MICHAEL D.

MUMFORD
KELSEY E. MEDEIROS
PAUL J. PARTLOW

Creative Thinking: Processes, Strategies, and

Knowledge

ABSTRACT
Creative achievements are the basis for progress in our world. Although creative
achievement is influenced by many variables, the basis for creativity is held to lie in
the generation of high-quality, original, and elegant solutions to complex, novel, ill-
defined problems. In the present effort, we examine the cognitive capacities that
make creative problem-solving possible. We argue that creative problem-solving
depends on the effective execution of a set of complex cognitive processes. Effective
execution of these processes is, in turn, held to depend on the strategies employed
in process execution and the knowledge being used in problem-solving. The implica-
tions of these observations for improving creative thinking are discussed.
Keywords: creativity, creative thinking, problem-solving, processes, strategies,
knowledge.

When we begin work on a topic, any topic, we must ask a straightforward ques-
tionwhat am I working on? For students of creativity, this question has, by no
means, proven, at all, easy to answer (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Some scholars
(e.g., Mackinnon, 1962) have argued that we are seeking to understand eminent pro-
fessional achievement. Other scholars have argued that we are seeking to understand
the outcomes of exceptional talent (e.g., Terman & Oden, 1959). Still other scholars
have argued that we are attempting to understand a special form of performance
(e.g., Guilford, 1950). Although all of these approaches have been employed by
students of creativity, in recent years (Mumford, 2003), we have begun to see a con-
sensus definition emerge of the phenomena we refer to as creativity. More specifi-
cally, creativity is held to involve the production of high-quality, original, and
elegant solutions (Besemer & OQuin, 1999; Christiaans, 2002) to complex, novel,
ill-defined, or poorly structured, problems (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988, 2007).
What should be recognized here, however, is that creativity, as is the case in most
forms of complex performance, can be understood, or explained, using a variety of
substantive models. One might seek to understand why people invest effort in crea-
tive work (Tierney & Farmer, 2010). One might ask what personality characteristics

30 The Journal of Creative Behavior, Vol. 46, Iss. 1, pp. 3047 2012 by the Creative Education Foundation, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/jocb.003
 Journal of Creative Behavior

lead people to invest in different types of creative efforts (Madjar, Greenberg, &
Chen, 2011). Or, one might ask what basic abilities people must possess to produce
creative problem solutions (Ma, 2009). Of course, all of these, and a number of
other, explanatory systems have value in our attempts to understand creative perfor-
mance. However, the definition of creativity noted above poses a more fundamental
questionwhat allows people to generate high-quality, original, and elegant solu-
tions to complex, novel, ill-defined problems? It is to this question that I, and my
colleagues, have addressed our research over the last thirty years.
In the present effort, we will attempt to sketch out some of the answers our
research has provided to this questiona fundamental question. We will begin by
examining the critical cognitive processing activities that appear to be involved in
most creative problem-solving efforts. Next, we will consider how the strategies peo-
ple employ contribute to effective process execution. We will then go on to consider
how the knowledge people are working with shapes process execution, strategy use,
and subsequent performance in creative problem-solving efforts. Finally, we will
consider some implications of our work for improving creative thinking in real-
world settings.

PROCESSES
Work on identifying the key cognitive processes contributing to creative prob-
lem-solving began at the turn of the last century (Dewey, 1910; Wallas, 1926). Over
the intervening years, a number of process models were proposed (e.g., Merrifield,
Guilford, Christensen, & Frick, 1962; Parnes & Noller, 1972; Sternberg, 1986). These
models differed not only with respect to key processes proposed but also with the
assumptions about how complex cognition operates. As a result, Mumford, Mobley,
Reiter-Palmon, Uhlman and Doares (1991) proposed a new model intended to spec-
ify the critical processes typically involved in incidents of creative thought.
Mumford et al.s (1991) model was based on three critical propositions. First,
creative problem-solving, like other forms of problem-solving, must be based on
knowledge and information (Baer, 2003; Rich & Weisberg, 2004)bearing in mind
the point that knowledge provides a basis for interpreting information. Second, it
was held that one could not generate new ideas solely on the basis of extant knowl-
edge. Rather, this knowledge must be recombined and reorganized to produce the
new knowledge that allows for the generation of novel ideas (Finke, Ward, & Smith,
1992; Mumford, Olsen, & James, 1989). Third, ideas must be evaluated and shaped
into viable plans for directing work on a creative project (Mumford, Schultz, & Van
Dorn, 2001)often work which precedes over a period of years.
These three key assumptions gave rise to this model of creative processing activi-
ties presented in Figure 1. This model assumes that creative thinking begins with
problem definition (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Problem definitions, in turn, lead to
information gathering and selection of the concepts used to understand this infor-
mation. These concepts then provide a basis for conceptual combination. The new
knowledge emerging from conceptual combination, in turn, allows for idea genera-
tion and evaluation of ideas. Following selection of viable ideas, implementation

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Creative Thinking

planning begins with people actively monitoring the outcomes of their actions as
they implement their plans. These processes are held to operate in a dynamic fash-
ion, with failure in executing any one process leading people to cycle back to early
processing activities.
One critical assumption underlying this model may be found in the proposition
that the combination and/or reorganization of extant knowledge structures provide(s)
the basis for generation of the new ideas that are held to be the hallmark of crea-
tivity. Accordingly, Mobley, Doares and Mumford (1992) presented undergraduates
with three concepts defined by four exemplars (e.g., birdsowls, robins, ostriches,
sparrows). They were asked to combine these concepts (e.g., birds, sporting equip-
ment, cars) to create a new concept, list additional exemplars of this new concept,
and prepare a story involving this concept, which was evaluated for quality and

FIGURE 1. Creative Process Model

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 Journal of Creative Behavior

originality. It was found that more original stories were produced when people
were asked to work with more diverse concepts on this conceptual combination
task.
In another study along these lines, Mumford, Baughman, Maher, Costanza and
Supinski (1997) presented undergraduates with 18 conceptual combination prob-
lems, where judges were asked to evaluate the quality and originality of the labels
provided for the new concepts, the features of attributes defining this new concept,
and list of exemplars of this new concept. In addition, these undergraduates were
asked to formulate solutions to two complex novel ill-defined problemsdeveloping
an advertising campaign for a new product (the 3D holographic television) and pro-
ducing solutions to a series of public policy problems. Problem solutions were evalu-
ated for quality and originality. It was found that the quality and originality of the
solutions obtained on these two problem-solving tasks, problems drawn from differ-
ent domains, could be accounted for by peoples conceptual combination skills. In
fact, the resulting relationships were sizeable, yielding multiple correlations in the
low .50s, and adding significantly to the prediction obtained from more traditional
ability measures (e.g., intelligence, divergent thinking). When these findings are con-
sidered in light of the findings obtained in other studies by Ward and his colleagues
(Finke et al., 1992; Ward, Patterson, & Sifonis, 2004), they provide some rather
compelling support for the importance of conceptual combination in creative
thought.
Of course, the studies described above all focused on conceptual combination.
Thus, the question arises as to whether there is evidence available for the other pro-
cesses indicated in this model. In fact, a series of studies conducted by Mumford
and his colleagues have provided evidence for the importance of problem construc-
tion (e.g., Mumford, Baughman, Threlfall, Supinski, & Costanza, 1996; Reither-
Palmon, Mumford, Boes, & Runco, 1997), information gathering (e.g., Mumford,
Baughman, Supinski, & Maher, 1996), information organization (e.g., Mumford,
Supinski, Threlfall, & Baughman, 1996), idea generation (e.g., Mumford, Marks,
Connelly, Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000), idea evaluation (e.g., Lonergan, Scott,
& Mumford, 2004), and implementation planning (e.g., Osburn & Mumford, 2006).
For example, in the Mumford, Baughman, Supinski and Maher (1996) study,
participants were presented with cards displaying six different types of information
(e.g., key facts, anomalous information, goal-relevant information), and time spent
reading each card was recorded. It was found that people who spent more time
reading cards presenting information bearing on key facts and anomalies produced
more creative problem solutions. In the Osburn and Mumford (2006) study, it was
found that penetration and forecasting capacities, two key elements of planning
(Mumford et al., 2001), were related to the production of higher quality and more
original solutions to a social innovation problem involving leadership in an experi-
mental secondary school.
Not only have these studies provided evidence for the various processes specified
in Mumford et al. (1991) model of creative thinking, studies by Connelly et al.
(2000), Mumford, Baughman and Threlfall et al. (1996) and Vincent, Decker and

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Mumford (2002) have examined the aggregate, or joint, impact of effective execu-
tion of each of these processes on creative problem-solving. Broadly speaking, the
findings obtained in these studies indicated that: (a) processing activities mediate
the impact of abilities and expertise on creative problem-solving; (b) each process
makes a unique contribution to prediction of creative problem-solving performance;
(c) problem construction, conceptual combination, and idea generation appear espe-
cially effective predictors of problem-solving performance; (d) these processes pre-
dict creative problem-solving performance in a number of domainsadvertising,
public policy, education, and military leadership; and (e) effective execution of these
processes is strongly related to the production of high-quality, original, and elegant
solutionsproducing multiple correlations in the .50 to .60 range with reliabilities
of the predictors and criteria in the low .80s.
Taken as a whole, these findings provide some rather compelling evidence for
Mumford et al. (1991) model of the critical processing operations held to underlie
creative thought. Nonetheless, a variety of questions remain unanswered with
regard to this model. For example, some processes may be more important for
performance in some fields than others (Simonton, 2012). In an initial study
along these lines, Mumford, Antes, Caughron, Connelly and Beeler (2010) found
that information gathering was particularly important for performance in the bio-
logical sciences, while conceptual combination was particularly important for
performance in the social sciences. Along related lines, relatively little information
is available concerning the contextual, or situational, conditions that promote or
inhibit effective execution of each of these processes. For example, if people are
instructed to search for anomalies that are incongruent with key facts, such search
activities will result in a better performance in information gathering. Alterna-
tively, it is better, in problem construction, to give people the goals of a creative
problem-solving effort or establish the constraints applying to problem definition
(Kidder, 1981).
Along somewhat different lines, there is reason to suspect that execution of all
these processes is subject to error (Mumford, Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006).
For example, Licuanan, Dailey and Mumford (2007) have shown that people dis-
count original ideas in idea evaluation. What we do not know are: What errors are
most likely to arise in execution of each of these processes? What is peoples capacity
to identify these errors? And what approaches do people use to manage these errors?
Along related lines, Mumford et al. (1991) model suggests that errors, or, alterna-
tively, inadequate products resulting from execution of any process, will lead people
to cycle back to earlier processing operations. However, we have little information
bearing on how people evaluate the products of process execution and how they
react to these products with respect to subsequent processing activities. Clearly, fur-
ther research along these lines is indicated, given the demanding trial-and-error nat-
ure of most creative problem-solving efforts (Carlson & Gorman, 1992), and the
evidence provided by Friedrich and Mumford (2009) indicating that errors flow
through these processes;thus, errors in problem definition influence information
gathering.

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 Journal of Creative Behavior

STRATEGIES
Although prior research indicates that the creative processing model developed by
Mumford et al. (1991) provides a plausible framework for describing the cognitive
operations contributing to creative problem-solving, the success of this model broa-
ches a new question: What actions must people take to ensure effective execution of
these processes? Attempts to answer this question have been subsumed under the
rubric of strategies. In our research intended to address this question, we have exam-
ined two different types of strategies: (a) the strategies contributing to effective execu-
tion of a particular processing operation (e.g., Scott, Lonergan, & Mumford, 2005)
and (b) strategies contributing to effective execution of multiple processes (e.g., By-
rne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010).
In an initial study along these lines, Baughman and Mumford (1995) sought to
identify the strategies that contribute to effective execution of the conceptual combi-
nation process. They argued that use of analogical reasoning strategies (e.g., Bejar,
Chaffin, & Embretson, 1991) might contribute to effective execution of the concep-
tual combination process. Accordingly, undergraduates were asked to work on Mob-
ley et al.s (1992) conceptual combination task. Strategies to be applied in working
on these problems were manipulated through the instructions given to people as
they worked on these problems. More specifically, they were asked to list either
typical or atypical features (attributes) of category members and/or list shared or
non-shared features of each category. Additionally, they were asked, or not asked, to
generate additional features of their new concept. In all conditions, participants gen-
erated a list of exemplars of their new concept, and, these exemplar lists were
appraised for quality and originality. It was found that more extensive elaboration
accompanied by a search for typical features not shared by the categories or a search
for atypical features shared by the categories contributed to the production of more
original new concepts. Thus, different analogical reasoning strategies apparently con-
tribute to conceptual combination.
In another study examining the strategies to be applied in process execution,
Lonergan et al. (2004) examined the strategies contributing to more effective execu-
tion of the idea evaluation process. Drawing from earlier work by Basadur, Runco
and Vega (2000), and Mumford, Lonergan and Scott (2002), they argued that idea
elaboration is an active, creative, process rather than a passive, appraisal, process.
They asked undergraduates to appraise and revise ideas of varying quality and origi-
nality for a new marketing campaign. Strategies were manipulated, again, through
instructions participants were given with regard to corporate criteria, either effi-
ciency/quality or innovative/originality criteria, to be applied when appraising ideas
for new advertising companies. Participants then criticized the ideas provided, pro-
duced their final advertising campaign, and this final campaign was appraised for
quality and originality. It was found that the highest quality and most original adver-
tising campaigns were produced when people appraised highly original ideas for qual-
ity or high-quality ideas for originality. Thus, it appears that use of a compensatory
strategy in idea evaluation contributes to the production of more creative products.

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Other studies have begun to identify the strategies contributing to effective execu-
tion of the other processes held to be involved in creative thought. For example,
Finke et al. (1992) have provided evidence that the idea generation process is more
effective when people search for potential applications of the features emerging from
new concepts constructed through conceptual combination efforts. Mumford et al.
(1996) have provided evidence indicating that a search for anomalies embedded in
key facts improves the effectiveness of information gathering. Also, Mumford et al.
(1996) have provided evidence indicating that problem construction improves when
people attempt to define problems based on procedures and restrictions as opposed
to goals and information.
Thus, it appears that creative thinking improves when people apply appropriate
strategies for executing each of the key processes involved in creative thought.
Although, in recent years, we have made some progress in identifying these strate-
gies, not all processes have been subjected to a thorough examination in this regard.
For example, little is known about requisite strategies to be applied in information
organization and implementation planning. Moreover, it should be recognized that
different strategies often appear beneficial to strategy execution under certain
conditions. Thus, there is a need for systematic taxonomic efforts intended to indi-
cate what strategies should be applied under what conditions for a certain class of
creative problems or within certain domains of creative activity. Although efforts
intended to answer these questions will probably prove time-consuming, the effort
invested might prove to be of great value both in enhancing our understanding of
creative thought and in developing creative potential (Puccio & Cabra, 2012).
Traditionally, studies of creative thinking strategies have been based on tasks that
isolate a single process with inferences with regard to the merits of applying these
strategies being bounded by the processing activity under consideration. An alterna-
tive approach to identifying strategies, however, is to attempt to identify strategies
that might contribute to effective execution of a number of processes (Stokes, 2001).
And, in recent years, we have begun to make some progress in identifying cognitive
strategies that might prove beneficial in executing a number of creative thinking
processes.
One illustration of these kinds of cross-process strategies may be found in fore-
casting. Forecasting refers to the prediction of downstream outcomes of an activity.
Given the interdependencies held to operate among creative thinking process, one
would expect that forecasting would contribute to effective execution of later pro-
cess, and, thus, more effective creative problem-solving. In a recent study of the
impact of forecasting on creative problem-solving, Byrne et al. (2010) asked under-
graduates to formulate advertising campaigns for a new producta high-energy root
beer. These advertising campaigns were evaluated for quality, originality, and ele-
gance. Prior to preparing these campaigns, participants were presented with requests
to formulate forecasts when evaluating ideas that had been proposed and after for-
mulating their implementation plans. These written forecasts were appraised for a
number of attributes such as positive outcomes mentioned, negative outcomes men-
tioned, anticipating errors, considering obstacles extra. It was found that more

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extensive forecasting during idea evaluation contributed to the effectiveness of

implementation planning. And, more centrally, the extensiveness of forecasting dur-
ing idea evaluation and implementation planning was positively related to the pro-
duction of high-quality, more original, and more elegant advertising campaigns.
Another illustration of a cross-process strategy has been provided by Marcy and
Mumford (2007). They argued that when people are working on social innovation
problems, a focus on processing critical causes would enhance process execution and
subsequent creative problem-solving (Mumford, 2002). Accordingly, they asked
undergraduates to complete seven self-paced instructional modules indicating the
value of working with causes that: (a) can be manipulated, (b) influence multiple
outcomes, (c) have large effects, (d) can be controlled, (e) have synergistic effects,
(f) work together, and (g) have direct effects. Subsequently, participants were asked
to solve six social innovation problems with three problems being drawn from the
public policy domain and three from the educational domain. Written problem
solutions were appraised for quality, originality, and elegance. This causal analysis
training resulted in the production of higher quality and more original problem
solutions especially in the less familiar public policy domain as opposed to the more
familiar educational domain.
Aside from forecasting and causal analysis, other scholars have suggested that
constraint analysis (Stokes, 2001) and production of a range of associations (Simon-
ton, 2012) might also represent potentially viable cross-process creative thinking
strategies. Indeed, a case can be made that divergent thinking, generation of a num-
ber of alternatives, may also represent a viable cross-process strategy (Guilford,
1950; Merrifield et al., 1962). These observations, however, broach the question as
to what other cross-process creative thinking strategies might existperhaps error
identification (Robledo et al., in press) or constraint management (Peterson et al.,
in press). More centrally, the question arises how these cross-process strategies might
interact with process-specific strategies in shaping creative thought.

KNOWLEDGE
Strategies are often held to reflect a form of procedural knowledge; however,
declarative knowledge, factual, information and cognitive schema for interpreting
this information are commonly held to be involved in most forms of complex per-
formance including creative thinking (Ericsson & Moxley, 2012). In fact, a number
of studies have been conducted in recent years that demonstrate the importance of
knowledge to creative thinking (e.g., Hass & Weisberg, 2009; Rich & Weisberg,
2004). More centrally, the type of knowledge being employed in creative thinking
may condition the type of strategies people apply as they execute various processes.
This point is nicely illustrated in a study conducted by Scott et al. (2005). They
presented undergraduates with either schematic, or conceptual, educational princi-
ples, or, alternatively, educational cases illustrating the same principles. They were
asked to apply these principles, or, cases, in formulating a plan for leading a new
experimental secondary school. The resulting plans were evaluated for quality, origi-
nality, and elegance. More centrally, after presentation of these concepts or cases,

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participants were presented with a series of probe questions. In one condition, they
were presented with probe questions where they were instructed to apply the feature
search, feature mapping, and elaboration strategies identified by Baughman and
Mumford (1995). In the other condition, they were instructed to identify critical
characteristics of each case, list case strengths and weaknesses, combine cases to cre-
ate an initial model, and predict the outcomes of using this model in plan forma-
tion. Additionally, the number of cases or concepts presented was varied. It was
found that when a larger number of cases, or concepts, were presented, use of ana-
logical strategies resulted in problem solutions of the highest quality, originality, and
elegance. When, however, only a limited number of cases, or concepts, were pre-
sented, use of case-based conceptual combination strategies resulted in solutions of
greater quality, originality, and elegance.
These findings are noteworthy because they suggest that different strategies should
be employed when people are working with different forms of knowledge in solving
creative problems. Unfortunately, we know little about what the type of knowledge
being employed implies for other creative thinking processes (e.g., problem defini-
tion, idea generation). A more critical question broached by the findings obtained
by Scott et al. (2005) concerns the type of knowledge that should be applied in crea-
tive problem-solving.
Although a variety of knowledge structures exist that people might employ in cre-
ative problem-solving, for example, spatial knowledge, sensory knowledge, or mental
models, it is commonly held that creative problem solutions arise from use of con-
ceptual, or schematic, knowledge, case-based, or experiential, knowledge or associa-
tional knowledge. Hunter, Bedell, Ligon, Hunsicker and Mumford (2008) examined
the value of conceptual, case-based, and associational knowledge for performance on
a social innovation problem. More specifically, undergraduates were asked to design
a new course to help prepare high school students for college. Participants were
asked to generate ideas for this course, with ideas being evaluated for the number of
ideas produced, and a plan for this new course, which was evaluated for quality,
originality, and elegance. Use of knowledge structures was primed through a training
manipulation where the value of applying each type of knowledge was illustrated.
It was found that the number and quality of ideas generated were highest when
people were encouraged to apply associational knowledge. However, the highest
quality, most original, and most elegant solutions to this social innovation problem
emerged when people were encouraged to apply either schematic or case-based
knowledge. Thus, schematic and case-based knowledge appear to contribute to crea-
tive problem-solving, but not necessarily associational knowledge.
These findings are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they suggest that certain
forms of knowledge may be especially beneficial for creative problem-solving. Sec-
ond, the forms of knowledge that appear to contribute to creative problem-solving
are those that are acquired rather slowly as a function of expertise (Ericsson &
Charness, 1994). Third, it should be recognized that schematic and case-based
knowledge are not the only forms of knowledge acquired with expertise. Expertise
also provides mental models and knowledge of errors and constraints. This

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observation, in turn, implies a need for research examining the impact of mental
models, error knowledge, and constraint knowledge on creative problem-solving
(Mumford et al., in press; Robledo et al., in press). Fourth, and finally, these find-
ings suggest that conditions that activate recall of relevant knowledge or affect the
accessibility of different types of knowledge warrant more attention than has tradi-
tionally been the case in studies of creative thinking (Antes & Mumford, 2009).
Typically, in studies of creative thinking, we assume that having more knowledge,
or more information, is beneficial to the production of viable problem solutions.
Given the demands made by creative thinking processes, and the complex, resource-
intensive, nature of these processing activities, having more information only proves
beneficial if this information is directly related to the problem at hand. This phe-
nomenon has been demonstrated in a recent study by Friedrich and Mumford
(2009). In this study, undergraduates were asked to work on a low-fidelity simula-
tion task bearing on marketing a new cookie. Participants were presented with
emails where the content of the email called for execution of the conceptual combi-
nation, idea generation, idea evaluation, and implementation planning processes. A
consultants report was used to introduce contradictory information as participants
responded to each of these emails. The quality and originality of responses provided
to each email were assessed. It was found that process execution, as reflected in
responses to emails bearing on a given process, suffered whenever contradictory
information was introduced. Moreover, introduction of contradictory information
early on (e.g., during conceptual combination) disrupted execution of subsequent
processing activities (e.g., idea evaluation). Thus, in creative thinking, it is not neces-
sarily good to have more, or more diverse, information. Rather, it is vital that peo-
ple have critical, relevant, information and critical, relevant, knowledge if they are to
be able to execute the cognitive processes held to underlie creative thought.

APPLICATIONS
Research on the processes, strategies, and knowledge used in creative thinking is
not of interest solely for academic reasons. Understanding the variables shaping crea-
tive thinking is useful because it provides guidelines for how we might go about
attempting to enhance creativity in real-world settings. For example, the substantial
cognitive domains made by the various processes underlying creative thought point to
the need for people to invest scarce cognitive resources in solving the problem at
hand. This observation, in turn, points to the importance of motivation (Tierney &
Farmer, 2002) and beliefs with regard to the feasibility of executing creative problem-
solutions (Mumford, Decker, Connelly, Osburn, & Scott, 2002). Indeed, Dailey and
Mumford (2006) have shown that positive beliefs about implementation intentions
contribute to creative problem-solving. Similarly, given the negative effects of distract-
ing information on creative thought, it is not surprising that creative work in organi-
zations often occurs in isolated settings (Cardinal, 2001).
Understanding the variables influencing creative thought, however, is perhaps
more important due to what it tells us about how we should go about developing
peoples potential for creative problem-solving. One intervention commonly used to

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address this issue is formal training programs intended to improve peoples creative
thinking skills (Puccio & Cabra, 2012). Scott, Leritz and Mumford (2004) conducted
a meta-analysis examining the effectiveness of the various training programs
intended to enhance creativity. They found that most educational programs intended
to improve creative thinking were effective. Indeed, they proved effective even when
relevant controls were taken into account. More centrally, however, effective training
programs were typically those that focused on the key cognitive capacities held to
contribute to creative thinkingespecially programs which focused on strategies rel-
evant to problem definition, conceptual combination, idea generation, and imple-
mentation planning.
In a recent study, examining cognitive approaches for enhancing creative thinking
success, Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford (in press) asked undergraduates to develop
advertisements for two new productsa new high-energy root beer and a wireless
company entering a new market. Written solutions to both the wireless problem, a
pre-test, and the soft drink problem, a post-test, were evaluated for quality, original-
ity, and elegance. Prior to preparing their post-test problem solutions, and following
the pre-test problem, participants were asked to complete a series of self-paced
instructional modules. These self-paced instructional programs provided training in
execution of strategies that might contribute to either effective execution of early
cycle processing activities (e.g., problem definition, conceptual combination) or late
cycle processing activities (e.g., idea evaluation, solution monitoring). For example,
Baughman and Mumfords (1995) strategies for conceptual combination were pro-
vided for conceptual combination, while strategies such as identifying critical out-
comes, formulating observational approach, checking restrictions, and monitoring
emergent opportunities were provided for solution monitoring.
Byrne et al. (in press) found that instruction in strategy execution contributed to
production of higher quality, more original, and more elegant solutions to the post-
test creative problem-solving task even when performance on the pre-test was taken
into account. It was also found that when training focused on early cycle processes,
it was more effective when instruction was presented in a schematic format. When,
however, training focused on strategies involved in executing late cycle processes, it
proved more effective when delivered in a case-based format. This finding is of some
importance because it suggests that effective training content may differ as a func-
tion of the processes and strategies, which are the focus of training. Thus, there may
not be one right way to train creative thinking strategies. Hopefully, future
research will begin to formulate a systematic set of principles providing guidelines
indicating what instructional techniques should be applied for a particular process
and certain strategies for executing this process. Even bearing this caveat in mind,
however, the Byrne et al. (in press) study provides a clear illustration of how
research of creative thinking might be used to improve the methods we use to
develop peoples creative thinking skills.
Another practical implication of our findings with regard to the processes, strate-
gies, and knowledge involved in creative thought concerns the fundamental nature
of these cognitive activities. More specifically, our model of creative thinking

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activities assumes that creative thought involves the conscious investment of scarce
cognitive resources (Mumford et al., 1991). The need to invest cognitive resources
in creative thought not only suggests that motivation will contribute to creative
problem-solving (Jaussi, Randel, & Dionne, 2007; Tierney & Farmer, 2010), but also
suggests that people will make a conscious decision as to when, or when not, to
make this investment. Thus, this model of creative thinking suggests that creative
work, and creative people, will be environmentally sensitive (Oldham & Cummings,
1996).
In creativity research, the influence of environmental pressure on creative think-
ing is commonly subsumed under the rubric of climate (e.g., Amabile, Conti, Coon,
Lazenby, & Herron, 1996)perceptions of the external environment (James, James,
& Ashe, 1990). Hunter, Bedell and Mumford (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of
prior studies examining the effects of climate perceptions on creative achievement
and creative problem-solving. Their findings indicated that climate perceptions had
strong effects on creative achievement and creative problem-solving. Indeed, these
effects were comparable to those obtained from effective training interventions.
More centrally, it was found that among some fourteen dimensions of climate, intel-
lectual stimulation challenge, and positive interpersonal exchange exerted the strong-
est effectsall variables contributing to active intellectual exchange among teams
working on projects.
These findings are noteworthy because they suggest that aspects of the environ-
ment that influence peoples willingness to invest cognitive resources in creative
efforts will prove to be of some importance in shaping the nature and success of peo-
ples creative problem-solving efforts. In fact, Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange
(2002) have argued that one key variable influencing those climate perceptions is the
behavior of leaders. Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta and Kramer (2004), in a qualitative
study of creative work on the information technology field, found that peoples
investment in creative efforts, and the success of subsequent creative problem-solving
efforts, was influenced by the actions taken by their leaders.
Recently, Shipman, Byrne and Mumford (in press) examined two competing
models for how leaders might go about motivating creative work. The first model, a
transformational, or charismatic, model holds that identification with a vision being
articulated by a leader will motivate creative thinking (e.g., Zhou & Shalley, 2003).
The second model holds that the leaders articulation of an intellectually challenging
mission where contingences are attached to successful execution of this mission will
motivate creative thinking (e.g., Mumford et al., 2002).
In the Shipman et al. (in press) study, the impact of these alternative models on
motivation for creative efforts and creative problem-solving was examined. Partici-
pants, undergraduates, were asked to formulate a creative solution to a marketing
problem where written solutions to this problem were appraised for quality, origi-
nality, and elegance. Presentation of emails prior to participants beginning work on
this task was used to manipulate perceptions of leader charisma, mission engage-
ment, recognition for mission execution, and intellectual stimulation. It was found
that the highest quality, most original, and most elegant solutions to this marketing

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problem were, in fact, obtained when participants evidenced substantial motivation.

More centrally, it was found that leader behavior involving definition of intellectu-
ally challenging missions where people would be recognized for their contributions
resulted in the strongest motivation. Although a number of other environmental
events aside from leader behavior might influence climate perceptions, these findings
indicate that an understanding of the nature of creative thought not only allows us
to improve creative thinking but might also provide clues as to how environmental
pressure, such as the pressure induced by leaders, acts to shape peoples creative
thinking.

CONCLUSIONS
Before turning to the broader conclusions flowing from the present effort, certain
limitations should be noted. To begin, in the present effort, we have not made any
attempts to examine every possible model of creativity (Mumford & Gustafson,
1988). For example, little has been said about how personality influences creativity
(McCrae, 1987). Similarly, little has been said about how team interactional pro-
cesses influence group creative problem-solving (Taggar, 2002). Rather, in the pres-
ent effort, and in our research, I and my colleagues have focused on one aspect of
creativity and creative achievement, the generation of high-quality, original, and ele-
gant solutions (Besemer & OQuin, 1999; Christiaans, 2002) to the kind of complex,
novel, ill-defined problems that call for creative thought (Mumford & Gustafson,
2007).
Moreover, it should be recognized that much of the research examined bearing
on how people go about solving these problems was based on studies using low-
fidelity simulation tasksmarketing problems, educational problems, story writing.
Although use of these kind of low-fidelity simulation tasks is generally recom-
mended in studies of creative thinking (Welling, 2007), it should also be recognized
that we have not examined creative thinking in every domain that might be of con-
cern (Baer, 2003; Simonton, 2012). Thus, the question remains as to whether the
conclusions emerging from these studies can be generalized to every domain where
creative thinking is called for.
Even bearing these caveats in mind, however, we believe that the results emerging
from this research point to a number of noteworthy conclusions. To begin, creative
thinking cannot be understood using a single, simple, model. The findings obtained
in these studies indicate that creative thinking involves multiple, complex, processing
operations. Effective execution of these processes, moreover, depends on the knowl-
edge available to the person and the strategies people employ in executing these pro-
cesses. As Hennessey and Amabile (2010) point out, the operation of multiple
processes, multiple strategies, and multiple knowledge structures makes it difficult,
albeit intriguing, to formulate an understanding of creative thinking.
The research we have conducted over the last few decades has, moreover, pro-
vided a clearer understanding of the key processes involved in creative thought.
More specifically, although cross-domain differences in the significance of certain
processing operations have been observed (Mumford et al., 2010), creative thinking

42
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appears to call for the effective execution of eight core processes: (a) problem defini-
tion, (b) information gathering, (c) information organization, (d) conceptual combi-
nation, (e) idea generation, (f) idea evaluation, (g) implementation planning, and
(h) solution monitoring. Effective execution of these processes, in turn, depends on
people applying requisite strategies during process execution and having available
requisite knowledge.
This model leads to some potentially important conclusions about the nature of
creative thought. For example, it is not sufficient just to generate ideas. Ideas must
be evaluated and solutions based on these ideas planned (Basadur et al., 2000; Os-
burn & Mumford, 2006). These back-end, or late cycle, processing activities may be
as important to creative thought as early cycle, or front-end, processes (Mumford,
2002). Indeed, future research should give more attention to the impact of these late
cycle processes on creative problem-solving. Similarly, for many years, students of
creativity assumed that creativity could be defined solely based on idea generation.
Although idea generation is important, it may not be any more important than
problem definition or conceptual combination. Furthermore, in prior studies, we
have often equated creativity with divergent thinking. Divergent thinking may, of
course, represent a cross-process, or general, strategy contributing to creative
thought. What should be recognized, however, is that it is not the only, or necessar-
ily the most important, strategy contributing to creative thought.
Not only does the model of creative thinking my colleagues and I have been
developing lead to some important theoretical conclusions, it also has some note-
worthy practical implications. This model suggests why climate perceptions and
leadership behavior creating these climate perceptions contribute to both creative
problem-solving and creative achievement (Hunter et al., 2007; Shipman et al., in
press). More centrally, this model is noteworthy because it provides guidelines as to
how we might seek to improve creative thinking. Not only does this model help
explain why creativity training works, it also suggests new instructional approaches
that might encourage creative thinking (Mumford, Mecca, Gibson, & Giorgini, in
press).
Finally, as is the case with most plausible models, the work we have conducted
suggests a number of directions for future research. For example, we need more
studies examining how strategies and knowledge bases interact in peoples creative
problem-solving efforts. We need research examining how people appraise effective
process execution and the types of errors they seek to manage during process execu-
tion. We need to know more about how knowledge structures are integrated in real-
world creative problem-solving efforts, and the type of knowledge which is likely to
prove especially valuable to peoples creative problem-solving efforts.
The findings obtained in the work conducted to date cannot provide fully ade-
quate answers to these, and a number of other questions, broached by the work I,
and my colleagues, have been conducting. By the same token, we hope that the pres-
ent effort and our past work serve as an impetus for future research along these
lines. Indeed, we believed that the key conclusion flowing from our work is that cre-
ative thinking is an unusually complex phenomenon. Only systematic, sustained,

43
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research programs will provide the basis for understanding the complexity of crea-
tive thought.

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Michael D. Mumford, Kelsey E. Medeiros, Paul J. Partlow, The University of Oklahoma
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Michael D. Mumford, Department of
Psychology, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019. E-mail: mumford@ou.edu

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Roni Reiter-Palmon, Ginamarie Scott-Ligon, Sam Hunter, and Tamara Friedrich for their contri-
butions to the present effort. Parts of this effort were supported by a grant from the National Science Foun-
dation (IIS- 0852589), Michael D. Mumford, principal investigator.

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