Pablico vs.

Villapando

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against
then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a
defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated
August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the
election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor Pablico
took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to
vacate the office.

Issue:

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the penalty of
dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from
service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in
Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that [t]he Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60,
Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority
referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the
President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective
local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules
and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such
as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that
they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute
is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)

HON. TOMAS JOSON III VS CA [G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006] FACTS:
8 members of the SP filed an administrative case against Mayor Vargas, alleging that the latter
submitted to the provincial budget officer 2 falsified documents, appropriation No. 1 & Resolution No.
2. Mayor Vargas countered a complaint for annulment of falsified minutes of session & appropriation
ordinance w/damages against the SB members in the RTC. Then, Mayor Vargas also filed w/ the SP a
motion to suspend proceedings due to a prejudicial question of the case he filed in the RTC. W/O
resolving the motion the SP issued an order recommending to the Gov., that Mayor Vargas be
preventively suspended. Later, the SP eventually denied the motion to suspend filed by Mayor Vargas.
The latter appealed his denied motion to the Office of the President. However, Gov. Joson issued an
order putting him under preventive suspension. The Office of the President reversed and lifted the
order of preventive suspension. Unsatisfied, Gov. Joson filed an MR to the Office of the President, the
latter granted the Gov.s MR, thus the order of preventive suspension was reinstated.

ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension is proper. (NECESSITY OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER)

RULING: Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be imposed (a)
after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues are
considered joined when the complaint has been answered and there are no longer any substantial
preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out. In its Order dated 22 April 2003, the Office of the
President stated that the facts of the case do not warrant a conclusion that issues are deemed joined.
Furthermore, the Office of the President found no basis for the issuance of the preventive suspension.
The Office of the President explained: In the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not file,
so far, an answer to the complaint thus the issues could not have been considered joined. What she
did was to file a Motion To Suspend Proceedings And/Or Motion To Dismiss which was treated by the
sanggunian as her answer. However, nothing in the records can be inferred that the petitioner intended
the said motion to be her answer. In fact, when the motion was denied on March 17, 2003 through SP
Resolution No. 105-s-2003, she immediately appealed the said Resolution to this Office. In fine, no
inference can be had that the motion filed was considered her answer otherwise, petitioner could have
stated so therein. Finally, even assuming that petitioners motion was already her answer and
therefore, the issues have been joined, it is observed that the grounds cited by the sanggunian in
recommending the assailed preventive suspension are general statements mere verbatim
reproduction of the provision of law, unsupported by any factual and substantial evidence. There is no
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, with both parties charging each other with falsification of
documents. In fact, that is the subject of Civil Case No. 4442. Moreover, it cannot be said that the
continuance in office of respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. The recitals in SP Resolution No. 105 s. 2003 are
unconvincing. xxx...xxx...xxx... It would thus appear that the grounds cited by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas were just general
statements unsupported by any evidence. This is contrary to the requisites for a preventive suspension
which require that evidence of guilt must be strong and that given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The haste in issuing the
resolution recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas is unreasonable considering the
gravity of the effects of such suspension. Suspension from office of an elective official would deprive
the electorate of the services of the person they have voted into office. As held in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals: The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions x x x because it is out
of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause (sic) of the investigation with
his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that
it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say
that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Malinao vs Reyes
Posted on October 3, 2012

VIRGINIA MALINAO vs. HON. LUISITO REYES, in his capacity as Governor of the
Province of Marinduque, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF MARINDUQUE and
WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque
G.R. No. 117618
March 29, 1996

FACTS:
Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due
process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of
the Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman.
On September 5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted Red of the charges against him. This
vote was embodied in a Decision which was signed by all the members. Malinao argued that the
First Sanggunian decision had already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second Decision is valid.

HELD:
Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In any case, this issue is already moot and
academic as a result of the expiration of Reds term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings are barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC].
Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official.
[Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of
the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against said official is abated if in the
meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a condonation of whatever misconduct he
might have committed during his previous term. In order to render a decision in an
administrative case involving elected local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in
writing, stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision.
MALINAO VS REYES [255 SCRA 616] Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the local elective official. Petitioners basic contention is that inasmuch as the Decision of
September 5, 1994 had become final and executory, for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal, it was
beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect
reversed the first decision. These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the
September 5, 1994 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of only one
member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the Decision as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the
signatures of the requisite majority. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
expiration of respondents term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and
further proceedings against respondent Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995. Pursuant to
66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or
a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative
disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected, because his
reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his
previous term.

SALALIMA VS GUINGONA [257 SCRA 55] The liabilities of the Sanggunian members who were
reelected are condoned without prejudice to appropriate civil or criminal cases. Section 66(b) of R.A.
No. 7160 expressly provides: SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x (b) The penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office. This provision sets the limits to the
penalty of suspension, viz., it should not exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of
office of the respondent for every administrative offense.[1] An administrative offense means every act
or conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.
Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the subject
four administrative cases arc correct, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the
penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion
of the petitioners term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative
offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of
the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. Their
term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995.[2] And this Court is not prepared to rule that the
suspension amounted to the petitioners removal from office.*3+ The petitioners cannot be
administratively liable. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people
of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing
petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992
elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases
as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances.

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF DON MARIANO MARCOS V. MARTINEZ [G.R. No. 170626, March 3,
2008] FACTS: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such
under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of the said local government unit. On November 2004, Martinez was administratively
charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials
pursuant to Section 61 of Rep. Act No. 7160. Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended
Administrative Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision
which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The trial court issued an Order
declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It
maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local
official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. After MR, appeal by
Certiorari straight to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office.

HELD: The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the
Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred
upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office: Section 60.Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx An elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en
banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner contends that administrative cases
involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from
office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. But, the
rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is
intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority.
Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may
be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision,
would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an
unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders
of the legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review,
and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised
by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official
concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only
after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an
elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the
fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the
electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted. The most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is
suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve
that the proper charges be filed in court.

MALONZO VS ZAMORA [323 SCRA 875] The law does not require the completion of the updating or
adoption of the internal rules of procedures before the Sanggunian could act on any other matter like
the enactment of an ordinance; There is nothing in the law, which prohibits that the 3 readings of a
proposed ordinance be held in just one session day.

DE LOS REYES VS SANDIGANBAYAN [281 SCRA 631] The approval of an ordinance where the LCE
affixes his signature is not a purely ministerial act. He in fact has veto power. In an effort to exonerate
himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent
passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive, he
has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have
taken advantage of his official position in committing the crime of falsification as defined and punished
under Article 171 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the
final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government
Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides: Art. 109 (b). The local chief
executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. . . . . Contrary
to petitioner's belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act
of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local
chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and
return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The
Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members
thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear,
therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or
resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well. The minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved
the subject resolution knowing fully well that "the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up
and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session." The
Sandiganbayan is directed to set the criminal case for arraignment and trial.

PUBLIC CORPORATION / PUBLIC OFFICERS

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; MAJORITY OF ALL

THE MEMBERS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE QUORUM

MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Compostela Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts
executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held
on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said sessions noted the
resignation letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the entire province under
a state of calamity and approved the Governor to enter into the contract with
the Allado Company. Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian,
during its February 26 session, conducted official business without a quorum
since only 7 out of the 14 members were present. He further questioned the
February 8 sessions validity arguing that only 7 members were present and
the failure to provide written notice to all members at least 24 hours before
the holding of the special session. Respondents argued that Board Member
Sotto was in the United States during such sessions and that the actual
number of Board Members in the country was only 13 which, they claimed,
should be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised
by Zamora was dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the
Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and specifies
applicable rule regarding the determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be

included in the counting of the entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged to be

without quorum, is deemed to be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A majority of all members of the
Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum
to transact official business. Quorum is defined as the number of members
of a body which, when legally assembled, will enable the body to transact its
proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. When required to
constitute a quorum, majority means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian.
Quorum should, thus, be based on the total number of members regardless
of whether or not a member is said to be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions
deemed to have not met the required quorum, such sessions and decisions
shall be considered void.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza

May 23, 2016

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. In the MOU, the oil
companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence
work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In
exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate
within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The
Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional.