VII.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT but no provisions were specifically made

for initiatives on the Constitution. This
LEGISLATIVE POWER omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the
A) INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, & Constitution was left to some future law
RECALL as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS.
COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was
intended to include initiative on
Amendment to the Constitution
amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed
covers such initiative.
with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the
Officials by Peoples Initiative The
system of initiative on amendments to the
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
constitution but is unfortunately
the time and dates for signature gathering
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
all over the country, b.) caused the
Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
necessary publication of the said petition
Amendments to this constitution may
in papers of general circulation,
likewise be directly proposed by the
and c.) instructed local election registrars
people through initiative upon a petition of
to assist petitioners and volunteers in
at least twelve per centum of the total
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
number of registered voters, of which
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special
every legislative district must be
civil action for prohibition against the
represented by at least there per centum
Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
of the registered voters therein. . . The
that 1.) the constitutional provision on
Congress shall provide for the
peoples initiative to amend the
implementation of the exercise of this
constitution can only be implemented by
right This provision is obviously not self-
law to be passed by Congress and no
executory as it needs an enabling law to
such law has yet been passed by
be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas,
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides
a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated
for three systems of initiative
without implementing legislation Section
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although
statues and on local legislation. The two
this mode of amending the constitution is
latter forms of initiative were specifically
a mode of amendment which bypasses
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof
Congressional action in the last analysis is
still dependent on Congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of
inititative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation.
The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if
Congress for whatever reason does not
provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been
reversed on November 20, 2006 when
ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735
is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere
minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court
reiterate their position, as
shown by their various opinions
already given when the Decision
herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to
amend the Constitution thru a
peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute
resolution did not become stare
decisis. See discussion here
See also Lambino vs COMELEC.
B) RECALL
SECTION 1.THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF
THEPHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST
OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE
EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE
BYTHE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM.
GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
(237 SCRA 279)
FACTS:
In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of
the municipality of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone(SSEZ)
in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise
known as the Bases Conversion
Development Act of 1992.
May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition
to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye1993. In the said petition, they
set some conditions which they want to
be complied with before they include
their municipality with SSEZ.
Municipality of Morong did not take any
action on the petition within 30 days after
its submission, which prompted the
petitioners resorted to their power of
initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991 whereby they started to
solicit the required number of signatures
to cause the repeal of said resolution.
Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan Morong, wrote a letter to the
Executive Director of COMELEC
requesting the denial of the petition for a
local initiative as it will just promote
divisiveness, counter productive
and futility.
July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved
to deny the petition for local initiative on
the ground that its subject is merely a
resolution and not an ordinance
July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved
to direct Provincial Election Supervisor,
Atty.Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the
authentication of signatures being
gathered by the petitioners
ISSUE:
Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong Bataan the proper subject of an
initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of
initiative can be exercised even what is
questioned is only a resolution and not an
ordinance?)
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC
Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and
SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds
of legislative power:
1.ORIGINAL
- possessed by the sovereign
people
2.DERIVATIVE
- delegated by the sovereign
people to legislative bodies and is
subordinate to the original power of
the people.
One of the lessons the people learned is
the folly of completely surrendering the
power to make laws to the legislature.
Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of
peoples initiative was thus installed which
endows the people with the power to
enact or reject any act or law by congress
or local legislative body.
COMELEC was also empowered to
enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4,
1989, it approved RA no.6735 entitled An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor. Which spelled out
the requirements for the exercise of the
power of initiativeand referendum;
procedure of the local initiative and
referendum; and their limitations. It was
alsointended for the acts to be included as
appropriate subjects of local initiatives.
LOCAL INITIATIVES-
legal process whereby the registered
voters of a local governmentunit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance. It does not, however, deal
withthe subjects or matters that can be
taken up in a local initiative.
The Constitution clearly includes not only
ordinance but resolutions as
appropriatesubjects of a local initiative. An
act includes a resolution. Black defines an
act as "an expressionof will or purpose...it
may denote something done...as a
legislature, including not merely
physicalacts, but also decrees, edicts,
laws, judgments, resolves, awards and
determinations." The lawshould be
construed in harmony with and not
in violation of the Constitution.
Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also
promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated
in Sec 5, Art 1that the power of initiative
may be exercised to amend the
Constitution, or to enact a
nationallegislation, a regional, provincial,
city, municipal or barangay law, resolution
or ordinance.
Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of
1991 does not limit the application of
localinitiatives to ordinances, but to all
subjects or matters which are within the
legal powers of theSanggunians to enact.
Resolution vs. Ordinance
RESOLUTION-
used whenever the legislature wishes to
express an opinion which tohave only a
temporary effect
ORDINANCE-
intended primarily to permanently direct
and control matters applying topersons or
things in general.
Considering the lasting changes that will
be wrought in the social, political, and
economicexistence of the people of
Morong by the inclusion of their
municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical
tohear their voice on the matter via an
initiative.
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC G.R.
No. 136781. October 6, 2000.
Facts:
May 11, 1998, the first election for party-
list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections.
A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen
(13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list
system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's
Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim
[the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up
of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the
two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would
defeat this constitutional provision, for
only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in
theHouse.
Thereafter, nine other party-list
organizations filed their respective
Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on
substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other
party-list organizations in a Manifestation
they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc.,
Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC
Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's
Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total
52 party-list representatives. It held that
"at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent
party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead,
it identified three "elements of the party-
list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be
filled up.
Issue:
How to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be settled by
addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold
requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the
affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?
organizations and coalitions are each
entitled to a party-list seat, because it
glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and
circumventing these statutory provisions,
the COMELEC effectively arrogated unto
itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power
and the discretion to define the mechanics
for the enforcement of the system. The
wisdom and the propriety of these
impositions, absent any clear
transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.
The COMELEC, which is tasked
merely to enforce and administer election-
related laws, cannot simply disregard an
act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of such
act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment
to the law find lobby for its approval and
enactment by the legislature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are

hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed In view of the party-list system
Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET elements per COMELEC
ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The First, "the system was conceived to
proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting enable the marginalized sectors of the
party-list representatives two for APEC Philippine society to be represented in the
and one each for the remaining twelve House of Representatives." Second, "the
(12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. system should represent the broadest
No pronouncement as to costs. SO sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
ORDERED. should encourage [the] multi-party
system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring
Ratio: the two percent threshold requirement of
RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list
In sum, we hold that the groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should
COMELEC gravely abused its have at least one representative."
discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight
(38) herein respondent parties,
In view of to whom should the seats be
given
In the suits, made respondents
together with the COMELEC were the 38
parties, organizations and coalitions that
had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the
House of Representatives. Collectively,
petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of
their parties and organizations, all of
which had obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued
a Status Quo Order directing the
COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from
constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on
any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998
Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this
Court."
In view of the 20% being mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for
the "incompleteness," for ultimately the
voters themselves are the ones who, in
the exercise of their right of suffrage,
determine who and how many should
represent them.
On the contention that a strict
application of the two percent threshold
may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the
prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement
rests in Congress. Our task now, as
should have been the COMELEC's, is not
to find fault in the wisdom of the law
through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can,
as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process.
In view of the 2% threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold,
Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable
to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that
anybody who has two-and-a-half percent
of the votes gets a seat. There are about
20 million who cast their votes in the last
elections. Two-and-a-half percent would
mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide
deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are
talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are
talking about 134,000 families. We believe
that there are many sectors who will be
able to get seats in the Assembly because
many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal.
Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
to ensure meaningful local
representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party
limit
An important consideration in adopting
the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of
representation. Again, we quote
Commissioner Monsod:

"MR. MONSOD: but we also wanted
to avoid the problems of mechanics and
operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is
why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within
the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and
enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional
groups, to earn their seats among the fifty.
. . ."
In view of the method of allocating
additional seats
Having determined that the twenty
percent seat allocation is merely a
ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote
threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the
method of determining how many party-
list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled
to.
In view of the Niemeyer Formula
Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party
would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats
to be allocated by the total number of
votes obtained by that party and dividing
the product by the total number of votes
garnered by all the qualified parties. The
integer portion of the resulting product will
be the number of additional seats that the
party concerned is entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt
suitable for Germany, finds no application
in the Philippine setting, because of our
three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation.
True, both our Congress and the
Bundestag have threshold requirements
two percent for us and five for them.
One half of the German Parliament
is filled up by party-list members. More
important, there are no seat limitations,
because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast,
RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes
a three-seat limit to encourage the
promotion of the multiparty system.
In view of the legal and logical formula
for the Philippines
Step One. Rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for
all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in
the computation of additional seats. The
party receiving the highest number of
votes shall thenceforth be referred to as
the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to
determine the number of seats the first
party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining
the most number of votes.
The Court has previously ruled in
Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a
whole membership of one when it would,
in effect; deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no
party can claim more than what it is
entitled to . . ."
In view of the formula for determining
additional seats for the first party
The only basis given by the law is that
a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were
to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice
the latter's number of seats and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench
mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of
additional seats. Likewise, it would
prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in
an extreme case wherein 18 or more
parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such
scenario, the number of seats to which all
the parties are entitled may exceed the
maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.
However, if the first party received a
significantly higher amount of votes
say, twenty percent to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party
getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first
party.
In view of the formula for additional
seats of other qualified parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve
for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
In view of the 2% threshold rationale
The rationale for the 2% threshold can
thus be synthesized as follows:
1.To avoid a situation where the
candidate will just use the party-list
system as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates
or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in
the elections;
3.To avoid the reserve seat system
by opening up the system;
4.To encourage the marginalized
sectors to organize, work hard, and earn
their seats within the system;
5.To enable sectoral representatives
to rise to the same majesty as that of the
elected representatives in the legislative
body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to
an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the
Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will
actually proliferate political party groups
and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn,
they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of
the party-list system; 16 and
7. To ensure that only those with a
more or less substantial following can be
represented.
The framers of the Constitution knew
that the sectoral groups suffer from major
disadvantages in the competitive election
arena. They sought to remedy this
inequality through an outright
constitutional gift of reserve seats for the
first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter,
they have to earn their seats through
participation in the party-list system.
In view of the 3-seat limit rationale
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to
distribute party-list representation to as
many party groups as possible. According
to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be
allowed to dominate, then the idea of
giving as much as possible to the
marginalized groups may be defeated.
The purpose is to allow as many as
possible of the marginalized groups that
would be entitled to representation to
have a seat in Congress, and to have
enough seats left for those who are way
below the list.
The party-list system of proportional
representation is based on the Niemeyer
formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of the
German Federal Electoral Law, which
provides that, in determining the number
of seats a party is entitled to have in the
Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by
the number of votes obtained by each
party and then the product should be
divided by the sum total of the second
votes obtained by all the parties that have
polled at least 5 percent of the votes.
First, each party receives one seat for
each whole number resulting from the
calculation. The remaining seats are then
allocated in the descending sequence of
the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer
formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941,
11.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all
seats allowed for party-list
representatives, which at present are 52.
The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80
percent district representatives to 20
percent party-list representatives. If in fact
all seats reserved for party-list
representatives are not filled, that is due
to the fact that the law limits parties,
organizations, and coalitions to three (3)
seats each. To maintain this ratio, the
entire number of seats for the party-list
system, after deducting the number of
seats initially distributed to the 2
percenters, must be allocated to them.
I see no legal or logical basis for the
majority's fixation with designating the
highest ranking participant as a "first"
party. This procedure, as admitted by the
majority, assumes that the seats to be
allocated to the qualified parties depend
on the seats of the so-called first party.
In essence, the majority "formula"
amounts simply to the following
prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for
every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the
first ranking party only and (2) with
respect to the rest of the 2 percenters,
give each party one (1) seat, unless the
first ranking party gets at least six percent,
in which case all 2 percenters with at least
one-half of the votes of the first ranking
party should get an extra seat..
The scheme adopted by the majority
will prevent all 2 percenters, which are not
the first ranking party, from obtaining the
maximum number of seats. This is so
because, with their votes being
proportioned against the votes of the first
ranking party, there will never be an
instance where the additional seats of
these parties will be equivalent to 2.
Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941,
11 which contemplates the possibility of
more than one (1) party obtaining the
maximum number of seats allowed by law.
LINDASAN vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Lidasan is a resident of Parang,
Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is
entitled "An Act
theMunicipality of Dianaton
the Province of Lanao del
was passed. Lidasan came to know
later onthat barrios Togaig and Madalum
just mentioned are within the municipality
of Buldon,
of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Lang
kong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,Colodan,
and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel
of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang,also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
[Remarkably, even the Congressman
of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]
Pursuant to this law, COMELEC
proceeded to establish precints forvoter
registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790
be nullified for being unconstitutional because
it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating
Dianaton, it would be including in the territory
thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which
includes barrios located in another province -
Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted
upon the constitutional mandate that "No
bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD:
The baneful effect of the defective title
here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in
the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by
the bill that even a Congressman from
Creating
Cotabato voted for it only to find out later
in
on that it is to
Sur,"
thep r e j u d i c e o f h i s o w n p r o v i n
ce. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against t
h e constitutionality of RA 4790.
Province
RA 7941 the Party list Act (1995)
BANAT V. COMELEC
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the
National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to
proclaim the fullnumber of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of
the legal group of COMELECs national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by theCOMELEC en
banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the resolution
of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full
number of party listrepresentatives provided by
the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in
May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of
seats of each winning party,organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v.COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the
consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for
certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its
decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold
prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat is constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be
allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be
barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a
valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes is
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only
in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats
presents an unwarranted obstacle to thefull
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:1. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.2. The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3)seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in
defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-
list elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by
thevote of 8-7, theCourt decided to continue
the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
ATONG PAGLAOM VS. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings
in Ang Bagong Bayani vs
COMELEC andBANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties
were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily
for not being qualified as representatives
for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition
for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely
followed the guidelines set in the cases
of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded
the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are
as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the
COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate
in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-
list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may
either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-
defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-
defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented
must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or
that represent those who lack well-
defined political constituencies, either
must belong to their respective sectors, or
must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political
parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres
really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to
participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave
weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the
party-list elections in order to develop a
political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the
people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people,
in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that
the party-list system should be reserved
for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized
that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery
unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed
votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-
oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court,
party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that
Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do
not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically
marginalized.
Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec
DOCTRINE:
If a person retains his domicile of
origin for purposes of the residence
requirement, the 1 year period is
irrelevant because wherever he is, he
is a resident of his domicile of origin.
Second, if a person reestablishes a
previously abandoned domicile, the 1
year requirement must be satisfied.
(Bernas book)
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos established her domicile
in Tacloban City, which was her fathers
hometown, in 1938 when she was 8
years old. She pursued her studies
(GS,HS, College) in the aforementioned
city and subsequently taught in the
Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she
went to Manila to work in the House of
Representatives. Two years after, she
married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when
he was still a Congressman in Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter.
In1959, her husband was elected a
Senator and they lived in San Juan,
Rizal where she again registered as a
voter. And in 1965, she lived in the
Malacanang Palace when her husband
became the President. This time, she
registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila. After their exile in Hawaii, she
ran for President in 1992 and indicated
in her CoC that she was a resident and
register voter of San Juan,
MetroManila.2.) Marcos filed her CoC
for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte.3.) The
incumbent Representative, Montejo,
filed for her disqualification alleging
that she did not meet the 1 year
constitutional requirement for
residency.4.) Apparently, she wrote
down in her CoC in item no.8, which
asked for the number of years of
residency, that she had been a resident
for 7 months.5.) Marcos filed an
amended CoC changing 7 months to
since childhood, claiming that it was
an honest misinterpretation that she
thought she was being asked for her
actual and physical presence inTolosa,
and not her domicile.6.) The COMELEC
found the petition for her
disqualification meritorious and
cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it
was clear that Marcos has not complied
with the 1 year residency requirement.
In election cases, the term residence
has always been considered synonymous
with domicile. This is the intention to
reside in the place coupled with the
personal presence.
When she returned after her exile, she
did not choose to go back to Tacloban.
Thus, her animus revertendi (intention
to return) Judge Princess points to
Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is
not sufficient, there must be conduct
indicative of such intention.7.) The
COMELEC denied her motion for
reconsideration but issued are solution
allowing for her proclamation should she
obtain the highest number of votes. On
the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and directed the
suspension of her proclamation.8.)
Marcos found out that she was won by a
landslide in the said elections and
prayed for her proclamation. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner was a resident, for
election purposes, of the First District
of Leyte for a period of one year.
RULING + RATIO:
The case at hand reveals that there is
confusion as to the application
of Domicile and Residence in election
law.
-
Originally, the essential distinction
between residence anddomicile lies in
the fact that residence is the
PHYSICAL presence of a person in a
given area and domicile is where a
person intends to remain or his
permanent residence. A person canonly
have a single domicile.
-
It was ascertained from the intent of
the framers of the1987 Constitution
that residence for election purposes is
synonymous with domicile. It cannot be
contested that the petitioner held
various residences in her lifetime. The
Courts reiterate that an individual does
not lose his domicile even if she has
maintained different residences for
different purposes. None of these
purposes pointed to her intention of
abandoning her domicile of origin. The
Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because
of the ff reasons:1. A minor follows
domicile
of her parents. Tacloban became
Imeldas domicile of origin by operation
of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;2. Domicile of origin is only lost
when there is actual removal or change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of
all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically
gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law
* does not mean the samething in
Political Law. When Imelda married
late President Marcos in1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.*Civil Code kasi sa Art 110:
The husband shall fix the residence of
the family. Sobrang distinguished yung
residence at domicile sa Civil
law.4. Assuming that Imelda gained a
new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only
after the death of Pres.Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country
clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in
her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. Sheeven
kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban,celebrating her
birthdays and other important
milestones.
DISPOSITION:
COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as
the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte
AQUINO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he
was a resident of the aforementioned
district for 10 months. Faced with
a petition for disqualification, he amended
theentry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and
13 days. The Commission on
Elections dismissed the petition on 6
May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a
motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election
later issued an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2
June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for
the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence.
Issue:
Whether residency in the certifi
cate of candidacy actually conno
tes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position
in the electoral district.
Held:
The place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is to
exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that
community
for electoral gain. Aquinos certificat
e of candidacy in a previous (1992)
election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of
San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election.
Aquinos connection to the Second District
of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. The short length of time he
claims to be a resident of Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his
claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not
to acquire a new, residence or domicile
but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified
by the Commission on Elections.
TECSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes
disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his
(Poes) certificate of candidacy by
claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen
despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding
that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court
may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court
which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction on questions regarding
qualification of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications
of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines which the Supreme Court
may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-
President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse
of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the
prevailing fundamental law on
respondents birth, provided that among
the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the
latters death certificate was identified as
a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1870. In the
absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzos citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondents
father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged
as Allans son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by
virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by
the respondents birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the
allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondents citizenship in
view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
LLAMANSARES VS. COMELEC
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May
2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that
she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to
the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and
even afterwards, she has been going to
and fro between US and Philippines. She
was born in 1968, found as newborn
infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 and
was naturalized as American citizen in
2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted
her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In
2010, before assuming her post as an
appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From
then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC
to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that
her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in
her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling
and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified
as a candidate for Presidency. Three
justices, however, abstained to vote on
the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
qualifications of candidates (Read
Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution
provides for the powers and functions of
the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that
only the SET and HRET tribunals have
sole jurisdiction over the election contests,
returns, and qualifications of their
respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC
en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for such
positions, the Constitution is silent. There
is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates
before elections. Such lack of provision
cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds
for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of
procedures would be contrary to the intent
of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it decided on the
qualification issue of Grace as a candidate
in the same case for cancellation of her
COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares
is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read
Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is
considerably a natural-born Filipino. For
that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the
Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical 10-year residency requirement
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact
that she was abandoned as an infant in a Held:
municipality where the population of the Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos requirements of animus manendi coupled
such that there would be more than 99% with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
chance that a child born in such province domicile.
is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents nationality. That Grace Poes domicile had been timely
probability and the evidence on which it is changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on
based are admissible under Rule 128, July 18, 2006 when her application under
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on RA 9225 was approved by the BI.
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to COMELECs reliance on cases which
accept the absurd, if not the virtually decree that an aliens stay in the country
impossible, as the norm. cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such
pronounced that foundlings are as a class, cases are different from the
natural-born citizens. This is based on the circumstances in this case, in which
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
Constitutional Convention show that the evidence of her actual stay and intent to
framers intended foundlings to be covered abandon permanently her domicile in the
by the enumeration. While the 1935 US. Coupled with her eventual
Constitutions enumeration is silent as to application to reacquire Philippine
foundlings, there is no restrictive language citizenship and her familys actual
which would definitely exclude foundlings continuous stay in the Philippines over the
either. Because of silence and ambiguity years, it is clear that when Grace Poe
in the enumeration with respect to returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers. Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy
should be denied or cancelled for
Third, that foundlings are automatically committing material misrepresentations in
conferred with natural-born citizenship is her COC
supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although Held:
the Philippines is not a signatory to some
of these treaties, it adheres to the No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her
customary rule to presume foundlings as COC on the ground that she
having born of the country in which the misrepresented facts as to her citizenship
foundling is found. and residency because such facts refer to
grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority qualified as a candidate for the
finding that a candidate is suffering from a presidency. Hence, there cannot be any
disqualification provided by law or the false representations in her COC
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny regarding her citizenship and residency
due course or cancel her candidacy on
ground of false representations regarding
her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme

Court Grace Poe is now pronounced