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70 Sask. L. Rev.

393

Saskatchewan Law Review


2007

Article

The Indefensibility of Post-Colonial Aboriginal Rights

Brian R. Pfefferle [FNa1]

Copyright 2007 by Saskatchewan Law Review; Brian R. Pfefferle

I. INTRODUCTION

In Canadian society and Canadian courts Aboriginal rights are theorized on the basis that
they are sui generis rights that flow from the Aboriginal claimant's Aboriginality. [FN1] In this
sense Aboriginal rights are not simply minority rights, but rather demand
that Aboriginal peoples be treated with special deference as first peoples and as Citizens
Plus. [FN2]
While Aboriginal peoples are entitled to collective recognition of their status, colonization
and liberalism have shaped and misshaped the boundaries within which Aboriginal claimants
must prove they are entitled to a particular right, and, in the process, have disentitled individuals
and communities deserving of recognition. Furthermore, at an interpersonal level,
Aboriginality and Aboriginalrights have been internalized by Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians, and rationalized as reparations or as a payback to those peoples who
have been treated as Citizens Minus [FN3] by the non-Aboriginal community. This concept
of Aboriginal rights as payback and reparations has had considerable consequences
for Aboriginal communities.
Aboriginality, as a cultural and racial category imposed on Aboriginalpeoples, cannot
sustain the type of rights sought by Aboriginal peoples as a collective, and only serves to
derogate Aboriginal communities, fuelling internal and external conflict. An argument exists
that in order for a more just application of Aboriginal rights, and less
fragmented Aboriginal communities, the identity and Aboriginality of Aboriginal peoples
must be defined from within the Aboriginalcommunities themselves.
While allowing communities to define membership and Aboriginality, there are
considerable complications dealing with who should be able to determine who the
Aboriginal peoples are. In the end, one must conclude that the definition of Aboriginality
has fundamentally changed Aboriginal societies, and recreatedAboriginal identities so as to
make fair and just membership impossible to determine. The legislative redefinitions of
Aboriginality have created a fragmentation and a rights-based approach that has
left Aboriginal communities and interpersonal relationships within these communities in
ruins. Furthermore, the judiciary, forced to define and categorize individuals and groups as
Aboriginal, and determine if those individuals or groups deserve Aboriginal rights, face a
difficult and highly political task.
Our society, like our legal system, is not equipped to turn back the historical clock of
collective recognition. While Aboriginality is said to exist in spite of legislative definitions, the
Aboriginality that exists today is so confused and mistaken that Aboriginal rights and
privileges in Canada serve to detract, rather than advance the very communities they are
thought to help. It is this liberal approach to Aboriginal rights that makes such rights, in their
current state, indefensible.
In this article, I will outline the concept of Aboriginality and the role legislative definitions
had in defining Aboriginal peoples. After discussing the fragmentation
within Aboriginal communities created by the concept of Aboriginality, I will outline some
interpersonal issues with Aboriginalcommunities, primarily focusing on
disenfranchised Aboriginal women, followed by a discussion of the liberal concepts that have
redefined Aboriginal peoples, their concept of Aboriginal identity, and the effect this
redefinition will have on membership. Lastly, I will outline three different cases where courts and
an administrative board attempted to define Aboriginality in the present day, and apply their
definition of Aboriginal to a specific situation. I will conclude by suggesting that it is impossible
and impractical to attempt to define a group concept of Aboriginality when the group that was
first entitled to a right is no longer the same. The future approach to Aboriginal rights in
Canada should focus on the needs of individual Aboriginal people, as opposed to the so-called
inherent rights of an Aboriginal peoples.

II. A THEORY OF ABORIGINALITY

The concept of who is Aboriginal and the term Aboriginality is of foremost concern to the
post-colonial, [FN4] liberally influenced Aboriginal person.Aboriginality, in the view of the
courts and Aboriginal communities, is a necessary requirement for government and non-
government entitlements, as well as Aboriginal and constitutional rights. [FN5]
The current and past definitions upon which Aboriginal peoples are defined are not based
on identity or historical, cultural, territorial, linguistic, or political origins, but rather on federal
Indian policy with little recognition of the former considerations. The terms and categories that
define Aboriginal rights are similarly influenced by federal Indian policy. By virtue of this,
Aboriginality emerges from the relationship between the original inhabitants of Canada and
the colonial government that has assumed jurisdiction over these inhabitants. [FN6] Thus,
Aboriginality is not defined from an existing set of peoples with pre-existing rights, [FN7] but
rather from a calculated, or more likely, a miscalculated set of categories for defining such
peoples. The definition of Aboriginality evolved from both a failure to recognize the diversity
between Aboriginal peoples and the social, political and territorial context within
which Aboriginal peoples have defined themselves.

III. ABORIGINAL ORIGINS AND THE COLONIAL DEFINITION OF INDIANS

The term aboriginal is derived from the Latin words ab, or from, and origo, meaning
origin. [FN8] The idea behind Aboriginality is that Aboriginalpeoples were on Canadian
lands from time immemorial [FN9] and were here first. [FN10] Although the literal meaning of
Aboriginal is based on the idea of original inhabitancy, the practical application of the post-
colonial principle of Aboriginality has failed to recognize the meaning behind being here
first.
The term Indian has had a significant impact on the concept of Aboriginality and the
rights flowing from this concept. Furthermore, the concept of Indian has created significant
changes in the identities of Aboriginal Canadians and their conception of what it means to be
Aboriginal. The 1850 An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the
Indians of Lower Canada, [FN11] was the first legislative action to truly define Indians, and
arguably began the legal creation of Aboriginality. [FN12] Under s. 5 of this Act, Indians
were defined as having the following characteristics:
First.--All persons of Indian blood reputed to belong to the particular Body or Tribe of Indians
interested in such lands, and their descendants:
Secondly.--All persons intermarried with such Indians and residing amongst them, and the
descendent of all such persons:
Thirdly.--All persons, residing among such Indians, whose parents on either side were or are
Indians of such Body or Tribe, or entitled to be considered as such: And
Fourthly.--All persons adopted in infancy by any such Indians, and residing in the village or
upon the lands of such Tribe or Body of Indians, and their descendants. [FN13]
Although this definition was the most inclusive definition of Indian adopted by the Canadian
Legislature--a definition which was essentially based on kinship--it was repealed one year
later. [FN14] The new legislation narrowed the definition of Indian, and thus narrowed the
concept of Aboriginality by creating a number of exceptions. Under s. 2 of An Act to Repeal in
Part and to Amend an Act, entitled, An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of
the Indians of Lower Canada, [FN15] only women of non-Indian ancestry were permitted to
acquire status through marriage to an Indian, and the children of women married to non-Indian
men were excluded. Furthermore, under the 1851 amendments non-Indians who lived among
Indians were excluded from the definition of Aboriginal. [FN16]Section 2 of the Act read as
follows:
Firstly. All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular Tribe or Body of
Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and their descendants:
Secondly. All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents were or are, or either of
them was or is, descended on either side from Indians, or an Indian reputed to belong to the
particular Tribe or Body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and the
descendants of all such persons: And
Thirdly. All women, now or hereafter to be lawfully married to any of the persons included in
the several classes hereinbefore designated; the children issue of such marriages, and their
descendants. [FN17]
The arbitrary nature of these changes fundamentally altered the societies of Aboriginal peoples.
The redefinition and reclassification of Indians separated societies and marginalized some
members of Aboriginal communities, a phenomenon which has had considerable practical
consequences for Aboriginal rights claimants. As Magnet writes: The narrowed definition [of
who is an Indian] was instrumental to decreas[ing] the Indian population and its
property. [FN18]The decreases in population led to new societal formations and new forms of
membership that have unfairly marginalized members of Aboriginal communities.
Canada's Indian Act was formally imposed on Canada's Aboriginal peoples in 1876 where
Indians were again defined, and the previous laws in Canada dealing with Indians were
consolidated. [FN19] The 1876 Indian Act definition excluded a number of people who were
racially, culturally, and ethnically Aboriginal. As Magnet explains:
The Act determined status patrilineally. The requirements of status are males of Indian
blood, reputed to belong to a particular band, or the child or wife of such a person.
Four categories of Aboriginal people were excluded from the 1876 definition: illegitimate
children; Indians residing five or more years in a foreign country; enfranchised Indians, and
Manitoba Mtis who received entitlements under the Manitoba Act, 1870. [FN20]
The 1951 Indian Act [FN21] excluded Inuit and Aboriginal persons who had reached the age
of twenty-one, and whose mother or father's mother had acquired Indian status through
marriage. [FN22] This 1951 revision of the Indian Act was significant, and represented a
fundamental shift in the self-determination of Aboriginal societies; prior to this revision the
government relied on membership lists of individual Indian communities, treaty paylists and
agency records to identify Indians. [FN23] The 1951 revisions effectively removed the ability of
Aboriginal groups to define their own membership. This is historically significant, in that defining
Aboriginality in this sense effectively passed to the government. Magnet explains the 1951
revisions as:
The 1951 Act introduced the Indian Register and the office of the Indian Registrar to
supervise inclusion into and deletion from the Register. This centralized bureaucratic power to
determine Indian status, and it also transferred a significant amount of power in that regard from
Indian communities to a federal official. [FN24]
The discretion to add and delete members of the Aboriginal community was criticised by the
Federal Court in the case of Canada (Registrar, Indian Register) v. Sinclair, [FN25] signifying
the gross injustice such discretion can play. Despite criticisms, the concept of who is
Aboriginal? has been forever changed by these policies.
The colonial agenda for enfranchisement further collapsed Aboriginal communities in an
attempt to civilize Indians and remove their Indianness.[FN26] This purported to force an
Aboriginal person to exit the legal classification of an Indian and become a full citizen of
Canada. [FN27] Legislation in the area of enfranchisement came in 1857, under the Gradual
Civilization Act, [FN28] and focused on breaking up Aboriginal communities and fully integrating
Indians into society. Under s. 3 of the Act, enfranchisement could occur if the Indian was
twenty-one years of age, could speak, read and write English or French, a person of good
moral character, and had no debts. [FN29]
Certainly the most problematic enfranchisement provision was s. 12(1)(b) of the 1951 Indian
Act. This provision automatically enfranchised women who married non-Indian men and was
extremely successfully in destroying Aboriginal communities, as approximately five hundred
women were enfranchised each year.[FN30] This remained in effect until 1985, when Bill C-
31 [FN31] reversed the effect of s. 12(1)(b) of the 1951 Act. Despite this reversal, considerable
damage was already done to Aboriginal communities, and problems remain with the offspring of
so-called Bill C-31 Indians. [FN32]
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of Bill C-31 was the internalization of the legislative
redefinitions by the Aboriginal communities. As Bonita Lawrence explains:
After over a century of gender discrimination in the Indian Act, the idea that it is somehow
acceptable for Native women to lose status for marrying non-status or non-Native men has
become a normalized aspect of Native life in many communities ... It has been the children of
Native mothers and white or Mtis fathers who have been forced through loss of Indian status to
become urban Indians, and who, in their Native communities of origin, are often regarded as
outsiders because they have been labelled as not being Indian.[FN33]
Understanding Aboriginal rights as a concept derived from being here first, and recognizing the
right to self-definition of membership may have considerable consequences in liberal societies
that value the rights and freedoms of individuals. Individuals who would, but for the government
infractions, be entitled to membership and recognition, are not accepted into communities due
to discriminatory membership policies and an internalization of previous regulations. In
generations to come, how are such persons to be granted the Aboriginal rights they would
otherwise deserve? How can Aboriginal rights exist when they knowingly exclude so many
deserving recipients?
The historical effect of Bill C-31 will complicate Aboriginal rights in future
generations. [FN34] As the post-Bill C-31 era gave Indian bands more control over their
membership lists, they were capable of determining who was, and who was not, a member of
their band. Magnet explains that there are still a number of problems with the new regime of
membership control for Indian bands:
The 1985 amendments to the Indian Act contain apparently conflicting provisions. On one
hand, First Nations can assume control of membership. This implies a form of self-government
in which bands alone decide their membership. On the other hand, under s. 10, certain
categories of persons acquired the right to have their names placed on band lists maintained by
the Department of Indian Affairs before these lists were transferred to the bands ... This flies in
the face of band control of membership, since the Department of Indian Affairs would still be
making decisions about band membership, this time by restoring Indian status and band
membership to those eligible under Bill C-31. [FN35]
While the Bill C-31 amendment combated against the sexual discrimination of the 1951 Indian
Act, the second generation cut-off rule continued to disenfranchise and reclassify Aboriginal
peoples. Cornet explains the new form of arbitrary disentitlement created by Bill C-31:
The new rule applies equally to males and females born after 1985. Under s. 6 of the
current Indian Act, status is denied to children born of two generations of status and non-status
parents. This rule is sometimes popularly called the second-generation cut-off rule. This is
achieved through the operation of the Indian registration system. Entitlement to registration now
is based only on descent from or adoption by registered Indians. Marriage can no longer result
in the conferral or denial of Indian status. [FN36]
The final step in the legislative redefinition of Aboriginality for Aboriginal people came in
the Constitution Act, 1982, [FN37] particularly with regard the recognition and affirmation of
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. [FN38]Although Aboriginal rights were affirmed and
recognized by the Constitution Act, 1982, neither the substantive rights that were affirmed and
recognized, nor the Aboriginal peoples that have such rights, were defined in the constitutional
document. This has presumably passed the definitional assessment on to the Canadian courts;
courts which are neither capable, nor entitled to make an assessment of membership as such
an assessment is difficult and non-justiciable.[FN39]

IV. FRAGMENTATION BY RACIALIZATION

The legal and legislative definition of who is Aboriginal has occurred through the legal
concept of Indian and Indians. These concepts do not accurately reflect the innate meaning
behind being ab-origo, nor do they reflect how Aboriginal peoples and nations organize and
define themselves. [FN40] Rather, the concepts of Indian and Indians are part of a colonial
process of racialization [FN41] and categorization. [FN42] Justice Turpel-Lafond comments:
This expression, Indian, is an alien one. It is a term imposed by the colonial governments.
It is not a First Nations term. First Nations people, who have their own words for themselves in
their various languages. We have names for our peoples, and for our territories. The
word Indian denies and effaces the diversity of our peoples. Our peoples are culturally distinct
and linguistically diverse. We are not Indians. One must remember that there are many distinct
indigenous peoples in Canada; there is no singular category named Indian. We have been
Indianized or classified by the government for administrative purposes. We are not a
monolithic or homogeneous race. We have been racialized as minorities by the state, and
that is why equality-seeking has to be properly contextualized. [FN43]
The internalization of the concept of race can be seen in Aboriginal communities--the
identification of authentic Aboriginal peoples based on appearance and social status.
Colonization has left many light-skinned descendents of Aboriginal people; this is particularly so
when Europeans parented Aboriginal offspring. Drew Hayden Taylor humorously exemplifies
how this mixing of people has created interpersonal problems within Aboriginal communities
and second class Indianness: [FN44]
The darker you are, the more you are embraced and the more Indian you are thought to be.
The lighter your skin, the more difficult it sometimes is to be accepted by your Aboriginal peers
(and the non-Native world). White is no longer right. And heaven forbid that a person from the
dominant culture, who happens to have some barely-remembered ancestor who tickled toes
and traded more than some furs and beads with a Native person, should let a conversation slip
by without mentioning that at least four of the 24 chromosomes in his body don't burn in the
summer sun. [FN45]
The categorization of peoples as racial beings forces members to focus on the differences that
make them authentic and assess other's authenticity against this backdrop.
By creating a social category based on race, [FN46] Aboriginal policy in Canada has created
social fragmentation within Aboriginal communities. Furthermore, Aboriginality has created a
legal connotation that has manifested a feeling of individual entitlement based on what it means
to be Aboriginal.
Institutional creation of Aboriginality has created a myth that Aboriginal peoples and being
Aboriginal is a race, rather than a social, political, or cultural concept. [FN47] The concepts of
race and descent are more fitting for animal husbandry than to define a people, a nation, or a
socio-political grouping. [FN48]Also troubling is the concept of Aboriginal identity. One often
hears the phrase Aboriginal identity, presumably contemplating that such an identity exists, or
can exist, as a definable category. [FN49] It is the logic of identity, and the mantra that follows it,
that helps define Aboriginality in present day Aboriginal communities. [FN50] Furthermore, it is
this definition that helps redefine community rights and relationships between Aboriginal
peoples.
In Canada, identity and identities are celebrated as a form of multiculturalism. This
multiculturalism is defined, in the self-congratulatory concept of a cultural mosaic, which
Canada, its peoples, and its government celebrate as demonstrative of Canada's open-
mindedness. Arguably, however, Aboriginal group identity, as historically defined and
internalized, creates boundaries within which members of Aboriginal groups believe that they
must define themselves. [FN51] In this sense, the collective group of Aboriginal peoples
changes.
Identity has become people's concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and
how they relate to others. [FN52] The practical implication of Aboriginality and Aboriginal
identity is that the authenticity of persons associated with Aboriginal peoples is assessed on the
basis of collective identity or identities. Those members of the ethnic class of Aboriginal
peoples whose social milieu does not contain some elements of Citizens Minus lifestyles are
seen as fakes, nicknamed by some as crackers, a derogatory term used to describe
Caucasians in the southern United States, or as apples, red on the outside white on the inside,
due to the popular defence of Aboriginal rights. [FN53]By virtue of this phenomenon,
Aboriginality is defined at a community level, and those persons defined as Aboriginal begin
to assess their claim to additional rights not held by other Canadians on the basis that
Aboriginality means Citizens Minus. I have seen and heard this phenomenon in my own
province. Authentic Aboriginals see success, wealth, and the easy road as inauthentic.
[FN54] This has lead to a conception that Aboriginal benefits are being reaped by crackers,
rather than the authentic, struggling Aboriginals who are in need of assistance. Given this
conception of what Aboriginal identity ought to be, who can objectively define Aboriginality?

V. ABORIGINALITY AS A LIBERAL INDIVIDUAL CONCEPT

Without doubt, evidence of the legacy of liberalism on Aboriginality can be found in


the Indian Act. The Indian Act focused on the concept of individuals overcollectives, and on
assimilation to combat the so-called Indian problem. [FN55]To some degree, this legislation
has had the effect of creating Indians as defined under the Act as being self-serving and not
interested in the preservation of the group.
In addition to the Indian Act, the 1969 White Paper [FN56] is an example of national unity
and liberalism affecting Aboriginality. [FN57] The basic thrust of this policy paper was to
eradicate the definitions and differences created by theIndian Act and remove all legal
distinctions between Indians and other Canadians. This eradication was recommended in the
name of avoiding discrimination of the minority Indians.
Aboriginal activists rejected the proposition put forth in the White Paper, as it had the
potential of eradicating what recognition Aboriginal peoples had in Canadian
society. [FN58] The paper's underlying thesis was that separate status contributed to economic
backwardness, social isolation, and retrogressive cultural
enclaves. [FN59] Alternatively, Aboriginal groups preferred to use the Hawthorn Report's
terminology defining Aboriginal peoples as Citizens Plus. [FN60] The rejection of the White
Paper has evidenced the Aboriginal acceptance that Aboriginality has been legislatively
taxonomized by non-Aboriginal government. While the rejection demonstrates such
recognition, community concepts of identity have still been damaged.
The basis upon which Aboriginality is defined is built on the history of assimilation and
liberal-individualism. Aboriginal peoples, and consequentlyAboriginal rights, are stuck in the
confines of an assimilationist model that ignores Aboriginal communities and their desires. The
myth of race [FN61] plays into the concept of Aboriginality, in that archaic conceptions of
blood quantum[FN62] defined who is, and who is not, part of the ethnic class
of Aboriginalpeoples. This has had a particularly negative impact on some Aboriginal peoples
who have defined what being Indians means in Canadian society, based often on seeing
Indians as individuals who are victimized, marginalized, and who belong to communities with a
plethora of social problems. Indeed, it is liberal conceptions of Aboriginal rights that have made
such rights acceptable to the majority of Canadians, who find some comfort in believing that
Aboriginal rights exist in order to help Aboriginal people become better individuals.
That Aboriginal rights are derived and defended from the concept that Aboriginal peoples
must suffer to be authentically Aboriginal, is perhaps best exemplified in the language of
the Hawthorn Report, where it is noted that the concept of Citizens Plus, which Aboriginal
rights under s. 35(2) of the Charter arguably create, is due at least partially to the reverse
status Indians have held, as citizens minus, which is equally repugnant to a strongly egalitarian
society, has been tolerated for a long time. [FN63]
It appears that the Hawthorn Report has mirrored a sentiment one may feel when listening
to Aboriginal Canadians in the communities in which they live. The Citizens Plus concept of
rights is built on the idea that Aboriginal peoples were treated poorly, and thus need to be
treated more favourably, to help them play catch-up with their non-Aboriginal counterparts.
Indeed, this is often the basis through which rights for on-reserve status Indians--such as tax
exemptions--are legitimized, despite being somewhat arbitrary in their application. [FN64]

VI. AUTHENTICALLY ABORIGINAL: A FROZEN CONCEPT

The linking of an Aboriginal social identity to Aboriginal peoples, and the individual and
collective rights that flow from such an identity, effectively freezes rights and rights-bearers in
time. In a philosophical and even practical sense, personal identity and association with a
collective identity implies that changes in the individual identity will make the individual different
from the collective, redefining the individual as something other than a member of the collective
identity. Thus, members of Aboriginal communities living on-reserve will often frown upon those
members who have moved off the reserve for the purposes of attaining a job or attending
school. While some members of the community will welcome such people back, the choice may
have considerable interpersonal consequences. [FN65] As Drew Hayden Taylor writes:
Many reserves and Native educational organizations are constantly encouraging and
extolling the virtues of education on the youth. Yet, these communities also believe that the
more educated you become, the less Native you will be. They scorn and disdain those who
want to or have gone through the educational process. Evidently, knowledge and learning
deprives individuals of their cultural heritage. [FN66]
The Aboriginal person who no longer acts Aboriginal, and is no longer treated as
Aboriginal, cannot be said to have an Aboriginal identity under this conception.[FN67] Acting,
relating, and simply being Aboriginal as it is understood and defined becomes a contingent
factor to assess authentic Aboriginal peoples. This assessment affects Aboriginal rights, and
how persons receiving such rights are seen within their own communities. This phenomenon
could be particularly problematic if Aboriginal communities, armed with colonial biases, are
capable of excluding members, and effectively excluding those members from any claims to
Aboriginal rights. With authenticity assessments, in combination with the historical defining and
redefining of Aboriginal peoples, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess who is capable of
being Aboriginal. Both the legislative identity and the social identity perpetuate a confusing
cycle.
Taxonomic identity, at least partly owing to the Indian Act, and other legislative policies in
Canada, defines definite qualities for who is, and who is not, of a certain identity. This
taxonomic identity discourages people, including the judiciary, from thinking and understanding
a people as a political, social, and historical entity. After much time, taxonomic identity
becomes a real identity, and those attempting to discern identity do not recognize the power,
domination, and flawed philosophical foundations upon which a people and their own
peoples have been categorized and defined. As Bonita Lawrence writes:
To be federally recognized as a status Indian in Canada, an individual must be able to
comply with strict standards of government regulation. The effect of having Native identity so
highly regulated by a body of laws such as the Indian Act is that our ways of understanding
Native identity are, in a sense, shaped by these various laws. The Indian Act, in this respect, is
much more than a set of regulations that have controlled every aspect of Indian life for over a
century. It provides ways of understanding Native identity, organizing a conceptual framework
that has shaped contemporary Native life in ways that now are so familiar as to almost seem
natural. [FN68]
It is of little surprise that present day Aboriginal peoples have assessed their authenticity against
a backdrop of the liberal conception of identities. [FN69] This is particularly so given the societal
changes imposed through the Indian Act.[FN70]
The conception of identity has successfully detached collective interests within Aboriginal
communities. Although difference and recognition of difference among all peoples has always
occurred, the concept of individual rights has redefined the interests of Aboriginal peoples.
These interests have become as self-serving as avoiding criminal liability through the assertion
of an Aboriginal right. While the interests of Aboriginal peoples have been redefined,
perceptions of authenticity have also been redefined. This phenomenon is a natural occurrence
with identity finding. As Charles Taylor explains, [d]efining myself means finding what is
significant in my difference from others. [FN71] The rights given to Aboriginalpeoples, and
that are recognized and affirmed under s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, are not the rights
that flow from Aboriginality or being here first, but rather flow from the taxonomic
assessment of a racialized people. This has confused the basis upon which Aboriginal rights
should exist.
There is no better evidence that the collective identities of Aboriginal peoples have been
confused and misconceived than in the new political groupingsAboriginal people have
created. [FN72] I suggest that these political groupings demonstrate the success of
liberal Indian policy in destructing Aboriginalcommunities. Several of the most
prominent Aboriginal organizations have seemingly embraced the redefinition
of Aboriginal identity, by attempting to represent the post-colonial categories
of Aboriginal peoples.
Looking at the various organizations themselves, the fragmentation in representation can be
seen. For example, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) represents status Indians living on
reserves, [FN73] while the Congress ofAboriginal Peoples (CAP) represents off-
reserve Aboriginal peoples. [FN74] The dichotomy between the two groups demonstrates the
divide between Aboriginalpeoples and the internalization that Aboriginal status Indians are
different than non-status Indians at the core of their existence. [FN75] These two groups
represent two different causes, and by virtue of this, define membership and Aboriginality in
a distinctly different way. [FN76]
While there is little doubt that on-reserve and off-reserve Aboriginal people have differing
needs and concerns, the sometimes diametrically opposed AFN and CAP have reorganized
politically according to colonial definitions. [FN77] This is particularly troubling in that modern
claims for the right to define citizenship will likely be based on the political and social
reorganization. It is this phenomenon that has confused Aboriginal political leaders into
misunderstanding that which is truly against their interests. [FN78]
A second example of the post-colonial divide in Aboriginal communities is the sexual
discrimination faced by Aboriginal women at the hands of Aboriginal men.[FN79] The Native
Women's Association of Canada (NWAC) is perhaps the most notable example of the political
divide between Aboriginal peoples and Aboriginal women. During the late 1990s, the NWAC
opposed the AFN and other First Nations organizations, arguing that Aboriginal women's
interests were not being addressed. Of particular importance in this regard is an argument made
by the NWAC that Aboriginal self-government is an inherent right, and further that such a right
cannot be exercised by the currently existing patriarchal forms of governance that were created
by a foreign government, that is, those created under theIndian Act. [FN80]
The NWAC was active in the pre-Charlottetown Accord debates and dealt with a number of
political and social conflicts from their own communities. Particularly problematic for Aboriginal
women during these debates was the argument advanced by the AFN that the Charter should
not apply to Aboriginal governments.[FN81] The NWAC, the National Action Committee on the
Status of Women, and the National Mtis Women of Canada were denied the right to participate
in these debates. This denial exemplifies that Indian Act political and societal changes have
occurred in Aboriginal communities, but that the post-Indian Act political organizations are
unwilling to address the problems created by the new forced social and political
arrangements. [FN82] As Green writes:
The single most influential factor determining the exclusion of NWAC from the constitutional
arena was the collective refusal to see Aboriginal women's concerns ... as distinct from and
equally legitimate with Aboriginal men's concerns, and to see male-stream organizations as
precisely that. [FN83]
Given the internalization of exclusionary policies by Aboriginal communities, are Aboriginal
communities capable of defining members and thus, controlling who has access to
rights? [FN84]

VII. THE RIGHT TO DEFINE CITIZENSHIP ... IS IT TOO LATE?

The current form of Aboriginality in Canada has permeated into the lives and identities of
those associated and descended from the Aboriginal peoples. The colonial policies that
purported to shrink those persons defined as Aboriginal have created an internalization of
identity in Aboriginal communities. [FN85]Cornet makes the following comments regarding the
right to define citizenship in the face of colonial definitions:
A system of racial identification and classification imposed through colonialism is quite
different from self-identifying cultural groups organizing themselves into collectiveities, as
peoples ... The right of self-determination is concerned with peoples, not race. Race implies
attributed racial identities assigned by some outside power that assumes superiority in
itself. [FN86]
Aboriginality, in the sense of Aboriginal rights as defined by government, has transformed
and influenced the relations between Aboriginal peoples, their representatives, and the
Canadian state. Although the recognition of Aboriginal peoples and Aboriginal rights occurs
through the definition of Aboriginality, this recognition has not involved the consultation or
meaningful involvement of Aboriginal groups.
Contrary to the policy enforced by the Indian Act, Aboriginal peoples have a right to define
those members of the larger communities that collectively hold rights. [FN87] Failure to
recognize this right to define membership could have significant consequences according to
some theorists. As Christie writes:
Insofar as decisions about how to live their collective lives are manifestations of their
assertions of identity, these sorts of decisions are vitally important. But the power to control their
destinies as Aboriginal peoples, to maintain control over their self-definition, must be
fundamental, for otherwise we could imagine a people being constructed by another. If
Aboriginal communities lose the power to control their self-definition they lose themselves--they
effectively become another. [FN88]
In a sense, it is difficult to see how Aboriginal communities have maintained control over
their own self-definition. Contrary to Christie's comments, the legislatively imposed definitions of
what and who is Aboriginal has created a situation where a people are being constructed and
defined by another. Despite this, there still exists reason to presume that Aboriginal peoples
have a right to define themselves. How this right is to be implemented is where the problem lies.
As the NWAC organization has proven, placing the control in the hands of Aboriginal
communities is much the same as placing it in the hands of colonial governments. As Lawrence
writes:
To treat the Indian Act merely as a set of policies to be repealed, or even as a genocidal
scheme, which we can simply choose not to believe in, ignores how having the identity of
colonized people classified by colonial government regulations can strongly influence their
understand[ing] of their identity. The practices dictated by the Indian Act--in particular, the
manner in which Native women for over a century lost their Indian status if they married white
men, and how half-breeds (now called Mtis) have been excluded from any recognition as
Indian ... now seem[s] normal ... Instead of recognizing that these categories were created by
the settler government to divide us. [FN89]
When an individual has lost status, that person is no longer capable of being active in their
community. Furthermore, communities have been redefined and reorganized into Bands, a
concept that was imposed on Aboriginal peoples by theIndian Act [FN90] and that has displaced
numerous Aboriginal people. How then can Aboriginal peoples properly define themselves when
their communities are dislocated? [FN91]

VIII. JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF ABORIGINALITY TO


ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

A. DECISIONS FROM CANADIAN COURTS

While there are a number of problems with allowing post-colonial Aboriginal communities to
define themselves, the Canadian judiciary is finding it equally problematic to assess Aboriginal
membership and rights. The courts in Canada have developed a number of tests to assess the
validity of the rights claimant, and to describe the content of the rights those claimants seek.
There is seldom, if ever, an attempt to recognize the actual identity of the individual before the
court. This approach, however, arguably changed in the case of R. v. Powley. [FN92] In that
case the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with the claims of two individuals who asserted
membership in a Mtis community, and the Aboriginal right to hunt and fish for food that flow
from such a membership.
In Powley, the Supreme Court developed an Aboriginality test consisting of self-
identification, ancestral connection, and community acceptance. The three part test is
problematic in that self-identification will be typically asserted in the context of criminal liability,
and the obvious outcome is that the accused will likely identify with any group that will allow him
or her to avoid criminal liability. Second, ancestral connection, when coupled with the
community acceptance test, creates interpersonal community problems.
Courts attempting to apply membership criteria to Aboriginal peoples are faced with
problematic applications of criteria based either on the broken history of Aboriginality, or the
myth of race. Following the Powley decision, the Saskatchewan Provincial Court dealt with the
case of R. v. Laviolette, [FN93] which unequivocally demonstrates that the doctrine of
Aboriginality in Aboriginal rights cases in Canada is confused.
In Laviolette, the accused was charged with ice fishing out of season on Green Lake. He
identified himself to the Crown's representatives as a member of Flying Dust First Nation, a First
Nation located in Northern Saskatchewan. The accused resided in Flying Dust and was married
into the community. Furthermore, he was fishing with Flying Dust community members when he
was charged with out-of-season fishing. The other two community members, treaty Indians,
were not charged as they were fishing for food in accordance with a treaty right. One other
Mtis person was also fishing on the lake, but was not charged because he was born in Green
Lake, and fit within the policy of the Department of the Environment, which recognizes an
Aboriginal right to hunt and fish for food if certain criteria are met. [FN94]
The fact that Laviolette resided, married, and associated with the community of Flying Dust
would, presumably, mean that he was indeed a member of this community. It would be these
considerations that would lead one to conclude that the social, political, and cultural attachment
to the Flying Dust community existed. Laviolette, perhaps engulfed by individual interest, and a
desire to avoid criminal liability and the penalties that followed, allowed the Court to apply
the Powleytest in his favour. Rather than using what might seem to be basic reasoning and an
examination of the communities themselves, the Court decided that Laviolette was a member of
the Green Lake Mtis community. This was decided on the basis that one of Laviolette's
ancestors had belonged to the community and he hadrelatives in the community. Presumably,
under the right pressures, Aboriginality can apply in a number of ways.
The application of the Powley decision to the Laviolette case demonstrates Canadian
judiciary often applies the myth of race. The result of the history of Aboriginality in Canada has
been the considerable confusion of who should have Aboriginal rights. The Powley case
demonstrates that the courts believe that only persons biologically descended from a Mtis
ancestor could belong to a Mtis rights bearing community. Furthermore, as the accused
obviously looked Aboriginal, Kalenith J. may have been reluctant to hold Laviolette criminally
liable while his friends, equally Aboriginal in appearance, were not charged. Thus, this case may
have been affected by the self-interest of the accused and the substantive fairness of the
process. Perhaps the saying hard cases make bad law best describes this case. One can
likely find many more hard cases upon which to apply membership criteria.
The Saskatchewan Provincial Court and the Supreme Court of Canada in both
the Laviolette decision and the Powley decision deserve respect for addressing the difficult
question that was placed before them. In the post-colonial Aboriginal communities that have
been reorganized and redefined by colonial legislation, how can one fairly determine residency?
Furthermore, when an individual's liberty is at stake, how can one be asked to identify with any
group other than the group that will enable that individual to avoid liability?
The liberal conception of rights and the reorganization of Aboriginal communities have made
the concept that [a]boriginal rights are collective rights[FN95] a challenge to accept. If
Aboriginal rights are made to apply in the collective sense, and also made to apply due to the
fact that the claimants were here first, then how does one deal with complications created by
the colonial reorganization of groups? Which groups are capable of being defined as holding
collective interests? Can these groups change from their historical roots? If these groups can
change, who can authorize the change?

B. DECISIONS FROM CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

A recent application for an oil sands mine and bitumen processing facility in Fort McMurray
demonstrates the problems associated with Aboriginality, and the liberal application of rights
theory in the historical context. The conception of Aboriginal rights being collective rights was
reinforced, and the idea that Bands, as defined colonially, are holders of collective interests
became problematic for members of Aboriginal communities who have been displaced.
On February 27, 2007, Imperial Oil made an application before the Alberta Energy and
Utilities Board for an oil sands mine. [FN96] In the application, a group of interveners composed
of the Clearwater River Paul Cree Band, the Wood Buffalo First Nation, the Wood Buffalo First
Nation Elders Society, and an individual, John Malcolm, sought meaningful consultation as to
the environmental concerns with a building project on the basis of their Aboriginality. In a
sense, the interveners claimed an Aboriginal right to consultation.
The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Panel assessed each intervener, and questioned
whether or not the particular party was capable of holding and asserting an Aboriginal right. The
Panel first held that the Clearwater Band was not a recognized entity, nor a distinct community
of individuals with Aboriginal rights that give rise to a duty imposed on governments to consult.
The Panel reasoned that because the Clearwater Band was not a Band as defined in
theIndian Act, it could not claim an Aboriginal right as a collective group. [FN97] The Panel
further reasoned that many of the individuals who identified themselves as members of the
Clearwater Band were registered members of another recognized Indian Band, and thus the
Clearwater Band, as a collective, was not entitled to consultative rights. [FN98]
The Panel also assessed the Aboriginal and treaty rights asserted by the Wood Buffalo First
Nation (WBFN), and concluded that the WBFN was also not a Band under the Indian Act, and
that members of this group were also members of another recognized Indian Band. [FN99] A
similar conclusion was drawn when assessing the claim of the Wood Buffalo First Nation Elders
Society, where the Panel held that an Aboriginal society is not capable of holding Aboriginal and
treaty rights. [FN100]
In the case of the individual, John Malcolm, the Panel held that Aboriginal and treaty rights
were communal rights, and where there is a corresponding duty on the part of governments to
engage in meaningful consultation with Aboriginal peoples, that duty is owed to the recognized
aboriginal community as a whole and not to individuals. [FN101] The Panel further held that
Malcolm's status under the Indian Act appears to be unresolved. [FN102]
These proceedings demonstrate the problems associated with defining Aboriginal rights in
the post-colonial era. Aboriginal peoples, given this analysis, are incapable of joining collectively
under their own terms. They are unable to form their own societies, and cannot avoid the
definitions imposed upon them by theIndian Act. The application by a created and perhaps ad
hoc group of Aboriginal people, will not give rise to so-called Aboriginal rights where a
legislatively created Band under the Indian Act presumably will. [FN103]
As Aboriginal rights seem to inevitably flow from descent and culture, the Panel's decision
in Imperial Oil presupposes that people may belong to only one societal cultural at any given
time. This is a fallacy; people may move in and out of cultures, may belong to more than one
culture simultaneously, and may change the culture itself. [FN104] If this conception of identity
and Aboriginality is a reality, then it is hard to distinguish between early enfranchisement
legislation and the current polices which prevent political and social reorganization. Thus, in a
practical sense, social and political organization of Aboriginal peoples is frozen to fit within pre-
existing colonial community formations for the purposes of achieving recognition in Aboriginal
rights claims.
Given the historical context upon which this decision is reasoned, it is difficult to understand
how the concept of being Aboriginal or being here first has any moral or cultural basis. The
basis for Aboriginal rights, it appears, is based not on culture or on family lineage, but rather on
historical definitions that arbitrarily created categories and groupings of Aboriginal people. It is
complicated situations like Imperial Oil that make race and genetics seem like a more just
approach to Aboriginality. Perhaps one could argue that the easiest solution would be to
accept that as long as the individual is biologically descended from an Aboriginal community,
and can fulfill a certain percentage of descent, that person can claim generic Aboriginal rights
anywhere in Canada. This application may lead to improper results, but may be less arbitrary. In
any case, it is difficult to draw a principled line between Indian Act Bands, and an ad
hoc grouping of people who are of Aboriginal descent.

IX. THE INDEFENSIBILITY OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

To ask that Aboriginal people be defined on descent can become rather tautological in the
sense that there has been no guidance regarding the amount of biological connection one must
have. The conception of descent presupposes racial categorization and not culture.
Furthermore, self-identification is also problematic as such a claim may only occur when the
individual faces criminal liability. Community acceptance and group membership is equally
problematic, because it is impossible to overcome the history of bad policy and discrimination of
Aboriginal peoples.
In the end, Aboriginal rights, as defined as rights belonging to those persons who were here
first, leave much to be desired. The hard questions about membership are made even harder
when attempting to find practical solutions for Aboriginal peoples. The liberal rights approach
has left persons with Aboriginal rights feeling as if they are entitled to such rights on the basis of
something connected to their skin colour or challenge-laden life. How can rights that exclude
legitimate first peoples be defensible? Perhaps throwing a collective approach by the wayside
and first, acknowledging that Aboriginal societies have been negatively affected by liberalism,
and second, finding a liberal solution to the problems of individually displaced peoples, may be
the best method of achieving reparations--focusing on needs rather than rights. Such theories
must be discussed against the backdrop of so-called Aboriginality.
Attempting to define Aboriginal rights after colonization is, in a sense, colonizing. Although
some may argue that the proper approach is to salvage what rights and peoples remain, it is
patently and fundamentally unfair to give rights, which are supposed to be inherent rights, only
to the group of people who have been fortunate not to be dealt colonization's bad hand.
Although some scholars attempt to define Aboriginal rights as group rights,[FN105] in
practice, Aboriginal rights are rights granted collaterally to one's membership, and are often
asserted for one's individual liberty or a small group's liberty. Taking a macro-view at the
place Aboriginal peoples play in our society, one must ask: Do Aboriginal rights serve a
function for most Aboriginal peoples? Do they serve a function for inner-city Aboriginal people
in larger centers? Do they serve a function for the displaced women of Bill C-31 and their
families? In the end, we should all have trouble accepting that Aboriginal rights are better than
nothing in their current form. Analyzed critically, Aboriginal rights are only better than nothing
for some Aboriginal peoples. For many, Aboriginal rights serve to exclude legitimate
claimants, and create a group of doubly disadvantaged citizens who are excluded from the
larger society and from Aboriginal rights bearing communities. Do we really want to promote
two-tiered Aboriginal peoples?
Accepting the current state of Aboriginal rights claims, and returning to the so-called sui
generis and ab-origo context within which Aboriginal rights are asserted in principle, one may
conclude that being here first can no longer be fairly determined. In reality, Aboriginal rights
appear to exist, not in the context of being here first, but primarily in the context of need for
reparations. Indeed,Aboriginal rights are legitimized on the basis that Aboriginal peoples were
treated poorly, and therefore, Aboriginal peoples need extra rights to help them survive.
If we look critically, not at what Aboriginal rights should be, but whatAboriginal rights are in
practice, we will understand that reparations for Aboriginalpeoples are not properly distributed
through the arbitrary application of Aboriginalrights. If the goal of Aboriginal rights is to
ensure Aboriginal peoples receive extra benefits to help them survive, then should we not
look to individually displaced Aboriginal people who need help? Do we need to look
to Aboriginalgroups when so many Aboriginal individuals are excluded from these groups?

X. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS: A CONCLUSION

Going back to what it means to be ab-origo, are the existing forms ofAboriginal rights
defensible? If they are, against whom are they defensible? The current form
of Aboriginal rights in Canada needs to be questioned critically. The billions of dollars spent
every year on Aboriginal peoples and Aboriginal rights have done little more than create inter-
ethnic conflict between Aboriginal peoples, and continue to leave Aboriginal people as the
most destitute people in Canada. If Aboriginality and Aboriginal rights are
getting Aboriginal peoples where they are today, a re-examination of the purpose behind
recognizing the liberalized concept of group rights must occur.
Legal and legislative notions of Aboriginality in Canadian law are problematic and have
been misconceived due to calculated and miscalculated attempts by the colonial government.
Individual claims to equality conflict with legislative definitions which have influenced the
practical assessment of what, and who, is an Aboriginal. The internalization of these
definitions has placed the identity and culture of Aboriginal peoples as a questionable
concept within Aboriginalcommunities. Aboriginal peoples within these communities have
turned against one another, and there may be little hope of recovering from the conflicts created
by the forced reorganization.
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples must examine the existing rights scheme in
Canada and ask themselves: Why are Canada's Aboriginal peoples the most destitute and
politically debilitated people in Canada? While I do not suggest that the rights scheme in
Canada has created these destitute and debilitated peoples, I would suggest that it certainly has
not helped all Aboriginalpeoples. Furthermore, Aboriginal rights may be excluding the very
people most in need of help.
A re-examination of both the basis for Aboriginal rights and the practical purpose of these
rights must take place. A closer examination may lead observers to conclude that
while Aboriginal rights are based in the concept that Aboriginalpeoples were here first, the
practical purpose of Aboriginal rights is to support and salvage those people who are a
percentage of the here first population. In this sense, Aboriginal rights have served to be a
form of reparations and entitlements based on support and survival. Understanding this, what
sorts of reparations are we to give to the rest of the people who were here first?
Aboriginal peoples, like the judiciary and the Canadian public, are incapable of ignoring the
past treatment of Aboriginal peoples and the definitions that have defined them. What then can
we do with Aboriginal rights and claims to such rights? Just to say we, as Canadians, have
preserved some traditions of someAboriginal peoples should not be enough to base a rights
regime. As an obscure observer, I do not have the answers to these problems, but would
suggest that on the basis of fairness, unless an appropriate answer can be found, Aboriginal
rights are indefensible.
[FNa1]. LL.B. (Saskatchewan). Currently articling with Cueleneare & Company in Saskatoon.
The author would like to thank Associate Dean Dwight Newman, Ian Flett, Eric Hovius, and Amy
Kolenick as well as the Saskatchewan Law Review and its anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
[FN1]. This is a term that has been used a number of times by the Supreme Court of Canada,
particularly in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203,
173 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Corbiere].

[FN2]. This concept was first developed in H.A.C. Cairns, S.M. Jamieson & K. Lysyk,A Survey
of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A Report on Economic, Political, Educational Needs
and Policies ed. by H.B. Hawthorn (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1966) vol. 1, M.-A. Tremblay,
F.G. Vallee & J. Ryan, ibid., vol. 2 [Hawthorn Report]. The concept of Citizen Plus is aptly
described by Justice Hood of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Thomas v. Norris, [1992] 2
C.N.L.R. 139 at 162, [1992] B.C.J. No. 210 (QL) as follows: While the plaintiff may have special
rights and status in Canada as an Indian, the original rights and freedoms he enjoys can be no
less than those enjoyed by fellow citizens, Indian and non-Indian alike. He lives in a free society
and his rights are inviolable. He is free to believe in, and to practise, any religion or tradition, if
he chooses to do so. He cannot be coerced or forced to participate in one by any group
purporting to exercise their collective rights in doing so. His freedoms and rights are not subject
to the collective rights of the Aboriginal nation to which he belongs.

[FN3]. Cairns, Hawthorn Report, supra note 2 at 6.

[FN4]. In this article the term post-colonial will refer to the period of time after colonization.

[FN5]. There are rights and benefits associated with registered Indian status, especially on
reserves, where the majority of registered Indians are located. These rights non-exhaustively
include: access to funding for housing; post-secondary schooling; tax exemption status; and
land and treaty rights. Aboriginal populations in other communities, such as Mtis and Inuit
peoples, do not have legal or practical access to the same rights and benefits due to location
and categorization.

[FN6]. As noted by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP): [T]heIndian Act is the
repository of the struggle between Indian peoples and colonial and later Canadian policy
makers for control of Indian peoples' destiny within Canada ... By examining the act, how it
came about and how it continues to influence the daily experience of Indian people in Canada,
much can be learned. See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 258 [Report].

[FN7]. See Katherine Biber, Being/Nothing: Native Title and Fantasy Fulfilment (2004) 3
Indigenous L.J. 1 for the argument that nationhood and Aboriginal identity are merely fantasy.

[FN8]. Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2000) at 11.

[FN9]. In The Queen v. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [1981] 4
C.N.L.R. 86 at 89 (C.A.), the Court explained that [t]he Indian peoples of Canada have been
there from the beginning of time. So they are called the Aboriginal peoples'. See also Calder v.
Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, where this concept
was cited in regard to Aboriginal title.

[FN10]. For the common law recognition of this proposition, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 at 559, 8 L. Ed. 483 (U.S.S.C. 1832), where Marshall C.J. recognized that [t]he
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded
them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of
the particular region claimed. For a theoretical discussion of this concept, see Arthur J. Ray, I
Have Lived Here Since the World Regan: An Illustrated History of Canada's Native
People (Toronto: Lester & Key Porter Books, 1996).

[FN11]. S. Prov. C. 1850, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 42. This Act was seen as legitimate and valid, due to
the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (U.K.), 41 & 42 Vict., c. 63.

[FN12]. To view historical legislation dealing with Canada's Aboriginal peoples, seeIndian and
Northern Affairs Canada, Historical Legislation, online: <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/lib/phi/histlws/hln/index_e.html>.

[FN13]. Supra note 11.

[FN14]. Joseph Eliot Magnet, Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada? in Dwight A. Dorey &
Joseph Eliot Magnet, eds., Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths,
2003) 23 at 43.

[FN15]. S. Prov. C. 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 59.

[FN16]. This conflicts with the understanding that Aboriginality can exist in a form of kinship
which could, in theory, allow non-Aboriginal people with no biologically link to those thought to
be Aboriginal people to become linked to the group. As noted by Raymond D. Fogelson,
Perspectives on Native American Identity in Russell Thornton, ed., Studying Native America:
Problems and Prospects (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) 40 at 44-45: For
Native Americans identity was primarily associated with kinship. Kinship not only included those
with whom one could trace familiar common descent, but could be extended to include more
ramifying groups like clans, moieties, and even nations. Moreover, besides biological
reproduction, individuals and groups could be recruited into kinship networks through
naturalization, adoption, marriage, and alliance. Identity encompassed inner qualities that were
made manifest through social action and cultural belief. For a discussion of outsiders becoming
members of a group, see S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the
Status of Freedmen's Descendants (2007) 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 387. The conception that
captivity can lead to an internalization of an identity, something perhaps akin to the Stockholm
Syndrome, has been discussed in a number of works: see James Axtell, The White Indians of
Colonial America, in James Axtell, The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of
Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); and June Namias, White
Captives: Gender and Ethnicity on the American Frontier (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1993). Perhaps one of the most popular and fascinating captivity narratives is
that of John Tanner. See John Tanner, A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John
Tanner, (U.S. Interpreter at the Saut de Ste. Marie) During Thirty Years Residence Among the
Indians in the Interior of North America, ed. by Edwin James (London: Baldwin & Cradock,
1830).

[FN17]. Supra note 15.

[FN18]. Supra note 14 at 43.


[FN19]. It should also be noted that the term Indians was used in s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, but that the term
was not defined therein. In The Attorney General of Canada v. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 at
207, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548, Justice Beetz found that using the word Indians' in s. 91(24), creates
a racial classification and refers to a special group for whom it contemplates the possibility of
special treatment. It does not define the express Indian.

[FN20]. Supra note 14 at 44.

[FN21]. S.C. 1951, c. 29.

[FN22]. Ibid., s. 12.

[FN23]. Magnet, supra note 14 at 44.

[FN24]. Ibid.

[FN25]. (2001), [2002] 3 F.C. 292 at paras. 71-72, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 169, 2001 FCT 1418.

[FN26]. For a broad discussion of the three policy pillars in Indian policy, see John L. Tobias,
Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline of Canada's Indian Policy in J.R. Miller,
ed., Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1991) 127.

[FN27]. For a more modern example of assimilation policy, see James (Skj) Youngblood
Henderson, Sui Generis and Treaty Citizenship (2002) 6 Citizenship Studies 415, particularly
with regard to the gentle invitation by Queen Elizabeth II for Aboriginal peoples to embrace
Canadian citizenship.

[FN28]. An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and to
Amend the Laws Respecting Indians, S. Prov. C. 1857, 20 Vict., c. 26 [Gradual Civilization Act].
Note that this Act was consolidated into the 1876Indian Act. Furthermore, compulsory
enfranchisement was attempted through s. 3 of An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1920, c.
50, and through s. 7 of An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1933, c. 42. It should also be noted
that the 1869 An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of
Indian Affairs, and to Extend the Provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C. 1869,
added a blood quantum requirement for the first time. After 1869, the only people considered
Indians under the Indian Act were those that had one-quarter blood. See Olive Patricia
Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992) at 251, 259.

[FN29]. Gradual Civilization Act, ibid.

[FN30]. Magnet, supra note 14 at 46. See also: Stewart Clatworthy, Indian Registration,
Membership and Population Change in First Nations Communities, online: <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/ra/rmp/rmp_e.pdf>; Stewart Clatworthy, Impacts of the 1985 Amendments to the
Indian Act on First Nations Populations in Jerry P. White, Paul S. Maxim & Dan Beavon,
eds., Aboriginal Conditions: Research as a Foundation for Public Policy (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2003) 63; and Stewart Clatworthy & Anthony H. Smith, Population Implications of the
1985 Amendments to the Indian Act, Final Report, Prepared for the Assembly of First Nations,
December 1992.
[FN31]. Now see Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.

[FN32]. See Martin J. Cannon, Revisiting Histories of Legal Assimilation, Racialized Injustice,
and the Future of Indian Status in Canada in Jerry White, Wendy Cornet and Eric Anderson,
eds., Bill C-31 and First Nations Citizenship: Past Development, Current Impacts and Future
Considerations (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, forthcoming) in draft form, online: <http://
www.arts.usask.ca/sociology/people/MartinCannon/DIANDPaperFinalDraft.pdf>; Joan
Holmes, Bill C-31: Equality or Disparity? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women, 1987); Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Correcting Historic Wrongs? Report of the
National Aboriginal Inquiry on the Impacts of Bill C-31 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1990); Shirley Bear with the Tobique Women's Group, You Can't Change the Indian
Act? in Jeri Dawn Wine & Janice L. Ristock, eds., Women and Social Change: Feminist
Activism in Canada(Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991); Thomas Isaac, Self-
Government, Indian Women and Their Rights of Reinstatement Under the Indian Act: A
Comment on Sawridge Band v. Canada, Case Comment, [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 1; Sally Weaver,
First Nations Women and Government Policy, 1970-92: Discrimination and Conflict in Sandra
Burt, Lorraine Code & Lindsay Dorney, eds., Changing Patterns: Women in Canada, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993) 92; and Joyce Green, Canaries in the Mines of
Citizenship: Indian Women in Canada (2001) 34 Can. J. Polit. Sci. 715.

[FN33]. Bonita Lawrence, Mixed-Race Urban Native People: Surviving a Legacy of Policies of
Genocide in Ron F. Laliberte et al., eds., Expressions in Canadian Native Studies (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Extension Press, 2000) 69 at 79 [Lawrence, Mixed-Race;
emphasis in original].

[FN34]. There is evidence that Aboriginal women face the most difficult socio-economic
circumstances in Aboriginal communities. See Linda M. Gerber, Multiple Jeopardy: A Socio-
Economic Comparison of Men and Women Among the Indian, Mtis and Inuit Peoples of
Canada (1990) 22 Canadian Ethnic Studies 69. Consider also: The Attorney General of
Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481; Courtois v. Canada (Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1991] 1 C.N.L.R. 40, 11 C.H.R.R. D/363
(C.H.R.T.); Corbiere, supra note 1;Sawridge Band v. Canada (1995), [1996] 1 F.C. 3, [1995] 4
C.N.L.R. 121 (T.D.); and Goodswimmer v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 2 F.C. 389, 123
D.L.R. (4th) 93 (C.A.). Note also the British Columbia Supreme Court's decision in McIvor v.
The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2007 BCSC 26, which held that ss. 6(1) and
6(2) of the Indian Act, dealing with the entitlement to register as an Indian, were discriminatory
and violated the Charter, and could not be saved under s. 1.

[FN35]. Magnet, supra note 14 at 57.

[FN36]. Wendy Cornet, Aboriginality: Legal Foundations, Past Trends, Future Prospects in
Dorey, supra note 14, 121 at 133.

[FN37]. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

[FN38]. Ibid., s. 35(2).

[FN39]. The issue of Aboriginal membership has been described as non-justiciable, in that the
process is political and not legal: see Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, Defining the Mtis of Canada: A
Principled Approach to Crown-Aboriginal Relations (2006) at 10 [unpublished]. On
justiciability, see generally Lorne Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of
Justiciability in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999).

[FN40]. See Claude Denis, Indigenous Citizenship and History in Canada: Between Denial and
Imposition in Robert Adamoski, Dorothy E. Chunn & Robert Menzies, eds., Contesting
Canadian Citizenship: Historical Readings (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002) 113 at
116.

[FN41]. For a discussion of this concept, see generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property
(1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707; and Margaret Lock, Genetic Diversity and the Politics of
Difference (1999) 75 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 83. It is notable that in Mabo v. Queensland (No.
2) (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 at 70, [1992] HCA 23, Brennan J. for the Court held: Membership of the
indigenous people depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual
recognition of a particular person's membership by that person and by the elders or other
persons enjoying traditional authority among those people. As the Supreme Court of Canada
in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 at para. 45, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 75, 2006 SCC
54 writes, the notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to racialized stereotypes of Aboriginal
peoples.

[FN42]. See Nancy Shoemaker, Categories in Nancy Shoemaker, ed., Clearing a Path:
Theorizing the Past in Native American Studies (New York: Routledge, 2002) 51.

[FN43]. Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian
State for First Nations Women in Caroline Andrew & Sandra Rodgers, eds., Women and the
Canadian State (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997) 64 at 66.

[FN44]. This term is used in Terry P. Wilson, Blood Quantum: Native American Mixed Bloods in
Maria P.P. Root, ed., Racially Mixed People in America (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications,
1992) 108.

[FN45]. Drew Hayden Taylor, How Native Is Native if You're Native? in Laliberte,supra note 33,
58 at 58-59.

[FN46]. Although race is socially defined, some theorists stress that it is also defined on the
basis of physical criteria: see Maurianne Adams, Core Processes of Racial Identity
Development in Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe & Bailey W. Jackson III, eds., New Perspectives
on Racial Identity Development: A Theoretical and Practical Anthology (New York: New York
University Press, 2001) 209.

[FN47]. See Larry Chartrand, Mtis Identity and Citizenship (2001) 12 Windsor Rev. Legal
Soc. Issues 5.

[FN48]. I thank Paul L.A.H. Chartrand who shared this thought with me in a personal
conversation in the summer of 2006.

[FN49]. Bonita Lawrence writes: Native resistance to colonization rejects notions of pan-Indian
identities that can, at best, only aspire for equality within a settler state framework; Gender,
Race, and the Regulation of Native Identity in Canadaand the United States: An Overview
(2003) 18:2 Hypatia 3 at 5. See also Hilary N. Weaver, Indigenous Identity: What Is It and
Who Really Has It? (2001) 25 Am. Indian Q. 240.
[FN50]. The concept that a uniform identity can and does exist, has, to some degree, been
internalized by Aboriginal peoples. See Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology:
Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) at 20,
where the author links self-identity to stereotyping.

[FN51]. These boundaries have been formed around communities, see Eva Marie
Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and Survival in Native America (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2003) at 99.

[FN52]. Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of
Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (New York: Routledge, 1988) at 2.

[FN53]. Indeed, the stereotyping can be internalized. When such internalization occurs, societal
orders can change. As Bhabha writes: For it is the force of ambivalence that gives the colonial
stereotype its currency: ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive
conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and marginalization; produces that effect of
probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be inexcess of what
can be empirically proved; Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge,
1994) at 66.

[FN54]. D.H. Taylor, supra note 45 at 59, jokingly states: I know many successful Aboriginal
people who are every bit as Native as those who still subsist on Kraft Dinner and drive 1974
Dodge pickups.

[FN55]. The Indian Problem was labeled as such by Duncan Campbell Scott, who stated: I
want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, that this country ought to
continuously protect a class of people who are able to stand alone ... Our object is to continue
until there is not a single Indian inCanada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and
there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department, that is the whole object of this Bill; John
Leslie & Ron Maguire, The Historical Development of the Indian Act (Ottawa: Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Treaties and Historical Research Center, 1978) at
114.

[FN56]. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government
of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) [White Paper].

[FN57]. For a discussion of this and other policies regarding the Trudeau Indian policy, see
generally Sally M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968-
1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); and J.R. Miller,Skyscrapers Hide the
Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1989).

[FN58]. To some degree the definitions of Aboriginality through historic Indian policy have
been successful in assimilating at least some Aboriginal Canadians, and have had the effect of
creating members of Aboriginal communities who are concerned with individual goals rather
than community goals.

[FN59]. Alan C. Cairns, Aboriginal Canadians, Citizenship, and the Constitution in Douglas E.
Williams, ed., Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship & Constitutional Change: Selected
Essays (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995) 238.
[FN60]. Hawthorn Report, supra note 2. For a critic of the White Paper ideology, see Harold
Cardinal, The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians(Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969).

[FN61]. See Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 5th ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Ian F. Haney Lpez, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice (1994) 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L.
Rev. 1.

[FN62]. It should be noted that the Indian Act has used blood quantum (and still uses it, subject
to the Band's discretion) and culture as defining features of Indians, something that is
inconsistent with internal norms of identity: see L. Chartrand, supra note 47. The concept of
blood corresponding to identity was thought to symbolize and embody racial and genetic
difference by Euro-North Americans. See also: Laura Kathryn Ferguson, Indian Blood or
Lifeblood? An Analysis of the Racialization of Native North American Peoples (M.A. Thesis,
Montana State University, 2005), online: <http://
www.montana.edu/etd/available/unrestricted/Ferguson_0505.pdf>; Circe Sturm,Blood Politics:
Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma(Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2002); Fogelson, supra note 16; Steve Russell, Apples are the Color of Blood
(2002) 28 Critical Sociology 65; Pauline Turner Strong & Barrik Van Winkle, Indian Blood:
Reflections on the Reckoning and Refiguring of Native North American Identity (1996) 11
Cultural Anthropology 547; and Frederick K. Lomayesva, Indian Identity and Degree of Indian
Blood (1995) 3 Red Ink 33. For an elaborate discussion of this concept in the American context,
see Paul Spruhan, Quantum of Power: Historical Origins of Blood Identification in the United
States Indian Policy (M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1996).

[FN63]. Cairns, Hawthorn Report, supra note 2 at 6.

[FN64]. See W. Graham Allen, Taxation Aspects of the Sechelt Agreement-in-Principle (2000)
48 Can. Tax J. 1817, for an example where the Indian Acttaxation exemption has arbitrary
results. However, it can be justified in that there are policy reasons to support and attract
individuals living on reserves. This arguably presumes that urban areas are easier for some
Aboriginal peoples to live. At an interpersonal level, Aboriginal peoples who live on reserves will
often scorn the concept that urban reserves can be exempt from taxation, given the fact that
urban reserves are not as destitute as many rural reserves.

[FN65]. See Fogelson, supra note 16. This is to be contrasted with the early sociological
conception that identity can change, but remain the same, in that identity can mature. Erikson
indicates that evolution can occur with identity: Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994). Indeed, as William Wordsworth noted, The Child is the
father of the Man: My heart leaps up when I behold in E. de Selincourt, ed., The Poetical
Works of William Wordsworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940) 226. This is not to imply that
leaving a reserve is an evolution, but rather to demonstrate that it can be maturing for some
persons living on reserves.

[FN66]. D.H. Taylor, supra note 45 at 58. For a discussion of the possible lack in authenticity of
some members of Aboriginal communities asserting status for preferential treatment, see Cornel
D. Pewewardy, So You Think You Hired an Indian Faculty Member? The Ethnic Fraud
Paradox in Higher Education in Devon Abbot Mihesuah & Angela Cavender Wilson,
eds., Indigenizing the Academy: Transforming Scholarship and Empowering
Communities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).
[FN67]. Note that the courts have, to some degree, internalized the conception that urban
Aboriginal peoples are somehow different from on-reserve Aboriginal peoples. The application
of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688,
171 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Gladue], is perhaps the best indication of this. At trial, Jamie Gladue
stated that because the accused was living off reserve in an urban centre, she had grown up in
a regular community and not an Aboriginal community, and therefore there were no special
circumstances arising from her Aboriginal status. Rebutting this presumption, the counsel on
behalf of Aboriginal Legal Service of Toronto argued on appeal that, The idea that an Aboriginal
people can only be an Aboriginal person while living on a reserve is clearly false and is
demeaning to the almost half the population of Aboriginal people who do live off reserve.
See Gladue, ibid. (Factum of the Intervener Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto at 12). See
also R. v. John, [2004] 7 W.W.R. 643, 182 C.C.C. (3d) 273, 2004 SKCA 13.

[FN68]. Lawrence, Mixed-Race, supra note 33 at 76.

[FN69]. The fact that the Indian Act definitions control so much in the lives of Aboriginal people
is one primary reason that authenticity of Aboriginality is assessed under the Indian Act model.
As Ovide Mercredi and Mary Ellen Turpel note in In The Rapids: Navigating the Future of First
Nations (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada, 1993) at 81: From the time of birth, when an Indian
child must be registered in one of seventeen categories defining who is an Indian, until the
time of death, when the Minister of Indian Affairs acts as executor of the deceased person's
estate, our lives are ruled by the Act and the overwhelming bureaucracy that administers it.

[FN70]. In The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, ON: House of Anansi Press, 1991) at 29 [C.
Taylor, Modernity], Charles Taylor explains that the concept of identity is a powerful moral ideal
that is imposed from the outside on one's self, and [i]t accords crucial moral importance to a
kind of contract with myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as in danger of being lost,
partly through the pressures towards outward conformity, but also because in taking an
instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the capacity to listen to this inner voice. On the
issue of identities as being defined by the Indian Act, see generally Robert K. Groves & Bradford
W. Morse, Constituting Aboriginal Collectivities: Avoiding New Peoples In Between (2004) 67
Sask. L. Rev. 257.

[FN71]. Modernity, ibid. at 35-36.

[FN72]. This includes the concept of community leadership. See Taiaiake Alfred,Peace, Power,
Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 1,
30.

[FN73]. See J. Wherrett & D. Brown, Self-Government for Aboriginal Peoples Living in Urban
Areas, abridged and revised version, prepared by the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations
for the Native Council of Canada, 1992, online: <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/ra/rep/cha1_e.html>. I understand that this is an oversimiplification of whom the
AFN proports to represent, however, for the purposes of this article, this general categorization
can be presumed.

[FN74]. Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, CAP Corbire Commission Report-- Issues for Phase
II, online: <http://www.abo-peoples.org/programs/corbiere/corbiere8.html>.

[FN75]. It should be reinforced that the genocidal policies of the Canadian government
contributed to the creation of on-reserve and off-reserve Aboriginals. In addition to the Indian
Act definitions, these genocidal policies have included residential schools, the widespread
adoption of Aboriginal children by non-Aboriginal families, and considerable economic policies
that forced Aboriginal peoples from their reserves. It should be noted that Lawrence, Mixed-
Race, supranote 33 at 87 states as follows: Everybody I interviewed asserted loftily, as if it was
all too obvious, that status had nothing to do with whether one is a Native person or not. At the
same time, almost everybody, when pressed, admitted that they did feel that status
Indians were more Native that non-status Indians or Mtis [emphasis in original].

[FN76]. This is perhaps most evident in the recent CAP support for the Conservative
government, while the AFN supported the Liberals. See Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, News
Release, Congress of Aboriginal Peoples Applauds Conservative Election Victory (27 January
2006), online: <http://www.abo-peoples.org/Communications/NewsReleases/Harper
%20Election%20Release.pdf>; and Doug Cuthand, Best for Chiefs to Steer Clear of Partisan
Politics The [Saskatoon] StarPhoenix (24 February 2006) A11.

[FN77]. RCAP wrote: Perhaps less well appreciated is the way the Indian Act, because of its
separation of status and non-status Indians, has influenced how national Aboriginal political
organizations are structured. The legislation helped institutionalize divisions between Aboriginal
political organizations. This is not to suggest that Aboriginal peoples do not have divisions and
differences of their own. However, the Indian Act legislated key divisions and helped create
Aboriginal political structures that made divide-and-conquer politics an easier game to play
(Report, supra note 6 at 251).

[FN78]. The saying too many chiefs, not enough Indians is an apt description of post-colonial
Aboriginal political groups. The changes imposed on Aboriginal societies by the definition and
redefinition of Aboriginality have created opposition and decentralization within Aboriginal
groups. There is little protection for individual rights under this conception, and at some point
there must be a more concentrated effort as a collective minority if genuine political power is to
be obtained.

[FN79]. For a discussion of this issue, see Joyce Green, Sexual Equality and Indian
Government: An Analysis of Bill C-31 Amendments to the Indian Act (1985) 1:2 Native Studies
Review 81; Lynn Gehl, The Queen and I: Discrimination Against Women in the Indian
Act Continues (2000) 20:2 Canadian Woman Studies 64; and Wendy Moss, Indigenous Self-
Government in Canada and Sexual Equality Under the Indian Act: Resolving Conflicts Between
Collective and Individual Rights (1990) 15 Queen's L.J. 279. See also D. Sanders, Indian
Status: A Women's Issue or an Indian Issue (1984) 3 C.N.L.R. 30.

[FN80]. Margaret A. Jackson, Aboriginal Women and Self-Government in John H. Hylton,


ed., Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues(Saskatoon: Purich,
1994) 180 at 185.

[FN81]. See Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, 119 D.L.R.
(4th) 224.

[FN82]. Cannon has argued that: [L]egal assimilation is furthered by the inability of
governments (deliberate or inadvertent) to transfer knowledge concerning legal inequality to
status Indian communities (supra note 32 at 13). One has to wonder if education has the ability
to change the views of these communities now.

[FN83]. Joyce Green, Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal
Government in Laliberte, supra note 33, 328 at 348.

[FN84]. For a discussion of how definitions of Indian have affected the concept of identity and
authenticity in American Indian communities, see Eva Marie Garroutte, The Racial Formation of
American Indians: Negotiating Legitimate Identities within Tribal and Federal Law (2001) 25
Am. Indian Q. 224.

[FN85]. As Jordan writes: [I]ndividuals recognize their self-sameness and continuity in time and
perceive that others recognize their self-sameness and continuity; Dierdre E. Jordan,
Aboriginal Identity: The Management of a Minority Group by the Mainstream Society (1986) 6
The Canadian Journal of Native Studies 271 at 273. As a social function, identity will change
when assessment criteria for identity and membership also change.

[FN86]. Cornet, supra note 36 at 125.

[FN87]. For a discussion of this concept, see Delia Opekokew, Self-identification and Cultural
Preservation: A Commentary on Recent Indian Act Amendments (1986) 2 C.N.L.R. 1. In the
American context, see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (U.S.S.C. 1978) which
effectively upheld the right of the Santa Clara Pueblo community to enact membership criteria
that discriminated against the rights of female members of the community. It should be noted
that this case has been subject to heavy criticism. See also Denis, supra note 40 at 115-17; and
Jo-Anne Fiske & Evelyn George, Seeking Alternatives to Bill C-31: From Cultural Trauma to
Cultural Revitalization through Customary Law (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2006),
online: <http:// www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/index_e.html> select: Seeking Alternatives to
Bill C-31: From Cultural Trauma to Cultural Revitalization through Customary Law.

[FN88]. Gordon Christie, Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples (2003) 2 Indigenous L.J. 67 at
98 [emphasis in original].

[FN89]. Lawrence, Mixed-Race, supra note 33 at 76.

[FN90]. The Indian Act created the concept of band council, and imposed the concept on
Aboriginal peoples despite their existing traditions.

[FN91]. For a discussion of these issues in relation to on-reserve membership, seeCorbiere,


supra note 1.

[FN92]. R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2003 SCC 43[Powley].

[FN93]. R. v. Laviolette, [2005] 3 C.N.L.R. 202, 267 Sask. R. 291, 2005 SKPC 70[Laviolette]. I
thank Paul L.A.H. Chartrand for his discussions of this decision with me.

[FN94]. Ibid. at para. 1.

[FN95]. R. v. Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 at para. 22, 58 C.R.R. (2d) 149 (Ont. Ct. J. (Prov.
Div.)).

[FN96]. Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited Application (27 February 2007), Alberta Energy
and Utilities Board Decision 2007-013, online: <http://
www.eub.ca/docs/documents/decisions/2007/2007-013.pdf> [Imperial Oil]. On the scope of
administrative tribunals, see generally Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission),
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 449, 2003 SCC 55.

[FN97]. Imperial Oil, ibid. at 13.

[FN98]. Ibid.

[FN99]. Ibid.

[FN100]. Ibid. at 14.

[FN101]. Ibid.

[FN102]. Ibid. In contrast, the Court in Labrador Metis Nation v. Newfoundland and Labrador
(Minister of Transportation and Works), [2006] 4 C.N.L.R. 94, 779 A.P.R. 257, 2006 NLTD
119, held that a community represented by a corporate entity had Aboriginal rights and had
selected the corporation as its agent to assert the Aboriginal rights. This dichotomy
demonstrates the continued confusion in this area.

[FN103]. For a discussion of the concept of Bands effecting membership and entitlements, see
Larry Gilbert, Entitlement to Indian Status and Membership Codes in Canada, (Scarborough,
ON: Carswell, 1996).

[FN104]. See S.O. Gaines Jr. et al., Interethnic Relationships in Judith A. Feeney & Patricia
Noller, eds., Close Relationships: Functions, Forms and Processes (New York: Psychology
Press, 2006) 171 at 172.

[FN105]. See e.g. Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of
Group Self-Preservation (1989) 2 Can. J.L. & Jur. 19; and Jocelyn Gagne, Entitlement to the
Rights of Aboriginal People (LL.M. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1992) (Ottawa: National Library
of Canada, 1994).

70 SASKLREV 393

END OF DOCUMENT

(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters.

70 Sask. L. Rev. 393

Tinjauan Hukum Saskatchewan


2007

Pasal

Para ketidakmungkinan untuk pembelaan Post-Colonial Hak Aborigin


Brian R. Pfefferle [FNa1]

Hak Cipta 2007 Saskatchewan Tinjauan Hukum; Brian R. Pfefferle

I. PENDAHULUAN
Dalam masyarakat Kanada dan pengadilan Kanada hak Aborigin berteori atas dasar bahwa mereka adalah sui
generis hak yang mengalir dari "Aboriginality" penggugat Aborigin itu.[FN1] Dalam hal ini hak Aborigin tidak hanya
hak-hak minoritas, melainkan menuntut bahwa orang-orang Aborigin diperlakukan dengan rasa hormat istimewa
sebagai "orang pertama" dan sebagai "Warga Plus". [FN2]
Sementara masyarakat Aborigin berhak atas pengakuan kolektif status mereka, kolonisasi dan liberalisme telah
membentuk dan misshaped batas-batas di mana pengadu Aborigin harus membuktikan mereka berhak atas hak
tertentu, dan, dalam proses, telah disentitled individu dan komunitas pantas pengakuan. Selanjutnya, pada tingkat
antarpribadi, "Aboriginality" dan Aboriginalrights telah diinternalisasi oleh Kanada Aborigin dan non-Aborigin, dan
dirasionalisasikan sebagai reparasi atau sebagai pengembalian kepada mereka orang yang telah diperlakukan
sebagai "Warga Minus" [FN3] oleh non- Aborigin masyarakat. Konsep hak Aborigin sebagai imbalan dan reparasi
telah memiliki konsekuensi yang cukup besar bagi masyarakat Aborigin.
"Aboriginality," sebagai kategori budaya dan ras yang dikenakan pada Aboriginalpeoples, tidak dapat
mempertahankan hak jenis dicari oleh masyarakat Aborigin sebagai kolektif, dan hanya berfungsi untuk masyarakat
Aborigin menyimpang, memicu konflik internal dan eksternal. Ada argumen bahwa dalam rangka untuk aplikasi yang
lebih adil dari hak-hak Aborigin, dan komunitas Aborigin kurang terfragmentasi, identitas dan "Aboriginality"
masyarakat Aborigin harus didefinisikan dari dalam Aboriginalcommunities sendiri.
Sementara memungkinkan masyarakat untuk menentukan keanggotaan dan "Aboriginality," ada komplikasi cukup
berurusan dengan siapa harus dapat menentukan siapa yang "orang-orang Aborigin" adalah. Pada akhirnya, kita
harus menyimpulkan bahwa definisi "Aboriginality" telah berubah secara fundamental masyarakat Aborigin, dan
identitas recreatedAboriginal sehingga membuat keanggotaan adil dan hanya mungkin untuk menentukan. Para
redefinitions legislatif "Aboriginality" telah menciptakan fragmentasi dan pendekatan berbasis hak yang telah
meninggalkan komunitas Aborigin dan hubungan interpersonal dalam komunitas ini dalam reruntuhan.Selanjutnya,
pengadilan, dipaksa untuk mendefinisikan dan mengkategorikan individu dan kelompok sebagai "Aborigin," dan
menentukan apakah individu atau kelompok layak hak Aborigin, menghadapi tugas yang sulit dan sangat politis.
Masyarakat kita, seperti sistem hukum kita, tidak dilengkapi untuk memutar waktu kembali sejarah pengakuan
kolektif.Sementara "Aboriginality" dikatakan ada meskipun definisi legislatif, "Aboriginality" yang ada saat ini sangat
bingung dan keliru bahwa hak-hak Aborigin dan hak istimewa di Kanada berfungsi untuk mengurangi, daripada
memajukan masyarakat yang sangat mereka berpikir untuk membantu. Ini adalah pendekatan liberal untuk hak-hak
Aborigin yang membuat hak-hak tersebut, dalam keadaan mereka saat ini, tidak dapat dipertahankan.
Pada artikel ini, saya akan menguraikan konsep "Aboriginality" dan peran definisi legislatif telah dalam
mendefinisikan masyarakat Aborigin. Setelah membahas fragmentasi dalam masyarakat Aborigin yang diciptakan
oleh konsep "Aboriginality," saya akan menjelaskan beberapa masalah interpersonal dengan Aboriginalcommunities,
terutama berfokus pada perempuan Aborigin kehilangan haknya, diikuti dengan diskusi konsep liberal yang telah
didefinisikan ulang masyarakat Aborigin, konsep mereka tentang Aborigin identitas, dan efeknya redefinisi ini akan
memiliki pada keanggotaan. Terakhir, saya akan menguraikan tiga kasus yang berbeda di mana pengadilan dan
dewan administrasi mencoba untuk mendefinisikan "Aboriginality" pada hari ini, dan menerapkan definisi mereka
tentang "Aborigin" pada situasi tertentu. Saya akan menyimpulkan dengan menunjukkan bahwa itu adalah mustahil
dan tidak praktis untuk mencoba untuk mendefinisikan konsep kelompok "Aboriginality" ketika kelompok yang
pertama kali berhak hak tidak lagi sama. Pendekatan masa depan untuk hak-hak Aborigin di Kanada harus fokus
pada kebutuhan orang-orang Aborigin individu, sebagai lawan yang disebut "melekat" hak-hak dari masyarakat
Aborigin.

II. Sebuah TEORI ABORIGINALITY


Konsep yang Aborigin dan "Aboriginality" Istilah perhatian utama ke pos-kolonial, [FN4] "Aboriginality," bebas
dipengaruhi orang Aborigin. Dalam pandangan pengadilan dan masyarakat Aborigin, adalah kebutuhan yang
diperlukan untuk pemerintahdan non-pemerintah hak, serta hak-hak Aborigin dan konstitusional. [FN5]
Definisi saat ini dan masa lalu di mana masyarakat Aborigin didefinisikan tidak didasarkan pada identitas atau asal-
usul sejarah, budaya, wilayah, bahasa, atau politik, tetapi lebih pada kebijakan India federal dengan sedikit
pengakuan dari mantan pertimbangan. Istilah dan kategori yang mendefinisikan hak-hak Aborigin sama-sama
dipengaruhi oleh kebijakan India federal.Berdasarkan ini, "Aboriginality" muncul dari hubungan antara penduduk asli
Kanada dan pemerintah kolonial yang telah diasumsikan yurisdiksi atas penduduk ini. [FN6] Jadi, "Aboriginality" tidak
didefinisikan dari satu set ada orang dengan pra-ada hak, [FN7] tetapi lebih dari dihitung, atau lebih mungkin, suatu
salah perhitungan seperangkat kategori untuk mendefinisikan masyarakat tersebut. Definisi "Aboriginality" berevolusi
dari kedua kegagalan untuk mengenali keragaman antara masyarakat Aborigin dan konteks sosial, politik dan
teritorial dalam masyarakat Aborigin yang telah ditetapkan sendiri.
III. ASAL USUL DAN Aborigin DEFINISI kolonial "INDIA"
Istilah "asli" berasal dari kata Latin "ab," atau "dari," dan "origo," yang berarti "asal". [FN8] Ide dibalik "Aboriginality"
adalah bahwa Aboriginalpeoples berada di tanah Kanada dari "zaman dahulu" [FN9] dan "sini dulu". [FN10]
Meskipun makna harfiah dari "Aborigin" didasarkan pada gagasan hal menghuni asli, aplikasi praktis dari prinsip
pasca-kolonial "Aboriginality" telah gagal untuk mengenali makna di balik menjadi "sini dulu".
Istilah "India" memiliki dampak yang signifikan pada konsep "Aboriginality" dan hak-hak yang mengalir dari konsep
ini.Selanjutnya, konsep "India" telah menciptakan perubahan signifikan dalam "identitas" dari Aborigin Kanada dan
konsepsi mereka tentang apa artinya menjadi "Aborigin". 1850-Sebuah Undang-Undang Perlindungan Lebih Baik
dari Tanah dan Properti Indian dari Lower Kanada, [FN11] adalah tindakan legislatif pertama untuk benar-benar
mendefinisikan "Indian," dan bisa dibilang memulai penciptaan hukum "Aboriginality". [FN12] Di bawah s. 5 Undang-
undang ini, "Indian" didefinisikan sebagai memiliki karakteristik sebagai berikut:
Pertama .-- Semua orang darah India terkenal milik Badan tertentu atau Suku Indian tertarik pada tanah tersebut,
dan keturunan mereka:
Kedua .-- Semua orang menikah dengan seperti India dan tinggal di antara mereka, dan keturunan dari semua
orang-orang tersebut:
Ketiga .-- Semua orang, yang berada di kalangan orang India tersebut, yang orang tuanya di kedua sisinya atau
Indian Tubuh atau Suku, atau berhak untuk dianggap sebagai seperti: Dan
Keempat .-- Semua orang diadopsi pada bayi oleh orang India tersebut, dan tinggal di desa atau di atas tanah suku
atau Tubuh Indian, dan keturunan mereka. [FN13]
Meskipun definisi ini adalah definisi yang paling inklusif dari "India" diadopsi oleh Legislatif Kanada - sebuah definisi
yang pada dasarnya berdasarkan kekerabatan - itu dicabut satu tahun kemudian. [FN14] Peraturan baru
mempersempit definisi "India," dan dengan demikian mempersempit konsep "Aboriginality" dengan menciptakan
sejumlah pengecualian. Dalam s. 2 An Act untuk Mencabut dalam Bagian dan untuk amandemen Undang-undang,
berjudul, UU Sebuah untuk Perlindungan Lebih Baik dari Tanah dan Properti Indian Kanada Bawah, [FN15] hanya
perempuan non-India keturunan diizinkan untuk memperoleh status melalui menikah dengan orang India, dan anak-
anak perempuan menikah dengan pria non-India dikeluarkan.Selanjutnya, di bawah 1851 amandemen non-India
yang tinggal di antara India dikeluarkan dari definisi Aborigin. [FN16] Bagian 2 dari Undang-Undang berbunyi sebagai
berikut:
Pertama. Semua orang darah India, terkenal milik suku tertentu atau Tubuh India tertarik pada tanah atau properti
immoveable, dan keturunan mereka:
Kedua. Semua orang yang tinggal di kalangan orang India tersebut, yang orang tuanya atau, atau salah satu dari
mereka berada atau tidak, turun di kedua sisi dari India, atau terkenal India milik suku tertentu atau Tubuh India
tertarik pada tanah atau properti immoveable, dan keturunan dari semua orang-orang tersebut: Dan
Ketiga. Semua wanita, sekarang atau selanjutnya untuk secara sah menikah dengan salah satu orang yang
termasuk dalam beberapa kelas yang ditunjuk disini sebelumnya, isu anak-anak dari perkawinan tersebut, dan
keturunan mereka. [FN17]
Sifat sewenang-wenang dari perubahan-perubahan fundamental mengubah masyarakat masyarakat
Aborigin. Redefinisi dan reklasifikasi masyarakat "Indian" terpisah dan terpinggirkan beberapa anggota masyarakat
Aborigin, sebuah fenomena yang memiliki konsekuensi praktis yang cukup besar untuk hak-hak pengadu
Aborigin. Seperti Magnet menulis: "Definisi menyempit [dari yang merupakan India] berperan untuk decreas populasi
[ing] Hindia dan properti." [FN18] Penurunan dalam populasi menyebabkan formasi sosial baru dan bentuk-bentuk
baru dari keanggotaan yang tidak adil terpinggirkan anggota masyarakat Aborigin.
Kanada secara resmi Undang-Undang India dikenakan pada masyarakat Aborigin Kanada pada tahun 1876 di mana
"Indian" lagi-lagi didefinisikan, dan hukum-hukum sebelumnya di Kanada berurusan dengan India
dikonsolidasikan. [FN19] Para 1876 India definisi Undang-Undang dikecualikan sejumlah orang yang rasial, budaya,
dan etnis Aborigin. Seperti Magnet menjelaskan:
Undang-undang ditentukan patrilineally status. Persyaratan status adalah laki-laki darah India, terkenal milik sebuah
band tertentu, atau anak atau istri dari orang tersebut. Empat kategori orang Aborigin dikeluarkan dari definisi 1876:
anak haram; Indian yang tinggal lima tahun atau lebih di negara asing; Indian hak suara, dan Manitoba Metis yang
menerima hak berdasarkan Undang-Undang Manitoba, 1870. [FN20]
India tahun 1951 Undang-Undang [FN21] dikecualikan orang Inuit dan Aborigin yang telah mencapai usia dua puluh
satu, dan yang ibu atau ayah ibunya telah memperoleh Status India melalui pernikahan. [FN22] Revisi 1951 Undang-
Undang India signifikan, dan mewakili pergeseran fundamental dalam penentuan nasib sendiri masyarakat Aborigin,
sebelum revisi ini pemerintah "mengandalkan daftar keanggotaan komunitas Indian individu, paylists perjanjian dan
catatan lembaga untuk mengidentifikasiIndian ". [FN23] Para 1951 revisi efektif dihapus kemampuan kelompok
Aborigin untuk menentukan keanggotaan mereka sendiri. Ini adalah signifikan secara historis, dalam mendefinisikan
"Aboriginality" dalam arti efektif diteruskan ke pemerintah. Magnet menjelaskan revisi 1951 sebagai:
Act 1951 memperkenalkan Daftar India dan kantor Panitera India untuk mengawasi masuknya ke dalam dan
penghapusan dari Register. Ini kekuasaan birokrasi terpusat untuk menentukan status India, dan juga ditransfer
sejumlah besar kekuasaan dalam hal itu dari masyarakat India untuk seorang pejabat federal. [FN24]
Kebijaksanaan untuk menambah dan menghapus anggota komunitas Aborigin dikecam oleh Pengadilan Federal
dalam kasus Kanada (Panitera, India Daftar) v. Sinclair, [FN25] menandakan kebijaksanaan ketidakadilan tersebut
dapat bermain. Meskipun kritik, konsep "yang Aborigin?" Telah selamanya diubah oleh kebijakan ini.
Agenda kolonial untuk pembebasan lebih lanjut runtuh masyarakat Aborigin dalam upaya untuk "membudayakan"
Indian dan menghapus "Indianness" mereka [FN26]. Hal ini diakui untuk memaksa orang Aborigin untuk keluar
klasifikasi hukum dari "India" dan menjadi warga negara penuh Kanada. [FN27] Undang-undang di bidang pemberian
hak memilih datang pada tahun 1857, di bawah Undang-Undang Peradaban Bertahap, [FN28] dan difokuskan pada
masyarakat Aborigin putus dan sepenuhnya mengintegrasikan "Indian" ke dalam masyarakat.Dalam s. 3 dari
Undang-Undang, pembebasan dapat terjadi jika "India" adalah dua puluh satu tahun, dapat berbicara, membaca dan
menulis bahasa Inggris atau Prancis, orang dari "karakter moral yang baik," dan tidak punya utang. [FN29]
Tentu saja ketentuan pemberian hak memilih yang paling bermasalah adalah s. 12 (1) (b) dari Undang-Undang India
1951.Ketentuan ini secara otomatis hak suara wanita yang menikahi pria non-India dan sangat berhasil dalam
menghancurkan komunitas Aborigin, sebagai kira-kira lima ratus perempuan hak suara setiap tahun [FN30]. Hal ini
tetap berlaku sampai tahun 1985, ketika Bill C-31 [FN31] terbalik efek s. 12 (1) (b) dari Undang-Undang
1951. Meskipun pembalikan ini, kerusakan besar sudah dilakukan untuk masyarakat Aborigin, dan masalah tetap
dengan keturunan yang disebut "Bill C-31 India". [FN32]
Mungkin aspek yang paling menantang dari Bill C-31 adalah internalisasi dari redefinitions legislatif oleh masyarakat
Aborigin.Sebagai Bonita Lawrence menjelaskan:
Setelah lebih dari satu abad diskriminasi gender dalam UU India, gagasan bahwa entah bagaimana dapat diterima
bagi perempuan asli kehilangan status untuk menikahi pria non-status atau non-asli telah menjadi aspek normal dari
kehidupan asli banyak komunitas ... Ini telah menjadi anak-anak dari ibu dan ayah asli putih atau Metis yang telah
dipaksa melalui hilangnya status India untuk menjadi kota India, dan yang, dalam komunitas asli asal mereka, sering
dianggap sebagai orang luar karena mereka telah diberi label sebagai "tidak sedang India ". [FN33]
Memahami hak Aborigin sebagai konsep yang berasal dari "sini dulu," dan mengakui hak untuk diri-definisi
keanggotaan dapat memiliki konsekuensi yang cukup besar dalam masyarakat liberal bahwa nilai hak-hak dan
kebebasan individu. Individu yang akan, tetapi untuk pelanggaran pemerintah, berhak untuk keanggotaan dan
pengakuan, yang tidak diterima di masyarakat karena kebijakan keanggotaan diskriminatif dan internalisasi peraturan
sebelumnya. Dalam generasi yang akan datang, bagaimana orang-orang tersebut untuk diberikan hak Aborigin
seharusnya mereka layak? Bagaimana hak-hak Aborigin ada saat mereka sadar mengecualikan layak penerima
begitu banyak?
Efek sejarah Bill C-31 akan mempersulit hak-hak Aborigin di generasi mendatang. [FN34] Sebagai Bill pasca-C-31
era band India memberikan kontrol lebih besar atas daftar keanggotaan mereka, mereka mampu menentukan siapa
itu, dan yang tidak, anggota band mereka. Magnet menjelaskan bahwa masih ada sejumlah masalah dengan rezim
baru kontrol keanggotaan untuk band India:
Tahun 1985 amandemen Undang-Undang India memuat ketentuan-ketentuan yang tampaknya bertentangan. Di satu
sisi, Bangsa Pertama dapat mengambil kendali keanggotaan. Ini menyiratkan suatu bentuk pemerintahan sendiri di
mana band-band sendiri memutuskan keanggotaan mereka. Di sisi lain, dalam s. 10, kategori tertentu dari orang
memperoleh hak untuk memiliki nama-nama mereka ditempatkan pada daftar band yang dikelola oleh Departemen
Luar India sebelum daftar ini dipindahkan ke band ... Ini lalat dalam menghadapi kontrol pita keanggotaan, karena
Departemen Luar India masih akan membuat keputusan tentang keanggotaan band, kali ini dengan mengembalikan
status yang India dan keanggotaan band untuk mereka yang memenuhi syarat di bawah Bill C-31. [FN35]
Sementara Bill C-31 amandemen diperangi terhadap diskriminasi seksual dari 1951 India Act, "generasi cut-off kedua
aturan" terus mencabut hak dan mereklasifikasi masyarakat Aborigin. Cornet menjelaskan bentuk baru disentitlement
sewenang-wenang yang diciptakan oleh Bill C-31:
Aturan baru ini berlaku sama bagi laki-laki dan perempuan yang lahir setelah 1985. Dalam s. 6 dari status Undang-
Undang India saat ini, ditolak untuk anak yang lahir dari dua generasi status dan non-status orang tua. Aturan ini
kadang-kadang populer disebut "generasi kedua cut-off aturan". Hal ini dicapai melalui operasi sistem pendaftaran
India. Hak untuk pendaftaran sekarang hanya didasarkan pada keturunan atau adopsi oleh terdaftar
India. Pernikahan tidak bisa lagi menghasilkan conferral atau penolakan status India. [FN36]
Langkah terakhir dalam redefinisi legislatif "Aboriginality" bagi orang-orang Aborigin datang dalam UU Konstitusi,
1982, [FN37] khususnya yang berkaitan dengan pengakuan dan penegasan hak Aborigin yang ada dan
perjanjian. [FN38] Meskipun hak Aborigin ditegaskan dan diakui oleh Undang-Undang Konstitusi, 1982, baik hak-hak
substantif yang ditegaskan dan diakui, maupun "orang-orang Aborigin" yang memiliki hak tersebut, didefinisikan
dalam dokumen konstitusional. Hal ini mungkin lulus penilaian definisi ke pengadilan Kanada; pengadilan yang tidak
mampu, atau berhak untuk membuat penilaian keanggotaan seperti penilaian sulit dan non-berkeadilan [FN39].
IV. Fragmentasi OLEH rasialisasi
Definisi hukum dan legislatif yang Aborigin telah terjadi melalui konsep hukum dari "India" dan "India". Konsep-
konsep ini tidak secara akurat mencerminkan makna bawaan balik menjadi "ab-origo," juga tidak mencerminkan
bagaimana masyarakat Aborigin dan bangsa mengatur dan mendefinisikan diri mereka sendiri. [FN40] Sebaliknya,
konsep "India" dan "India" adalah bagian dari proses kolonial rasialisasi [FN41] dan kategorisasi.[FN42] Keadilan
Turpel-Lafond komentar:
Ungkapan ini, "India," adalah salah satu yang asing. Ini adalah istilah yang dipaksakan oleh pemerintah kolonial. Ini
bukan istilah Bangsa Pertama. Pertama Bangsa-orang, yang memiliki kata-kata mereka sendiri untuk diri mereka
sendiri dalam berbagai bahasa mereka. Kami memiliki nama untuk rakyat kami, dan untuk wilayah kami. Kata "India"
dan menyangkal effaces keragaman masyarakat kita. Masyarakat kami adalah budaya yang berbeda dan bahasa
yang beragam. Kami tidak "Indian".Satu harus ingat bahwa ada banyak masyarakat adat yang berbeda di Kanada,
tidak ada kategori tunggal bernama "India".Kami telah "Indianized" atau diklasifikasikan oleh pemerintah untuk tujuan
administratif. Kami bukan "ras" monolitik atau homogen. Kami telah "rasial" sebagai minoritas oleh negara, dan itulah
sebabnya kesetaraan-mencari harus benar dikontekstualisasikan. [FN43]
Internalisasi konsep ras dapat dilihat di komunitas Aborigin - identifikasi masyarakat Aborigin otentik berdasarkan
penampilan dan status sosial. Kolonisasi telah meninggalkan banyak berkulit terang keturunan orang Aborigin, ini
terutama jadi ketika Eropa mengasuh keturunan Aborigin. Drew Hayden Taylor bercanda mencontohkan bagaimana
ini "pencampuran" dari orang-orang telah menciptakan masalah interpersonal dalam masyarakat Aborigin dan
"Indianness kelas dua": [FN44]
Semakin gelap Anda, semakin Anda memeluk dan semakin India Anda dianggap. Lebih ringan kulit Anda, semakin
sulit kadang-kadang harus diterima oleh rekan-rekan Aborigin Anda (dan dunia non-Pribumi). Putih tidak lagi
benar. Dan surga melarang bahwa seseorang dari budaya yang dominan, yang kebetulan memiliki beberapa nenek
moyang hampir-ingat siapa yang menggelitik jari-jari kaki dan diperdagangkan lebih dari beberapa bulu dan manik-
manik dengan orang Pribumi, harus membiarkan slip percakapan dengan tanpa menyebutkan bahwa setidaknya
empat dari 24 kromosom di dalam tubuhnya tidak membakar di matahari musim panas. [FN45]
Kategorisasi masyarakat sebagai ras pasukan anggota untuk fokus pada perbedaan yang membuat mereka otentik
dan menilai keaslian lainnya terhadap latar belakang ini.
Dengan menciptakan kategori sosial berdasarkan ras, [FN46] kebijakan Aborigin di Kanada telah menciptakan
fragmentasi sosial dalam masyarakat Aborigin. Selanjutnya, "Aboriginality" telah menciptakan konotasi hukum yang
dimanifestasikan rasa hak individu berdasarkan pada apa artinya menjadi "Aborigin".
Penciptaan kelembagaan "Aboriginality" telah menciptakan sebuah mitos bahwa masyarakat Aborigin dan menjadi
"Aborigin" adalah ras, bukan konsep, sosial, politik, atau budaya.[FN47] Konsep ras dan keturunan lebih cocok untuk
peternakan hewan daripada mendefinisikan orang, bangsa, atau pengelompokan sosial-politik. [FN48] Juga
mengganggu adalah konsep identitas Aborigin. Orang sering mendengar ungkapan "identitas Aborigin," mungkin
merenungkan bahwa seperti identitas ada, atau bisa eksis, sebagai kategori ditentukan.[FN49] Ini adalah logika
identitas, dan mantra yang mengikutinya, yang membantu mendefinisikan "Aboriginality" di komunitas Aborigin hari
ini. [FN50] Selain itu, definisi ini yang membantu mendefinisikan hak-hak masyarakat dan hubungan antara orang-
orang Aborigin.
Di Kanada, identitas dan identitas dirayakan sebagai bentuk multikulturalisme. Multikulturalisme ini didefinisikan,
dalam konsep diri-ucapan selamat dari "mosaik budaya," yang Kanada, rakyatnya, dan pemerintah merayakan
sebagai demonstratif keterbukaan Kanada. Diperdebatkan, bagaimanapun, identitas kelompok Aborigin, seperti yang
didefinisikan secara historis dan diinternalisasi, menciptakan batas-batas di mana anggota kelompok Aborigin
percaya bahwa mereka harus mendefinisikan diri mereka. [FN51] Dalam hal ini, kelompok kolektif perubahan
masyarakat Aborigin.
Identitas telah menjadi "konsep orang tentang siapa mereka, apa jenis orang mereka, dan bagaimana mereka
berhubungan dengan orang lain". [FN52] Implikasi praktis dari "Aboriginality" dan identitas Aborigin adalah bahwa
keaslian orang berhubungan dengan orang Aborigin dinilai berdasarkan identitas kolektif atau identitas. Mereka
anggota kelas etnis "orang Aborigin" yang sosial lingkungan tidak mengandung beberapa unsur "Warga Minus" gaya
hidup dilihat sebagai palsu, dijuluki oleh beberapa sebagai "cracker", sebuah istilah menghina yang digunakan untuk
menggambarkan bule di selatan Amerika Serikat , atau sebagai "apel," merah di luar putih di dalam, karena
pertahanan populer hak Aborigin. [FN53] Berdasarkan fenomena ini, "Aboriginality" didefinisikan pada tingkat
masyarakat, dan orang-orang didefinisikan sebagai "Aborigin" mulai menilai klaim mereka atas "hak tambahan" tidak
dimiliki oleh Kanada lainnya atas dasar bahwa "Aboriginality" berarti "Warga Minus". Saya telah melihat dan
mendengar fenomena ini di provinsi sendiri. "Aborigin asli" melihat kesuksesan, kekayaan, dan "jalan yang mudah"
seperti yang autentik [FN54]. Hal ini telah mengakibatkan konsepsi yang menguntungkan Aborigin sedang menuai
oleh "cracker," bukan otentik, berjuang "Aborigin" yang berada dalam membutuhkan bantuan. Mengingat konsepsi
tentang apa yang "identitas Aborigin" seharusnya, yang obyektif dapat mendefinisikan "Aboriginality"?

V. ABORIGINALITY SEBAGAI INDIVIDU KONSEP LIBERAL


Tanpa diragukan lagi, bukti dari warisan liberalisme pada "Aboriginality" dapat ditemukan dalam UU India. UU India
berfokus pada konsep overcollectives individu, dan asimilasi untuk memerangi apa yang disebut "masalah
India". [FN55] Untuk tingkat tertentu, undang-undang ini memiliki efek untuk menciptakan "Indian" sebagaimana
didefinisikan dalam Undang-Undang sebagai melayani diri sendiri dan tidak tertarik dalam pelestarian kelompok.
Selain Undang-Undang India, tahun 1969 "White Paper" [FN56] adalah contoh dari persatuan nasional dan
liberalisme mempengaruhi "Aboriginality". [FN57] Dorongan dasar dari paper ini adalah untuk membasmi kebijakan
definisi dan perbedaan yang diciptakan oleh UU theIndian dan menghapus segala perbedaan hukum antara "India"
dan Kanada lainnya.Pemberantasan ini direkomendasikan dalam nama menghindari diskriminasi terhadap minoritas
"Indian".
Aktivis Aborigin menolak proposisi yang dikemukakan dalam "White Paper," karena memiliki potensi pemberantasan
apa pengakuan masyarakat Aborigin yang ada dalam masyarakat Kanada. [FN58] yang mendasari tesis makalah ini
adalah bahwa status terpisah berkontribusi pada keterbelakangan ekonomi, isolasi sosial, dan kantong-kantong
budaya mundur. [FN59] Atau, kelompok Aborigin lebih suka menggunakan terminologi masyarakat Laporan
Hawthorn itu Aborigin mendefinisikan sebagai "Warga Plus". [FN60] Penolakan "White Paper" telah dibuktikan
penerimaan suku Aborigin bahwa "Aboriginality" telah legislatif taxonomized oleh non-Aborigin
pemerintah. Sementara penolakan menunjukkan pengakuan tersebut, masyarakat konsep "identitas" masih rusak.
Dasar atas mana "Aboriginality" didefinisikan dibangun pada sejarah asimilasi dan liberal-individualisme. Orang
Aborigin, dan hak consequentlyAboriginal, terjebak dalam kungkungan model asimilasi yang mengabaikan komunitas
Aborigin dan keinginan mereka. Mitos ras [FN61] memainkan ke dalam konsep "Aboriginality," dalam konsepsi kuno
darah kuantum [FN62] yang didefinisikan, dan siapa yang tidak, bagian dari kelas etnis Aboriginalpeoples. Ini telah
berdampak sangat negatif pada beberapa orang Aborigin yang telah mendefinisikan apa yang "Indian" berarti dalam
masyarakat Kanada, berdasarkan sering pada melihat "India" sebagai individu yang menjadi korban, terpinggirkan,
dan yang menjadi milik masyarakat dengan kebanyakan masalah sosial . Memang, itu adalah konsepsi liberal
tentang hak Aborigin yang telah membuat hak-hak tersebut diterima oleh mayoritas dari Kanada, yang menemukan
kenyamanan dalam percaya bahwa hak-hak Aborigin ada dalam rangka untuk membantu orang Aborigin menjadi
individu yang lebih baik.
Bahwa hak-hak Aborigin dan membela berasal dari konsep bahwa masyarakat Aborigin harus menderita untuk
menjadi otentik "Aborigin," mungkin terbaik dicontohkan dalam bahasa Laporan Hawthorn, di mana ia mencatat
bahwa konsep "Warga Plus," yang hak-hak Aborigin dalam s. 35 (2) dari Piagam boleh dibilang membuat, ini
disebabkan setidaknya sebagian untuk "status sebaliknya India telah mengadakan, sebagai warga negara dikurangi,
yang juga bertentangan dengan masyarakat yang sangat egaliter, telah ditoleransi untuk waktu yang lama".[FN63]
Tampaknya bahwa Laporan Hawthorn telah mencerminkan sentimen seseorang mungkin merasa saat
mendengarkan Aborigin Kanada dalam masyarakat di mana mereka tinggal.Para "Warga Plus" konsep hak-hak
dibangun atas gagasan bahwa orang-orang Aborigin diperlakukan dengan buruk, dan dengan demikian harus
diperlakukan lebih baik, untuk membantu mereka "mengejar ketinggalan" dengan non-Aborigin rekan-rekan
mereka. Memang, ini sering dasar melalui mana hak untuk on-cadangan India Status - seperti pembebasan pajak -
yang disahkan, meskipun agak sewenang-wenang dalam aplikasi mereka. [FN64]

VI. Otentik Aborigin: KONSEP FROZEN


Yang menghubungkan dari sebuah identitas sosial dengan masyarakat Aborigin Aborigin, dan hak-hak individu dan
kolektif yang mengalir dari seperti identitas, efektif membeku hak dan hak-pembawa dalam waktu. Dalam arti filosofis
dan bahkan praktis, identitas pribadi dan asosiasi dengan identitas kolektif menyiratkan bahwa perubahan identitas
individu akan membuat individu yang berbeda dari kolektif, mendefinisikan individu sebagai sesuatu selain anggota
identitas kolektif. Dengan demikian, anggota masyarakat Aborigin tinggal di-cadangan akan sering mengerut atas
para anggota yang telah dipindahkan dari cadangan untuk mencapai tujuan pekerjaan atau menghadiri
sekolah. Sementara beberapa anggota masyarakat akan menyambut orang-orang seperti kembali, pilihan mungkin
memiliki konsekuensi interpersonal yang cukup besar. [FN65] Sebagai Drew Hayden Taylor menulis:
Banyak cadangan dan organisasi pendidikan asli terus-menerus mendorong dan memuji kebaikan pendidikan pada
pemuda.Namun, komunitas ini juga percaya bahwa semakin terdidik Anda menjadi, kurang "asli" Anda akan. Mereka
mencemooh dan penghinaan mereka yang ingin atau telah melalui proses pendidikan. Jelas, pengetahuan dan
pembelajaran individu menghilangkan warisan budaya mereka. [FN66]
Orang Aborigin yang tidak lagi bertindak "Aborigin," dan tidak lagi diperlakukan sebagai Aborigin, tidak dapat
dikatakan memiliki identitas Aborigin di bawah konsepsi ini [FN67] Bertindak, berkaitan, dan hanya menjadi "Aborigin"
seperti yang dipahami dan didefinisikan. menjadi faktor kontingen untuk menilai "otentik" orang-orang
Aborigin. Penilaian ini mempengaruhi hak-hak Aborigin, dan bagaimana orang yang menerima hak tersebut terlihat
dalam komunitas mereka sendiri.Fenomena ini bisa sangat bermasalah jika masyarakat Aborigin, dipersenjatai
dengan bias kolonial, mampu anggota tidak termasuk, dan efektif termasuk para anggota dari setiap klaim hak-hak
Aborigin. Dengan penilaian "keaslian", dalam kombinasi dengan mendefinisikan sejarah dan mendefinisikan
masyarakat Aborigin, sulit, kalau bukan mustahil, untuk menilai siapa yang mampu menjadi Aborigin. Kedua identitas
legislatif dan identitas sosial melanggengkan siklus membingungkan.
Taksonomi identitas, setidaknya sebagian karena Undang-Undang India, dan kebijakan legislatif lainnya di Kanada,
mendefinisikan kualitas yang pasti bagi yang, dan siapa yang tidak, dari sebuah "identitas" tertentu. Identitas
taksonomi menghambat orang, termasuk peradilan, dari pemikiran dan pemahaman "orang" sebagai sebuah entitas
politik, sosial, dan sejarah. Setelah banyak waktu, identitas taksonomi menjadi identitas yang nyata, dan mereka
mencoba untuk melihat "identitas" tidak mengakui kekuasaan, dominasi, dan dasar-dasar filosofis cacat di mana
"orang" dan mereka sendiri "masyarakat" telah dikategorikan dan didefinisikan. Sebagai Bonita Lawrence menulis:
Untuk dapat diakui sebagai pemerintah federal India status di Kanada, seseorang harus mampu memenuhi standar
ketat dari peraturan pemerintah. Pengaruh memiliki identitas asli sehingga sangat diatur oleh suatu badan hukum
seperti Undang-Undang India adalah bahwa cara kita memahami identitas asli, dalam arti, dibentuk oleh berbagai
undang-undang. Undang-Undang India, dalam hal ini, jauh lebih dari satu set peraturan yang telah dikendalikan
setiap aspek kehidupan India selama lebih dari satu abad. Ini memberikan cara memahami identitas asli,
mengorganisir sebuah kerangka kerja konseptual yang telah membentuk kehidupan asli kontemporer dalam cara-
cara yang sekarang begitu akrab untuk hampir tampak [FN68] "alami."
Ini adalah kejutan kecil yang hadir hari masyarakat Aborigin telah dinilai keasliannya dengan latar belakang konsepsi
liberal tentang identitas. [FN69] Hal ini khususnya mengingat perubahan sosial yang dipaksakan melalui UU India
[FN70].
Konsepsi identitas telah berhasil melepaskan kepentingan kolektif dalam masyarakat Aborigin. Meskipun perbedaan
dan pengakuan perbedaan di antara semua bangsa selalu terjadi, konsep hak-hak individu telah merumuskan
kembali kepentingan masyarakat Aborigin. Kepentingan ini telah menjadi sebagai diri-sebagai menghindari tanggung
jawab kriminal melalui penegasan dari sebuah "hak Aborigin". Sementara kepentingan masyarakat Aborigin telah
didefinisikan ulang, persepsi keaslian juga telah didefinisikan ulang. Fenomena ini adalah kejadian alami dengan
menemukan identitas. Sebagai Charles Taylor menjelaskan, "[d] efining sendiri berarti menemukan apa yang
signifikan dalam perbedaan saya dari orang lain." [FN71] The "hak" yang diberikan kepada Aboriginalpeoples, dan
yang diakui dan ditegaskan dalam s. 35 (2) dari Undang-Undang Konstitusi,, 1982 bukan hak yang mengalir dari
"Aboriginality" atau menjadi "di sini dulu," melainkan mengalir dari penilaian taksonomi dari orang rasial. Hal ini telah
membingungkan dasar atas mana "hak Aborigin" harus ada.
Tidak ada bukti yang lebih baik bahwa identitas kolektif masyarakat Aborigin telah bingung dan salah paham dari
pada orang-orang baru groupingsAboriginal politik telah dibuat. [FN72] saya menyarankan bahwa pengelompokan
politik menunjukkan keberhasilan kebijakan India liberal di Aboriginalcommunities merusak. Beberapa organisasi
Aborigin paling menonjol tampaknya telah memeluk redefinisi identitas Aborigin, dengan mencoba untuk mewakili
kategori pasca-kolonial masyarakat Aborigin.
Melihat berbagai organisasi sendiri, fragmentasi dalam representasi dapat dilihat. Sebagai contoh, Majelis Bangsa
Pertama (AFN) merupakan status yang tinggal suku Indian di cadangan, [FN73] sementara Kongres ofAboriginal
Masyarakat (CAP) merupakan cadangan off-orang Aborigin. [FN74] Dikotomi antara kedua kelompok menunjukkan
kesenjangan antara Aboriginalpeoples dan internalisasi yang statusnya Indian Aborigin yang berbeda dibandingkan
non-status Indian pada inti dari keberadaan mereka. [FN75] Kedua kelompok ini mewakili dua penyebab yang
berbeda, dan karena ini, menentukan keanggotaan dan "Aboriginality" dalam cara yang jelas berbeda.[FN76]
Meskipun ada sedikit keraguan bahwa pada cadangan-cadangan dan off-orang Aborigin memiliki perbedaan
kebutuhan dan keprihatinan, kadang-kadang bertentangan AFN dan CAP telah reorganisasi politik menurut definisi
kolonial. [FN77] ini sangat mengganggu dalam klaim modern untuk hak untuk menentukan kewarganegaraan
kemungkinan akan didasarkan pada reorganisasi politik dan sosial. Ini adalah fenomena yang telah membingungkan
para pemimpin politik Aborigin menjadi kesalahpahaman yang benar-benar bertentangan dengan kepentingan
mereka. [FN78]
Contoh kedua dari perpecahan pasca-kolonial di komunitas Aborigin adalah diskriminasi seksual yang dihadapi oleh
perempuan Aborigin di tangan orang-orang Aborigin [FN79] Perempuan asli Asosiasi Kanada (NWAC) mungkin
adalah contoh yang paling penting dari perpecahan politik antara.Aborigin masyarakat dan perempuan
Aborigin. Selama akhir 1990-an, NWAC yang menentang AFN dan lainnya Pertama Bangsa organisasi, dengan
alasan bahwa kepentingan perempuan Aborigin yang tidak ditangani. Sangat penting dalam hal ini merupakan
argumen yang dibuat oleh NWAC bahwa diri pemerintah Aborigin merupakan hak yang melekat, dan lebih jauh
bahwa hak tersebut tidak dapat dilakukan oleh "bentuk-bentuk patriarki saat ini ada pemerintahan yang diciptakan
oleh pemerintah asing, "yaitu, mereka dibuat di bawah Undang-Undang theIndian". [FN80]
NWAC itu aktif dalam pra-Charlottetown Accord perdebatan dan ditangani dengan sejumlah konflik politik dan sosial
dari komunitas mereka sendiri. Terutama bermasalah bagi perempuan Aborigin selama perdebatan adalah argumen
canggih oleh AFN bahwa Piagam tidak harus berlaku untuk pemerintah Aborigin [FN81] Para NWAC, Komite Aksi
Nasional tentang Status Perempuan, dan Metis Nasional Perempuan Kanada itu. Ditolak hak untuk berpartisipasi
dalam perdebatan ini. Penyangkalan ini mencontohkan bahwa UU India perubahan politik dan sosial telah terjadi di
komunitas Aborigin, tetapi bahwa pasca-India Act organisasi politik tidak bersedia untuk mengatasi masalah yang
diciptakan oleh perjanjian baru sosial dan politik memaksa. [FN82] Sebagai Hijau menulis:
Faktor yang paling berpengaruh dalam menentukan pengecualian NWAC dari arena konstitusional adalah penolakan
kolektif untuk melihat persoalan perempuan Aborigin yang ...yang berbeda dari dan sama-sama sah dengan masalah
pria Aborigin, dan untuk melihat "laki-stream" organisasi setepat itu.[FN83]
Mengingat internalisasi kebijakan eksklusif oleh masyarakat Aborigin, komunitas Aborigin yang mampu
mendefinisikan anggota dan dengan demikian, mengendalikan siapa yang memiliki akses ke "hak"? [FN84]

VII. HAK UNTUK MENDEFINISIKAN KEWARGANEGARAAN ...IS IT TERLAMBAT?


Bentuk saat ini "Aboriginality" di Kanada telah meresap ke dalam kehidupan dan identitas orang-orang terkait dan
keturunan dari orang-orang Aborigin. Kebijakan-kebijakan kolonial yang tujuannya untuk mengecilkan orang-orang
didefinisikan sebagai "Aborigin" telah menciptakan internalisasi identitas di komunitas Aborigin. [FN85] Cornet
membuat komentar berikut tentang hak untuk menentukan kewarganegaraan dalam menghadapi definisi kolonial:
Sebuah sistem identifikasi dan klasifikasi rasial yang dipaksakan melalui penjajahan sangat berbeda dari diri-
mengidentifikasi kelompok budaya mengorganisir diri ke dalam collectiveities, sebagai masyarakat ... Hak
menentukan nasib sendiri berkaitan dengan masyarakat, bukan ras. "Ras" menyiratkan identitas ras disebabkan
ditugaskan oleh beberapa kekuatan luar yang mengasumsikan superioritas dalam dirinya sendiri. [FN86]
"Aboriginality," dalam arti hak-hak Aborigin seperti yang didefinisikan oleh pemerintah, telah mengubah dan
mempengaruhi hubungan antara orang-orang Aborigin, wakil-wakil mereka, dan negara Kanada. Meskipun
pengakuan masyarakat Aborigin dan hak Aborigin terjadi melalui definisi "Aboriginality," pengakuan ini tidak
melibatkan konsultasi atau keterlibatan bermakna dari kelompok Aborigin.
Bertentangan dengan kebijakan ditegakkan oleh UU India, masyarakat Aborigin memiliki hak untuk menentukan
anggota-anggota masyarakat yang lebih besar yang secara kolektif memiliki hak. [FN87] Kegagalan untuk menyadari
hal ini hak untuk menentukan keanggotaan bisa memiliki konsekuensi yang signifikan menurut beberapa
teori. Seperti Christie menulis:
Sejauh keputusan tentang bagaimana menjalani kehidupan kolektif mereka adalah manifestasi dari pernyataan
mereka identitas, jenis ini keputusan yang sangat penting. Tapi kekuatan untuk mengendalikan nasib mereka
sebagai masyarakat Aborigin, untuk mempertahankan kontrol atas diri-definisi mereka, harus menjadi dasar, karena
kalau tidak kita bisa membayangkan orang-orang yang dibangun oleh orang lain. Jika masyarakat Aborigin
kehilangan kekuatan untuk mengendalikan diri mereka definisi mereka kehilangan diri mereka sendiri - mereka
secara efektif menjadi "lain." [FN88]
Dalam arti, sulit untuk melihat bagaimana masyarakat Aborigin telah mempertahankan kontrol atas diri mereka
sendiri-definisi.Berlawanan dengan komentar Christie, definisi legislatif dikenakan apa dan siapa yang "Aborigin"
telah menciptakan situasi di mana orang sedang dibangun dan didefinisikan oleh orang lain. Meskipun demikian,
masih ada alasan untuk menganggap bahwa orang-orang Aborigin memiliki hak untuk mendefinisikan diri mereka
sendiri. Bagaimana hak ini akan dilaksanakan adalah di mana masalah terletak. Sebagai organisasi NWAC telah
terbukti, menempatkan kontrol di tangan masyarakat Aborigin adalah sama seperti menempatkannya di tangan
pemerintah kolonial. Seperti Lawrence menulis:
Untuk mengobati UU India hanya sebagai seperangkat kebijakan yang akan dicabut, atau bahkan sebagai skema
genosida, yang kita hanya dapat memilih untuk tidak percaya, mengabaikan bagaimana memiliki identitas orang-
orang terjajah diklasifikasikan oleh peraturan pemerintah kolonial kuat dapat mempengaruhi mereka memahami [ing]
identitas mereka.Praktek ditentukan oleh Undang-Undang India - khususnya, cara di mana perempuan asli untuk
lebih dari satu abad India kehilangan status mereka jika mereka menikah dengan pria kulit putih, dan bagaimana
"setengah-keturunan" (sekarang disebut Metis) telah dikecualikan dari pengakuan apapun seperti India ...sekarang
tampaknya [s] yang normal ... Alih-alih mengakui bahwa kategori ini diciptakan oleh pemerintah pemukim untuk
memecah belah kita. [FN89]
Ketika seseorang telah kehilangan status, orang yang tidak lagi mampu menjadi aktif dalam komunitas
mereka. Selanjutnya, "masyarakat" telah didefinisikan ulang dan diorganisasikan menjadi "Band," sebuah konsep
yang dikenakan pada masyarakat Aborigin oleh Undang-Undang theIndian [FN90] dan yang memiliki banyak
pengungsi orang-orang Aborigin.Bagaimana kemudian dapat masyarakat Aborigin benar mendefinisikan diri mereka
ketika masyarakat mereka dislokasi? [FN91]

VIII. HUKUM dan quasi-PENERAPAN HUKUM "ABORIGINALITY" HAK UNTUK Aborigin

A. DARI KEPUTUSAN PENGADILAN KANADA


Walaupun ada sejumlah masalah dengan memungkinkan pasca-kolonial komunitas Aborigin untuk mendefinisikan
diri mereka, pengadilan Kanada menemukan itu juga bermasalah untuk menilai keanggotaan Aborigin dan
hak. Pengadilan di Kanada telah mengembangkan sejumlah tes untuk menilai keabsahan hak penggugat, dan untuk
menggambarkan isi dari hak-hak mereka yang mencari pengadu. Ada jarang, jika pernah, sebuah usaha untuk
mengenali identitas sebenarnya dari individu sebelum pengadilan. Pendekatan ini, bagaimanapun, bisa dibilang
berubah dalam kasus R. v. Powley. [FN92] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah Agung Kanada dihadapkan dengan klaim dari
dua individu yang menegaskan keanggotaan dalam sebuah komunitas Metis, dan hak Aborigin untuk berburu dan
ikan untuk makanan yang mengalir dari seperti keanggotaan.
Dalam Powley, Mahkamah Agung mengembangkan "Aboriginality" tes yang terdiri dari identifikasi diri, koneksi
leluhur, dan penerimaan masyarakat. Tes bagian tiga bermasalah di bahwa identifikasi diri akan biasanya
menegaskan dalam konteks tanggung jawab pidana, dan hasil jelas adalah bahwa terdakwa kemungkinan akan
mengidentifikasi dengan kelompok yang akan memungkinkan dia untuk menghindari tanggung jawab pidana. Kedua,
koneksi leluhur, ketika digabungkan dengan uji penerimaan masyarakat, menciptakan masalah komunitas
antarpribadi.
Pengadilan mencoba untuk menerapkan kriteria keanggotaan untuk masyarakat Aborigin dihadapkan dengan
aplikasi bermasalah kriteria didasarkan baik pada sejarah rusak "Aboriginality," atau mitos ras. Menyusul keputusan
Powley, Pengadilan Provinsi Saskatchewan ditangani dengan kasus R. v. Laviolette, [FN93] yang tegas menunjukkan
bahwa doktrin "Aboriginality" dalam kasus-kasus hak Aborigin di Kanada bingung.
Dalam Laviolette, terdakwa didakwa dengan memancing es di luar musim di Green Lake. Dia memperkenalkan
dirinya kepada wakil-wakil Crown sebagai anggota Nation Debu Terbang Pertama, First Nation terletak di Northern
Saskatchewan.Terdakwa tinggal di Debu terbang dan menikah ke masyarakat.Selain itu, ia sedang memancing
dengan anggota Debu Terbang komunitas ketika ia didakwa dengan out-of-musim penangkapan ikan. Para anggota
masyarakat lainnya dua, perjanjian India, tidak dikenakan karena mereka memancing untuk makanan sesuai dengan
hak perjanjian. Satu orang lainnya Metis juga memancing di danau, tapi tidak dikenakan biaya karena ia lahir di
Green Lake, dan "sesuai dalam kebijakan Departemen Lingkungan Hidup, yang mengakui hak Aborigin untuk
berburu dan ikan untuk makanan jika kriteria tertentu terpenuhi ". [FN94]
Fakta bahwa Laviolette tinggal, menikah, dan terkait dengan komunitas Debu Terbang akan, mungkin, berarti bahwa
dia memang anggota komunitas ini. Ini akan menjadi pertimbangan yang akan membawa kita untuk menyimpulkan
bahwa keterikatan sosial, politik, dan budaya untuk masyarakat Debu Terbang ada. Laviolette, mungkin ditelan oleh
kepentingan individu, dan keinginan untuk menghindari tuntutan pidana dan hukuman yang diikuti, memungkinkan
Mahkamah untuk menerapkan Powleytest menguntungkannya. Daripada menggunakan apa yang tampaknya
merupakan alasan dasar dan pemeriksaan dari masyarakat itu sendiri, Pengadilan memutuskan bahwa Laviolette
adalah anggota dari Green Lake Metis masyarakat. Ini diputuskan atas dasar bahwa salah satu nenek moyang
Laviolette telah milik masyarakat dan dia hadrelatives di masyarakat. Agaknya, di bawah tekanan yang tepat,
"Aboriginality" dapat diterapkan dalam sejumlah cara.
Penerapan keputusan Powley untuk kasus Laviolette menunjukkan Kanada peradilan sering kali berlaku mitos
ras.Hasil sejarah "Aboriginality" di Kanada telah menjadi kebingungan siapa yang harus memiliki hak Aborigin. Kasus
Powley menunjukkan bahwa pengadilan percaya bahwa orang hanya biologis keturunan dari nenek moyang Metis
bisa milik sebuah komunitas bantalan hak Metis. Selain itu, sebagai terdakwa jelas tampak Aborigin, Kalenith J.
mungkin telah enggan untuk menahan Laviolette bertanggungjawab secara pidana sedangkan teman-temannya,
sama Aborigin dalam penampilan, tidak dikenakan biaya. Jadi, kasus ini mungkin telah terpengaruh oleh
kepentingan-diri terdakwa dan keadilan substantif proses. Mungkin mengatakan "kasus-kasus berat membuat hukum
buruk" terbaik menggambarkan kasus ini. Satu kemungkinan bisa menemukan banyak kasus lebih keras yang di
atasnya untuk menerapkan kriteria keanggotaan.
Pengadilan Saskatchewan Provinsi dan Mahkamah Agung Kanada dalam kedua keputusan Laviolette dan keputusan
Powley pantas mendapatkan rasa hormat untuk mengatasi pertanyaan sulit yang ditempatkan di depan
mereka. Dalam pasca-kolonial komunitas Aborigin yang telah direorganisasi dan didefinisikan ulang oleh undang-
undang kolonial, bagaimana bisa satu yang cukup menentukan residensi? Selanjutnya, ketika kebebasan individu
yang dipertaruhkan, bagaimana seseorang bisa diminta untuk mengidentifikasi dengan kelompok lain selain
kelompok yang akan memungkinkan individu bahwa untuk menghindari kewajiban?
Konsepsi liberal tentang hak dan reorganisasi masyarakat Aborigin telah membuat konsep bahwa "[a] boriginal hak
adalah hak kolektif" [FN95] tantangan untuk menerima. Jika hak-hak Aborigin yang dibuat untuk menerapkan dalam
arti kolektif, dan juga membuat untuk menerapkan karena fakta bahwa pengadu adalah "sini dulu," lalu bagaimana
orang menangani komplikasi yang dibuat oleh kolonial reorganisasi kelompok? Kelompok mana yang mampu
memegang didefinisikan sebagai kepentingan kolektif? Dapatkah kelompok-kelompok ini berubah dari akar sejarah
mereka? Jika kelompok ini bisa berubah, yang dapat mengotorisasi perubahan?

B. KEPUTUSAN DARI PENGADILAN ADMINISTRASI KANADA


Sebuah aplikasi terakhir untuk minyak pasir tambang dan fasilitas pengolahan di aspal Fort McMurray menunjukkan
masalah yang terkait dengan Aboriginality, dan penerapan teori liberal tentang hak-hak dalam konteks
sejarah. Konsepsi hak Aborigin menjadi hak kolektif diperkuat, dan gagasan bahwa "Band," sebagaimana
didefinisikan oleh penjajah, adalah pemegang kepentingan kolektif menjadi masalah bagi anggota masyarakat
Aborigin yang telah mengungsi.
Pada tanggal 27 Februari 2007, Imperial Oil membuat aplikasi sebelum Energi Alberta dan Utilitas Dewan untuk
sebuah tambang pasir minyak. [FN96] Dalam aplikasi, sekelompok interveners terdiri dari Clearwater Sungai Paulus
Cree Band, Wood Buffalo Bangsa Pertama, Wood Buffalo Bangsa Sesepuh Masyarakat Pertama, dan seorang
individu, John Malcolm, mencari konsultasi bermakna untuk masalah lingkungan denganproyek pembangunan atas
dasar "Aboriginality" mereka. Dalam arti, interveners mengklaim hak Aborigin untuk konsultasi.
Energi Alberta dan Utilitas Dewan Panel dinilai intervener masing-masing, dan mempertanyakan apakah atau tidak
pihak tertentu mampu memegang dan menegaskan hak Aborigin.Panel pertama berpendapat bahwa Band
Clearwater bukanlah badan yang diakui, atau sebuah komunitas yang berbeda dari individu dengan hak-hak Aborigin
yang menimbulkan kewajiban dikenakan pada pemerintah untuk berkonsultasi. Panel beralasan bahwa karena
Clearwater Band bukan "Band" sebagaimana didefinisikan dalam UU theIndian, tidak bisa mengklaim hak Aborigin
sebagai kelompok kolektif. [FN97] Panel lanjut beralasan bahwa banyak individu yang mengidentifikasi diri mereka
sebagai anggota Band Clearwater adalah anggota terdaftar Band lain India diakui, dan dengan demikian Clearwater
"Band," sebagai kolektif, tidak berhak atas hak konsultatif. [FN98]
Panel juga menilai perjanjian hak Aborigin dan menegaskan oleh Nation Buffalo Kayu Pertama (WBFN), dan
menyimpulkan bahwa WBFN itu juga bukan "Band" di bawah Undang-Undang India, dan bahwa anggota kelompok
ini juga anggota lain India diakuiband. [FN99] Sebuah kesimpulan serupa diambil saat menilai klaim Bangsa Kayu
Buffalo Pertama Sesepuh Masyarakat, di mana Panel menyatakan bahwa masyarakat Aborigin tidak mampu
memegang hak Aborigin dan perjanjian. [FN100]
Dalam kasus individu, John Malcolm, Panel menyatakan bahwa Aborigin dan perjanjian hak-hak itu hak komunal,
dan di mana ada tugas yang sesuai pada bagian dari pemerintah untuk melakukan konsultasi yang bermakna
dengan masyarakat Aborigin, tugas yang berhutang pada " diakui komunitas aborigin sebagai keseluruhan dan
bukan kepada individu ". [FN101] Panel lanjut berpendapat bahwa Malcolm "status sesuai dengan Undang-Undang
India tampaknya belum terselesaikan". [FN102]
Proses ini menunjukkan masalah yang terkait dengan mendefinisikan hak Aborigin di era pasca-kolonial. Masyarakat
Aborigin, diberikan analisis ini, tidak mampu bergabung dengan kolektif dengan syarat mereka sendiri. Mereka tidak
mampu untuk membentuk masyarakat mereka sendiri, dan tidak dapat menghindari definisi dipaksakan pada mereka
oleh Undang-Undang theIndian. Aplikasi oleh kelompok ad hoc "diciptakan" dan mungkin orang-orang Aborigin, tidak
akan menimbulkan apa yang disebut "hak Aborigin" dimana "Band" legislatif dibuat di bawah Undang-Undang India
mungkin akan. [FN103]
Sebagai hak Aborigin tampaknya pasti mengalir dari keturunan dan budaya, keputusan Panel dalam mengandaikan
bahwa orang-orang Imperial Minyak mungkin milik hanya satu budaya masyarakat pada waktu tertentu. Ini adalah
suatu kesalahan, orang bisa bergerak masuk dan keluar dari budaya, mungkin milik lebih dari satu budaya secara
bersamaan, dan dapat mengubah budaya itu sendiri. [FN104] Jika konsepsi identitas dan "Aboriginality" adalah
kenyataan, maka sulit untuk membedakan antara undang-undang pembebasan awal dan kebijakan saat ini yang
mencegah reorganisasi politik dan sosial. Jadi, dalam arti praktis, organisasi sosial dan politik masyarakat Aborigin
adalah "beku" agar sesuai dalam pra-ada formasi masyarakat kolonial untuk tujuan mencapai pengakuan dalam
klaim hak Aborigin.
Mengingat konteks historis di mana keputusan ini beralasan, sulit untuk memahami bagaimana konsep yang
"Aborigin" atau menjadi "sini dulu" punya landasan moral atau budaya. Dasar bagi hak-hak Aborigin, tampaknya,
tidak berdasarkan budaya atau pada garis keturunan keluarga, tetapi lebih pada definisi sejarah yang sewenang-
wenang menciptakan kategori dan pengelompokan orang-orang Aborigin. Ini adalah situasi rumit seperti Minyak
Imperial yang membuat "ras" dan genetika tampak seperti pendekatan yang lebih hanya untuk
"Aboriginality". Mungkin orang dapat berargumentasi bahwa solusi termudah adalah dengan menerima bahwa
selama individu secara biologis keturunan dari komunitas Aborigin, dan dapat memenuhi "persentase" tertentu dari
keturunan, orang yang dapat mengklaim hak Aborigin generik mana saja di Kanada. Aplikasi ini dapat menyebabkan
hasil yang tidak tepat, tapi mungkin kurang sewenang-wenang. Dalam kasus apapun, sulit untuk menarik garis
berprinsip antara India Act "Band," dan pengelompokan ad hoc dari orang-orang yang keturunan Aborigin.

IX. Ketidakmungkinan untuk pembelaan HAK ATAS Aborigin


Untuk bertanya bahwa orang-orang Aborigin didefinisikan pada keturunan bisa menjadi agak tautologis dalam arti
bahwa tidak ada panduan tentang jumlah koneksi biologis seseorang harus memiliki. Konsepsi kategorisasi
keturunan mengandaikan rasial dan bukan budaya. Selanjutnya, identifikasi diri juga bermasalah seperti klaim hanya
mungkin terjadi ketika individu menghadapi tanggung jawab pidana. Penerimaan masyarakat dan keanggotaan
kelompok sama-sama bermasalah, karena tidak mungkin untuk mengatasi sejarah kebijakan yang buruk dan
diskriminasi masyarakat Aborigin.
Pada akhirnya, hak-hak Aborigin, seperti yang didefinisikan sebagai hak milik orang-orang yang "sini dulu,"
meninggalkan banyak yang harus diinginkan. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan sulit tentang keanggotaan dibuat bahkan lebih
sulit ketika mencoba untuk menemukan solusi praktis bagi masyarakat Aborigin.Liberal "hak" pendekatan telah
meninggalkan orang-orang dengan hak Aborigin merasa seolah-olah mereka berhak untuk hak atas dasar sesuatu
yang berhubungan untuk warna kulit mereka atau tantangan-sarat kehidupan. Bagaimana hak-hak yang
mengecualikan orang pertama yang sah harus dipertahankan? Mungkin melemparkan pendekatan kolektif di pinggir
jalan dan pertama, mengakui bahwa masyarakat Aborigin telah negatif dipengaruhi oleh liberalisme, dan kedua,
menemukan solusi liberal untuk masalah-masalah masyarakat pengungsi individual, mungkin metode terbaik untuk
mencapai reparasi - berfokus pada kebutuhan bukan hak. Teori tersebut harus dibahas dengan latar belakang yang
disebut "Aboriginality".
Mencoba untuk mendefinisikan hak-hak Aborigin setelah kolonisasi adalah, dalam arti, menjajah. Meskipun beberapa
mungkin berpendapat bahwa pendekatan yang tepat adalah untuk menyelamatkan apa hak dan masyarakat tetap,
itu adalah terang-terangan dan secara fundamental tidak adil untuk memberikan hak, yang seharusnya hak-hak yang
melekat, hanya untuk sekelompok orang yang telah beruntung tidak harus ditangani kolonisasi yang "buruk tangan".
Meskipun beberapa sarjana berusaha untuk mendefinisikan hak-hak Aborigin sebagai hak kelompok, [FN105] dalam
praktek, hak Aborigin hak yang diberikan collaterally untuk keanggotaan seseorang, dan sering menegaskan untuk
kebebasan individu seseorang atau kebebasan kelompok kecil. Mengambil makro-view di tempat orang-orang
Aborigin bermain di masyarakat kita, seseorang harus bertanya: Apakah hak-hak Aborigin melayani fungsi bagi
masyarakat Aborigin yang paling? Apakah mereka melayani fungsi untuk dalam kota orang Aborigin di pusat-pusat
yang lebih besar? Apakah mereka melayani fungsi untuk pengungsi perempuan Bill C-31 dan keluarga
mereka? Pada akhirnya, kita semua harus mengalami kesulitan menerima bahwa hak-hak Aborigin "lebih baik
daripada tidak sama sekali" dalam bentuk mereka saat ini. Dianalisis secara kritis, hak Aborigin hanya "lebih baik
daripada tidak" untuk beberapa orang Aborigin. Bagi banyak orang, hak-hak Aborigin berfungsi untuk mengecualikan
pengadu yang sah, dan menciptakan sekelompok warga negara ganda yang kurang beruntung yang dikecualikan
dari masyarakat yang lebih besar dan dari hak-hak masyarakat Aborigin bantalan. Apakah kita benar-benar ingin
mempromosikan dua-tier orang Aborigin?
Menerima keadaan saat klaim hak Aborigin, dan kembali ke apa yang disebut sui generis dan ab-origo konteks di
mana hak-hak Aborigin menegaskan pada prinsipnya, seseorang dapat menyimpulkan bahwa menjadi "sini dulu"
tidak bisa lagi cukup ditentukan. Pada kenyataannya, hak Aborigin tampaknya ada, bukan dalam konteks menjadi "di
sini dulu," tetapi terutama dalam konteks kebutuhan untuk reparasi. Memang, hak-hak Aborigin dilegitimasi atas
dasar bahwa masyarakat Aborigin diperlakukan dengan buruk, dan karena itu, masyarakat Aborigin perlu hak ekstra
untuk membantu mereka bertahan hidup.
Jika kita melihat secara kritis, bukan pada apa hak Aborigin harus, tapi hak-hak whatAboriginal yang dalam praktek,
kita akan memahami bahwa reparasi untuk Aboriginalpeoples tidak benar didistribusikan melalui penerapan
Aboriginalrights sewenang-wenang. Jika tujuan hak Aborigin adalah untuk memastikan orang-orang Aborigin
menerima "ekstra" manfaat untuk membantu mereka bertahan hidup, maka harus kita tidak melihat orang-orang
Aborigin individual pengungsi yang membutuhkan bantuan? Apakah kita perlu untuk melihat ke Aboriginalgroups
ketika individu Aborigin begitu banyak dikecualikan dari kelompok-kelompok ini?

X. Aborigin HAK: KESIMPULAN


Kembali ke apa artinya menjadi "ab-origo," adalah bentuk-bentuk yang ada hak ofAboriginal dipertahankan? Jika
mereka, terhadap siapa mereka dibela? Bentuk saat ini hak-hak Aborigin di Kanada perlu dipertanyakan secara
kritis. Miliaran dolar yang dihabiskan setiap tahun pada masyarakat Aborigin dan hak Aborigin telah melakukan
sedikit lebih dari menciptakan konflik antar-etnis antara masyarakat Aborigin, dan terus meninggalkan orang-orang
Aborigin sebagai orang yang paling miskin di Kanada. Jika hak "Aboriginality" dan Aborigin mendapatkan orang-
orang Aborigin di mana mereka hari ini, pemeriksaan ulang tujuan di balik konsep liberalisasi mengakui hak-hak
kelompok harus terjadi.
Pengertian hukum dan legislatif "Aboriginality" dalam hukum Kanada yang bermasalah dan telah salah paham
karena upaya dihitung dan salah perhitungan oleh pemerintah kolonial. Klaim individu untuk konflik kesetaraan
dengan definisi legislatif yang mempengaruhi penilaian praktis dari apa, dan siapa, adalah "Aborigin". Internalisasi
dari definisi ini telah menempatkan "identitas" dan "budaya" masyarakat Aborigin sebagai konsep dipertanyakan
dalam Aboriginalcommunities. Masyarakat Aborigin dalam masyarakat ini telah berbalik melawan satu sama lain, dan
mungkin ada sedikit harapan pulih dari konflik yang diciptakan oleh reorganisasi paksa.
Masyarakat Aborigin dan non-Aborigin harus memeriksa skema hak yang ada di Kanada dan bertanya pada diri
sendiri: Mengapa orang-orang Aborigin Kanada orang yang paling miskin dan lemah secara politik di
Kanada? Sementara saya tidak menyarankan bahwa skema hak di Kanada telah menciptakan orang-orang ini miskin
dan lemah, saya akan menyarankan bahwa tentu tidak membantu semua Aboriginalpeoples. Selanjutnya, hak
Aborigin mungkin tidak termasuk orang-orang yang paling membutuhkan bantuan.
Sebuah pemeriksaan ulang dari kedua dasar bagi hak-hak Aborigin dan tujuan praktis dari hak-hak ini harus
terjadi. Sebuah pemeriksaan lebih dekat dapat menyebabkan pengamat untuk menyimpulkan bahwa sementara hak-
hak Aborigin didasarkan pada konsep bahwa Aboriginalpeoples adalah "sini dulu," adalah tujuan praktis dari hak-hak
Aborigin untuk mendukung dan menyelamatkan orang-orang yang adalah persentase penduduk "sini dulu". Dalam
hal ini, hak-hak Aborigin telah melayani menjadi bentuk reparasi dan hak berdasarkan dukungan dan kelangsungan
hidup. Memahami ini, apa jenis reparasi yang harus kita berikan kepada sisa orang-orang yang "di sini pertama"?
Masyarakat Aborigin, seperti peradilan dan masyarakat Kanada, tidak mampu mengabaikan pengobatan masa lalu
masyarakat Aborigin dan definisi yang telah ditetapkan mereka. Apa yang kemudian dapat kita lakukan dengan hak
Aborigin dan mengklaim hak-hak tersebut? Hanya untuk mengatakan bahwa kita, sebagai Kanada, telah diawetkan
beberapa tradisi masyarakat someAboriginal seharusnya tidak cukup untuk dasar rezim hak. Sebagai seorang
pengamat jelas, saya tidak memiliki jawaban untuk masalah ini, tapi akan menunjukkan bahwa atas dasar keadilan,
kecuali jawaban yang tepat dapat ditemukan, hak-hak Aborigin tidak dapat dipertahankan.
[FNa1]. LL.B. (Saskatchewan). Saat ini articling dengan Cueleneare & Company di Saskatoon. Penulis ingin
mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Dekan Dwight Newman, Ian Flett, Eric Hovius, dan Amy Kolenick serta Law
Review Saskatchewan dan pengulas anonim untuk komentar yang sangat membantu mereka pada draf awal artikel
ini.

[FN1]. Ini adalah istilah yang telah digunakan beberapa kali oleh Mahkamah Agung Kanada, khususnya di Corbiere v.
Kanada (Menteri Urusan India dan Utara), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 173 D.L.R.(4) 1 [Corbiere].

[FN2]. Konsep ini pertama kali dikembangkan di H.A.C. Cairns, S.M. Jamieson & K. Lysyk, A Survey of Indian
Kontemporer Kanada: Laporan Ekonomi, Politik, Kebutuhan Pendidikan dan Kebijakan ed. oleh H.B. Hawthorn
(Ottawa: Cabang Negeri India, 1966) vol. 1, M.-A. Tremblay, F.G. Vallee & J. Ryan, ibid., Vol. 2 [Hawthorn
Laporan]. Konsep "Warga Plus" yang tepat digambarkan oleh Hood Kehakiman Mahkamah Agung British Columbia
di Thomas ay Norris, [1992] 2 CNLR 139 di 162, [1992] B.C.J. No 210 (QL) sebagai berikut: "Sementara penggugat
dapat memiliki hak istimewa dan status di Kanada sebagai seorang India, 'asli' hak-hak dan kebebasan dia
menikmati bisa tidak kurang dari yang dinikmati oleh sesama warga negara, India dan non-India sama. Dia tinggal di
masyarakat yang bebas dan hak-haknya yang tidak bisa diganggu gugat. Dia bebas untuk percaya, dan berlatih,
apapun agama atau tradisi, jika ia memilih untuk melakukannya. Dia tidak dapat dipaksakan atau dipaksa untuk
berpartisipasi dalam satu oleh kelompok yang mengaku menggunakan hak kolektif mereka dalam
melakukannya. Kebebasan dan hak-hak-Nya tidak 'tunduk pada hak-hak kolektif bangsa Aborigin yang dia milik. "'

[FN3]. Cairns, Laporan Hawthorn, supra note 2 di 6.

[FN4]. Dalam artikel ini istilah "pasca-kolonial" akan mengacu pada periode waktu setelah penjajahan.

[FN5]. Ada hak dan manfaat yang terkait dengan status terdaftar India, terutama pada cadangan, di mana mayoritas
Indian terdaftar berada. Hak-hak non-mendalam meliputi: akses ke pendanaan untuk perumahan; pasca-sekolah
menengah sekolah, status pembebasan pajak, dan hak atas tanah dan perjanjian.Populasi Aborigin di komunitas
lain, seperti Metis dan Inuit masyarakat, tidak memiliki akses hukum atau praktis untuk hak yang sama dan manfaat
karena lokasi dan kategorisasi.

[FN6]. Sebagaimana dicatat oleh Komisi Royal Masyarakat Aborigin (RCAP): "[T] heIndian Act adalah repositori dari
perjuangan antara orang-orang India dan pembuat kebijakan kolonial dan kemudian Kanada untuk mengendalikan
nasib masyarakat Indian di Kanada ... Dengan memeriksa tindakan, bagaimana itu terjadi dan bagaimana hal itu
terus mempengaruhi pengalaman sehari-hari masyarakat India di Kanada, banyak yang dapat dipelajari ". Lihat
Kanada, Royal Komisi Masyarakat Aborigin, Laporan Komisi Royal Masyarakat Aborigin: Looking Forward, Melihat
Kembali, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Menteri Pasokan dan Jasa Kanada, 1996) pada 258 [Laporan].

[FN7]. Lihat Katherine Biber, "Menjadi / Tidak ada: Judul asli dan Pemenuhan Fantasy" (2004) 3 LJ Adat 1 untuk
argumen bahwa kebangsaan dan identitas Aborigin hanyalah fantasi.

[FN8]. Tom Flanagan, Bangsa Pertama? Kedua Pikiran (Montreal dan Kingston: McGill-Queen University Press,
2000) di 11.

[FN9]. Dalam Ratu v. Sekretaris Negara untuk Urusan Luar Negeri dan Persemakmuran, [1981] 4 CNLR 86 pada 89
(CA), Mahkamah menjelaskan bahwa "[t] ia orang India Kanada telah ada dari awal waktu. Jadi mereka disebut
'orang-orang Aborigin' "Lihat juga Calder v. Jaksa Agung British Columbia, [1973] SCR.313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145,
dimana konsep ini dikutip dalam kaitannya dengan judul Aborigin.

[FN10]. Untuk pengakuan hukum umum dari proposisi ini, lihat Worcester ay Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet.) 515 di 559, 8 L.
Ed. 483 (USSC 1832), di mana Marshall CJ mengakui bahwa "[t] ia bangsa India telah selalu dianggap sebagai yang
berbeda, masyarakat politik yang independen, mempertahankan hak-hak asli mereka alami, sebagai pemiliknya tak
terbantahkan tanah, dari dahulu kala, dengan single pengecualian yang dipaksakan oleh kekuatan tak tertahankan,
yang dikeluarkan dari hubungan dengan penguasa Eropa selain penemu pertama dari pantai daerah tertentu diklaim
". Untuk diskusi teoretis dari konsep ini, lihat Arthur J. Ray, aku telah tinggal di sini Sejak Regan Dunia: Sebuah
Sejarah Illustrated Rakyat asli Kanada (Toronto: Lester & Porter Kunci Buku, 1996).

[FN11]. S. Amsal. C. 1850, 13 & 14 Vict, c.. 42. Undang-undang ini dipandang sebagai yang sah dan valid, karena
Undang-Undang Hukum Kolonial Validitas, 1865 (Inggris), 41 & 42 Vict., C. 63.

[FN12]. Untuk melihat peraturan sejarah berurusan dengan masyarakat Aborigin Kanada, seeIndian dan Northern
Urusan Kanada, "Legislasi Sejarah", secara online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/lib/phi/histlws/hln/index_e. html>.
[FN13]. Supra note 11.

[FN14]. Yusuf Eliot Magnet, "Siapakah Orang Aborigin di Kanada?" Di Dwight A. Yusuf Eliot Dorey & Magnet, eds,
Aborigin Hak Litigasi (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003). 23 pada 43.

[FN15]. S. Amsal. C. 1851, 14 & 15 Vict, c.. 59.

[FN16]. Ini bertentangan dengan pengertian bahwa Aboriginality bisa eksis dalam bentuk kekerabatan yang bisa,
dalam teori, memungkinkan non-Aborigin orang dengan tidak ada kaitan biologis dengan pemikiran mereka untuk
menjadi "orang-orang Aborigin" untuk menjadi dikaitkan dengan kelompok tersebut.Sebagaimana dicatat oleh
Raymond D. Fogelson, "Perspektif tentang Identitas asli Amerika" di Russell Thornton, ed, Belajar Amerika asli:.
Masalah dan Prospek (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) 40 pada 44-45: "Untuk identitas asli
Amerika terutama terkait dengan kekerabatan. Kekerabatan tidak hanya termasuk orang-orang dengan siapa kita
bisa melacak nenek moyang akrab, tetapi bisa diperluas untuk mencakup kelompok-kelompok yang lebih ramifying
seperti klan, gugus, dan bahkan bangsa. Selain itu, selain reproduksi biologis, individu dan kelompok dapat direkrut
ke dalam jaringan kekerabatan melalui naturalisasi, adopsi, pernikahan, dan aliansi. Identitas mencakup kualitas
batin yang dimanifestasikan melalui tindakan sosial dan keyakinan budaya. "Untuk pembahasan menjadi anggota
luar kelompok, lihat S. Alan Ray," Sebuah Ras atau Bangsa? Cherokee Nasional Identitas dan Status Keturunan
dimerdekakan itu "(2007) 12 Mich J. Race & L. 387. Konsepsi bahwa tawanan dapat mengarah pada internalisasi
identitas, sesuatu yang mungkin mirip dengan "Stockholm Syndrome," telah dibahas dalam sejumlah karya: lihat
Yakobus Axtell, "The Indian Putih Kolonial Amerika," dalam Yakobus Axtell, The Eropa dan India: Esai dalam
Ethnohistory Kolonial Amerika Utara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); dan Juni Namias, Tawanan Putih:
Gender dan Etnis di Perbatasan Amerika (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). Mungkin salah satu
narasi penangkaran yang paling populer dan menarik adalah bahwa Yohanes Tanner. Lihat John Tanner, Sebuah
Narasi dari Pembuangan dan Petualangan John Tanner, (AS Interpreter di Saut de Ste. Marie) Selama Tiga Puluh
Tahun Residence antara India di Negeri Amerika Utara, ed. oleh Edwin James (London: Baldwin & Cradock, 1830).

[FN17]. Supra note 15.

[FN18]. Supra note 14 pada 43.

[FN19]. Hal ini juga harus dicatat bahwa istilah "Indian" digunakan di s. 91 (24) dari Undang-Undang Konstitusi,, 1867
(Inggris) 30 & 31 Vict, c.. 3, dicetak ulang di R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No 5, tetapi istilah ini tidak didefinisikan di
dalamnya. Dalam Jaksa Agung Kanada ay Canard, [1976] 1 SCR 170 di 207, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548, Keadilan Beetz
menemukan bahwa "menggunakan 'India' dalam s. 91 (24), menciptakan klasifikasi rasial dan mengacu pada
kelompok khusus untuk siapa itu merenungkan kemungkinan perlakuan khusus. Ini tidak mendefinisikan
mengekspresikan 'India'. "

[FN20]. Supra note 14 di 44.

[FN21]. S.C. 1951, c. 29.