Washington Consensus - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

10/7/2016 WashingtonConsensusWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia
WashingtonConsensus
FromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia
TheWashingtonConsensusisasetof10economicpolicyprescriptionsconsideredtoconstitutethe"standard"
reformpackagepromotedforcrisiswrackeddevelopingcountriesbyWashington,D.C.basedinstitutionssuchas
theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),WorldBank,andtheUSTreasuryDepartment.[1]Thetermwascoinedin
1989byEnglisheconomistJohnWilliamson.[2]
Theprescriptionsencompassedpoliciesinsuchareasasmacroeconomicstabilization,economicopeningwith
respecttobothtradeandinvestment,andtheexpansionofmarketforceswithinthedomesticeconomy.
SubsequenttoWilliamson'suseoftheterminology,anddespitehisemphaticopposition,thephraseWashington
Consensushascometobeusedfairlywidelyinasecond,broadersense,torefertoamoregeneralorientation
towardsastronglymarketbasedapproach(sometimesdescribedasmarketfundamentalismorneoliberalism).In
emphasizingthemagnitudeofthedifferencebetweenthetwoalternativedefinitions,Williamsonhimselfhas
argued(see"OriginsofPolicyAgenda"and"BroadSense"below)thathistenoriginal,narrowlydefined
prescriptionshavelargelyacquiredthestatusof"motherhoodandapplepie"(i.e.,arebroadlytakenforgranted),
whereasthesubsequentbroaderdefinition,representingaformofneoliberalmanifesto,"neverenjoyeda
consensus[inWashington]oranywheremuchelse"andcanreasonablybesaidtobedead.
DiscussionoftheWashingtonConsensushaslongbeencontentious.Partlythisreflectsalackofagreementover
whatismeantbytheterm,infaceofthecontrastbetweenthebroaderandnarrowerdefinitions.Buttherearealso
substantivedifferencesinvolvedoverthemeritsandconsequencesofthevariouspolicyprescriptionsinvolved.
Somecriticstakeissue,forexample,withtheoriginalConsensus'semphasisontheopeningofdeveloping
countriestoglobalmarkets,and/orwithwhattheyseeasanexcessivefocusonstrengtheningtheinfluenceof
domesticmarketforces,arguablyattheexpenseofkeyfunctionsofthestate.Forothercommentatorstheissueis
morewhatismissing,includingsuchareasasinstitutionbuildingandtargetedeffortstoimproveopportunitiesfor
theweakestinsociety.Despitetheseareasofcontroversy,anumberofdevelopmentalinstitutionsandeconomists
(suchasJosephStiglitz)wouldbynowacceptthemoregeneralpropositionthatstrategiesbestworkiftheyare
specificallydesignedtothecertaincircumstancesoftheindividualcountries.
Contents
1 History
1.1 Originalsense:Williamson'sTenPoints
1.2 Originsofpolicyagenda
1.3 Broadsense
2 Context
3 Macroeconomicadjustment
4 Tradeliberalization
5 Criticism
5.1 Antiglobalizationmovement
5.2 NeoKeynesiancriticisms
5.3 Proponentsofthe"Europeanmodel"andthe"Asianway"
6 Argentina
7 Subsidiesforagriculture
8 Continuingcontroversy
9 Missingelements
10 Alternativeusagevisavisforeignpolicy
11 Seealso
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus 1/17
11 Seealso
12 References
13 Sources
13.1 Primarysources
13.2 Secondarysources
14 Externallinks
History
Originalsense:Williamson'sTenPoints
TheconceptandnameoftheWashingtonConsensuswerefirstpresentedin1989byJohnWilliamson,an
economistfromtheInstituteforInternationalEconomics,aninternationaleconomicthinktankbasedin
Washington,D.C.[3]Williamsonusedthetermtosummarizecommonlysharedthemesamongpolicyadviceby
Washingtonbasedinstitutionsatthetime,suchastheInternationalMonetaryFund,WorldBank,andU.S.
TreasuryDepartment,whichwerebelievedtobenecessaryfortherecoveryofcountriesinLatinAmericafromthe
economicandfinancialcrisesofthe1980s.
TheconsensusasoriginallystatedbyWilliamsonincludedtenbroadsetsofrelativelyspecificpolicy
recommendations:[1]
1.Fiscalpolicydiscipline,withavoidanceoflargefiscaldeficitsrelativetoGDP
2.Redirectionofpublicspendingfromsubsidies("especiallyindiscriminatesubsidies")towardbroadbased
provisionofkeyprogrowth,propoorserviceslikeprimaryeducation,primaryhealthcareandinfrastructure
investment
3.Taxreform,broadeningthetaxbaseandadoptingmoderatemarginaltaxrates
4.Interestratesthataremarketdeterminedandpositive(butmoderate)inrealterms
5.Competitiveexchangerates
6.Tradeliberalization:liberalizationofimports,withparticularemphasisoneliminationofquantitative
restrictions(licensing,etc.)anytradeprotectiontobeprovidedbylowandrelativelyuniformtariffs
7.Liberalizationofinwardforeigndirectinvestment
8.Privatizationofstateenterprises
9.Deregulation:abolitionofregulationsthatimpedemarketentryorrestrictcompetition,exceptforthose
justifiedonsafety,environmentalandconsumerprotectiongrounds,andprudentialoversightoffinancial
institutions
10.Legalsecurityforpropertyrights.
Originsofpolicyagenda
AlthoughWilliamson'slabeloftheWashingtonConsensusdrawsattentiontotheroleoftheWashingtonbased
agenciesinpromotingtheaboveagenda,anumberofauthorshavestressedthatLatinAmericanpolicymakers
arrivedattheirownpackagesofpolicyreformsprimarilybasedontheirownanalysisoftheircountries'situations.
Thus,accordingtoJosephStanislawandDanielYergin,authorsofTheCommandingHeights,thepolicy
prescriptionsdescribedintheWashingtonConsensuswere"developedinLatinAmerica,byLatinAmericans,in
responsetowhatwashappeningbothwithinandoutsidetheregion."[4]JosephStiglitzhaswrittenthat"the
WashingtonConsensuspoliciesweredesignedtorespondtotheveryrealproblemsinLatinAmericaandmade
considerablesense"(thoughStiglitzhasattimesbeenanoutspokencriticofIMFpoliciesasappliedtodeveloping
nations).[5]InviewoftheimplicationconveyedbythetermWashingtonConsensusthatthepolicieswerelargely
externalinorigin,StanislawandYerginreportthattheterm'screator,JohnWilliamson,has"regrettedtheterm
eversince",stating"itisdifficulttothinkofalessdiplomaticlabel."[4]
A2010paperbyNancyBirdsall,AugustodelaTorre,andFelipeValenciaCaicedolikewisesuggeststhatthe
policiesintheoriginalconsensuswerelargelyacreationofLatinAmericanpoliticiansandtechnocrats,with
Williamson'srolehavingbeentogatherthetenpointsinoneplaceforthefirsttime,ratherthanto"create"the
packageofpolicies.[6]
InWilliamson'sownwordsfrom2002:
Itisdifficultevenforthecreatorofthetermtodenythatthephrase"WashingtonConsensus"isa
damagedbrandname(Nam2002).Audiencestheworldoverseemtobelievethatthissignifiesaset
ofneoliberalpoliciesthathavebeenimposedonhaplesscountriesbytheWashingtonbased
internationalfinancialinstitutionsandhaveledthemtocrisisandmisery.Therearepeoplewhocannot
utterthetermwithoutfoamingatthemouth.
Myownviewisofcoursequitedifferent.ThebasicideasthatIattemptedtosummarizeinthe
WashingtonConsensushavecontinuedtogainwideracceptanceoverthepastdecade,tothepoint
whereLulahashadtoendorsemostoftheminordertobeelectable.Forthemostparttheyare
motherhoodandapplepie,whichiswhytheycommandedaconsensus.[7]
Broadsense
Williamsonrecognizesthatthetermhascommonlybeenusedwithadifferentmeaningfromhisoriginal
prescriptionheopposesthealternativeuseoftheterm,whichbecamecommonafterhisinitialformulation,to
coverabroadermarketfundamentalismor"neoliberal"agenda.[8]
Iofcourseneverintendedmytermtoimplypolicieslikecapitalaccountliberalization(...Iquite
consciouslyexcludedthat),monetarism,supplysideeconomics,oraminimalstate(gettingthestate
outofwelfareprovisionandincomeredistribution),whichIthinkofasthequintessentiallyneoliberal
ideas.Ifthatishowthetermisinterpreted,thenwecanallenjoyitswake,althoughletusatleasthave
thedecencytorecognizethattheseideashaverarelydominatedthoughtinWashingtonandcertainly
nevercommandedaconsensusthereoranywheremuchelse...[7]
Morespecifically,Williamsonarguesthatthefirstthreeofhistenprescriptionsareuncontroversialinthe
economiccommunity,whilerecognizingthattheothershaveevokedsomecontroversy.Hearguesthatoneofthe
leastcontroversialprescriptions,theredirectionofspendingtoinfrastructure,healthcare,andeducation,hasoften
beenneglected.Healsoarguesthat,whiletheprescriptionswerefocusedonreducingcertainfunctionsof
government(e.g.,asanownerofproductiveenterprises),theywouldalsostrengthengovernment'sabilityto
undertakeotheractionssuchassupportingeducationandhealth.Williamsonsaysthathedoesnotendorsemarket
fundamentalism,andbelievesthattheConsensusprescriptions,ifimplementedcorrectly,wouldbenefitthepoor.[9]
InabookeditedwithPedroPabloKuczynskiin2003,Williamsonlaidoutanexpandedreformagenda,
emphasizingcrisisproofingofeconomies,"secondgeneration"reforms,andpoliciesaddressinginequalityand
socialissues(KuczynskiandWilliamson,2003).
Asnoted,inspiteofWilliamson'sreservations,thetermWashingtonConsensushasbeenusedmorebroadlyto
describethegeneralshifttowardsfreemarketpoliciesthatfollowedthedisplacementofKeynesianisminthe
1970s.InthisbroadsensetheWashingtonConsensusissometimesconsideredtohavebegunatabout1980.[10][11]
Manycommentatorsseetheconsensus,especiallyifinterpretedinthebroadersenseoftheterm,ashavingbeenat
itsstrongestduringthe1990s.Somehavearguedthattheconsensusinthissenseendedattheturnofthecentury,
oratleastthatitbecamelessinfluentialafterabouttheyear2000.[6][12]Morecommonly,commentatorshave
suggestedthattheConsensusinitsbroadersensesurviveduntilthetimeofthe20082009globalfinancial
crisis.[11]Followingthestronginterventionundertakenbygovernmentsinresponsetomarketfailures,anumberof
journalists,politiciansandseniorofficialsfromglobalinstitutionssuchastheWorldBankbegansayingthatthe
WashingtonConsensuswasdead.[13][14]TheseincludedformerBritishPrimeMinisterGordonBrown,who
followingthe2009G20Londonsummit,declared"theoldWashingtonConsensusisover".[15]Williamsonwas
askedbyTheWashingtonPostinApril2009whetherheagreedwithGordonBrownthattheWashington
Consensuswasdead.Heresponded:
ItdependsonwhatonemeansbytheWashingtonConsensus.IfonemeansthetenpointsthatItriedto
outline,thenclearlyit'snotright.IfoneusestheinterpretationthatanumberofpeopleincludingJoe
Stiglitz,mostprominentlyhavefoistedonit,thatitisaneoliberaltract,thenIthinkitisright.[16]
Afterthe2010G20SeoulsummitannouncedthatithadachievedagreementonaSeoulDevelopmentConsensus,
theFinancialTimeseditorializedthat"Itspragmaticandpluralisticviewofdevelopmentisappealingenough.But
thedocumentwilldolittlemorethandriveanothernailintothecoffinofalongdeceasedWashington
consensus."[17]
Context
Manycountrieshaveendeavoredtoimplementvaryingcomponentsofthereformpackages,withimplementation
sometimesimposedasaconditionforreceivingloansfromtheIMFandWorldBank.[10]Theresultsofthese
reformsaremuchdebated.Somecriticsfocusonclaimsthatthereformsledtodestabilization.[18]Somecritics
havealsoblamedtheWashingtonConsensusforparticulareconomiccrisessuchastheArgentineeconomiccrisis
(19992002),andforexacerbatingLatinAmerica'seconomicinequalities.CriticismoftheWashingtonConsensus
hasoftenbeendismissedassocialismand/orantiglobalism.Whilethesephilosophiesdocriticizethesepolicies,
generalcriticismoftheeconomicsoftheconsensusisnowmorewidelyestablished,suchasthatoutlinedbyUS
scholarDaniRodrik,ProfessorofInternationalPoliticalEconomyatHarvardUniversity,inhispaperGoodbye
WashingtonConsensus,HelloWashingtonConfusion?.[19]
Theinstitutionsthatformedtheconsensusstartedsofteningtheirinsistenceonthesepoliciesinthe2000slargely
duetopoliticalpressuressurroundingglobalization,butanyreferenceoftheseideasasaconsensusessentially
endedinthewakeofthe2008globalfinancialcrisis,asmarketfundamentalismlostfavour.Though,itshouldbe
noted,thatmostofthecorespecificpoliciesarestillgenerallyregardedfavourably,butthepolicieshavecometo
beviewedasnotpreventingnoralleviatingacuteeconomiccrises.Thisisperhapsmostnotableintheworkofthe
IMFwithSouthKoreatocreateanewsortofinterventionprogramtotheonethatSouthKoreawasforcedto
acceptduringtheAsianFinancialCrisisofthelate1990s.Thatintervention,whichwasheavilygroundedinthe
WashingtonConsensus,washailedatthetimeforstoppingthe"AsianContagion"buteventuallytheprogram
cametobeseenmoreskeptically.
Williamsonhimselfhassummarizedtheoverallresultsongrowth,employmentandpovertyreductioninmany
countriesas"disappointing,tosaytheleast".Heattributesthislimitedimpacttothreefactors:(a)theConsensus
perseplacednospecialemphasisonmechanismsforavoidingeconomiccrises,whichhaveprovedvery
damaging(b)thereformsboththoselistedinhisarticleand,afortiori,thoseactuallyimplementedwere
incompleteand(c)thereformscitedwereinsufficientlyambitiouswithrespecttotargetingimprovementsin
incomedistribution,andneedtobecomplementedbystrongereffortsinthisdirection.Ratherthananargumentfor
abandoningtheoriginaltenprescriptions,though,Williamsonconcludesthattheyare"motherhoodandapplepie"
and"notworthdebating".[7]BothWilliamsonandotheranalystshavepointedtolongertermimprovementsin
economicperformanceinanumberofcountriesthathaveadoptedtherelevantpolicychangesconsistently,suchas
Chile(below).
AsWilliamsonhimselfhaspointedout,thetermhascometobeusedinabroadersensetoitsoriginalintention,as
asynonymformarketfundamentalismorneoliberalism.Inthisbroadersense,Williamsonstates,ithasbeen
criticizedbypeoplesuchasGeorgeSorosandNobelLaureateJosephE.Stiglitz.[9]TheWashingtonConsensusis
alsocriticizedbyotherssuchassomeLatinAmericanpoliticiansandheterodoxeconomistssuchasErik
Reinert.[20]Thetermhasbecomeassociatedwithneoliberalpoliciesingeneralanddrawnintothebroaderdebate
overtheexpandingroleofthefreemarket,constraintsuponthestate,andtheinfluenceoftheUnitedStates,and
globalizationmorebroadly,oncountries'nationalsovereignty.
"Stabilize,privatize,andliberalize"becamethemantraofagenerationoftechnocratswhocuttheir
teethinthedevelopingworldandofthepoliticalleaderstheycounseled.[19]
DaniRodrik,ProfessorofInternationalPoliticalEconomy,HarvardUniversityinJELon
December2006
Whileopinionvariesamongeconomists,Rodrikpointedoutwhatheclaimedwasafactualparadox:whileChina
andIndiaincreasedtheireconomies'relianceonfreemarketforcestoalimitedextent,theirgeneraleconomic
policiesremainedtheexactoppositetotheWashingtonConsensus'mainrecommendations.Bothhadhighlevels
ofprotectionism,noprivatization,extensiveindustrialpoliciesplanning,andlaxfiscalandfinancialpolicies
throughthe1990s.Hadtheybeendismalfailurestheywouldhavepresentedstrongevidenceinsupportofthe
recommendedWashingtonConsensuspolicies.Howevertheyturnedouttobesuccesses.[21]AccordingtoRodrik:
"Whilethelessonsdrawnbyproponentsandskepticsdiffer,itisfairtosaythatnobodyreallybelievesinthe
WashingtonConsensusanymore.ThequestionnowisnotwhethertheWashingtonConsensusisdeadoraliveitis
whatwillreplaceit".[19]
Rodrik'saccountofChineseorIndianpoliciesduringtheperiodisnotuniversallyaccepted.Amongotherthings
thosepoliciesinvolvedmajorturnsinthedirectionofgreaterrelianceuponmarketforces,bothdomesticallyand
internationally.[22]
InabookeditedwithPedroPabloKuczynskiin2003,JohnWilliamsonlaidoutanexpandedreformagenda,
emphasizingcrisisproofingofeconomies,"secondgeneration"reforms,andpoliciesaddressinginequalityand
socialissues.
Macroeconomicadjustment
ThewidespreadadoptionbygovernmentsoftheWashingtonConsensuswastoalargedegreeareactiontothe
macroeconomiccrisisthathitmuchofLatinAmerica,andsomeotherdevelopingregions,duringthe1980s.The
crisishadmultipleorigins:thedrasticriseinthepriceofimportedoilfollowingtheemergenceofOPEC,mounting
levelsofexternaldebt,theriseinUS(andhenceinternational)interestrates,andconsequenttotheforegoing
problemslossofaccesstoadditionalforeigncredit.Theimportsubstitutionpoliciesthathadbeenpursuedby
manydevelopingcountrygovernmentsinLatinAmericaandelsewhereforseveraldecadeshadlefttheir
economiesillequippedtoexpandexportsatallquicklytopayfortheadditionalcostofimportedoil(bycontrast,
manycountriesinEastAsia,whichhadfollowedmoreexportorientedstrategies,founditcomparativelyeasyto
expandexportsstillfurther,andassuchmanagedtoaccommodatetheexternalshockswithmuchlesseconomic
andsocialdisruption).Unableeithertoexpandexternalborrowingfurtherortorampupexportearningseasily,
manyLatinAmericancountriesfacednoobvioussustainablealternativestoreducingoveralldomesticdemandvia
greaterfiscaldiscipline,whileinparalleladoptingpoliciestoreduceprotectionismandincreasetheireconomies'
exportorientation.[23]
Tradeliberalization
TheWashingtonConsensus,asframedbyWilliamson,envisagedalargelyunilateralprocessoftradereform,by
whichcountrieswouldlowertheirnontariff(especially)andtariffbarrierstoimports.Manycountries,including
themajorityofthoseinLatinAmerica,haveindeedundertakensignificantunilateraltradeliberalizationover
subsequentyears,openingtheireconomiestogreaterimportcompetitionwhilesimultaneouslyincreasingtheshare
ofexportsintheirGDP(inparallel,LatinAmerica'sshareinglobaltradehasalsoincreased).
AseparateagendaonlytangentiallyrelatedtotheWashingtonConsensusasframedbyWilliamsonconcerns
variousprogramsformultilateraltradeliberalization,whetherattheglobal(WTO)orregionallevel,includingthe
NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)andDRCAFTAagreements.
Criticism
Mostcriticismhasbeenfocusedontradeliberalizationandtheeliminationofsubsidies,andcriticismhasbeen
particularlystridentintheagriculturesector.Innationswithsubstantialnaturalresources,though,criticismhas
tendedtofocusonprivatizationofindustriesexploitingtheseresources.
Asof2010,severalLatinAmericancountrieswereledbysocialistorotherleftwinggovernments,someofwhich
includingArgentinaandVenezuelahavecampaignedfor(andtosomedegreeadopted)policiescontrarytothe
WashingtonConsensuspolicies.OtherLatinAmericancountrieswithgovernmentsoftheleft,includingBrazil,
ChileandPeru,inpracticeadoptedthebulkofthepoliciesincludedinWilliamson'slist,eventhoughthey
criticizedthemarketfundamentalismthattheseareoftenassociatedwith.Alsocriticalofthepoliciesasactually
promotedbytheIMFhavebeensomeUSeconomists,suchasJosephStiglitzandDaniRodrik,whohave
challengedwhataresometimesdescribedasthe'fundamentalist'policiesoftheIMFandtheUSTreasuryforwhat
Stiglitzcallsa'onesizefitsall'treatmentofindividualeconomies.AccordingtoStiglitzthetreatmentsuggestedby
theIMFistoosimple:onedose,andfaststabilize,liberalizeandprivatize,withoutprioritizingorwatchingfor
sideeffects.[24]
Thereformsdidnotalwaysworkoutthewaytheywereintended.Whilegrowthgenerallyimproved
acrossmuchofLatinAmerica,itwasinmostcountrieslessthanthereformershadoriginallyhoped
for(andthe"transitioncrisis",asnotedabovedeeperandmoresustainedthanhopedforinsomeof
theformersocialisteconomies).SuccessstoriesinSubSaharanAfricaduringthe1990swere
relativelyfewandfarinbetween,andmarketorientedreformsbythemselvesofferednoformulato
dealwiththegrowingpublichealthemergencyinwhichthecontinentbecameembroiled.Thecritics,
meanwhile,arguethatthedisappointingoutcomeshavevindicatedtheirconcernsaboutthe
inappropriatenessofthestandardreformagenda.[25]
Besidestheexcessivebeliefinmarketfundamentalismandinternationaleconomicinstitutionsinattributingthe
failureoftheWashingtonconsensus,Stiglitzprovidedafurtherexplanationaboutwhyitfailed.Inhisarticle"The
PostWashingtonConsensusConsensus",[26]heclaimsthattheWashingtonconsensuspoliciesfailedtoefficiently
handletheeconomicstructureswithindevelopingcountries.ThecasesofEastAsiancountriessuchasKoreaand
Taiwanareknownasasuccessstoryinwhichtheirremarkableeconomicgrowthwasattributedtoalargerroleof
thegovernmentbyundertakingindustrialpoliciesandincreasingdomesticsavingswithintheirterritory.Fromthe
cases,theroleforgovernmentwasproventobecriticalatthebeginningstageofthedynamicprocessof
development,atleastuntilthemarketsbythemselvescanproduceefficientoutcomes.
ThepoliciespursuedbytheinternationalfinancialinstitutionswhichcametobecalledtheWashington
consensuspoliciesorneoliberalismentailedamuchmorecircumscribedroleforthestatethanwere
embracedbymostoftheEastAsiancountries,asetofpolicieswhich(inanothersimplification)came
tobecalledthedevelopmentstate.[26]
ThecritiquelaidoutintheWorldBank'sstudyEconomicGrowthinthe1990s:LearningfromaDecadeofReform
(2005)[27]showshowfardiscussionhascomefromtheoriginalideasoftheWashingtonConsensus.Gobind
Nankani,aformervicepresidentforAfricaattheWorldBank,wroteinthepreface:"thereisnouniqueuniversal
setofrules....[W]eneedtogetawayfromformulaeandthesearchforelusive'bestpractices'...."(p.xiii).The
WorldBank'snewemphasisisontheneedforhumility,forpolicydiversity,forselectiveandmodestreforms,and
forexperimentation.[28]
TheWorldBank'sreportLearningfromReformshowssomeofthedevelopmentsofthe1990s.Therewasadeep
andprolongedcollapseinoutputinsome(thoughbynomeansall)countriesmakingthetransitionfrom
communismtomarketeconomies(manyoftheCentralandEastEuropeancountries,bycontrast,madethe
adjustmentrelativelyrapidly).Morethanadecadeintothetransition,someoftheformercommunistcountries,
especiallypartsoftheformerSovietUnion,hadstillnotcaughtuptotheir1990levelsofoutput.ManySub
SaharanAfrican'seconomiesfailedtotakeoffduringthe1990s,inspiteofeffortsatpolicyreform,changesinthe
politicalandexternalenvironments,andcontinuedheavyinfluxofforeignaid.Uganda,Tanzania,and
Mozambiquewereamongcountriesthatshowedsomesuccess,buttheyremainedfragile.Therewereseveral
successiveandpainfulfinancialcrisesinLatinAmerica,EastAsia,Russia,andTurkey.TheLatinAmerican
recoveryinthefirsthalfofthe1990swasinterruptedbycriseslaterinthedecade.Therewaslessgrowthinper
capitaGDPinLatinAmericathanintheperiodofrapidpostWarexpansionandopeningintheworldeconomy,
195080.Argentina,describedbysomeas"theposterboyoftheLatinAmericaneconomicrevolution",[29]came
crashingdownin2002.[28]
Amongotherresultsoftherecentglobalfinancialcrisishasbeenastrengtheningofbeliefintheimportanceof
localdevelopmentmodelsasmoresuitablethanprogrammaticapproaches.Someelementsofthisschoolof
thoughtweresummarizedintheideaofa"BeijingConsensus"whichsuggestedthatnationsneededtofindtheir
ownpathstodevelopmentandreform.
Antiglobalizationmovement
Manycriticsoftradeliberalization,suchasNoamChomsky,TariqAli,SusanGeorge,andNaomiKlein,seethe
WashingtonConsensusasawaytoopenthelabormarketofunderdevelopedeconomiestoexploitationby
companiesfrommoredevelopedeconomies.Theprescribedreductionsintariffsandothertradebarriersallowthe
freemovementofgoodsacrossbordersaccordingtomarketforces,butlaborisnotpermittedtomovefreelydueto
therequirementsofavisaoraworkpermit.Thiscreatesaneconomicclimatewheregoodsaremanufacturedusing
cheaplaborinunderdevelopedeconomiesandthenexportedtorichFirstWorldeconomiesforsaleatwhatthe
criticsarguearehugemarkups,withthebalanceofthemarkupsaidtoaccruetolargemultinationalcorporations.
ThecriticismisthatworkersintheThirdWorldeconomyneverthelessremainpoor,asanypayraisestheymay
havereceivedoverwhattheymadebeforetradeliberalizationaresaidtobeoffsetbyinflation,whereasworkersin
theFirstWorldcountrybecomeunemployed,whilethewealthyownersofthemultinationalgrowevenmore
wealthy.
AntiglobalismcriticsfurtherclaimthatFirstWorldcountriesimposewhatthecriticsdescribeastheconsensus's
neoliberalpoliciesoneconomicallyvulnerablecountriesthroughorganizationssuchastheWorldBankandthe
InternationalMonetaryFundandbypoliticalpressureandbribery.TheyarguethattheWashingtonConsensushas
not,infact,ledtoanygreateconomicboominLatinAmerica,butrathertosevereeconomiccrisesandthe
accumulationofcripplingexternaldebtsthatrenderthetargetcountrybeholdentotheFirstWorld.
Manyofthepolicyprescriptions(e.g.,theprivatizationofstateindustries,taxreform,andderegulation)are
criticizedasmechanismsforensuringthedevelopmentofasmall,wealthy,indigenouseliteintheThirdWorld
whowillrisetopoliticalpowerandalsohaveavestedinterestinmaintainingthelocalstatusquooflabor
exploitation.
Somespecificfactualpremisesofthecritiqueasphrasedabove(especiallyonthemacroeconomicside)arenot
acceptedbydefenders,orindeedallcritics,oftheWashingtonConsensus.Totakeafewexamples,[30]inflationin
manydevelopingcountriesisnowatitslowestlevelsformanydecades(lowsinglefiguresforverymuchofLatin
America).Workersinsomefactoriescreatedbyforeigninvestmentarefoundtypicallytoreceivehigherwagesand
betterworkingconditionsthanexistinmanyoftheirowncountries'domesticallyownedworkplaces.Economic
growthinmuchofLatinAmericainthelastfewyearshasbeenathistoricallyhighrates,anddebtlevels,relative
tothesizeoftheseeconomies,areonaveragesignificantlylowerthantheywereseveralyearsago.
Despitethesemacroeconomicadvances,povertyandinequalityremainathighlevelsinLatinAmerica.Aboutone
ofeverythreepeople165millionintotalstillliveonlessthan$2aday.Roughlyathirdofthepopulationhas
noaccesstoelectricityorbasicsanitation,andanestimated10millionchildrensufferfrommalnutrition.These
problemsarenot,however,new:LatinAmericawasthemosteconomicallyunequalregionintheworldin1950,
andhascontinuedtobesoeversince,duringperiodsbothofstatedirectedimportsubstitutionand(subsequently)
ofmarketorientedliberalization.[31]
SomesocialistpoliticalleadersinLatinAmericaarevocalandwellknowncriticsoftheWashingtonConsensus,
suchasthelateVenezuelanPresidentHugoChvez,CubanexPresidentFidelCastro,BolivianPresidentEvo
Morales,andRafaelCorrea,PresidentofEcuador.InArgentina,too,therecentJusticialistPartygovernmentof
NstorKirchnerandhisspousewhosucceededhimundertookpolicymeasureswhichrepresentedarepudiationof
atleastsomeConsensuspolicies(seeContinuingControversybelow).WiththeexceptionofCastro,theseleaders
havemaintainedandexpandedsomesuccessfulpoliciescommonlyassociatedwiththeWashingtonConsensus,
suchasmacroeconomicstabilityandpropertyrightsprotection.Butmanyhavealsoproposedandimplemented
policiesdirectlyopposedtotheWashingtonConsensus:underChavez,forexample,Venezuelapartially
nationalizedthestaterunoilcompany,PetrleosdeVenezuelaS.A(PdVSA),andwiththehelpofthecompany's
assetsdevelopedseveralsocialprogramstohelpthecountry'spoor.Theseprogramshavebeencreditedwiththe
dramaticimprovementinqualityoflifeduringChavez'spresidency:thepovertyratedroppedfrom48.6%in2002
to29.5%in2011,whileaccesstoeducationandhealthcarewassignificantlyincreased.[32]
OthersontheLatinAmericanlefttakeadifferentapproach.GovernmentsledbytheSocialistPartyofChile,by
AlanGarcainPeru,byTabarVzquezinUruguay,andbyLuizIncioLuladaSilvainBrazil,haveinpractise
maintainedahighdegreeofcontinuitywiththeeconomicpoliciesdescribedundertheWashingtonConsensus
(debtpaying,protectiontoforeigninvestment,financialreforms,etc.).Butgovernmentsofthistypehave
simultaneouslysoughttosupplementthesepoliciesbymeasuresdirectlytargetedatimprovingproductivityand
helpingthepoor,suchaseducationreformsandsubsidiestopoorfamiliesconditionedontheirchildrenstayingin
school.
NeoKeynesiancriticisms
NeoKeynesianandpostKeynesiancriticsoftheConsensus[citationneeded]havearguedthattheunderlying
policieswereincorrectlylaiddownandaretoorigidtobeabletosucceed.Forexample,flexiblelaborlawswere
supposedtocreatenewjobs,buteconomicevidencefromLatinAmericaisinconclusiveonthispoint.Inaddition,
somearguethatthepackageofpoliciesdoesnottakeintoaccounteconomicandculturaldifferencesbetween
countries.Somecriticshavearguedthatthissetofpoliciesshouldbeimplemented,ifatall,duringaperiodof
rapideconomicgrowthandnotasoftenisthecaseduringaneconomiccrisis.
MoissNam,chiefeditorofForeignPolicy,hasmadetheargumentthattherewasno'consensus'inthefirstplace.
Hehasarguedthatthereareandhavebeenmajordifferencesbetweeneconomistsoverwhatisthe'correct
economicpolicy',hencetheideaoftherebeingaconsensuswasalsoflawed.
Proponentsofthe"Europeanmodel"andthe"Asianway"
SomeEuropeanandAsianeconomistssuggestthat"infrastructuresavvyeconomies"suchasNorway,Singapore,
andChinahavepartiallyrejectedtheunderlyingNeoclassical"financialorthodoxy"thatcharacterizesthe
WashingtonConsensus,insteadinitiatingapragmatistdevelopmentpathoftheirown[33]basedonsustained,large
scale,governmentfundedinvestmentsinstrategicinfrastructureprojects:"SuccessfulcountriessuchasSingapore,
Indonesia,andSouthKoreastillremembertheharshadjustmentmechanismsimposedabruptlyuponthembythe
IMFandWorldBankduringthe19971998'AsianCrisis'[]Whattheyhaveachievedinthepast10yearsisall
themoreremarkable:theyhavequietlyabandonedtheWashingtonConsensusbyinvestingmassivelyin
infrastructureprojects[]thispragmaticapproachprovedtobeverysuccessful".[34]
WhileChinainvestedroughly9%ofitsGDPoninfrastructureinthe1990sand2000s,mostWesternandnon
Asianemergingeconomiesinvestedonly2%to4%oftheirGDPininfrastructureassets.Thisconsiderable
investmentgapallowedtheChineseeconomytogrowatnearoptimalconditionswhilemanySouthAmerican,
SouthAsian,andAfricaneconomiessufferedfromvariousdevelopmentbottleneckslikepoortransportation
networks,agingpowergrids,andmediocreschools.
Argentina
TheArgentineeconomiccrisisof19992002isoftenheldoutasanexampleoftheeconomicdevastationsaidby
sometohavebeenwroughtbyapplicationoftheWashingtonConsensus.Argentina'sformerDeputyForeign
MinisterJorgeTaiana,inaninterviewwiththestatenewsagencyTlamonAugust16,2005,attackedthe
WashingtonConsensus.Thereneverwasarealconsensusforsuchpolicies,hesaid,andtoday"agoodnumberof
governmentsofthehemispherearereviewingtheassumptionswithwhichtheyappliedthosepoliciesinthe
1990s",addingthatgovernmentsarelookingforadevelopmentmodeltoguaranteeproductiveemploymentand
thegenerationofrealwealth.[35]
Manyeconomists,however,challengetheviewthatArgentina'sfailurecanbeattributedtocloseadherencetothe
WashingtonConsensus.Thecountry'sadoptionofanidiosyncraticfixedexchangerateregime(theconvertibility
plan),whichbecameincreasinglyuncompetitive,togetherwithitsfailuretoachieveeffectivecontroloveritsfiscal
accounts,bothrancountertocentralprovisionsoftheConsensus,andpavedthewaydirectlyfortheultimate
macroeconomiccollapse.ThemarketorientedpoliciesoftheearlyMenemCavalloyears,meanwhile,soon
peteredoutinthefaceofdomesticpoliticalconstraints(includingMenem'spreoccupationwithsecuringre
election).[36]
InOctober1998theIMFinvitedArgentinePresidentCarlosMenem,totalkaboutthesuccessfulArgentine
experience,attheAnnualMeetingoftheBoardofGovernors.[37]PresidentMenem'sMinisterofEconomy(1991
1996),DomingoCavallo,thearchitectoftheMenemadministration'seconomicpolicies,specificallyincluding
"convertibility",madetheclaimthatArgentinawasatthatmoment,"consideredasthebestpupiloftheIMF,the
WorldBankandtheUSAgovernment":
Onthesecondsemesterof1998ArgentinawasconsideredinWashingtonthemostsuccessful
economyamongtheonesthathadrestructureditsdebtwithintheBrady'sPlanframework.Noneof
theWashingtonConsensus'sponsorswereinterestedinpointingoutthattheArgentineeconomic
reformshaddifferenceswithits10recommendations.Onthecontrary,Argentinawasconsideredthe
bestpupiloftheIMF,theWorldBankandtheUSAgovernment.[38]
Theproblemswhicharisewithrelianceonafixedexchangeratemechanism(above)arediscussedintheWorld
BankreportEconomicGrowthinthe1990s:LearningfromaDecadeofReform,whichquestionswhether
expectationscanbe"positivelyaffectedbytyingagovernment'shands".Intheearly1990stherewasapointof
viewthatcountriesshouldmovetoeitherfixedorcompletelyflexibleexchangeratestoreassuremarket
participantsofthecompleteremovalofgovernmentdiscretioninforeignexchangematters.AftertheArgentina
collapse,someobserversbelievethatremovinggovernmentdiscretionbycreatingmechanismsthatimposelarge
penaltiesmay,onthecontrary,actuallyitselfundermineexpectations.VelascoandNeut(2003)[39]"arguethatif
theworldisuncertainandtherearesituationsinwhichthelackofdiscretionwillcauselargelosses,apre
commitmentdevicecanactuallymakethingsworse".[40]Inchapter7ofitsreport(FinancialLiberalization:What
WentRight,WhatWentWrong?)theWorldBankanalyseswhatwentwronginArgentina,summarizesthelessons
fromtheexperience,anddrawssuggestionsforitsfuturepolicy.[41]
TheIMF'sIndependentEvaluationOfficehasissuedareviewofthelessonsofArgentinafortheinstitution,
summarizedinthefollowingquotation:
TheArgentinecrisisyieldsanumberoflessonsfortheIMF,someofwhichhavealreadybeenlearned
andincorporatedintorevisedpoliciesandprocedures.Thisevaluationsuggeststenlessons,inthe
areasofsurveillanceandprogramdesign,crisismanagement,andthedecisionmakingprocess.[42]
MarkWeisbrotsaysthat,inmorerecentyears,ArgentinaunderformerPresidentNstorKirchnermadeabreak
withtheConsensusandthatthisledtoasignificantimprovementinitseconomysomeaddthatEcuadormaysoon
followsuit.[43]However,whileKirchner'srelianceonpricecontrolsandsimilaradministrativemeasures(often
aimedprimarilyatforeigninvestedfirmssuchasutilities)clearlyrancountertothespiritoftheConsensus,his
administrationinfactrananextremelytightfiscalshipandmaintainedahighlycompetitivefloatingexchange
rateArgentina'simmediatebouncebackfromcrisis,furtheraidedbyabrogatingitsdebtsandafortuitousboomin
pricesofprimarycommodities,leavesopenissuesoflongertermsustainability.[44]TheEconomisthasarguedthat
theNstorKirchneradministrationwillendupasonemoreinArgentina'slonghistoryofpopulistgovernments.[45]
InOctober2008,Kirchner'swifeandsuccessorasPresident,CristinaKirchner,announcedhergovernment's
intentiontonationalizepensionfundsfromtheprivatizedsystemimplementedbyMenemCavallo.[46]Accusations
haveemergedofthemanipulationofofficialstatisticsundertheKirchners(mostnotoriously,forinflation)to
createaninaccuratelypositivepictureofeconomicperformance.[47]TheEconomistremovedArgentina'sinflation
measurefromitsofficialindicators,sayingthattheywerenolongerreliable.[48]
In2003,Argentina'sandBrazil'spresidents,NstorKirchnerandLuizInacioLuladaSilvasignedthe"Buenos
AiresConsensus",amanifestoopposingtheWashingtonConsensus'policies.[49]Skepticalpoliticalobserversnote,
however,thatLula'srhetoriconsuchpublicoccasionsshouldbedistinguishedfromthepoliciesactually
implementedbyhisadministration.[50]Thissaid,LuladaSilvapaidthewholeofBrazil'sdebtwiththeIMFtwo
yearsinadvance,freeinghisgovernmentfromIMFtutelage,asdidNstorKirchner'sgovernmentin2005.
Subsidiesforagriculture
TheWashingtonConsensusasformulatedbyWilliamsonincludesprovisionfortheredirectionofpublicspending
fromsubsidies("especiallyindiscriminatesubsidies")towardbroadbasedprovisionofkeyprogrowth,propoor
serviceslikeprimaryeducation,primaryhealthcareandinfrastructureinvestment.Thisdefinitionleavessome
roomfordebateoverspecificpublicspendingprograms.Oneareaofpubliccontroversyhasfocusedontheissues
ofsubsidiestofarmersforfertilizersandothermodernfarminputs:ontheonehand,thesecanbecriticizedas
subsidies,ontheother,itmaybearguedthattheygeneratepositiveexternalitiesthatmightjustifythesubsidy
involved.
SomecriticsoftheWashingtonConsensusciteMalawi'sexperiencewithagriculturalsubsidies,forexample,as
exemplifyingperceivedflawsinthepackage'sprescriptions.Fordecades,theWorldBankanddonornations
pressedMalawi,apredominantlyruralcountryinAfrica,tocutbackoreliminategovernmentfertilizersubsidies
tofarmers.WorldBankexpertsalsourgedthecountrytohaveMalawifarmersshifttogrowingcashcropsfor
exportandtouseforeignexchangeearningstoimportfood.[51]Foryears,Malawihoveredonthebrinkoffamine
afteraparticularlydisastrouscornharvestin2005,almostfivemillionofits13millionpeopleneededemergency
foodaid.Malawi'snewlyelectedpresidentBinguwaMutharikathendecidedtoreversepolicy.Introductionof
deepfertilizersubsidies(andlesseronesforseed),abettedbygoodrains,helpedfarmersproducerecordbreaking
cornharvestsin2006and2007accordingtogovernmentreports,cornproductionleaptfrom1.2millionmetric
tonsin2005to2.7millionin2006and3.4millionin2007.Theprevalenceofacutechildhungerhasfallensharply
andMalawirecentlyturnedawayemergencyfoodaid.
InacommentaryontheMalawiexperiencepreparedfortheCenterforGlobalDevelopment,[52]development
economistsVijayaRamachandranandPeterTimmerarguethatfertilizersubsidiesinpartsofAfrica(and
Indonesia)canhavebenefitsthatsubstantiallyexceedtheircosts.Theycaution,however,thathowthesubsidyis
operatediscrucialtoitslongtermsuccess,andwarnagainstallowingfertilizerdistributiontobecomeamonopoly.
RamachandranandTimmeralsostressthatAfricanfarmersneedmorethanjustinputsubsidiestheyneedbetter
researchtodevelopnewinputsandnewseeds,aswellasbettertransportandenergyinfrastructure.TheWorld
Bankreportedlynowsometimessupportsthetemporaryuseoffertilizersubsidiesaimedatthepoorandcarriedout
inawaythatfostersprivatemarkets:"InMalawi,BankofficialssaytheygenerallysupportMalawi'spolicy,
thoughtheycriticizethegovernmentfornothavingastrategytoeventuallyendthesubsidies,questionwhetherits
2007cornproductionestimatesareinflatedandsaythereisstillalotofroomforimprovementinhowthesubsidy
iscarriedout".[51]
Continuingcontroversy
MostLatinAmericancountriescontinuetostrugglewithhighpovertyandunderemployment.Chilehasbeen
offeredasanexampleofaConsensussuccessstory,andcountriessuchasElSalvadorandPanamahavealso
shownsomepositivesignsofeconomicdevelopment.Brazil,despiterelativelymodestratesofaggregategrowth,
hasseenimportantprogressinrecentyearsinthereductionofpoverty.Thisiscounterweight,sincethelasttwo
Braziliansocialistpresidentshaveadjustedmodestsocialistreforms.
JosephStiglitzhasarguedthattheChileansuccessstoryowesalottostateownershipofkeyindustries,
particularlyitscopperindustry,andcurrencyinterventionsstabilizingcapitalflows.Manyothereconomists,
though,arguethatChile'seconomicsuccessislargelyduetoitscombinationofsoundmacroeconomicsand
marketorientedpolicies(thoughthecountry'srelativelystrongpublicinstitutions,includingoneofthebetter
publicschoolsystemsintheregion,alsodeservesomecredit).[53]
TherehavebeenclaimsofdiscrepanciesbetweentheWashingtonConsensusaspropoundedbyWilliamson,and
thepoliciesactuallyimplementedwiththeendorsementoftheWashingtoninstitutionsthemselves.Forexample,
theWashingtonConsensusstatedaneedforinvestmentineducation,butthepoliciesoffiscaldisciplinepromoted
bytheInternationalMonetaryFundhavesometimesinpracticeledcountriestocutbackpublicspendingonsocial
programs,includingsuchareasasbasiceducation.ThosefamiliarwiththeworkoftheIMFrespondthat,ata
certainstage,countriesnearbankruptcyhavetocutbacktheirpublicspendingonewayoranothertolivewithin
theirmeans.[54]Washingtonmayargueforenlightenedchoicesamongdifferentpublicspendingpriorities,butin
thelastanalysisitisdomesticallyelectedpoliticalleaderswhoultimatelyhavetomakethetoughpoliticalchoices.
Missingelements
AsignificantbodyofeconomistsandpolicymakersarguesthatwhatwaswrongwiththeWashingtonConsensus
asoriginallyformulatedbyWilliamsonhadlesstodowithwhatwasincludedthanwithwhatwasmissing.[55]This
viewassertsthatcountriessuchasBrazil,Chile,PeruandUruguay,largelygovernedbypartiesoftheleftinrecent
years,didnotwhatevertheirrhetoricinpracticeabandonmostofthesubstantiveelementsoftheConsensus.
Countriesthathaveachievedmacroeconomicstabilitythroughfiscalandmonetarydisciplinehavebeenloathto
abandonit:Lula,theformerPresidentofBrazil(andformerleaderoftheWorkers'PartyofBrazil),hasstated
explicitlythatthedefeatofhyperinflation[56]wasamongthemostimportantpositivecontributionsoftheyearsof
hispresidencytothewelfareofthecountry'spoor,althoughtheremaininginfluenceofhispoliciesontackling
povertyandmaintainingasteadylowrateofinflationarebeingdiscussedanddoubtedinthewakeoftheBrazilian
EconomicCrisiscurrentlyoccurringinBrazil.[57]
Theseeconomistsandpolicymakerswould,however,overwhelminglyagreethattheWashingtonConsensuswas
incomplete,andthatcountriesinLatinAmericaandelsewhereneedtomovebeyond"firstgeneration"
macroeconomicandtradereformstoastrongerfocusonproductivityboostingreformsanddirectprogramsto
supportthepoor.[58]Thisincludesimprovingtheinvestmentclimateandeliminatingredtape(especiallyfor
smallerfirms),strengtheninginstitutions(inareaslikejusticesystems),fightingpovertydirectlyviathetypesof
ConditionalCashTransferprogramsadoptedbycountrieslikeMexicoandBrazil,improvingthequalityof
primaryandsecondaryeducation,boostingcountries'effectivenessatdevelopingandabsorbingtechnology,and
addressingthespecialneedsofhistoricallydisadvantagedgroupsincludingindigenouspeoplesandAfro
descendantpopulationsacrossLatinAmerica.
Alternativeusagevisavisforeignpolicy
Inearly2008,theterm"WashingtonConsensus"wasusedinadifferentsenseasametricforanalyzingAmerican
mainstreammediacoverageofU.S.foreignpolicygenerallyandMiddleEastpolicyspecifically.MardaDunsky
writes,"Timeandagain,withexceedinglyrareexceptions,themediarepeatwithoutquestion,andfailtochallenge
the"Washingtonconsensus"theofficialmindsetofUSgovernmentsonMiddleEastpeacemakingover
time."[59]AccordingtosyndicatedcolumnistWilliamPfaff,BeltwaycentrisminAmericanmainstreammedia
coverageofforeignaffairsistheruleratherthantheexception:"CoverageofinternationalaffairsintheUSis
almostentirelyWashingtondriven.Thatis,thequestionsaskedaboutforeignaffairsareWashington'squestions,
framedintermsofdomesticpoliticsandestablishedpolicypositions.Thisinvitesuninformativeanswersand
discouragesunwantedorunpleasantviews."[60]Liketheeconomicdiscussionabovetheforeignpolicyusageofthe
termhaslesstodowithwhatisincludedthanwithwhatismissing.
Asimilarview,thoughbyadifferentname,istakenbyFairness&AccuracyInReporting(FAIR),aprogressive
mediacriticismorganization.Theynote"OfficialAgendas"asoneofnine'issueareas'[61]theyviewascausing
'What'sWrongWiththeNews?"Theynote:"Despitetheclaimsthatthepresshasanadversarialrelationshipwith
thegovernment,intruthU.S.mediagenerallyfollowWashington'sofficialline.Thisisparticularlyobviousin
wartimeandinforeignpolicycoverage,butevenwithdomesticcontroversies,thespectrumofdebateusuallyfalls
intherelativelynarrowrangebetweentheleadershipoftheDemocraticandRepublicanparties."[62]
Seealso
TheEndofHistoryandthe Hyperinflation ImmanuelWallerstein
LastMan NorthAmericanFreeTrade PovertyReductionStrategy
BrettonWoodssystem Agreement(NAFTA) Paper
Macroeconomics CentralAmericaFreeTrade Structuraladjustment
Grossdomesticproduct Agreement(CAFTA) BeijingConsensus
Democraticcapitalism WorldSystemsTheory MumbaiConsensus
Economicgrowth AndreGunderFrank
Hyperinflation ImmanuelWallerstein
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