CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE 2004,[3] convicted petitioner in the three cases, disposing as
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 180010
Promulgated: July 30, 2010
x- ----------------------------------------
---------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514, People of the
Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga, dismissed the appeal of Cenita
Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with
a Salary Grade of 24, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293,
reads:
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Cabatuan, Province
of Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public
officer, being the Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela,
and as such is accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected
and/or received by her by reason of her position, acting in
relation to her office and taking advantage of the same, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
misappropriate and convert to her personal use the amount of
TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
PESOS (P2,785.00) representing the remittance of the
Municipality of Cabatuan to the Provincial Government of
Isabela as the latters share in the real property taxes collected,
which amount was not received by the Provincial Government
of Isabela, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] (underscoring supplied)
The two other Informations in the second and third criminal
cases, Nos. 1294 and 1295, contain the same allegations
except the malversed amounts which are P25,627.38 and
P20,735.13, respectively.[2]
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22,
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the three (3)
separate informations and in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer:
1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of
from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as maximum and its accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Eighty Five (P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine of
Twenty Five Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven
(P25,627.00) Pesos. She is ordered to indemnify the
Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five Thousand Six
Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against
the accused.
3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Twenty
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The bailbonds
are cancelled. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal,
stating that he intended to appeal the trial courts decision to
the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of May 28, 2007,[4] the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding
that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction thereon. Held the appellate court:
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the
Regional Trial Court considering that the position of
Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27.
Pursuant to Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it is the Sandiganbayan,
to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate
jurisdiction over the offense. Evidently, the appeal to this
Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds was
improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
Resolution of September 27, 2007.[5] Hence, the present
petition for review, petitioner defining the issues as follows:
I. WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR
AND GRAVE ERROR COMMITTED BY COUNSEL OF
[PETITIONER] AND OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER]
WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHTOR BE
ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN
PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.
II. WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW
TRIAL BE GRANTED TO THE PETITIONER TO BE
UNDERTAKEN IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT)
SO THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONERBE
ADMITTED.[6]
Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by
her former counsel, implores the Court to relax the Rules to
afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the
merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of
substantial justice.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
x x x.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not
be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the
Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,[7] as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:[8]
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of
a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse
militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court
grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application
thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
substantial justice must always be avoided.[9]
In Ulep v. People,[10] the Court remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her
appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a
dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose
had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed
outright for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what
happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward
the records of the case to the proper forum, the
Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned
ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong
court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving
government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are
fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected
to know and should have known the law and the rules of
procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be
taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the
Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully
observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this
where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial
courts apparent ignorance of the law effectively conspired to
deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her
conviction.[11]
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the
Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in criminal
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law; when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property;
or where the interests of justice so require. [12] It can not be
gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under any of these
exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the
evidence for the prosecution and defense as well as a proper
application of the imposable penalties in the present case by
the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that
her appeal is decided scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the
records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan
for proper disposition.
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the
Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is warned against
committing the same procedural error, under pain of
administrative sanction.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]
CARLITO D. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and
JUANITO ALVARADO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review
in Civil Case No. 92-62869.
Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private
respondent Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for
recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the
latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own
use.
Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain
Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his
property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties,
however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an
"Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his
house to any person who can afford to purchase the same.
Consequently, Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for
P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was
established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado
demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying
because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use.
Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded, prompting
Corpuz to seek his ejectment.
In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1)
the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and
Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to
the Lupong Tagapayapa.
Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the
MTC of Manila handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision
ordering Alvarado to vacate the room.[2]
Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March
11, 1993, said court rendered its decision[3] which, in effect,
reversed the MTC's decision on the ground that the purported
sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a
controversy pending before the National Housing Authority
(NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also
concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado
and Barredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the
dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, and ruled that
Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject
premises.
His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been
denied for lack of merit by the RTC[4] on July 16, 1993,
Corpuz elevated his case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the
assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its
assailed decision dated July 14, 1994.[5] A subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated September 1, 1994.[6] Hence,
this petition.
The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz'
unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado
should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in
the NHA impugning the sale of said property, and whether the
"Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was
authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion
challenging his ownership over the said property is not a
sufficient ground to divest the MTC of its exclusive
jurisdiction.[7]
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
ejectment cases.[8] As the law now stands, the only issue to be
resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is,
possession de facto.[9]
In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals,[10]
however, we ruled that:
"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this
Court, in making a distinction between the reception of
evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held
that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or
ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence
would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It
cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by
declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner
of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue
would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not
sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With
this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment
introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested
that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with
adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised
by the parties in an ejectment suit."
Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of
possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the
controversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinal
pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.
Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far
from novel. The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for
the annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any
ejectment action respecting the same property.[11]
In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations,
et al. v. Court of Appeals,[12] Justice (now Chief Justice)
Andres Narvasa outlined the following cases involving the
annulment of the title or document over the property which
should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit,
to wit:
"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions
respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment
of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare
the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang
Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153
[1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758
[1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174
SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment
of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."
Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the
defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is
summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the
NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the
authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the
MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for
the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right
among the parties.
It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We
have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to
the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts
therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving possession.[13]
Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition
that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon
Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.
We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single
general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held in
Dui v. Court of Appeals[14] that failure of a party to
specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with
the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of
that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no
reason or explanation was given to support his allegation,
which is deemed a mere general averment.
In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had
already acquired over the subject matter and the parties
therein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated July 14, 1994, of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6, in
Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69334 July 28, 1986
SERVILLANO ALINSUGAY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
PERFECTO M. CAGAMPANG, JR., Presiding Judge
Designate of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon,
10th Judicial Region, ESTHER G. CAJES and RICARDO M.
CAJES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether referral to the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo under Presidential Decree No. 1508, the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, is mandatory even where the
failure at conciliation is due to the non-appearance of one
party.
On October 19, 1984 petitioner Servillano Alinsugay instituted
an action in the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon, Malaybalay
branch, against respondents Ester G. Cajes and Ricardo M.
Cajes for the annulment of title and recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of 3,068 square
meters located in Barangay Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon
[Civil Case No. 1566].
Respondents Cajes filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that: [1] the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
action because the dispute was not brought before the
barangay for amicable settlement in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508, [2] the complaint was
premature, and [3] the action was barred by prescription and
laches. Specifically, respondents argued that petitioner did not
follow the process of going through a Pangkat in the
settlement of his dispute, after mediation before the barangay
chairman had failed.
In reply, petitioner asserted that the trial court had jurisdiction
over the case because of the "certification to file action" issued
on July 31, 1983 by the Punong Barangay and attested by the
Barangay Secretary to the effect that respondent Esther Cajes
"wilfully failed or refused to obey summons or to appear for
hearing, and therefore the corresponding complaint for the
dispute may now be filed in court/government office. 1
In an order dated November 13, 1984, respondent Judge
Perfecto M. Cagampang, Jr. dismissed the complaint "without
prejudice to the filing of the same after the provisions of PD
1508 shall have been complied properly as prayed for in the
'Motion to Dismiss' filed by defendants despite the Opposition
filed by plaintiff; and without passing on the merits on the
other grounds alleged in the same 'Motion to Dismiss.' " 2
Assailing the order of dismissal as a patent nullity and having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari.
There is no question that the controversy was referred to the
Punong Barangay of Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon. It was
docketed as Barangay Case No. 26. Summons were served
upon the parties. For one reason or another, respondent Esther
Cajes failed to appear before the barangay chairman,
prompting the latter to issue on July 31, 1983 the certification
to file action for the complainant, herein petitioner Alinsugay.
There is no mention in the records of the reason for Cajes'
non-appearance.
In his memorandum, petitioner Alinsugay contends that the
issuance of the certification to file action by the Punong
Barangay, attested by the Barangay Secretary, substantially
complies with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
and its implementing rules.
On the other hand, respondents Esther Cajes and Ricardo M.
Cajes argue that the certification is premature and therefore
null and void. They theorize that under the law, the Punong
Barangay should have constituted the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo after he had failed to bring about a settlement
between the contending parties; that the Punong Barangay on
his level is bereft of legal authority to issue the questioned
certification, and that what is contemplated by PD No. 1508 is
intervention by the Punong Barangay and members of the
Pangkat, otherwise what would prevent a corrupt barangay
chairman from issuing indiscriminate certifications.
We hold for petitioner Alinsugay.
This is a case wherein only one party appears before the
Punong Barangay and the other party fails to do so despite due
notice or summons. What should the Punong Barangay do in
such a case?
Rule VI, Section 7 of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules
provides:
SECTION 7. Failure to appear.- The complaint may be
dismissed when complainant, after due notice, wilfully fails or
refuses to appear on the date set for mediation, conciliation or
arbitration. Such dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or
Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, shall bar the
complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause
of action as that dismissed.
Upon a similar failure of the respondent to appear, any
counterclaim he has made that arises from or is necessarily
connected with complainant's action, may be dismissed. Such
dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary, as
the case may be, shall bar the respondent from filing such
counterclaim in court; and it shall likewise be a sufficient basis
for the issuance of a certification for filing complainant's cause
of action in court or with the proper government agency or
office.
In addition, such willful failure or refusal to appear may
subject the recalcitrant party or witness to punishment as for
contempt of court, i.e., by a fine not exceeding one hundred
pesos (P100.00) or imprisonment of not more than one (1)
month or both.
Thus it is very clear from the Rules that the willful refusal or
failure to appear on the part of respondent is sufficient basis
for the complainant present to be given a certification to file
action. The issuance of a certification to file action means that
the complainant may already bring his case to the court or
other government office for adjudication.
Section 4[b] of PD No. 1508 likewise provides that if the
Punong Barangay fails in his mediation efforts within fifteen
[15] days from the first meeting of the parties, he shall
forthwith set the date for the constitution of the Pangkat.
However, such referral to the Pangkat is mandatory only in
those cases where both parties have submitted themselves to
the Lupon for conciliation and conciliation has failed.
In instances where one party fails to appear for no justifiable
reason, convening the Pangkat as a necessary second step will
serve no useful purpose. It will accomplish nothing in view of
a party's unwillingness, as reflected in his unjustified absence,
to settle the dispute outside the regular courts. In that case, the
only feasible alternative for the Lupon is to issue the
certification allowing complainant to bring the controversy to
court.

It is evident that the respondents have not come to court with

clean hands. The desired conciliation at the barangay level
failed to materialize due to their non-appearance. They should
not be subsequently allowed to frustrate petitioner's cause of
action by invoking that situation which they themselves
created.

Respondent Judge Cagampang, Jr. acted arbitrarily and with

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner has complied with the condition precedent set forth
in Presidential Decree No. 1508. The issuance of the
certification to file action is warranted by the Rules in view of
respondent's unexplained refusal to appear.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge Cagampang, Jr.

dated November 13, 1984 is set aside and a new one is entered
directing the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon, Malaybalay
branch to proceed with the hearing on the merits of Civil Case
No. 1566.

Case remanded. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.