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Puruganan Chato Tan & Geronimo for petitioner in G.R. No. 112991.
Potenciano A. Flores for petitioners in G.R. No. 109373.
Marbibi Law Office for private respondent.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MENDOZA , J : p
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is
the same: whether a petition for liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise
known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The
Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on
this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing. cdphil
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of
the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders
to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992 he granted the
Union's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991 ,
likewise led claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of
shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of
154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the
PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment
entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law. cdll
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the
Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred
creditors. 7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16 , 1992 . On September 30 ,
1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October
2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5 ,
1992. On October 14,1992 he led a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September
16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered
the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been led without
authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the
judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the
Stockholders/Investors' claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator led separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from
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the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two
Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raf ed, rendered
conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No.
109373) the Fifth Division 8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the
trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or nal order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the
Liquidator was led on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's
claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the
orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the
Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing. llcd
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division 9 ruled in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991 ) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors
that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing
from any decision or nal order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the
Liquidator's appeal notice was led on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending,
the notice of appeal was led late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the
Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
certiorari filed by Naagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of
appeal filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Paci c Banking
Corporation is a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple
appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days
from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders
whose right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the
creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not
in the nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an
ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth
Division stated:
The petition led is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
where there are con icting claimants or several claims upon the same subject
matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader
to compel the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among
themselves. (Section 1, Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like
an ordinary action, may be appealed only within fteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement
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the provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special
civil actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court
to the Court of Appeals.
...
Thus, under Section 1, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is de ned as "an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On
the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy
including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be
by special proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted de nitions of an action and a special
proceeding, the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset
of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to
establish the fact of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had
already been previously determined by the Central Bank in accordance with
Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was led. All that needs to be done is
to liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the assistance of the respondent
court is sought for that purpose. LLphil
It should be pointed out that this petition led is not among the cases categorized
as a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among
the special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the
Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court provide:
1. Action de ned . Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
2. Special proceeding distinguished. Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against
another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact.
Where a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to le
an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an
insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of
insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be
affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265,
the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of
the institution, and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board
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and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot
question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary
Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside
the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there was nothing else
for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of
the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (29) of the law invoked by the Union, the
court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this
Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15
There is no question that the action of the Monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere
with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a
distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has
never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v.
Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also
of the insolvent bank. Under 28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank
"personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against
the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these
purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or nal
orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of
time to le the record on appeal led in behalf of the Central Bank was not led by the
Of ce of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no
merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed
the trial court on March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the
PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of
Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal led were
jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of
the PDIC. 17
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No. 112991, the decisions appealed
from are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a) The claim for holiday pay covering the period from November 1, 1974 to
October 31, 1985;
b) The claim for 28% salary differential pursuant to the CBA increase;
c) The claim for Christmas Bonus which should be pro rated based on the
employees length of service rendered up to 1985 when the Paci c Banking Corporation
was placed under liquidation; and
d) The claim for unused sick leave bene ts which should be computed and
paid accordingly.
Furthermore, this Court orders:
a) The prorata payment of 13th month pay in accordance with the position
taken by the Liquidator provided in the Implementing Rules of the Department of Labor;
and
b) Consistent with the previous orders of this Court payment of 10%
attorney's fees should be deducted from the total claims afforded to the
plaintiffs/intervenors and other employees of the bank (PaBC).
7. The dispositive portion of the trial court's order, dated September 11, 1992 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Liquidator of PaBC is ordered to pay
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claimants, through their Attorney-In-Fact Gonzalo C. Sy, their total investment of
US$2,531,632.18 as preferred creditors. Dividends and/or interest that accrued in favor
of claimants is hereby deferred pending study by the Liquidator who is hereby ordered
to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Order.
8. Justice Sera n E. Camilon, Chairman and ponente; Justices Sera n V.C. Guingona and
Cancio C. Garcia, Members, concurring.
9. Justice Antonio M. Martinez, Chairman and ponente; Justices Artemon D. Luna and
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Members, concurring.
10. 1. Interpleader when proper. Whenever con icting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants,
he may bring an action against the con icting claimants to compel them to interplead
and litigate their several claims among themselves.
11. 1 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULE OF COURT 119-120 (1979), citing Hagans v.
Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880, 882, (1922).
12. Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 65 Phil. 302 (1938).
13. Rep. Act No. 265, 29, as amended.
14. Salud v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 143 SCRA 590 (1986).
15. 162 SCRA 288 (1988).
16. Rollo, p. 41, G.R. No. 112991.
17. Annexes "H" and "I", Rollo, CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27751.