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The South African Border War
2012- 02- 04 10:02:55 Peter Baxter
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For t hose not f amiliar wit h t he wider event s of Af rican liberat ion, it might be
said in a nut shell t hat t he major European powers awoke in t he af t ermat h of
WWII wit h a recognit ion t hat t hey were ent ering int o a new world order t hat
would be governed less by t he dict um of men such as Cecil John
Rhodes{{1}}[[1]]Rhodes most widely quot ed remark in ref erence t o
imperialism was Philant hropy plus f ive percent , implying a an imperial mission
f or t he bet t erment of mankind alongside an obligat ion t o prof it [[1]] and more
in line wit h t he principals of t he Atlantic Charter, t he second and t hird principals
of which required t hat territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of
the peoples concerned and t hat all peoples had a right to self-determination. T he
t wo principal signat ories of t his document were Roosevelt and Churchill.
In act ual f act t he principal of self det erminat ion had become inescapable in
modern Af rica, bearing in mind t hat a generat ion of educat ed blacks had
ent ered t he mainst ream of polit ics, a great many of whom had been also
exposed t hrough milit ary service t o t he principals of f reedom implicit in t he
wider war ef f ort . T he dominoes began t o f all t owards t he end of t he 1950s,
wit h t he f irst major bloodlet t ing t aking place in Algeria and Kenya, and t hen a
decade lat er in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. Resist ance t o majorit y
rule t ended t o be regist ered most f orcef ully in t hose colonies occupied by
European set t lers. Rhodesia and Kenya were probably t he best examples of
t his. Sout h Af rica escaped much of t he pressure t o liberalize her polit ics by
dint of t he f act t hat she had been declared a Crown Dominion 1910, and t hen
grant ed de facto independence by t he Statute of Westminster of December
1931 t hat of f ered such t o all of t he set t led dominions.{{2}}[[2]]f our basics
levels of membership of t he Brit ish Empire exist ed. T hese were Protectorates,
Colonies, Self Governing Colonies and Dominions.[[2]]
T he Brit ish, meanwhile, handed over sovereignt y wit h very lit t le apparent
regret , t he French, on t he ot her hand, t ended t o renegot iat e revised t erms,
while t he Port uguese alone held on wit h f anat ical det erminat ion t o t heir
overseas provinces. Rhodesia was somewhat unique inasmuch as t he whit e
communit y declared a highly quixot ic unilat eral independence, and paid f or it
wit h f if t een years of brilliant but st rangulat ing civil war. Port ugal ult imat ely
relinquished Mozambique an Angola only in t he af t ermat h a peacef ul milit ary
coup in April 1974 t hat overt hrew a f ascist dict at orship in Lisbon, and
Rhodesia, of course, became Zimbabwe t hanks t o a negot iat ed set t lement
t hat ended a divisive civil war.
T his lef t Sout h Af rica alone st aring down t he massed ranks of Af rican
liberat ion, holding under her wing Sout h West Af rica (lat er Namibia), t he last
subst ant ive t errit ory, aside f rom Sout h Af rica herself , st ill under minorit y whit e
cont rol. Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola all had t heir liberat ion movement s,
each of which conf ormed t o t he somewhat ad-hoc organizat ion of a
revolut ionary movement , t ending also t o be Marxist aligned, and each
f ollowing f airly closely t he Maoist dict um of revolut ionary guerrilla war.
In t he case of Sout h Af rica t his was SWAPO, or t he South West Africa Peoples
Organization, a movement cut complet ely f rom t he clot h of Leninist /St alinist
revolut ion t hat had inbuilt int o it everyt hing t hat st ruck most cleanly at t he
heart of whit e Sout h Af rican f ear. Init ially SWAPO f ound ref uge in Zambia f rom
where incursions were launched int o t he Caprivi St rip region of Sout h West
Af rica t hat challenged Sout h Af rican law enf orcement hardly at all. Angola at
t hat t ime st ill lay under Port uguese cont rol. However, af t er t he 1974 coup in
Lisbon t he polit ical landscape changed radically. T he civilian government in
Port ugal f ell, t he symbolic value of empire def lat ed, af t er which an almost
unseemly rush t o divest t he nat ion of it s colonies gripped t he new milit ary
administ rat ion.
Sout h Af rica init ially responded t o t he Swart Gevaar, or black danger, buy
at t empt ing t hrough a policy of detente t o accommodat e black Af rica, of f ering
in exchange f or accept ance t he ballast of t he Sout h Af rican economy in a
cont inent -wide common market . At more or less t he same t ime t he Unit ed
St at es, somewhat dist ract ed by event s in Viet nam, began t o t ake not ice of a
sudden power vacuum in Af rica where t he Soviet Union and Cuba had adroit ly
begun t o sow inf luence. Sout h Af rica also t ook, some would say belat ed,
not ice of t he arrival of communism right in it s midst , not icing also t hat t he
liberat ion of Sout h West Af rica had become of t he new f ocus of t he Front Line
States, a loose af f iliat ion of newly liberat ed government s act ively conf ront ing
and seeking t o f lush out t he last corners of whit e dominat ion. T he lat est of
t hese had been Angola and Mozambique, bot h now under radical black
leadership, bot h aligned st rongly t o t he lef t and bot h manif est ly unst able.
Needless t o say SWAPO moved it s of f ensive operat ions swif t ly f rom Zambia
int o Angola where it was availed of almost 1200km of t hinly garrisoned border
wit h Sout h West Af rica. What is more t he implied might of Moscow and
Havana backed up t he ruling MPLA, which in t urn of f ered implicit support f or
SWAPO, alt ering t he complexion of Sout h Af ricas Border War almost
overnight .
It must be remembered t hat SWAPOs primary t act ic had been no avoid set
piece engagement s wit h an enemy it could not hope t o beat in an open f ight ,
but rat her t o pursue a revolut ionary agenda among t he local populat ion,
seeding what dest ruct ion it could t hrough ambushes, land mine act ivit y and
occasional inf rast ruct ural sabot age. For t he remainder it sought always t o
st ay one st ep ahead of t he Sout h Af ricans, and f or t he most part it
succeeded. From t his emerged Koevoet, more accurat ely known as t he South
West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit, a mult iracial f orce modeled very
closely on t he Rhodesian Selous Scout s, alt hough of course remaining a police
and not an army unit .
Operation Savannah
T he f irst signif icant incursion t ook place t owards t he end of 1974 and early
1975. Port uguese decolonizat ion, once t he decision had been made, was
perf unct ory at t he very least . T his did not ramif icat e part icularly seriously on
t he power handover in Mozambique. Here t here was only one unit y movement
poised t o t ake power, and what ever it might have est ablished as t he new
polit ical blueprint of Mozambique, t he t ransit ion at least was relat ively
st raight f orward. In Angola, on t he ot her hand, t hree armed revolut ionary
organizat ions exist ed, conf igured t o a large ext ent along et hnic/regional lines,
and support ed respect ively by t he Unit ed St at es, Cuba and t he Soviet Union.
T hese were t he Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, t he
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA, and t he National Movement for
the Total Independence of Angola , or UNITA. T he Port uguese lef t t he st age
upon t he underst anding t hat an elect ion would be held t o decide t he mat t er.
T his was t he Treaty of Alvor which ended t he long Angolan independence
st ruggle alt hough, of course, no sooner had t he agreement been signed,
t han t he long Angolan civil war began.
T he concern t hat t hese vent s generat ed in t he superpower capit als can easily
be imagined. T he Unit ed St at es, however, was somewhat slower of f t he mark
t han t he Soviet Union and Cuba in sowing inf luence in an ef f ect ive power
vacuum, t his t hanks largely t o event s st ill underway in Viet nam, and t he
ext reme reluct ance in Washingt on t o cont emplat e overt armed int ervent ion
anywhere else in t he world f or t he t ime being, and cert ainly not in Af rica.
T he Unit ed St at es, however, if not an ally, had at least a local part ner in t he
region wit h similar st rat egic int erest s as it s own t o call upon. T his was Sout h
Af rica. Wit h covert CIA assist ance, and much rhet orical American support ,
sout h Af rica moved int o Angola wit h t he int ent ion of inf luencing mat t ers on
t he ground, poising it self t o support t he pro-west UNITA and FNLA f act ions
against t he dist inct ly pro-east MPLA. Four Sout h Af rican bat t le groups began
what milit ary hist orians f rom all sides agree was a spect acular advance nort h
t owards t he capit al Luanda. T his operat ion was ult imat ely st alled by t he
combinat ion of signif icant Cuban reinf orcement of t he st at us quo and a
general re-adjust ment of t he polit ical landscape which saw t he US
wit hdrawing support and t he Organizat ion of Af rican Unit y opt ing t o t hrow it s
weight behind t he MPLA. T he sit uat ion f or Sout h Af rica, lef t carrying t he baby
as it were, was bot h embarrassing and milit ary precarious. An inevit able
wit hdrawal was ordered by Pret oria and complet ed t owards t he end of 1975.
All t hat could be said of t he mat t er was t he Sout h Af rica emerged wit h a new
key ally UNITA t o help cover t errit ory in a by now massively amplif ied
f ront ier insurgency. Overall power in Angola was assumed by t he MPLA wit h
overwhelming support f rom t he USSR, Cuba and t he Organization of African
Unity OAU.
Alt hough it was hardly t he t rut h of t he mat t er, Sout h Af rica was perceived,
and t he associat ed enemy propaganda drove t his f act home, t o have been
def eat ed in Angola. T his prompt ed a liberat ion hungry populat ion of Sout h
West Af rica and Sout h Af rica t o cont ribut e a great many more sons t o what
was seen as t he f inal push t owards Namibian independence. At t he same t ime
as it s ranks were t hus swelling, SWAPO was able at last t o break out of t he
easily def ensible Caprivi region and spread t he insurgency across t he lengt h
of t he Angolan/SWA border area in part icular int o t he polit ically alert and
populous Ovamboland.
T his conf ormed very much t o t he t hree phase Maoist st rat egy of guerrilla
warf are. To at t enuat e convent ional enemy f orces t o such an ext ent t hat t hey
are unable t o ef f ect ively operat e. No less import ant was t he polit icizat ion of
t he masses which in t he Af rican cont ext implied heavy doses of Marxist
aligned ideology alongside t he salut ary t ort ure and killing of select ed
individuals quit e of t en administ rat ive chief s who were st igmat ized by an
associat ion wit h t he st at e as an indicat ion of t he price t o be paid f or not
support ing t he movement .
Sout h Af rica was not immediat ely equipped t o t ake on a f ully f ledged
insurgency such as t his, an in t he beginning responded by f looding t he region
wit h bat t alions composed largely of young whit e conscript s who at t empt ed
by t he use of t he Kit cheneresque st rat egy of massive overland sweeps t o
drive f orward or net SWAPO concent rat ions. As many analyst s observed at
t he t ime, urban Sout h Af rican yout h were not dissimilar t o urban yout h
anywhere, and t ended t o be out of t heir dept h in t he deep bush of nort hern
SWA, while t act ically t heir command element lacked a cert ain amount of
creat ivit y, caused perhaps by inexperience. It might be wort h point ing out t hat
Sout h Af rica had scaled back it s milit ary preparedness in t he Af t ermat h of
WWII, and now, conf ront ed by an increasingly unf riendly int ernat ional
communit y, and t he onset of t he ant i-Apart heid St ruggle, it was much less
able t o replenish it s capacit y using t radit ional sources such as t he Brit ish.
Perhaps t he most import ant issue, however, was t hat t he SADF in all is
permut at ions had absolut ely no meaningf ul cont act wit h, no sympat hy f or and
no inf luence over t he local populat ion. T he bat t le f or heart s and minds, so
crucial in any armys count er-insurgency arsenal, was t heref ore lost bef ore it
was even f ought .
In due course, however, SADF began t o f ind it s f eet . A more t radit ional
count er-insurgency met hodology slowly evolved wit h perhaps t he earliest and
clearest sign of adapt ion being t he increased use of nat ive t roops as t he
bulwark of local knowledge and as t rackers in an increasingly art f ul approach
t o war. Koevoet came int o being, ref lect ing t he racially mixed make of up
Rhodesias Selous Scout s, f ollowed by 32 Bat t alion, or t he Buffalo Soldiers,
which consist ed in t he main of ex-FNLA f ight ers, 31 Bat t alion, made up of
Bushmen, 101 Bat t alion of Ovambos, 201 Bat t alion of East Caprivi and t he
et hnically mixed 911 Bat t alion. Wit h t he except ion of Koevoet, which was under
police administ rat ion, and 32 Bat t alion which remained part of t he SADF, all of
t hese became part of t he South West Africa Territorial Force SWAT F, a local
conf igurat ion t hat ult imat ely account ed f or about sevent y percent of t he
manpower engaged in t he Sout h Af rican Border War.
In addit ion t o t his, heavy ext ernal operat ions against SWAPO or combined
SWAPO/FAPLA bases and set t lement s, of t en direct ly support ed by Cuban
Mig pilot s and ground t roops, were undert aken t hat again pushed t he war
t owards f ully convent ional scope, bringing, as t he 1980s progressed, SWAPO
ef f ect ively t o it s knees. T his, however, did not mean t he was was won. Far
f rom it . Not wit hst anding t he wider geo-polit ical global landscape, against
which Sout h Af rica had no def ense, as SWAPO f ell away as t he main enemy
Sout h Af rica f ound it self more deeply involved in t he Angolan civil war t hrough
t he ongoing support of it s proxy Movement UNIT A.
In t his regard t he SADF lost no single major t act ical engagement , but in doing
so, and in dest roying t he colossal amount s of enemy ordnance t hat it did, it
simply prompt ed ever more sophist icat ed and quant it at ive Soviet resupply
which exponent ially placed ult imat e vict ory f urt her and f urt her out of reach.
A negotiated solution
Also in t hat year a US mediat ion t eam headed by t he highly compet ent US
Assist ant Secret ary of St at e f or Af rican Af f airs, Chest er A. Crocker, who
assembled negot iat ors f rom Angola, Cuba, and Sout h Af rica alongside
observers f rom t he Soviet Union f or a round t able session held in London.
Int ense diplomat ic maneuvering charact erized t he next seven mont hs, as t he
part ies f ormulat ed a series of agreement s t o bring peace t o t he region and
make possible t he implement at ion of Unit ed Nat ions Securit y Council
Resolut ion 435 (UNSCR 435).