ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA Anna:Tenesa Tranenitens i CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYLA THE ACTING PERSON | ‘ranshated from he Polish by “This deitive tet ofthe work established in collaboration wth the author by B27 ade Ae to D, REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY S181poueery penaey. = THOMAS ey are tt ein a Joo Pa ope, 22 ‘xn teat by Anse Tees Tymenecka cusnarena Perens Trea Si eave Isa 9027 ae in ISnv 90278 cher ag) tte yD Rel Poin Con to en te 1 Pl ition, Ob Cy, Poste Towne Feene: Cusoe "No part te moral tei by hi cot ace ma be ese ae itedinsy frm oy ean esha ‘sing pci ty tn ara seca yc amo rn frm om he spr owSong tates saat ee Col as ier PREFACE [Now that the preset work going to emerge from the lated feadership to which I has s0 far been confined by the orginal Tnngsage of composition. T would tke to preface with several rst of all, audaciows though t may sem in the present day—in which philosophical sinking i not only nourished by, and based pon, history bu in which to “phlosophize™ often means to refect, upon theories about theories the present work canot be seen othe: ‘wie an asa personleffor bythe authr fo disentangle the nieces (t's crucial wate of lis and to clarify the base clements of the Drobleme involved Ihave, indeed, ted to face the major fees themselves concerning fe, nature, abd the existence of the human ting with itiniatins a well a hit privileges iret os they resent themselves to man i is stu to survive while msntinng {he dignity ofthe human being: man who sets mse gos ad stves| to accomplish them, and who i tor apart between hv ll 00 limited option and his highest sprains (ost hse free "Tse supe of the human being ae elected by the stgaes of tmeuuthorhimsllwho han attemptedin the present work fo vrayethe bjcent apparatus of man's operations at may lead iter Yo hi ‘ctones or tis defeats onl as sich should the present work be seen May i consbute to this disentancing ofthe conflicting fs facing Iman which ore crucial for man’s owa carication of his existence and ‘Becton of his conduct ‘Our approach rus aso courte to another trend of modern philoso phy, Since Descartes, knowledge about man and ht word has bee Kaentifed with the cognitive function ar if only fn coenon, 20d ‘specially tough aowedge of himself could man manifest his nate Sind is prerogative: And yet in veal. does mam reveal Rimsll “inking”, rather, inthe actual. acting of his existence? in observing, lnterpetig. speculating, or reasoning (which are change thie, even flexible insofar as they ate acs, and often fete when Confronted with the face of reais) orn he confrontation tel whenbe has to take an ative stand upon sues requiring vial decisions and faving vital consequences and fepereusion Jn fc. i 8 reversing ‘he post Cartesian atitude toward man that we undertake our tod 99 approaching him though ston. “Considering the enormous spread of sues confronting the piso: per who sceks new approach othe human bsingand who atergts © "pp ie isonly ara tat our work must a i poi be kee. We ate perfectly aware ofboth pst and present erature sharing nS spproach, butt appear simpeatve to undertake tin our wm ea. ‘Granted the author's acqlaitance with wditionl_ Aristotelian ‘outs ii homever the work of Max Scheley tat bus Deena ealot Jntuence upon hs tet Jo my" vera! conception of he perros envisaged through the mechanisms of his operative stems an their ‘aiations, as presented Ree, may indeed be seen the Sehelenan foundation studied in my previous work Fst of alli Sele’ value theory that comes ito question. Howeve, in ou tines when the diferention of sues concerning rman his reached is pesk- introducing the most artical cleavages Into the heat ofthe sues themselves i the nity of te human a seems imperative to Avestpste I fact, im spite of the findamemal Scbleian, and Tor that matter Pnerlypeomeno™ logial lly conducive tothe coenton of the complete man hs ‘ty ti, ax ella its primordial manifestation, are stl ming the present-day philosophical conception of man” whereas in tal tional Artotetian thought twas the very concecon of the "naman SCC" which was se as the mifstton of man's iy a8 well 37 Source. J! seme ther tac by introducing here this approach to man ‘rough ction me may Ved the eceseary sles nt the Ua ofthe ‘human being ‘Andi certainly not necessary to emphasize the importance of 38 inquiry iat the unifying factors of tan forthe person doy culo pon if. saniy, ete an tel prospect. ‘One more pot mest be mentioned nthe lapse f time between its frst appearafce inthe Polish langue and the present version ofthis ‘work nt only the authors prtlpation ia the pifmophical fe, but ‘eo s numetoye seis of phlosopica dictesons hare contoted tm reer previo on many pias. There were Rist dncussion with ‘number of Polish phiosopher (publahed in Anelote Cracoiesla 1973/70). Those with Proearor AnsaTeresaTymlehiecka of Boston however wer te most iptnt othe presen polation They tive aed tothe ciety af stan ence Sa steely oa nroved petenaie leer AT Tyme hovne commented become th pnp ior a he mort ts moped some ching whch hv bts ncaa i Scie nro mo fa pal fests Ph aso plese that the Sefton f hs bok eas we Steed Anais Hesrine Sees ‘des ht ot esata Theo thk the wana Me Anite otek, who hia stented mot Piper ant a et ‘tvtn an te tenet hehe acu Fete ae English language. “ "he , 2 ey Fie ee Facsimile of the Handwriten Draft of the Author's Preface ser Caer anne fi aaln , Poms Hoggaad any baal Coaucds Urerimn 0 py ehowrah pares “arch I Tie ator i‘ thowe atonal personal tober whch only he cout Debs P ted C4 Fy wranetirlng’ he mates but ne thse touches ae of oecestty msn no we re denpelavig F etenatilyn PAC 0h ‘ing np. san Egish ana ofthe oral ett the face TD He aac or So ae reproducing in foul the fest ahd ast paper of that pale Capers brim ‘ onan rt cece poli mermsas tam isa olf linen fobteTinap ancepe porta OE “AG tae aha 8 Pare oe Epon Ae cle rneang hot Uaageoat hcepastans meade sal nee a ela beset d | ioe a ee promsee saoed ems hfe fis meaty Cote ber pack poste al de he, Selecdarn » porstte voy tte Py tyke to otal, teSopot, A ln Pty eae Le Soa tan Morfininp ok tackatet Oh reread Zi Tn taf 1 hay agth back wot epee a IBY Cree Ny say, te Bet Tog pon © othe! gta ta Pell ale Letye pnia Translation of Handwritten Draft of the Author's Preface 1 consider it my ty to ten to Professor AT. Tymieieeka nt only aks for hernia ie publishing my wort The Acting iso with some explanation. [think tha is explanation shout constitute a preface to the English/Americas edition of The “Aetng Peron and shoul precede the Watson ofthe preface in the Patch eto, “The concept of he acting person which am preventing wasbors rom iy previous works especialy rom my analyiofM-Schelraboveal [this Werth AS ts Known, Scher Bult hs concept of materiale Werehi with te thousht of challenging the arora etic of pre form, or ruber of pure duly, which 2 Kans hettge,domiaated toughout the ninetenth century See's rie, itespectiveyof| hic soholary relations with Huser followed the Hae that had Been ‘harted hy the master of phenomenology am the foundation of the pin ‘ple snc sum Gegenstand. Te baste controversy condcte nthe ardtha whic objective iter oot the problem of Immoral), present the pablem ofthe person or ofthe human being te» pron, hete the pre-Cartesin pilosophy and above all the heritage of [Aristotle and, amore the Catholic school of thought of St. Thome ‘Aquinas has provoked me to undertake an attempts reiterprting ‘erin formulations proper fo his whole phitosophy. The fist question (Ceraiatvasery poor staden was the ques ‘between tion as inerpreted bythe atonal ethic afar humandthe action as an experience. Thi 2nd other similar uestins ed me ‘sradally to a more sfnthetie formulation ia th frm of the preset The autor ofthe goment sty owes evrything to the systems of ‘metaphysis of anthropology, and of AnstoelanThomistic ethics on ‘he one hand, and 10 phenomenology, above al in Schele' gtr ‘retain, aed though Seheler'sertiqu ase to Kant onthe ofherhand ‘Athesame time am individual tempt hasbeen undertaken teaching ‘his reality which the man person at seen through his tons, thank the efor, Proferae AT Tymieniecka, who, Buied by ‘nt excellent Knowledge ofthe phlosophic environment af the West, fave to my text ite Bal shape, In comparison With the fst and only Polaheiton the text now pubshedin Analecta Huszelana comet {truer of changes, slough the basic concept of he Work has remained unaltered. Footnotes, which re aking inthe Polish edition, ave bees introduced they parialy select the debate which he author The Acting Person cried on whi ropa forhis formation ofthe oncen of the “acting person.” Perhaps, the reader, afer having ‘routed al objections that may be put forward from the point of ‘ew ofthe spend precision and inner ogi of piosophial ystems, wil accept something trom my Droadened discovery ofthe person "rough his ations In this the authog ses a tur foward the mast Interesting “thing tell curck 2um Gpenstend) which Is precisely ‘he human being as subject. Wate in Rome, Marck 1977 (Ea) "steno Me Daemm) TABLE OF CONTENTS inTRopucTION 1. The Experience of Man 2 Cogito ofthe Person Rests oa the Experience of Man 3. The Stages of Comprchending and te Cites of 4 The Concepon of Person and Action to Be Prevented in This Study PART ONE: CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICACY 1. The Historical Wealth ofthe Expression “Human Act 2 The Attempt to Discern Consciousness the Human Ast 3. Consciousness and Seif Keowee 4 The Twofold Functie of Conscoweness andthe Experince of Subjetivenese 5. The Emotionaization of Comslousnest 6. Subjectivy aod Subjectviam 2s * gee1. The Basic Conceptions and Diferentaions of Homan Dynamism 2. The Definition of ticaey 5. The Synthesis of Etcacy and Subjectveness. The Person ssa Base Ontological Structure 44 The Person and Nature: Ther Opposition o Iteration? 5. Nature asthe Basis forthe Dynamic Coneion of the Person 6 Poteniity and ts Relation to Consiousness 7. The Relation of Potetiality 9 Consciousness Expressed by Subconsciousess 4. Manin Becoming: The Manifestation of Freedom in the Dynami of the Man-Subject, PART TWO: THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE PERSON INTHE ACTION. 1. The Fundamentals ofthe Personal Stuctre of Se 2. Au Attemot to Interpret he Integral Dysamise of the Wil 5, Free Wis the Bass ofthe Transcendence of the Acting “ ‘5. Decision Inthe Pocus ofthe Activites of Free Will {6 Responsibility inthe Ace of Wil Modvation and Response 7. The Moment of “Truth shout Good" asthe Basis forthe ‘Acting Person's Perception and Transcendence 4. The Copntve Experience of Values a the Condition of hole and Decision 9. The Creative Roe of Inston Is Unimiished by the Judgment of Valuer 10 8 Bs wo 1. Pecfoeming an Action Brings Persona Fullent w 2. The Reliance of Sel Fulliment onthe Conscience is 3 Consiene Depends on Truthiness Iss 44 The Obligation to Seok Self Fuflinent ts 5. Responsibility 6 { Hlappines and the Person's Transcendence inthe Action 174 41. The Transcendence ofthe Person and the Spiralty of Man v9 {The Unity and Compleity of the Man-Person 18 PART THREE: THE INTEGRATION OF THE PERSON, IN THE ACTION CHAPTER FIVE / INTEGRATION ANDTHE SOMA 19 1. The Fundamentals ofthe Peron’ Integration in Aston 169 2 The Iteration nthe Action anifested in Disintepraon 192 4 The Person's Integration the Acton Is the Key tothe Undertaniag of Man's Psychosomatic Unity 196 4& The Imegration and the “Integrity of Mano the Bass of Interacting Pr¥chosomatie Condionings 1 5 The Person and the Body 2 {6 The Seit.Determination ofthe Person andthe Reactivity of te Body 26 17. Retin and Mtion 210 {sting and the Person's Integration athe Action as 1. The Pryche andthe Soma 0 2. AChureterati ofthe Pyche -Emotivity Ey 4: Reelngs and Consciousees athe Experience of the Dy 26 4 Seniiy and Trutfuless| a 5. Desire and Exctment 2 6 *Suiriag Emotion” and Emotivity 28 7. The Emaivity ofthe Subject and the Etincy of the Person 2aA The Emotvty ofthe Subject andthe Experience of Valve 9. Action and Emotion The Integrating Function of Sit 10: Condit and Behavior 1. The Person's Integration ip Action a Relation the Soul Body PART FOUR: PARTICIPATION Introduction othe Concent of Patcipation ‘The Personalise Vale of Action ‘3 More Detaled Defiaiton of Participation” Participation and Community Paricpation and he Common Good “Authen” Atiuder “Nonathente” Attitudes Fellow Member and Neighbor Bepnnnayye 0 a x 20 2 26 = eo Bs os oss EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION ‘The volame which we here present 1a philosophical audience or the frst time in ts deinitve form conttes further vance i an Investigation whick the World Institute for Advanced Phevomeno- logis! Research and Lesening has een conducting under the heading “The Phevomenology of Man and the Human Condition” The theme of ction has een preseat for same tie inthe jin efforts of ut ‘lboratre published in Anolecta Harserana. Fst ran a 30 Sndercurent trough our guest for the loeducile Element nM then rose to prominence in out inguty concerning the basis of the homan condlon bass we losited athe coreation between The Sef and the Other (Analeta, val VI. of which scion ts 2001 {actor In The Human Being ie rion (el. VID) we took further step and eauined, within the perspectives of consciousness, bod. imavination, wil, moral coascience, and cretve. ston, th phenomenoiogaly observable articulations of human atv, te Ing them ia that functional and eistemit web within which each tia being, ee individual and as peson, finds himsel! enmeshed, and Trom which personal, deliberate ation arses a the program of inghry hitherto pursed. We have left sie the transcendental a well atthe eldetic of hetmeneuic spproaches of ‘lassie and curenphenomenolgies, and have focysed om the human beng as individual and ae person. directly and comprehensively. {ma attempt to bring out the various entanglements and nat in 8S fonconing These revealed themselves recut) i the individ cenlzaleustetal expression at am agent thal iS, ah manifest ‘scl action the potent book Cardinal Karol Woitla teats the human being sively “ecting person” He tse 10 cUt trough the web of ‘oumes capris, as i were, that Support persons existence. to ‘each the major arteries, The aparently confused network fo tre mist be dlfereniated sad wai, then Tekin clepilosophical scheme. The ping ai ofthis complex investiation ‘to eldeidate the mature of the specially human Beng insofar as he ‘or she i capable of personal actin: tal interaction with another ters, establishing = life nord both comnts and soci, within ‘hich the fall posabllies of human existence ca be relze. Tn bis tempt to formute adequately the inttive glimpses tthered along the fortous path where ssh subject leads, the thor leaves aside historical references, polemic, and conceptiat Conventions, His passionate faithfulness tothe “state of things ‘hemselve— worthy of Max Scheer, through whom he eal It ited Aimset into the phenomenological racalinm of intuitively trsping "things in themelver"=bringy thie extremely perso It ‘entation within the Bld of phenomenology. Indeed, his ot ll {tnuine phosophical rection thoughout history arisen through this ‘Sime radical Baeity to inttive perception? "To the tnent of phenomensogy proper, my satements may appear surprising. Not without ease, either transcendent! pene italyss, which focuses upon the genesis of human comsicusness Constiive ofthe Ifesmord not eee analysis the sroctares of ity a8 such, bas approached human agency directly. Human which cares the fiat nd enue Te seCONd, escapes the Smmediacy ofthe inspection practiced by both In his own approach, the author traces the Inspiration of phenomenslgia! iuition back {trough Brentano ll he way to Arist: andthe putl¥ descriptive mays of the given “of things in themselves eons the explana: tion oftheir causl-esltntl network (Did not Eapen Fink eady mphasize that within the broad scape af phenomenlog! pio by. descriptive analysis cannot be but the bass pilosopicl Feeonstucton”) Hence the pitre of the hun agent and of hua gency which emerges inthis study fe description and explanation, toon of retsoning as well at dst intton Cardinal Wojtyla i well knowa tothe readers of Analecta Hasse. Tiana. They doubts recall is coming contribution to Ur debates snd explorations. His unbiased fection on specifi issues, lending “the modern sith the ancien,” harmonies wth ou efoto steer & nile course between the extemer of contemporary peilosophical thought. On the one hand, does not even the greatest ingeiousses mount to nothing more than breaking down doors steady open lanorescontemptoousy the aquisions of past genius? At the other fem, dome ever stun the level of "the state of things Themselves Awe eteraly dwell upon history ax supposedly aid bare by the polemical dinsevson of concepts? Thowgh varied philosophers and ends of thought ~ Aristo, Aquinas, Kant contemporary philosophies of existence appear 98 ie Counc of the book. the spec atten iter er weawat dhcrao Sa satncenioa eset Heveiihs blatant as aaa eee ee ete yen Govemeeenrrtetecmmece TDi a Lie ac “The author steses that hit study is strictly antropolopical, not hice By means of a "onfolopcs hermeneutics” it probes the functional dyeamisms integrated by the “acting person." No mere rent of circumstances, conditioned and engulfed by his soci tlie, the human agent alone, chrough se possesion and set overnane, cat fashion a sell fe worth Iving nits emphasis on| {he communal condition of man Bt atthe same ime on the rd Ie rancendence of the human perso with respect othe cutent of Soci ife the book counteract the deviant, reductive tendencies We fave noted, so prevalent i contemporary philosophy and sie Tris however evident that sich a tad, though anthropologicalslko has sonificance for ethics and in particular forthe origin and foundation of moral dgment. The solvent nluence of contemporary ‘movements deterministic. behaviorist, utilitarian: in psycholoey. Dsschosnalysss and cloewhere it wellknown. And phenomenolosy. ‘eapte ts masive nvestgation of the human subject, has provided ove, valid foundation. Yet Kant was right in viewing. moral Jr nea Hoot ting together crucl stues of epistemoloy. ‘ntaogy, cosmology. and metaphysis. The present sty goes st Tendencies and strvings, i reveals his status in the world, the Incas freedom and of human ulliment. There canbe no dub ‘The Acting Person shows tan conliuting Nell through mo idement and corespondng ction ‘The pretent volume i essentially the English translation of the book seriten abd published in Posh under the tie Osobassy. Thiet ‘ersion eas printed fom an orignal draft before th author had the Spportniy to give st more careflstention and t ei hime or publication. Consequently forthe El dian it hs en necer ry to subject the work to the sort of caefel sruiny customary for ‘Scholarly publications and fo reve i extensively. The revision Work hasbeen tecompished in a calaboration between the autor aed the fdtor Asthe author stats in ix preface he brought othe revision ne Feflction, new insights and ae organization of bis thought A st of Fefereces added by him, which were missing in he oil eon, 8 tll rhe division of the entire work into sections show the Jeph of Thereoewed reetion tht he has brought tothitusk. ALthe same tine, the editor went through the species of philosophical expression an Sie, proposing thorough cmeedatons forthe author's approval, The Jectivity by Participation brings us to a diferent dimension of the txperience of “manacts” «dimension that ts absolutely necessary to noe but whose more complete analysis we shall nol undertake The Significance of Personalise Problems ‘The argumentation and analyses consid inthis study rect the tremendous signicance that personlisti roblems have today. Theit ‘ial impor inthe lives ofall men ar wel as of the whole, slay’ Expanding, human family i undenishe.Ceasless speculations about the various ends in the development of mankind™for example, the Suantiaive tpects of development, the progres of culture and Slvliaion with all the resulting iequalies and their dramatic onsequences~are a portal impulse forthe philosophy of the person. We cannot help feeling. however, thatthe magnitude of fopntve eters spent in all dzeclns i out of propertion tothe ‘lots and achievements actualy conceited on man himself Tt Imay be not merely a question concerning the cognitive efforts ad sccomplishments, which we know to be enormous and incresinly ‘comprehensive. Perhaps the problem consist of the fact that mas i Sl awaiting new and profound analysis of himself, or rather, what is much more importants an eversew synthesis and thi mot easy tw atin. Having conquered so many secrets of ature the conqueror himself must have his own mysteries ceaselessly unraveled anew In2 iwrnapverion the absence of a defisitve analysis, man myst forever ste for ew =a more maure- expression of his nate Moreover, as already noted, man ip the Mest, closest, and most frequent object af experience, and 80 he I in danger of Becoming son and commonplace; he risks becoming too ordinary even for mse. I ncestcy tha hie he avoided and was prestely de tothe need to oppose the Jomptation of fling nt the rt of abit ‘hth siady ote conceived. I was bore ot ofthat wonderment fhe human being which se we now, Hots the Sst cognitive Impulse As function of the mind this wonderment whichis 0% to be confused with admiaton. albeit they ave something in ‘common ~anifests sellin act of quesons and then ina et of Snswers and solution. In this way not only Is am inquiry Cour own inquiry) nated in strain of thoughts about min, he adion ‘one of aa'sfundumenta! read reovivessttenon. Man shold nok fates proper pace im the wor that he has shaped himeel” “The problem consists incoming to ips with man reality at the most propitious point the pot thats indicated bythe experience of than and which man caneot abandon without 4 esing of having [bandoned imei. In embarking upon this Work the autor is fll Aware that there afe many who have aeady explored or wil explore the domuny of human experience, The reader bibl? wil renly recogaiz all he influences and borrowings ia ths work infivences which form part of man's grea! philosophical heritage and of which {ny new stay of man mitt one way or another take account thas not been the author's intention to produce historical of ‘even complehenive, systematic study ofthe subject. ee merely bis owe inlvigoal endewor to understand the object af he concern, fn esay in analysis aimed at developing syaetic expression for the conception of person and action. The essence of ch conception bas forts vine objective the understanding ofthe human person for the sake ofthe pereon himself: i thus designed to Fespond tothe ‘fllenge that fr posed by the experence of man as wel at by the ‘xistental probleme of man nthe Sentemporary word” PART ONE CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICACYTHE ACTING PERSON IN THE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS The Act He Traditional Interpretation Before embarking yon 2 discussion of the act and the person iti first necessary to look, however bre nfo a question that has but te semblance of poreiy terminological signieance, I is only man’s ‘eiberete acting that ye clan act of "action." Nothing ele a i ‘cing. aothing tht Is not intended and deliberate deserves to be 50 {ermed. In the Westen phlosophical tation = deliberate action has been Seen asthe actus humans, the human Sc. with he sess Tai on the aspect of punpose and dierateness i isi this wense ‘hat the teem fs used, even if imply, troughout this book, since ‘only man can act purposely and deliberately The expression “actus ‘Rumanus” tue 1 not otly derived from the ver apee— which stables its alec relationship with action and acting because agere Ineans to actor todo bat lu asus, a its traiionally sed im Western philosophy, 2 spocied interpretation of the action, ‘amely, the iaterpretation found inthe philosopher of Arsole and 'SUThomas Aquins. The interpretation i realistic and objctivistic fs well ae metaphysical. issues frm the whole conception of Being, Sad’ more dec fom the conception of potetia-actus, which bas been used by Avstotetians to exfinin the changeable and simul ‘anculy dynamic natre of being Here we are concerned withthe concrete being thats man, with ‘is own proper mode of acting. The specife mode of man's acting is Ireisely the retson why in Scholae philosophy the action it ‘defined as actus human or, more previsey, at act slant Sueh acton i the concretion of the dynamism proper to man, nso 4s ie perfomance fs conformable withthe free wil The fate Indicted bythe stiibulive solaris isthe decisive factor in the inherent essence of action as well at f0F i peprateness from the 22% ‘consciousness AND EFFICACY ‘ting of any other subject that not «person, Inthe ist of the ‘Aviston conception as interpreted bythe Scholtes, the pecuar fipect of the term actus iss close link with » coresponding Potent, This points fo the pleats) substratum of atlization: Explains why actus humana consiere man a he subject who ste less drety, accounts for his potently ar the source of acting ‘The same s secomplished with stil reste precision by the expres lon sctusvoluartus, which points dec tothe power tat serves the dynamic basis im conscious acting the Bais of ction The power in question ie the free wil. The attribute slanarias also tel Ue how the action i accomplished, namely, that Hts voluntary” ‘which menos there nothing interfere withthe ataalintion ofthe Tree wil Action o8 Peculiar othe Person Nevertheless, the term “human act” of “scton” a such contains ‘etn lnterpctaton of seuon a conscious acting, which srl ‘omected withthe philosophy of being. nis own way thi Sater pretation is correc. Ht accounts forthe experiential acts 3 2 whole nd beings out most meaning all that essential in them. In 3 Sease we may even Say no oie interpretation of human action is posibes fort cems theres po conception beter sued for grasping both the thoroughly syaamic nature of human sctions ah their Intimate association withthe human being as a person. I Seems, moreover, that any stem at dealing wih this problem, an) atspt that strives to alti the fll meaning of al essential elements and ‘onstiuve intrelations, must in ope way or another ackno edge {86 philosophical content hidden in the terme "human act” ahd "voluntary ac.” The tame philosophical coment i assumed aso in the atempt undertaken ia this study. Nevertheless, nthe course of four ‘consierstions we shall have to sertinize and unfold these Assumptions farther and feexamine them i thet various aspects. For the moment it slices to say thatthe istovial conception tends to sssume’the human person 4s the source of action! whereas the [pproach of this study 18 from the opposite sige, and aims to bring into full view preciely that which Ir only assumed in the classic Conception of the "human acts for indeed, as ve have pointed out before, action may also serve as a source of knowledge of the uri asrEcr oF consciouswess n person" Action as such-fha is a8 the human ston ought to Be elf in the cognitive atualizatton ofthe potentiality, which takes {or granted is soot But the pote i that of the personal beings that actin sto be interpreted not only asthe human ation but also atthe action of the person. In approaching the person throu his ction: we shall ave to retin tat pilsophial intuition ‘whch appears to be indispensable for the comprehension and the Biilosopical interpretation of any dynamin and thus aso ofthe Synamism of action, that Is, of conscious ectng. Since, then, the {ules and most comprehensive interpretation ofthat damien she ‘only way of bringing int view the whole realty of the perso, the ‘rovnion of such an iattpretation sal be our main objective ‘When so deine, action Is ential a meaning with human action: ‘he noun action i Flated Uo the verbs fo act and todo. “Acton” the sense tuned hee, Is equivalent to the sting of man at 2 person While “human act shows sch ation ass specif manner of| Ecsoming based onthe potent ofthe persona subject the ters {ctor action themselves tel us nothing about Tey sem to denote the same dynamic realty but, n'a way, only a4 phenomenon of tnanifestation rather than ss an onic suctre. It dove not mean, however that they prevent us fiom taining ocess 1 thi trace ‘On the contrary, both acto And conscous ecting tell ts of the ‘Synamism proper to man as a person Iti owing to this iin ontet thatthe) compese all that Is scant by "human act" ap pafenly plosophicel thought has 50 Tar failed to develop # more Fondamental concept for expressing dyeamisen pert from the concept af act Voluntriness as Idleaton of Consciousness By “action” is meant acting consioualy. When ve say “conscious ting" we inl refer to the kindof acting tha sft fo and ‘haracterstc of the will Thus the phrase fo some exten corresponds Go the actur oluntriur of Scholastic phosophy. since any acting Pertaining tothe hum wil must aso be conscious. We etn now ec even mere vividly how condensed isthe meaning of "scion" oF ofthe conesponding “comvcous acing" of everyday speech Init are ‘Contained the ontologies! meanings, which belong Yo the huma act, swell asthe psychological meanings, which are traceable in such™ consclousness ann erricacy sibutves asthe Lata eolunarius oF the English conscious. Hence the potion of action contain n reat wlth of plications, which tril have to be gradually exticated and explicate, Simultaneously Sur explication will gradually disose that realty of the hum persons indeed, tis he object of this sud) to uncover and gray {0 expound ihe notion of action trom the point of view ofthe reali ‘he human person. Tht sim we shal sve Yo neheve step by sep, Keeping in mind the ofzaic integrity of the concrete ation in it relation to the petson. This gradual approach i indeed, the deeet ‘consequence of the very concepion of a8 “aspoct a Sept ever stand for the whole sd may never put iout of view. If bette fra whole, it cears tobe bat sm aspect and unavohday leads to errors inthe conception we form of aay composite rely ‘Bu i precy sucha complex reality tht we Rove inthe ating person, We cannot for © moment forget the existence ofthis com Dlenity and the ensuing epiremalogial principles when we embark Upon the analy ofthe person and bis ation by examining sty the oct of conselouness an second, tit of ca) ‘Is his Analysis Possible and Necestary? The concept of “conscious acting” brings ws to emsae the aspect of ‘consciousness in an ation but does ot precise identify it ts eat necessary to recognize the diflernce tween conscious Acting and the conciousness of acti: the aspect of consciousness wll hen ‘come ims view as wer, tet. The dstnction, when we make allows aso gain direct access to comsiounness, hun enabling US 0 examine iin greater deta though obviously we must continve 10 ke account of the fonction which t performs in he acting a wel 2 the whole existence of the petson. For man not ony acts com Sciously, but asa has the Conseiowness that he is acting and even that he is acting consciously. This in parent ie the fact th “conscious” and “consciousness” have two diferent application: one Is used atibutvey, when reference is made to conseous acing: the ‘her is employed ar'a noe, which maybe the subjec, when the Feference i t0 the consclousness of acting. Our discussion will Inv rw ASPECT OF conscrouswess » henceforth concentrate on the consciousness of acting and con Sequently on the consciousness ofthe acting person; ence our ain ‘willbe disclose itr relatonsip withthe person and the ection. Is ‘only inthis connection tat consciousbess gs sch wil he considered ‘When, on the other hand, we speak of conscious acting without stressing the consioumnest of acting then we pont onl to actin, {o is constiuive feature that proceeds trom cognition. What implied here is the Kind of cognition that makes the action also voluntary, which means that tis performed according othe wil for ‘oentve objectivation fy assumed in te coreetfonetoning of the Srl IC ow becomes clear why the expression “eonsciousscting ‘Says nothing directly of the consciousness of acting. I iy however, possible and even neceiary to discern, in that dynamic. whole, Consciousness a uch, and to examine ita apecal aspect. ince We Shall be concemed throughout ths sudy with conslows acting on ‘xamiaton of the consciousness of sting, which he these scapes, may vow ew it onthe Whole dyn ten of person and ection, 'A thi point the question may, a¢ even shoud be asked why the aspect of consciousness sensed im he frst chapter, that. why the discuss of the consciousness af acting precedes the discon ‘of effency, though I is eleacy that makes of concious sting the ction ofthe person. Why in oor akayas do we frat consis What is Sccondary and not what is fundamental in our conception of tion? “The quewion cannot be answered in sdvance; x possibly fll and sailed explanation wil emerge only nthe cours of ou aque. At ny rate we fist undertake a anaiyis ofthe conslournes of Acting, we sal be better able to dislwe the eround forthe esas ‘of efcacy to extend si were, the range ofthe analysand at the Sametime to draw in sharper contour the image of action as the Synamism which best expreses the human person a such. Needless to ty, even when considered ina position of priory, the analysis of onscousness refers also to eficacy ~as well ast the whole human Synamism and permanently presupposes II do not intend to enter here into an analysis of consciousness as soc and in ie, bu aly ins strtassocation with the dynamism and eMieacy of the human being, jst ay inthe real of the human experince the conscour est of acing is sticly associated with acting consiouly. The ‘ngling ou of consiourness tea separate objet Of lavetigatin ir0 consciousness AND EFFICACY only a methodical operation: iti ke taking teem out of brackets fonder thereby to gain a beter understanding of what remains bracketed. That is precsely the reason why inthe eo his chapter ‘mention is mace na of consciousness alone Bt ofthe person ad his ing in the atpect of conscousnese ‘ow fs Consciousness Implied nthe Human Act? “The traditional interpretation of action 86 ims ct pies con sciousness in the sense carer fined as atebutive: human, i ceauivalent to concious acting Its inthis tense that conscowaness Jno to speak, completely merged in the soluntartm, inthe 8 amism of the hurman wil, This interpretation neither isltes nor develops the aspect of consciousness. But conscious a5 rich, ‘consciousness in the substantval and subjective sense, because Bermeates deep into the whole person-eton relation and Bectse in Suet ii an important aspect ofthis relation, may be perceived by lise in Conscious acting ists aepect that not oaly reflec the existence ofthe person sv wall x his ations, but aso feshions them ina specie: manner. Lec us note, however, that although the Uadiionl conception of human act this aspect was aot ently iscegarded, ts presentation was vague, and, at were, only ipled “The traditional conception of actu humanity was in fast a8 we lteady remarked, a tibutary. not ony of an epistemological reali ‘ic postion, bur eho of 4 metaphysical standpoint. I conceived fontciousness a5 something that wat Incorporated and subordinate, iit was dissolved in man's actions and in his Bing the being ‘he rational mature; though man exited und acted conscious tas ‘notin consciousness that his being and acting had thei speci aii, Inthis connection we have to keepin mind that our own tan on that suestion Is also clay against ny tendency to abut absolte Steileance to consciousness. We Want, however, to bring Sut and, 30 To speak, fo expose the fact that conciousness sonstutes a specie tnd unique aspect ia human action. Whereas inthe Scholstc ap- proach, the aspect of consciousness was onthe ne hand only implied land, av it were, hiden in “rationality” this refers tothe deiitons homo est animal rationale and persona est rtionals natura te std substantia onthe other and it was towaine! i the will (understood as appetitus rationals) and expressed by volunariag. ‘The tak set out mths investigation io po farther and to exhib Consciousness aan intrinsic and consti aspect ofthe dynamic Structure, thai of he acting person Tnded, man not only sts consciously, but hei alo aware af bath the act sat he is acting andthe fact hat is he who acting hence he-has the awareness of the eton a wells of the person in thei the renal of thse et.u CconscIOUSNESS AND BFHICACY necessary nevertheless to note that he sum or eslant of the acts of consciousness determines the actual state of consciousness “The subject ofthis state however, fe not consciousness self But the human beings of whom we righ) may say that he for i not Seonacius" that he has ful or limited. consciousness, and 0 on Consciousness ist docs not ist athe “substanve™ subject of fhe ace of consiournes: i exists neither a6 an independent factor tor aba faculty A fll discussion ofthe arguments in support of hs thesis isthe tak of philosophical psychology oe anthropology and is beyond the scope of the prerentenguty. Nevertcess. from what Mov already sid of the natre ofthe consciousness iti lat that ti tee disoved ints own acts and in their specie character of “Seing mare" and though thi specibe character Is connected with the mioring faction fis diferent thing from connie objec- tivation. Indeed ti wot only cognitively that man esters ito the ‘word of other men and objects and even discovers himself there 8 ‘Soe of them: he hs also a hit porsesston all this world in the uae imvored by consciousness, whichis factor im hi innermost, most pena life. For consciousness ot only reflects but alse interionzs Iris own specie manner what i maerors, thus encapsulating oF "turing iin the person's eg. Here, however, we cme to another nd supposedly » Geeper function of consciousness, which ve shall Inve to discuss separately, We shall them have to answer the question ow this itriorization may be accomplished by the mitroring and Itominating fonctions of consciousness, which we have idntied in the preveding analysis, At any tte, our investigation Brought ws ‘loser to the contiogt aspect of slim and atthe same time of the “conscious aspect of the person. We have found that consciousness of ‘Sion differs from an action conceived ae consisting Ia ecting con Sciouly. Te consclousnese of an ction ha reection, one of the tmany micrrigs, which make up the consciousness of the person, “Thc reflection belongs by is very natre to consciousness and docs not consist inthe objectivtion of either the scion oF the person, tren though i caries within self faithful image ofthe action 2s sell as of the person, notin asrner op consctouswess as 2. cONscIOUsNESS AND SELF-KWOWLEDOE, Consclouaness Conditioned by Is Reflecting Function From what we have sid so far we sither tat consciousness miors human actions ints own pecullar manger the reflection iia elongs to it~ but doesnot copntvely objective either the scons forthe perch who performs them, or even the whole “universe of he person,” which a one way or another Is compected with man’s being fd acing. Nevertheless, the acts of consciousness well as thelr result aze obviously related to everything tht es beyond them, Sed especially tothe actions performed by the personal ego. Ths ‘elton it extabithed by meant of the consciousness, which Consttued bythe meanings ofthe particular iems of realy ad of {heir interelationships. When we speak ofthe aspect of conscious ness that refee to meanings, and atthe same ime state that con “Glousness a auch bas no power of cognitive objecvaion, we come {othe conclusion thatthe whole of human copniton the power and ‘lourness,Conaclousness self f thus condiloned by tis power fd efcacy itis conditioned, soto speak, by the cognitive poten tialiys which conformably withthe whole Western whilosophial tradition appears as fundamental property ofthe human person. “The power and the eficacy of etve understanding slows t0 corporate them, a5 well asthe relations between them, “ino” oUF ‘consciousness. Fr to “understand” means the same a (0 "arsp” the meaning of tings an ther interelaton. lof al thie ent consciousness the whole process of active comprehending nether Droceeds nt ris owing to The meanings of things and oftheir Felons afe given to consciousness, st were, fom ouside a the product of knowledge which in turn results from the active com Situion and’ comprehension of the objective reality and is ac- umulsted by man and possesed By him by varlous meats and 10 Aieret degrees. Hence te varios Jepsces of knowledge determine the diferent levels of consiourness. ‘all the forms and Kinds of Knowledge which man acquires and postesct ani which shape his consciousness with respect to is Eontent, that is fiom the side of objective meanings, have 10 beiningished trom what we cll “sel-knowiedge Tre mo need {0 ep hat setAnovicige costs nthe understanding fons Sn sean concerned ith Kind of count asi ho the ‘ject that Tam for mys. We may ad at sbch a8 set {Rueauces' specie cont Yo the dverae moments of sates in then othe ep bcs racer wht omit the rimay un, which comes rom tc Being rooted inthe eg. Hence Ii'ctsupiing tht sttsomlege more th 29 ee Form of howled must fe content with consioustess for #8 subject ‘iter ithe ego. with whch -as wil be fully demonstrated inthe ‘ure ot futher amalyse-conslovsnese remain in an intimate Stbjecve unm, Arts pom selfAnowiedge and comciousess ‘eit vest tpt, ut atte sue tine they devi rom each Sie, snce conslounes fo a the itn of subjective onion ithe ep. docs mot cjectvze the ege or anything else with regard {ots extnce ands acing Ti function I performed by ate of ‘eithaoetedge tbeneiven ef thom that every man ower the ‘Seca somact wi himself mad wih is ston. Because of tional experiences, with all their subjective completeness, are Formed instead of the primitive emotive ocurrences, which, though they indublaly proceed trom the subject. cannot be endued by ontciovsness with the subjective profle appertaining tothe per- onal ego. This isto because the emotioalzation of eonsciosness obstructs or even prevent ts proper atulization Tall hat was sald above no al pronouncements about the value of felings snd emotions forthe inter fe of man ad for morality Should be seen. The dscusion of these querdons fr deferred to “Sbjctsity Inherent inthe Realty ofthe Acting Person ‘The preceding analyses have brought us othe pont when it becomes possible, and even in a way necessary, to lscriminate clearly be teen man's “subjectivity” which we re here considering together withthe analysis of consciousness—and “subjectivisn” a8 9 mental Sititude. To have shown the subjectivity of the human person 5 fundamental fr thereat position of this stody. Indeed, man has appeared in our analysis ux the subject and the asthe abject that ‘experiencing himscll That i the ground oa which the dynamic Felson, o rather itertlain,batween the person andthe scion ‘Scualind. The fale to recognize mans subjectivity would deprive tr of the level on which eam be prasped all the aspects of this imerelation, The aspect of consciousness has an essential sgn Seance for asserting man's subjectivity, beeabe it Ix conslour ress tht allows man To experience himself aw the subject He Cxperiences himself sx such and therefore he “i the subject in the Stnclly experiential sense. Here the understanding springs directly from the experience without any intermediate reps, without any fecourse to argument. He alto experiences his aston st ate of ‘hich he himelf the agent This efeaey, which we shall dtcuss fully ia the next chapter is made evident by experence and i en ty us from the aspect of contiownest. Ths in onder fo eras fcacy a0 flly experint) Satu, it ncessiry to come lose fxperence at well ro man’s subjectivity, which ithe propet found of experience. Viewing subjectivity solely ffom the metaphy= cal standpoint and stating that man a. type of Being consttes the tra subject of existing apd acting. autonomous individual hens, sve abstract to a large extent from what is the s00tce of ou ‘sualization, the soutee of experience. ts far etter, therefore 0 try to coordinate and join together the two aspects, the aspect of| being (ma, person) with the aepct of consciousness: the aspect of cs (ating and ation) with the aspect of experience ‘This important not only for methodolopel reasons, which were slready discesed in the introduction, bu als forthe take of our fubject matter. We made this poi a moment ago whea aseting that ‘without outlining a possibly" complete explanation of man's sub- Jectivty it would be impossible to grasp the fll depth ofthe dymamic Interrelation of person and acon. For the iteration is n0t aly mirrored in consciousness, si were reflected in an inet mirror of tans being and sting in dition iis owing to conciousness that iCobtains in its own way its inal, subjective form. The frm is hat of taperence, the eapercnce of action, the experience bad of the Sffcaciousiterelation of person and action, and of the moral valese consciousness ano EFrteacy ‘hat germinates inthis dynamic system, All hese are objective data, bot ata that old the objectivity and reality status only and excunively in the subjectivity of man. Without completely fevealng| this ‘whole, objectively multifarioes composton of those important to stres, however, tht the bias of aubjectviem may also ‘develo in connection witha narow and one-sided Ba of ebectvism, The Diference between Subjctisty and Subjectiism ‘Sebjecivism, a here considered, seems 1o consist at, ina complete epuaton of experience from ation and second, in reducing tothe tmere sats of consciousness and moral valves that at we have faoratively pati perminate in this ation a= well inthe person. What we are speukiog of now was prevouly seen as the “ab: Soluti2aon™ of single aspect The reduction which operates such ‘hsoatization of the experiential sepect is characteristic of the Specie mental stitudeiberent in subjocivism and, more distant perspective iniealsm.Tadubtabl, consciousness i that aspect of| tan whih nde el to being able but he ese Ding ‘S'maintaied ax merely am atpect~and throughout this chepler we have tried to teat ap such-it serves only to gain better under- Standing of the subjecvty of man. in pariolar of his inner elation to hit own actions. However when conciousness i absautized, face ceases to account forthe subjectivity of man, that ety, Bs being the subject. or fr his actions: andi becomes a subsite for the subject. Sobjectivism conceives conseiournets ite ak = tol and ache subject the subject of experionoes oad valet, 20 far a= ihe domain of moral experience 5 concerned. Unfortantey, ith this approach, experienes and values lore thee ats reality they Sslousness:erse~ percip™ Ulienely consciousness self eases being anything teal: becomes but the subject of @ meaning! network. The path of subjectivsm ends in idealism, ‘We may even say that this tend hes some support in the purely ‘conscious character of the “acts of cansclournese™ It was asered ‘ater that acts of conscioesess as such and consciousness things and beings 2s well 80 theef0 conceived asa cleus of mae Seem av real being. They donot extablish anything inthe Sense of| Dosting is acto! existence: rather they ony miror things. They Eontain only subject matter which ower its objeciveess andi Satu of realty to selfnowledge. The boundary of objcivism and {ealsm in the conception of man-in our case this applies tothe fperson-cton totaly -ls marked out by the asertin f selAno: {dpe In spite of specifclly conscious character, consciousness Interated hy seltnowlede ito the whole ofa real person resin its objective sgniance and thor sls the objective status inthe “ibjectvestrotare of man In this perspective and dv to this stats ‘onsciowsnessappeas but the key tothe subjectivity of man. and 30 tino way can serves the basi forsabjectvis. It owes fle in ‘human subjectivity tots Being the condion of experienc, in which ‘the human ego reveals ite (experiential) a5 she objec. CConcusions Leading tothe Analysis of Human Eficcy Now that we have examined the aspects of consciousness in the ting potson we are ready for the mest step, and we can embark pon an analyse of eflacy. We must retain, however, all the Senicantcorclsions reached 50 fara contbution to ou farther Investigations into the ynamiam proper to the human person, Ths Ciyoamisns and in partcuar the eBlency which forms an essetal tnomest i the dynamic emergence of action from the person, i nt nl rele inthe eld of consciousness but as we have ed 10 ‘Sow heres aso thoroughly pervaded by consciousness. Even if inthe Course of our discussion we placed the aspect of consciousness Somes apart andi lation lke the mathematician who pus a Cxpresion ousie the brackets the eflect aimed at was 1 show uP ‘more sharply the presence of conciousness ia the person's action. Moreover, we could yee beter the specie function performed Consciousners inthe formation of the character subjectivity of the penton the subjectivity from which, because of its vital ‘eMleacy, the actin issues "The features of human eficacy der from those of consciousness though obviously the specify ofthe former cannot be grasped in Iolatton trom the litter Each of them in is own specie manner ‘etermines both perton sod actionAN ANALYSIS OF EFFICACY IN THE LIGHT OF HUMAN DYNAMISM Introductory Remarks onthe Relation of Dynamiem to Conecousnces We now abandon the aspect of consciousness in ord that we may understand Better it foncdons through an analysis of the fact Iman acts. The fact is given ts fet in the experience of "act Because of the experience we ourselves are placed, ei were, right inside this fat. Similarly the fullness of am experience i erent four process of experiencing, and thus by analogy and generalization {isthe basis forthe formation of the human act. For every ep ft human being and every human being Is this that aay other ep Hence, when i is “you.” "he" or “anybody else” who act, their acting can be undestoed on the ground of experiencing oh Own cing. in "Tact" The experience of acting i subjective ia the sense that i Keeps us within the fits ofthe concrete sublectiity of the fctng human ego, without however obscuring the itersobjectvty that is needed Tor the understanding and interpretation of human “The objstvation of the fact of “man-acts™ requires am equally ‘objective presentation of itepal human dynamin. For hs £8 peiemial fact gccurs no in isltion but nthe context of the ere fhuman dynamism and in orsnic relation to The dynamism in question is the total dynamism that i present the complete txperence of man. Not everything belonging tothe human dynamic Is fefeted in consciousness. For instance, practically nothing o the ‘egetative dynamism of the human body i mirrored in consetous: nes. Similarly, no at the factors ofthe human dyoumisan may be consciously experienced by nin. We already had the opportanty t0 ‘mention tiey the lsproportion Between the totahty of man's ie nd he scope or range of his experiences, and We sal urn tothe ‘qveston to expound and complement it. At any rate, itis the Conditions themselves of experience that stem to dicate in the “nalyss ofthe human dynamism the ned to pu sie at present the Sepect of consciousness and the questions besing. only Upon ‘xperiencing. I isnot by secidea that im the Invodaction we is minute the total experince of man from its various aspects of ‘which ts fnersepect as even then soem ax bang closely connected ‘Al the same, Is not only the dymanism proper to man that receives ite hase reflection in conscionrnes; the, human being i ‘areas well ofthe main trends in As dynamism, the awareness being connected aso’ with his expeiencing them. Indeed, be experiences octing and doing as meting essentially diferent fom {he mere happening, that sos, fom what ony takes place or gos ‘on in bim and in what e st man takes no active part. Having the perience ofthe two, objertively diferent strctares of the "man Scie" and “the “somethng-happensin-hin” together with their ‘iferentation inthe fof seperience, provides the evidence, onthe fone hand, ofthe essemial comity of man's consiournes with is being: om the other Sand, the difereniation of experience gives each of these structures that nneress and subjectiveness which in general ‘te owe to consciousness. AI present, however, We are not interested im experiencing x soch ut i thor strtures which to be bjee- tial diferciated require that we rely upon the foal experince of ‘man and sot merely onthe evidence which might be supplied or Conscinosnes. The immanent experience ssl iy insuicieat vith expect to all the procesten, operations, events and lacs of the nan Sod all tht pertains tothe fe ofthe organism. We always have to reach t0 other sources than the merely spontaneous and imstotancoue evidence of consciousness ia and the experiences sStoctated with it we have to supplement continuously from the tute in order to make ovr Knowledge of man inthis dimension a ‘The Jutapotition of “To Act™ and “To Happen” as the Experiential Basis of Activenss and Passleeness, “The two objective strctures, “man-cts” and “something happens Inman,” determine the two fUndamental ines of the dyaamisme CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICACY proper to man. Thee directions are mutually opposite, ofa as man's yotivenesa tha tos, bis acting, Windalied and actualized — Ione while his certain passveness, and passivity, ar in the ther. Ineachof these clement ines of the dynamism proper to man the phenomenon or the content of vnulzaion correspond to the atta Structure, and, conversely, each stuture manifests ise ar the Phenomenon. The acveness andthe pasivenst visualized ia either fine are the constituents ofthe srctures andthe objesive ground for thir fiferensation. The “sctveness" inthe "manact sucture ‘something diferent frm the “passveners” of the “something: Dappens-imman” structure, the two being mutually opposite. In ths ‘opposition the whole stuctre the ope and the othe. takes part” ust we may consider “actvenes” and "passiveness” to be not ‘only mutually opposed at also conditioned ahd determined by each fother, so we cam draw a line separating what we do from what happens in us, though the things om either sie ofthe line wot only difler but also mitualy account fr hemselves. This hs the greatest, Inpornce for understanding. the “mamas” strctore and ub sequently fr is posibly complete interpretation. We may say that ‘man's dons and all that happens in him ae not only ually ‘opposed but also diatncy correlate inthe sense ofa certain parity ‘ofboth facts or both stuetures, For speaking of acting we say "man 1218" and of what takes pace in hin we sa) fe “happens in man,” x9 that in either statement man stands asthe dynamic eject. Man's factions jstas much a the things toe happenin him provide val their own way ~theratzaton ofthe dynamism propet to the humat ‘being. Bodh have thei source in man and thus ifm another aspect we perk of actvenes and passvenert ar of to diferent dvections In the same dynamism, we thereby assert that the direction “rom ‘tins common to both the more s0 a+ i forms part of the Essence of all dynamism, Though activeness and. passiveness ‘iterenate the dymamizn they do not deprive ofthe unity ising fut of the same dynamic subject; this, however, in no way atrs the fer that action ders from the reat ofthe dyamie manifestations of the man-subject, the manifestations tha are inclided in the stegory alo seems necessary to call attention to two diferent forms of, passvenes that are expressed inthe propositions, "Something bap pene im manand "Something happens with man” in ordinary speech ‘hese propositions may vometimes be wed indiscriminately often, a speaking of something happening vit «person, we actually think of ‘that takes place In hi Actually, when speaking of what happens With & person we refer to what the person undetanesYrom outside This isan emily diferent kid of passiveness. Rather thas the aan subject andthe source of what occurs, mah ie then merSy fn object that only undergoes what another subject or even another force i doing with him. Undergoing as such refers to the passveness of ma, the subject, but says nothing, atleast tot doe, of the Subjects inner dymamim, in particular nothing of the dynamism Feferted ton the proposition “Something happens in man.” ‘The Potency and Act Conjugate as Conceptual Homologue of Dynami 1 the traditions approach othe person and to action the dynamism prope o man i itrpreted by analogy t the dynamism of al beings ‘The dymmism of being i the subject of traditional metaphysic, and to metaphysis in particular toi great founder, Aistlle-we owe the conception in which the dynamic nature of being expresiea in philosophical rms. This sno inited tothe concept of act” alone ft inches the conjugate conceptual whole formed by the Pie, potency and act The dalctie at we would say nowadays~con- Jugation ofthe pir makes them so erally refering to each other that when pointing to oe we atthe same time indicate the eter for to grap the correlated meaning of elter, the understanding ofthe fer i indispensable. tis fr this reason that act cannot be under Sood apart fom potency and vice versa The terms potency and at need lite explanation. Potency, the Latin ptentia, maybe defined 33 potently, as something that steady fr but slo i nat Yet as Something that si prepartion, x svalable, and even ready at hand buts not actualy failed. The et, the Latin actus, ithe acai tion of potently, ts flint, “As isto be seen, the meanings of bath concepts are tity conelated and iahere inthe conjugate they form rather tha a each Sf them separately. Their conjutation reveals not only the diferen- tiated, though motullycoseseat stats of existence Bat also the teansons from one tothe other. te these transits that bjee= tive the structure of all 6ynamism inherent in being. im belng 5o ‘CONSCIOUSNESS AND EIICACY ‘such, which consites the proper subject of metaphysis, and a he same tne i every and any being, regardless of the branch of human nowledge hove specife concern constitutes, We may with asice ‘ay tha at thie point metaphysis appears as the intelectual sll ‘herein al the domains of knowledge hve thet sot, Indeed, we 30 tot seem to have as Jet anyother conceptions and anyother langage “Thich would adequately render the dynam essence of change of Alehange whatever occurring any Being ~apart fom thse that We Inve teen endowed with bythe philosophy of potency and act. By means of this conception we can grasp and deseribe precisely any ‘Synumiem that cars in any being Tis to them we so have 10 revert when discussing the dynamism proper to man. "The concept ofthe “at” we may call 50 fr short, once we keep in mind the corelte i implies has primarily an existential signicagce. The two ilerent states of Beng, fo which vorespond to ifeent forms of existence, are nt indeated slly by the tw0 terms (potency and a) extentl to this conception. In ain, the transition fom potency to ac, tered actualaation, sx wantin a the order of existence tindeates some sort of Becoming. no inthe stlute sense~this is possible only when something comes into being out of nonexistence but i the felatve sense that 0 4, becoming Based oma lead existing Being and from within sine structure. The dynamism of being is intrinsically connected With is ‘ery existence nd is also the fans for, and the source of, al the tractus that ay be ditngulshe in i. Every actniaion con tains in sell both the posbiity ant the ack, which is the real flient of the possbiy: hence i contains them not a {wo ates but as two interrlted forms of existence. Actalization sheays implies the fliowing pater of existences: what exist a8 a possiblity may, becase it hus exists, come into existence in an act End conversely, what come ito existence inthe act did so because of| ite previous existence ae potently. In actuation posibity and ct consitte, at Ht wete th two moments or the two phases of foncrte existence joined together int dynamic unity. Moseover, the Sct does not signify solely that the sate of flied potent has fended; it also. sgnies the transton self fom potently 10 fatiment, the very flllment. now becomes evident that thet i seed ofa factor that woul low this Wanstion or fulment to be ‘Sccomplished; this problem, however, we will ot Jscuss at present. ’ ervicacY ITE LOWE OF HUMAN ONANISM 6S ‘The Ambiguity of he Concept of “Act” and Diferentaton ofthe [Experines of Acting and Happening Applying the conception ofthe at to the dynamism that is proper to Iman and coneutes the vil core of the dynamic conjugate of ation find person, we have to asert at this tage ofthe discussion that both essential forms of the human dymaminm haown from ah by experience The structure of "ean-aste” st well se the stictne of “something happensin-man’” constitute the concrete manifestation of the dynamism proper to man. Some oftheir equivalence consist a man Being present in ether a Hs dynamic subject. The equivalence rise from the point of view of the human dynamism set. From this viewpoint, hnving assumed the anlony of being, we may reard ‘man's acting a wel as whut happens in him to be the Fulfilment of 3 pote. The one and theater isn actasiation, the dyna Unity of potentiality and ct. This way of ratping the problem i Justied by the general dynamism of man Italo enables ot te search for and determine those potentlties which ae daherent in man atthe Begining Gf his various acags and of what We may Pethas cll the various happesigs the diferent things that happen him “The siference ofthe activeness-pusivenss type that oocurs be teen the acing of man and the happening in man, the iflerence between dynamic acting and certain dyaaie paseiveness, cannot scure or annul the uma dynamism, whichis inherent one a5 Sell asin the other form. It doesnot obscure in the sense of the phenomenological experience and docs no alia the sense of the eed of relinuc interpretation Essential, the human dynam i Interpreted by the concept ofthe “act.” In this sense the term "at" IMeguately denotes the Syeamie content of ot sisturs: a ci” and "something happensinman™ The _ question renin whether Ii equally adequate to show the specie nature of ton ‘Topi he problem precisely we have to ask wheter the word "at wile designating the dyeamir Of cing. as wel s every ums Synamismactiveness as wells pasiveness has als the eapabiiy ‘of reveaing the whole specie nate of ation‘The Eaperenc of Eficacy andthe Diferentation ofthe Experiences (of Acting and Happening A distinction may be drawn between human act and act of man. In this way action ie ditnguthed trom all the other ctalzationt {aking place in man (ct of man) by means ofthe atbutve human. Te seems, however, that this distinction his a merely verbal ‘gnience and ervey to accentuate rather than {0 expan the Ailerence. For human acto, equvalenty. "human acting.” Is so an ect of man. Hence, itis Rist necessary 10 demonstrate Why Spd when the act of man not human acting: fr only then wil be possible to understand why human acting lone ithe acting prope ‘man, that it alone coresponds to what actaly is contained fn the sroctre of "manacte” We shill now endeavor to find such a ‘explanation whe adhering to ou inital poston sr defined above “Ths, the starting pont in eur arBument wil be the experiential siterence that is dixcenble in the tomy of man's dynamin between man's acting and what happens In mn Am examination of fhe fats dislowes that isthe moment of eficacy that determines this fundamental diference In this case the moment of efcec) i bbe understood as the having of the experience of “being the ato ‘his experience discriminates man's scung from everything that smerly happens in him. Tt also explains the dynamic cntraposition of fete and retires, in which stiveness and pasrivenese ate dy Unety manifest. When acting Ihave the experience of yl the gent responsible for this particular form of the dynamiation of Imysef as the subject. When theres something happening in, then {he dynamism is imparted without the effcscous participation Sf my go. This preclely the Feson why we speak ofthe facts of the later kind af of something that happens inna, indicating thereby that then the dynamism ts mot accompanied by efficacy, by the ‘flcacious particpation of an. 1 Thus that i the dynamism of tan thre sppears the essen diference arising trom having the Experience of effeacy” On the one hand, there that form of the human dynamism és which man Rimsci is he agent that i os he {ete conscus cause of his ows causation; this form we grasp by the exeesion, "mam ets” On the other had thee is that frm of ’ uma dynamism in which man is aot aware of his efcay and docs not experience it: this we express by “Something happens in man.” ‘The contaposition of acting and happening, of nclivenes and passvenes rings forth stil another contraption that arises fom having, or at having. the experience ot eens. Onjetiveefeacy i the correlate ofthe experience of efcacy, for having this experience fopens t0 oor ing the structure of the eeacious eyo. But not ing the expeicace of effcacy—when ‘he eg0 does not efi acously prtciate in all that only happens ip man~is. by no imeane equtvalet tothe abience of objective causation, When some: thing happens. when an ane change takes place inrman, mus ave ‘eatee, Experience, in partic fhe iner experience oly supplies the evidence that the ego not the cause in the manne that ra a etn in acing ‘The Experience of Eficacy ond the Causal Releton of Person und We now sce thatthe momento efcay, which i present in acting And absent in happening, doc nt at once explain wha fea} is but ‘only points tothe specially dynamic stueture of human ating as Sell as ofthe one who ats. Having the experience of himself as he “pent the ator ditcovers himself tobe a the orig af is acting Tes ‘om tim tat the existence of acting as such depends: in him ft has is origin and he sustains te existence, To be the ease means produce an eect and to sotin is existence, its becoming and is being. Man ir thar in a wholly experiential Way the case of BS sslng. There i between petson and action 2 sensibly experiential, aus relation, which brings the person, tha so say, every concrete man eg, to recognize his action tobe the result of his efeacy: in thir seme he must accept his ctons as his own property and aso, [rimaiybecsuse oftheir mora nature, atthe domi of hs respon: "ity. Both the responsibilty andthe seas of property invest with fapecal quality the causation ielf apd the eMeacy ise of the cing person. The stents ofthe problems of causality. on the one hand, and peychologit, om the ober, oem note that human acting S| fn fact the only complete experience of what has been called by ‘Aristotle “eficient eausation” Without going into the deta of this thesis, we Rave at any rate To accept that prt of Which asserts the« CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICACY special settevidence of man's eficieat causation in acting, the ‘ficient causation of the acing person ‘The Experience of EBicacy end Man's Transcendence of His Acting Eficacy icf ts the relation of cause and effect leads us 10 the ‘bjctve order of Being and existence abd is ths ofan existential fatre, In ths case efacy Is simukancovly an experince, There Teste source ofthe specie empiri slniicance of human cflescy ‘elted with acting For 8 alrendy motioned, the ficacy of man rw him, on te one hand into tht form of is dyramis wich Sst in setng sd om the other, allows him to rema above this Synamism and this acting. In the srctre of manacts” we also fave what may be defined sth immanence of san in is own acting And atthe same time what his toe regarded 3s his transcendence Feluively to this ating. Te moment of effcacy, the experience of ficay. brings forth sto al the transcendence of tan latvely 1 his owe acting Bu then the transcendence proper to the experience had in being the agen of sting passes into the immancnce of the cnpercne of acti 16S: when Tact am wholly engaged In ny Sting int dynamization ot the epo fo which my owe cacy hat Contributed. The one ould at be accomplished without the other. ‘Te “etlacius ego andthe "actag ego" ech tne form 3 namic synihens and a dynamic uni in any particular acon. It the Synthesis and unity of person an action. "Tis unity, however, nether oscars nor solishs the diference. Asin here that we come tothe distinguishing tot in the stvtue of “imamacts the rat that ets off essential from the srr of thing hapensinan.” Beng theses, man ede the sbject i his acting. Whe something happens 0% man but the ‘omBhing” tht stands out she agent mie man emai athe pase sive sbjec He experiences passively his own dynamism, What kes ‘lice in him cannot be, onthe evidence of experience, defied {Eting, even thovgh if stl some sort of sctunzaton of Bis owt Dotemalty, ‘The. term vact" ft as silly existed. phe: ‘omenologialy asi ating or even action Ts teference is ROU Syst ay Sani of th a hat a at eo the man who i the ego has the experience of himself the EPFICACY IN-THE LIGHT OF MUMAN DYNAMISM agent According othe evidence of the intetra experience is then, nd ony then that man performs an action, ‘The Esperence of EBlcacy andthe Diferentstion of Action ou of Various Actisations Every dynamization of man in which hei nt active asthe concrete 50 tha is fo say, he atthe ego, doesnot have the experience of his ‘ficcy we shall cll acteation ‘There activaton whenever some thing happens only i man and the something that happens is darned from the ner dynamism of man hinsel But now the mode othe inet servation is diferent from that which man does, in what hi ction. ‘The term actiaton seems to combine mort adequtely the moment certain passivenes wih the moment of activ, of eta ative ess or, at any rte actualzation- The words much ured in mats seiene, but does nt seem to have Beew applied in the study of the ‘human being, in pte ofits apparent adequacy for defining, snd in = ay even for expliing, the diflvence existing between the fact hat ‘man acts and the fact that something happens in him. Moreover, Teng rooted in everyday specch expresses well the semantic Aiferene and even cntrapostion between t and action. By now the eynamism proper to man sceme lo. have. been sufcintly explained ia the rst approach. This fst approach hes ‘eat with he experiential difereatation of the human dynamism by the fas of acting and the facts of happening which take pltce inthe Iman Being In addition, inthe Sst expercatil approach we hate already been able to discern within the trotae of "mat acl the SpeciBcity of the couse of person and action. It has been Drought ito view by the moment of efieacy, which Is simultaneously the ‘moment ofthe transcendence of the person with retard to hs acting. ‘As the person-acion conjupite occurs owing to this moment of transcendence we shall now consider it separately for & thorough anal Man “Creates” Himself in Action: the Roots of Human Ethos Eeacy and transcendence ting with them a special dependence of acting upon the person. Man isnot ony the agent of his acing, hei nso the creator of Ie es inthe esenceof ecu) tha produces0 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICACY nd mainsing the extence of an effect. On the other hand, the Cssence of creatvenes i t0 shape the created work. In a sense, cing iat ork crested by man. This sharcterstic tat of cing specially evidenced by morally a8 one of i properties (and which we have frequen teered ton thi sto). Morality and cing ifr essentially, but at the same time they are so stcly Sted with eachother that morality haw no real existence spat fom human acting apart from scons. Their esentil separateness does tot obscure their existential elution. The one ad the other are Imost tcl related withthe efeacy of the person, ined, with the ‘heaomenon ‘of the experience had of fie. (AL this. Point Phenomenology seems to ifringebolly upon metaphysics and is eve that ir reliance upon metaphysics is most aweded: for phenoaena themselves ca viualze «ching ley enough, Bu they ‘Ne lncepabie of» sulicent explanation of themselves) i i acting that man forms hs wn moral valve — where contained an slement of the specially human erat then this Slaionally confrms that man, the actor, himself shapes his wcting Sh hie actions" The olf Arsteian problem, whether actions ace the product of the ating man r the pruct i solely the cuward effet of his acting for instance, whether the product the sheet of| baper covered wth writing or the steve plan worked out By the ‘mind supplies uficient evidence tht human efeacy i so £73: {ives Tis eeativenes uses an himself ae i eaw mater Inthe st plan, the humso being forms himsell by te acting. In the. com ttaporition of man a “creator” and man asthe “aw mater” we ‘again discover form, or eather an aspect, ofthe contast between fetiveness and psuiveness, which we have Been tracing hee fom the stare Indeed it ea new arpect rater than new form fr we annot simply and defintely Menti'y man ax the “creator” with Iman acing, ad man asthe "rw mater” with what happens i {he human subject. On the other hand, there cane mo doubt that ction always consist ia overcoming human pasiveness in one Way sranother ‘The moment of crativeaes. which closely accompanies the smorsent of eficacy, the experience of eficacy that sels up the hjective structure of “man-ats” rings Out even more vivily the ‘dominant role of eficacy inthe integral dymamisn of the human ‘eine Eeacy Wel dynamic indeed it coneitates, asi were, the