landas who, they said, told the authorities of the alleged
criminal activities of the group only after he had been arrested and
detained, nine years after the alleged incident. They then submit that the
evidence presented by the prosecution came from a polluted source,
harping on Landas being with the roving team at the time of the
commission of the crime, making him a co-conspirator.

However, the trial court gave full weight and credence to Landas
testimony. Evaluating the same, the court said:

Witness Modesto Landas was likewise very positive, direct, straight-

forward and convincing in his testimony against accused Agustino
Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan. This witness never faltered or wavered
in his claim about the participation of accused Agustino Tamolon and
Antonio Cabagan in the massacre of the Malabarbas family and in
setting fire to the dr[y]er of Vilma Ganad.[16]

The CA also held that, by way of exception, the testimony of a co-

conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient for conviction
when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because it is given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details by which their
nature could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought.[17]

In this regard, worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters

involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position
to assess the credibility of witnesses, since it has observed firsthand their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Absent any
showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would
appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual findings on and assessment of the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an
appellate tribunal.[18] A trial courts assessment of the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence.[19] Thus, in Valcesar Estioca y Macamay v. People
of the Phils.,[20] we held:

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this

Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the
 reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless
there is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the
witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and
convincing manner is a credible witness.

By the foregoing standards especially because the trial courts findings

were concurred in by the CA, we are obliged to adopt the trial courts
evaluation of Landas credibility.

As to the appellants defense which is based mainly on denial and alibi,

nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
witness.[21] In People of the Phils. v. Carlito Mateo y Patawid,[22] we had
occasion to state:

Accused-appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the

positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. x x x. A
defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving
no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters. x x x.

Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed

with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi is an
inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received
with caution, because it can easily be fabricated. [23] For alibi to prosper,
appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the
crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.[24]

In the case at bench, no convincing evidence was presented by the

defense to reinforce the appellants denial and alibi.

As to the award of additional damages, the CA is correct in ordering the

appellants to pay the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages, to the heirs
of each of the victims. We held in People v. Panado:[25]

We grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of

the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as
 borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably
and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment,
pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or
brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of
his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing
feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages may be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and
proof of the heirs emotional suffering. x x x. With or without proof,
this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be
considered proved.

Given the foregoing disquisition, we find no reason to reverse the

Decision of the CA upholding the conviction of accused-appellants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00463 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 564
dated February 12, 2009.
**
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No.
568 dated February 12, 2009.
***
In lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 563 dated February 12,
2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion
and Elihu A. Ybaez, concurring; rollo, pp. 4-12.
[2]
Promulgated by RTC Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla.
[3]
Also referred to as Agustino Tamulon in the information for multiple murder.
[4]
Referred to as Tony Cabagan in the information for multiple murder.
[5]
The other accused are Ernesto Dawali alias Alang, Samson Cabagan, Kimpo Angga and Joseph
Wagia.
[6]
CA rollo, p. 5.
[7]
Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-365 (93), in an information which reads:
That on or about December 15, 1991 at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused with intent to gain, motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner of the
property and acting as a syndicate, conspiring, confederating, helping one another and acting in concert
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously set on fire or burn the copra dryer (pugon)
owned by Mrs. Vilma vda. de Ganad valued at P30,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Id. at 17.)
[8]
Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-364 (93), in an information which reads:
That sometime in March 1992, or thereabout, at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused with intent to gain, motivated by spite or hatred to the
property owner, and acting as a syndicate, conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire or burn the rubber plantation and/or farm of one
Mrs. Vilma vda. de Ganad to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Id. at 18.)
[9]
Docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-342 (92), in an information which reads:
That sometime on January 1, 1992 at Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating, helping one another and acting in concert with other
persons, whose identities are still to be determined but who will be charged appropriately once
established later, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a written note or letter to
one Vilma Serapion vda. de Ganad demanding from the latter the amount of P60,000.00 and
threatening, should she fail to deliver the sum, to burn her rubber trees and to kill her and other
members of her family, to her damage and prejudice; that the threat letter was sent to the offended party
through a middleman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Id.)
[10]
Id. at 58-60.
[11]
Id. at 25-28.
[12]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[13]
The RTC disposed of the other criminal cases as follows:
In Criminal Case No. XXI-343(92) for Grave Threats, the Court finds accused Agustino Tamolon and
Antonio Cabagan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats as defined and
penalized under Article 282 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the accused in threatening the
complainant imposed a condition that of demanding the amount of P60,000.00 and killing the members
of Vilma Ganads family if the demand is not met, and therefore the crime threatened to be committed is
Homicide, the Court has to lower the penalty by two degrees from Reclusion Temporal which is the
penalty provided for the crime of Homicide, and since the threat was made through a middleman, the
Court hereby imposes upon said accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan the Indeterminate
Penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. XXI-343(92) the Court is at a loss as to the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused considering that the crime the accused intended to commit is that of Malicious Mischief,
should the private complainant fail to meet the demand but the prosecution failed to allege in the said
Information the damage that the private complainant will suffer as a result of the crime of Malicious
Mischief. Considering that the penalty in Malicious Mischief would depend on the amount of the
damage occasioned thereby, and the Information failed to allege the amount of the damage, the
Information aforesaid suffers from a very substantial defect. In view hereof, the Court ACQUITS
accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan of Grave Threats in Criminal Case No. XXI-342(92).
In Criminal Case No. XXI-365(93) for Arson this Court finds accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio
Cabagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson defined and penalized under Art. 322
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by P.D. 1613, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify private complainant
Vilma Ganad the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS for the burned copra dr[y]er.
In Criminal Case No. XXI-364(93) this Court finds accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Forms of Arson defined and penalized under Art.
321 par. 2, sub-par. C of the Revised Penal Code as amended by P.D. 1613 and hereby sentences each
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify
private complainant Vilma Vda. de Ganad the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS
for the damage caused to the partially burned rubber plantation. Both accused being detained are
entitled to full credit of the preventive imprisonment they had undergone if they have signed their
conformity to abide by the rules and regulations imposed upon inmates by the Provincial Jail
authorities of Davao del Sur, otherwise, they shall be entitled only to four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment they had undergone. The case with respect to accused Romy Solutan in Criminal Case
 No. XXI-365(93) for Arson is hereby ordered DISMISSED in view of the death of said accused and the
cases against accused Ernesto Damali alias Alang, Samson Cabagan, Kimpo Angga, Joseph Wagia,
Boy Cabagan and Joseph Madot are hereby ordered placed in the archive to be retrieved therefrom as
soon as these accused shall have been arrested.
SO ORDERED. (CA rollo, pp. 26-28.)
[14]
Rollo, p. 11.
[15]
Id. at 40.
[16]
CA rollo, p. 75.
[17]
Citing People v. Cuya, Jr., 141 SCRA 351, 354 (1986).
[18]
People of the Phils. v. Budoy Gonzales y Lacdang, G.R. No. 180448, July 28, 2008.
[19]
Rene Soriano @ Renato v. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 148123, June 30, 2008.
[20]
G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008.
[21]
People of the Phils. v. Donato Bulasag y Arellano alias Dong, G.R. No. 172869, July 28, 2008.
[22]
G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008.
[23]
People v. Penaso, 383 Phil. 200, 210 (2000).
[24]
People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, July 23, 2002, 385 SCRA 38, 51.
[25]
G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691.

Today is Monday, April 24, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180762 March 4, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CARLITO DE LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO "AKA" NELIO CABILDO and FILOTEO DE LEON, Appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26390 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Ecija, Branch 352 finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the private
complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

On June 14, 1989, an Information 3 was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson. The accusatory portion of
he Information reads:

That on or about the 5th day of April, 1986, in the Municipality of Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one RAFAEL
MERCADO, an inhabited house or dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be awarded to him under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his arraignment. 5

Appellants Bien de Leon, 6 Carlito de Leon,7 Filoteo de Leon8 and Nelio Cabildo9 were subsequently arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The facts of the case are as follows:

At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint (Aquilina) and her sister Leonisa Mercado (Leonisa), together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., (Junior) were inside a
hut owned by their father Rafael Mercado 10 (Rafael) located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Pearanda, Nueva Ecija. The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep
hrough the window and saw five men approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid
behind a pile of wood nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.

From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut 11 and set to fire the cogon roofing. 12 While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at
he group in order to see them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises. 13 By the time Junior arrived
with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.

On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado (Lucio) conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime and saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut. 1

Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire. 15 They also testified
hat prior to the incident, appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut which was first built therein. Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and
ssued threats that if he would not give up his claim on the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father Rafael filed several cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry
and Serious Physical Injuries against appellants.

Appellants denied the charge against them.

Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had been staying for a year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of
he tumana contrary to Rafaels claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal therein until 1975 when he took over upon the latters request; and that when Gaudencio
passed away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands.16

Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafaels attempt to build a hut was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio. 17 On cross-examination however,
he admitted that on March 12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed that he was found
guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No. 1985 filed against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Pearanda. 18 1avvphi1

Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and could not have gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted
n the pictures presented by the prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the pictures were materials brought by Rafael into the
andholding during the latters unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on the tumana.19

Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants desire to grab the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he
has been living in Rizal, Nueva Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Pearanda. 20 For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made by his co-appellants. 21

On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:

n the light of the foregoing, the prosecution had established the guilt of all the accused Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio "aka" Nelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon beyond reasonable doubt
or the crime of arson, and they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rafael Mercado the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut.

SO ORDERED.22

Appellants appealed before the Court of Appeals which rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado the sum of Php2,000 as temperate damages and Php20,000 as exemplary
damages. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.23

Hence, this appeal.

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 24 amending the law on arson provides:

Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. x x x

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

xxxx

Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is planned or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed in
ts maximum period.

Under the following provision, the elements of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and, (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The appellate court correctly found
hat the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the two essential elements of the offense.

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and
when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. 25 If there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he
can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. 26

n the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of credence, thus:

The inconsistencies and contradictions presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafaels house was intentionally burned by accused-appellants who were positively
dentified by witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa. In the face of these positive declarations, accused-appellants puerile attempt to discredit them crumples into dust. 27

t is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their credibility. 28

The testimony of Aquilina that she witnessed the burning of her fathers hut by appellants is positive and categorical, thus:

ATTY. BAUTO:

Q. Where were you when according to you they burned the house of your father? that house where you were residing?

A. I was in the tumana, sir.

Q. In the house or outside the house?

A. Outside of the house, sir.

Q. Why were you outside of the house?

A. When they were arriving or entering the premises of the house of my father or the tumana, our dog barked and we peeped thru the window, sir.

Q. What did you see?

A. We saw that men are coming, sir.

Q. How many men are coming?

A. Five men, sir.

Q. Were you able to recognize them when they were approaching the house?

A. Yes sir we recognize them.

Q. What did you do?

A. We went outside of the house, sir.

Q. Where did you go?

A. We hid ourselves behind the files (sic) of wood, sir.

Q. How far is that file (sic) of wood from the house of your father?

A. More or less seven meters, sir.

Q. Why did you, in the first place, go out of the house when you saw them coming?

A. Because we wanted to hide, sir.

Q. Why were you apprehensive?

A. Because they were our adversary, sir. (Kalaban po namin sila.)

 xxxx

Q. Who were with you when you went out of the house?

A. Only my sister Leonisa because I already instructed my nephew to go to our house when we noticed them coming and I instructed him to fetch my brothers, sir.

Q. When you were already behind the files (sic) of wood what happened next?

A. They surrounded our house and they lighted it up with match, sir. (Pinaikutan po nila ang aming bahay at sinilaban.)

Q. Who first lighted a match for purposes of burning the house?

A. Gaudencio Legaspi, sir.

Q. And what did the others do after Gaudencio Legaspi lighted a match?

A. They also lighted their matches, sir.

COURT:

Q. You mean the five had their matches at the time?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q. What portion of the house was lighted first?

A. The cogon roofing of the hut, sir. That was the portion that could be easily burned. 29

Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had not shown that it was physically impossible for them to be
present at the time and place of the crime. 30

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts reliance on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a
badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. 31

Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually
been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally
caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.32 The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily
proven in the instant case.

The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance. The crime was committed by
a syndicate since it was carried out by a group of three or more persons.

On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of P2,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance,
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26390, finding appellants Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de
Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson, sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado
P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTE S TATI O N

attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
In lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, per Special Order No. 568 dated February 12, 2009.

1
Rollo, pp. 2-22; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and
Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III.

2
CA rollo, pp. 51-55; penned by Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta.

3
Records, p. 71.

4
Id.

5
Id. at 119.

6
Arraigned on April 19, 1990; see records, p. 136.

7
Arraigned on May 9, 1990; see records, p. 140.

8
Id.

9
Arraigned on July 10, 1990; see records, p. 162.

10
Died on February 23, 1988; Certification dated January 22, 1990 from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pearanda, Nueva Ecija. Records, p. 117.

11
TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 4.

12
TSN, May 4, 1993, p. 9; TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 5.

13
Id. at 10; Id. at 6-7.

14
Id. at 14; Id. at 7.

15
Id.

16
TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 4-5.

17
Id. at 10.

18
Records, p. 54.

19
TSN, October 24, 1995, pp. 5-6.
 20
TSN, March 26, 1996, pp. 2-3; 5.

21
Id. at 5-6.

22
CA rollo, p. 55.

23
Rollo, pp. 21-22.

24
March 7, 1979.

25
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 367, 373, citing Curtis, A Treaty on the Law of Arson (1st ed., 1986), Sec. 283, p. 303.

26
Id., Sec. 287, p. 307.

27
Rollo, p. 16.

28
People v. Clidoro, G.R. No. 143004, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 149, 154.

29
TSN, May 4, 1993, pp. 7-9.

30
People v. Dela Pena, Jr., G.R. No. 183567, January 19, 2009.

31
Id.

32
People v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 180448, July 28, 2008.

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