2010 3

1978

1979
[1]
1980
[2]1984 4 14

*
[1]

[2] 15% 33%

1985 3 1990 2000

export-led growth

FDI

1980

[1]
Selbstnegation

paradigm shift

[1]

2 1972 218

1996 2009

[1]
[2]

25

1991

[1] 1983

30 2010
[2] 2007 3 16 11





: 2007-03-16 12:38:20 2010 1 22 2 1


http://www.sina.com.cn 2010 02 02 07:26

2003

2002 40%

1
100

1996
1996 10 [1]

1997 6 20

1997 7 24
[2]
1059

S-I=X-M X-M
S-I

[1] 2004 32 45
[2] 1996 1997

10


1997 10 [1]
1996

1997 7

1994

1993 5.76 1 1994 8.62 1 [2]

19941997
3.4% [3]1998 1999

8.278~8.277 1

[4] 1998
1

4
1997 7

[1] 2005 276 287

[2]
[3] Zhang Zhichao,2000. Exchange Rate Reform in China: An Experiment in the Real Targets
Approach, the World Economy, Vol. 23, No.8, p1067.
[4] 2004

11


7080
8
9
,

[1]
2000 GDP 1999 7.6%
8.4% 1949 2492 28%
2001 GDP 8.3%
6.7%
1997 2002

1985
1995
1 80 1998 8
148 1 1998 10
110 1
2000 11 2001

[1]
1998 8 21

2004 344 347

12


2001 12 130
1
2001 [1]

2002 1

[2]

2002 GDP -1.3%-0.9%

5.4%2002 4
120 1 2002 12

[3]2003 2

2002 22%2003 40%

69

2003
2001 IT 2002

2002 4

[1] 2001 12 29 2002 1

[2] 2002 1 1

[3] Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro Kawai Time for a switch to global reflation, FT.com site; Dec 01,
2002 2002 10 China exporting
deflation to the world

13


2004

[1]
2002 GDP 9.1% 2001
2121.6 2864 2003
[2]
1994
2003

2003 9

1985

1985
[3]

[1] William Pesek Jr. ,John Snow's China Dreams Meet S&P's Reality, Bloomberg, Sep. 16,2003.
[2]
[3] Hiroshima Yoshikawa, Japans Lost Decade, I-House Press, Tokyo, 2002.

14


40%

[1]

1987

2.5% 1983 5%

[2]

[3]

2~3

2003
2003 7 15
2003 9 15
2003 9-10

[1] 2010
1 21
[2] 1998 7-8
2004 506 524 20 80

[3] Hiroshima Yoshikawa, Japans Lost Decade, I-House Press, Tokyo, 2002.
2001
1995 6

15


2005 1 10 [1]
1998

[2]

[1] 2002 3 2

2004 391
[2] 2006 12

16


20 FDI

/GDP 22.7%

GDP
GDP

19932000
13%

300 400
4000
FDI 1500
3500
FDI

FDI

20 FDI
imbalanced

2003 4032.5

17


2003
2003 10 2004

2004 686.6
1106.6 2063.6 270

2005
2005 7 21

2005 8

2005 10
2005 7 21

200520062007 1608
2533 3718 2004 6099
8188.7 10663.4 15282.5

18


2007 8 9
2007 8
2007 10 11
2008 4 10

3% 2%

[1]

[1]

2004 5-6

19


[1]
[2]

3%
(
)

3%
3%
2004

3%

[3]

[1] 2007 10 11
2008 4 10 2007 8
China's Macroeconomic Situation since 2003 prepared for a meeting sponsored
by the University of Tokyo on the 16th of October,2004China s Macroeconomic Situation and Monetary
PolicyA memo written for Bellagio Group Meeting,January 20-21,2005,Amsterdam Concluding Panel
(transcript, The Fourteenth International Conference, Growth, Integration and Monetary Policy in East
Asia, Bank of Japan May 31,2007, 2007 9-10 2008
[2008 4 17 ]
[2]





[3] 21 2007 5 29

20


[1]

[2]

1993

4%

4%
8% 8% 8%
4% [3]
2005
1981 1990

2002

[1] 2007 10 11
[2]
2007 08 09

[3]
21 2007 12 10

2008 01 03

21


2005 GDP 5.87% 7230 2004

1040 16.64% [1]
GDP
GDP
GDP
/

[2] - Dooley,
Folkerts-Landau and Garber 10 20

[3]

-

90 2006
1
S-I=X-M

[1] BEA2006 3 14
[2] Poole, W. 2005, How dangerous is the US current account deficit?, Economic Policy Lecture
Series, Lindenwood University, St Charles, Missouri, 9 November, <http:// stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/
2005/11_09_05.htm>
[3] Dooley, M. P., Folkerts-Landau, D. and Garber, P. 2003, An essay on the revived Bretton Woods
system, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 9971 Cambridge, Massachusetts.

22


S-I=X-M

S-I=X-M GDP-C-I=X-M
GDP S

1990

S-I=
X-M GDP-C-I=X-M
GDPCIS X-M X M
X-M X-M S-I GDP S-I
80
1994

23


25
25

2006 10
2007 3
-

IMF
[1] -

GDP

1996 1997

[1] IMF

24


capital losses

1
2002

2002

valuation risk
(currency risk)

[1] 2002 3
2276 2006
10000
M.Corden
parking theory [2]

[1] 2002 3 2 2004 391

[2] Corden, W. Max.,"Those Current Account Imbalances: A Skeptical View". Working Perpar No.13/06,
Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series, Melbourne University, August, 2006.

25


FDI

1996 1997

FDI FDI FDI

FDI FDI

FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI

8000
2005 320

FDI 2005
FDI FDI 19%
FDI
[1]

[1]

26


FDI FDI
FDI
FDI
FDI

2005 2005

2005 borrowed
(earned)

sp-ie + sg-ig =if-ca ie ig if
sp sg ca
GDP

sg R&D ig

sp

ie [1]
if

[1]

27


-ca

[1]

[2]

S-I=
X-M

[1] GDP
[2]

28


[1] S-I

S-I X-M
S-I
X-M

21 2007 3 1997
1957 Geoffery Crowther

FDI

FDI

[1] Louis Kuijs HOW WILL CHINAS SAVING-INVESTMENT BALANCE EVOLVE? World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 3958, July 2006 World Bank Office, Beijing, China (EASPR). Email: akuijs@worldbank.org.

29


2005 11.4
10.4

[1]

13
1991 2005 1993

[2]

[1] Kojima Akira,Balance AdjustedThe Japan Journal, July 2006 10-12.

[2] 2005

30


[1]

10~15

10~15

[2] [3]
2006 8 13
1980

1986
M1 50%
,1980

[1]

[2] 2004
[3]
21 2007 8 4 http://www.
jrj.com

31


1987 3720
1987

1994 1980
IT

1986 40 1 1987 29 1
1988 261

2007 8

32


2007 17 2.3

20%
20% 4000 80% 20%

FDI

FDI 5000 20%

22% 1000
10% 500 1690
6000

6000

2003

2007 11 20

33


[1]

QDII
QDII

CIC CIC

chief

[1]

34


staff AEI Phillips Swagel

27%
27% 27%

a cynic
devious attempt

[1]

AEI

2007 8

defaults

[1] Swagel.P.L. 2005 Yuan answers? , AEI On-line, 22 June,http://www.aei.org/publications/

pubID.22747/pub_detail.asp

35


4



GDP
GDP [1]
2008 9 15
11 4


2009 3 13
:


[2]
2009 4
2 T-
bills

70%

SDR

capital losses [3]

[1] 2007 11 20
[2] 2009 03 13
[3] Paul Krugman,China s Dollar Trap, Op-Ed, New York Times, April 2, 2009
2002 3 2 2005 1
10

36


China's Dollar Trap

2.5 US
government securities GSE bonds [1] 2005
1997 1000 2003
7000 2005 1 2007 2
2009
2.4 2010 2011 3

[2] 2002 4
2009 41%

2%~3%

2009 1.42
GDP 9.9% 12 GDP 84% [3]2010
1.56 14 2011

[1] 4000
[2]

[3] Kenneth Roggoff, Global Growth after the Second Great Contraction, PPT slide 26
2010 1 15

37


1.27 GDP 2015

100% [1] 2013 GDP 4%
3.6% 2010 2019 9
1 GDP 5% [2]

2011

Government Accountability OfficeGAO

/ GDP 20 90 GDP
3.2% GAO
2040 GDP
2020 80% [3] GAO
/
2007 52.7 17.5
3.3

[1] GDP 2010 2 1 The

nation s publicly held debt, much of it owed to China and other foreign creditors, by 2020 would equal
77 percent of the gross domestic product, the highest level since 1950. Then the postwar debt was on its
way down; now it is on its way up to unsustainable heights.
[2] Peter Orszag, Discipline, Efficiency, Prosperity, OBM www.whitehouse.gov/omb/, FEBRUARY 26,
2010.
[3] US debt will keep growing even with recovery.

38


[1]
repudiation
1933 41%
the gold clause1971
2009

IMF
Kenneth Rogoff
GDP 90%

[2]
6% GDP 20% [3]

30% 2009
24% [4]

[1] (Peter Schiff)

Why the Meltdown Should Have Surprised No One
hjenglish.com/new/print/97239/
[2] Kenneth Roggoff, Global Growth after the Second Great Contraction, PPT slide 26
2010 1 15
[3] Aizenman, Joshua and Nancy Marion, Using Inflation to Erode the US Public Debt, NBER
Working Paper 15562.
[4] OMB, Analytical Perspectives, ,2010 2 2 70 OMB

39


NIIP

Lawrence Summers
financial balance of terror

2009
3000 5000
8000 1

20 Jacques Rueff

greenback
fiduciary money fiat money

Ponzi game

1980

40


21 2008 10 20
2008 12 12
2009 5-6
2009 4 13

TIPS

10000

1989
40000 10000 40
20

[1]

2007
2009

[1]

41


10

2008

(
)

2008

42


SDR
SDR
(Fred Bergsten) 1970 IMF
(substitution account)

SDR

IMF SDR SDR

IMF

IMF
G20

13

1983

43


[1]

2010

[2]

[3]

ABC

scoring board

[1] 1983 5 22 26

30 2010
[2] 2010 02 03 21:16:37
[3] Samuleson Paul A, Economics, McGraw-Hill, 1980, p8.

44
 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
2010.3

ESSAYS

Witness ImbalancesTwin Surpluses, Renminbi Exchange Rate and the

Dollar Trap
Yu Yongding 7
China has long run current account surplus, owing to its trade encouragement policy and structural
factors. In the mean time, it also runs capital account surplus due to its preferential policy towards FDI
and other attractiveness. Chinas running oftwin surplusesmeans that while importing capital in the
form of FDI and foreign debts with high costs, it exports capital in the form of piling up greenbacks and
US treasuries with low yields or no yields at all. By doing so, China has been suffering massive welfare
losses. To make things worse, China has fallen into a dollar trap.
Chinas twin surpluses are not just a result of the so-called structural imbalances, such as excess
savings. As a matter of fact, to a very large extent, Chinas external imbalances are created by its
growth strategy centered on export promotion and related policies. Policies create path dependence.
The rebalancing of the economic structure is pre-conditional on policy changes. To correct Chinas
imbalances, paradigm shift and policy adjustment admit of no delay.

Challenges and ProspectsUS Economy in the First Year of the Obama

Administration
Lu Feng, Chen Jianqi, Wang Jian, Liu Liu, and Yang Yewei 45
This article examines the policy measures carried out by the US government and the American
stimulus-supported economic recovery in 2009 and analyzes the four challenges facing its attempt to
achieve stable economic recovery and sustainable growth. It emphasizes the in-depth structural
problems that are inevitable for the US economy and, based on current trends and historical data,
argues that the long-term growth of the US economy is likely to decline markedly in the coming years
unless major industrial and technological breakthroughs occurred in a manner particularly to the
advantage of the US. The limit for US policy choices and implications of its economic prospects for
Chinas economic growth and policy adjustment are also briefly discussed.