Gibbards Neosentimentalism

Rational as endorsing linguistic meansi

I Central insight: to think something is to endorse a

sentiment by deeming it appropriate.
Rational as endorsing linguistic meansi

I Central insight: to think something is to endorse a

sentiment by deeming it appropriate.
I Rational is a lingustic device to express endorsement.
Gibbard: To call a thing rational [or to think that it makes
sense] is to endorse it, which is expressing ones acceptance
of the norms that permit it.
Rational as endorsing linguistic meansi

I Central insight: to think something is to endorse a

sentiment by deeming it appropriate.
I Rational is a lingustic device to express endorsement.
Gibbard: To call a thing rational [or to think that it makes
sense] is to endorse it, which is expressing ones acceptance
of the norms that permit it.
I Endorsement = direct and flavorless endorsement;
I Norm acceptance = a kind of motivational state.
Rational as endorsing linguistic meansi

I Central insight: to think something is to endorse a

sentiment by deeming it appropriate.
I Rational is a lingustic device to express endorsement.
Gibbard: To call a thing rational [or to think that it makes
sense] is to endorse it, which is expressing ones acceptance
of the norms that permit it.
I Endorsement = direct and flavorless endorsement;
I Norm acceptance = a kind of motivational state.

I Gibbards offers several reasons to include the state of norm

acceptance in human psychology.
The mental state of endorsing

I The clearest example: the akratic nut eater:

The mental state of endorsing

I The clearest example: the akratic nut eater:

I I think it makes sense to stop eating nuts at a party but I cant
stop.
The mental state of endorsing

I The clearest example: the akratic nut eater:

I I think it makes sense to stop eating nuts at a party but I cant
stop.
I To endorse desisting is not necessarily to stop eating the nuts.
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
I Thanks to Gibbards insight we are able to make sense of the
dispute over instrumentalism:
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
I Thanks to Gibbards insight we are able to make sense of the
dispute over instrumentalism:
I Instrumentalism:
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
I Thanks to Gibbards insight we are able to make sense of the
dispute over instrumentalism:
I Instrumentalism:
I Anti-instrumentalism:
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
I Thanks to Gibbards insight we are able to make sense of the
dispute over instrumentalism:
I Instrumentalism:
I Anti-instrumentalism:
I Gibbard:
Compared to other accounts of rationality

I Gibbards norm-endorsement-expressivist account rationality

claims to fare better than other accounts, whose main flaw is
not noticing the element of endorsement expressed by
rational.
I Thanks to Gibbards insight we are able to make sense of the
dispute over instrumentalism:
I Instrumentalism:
I Anti-instrumentalism:
I Gibbard:
I Furthermore, starting from Gibbards account, we can
elaborate a theory or moral judgment.
Moral judgements and emotions

I Moral judgments of right and wrong relate the rationality of

moral emotions: guilt and impartial anger.
I Thinking an action wrong = think rational for the agent to feel
guilty, and others to resent him, for so acting.
I But also:
I Shameful:
I Dangerous:
But...
The Conflation Problem... Again
The Conflation Problem... Again

I This makes Gibbard a neosentimentalist and the RDT can be

formulated in such a way that he would accept it;
The Conflation Problem... Again

I This makes Gibbard a neosentimentalist and the RDT can be

formulated in such a way that he would accept it;
I He cant distinguish between reason for feeling F toward X
that are relevant to whether X is and those that are not.
The Conflation Problem... Again

I This makes Gibbard a neosentimentalist and the RDT can be

formulated in such a way that he would accept it;
I He cant distinguish between reason for feeling F toward X
that are relevant to whether X is and those that are not.

Lets consider an example...

Dennis

I Dennis...
Dennis

I Dennis...
I He thinks his abilities are shameful. But he does not endorse
feeling shame.
Dennis

I Dennis...
I He thinks his abilities are shameful. But he does not endorse
feeling shame.
I Hence: to think something shameful is not in fact equivalent
to endorsing shame at it that is, to thinking it rational to be
ashamed.
Dennis

I Dennis...
I He thinks his abilities are shameful. But he does not endorse
feeling shame.
I Hence: to think something shameful is not in fact equivalent
to endorsing shame at it that is, to thinking it rational to be
ashamed.

Gibbard addresses the problem...

Emotional Warrant

I Gibbard: the notion of rationality has to be understood in the

same way we understand the rationality of a belief. The
question of whether a belief is rational [. . . ] is the question of
whether it is warranted. This is a matter of evidence
alone(p.742) Its not matter of advantageousness.
I Going back to Dennis: he deems his shame warranted, though
disavantageous.
Emotional Warrant

I But how can an emotion be warranted?

Two problems

I Gibbards idea or warrant constitutes ad advance for

sentimentalism according to DArms and Jacobson.
Two problems

I Gibbards idea or warrant constitutes ad advance for

sentimentalism according to DArms and Jacobson.
I But there are two problems.
First problem

I Identifying judgments of rationality with flavorless

endorsement and claiming that what is rational to believe
seetls what to believe, and what is rational to feel about
something settles wwhat to feel renders him not entitled to
say that obnly considerations of warrant bear on question of
the rationality of an attitude.
I In some cases...
I Dennis:
First problem

I Gibbard though claims that questions about the

advantageouness of a belief or emotion, can be understood as
questions about whether is rational to desire having this
attitude.
I Take Dennis again: it rational for him to be ashamed of his
inability (the shame is warranted), but is also rational for him
to want not be ashamed (shame is undesirable).
I Gibbard: Rationally feeling or believing something is distinct
from rationally wanting to feel or believe it
It is rational to believe or feel in accordance with your
evidence, but it may be rational to want to believe or feel
otherwise.
First problem

I According to DArms and Jacobson this does not solve the

problem. Assuming that Gibbard is right, Dennis would feel
counterproductive shame while vainly desiring not to feel it.
This is considered an unacceptable result.
First problem

I According to DArms and Jacobson this does not solve the

problem. Assuming that Gibbard is right, Dennis would feel
counterproductive shame while vainly desiring not to feel it.
This is considered an unacceptable result.

It is more plausible to think that, after weighing all the

reasons, Dennis endorses not feeling shame in this situation.
But, at the same time, this is compatible with his thinking
that his inabilities are shameful and that shame is warranted.
First problem

I According to DArms and Jacobson this does not solve the

problem. Assuming that Gibbard is right, Dennis would feel
counterproductive shame while vainly desiring not to feel it.
This is considered an unacceptable result.

It is more plausible to think that, after weighing all the

reasons, Dennis endorses not feeling shame in this situation.
But, at the same time, this is compatible with his thinking
that his inabilities are shameful and that shame is warranted.

It follows that an emotion warranted differs from a thin

endorsement of it.
First problem

I One possible strategy for Gibbard would be to abandon the

idea that norm acceptance is thin endorsement (that is that
what is rational to do/believe/feel settles the question of what
to do/feel/believe);
I But, even in this case, the question fo whether anyone is
warranted in feeling F at X turns out to be different from the
question of whether X is .
Second problem

I If we substitute warrant for appropriate in RDT, we get:

To think X is is to think it warranted to feel F in
response to X.
I The trouble: whether someone si warranted in feeling an
emotion depends upon the evidence he has about the
circumstance, but whether the circumstance is may not
depend on any such thing.
I A situation may be dangerous but I can, lacking information,
be unable to recognize the danger. According to DArms and
Jacobson Im not warranted in being afraid, but the situation
is dangerous.
I An actor who unwittingly delivers his accpetance speech with
his fly open...
Second problem

I In cases of misleading evidence then:

the question of whether a the question of whether is

or would be warranted in
circumstance (action, 6=
feature, etc.) is feeling F in that
circumstance.