YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

R,~MANUJA'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE

U P A N I S A D S IN C O M P A R I S O N W I T H g A l q K A R A ' S
INTERPRETATION

In the history of Indian philosophy, R~n~nuja (1017-- 1137 C.E.) is

regarded as the first philosopher who rejected gafikara's advaita
philosophy from a theistic viewpoint. As is well known, R~m~nuja
developed his Vi~ist~dvaita philosophy in the gri Vaisnava devotional
theistic tradition, in which Visnu-N~r~yana was regarded as the
Supreme Lord. Along with the views of gafikara and Madhva, his
philosophy has constituted one of the three major representative
streams of Vedanta philosophy. Of the three scriptures known as the
prasthdnatraya, R~m~muja commented only on the Brahma-sfttra and
the Bhagavad-gitd: he left no commentary on the Upanisads. Never-
theless, his Veddrthasamgraha and ~ff-bhdsya show how he under-
stands the teachings of several Upanisads. By contrasting R~n~nuja's
interpretation of the Upanisads with that of ~afikara, this paper will
attempt to elucidate the nature of R~manuja's hermeneutics, as implied
in his understanding of the Upanisads.

In his Xri-bhdsya (I.i.1.), R~mfinuja describes brahman as the "Supreme

Person" (purusottama), who is "free from all imperfections by inherent
nature" (svabhdvato nirasta-nikhila-doso) and who possesses "number-
less classes of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence"
('navadhikdtidaydsamkhyeya-kalydna-gun. a-gan,ah.). Thus, in his scheme,
the only being whose greatness (brhattva) is of matchless excellence is
the personal brahman, that is, "the Lord of all" (sarvedvara).1 This
Lord, possessed of perfect qualities, is transformed by matter and by
the individual souls, whether these be "in subtle or causal state, or
gross or effectual state. ''2 Matter and souls constitute the body to
which brahman is the Soul.
Rhm~nuja regards brahman to be the sole cause of the world, that

Journal of lndian Philosophy 19: 89--98, 1991.

1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
90 YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

is, to be both the substantial (or material) cause and the efficient (or
operative) cause. These causes are inseparable (abhinna-nimittopdddna
kfzrana). This idea itself is not specifically distinctive of R~nS.nuja's
philosophy, for it is common to the Ved~-ata philosophical tradition.
Safikara, for example, also calls brahman the substantial and efficient
causes of the world, though he limits this characterization to the
saguna-brahman and emphasizes the singularity of nirguna-brahman.
Safikara considers the diverse beings in the world to be subject to
illusion (mdyd). For R~m~nuja, however, brahman, i.e., the personal
God as the sole cause and support of the universe, is the perfect Soul
of the w o r d and is not subject to any change in the world. 3 This is
true even though one aspect of the brahman of R~mS.nuja is an ever-
changing body, which at the beginning of creation was in its subtle or
causal phase. This aspect, matter (prakrti), changes in its essence as it
passes through the process of the evolution of the universe. The other
aspect, purusa, undergoes no essential change, though it manifests
different attributes of knowledge in the same evolutionary process.
Moreover, as the "inner Ruler" (antarydmin) of the world, setting
everything into motion and allowing it to operate in accordance with
the principle of causality, brahman is the efficient or operative cause
of the world. 4
In ~afikara's theory, there is ultimately no ground for a polarity of
beings in the world, for the only ultimately existent being, the
nirguna-brahman, is non-dual, impersonal, inexpressible and relation-
less: all other things are assumed to exist within the nirguna-brahman
and thus are not ultimately real. For RhmS~nuja, however, the saguna-
brahman includes the world of the individual finite souls and of finite
matter: the diversity of the world is real. Accordingly, the relational
polarity of saguna-brahman with the individual finite souls and things
is fundamental.

II
This relational polarity is not static but dynamic. As Julius J. Lipner
points out, within one and the same context of divine originative
causality, RS.rnS.nuja discusses this relational polarity in two ways.
Temporarily to adopt Lipner's terminology, these ways may be charac-
 RAMANUJA'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE UPANISADS 91

terized as "centripetal" and "centrifugal": the "centripetal" method

emphasizes "Brahman's identity with the world," the "centrifugal"
stresses "his [Brahman's] difference from the world. "s In short,
Rfim~nuja simultaneously attempts to demonstrate the "non-differ-
ence" (abheda) of brahman from the world, and the "difference"
(bheda) of brahman from it. In the Veddrthasam.graha, Rfimfinuja
says:

Non-difference is established in the sense that Brahman is modified by

all because all constitute his body. Both difference and non-difference
are established in the sense that the sole Brahman, being modified by the
variety of spiritual and non-spiritual entities, abides in variety. There is
difference inasmuch as the non-spiritual order, the spiritual order and
the Lord have categorically different proper forms and natures and are
never confused.

.. sarva~ariratayfi sarvaprakfiram, brahmaivfivasthitam ity abhedah

samarthitah / ekam eva brahma nfinfibhfitacidacidvastuprakfiram nfinfi-
tvenfivasthitam iti bhedfibhedau / acidvastuna~ cidvastuna~ ce~varasya ca
svarfipasvabhfivavaitaksan.yfid asamkarfic ca bhedah sarnarthitah/6

In R~mhnuja's theory, reconciliation of abheda and bheda is

supported by the concept of the so-called "soul-body relationship"
(~arira-~ariri-bhdva or dtma-garfra-bhdva), which explains the com-
bination of transcendence and immanence in the nature of the per-
sonal brahman. In his Veddrthasam.graha, RfirnSnuja explains the
relationship between soul and body as "the relationship between
substratum and dependent entity incapable of functioning separately"
(p.rthak-siddhy-anarhddhdrddheya-bhdva), "the relationship between
transcendent controller and thing controlled" (niyantr-niydmya-bhdva)
and "the relationship between principal and accessory" (gesa-~esi-
bhdva).7 In this relationship, "soul" (garirin) is in all respects the
substratum, the controller and the principal, while "body" (garira) is a
modification, which is inseparably connected with soul, and is a
dependent, accessory entity, a thing controlled. This "soul-body"
relationship expresses the total dependence of the "body" as a modi-
fication upon the inner ensouler. This fundamental vi~istfidvaita
concept of "soul-body relationship" has a scriptural source in the
Brhaddranyakopanisad (III. vii. 1--23). For example, Brhaddranyako-
panisad (III. vii. 3) states:
92 YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

He, who dwells on the earth, who is within the earth, whom the earth
does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth from
within, is your Soul, the inner Ruler, the immortal One.
yah prthivy~m tisthan p.rthivyfiantaro yam p.rthivi na veda yasya p.rthivi
~ariram yah p.rthivim antaro yamayaty esa ta fitmfintaryfimyam.rtah8

RS.mfinuja's theory of the soul-body relationship applies at the

levels of both microcosm and macrocosm. This theory recognizes
three ontological categories: brahman, souls (sentient beings), and
matter (non-sentient beings). To support this distinction, the ~ri-
bh@ya 9 frequently quotes Taittiffyopanis.ad II.vi. 1:

He sent forth all this, whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered
into it. Having entered it he became sat and tyat....
idam sarvam as.rjata / yad idam. kim ca / tat srstvfi / tad evfinuprfivigat/
tad anupravigya/ sac ca tyac c~bhavat. . . .

Rfimfinuja cites this passage to show that brahman, as an "inner ruler"

(antary~min), has a body consisting of both intelligent souls and non-
intelligent matter. In other words, just as individual souls, entering into
matter, give life to it, so too does brahman, entering into both matter
and souls, bestow on them their power and peculiar character. Just as
the body has no proper existence without the soul, the soul, too, has no
proper being without the Supreme Soul, i.e., brahman which is imma-
nent as an "inner Ruler." The personal brahman is thus a Soul animat-
ing a body, the world, which is made up of souls and matter. In other
words, brahman, being beyond all transformation in the world, is
"supreme" (para) for finite beings. Yet brahman, being immanent inside
their bodies, can nevertheless also be "accessible" (sulabha) to them.
John B. Carman points out that the terms, "supremacy" (paratva) and
"accessibility" (saulabhya), "though they were not used by Rfimfinuja,
do capture a real distinction between two groups of more concrete
attributes in RfimS~nuja's concept of God. ''1 In any case, the world,
which is full of distinctions, has the personal brahman for its Soul and
represents the organic oneness of nature.
From the point of view of the relationship between the individual
souls and brahman, Rfimfinuja categorizes the Upanis.ads into two
distinct groups. 11 The first of these (which might seem to support
 R,~MANUJA'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE UPAN1SADS 93

~afikara's viewpoint) presents brahman as the only reality and the

whole world of souls and matter as illusory. The other group of
Upanisads represents brahman as abounding in limitless auspicious
qualities and represents the individual souls as being real and many.
Though clearly inspired by the latter group, Rfimfinuja attempts, as will
be discussed below, to reconcile the two kinds of teaching by finding a
synthesis in such Upanisadic texts as the Brhaddranyaka and Taittiriya
passages quoted above. There is no real contradiction, Rfirnfinuja
maintains, between the two apparently contradictory sets of texts. 12
Rfimanuja's principle of scriptural reconciliation is diametrically
opposed to that of gafikara. A striking feature of gafikara's interpreta-
tion of scripture (Veda or ~ruti) is his discrimination of the jhdna-
kdnda -- the intellectual part of the Veda found in the Upanis..ads (also
called Veddnta "end of the Veda") -- from the karma-kdnd, a, that is, the
ritual part of the Veda. While the former predominantly sets forth the
absolute (paramdrtha) knowledge of reality, the latter for the most part
presents only relative (vyavahdrika) reality. In other words, gafikara
attempts to cope with apparently irreconcilable passages of ~ruti by
recognizing two levels of truth. R~tmfinuja rejects gafikara's distinction
on the grounds that all parts of ~ruti texts possess equal weight. As van
Buitenen points out, this view of ~ruti, though not clearly stated, is
implicit throughout Rfimfinuja's works. 13 Unlike gafikara, Rfimfinuja has
no intention to supersede Prrva-mimdmsd. For Rfimfinuja, the two
mimdmsds are not fundamentally different, but combine to offer
equally valid statements about reality. In his Veddrthasamgraha,
Rfimfinuja says:

We have to interpret all these grutis in such a manner that there is no

contradiction between their statements, however diverse, and that their
primary sense is not sacrificed.
n~n~rfip~.~mvakyfinfimavirodho mukhyfirthaparityagagca yathfi
sambhavati tath~ vain.aniyam/~4

In Rfimfinuja's scheme, as presented by van Buitenen, the two

mimamsas form a continuum. The former mimdmsd explores "the
ritual acts by which God, the Supreme Brahman, is worshipped
indirectly in His multiple manifestations in Vedic deities," while the
latter mimdmsd analyzes the way in which God is directly realized by
94 YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

immediate knowledge. The former is subordinate and introductory to

the latter. 15 Moreover, inasmuch as smrtis are promulgated by per-
fectly trustworthy personalities in harmony with the contents of the
gruff, they serve to corroborate them. But when the contents of smrtis
are against gruff in its primary meaning, they cannot be accepted as
elucidating the truth. 16

IV
An Upanisad passage that deserves special attention as revealing
R~m~nuja's interpretation of gruff'is the well-known mahdvdkya,
"Thou art That" (tat tvam asi). This statement is made nine times by
Uddfilaka Aruni to his son gvetaketu in Chdndogyopanisad VI. 8--16.
gafikara argues that this mahdvdkya encapsulates the essence of the
whole gruff, namely, the identity of brahman and dtman, gafikara's
Upadegasdhasff explains the word "That" in the mahdvdkya as mean-
ing brahman, i.e., Being (sat). 17 The word "art" (asi) means that "That"
and "Thou" have the same referent (tulya-nid. atva), is Since the word
"Thou" is used in connection (yoga) with the word "That," the word
"Thou" must also refer to brahman. 19 This sentence is regarded by
gafikara as asserting the identity of brahman and dtman, and thus the
ultimate existence of a single attributeless Being in the universe. Later
Advaitins followed gafikara in ranking this mahdvdkya as a primary
expression of the central teaching of the Vedfinta.
Rfim~muja, by contrast, holds that "Thou art That" refers not to the
oneness of any attributeless brahman, but rather to brahman as
distinguished by difference. According to the ~ri-bhdsya, the word
"That" points to the personal brahman who is omniscient, wills the
truth and is the cause of the world. In support of this interpretation,
he cites, for example, the Chdndogya passage "That thought: 'May I
become many' (tad aiksata bahu sydm)," 2o which depicts brahman as
forming the "basis" (prakrta). The word "Thou," which is equated
with "That," refers to "brahman whose body is the individual soul
connected with non-intelligent matter" (acid-vigista-fiva-garirakam.
brahma). For "co-ordination" (sdmdnddhikaranya), 21 i.e., the grammat-
ical equation of "Thou" and "That," denotes "a single reality which
exists in two modes" (prak~ra-dvaydvasthitaikavastu-). 22 The words
 R,&MANUJA'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE UPANISADS 95

"Thou" and "That" apply to the same personal brahman, but under
different aspects. In other words, like brahman, the individual souls
are by themselves essentially uncontracted, unlimited and of the nature
of perfect knowledge, but they come to be "covered up by ignorance
in the form of karman" (karmar@dvidydvestitds); 23 their knowledge is
subject to contraction in accordance with their karman, and they
become embodied in bodies of multifarious varieties, ranging from
Brahmfi to the lowest species of inanimate being. Thus in R~tm~muja's
view, this mahdvdkya thus does not, as gafikara maintains, proclaim
the mere identity of brahman and dtman, for a mere identity would
contradict the Chdndogyopanisad passage which states "That thought:
'May I become many.'" In short, Rfimfinuja holds that this mahdvdkya
must be regarded as non-technically expressing the truth propounded
in the passage (which immediately precedes "tat tvam asi" in Ch(mdo-
gyopanisad VI. viii. 7) "all that consists in this" (aitaddtmyam idam
sarvam). 24 Rfimfinuja explains the words "all that" in this passage to
mean "the world, including the intelligent souls (cetana-migram
prapaficam) and "this" to denote brahman, the "soul" (dtman) of the
world. 25
Moreover, for Rfimfinuja, gafikara's denial of attributes to brahman
is contraverted by the teachings of the Upanisads. In the sentence
"Thou art That," without interpreting both "Thou" and "That" figura-
tively, neither word can denote an "attributeless" reality. But there is
no room for any figurative interpretation of this mahdvdkya in the
Upanisadic context. Rfimfinuja follows the same line of interpretation
in discussing "brahman is existence, knowledge and infinite" (satyam
jfidnam anantam brahma) in the Taittiriyopanisad (II. i. 1). 26 H e
argues that this passage does not relate to the "reality which is devoid
of attribute" (nirvi~esa-vastu-), i.e., unqualified brahman; inasmuch as
the three words, satyam, ]hdnam and anantam, are in a "co-ordina-
tion" (sdmdnddhikaranya), and denote the "one thing which is charac-
terized by more than one attribute" (aneka-vi~esana-vi~istaikdrtha-),
i.e., the personal brahman. 27
Rfimfinuja also refutes gafikara's interpretation of the well-known
phrase neti neti. The Brhaddranyakopanisad (II. iii. 6) states: "Hence,
now, there is the teaching [of brahman]: 'it is not this nor that" (athdta
dde~o neti neti).2s In gafikara's view, this passage teaches that the only
96 YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

way to describe the true nature of brahman is to deny that it

possesses such distinguishing characteristics as name, form and action.
One must say: "It is not this nor that" (neti neti). There is no other,
more appropriate description of brahman than this. These two
negative particles are used for the sake of "the elimination of all
limiting adjuncts" (sarvopddhi-nirdkarana). When this elimination
dispels one's desire to know about space, time and everything other
than brahman, one comes to recognize "the Truth of truth" (salyasya
satyam), that is, one's identity with brahman, as stated by the
mahdvdkya, "I am brahman" (aham brahmdsmi). 29
Rfimfinuja takes this passage in entirely different way. He empha-
sizes the context to which it belongs. He argues that, within its
Upanisadic context, the negation neti neti cannot mean that brahman
is devoid of attributes. Rfimfinuja corroborates his understanding of
neti neti by pointing out that this phrase is immediately followed by a
passage which declares the qualities of brahman: "For there is nothing
higher than this, that he is thus. Now the designation for him is 'the
Real of the real' (satyasya satyam). Verily, breathing creatures are
the real (prdnd vai satyam. ). He is their Real (tesam esa satyam)."
R~mfmuja explains 30 that the term prdna here denotes the individual
souls (jivdh.) which are the "real" (satyam); they do not undergo
transformations (parindma) entailing an alteration of their essential
nature (sva~pa). 'The Real of the real' is the highest Person (parama-
purusa), who is "free from all sin" (apahata-pdpmanas). The souls,
unlike the personal brahman, undergo contractions and expansions
of knowledge in accordance with their karman. 31 R~mfinuja thus
concludes:

As thus the complementary passage declares brahman to be connected

with certain qualities, the clause neti neti (Brh. Up., II. iii. 6) cannot
deny that brahman possesses distinctive attributes, but only that
brahman's nature is confined to the attributes previously stated.
ata~ caivam, vfikyMesoditagunajfitayogfin neti neti (Br. II. iii. 6)
iti brahmanal ? savi~esatvam na pratisidhyate / api tu
pfirvaprak.rteyattfimfitram ~32

CONCLUSION

RS.mfirluja rejects gafikara's interpretation of the Upanisadic mahd-

 RAMANUJA'S HERMENEUTICS OF THE UPANISADS 97

vdkyas as inappropriate to their context. He maintains that the

Advaitin interpretation is inadequate in view of the Upanisadic
proclamation that brahman possesses attributes and that the world of
name and form is real. He holds that the seemingly contradictory
passages in the Upanisads are to be explained by finding in them a
common, non-contradictory sense. In considering the contexts of these
Upanisadic passages, Rfimfinuja, who sees indisputable authority in all
gruti texts, finds this common sense in the sphere of a complex "soul-
body" relationship subsisting among brahman, individual souls and
matter. In short, for Rfimfinuja, the truth of the Upanisads is truly
understood only through his vi~istfidvaitic view, which reconciles the
Upanisadic principles bheda and abheda.

NOTES

R~.mfinuja, ~ri-bh6s.ya, edited by Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar (Bombay: Government

Central Press, 1914), I. i. 1, p. 2.
2 j. A. B. van Buitenen, Rdmfmuja's Vedftrthasam.graha (Poona: Deccan College,
1956), Introduction, p. 69.
3 "Creation," according to Ramfinuja, means only the transformation of brahman,
accompanied by the subtle (sftkq.ma) phase of cit and acit, into the gross (sth~la)
phase of cit and aeit. In other words, creation merely implies that the subtle becomes
gross: in the process of creation the personal brahman remains absolutely free and
independent.
4 In his comment on Brahma-sfttra (I. iv. 28), which calls brahman the womb (yoni)
of the world, Rfimfinuja says brahman is both the substantial and efficient cause of
the world. He cites two Mun.d.akopanisad passages: "the maker, the Lord, the person,
brahman, the womb (kartdram i~am. purus.am, brahma yonim, Ill. i. 3) and "that which
the wise regard as the womb of all beings" (yad bh~ta-yonim, paripagyanti dhirdh, I. i.
6). Cf. ~ri-bh6s.ya, I. iv. 28, p. 395.
Julius J. Lipner, The Face of Truth: a study of meaning and metaphysics in the
Veddntic Theology of Rdmdnuja (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986),
p. 135. Lipner's centripetal/centrifugal distinction is a challenging attempt to illumi-
nate Rfimfinuja's thought, which stands between the advaitic and dvaitic standpoints,
that is, the non-dual and the dual.
6 Text and translation: Rdm6nuja's Veddrthasamgraha, verse 85, pp. 122, 244.
7 Ibid., verse 76, pp. 114, 235.
8 Brhad6ranyakopanisad, Anandfigrama Sanskrit Series, no. 15, (Poona: Anand~grama
Press, 1891) IlL vii. 3, p. 450. Cf. ibid., III. vii. 1--23, pp. 446--454.
9 Cf. ~ri-bhdsya I. i. 13, p. 197; I. i. 32, p. 231; I. iv. 27, pp. 392--394; II. iv. 14, p.
556. There are several similar citations in the ~r[-bhds.ya. See also the Veddrtha-
samgraha, e.g. verse 140, p. 170.
~0 John B. Carman, The Theology of Rdmdnuja: an essay in interreligious under-
standing (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 87. In later gri
98 YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

Vaisnavism, "the polarity most keenly felt is that between the Divine justice (an
expression of God's supremacy or essential lordship) and His mercy (an expression of
His accessibility). This polarity is reflected in the ascription of justice to G o d Himself
(N~rfiyana), and of mercy to His Consort gri." (John B. Carman, ibid., p. 246.)
11 ~ri-bhdsya, IV. i. 3, pp. 715--717.
12 Ibid.
13 j. A. B. van Buitenen, ibid., Introduction, p. 58. Lipner (Face of Truth, p. 165)
takes issue with van Buitenen's remark, "All grutis are equally authoritative," to
characterize Rfimfmuja's position in contradistinction to that of gafikara. Lipner points
out: "~afikara and Rfimfinuja would agree that all grutis are equally authoritative in
that all equally derive from the same authoritative source." Van Buitenen's point,
however, is that while gafikara, on one hand, establishes a two-level hierarchy of truth
and finds that the jfidna-kdnd, a is particularly relevant to the higher level of truth,
Rfimfinuja, on the other, sees both parts of the Veda as making statements which have
equal truth value.
14 Text and translation: Rdmdnuja's Veddrthasam.graha, verse 84, pp. 1 2 1 , 2 4 3 .
The mukhydrthaparityagai of van Buitenen's text is an apparent misprint for
mukhydrth~parityagai.
J5 j. A. B. van Buitenen, ibid., Introduction, p. 55.
16 ~ri-bhdsya, II. i. 1, pp. 397--402.
~7 ga/lkara, Upadeiasdhasri, critically edited with introduction and indices by Sengaku
Mayeda (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1973), I. 18. 169, p. 174.
18 Ibid. See also verse I. 18. 194.
19 Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings: the Upadeiasdhasff of ~afikara
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), p. 52.
20 Chdndogyopan~ad, Anand~grama Sanskrit Series, no. 14 (Poona: A n a n d ~ r a m a
Press, 1890), VI. ii. 3, p. 305.
21 According to Rfim~nuja, sdmdnddhikaranya is defined as "the application of two
terms to connote one meaning under the aspects of two modifications" (dvayoh
padayoh, prakdradvayamukhenaikdrthanisthatvam ). Cf. R dmdnuja "s Veddrthasamgraha,
verse 65, p. 109.
22 ~ri-bhdsya, I. i. I., p. 110. Cf. Rdmdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, verse 20, pp. 82--
83; verse 65, pp. 108--109.
23 Rdmdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, verse 78, p. 116.
24 ~ri-bhdsya, I. i. 1., p. 113. The word "non-technically" above renders Rfimfinuja's
loka-vyutpattyd, lit. "by popular etymology."
25 ~ri-bhdsya, I. i. 13, p. 198.
26 Taittiriyopanisad, Anandfi~rama Sanskrit Series, no. 12 (Poona: Anandfigrama
Press, 1897), p. 47.
27 ~ri-bhdsya, I. i. 1., p. 59.
28 Brhaddranyakopanisad, II. iii. 6, p. 325.
29 gaflkara, Brhaddranyakopanisadbhdsya, II. iii. 6, p. 327.
30 ~ri-bh6sya, III. ii. 21, pp. 599--600.
3J Ibid. Cf. Rdmdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, verse 38, p. 110.
32 Ibid., p. 600.

Tenri University
Japan