ADMIN CASES COMPILATION
legal
1. APARRI VS CA
Facts: Bueno O. Aparri was appointed as General
Manager of NARRA Corporation. However, his term
was short, lesser than what he actually expected.
Aggrieved, he filed a petition for mandamus to annul
the resolution of the NARRA Board fixing his term,
and to command the Board to allow him to continue
his office as GM until he vacates it in accordance with
law.
The lower court, however, dismissed the petition,
hence the case.
Issue: WON Aparri has the right to compel the Board
to let him continue his office until he vacates
Ruling: No.
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The
right to hold a public office under our political system
is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists
at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid.,
Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or
its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
2. METCALF & EDDY VS MITCHELL
Facts: Petitioners were consulting engineers and are
contending that they should be exempted from income
tax on the ground that they do work for the state.
Issue: WON petitioners are considered officers
Ruling: No. An office is a public station conferred by
the appointment of government. The term embraces
the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties
fixed by law. Where an office is created, the law
usually fixes its incidents, including its terms, its
duties and its compensation.
The term "officer" is one inseparably connected with
an office; but there was no office of sewage or water
supply expert or sanitary engineer, to which either of
the plaintiffs was appointed. The contracts with them,
although entered into by authority of law and
prescribing their duties, could not operate to create an
office or give to plaintiffs the status of officers.
3. DIXON VS OSMAN
Facts: Connie Dixon was dismissed by the Auditor
General from public employment because of a past
criminal conviction without prior notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Issue: WON the Auditor General's act is valid and
Ruling: Yes. She was not dismissed because of an
irrebuttable statutory presumption, she was merely
dismissed by her immediate supervisor as he is
permitted to do so with or without cause under the
Arizona Statute. Auditor General could dismiss her for
any reason other than one which is constitutionally
prohibited.
Therefore, while the Constitution does prohibit a
government employee's termination for
constitutionally impermissible reasons, it does not
prohibit the Auditor General from dismissing her
because she is an ex-felon. There was no constitutional
violation by failing to give her an opportunity to be
heard on the dismissal. The Auditor General possessed
the power under A.R.S. 41-1279.02 to dismiss
appellant at his will and his exercise of that power was
constitutionally permissible.
Appellant additionally contends that A.R.S. 41-
1279.02 is void for vagueness as it constitutes an
unconstitutional standardless delegation of power to
the Auditor General in contravention of the precepts of
due process. The rule of nondelegability is applicable
to legislative powers only. As the power to appoint and
dismiss personnel is not a legislative but rather an
internal administrative function, the prohibition is
inapplicable.
5. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES,
CATANDUANES VS CA
Facts: Augusto Antonio was elected barangay captain
of Sapang Palay. He was then subsequently appointed
by the Pres as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of San Andres. Meanwhile, DILG Sec
declared the election for the president of the
Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils
(FABC) void. Knowing such, he resigned as Pres of
the Sangguniang Bayan. He gave his resignation to the
mayor and gave copies to the other officers including
DILG secretary. After some time, he wanted to occupy
the position again.
Issue: WON his resignation is effective
WON he should be allowed to occupy the position
again
Ruling: No to both.
In Ortiz vs. COMELEC,[28] we defined resignation as
the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to
use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some
form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance
by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public office,
there must be:
(a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
(b) an act of relinquishment; and
(c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one
is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The records are bereft of any evidence that private
respondents resignation was accepted by the proper
authority.
Even if the resignation is not valid for absence of an
acceptance by the proper authority, a public officer
may be deemed to have relinquished his office due to
his voluntary abandonment of said post.
6. LIBANAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of
Eastern Samar was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan prior to the election and was among
those who were charged with a criminal complaint
before the Sandiganbayan. Because of this he was
suspended, by virtue of Sec 13, RA No 3019.
Libanan, now contends that the order of suspension,
being predicated on his acts supposedly committed
while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan can no
longer attach to him, now that he is the duly elected
and incumbent vice governor, as such would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Issue: WoN suspension would be a deprivation of
property without due process of law
Ruling: No. Suspension order does not amount to
deprivation of property without due process as public
office is a "public agency or trust," and ir ia not the
property envisioned by the Constitution provision
which petitioner invokes.
Sec 13. RA 3019: The term "office" used in the law
could apply to any office which the officer charged
might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office under which he was charged.
7. LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA
Facts: Pres. Ramos, herein, issued AO No. 52 finding
petitioner Arsenio Lumiqued, the Regional Director of
the DAR administratively liable for dishonesty in the
alteration of 15 gasoline receipts, and dismissing him
from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and
other benefits.
However, during the course of the proceedings,
petitioner died. The heirs of herein petitioner, moved
for the reversal of such order on the ground that during
the investigation of said administrative charges, the
investigating committee failed to inform Lumiqued of
his right to counsel during the prior hearings.
Issue: WON the right to counsel indispensable during
an administrative inquiry
Ruling: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation and may not be
invoked by a respondent in an administrative
investigation.
An actual hearing is not always an indispensable
aspect of due process--as long as a party was given the
opportunity to be defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process.
8. SANTOS VS SECRETARY OF LABOR
Facts: Segundo Santos was employed as Labor
Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the
Department of Labor. His salary is 259 per month or
3108 per annum. On Aug. 24, 1960, he was promoted
and appointed as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office
No.3, Manila) with 3493 salary per year. The
appointment effective Sept. 1, 1960, was approved by
th Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962
and release to the dept. Of labor on May 25, 1962.
Resp. Sec. Of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco to the
same position in June of 1962. Santos' demand
revocation of Tiongco's appointment and payment to
him salary differentials but was rejected by the Sec. Of
labor. Santos then filed mandamus on August 20, 1962
(3 days before he is actually retired)
Resp's challenge the legality of Santos' appointment
claiming that based on circular of CSC stating that
"employees should not be assigned or promoted to
positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of
which exceed the maximum allowable for their
eligibility." Santos' appointment is within the
prohibition (pero di to totoo kasi 2nd grade eligible si
santos kaya sakto lang yung pagtaas ng salary sa
position nya)
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's claim is correct?
Ruling: Yes. Santos' petition is meritorious. The record
clearly discloses that the original appointment of
petition as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of
the CSC; it was approved by the Commissioner of CS
on May 14,1962 and released to the Sec of Labor on
May 25, 1962. CIVIL SERVICE APPROVAL
COMPLETED PETITIONER'S APPOINTMENT.
Kung sakaling itanong ni sir, yung award ng pera
P761.68- estate ng deceased. Kasi namatay si santos,
tapos pinayagan ng court yung heirs na ituloy to.
9. ABEJA VS TAADA
GR No. 112283
Aug 30, 1992
Facts: Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent
Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the
office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the
May 11, 1992, national elections. The private
respondent won. After the proclamation Abeja filed an
election protest covering 22 precincts. Priv resp. Filed
an answer with a counter-protest of the results in 36
precincts.
The revision of the ballots covering 22 protested
precincts was completed in sept 1992. priv. resp's
counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-
protested precincts be revised only if it is shown after
completion of the revision of the 22 protested precincts
that petitioner leads by a margin of at least one (1)
vote. Petitioner sought that the said counter-protest be
declared withdrawn upon the inaction of priv resp.
June 13, 1993 priv. Radovan died and was substituted
by vice mayor de ram and his spouse, Ediltrudes
Radovan.
Eto in case magbusisi si sir
Judge Lopez ( reassigned to RTC Kalookan) ruling did
not contain summation of the exact number nor the
declaration of the winner. Judge Tanada, who
succeeded Judge Lopez denied motion to determine
votes, to proclaim winner and allow assumption of
office." Filed by petitioner.
Issues:
1. WON the priv resp should be allowed to revision of
the 36 precincts
2. WON the substitution is validly done
Ruling:
1. No. The applicable comelec rules provide that the
submission of evidence must be within reasonable
time. Sc ruled that radova is guilty of laches. Pleadings
and procedure; the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
controlling in election protests heard by a RTC
2. The SC found it as erroneous the substitution of the
deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes
Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a
counter-claim for damages. "Public office is personal
to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to
his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA
848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA
561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the
deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against
the protestant for that was extinguished when death
terminated his right to occupy the contested office
(Dela Victoria, supra)
10. VICENTE SEGOVIA VS PEDRO NOEL
G.R. No. 23226
March 4, 1925
PUBLIC OFFICERS; RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE; Though there is no vested right to an
office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet
the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If
that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms
should
OFFICE AS PROPERTY OR CONTRACT.A public
office cannot be regarded as the property of the
incumbent. A public office is not a contract..
FACTS:
In 1907, Vicente Segovia was appointed as judge in
Dumanjug, Cebu. In 1923, Act 3107 was enacted. Said
law made it mandatory for judges to retire upon
reaching the age of 65. In 1924, Judge Segovia reached
the age of 65. The Secretary of Justice the ordered
Segovia to retire from his post and since then, Judge
Pedro Noel acted as the judge in Dumanjug.
Thereafter, Segovia filed a petition for quo warranto
where he assailed the constitutionality of Act 3107 as it
impairs the contractual right of Segovia to his office;
that no age limit has been prescribed when he was
appointed as judge hence Act 3107 should not be
applied retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether or not Segovia should be reinstated to
his office.
HELD: Yes. But only because the law should not be
applied retroactively; Act 3107 is therefore
constitutional.
Though Segovia abandoned his theory on the
unconstitutionality of Act 3107, the Supreme Court
emphasized that public office cannot be regarded as
the property of whoever is incumbent. A public office
is not a contract contrary to how Segovia viewed it in
his abandoned theory.
But though there is no vested right in an office, which
may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent
has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be
taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in
which the purpose is stated. In the case at bar, Act
3107 did not provide for retroactive application.
Hence, it can only be applied prospectively. As such,
the old law is still applicable in the case of Segovia
hence, pursuant to the old law, he can remain in his
post as a judge so long as he maintains good behavior
11. CHANCO VS IMPERIAL
FACTS: Chanco alleges that on or about the 1st day of
July 1914, he was duly named and appointed as Judge
of the CFI of Bataan and Zambales, by the Governor
General with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission; that he duly qualified and entered upon
the discharge of duties thereof on said date in
conformity with Act no 2347.
That the defendant, Imperial has usurped and intruded
into and taken possession of the said office and is now
exercising the functions o said office without Chanco's
resignation or removal from the position.
Imperial now alleges that Chanco on or before the 9th
of October 1915 has completed his 65th year and that,
by reason of sec 7 of Act no 2347 which provides that
no person holding office of Judge of CFI after he has
completed his sixty-fifth year and that said plaintiff
has ipso facto ceased to be Judge and the office is
thereupon became vacant.
The plaintiff no alleges that sec 7 of Act 2347 is
incompatible with and contrary to the Act of Congress
of July 1,1902 and Act no 136 of the Philippine
Commission and is therefore null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7 of 2347 is in
violation of or contrary to the Act of Congress of July
1,1902
RULING:
No. The Court do not believe the contention of the
plaintiff nor can it be sustained.
The Supreme Court of the United States has that the
Philippine Legislature has the same powers in the
Philippine Islands, within the sphere in which it may
operate, as Congress itself (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.
S., 549); and it has strongly intimated that when an Act
of the Philippine Legislature is reported to Congress
and has not been annulled by that body it is a lawful
and valid Act. By this it is not meant to say, as we
understand it, that the Philippine Legislature can pass a
valid law which is in violation of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, or of any other Act of Congress; or
that it can legislate in a field which Congress has
already occupied by appropriate legislation (U. S. vs.
Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7). In the Bull case we held that an
Act of the legislative authority of the Philippine
Government which has not been expressly disapproved
by Congress is valid, unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the Organic Law; and
that the reservation by Congress (Act of July 1, 1902)
of the power to suspect valid Acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature does not operate to
suspend such Acts until approved by Congress, or
when approved, make them laws of Congress. They
are valid Acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled.
12. US VS HARTWELL 181 L. ED 830
Cannot be found
13. STATE VS TAYLOR
Facts: Mr. McGee was a duly appointed and acting
zoning inspector for the City of Des Moines on
November 12, 1964, and that while on duty that
forenoon he discovered an addition being made on
defendant's (Clifford Taylor) home and apartment
house on Kingman Boulevard. Mr. McGee testified
during his investigation he met the defendant in the
back yard and asked him if a permit to build had been
secured. When it appeared he had none, the defendant
offered the inspector $500.00 to "forget" about his
discovery, but he refused and told defendant he would
return. After a conference with law enforcement
officers at City Hall, McGee did return, this time with
a hidden tape recorder on his person. Further
conversation about the zoning violation and
defendant's offer followed and were tape-recorded by
the inspector. At that time defendant also gave Mr.
McGee a check in the sum of $500.00, later introduced
as State's Exhibit "A". The following day defendant
was arrested and charged with violation of section
739.11 of the code (corruptly influencing a public
official)
Issue: WON Mcgee is a public officer
Ruling: Yes.
It is somewhat difficult to define with accuracy the
term "public officer" as distinguished from an
"employee". It has been wisely said that, although an
office is an employment, it does not follow that every
employee is an officer. Clearly, McGee was a city
employee.
In the early case of State v. Spaulding, 102 Iowa 639,
72 N.W. 288, we fully considered this problem and set
forth what we believed were the acceptable guidelines
to be used in determining the status of one holding
such a public position. We have never departed from
them and they are applicable here. To summarize, five
essential elements are required by most courts to make
a public employment a public office. They are: (1) The
position must be created by the constitution or
legislature or through authority conferred by the
legislature. (2) A portion of the sovereign power of
government must be delegated to that position. (3) The
duties and powers must be defined, directly or
impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative
authority. (4) The duties must be performed
independently and without control of a superior power
other than the law. (5) The position must have some
permanency and continuity, and not be only temporary
and occasional.
While State v. Spaulding, supra, 102 Iowa 639, 72
N.W. 288, was criminal, the guidelines set out therein
and the recitation of elements necessary to make a
public employment a public office have been adopted
in other fields of law. It will be noted that, in
determining the status of one holding a public position,
consideration is also given to such matters as the term
of office, requirement of oath and bond, although these
elements, we have said, are not deemed essential to a
public office. Francis v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm.,
supra. With these rules and basic elements in mind, we
turn to the showing here, for in the end it must be said
each case turns upon its own circumstances. Hutton v.
State, supra.
It is not disputed that the position of Des Moines
zoning inspector was created by city ordinance under
due authority conferred upon the city by the lowa
legislature
14. OCAMPO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Cannot be found
15. DELA LLANA VS ALBA
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled
An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed.
Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be
one of the judges that would be removed because of
the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides
the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He
averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana
can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).
RULING: Yes. The SC ruled the following way:
Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with
accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained
that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were
the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way
of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved
by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one
which would save and another which would invalidate
a statute, the former is to be preferred.
16. CASTILLO VS PAJO
FACTS: Carmen R. Castillo was appointed
correspondence clerk in the office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bohol by the Governor of that province. She
rendered service as such until June 12, 1954, when she
stopped working by reason of the Provincial Boards
Resolutions Nos. 161 and 300 abolishing her position
effective June 9, 1954. She protested to the
corresponding authorities; and having obtained no
relief, she instituted the instant proceeding to compel
reinstatement, payment of back salaries, damages and
attorneys fees. Her action rested on the propositions
that her separation was unlawful in view of her civil
service eligibility and status. She also relied on the
Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law."
ISSUES:
(a) whether the Board did validly abolish the
petitioners position; and
(b) whether such abolition, if valid, produced her
lawful separation from the provincial service
RULING:
(a)YES. It is not disputed that the position of clerk in
the Fiscals Office occupied by petitioner was created
by the Provincial Board in virtue of its power
expressly given by Section 2081 of the Revised
Administrative Code to "fix the number of assistants,
deputies, clerks and other employees for the various
branches of the provincial government" and to fix their
salaries. There is no statute expressly empowering the
Board to abolish the offices or positions it has created;
however, it is a well-established principle in the law of
public administration that the power to establish an
office includes the authority to abolish it unless
there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or
impliedly providing otherwise. And the abolition of the
office terminates the right of the incumbent to exercise
the rights and duties thereof.
(b) YES. There is, of course, the fundamental
protection afforded to civil service employees against
removal "except for cause as provided by law" ; but it
does not govern in this case, because there has been no
removal of petitioner but an abolition of her position,
which was within the power of the provincial board, in
the same way that Congress has the power to abolish
offices created by it or by its authority. In Manalang v.
Quitoriano 5 Luis Manalang was prior to June 20,
1952, Director of the Placement Bureau. On that date,
Republic Act No. 761 abolished the Bureau and his
office. When he sued to retain his office or to assume
the equivalent post of Commissioner of the National
Employment Service which succeeded to the
Placement Bureau, he invoked the constitutional
mandate that "no officer . . . in the Civil Service shall
be removed . . . except for cause as provided by law."
This Court had to deny him relief seeing no violation
of said mandate, since "there has been neither a
removal nor a suspension of petitioner Manalang but
an abolition of his former office of Director of the
Placement Bureau, which admittedly is within the
power of Congress to undertake by legislation."
17. MANIEGO VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts: Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer
to work as the person in charge of delivering summons
and subpoenas in the Municipal Court of Manila.
Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted to write motions
for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against
offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the
court for action, without passing through the regular
clerk.
Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was
subpoenaed in connection with a traffic violation. The
said crime has prescribed without Rabia being
prosecuted but then Maniego informed Rabia that he is
penalized with a P15 fine; that Maniego can fix this if
Rabia can pay him P10. Maniego pocketed the P10.00
and for this he was later charged for violating Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code which provides in part:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present received by such
officer, personally or through the mediation of another,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than
the value to the penalty corresponding to the crime
agreed upon if the same shall have been committed.
Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among others,
that he is not a public officer as he was merely hired as
an ordinary government employee.
Issue: Whether or not Maniego is correct.
Ruling: No. Maniego is considered a public officer
under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code which
includes all persons who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches,
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official or any rank or class. That definition is quite
comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public
servant from the highest to the lowest. For the
purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between
officer and employee. Further, even assuming that The other directors of MOELC then sought to enforce
Article 203 cant be applied, although Maniego was
originally engaged as a laborer, he was temporarily
performing public functions when he was permitted to
draft motions. And as in the performance thereof he
accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he certainly
guilty as charged. The receipt of bribe money is just as
pernicious when committed by temporary employees
as when committed by permanent officials.
18. GONZALES (Rice planter and president of
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association) VS
HECHANOVA (Executive Secretary)
Facts: On September 22, 1963, the Executive Secretary
authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign
riced to be purchased form private parties.
Petitioner then filed a prohibition with a prayer of a
writ of injunction alleging that the executive secretary
is acting without or in excess of jurisdiction for RA
3452 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn for as stated in te given law , "The policy of the
government is to engage in the purchase of these basic
food directly from those tenants, farmers, growers,
producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish
to dispose of their products at a price that will afford
them a fair and just return for their labor and capital
investment."
However, the respondent Executive Secretary moved
for the dismissal of the case due to non exhaustion of
administrative remedies of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the Executive
secretary with regard the exhaustion of administrative
remedies correct?
Ruling: No. This Court has repeatedly held that the
principle requiring the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not an absolute rule and admits to a few
exceptions. The ones which apply to this case are the
following: where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one; or was performed without or in excess of
jurisdiction; or where the controverted act is patently
illegal; or where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the president
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter
unless actually disapproved by him; or where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. The respondent's contention is therefore,
untenable.
19. AGUILA VS GENATO
Facts: Dominador Borje was an elected member of the
Board of Directors of the Misamis Occidental Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (MOELC). While still serving as a
director for MOELC, he ran for an elective position to
the Sangguniang Bayan of Ozamiz City. Therafter,
David Aguila of the National Electrification
Administration issued a memorandum which states
that all officials and employees of electric cooperatives
who run for public office, win and assume office, shall
be considered resigned. Borje won in the elections.
the memorandum against Borje. Borje filed a petition
in court questioning said memorandum. Borje claimed
that the memorandum is not applicable to him because
when he assumed the Directorship in MOELC he was
already qualified and so he must be allowed to
continue holding office. Judge Genato agreed with
Borje and so he issued a TRO against MOELC from
considering Borje as resigned.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling is correct.
Ruling: No. The court has no jurisdiction over the said
matter. PD 269 which created NEA provides that
electric cooperatives (like MOELC) have the right to
prescribe qualifications of its directors and their
manner of election and removal. MOELC has to
comply with the memorandum of NEA, a superior
office under which MOELC is being administered.
Further still, Borje has not shown that he has an
explicit right to continue holding the Directorship.
Further, Borje being considered resigned by reason of
his election to the Sanggunian is not merely grounded
on the NEA memorandum. It is also grounded on PD
269 which provides that elective officials are ineligible
to become officers and/or directors of any cooperatives
except if such elective position is no higher than a
barangay captain. There is no merit to Borjes
contention that since he was originally qualified he
shall be allowed to continue his unexpired term in
MOELC. Eligibility to an office should be construed
as of a continuing nature and must exist at the
commencement of the term and during occupancy of
the office. Borje ceased to be qualified and so he must
be resigned from MOELC.
20. JIMENEZ VS FRANCISCO
Facts: In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a
temporary legal investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief
of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary
capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In
1950, he took a promotional civil service exam. In July
1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman
Gen. Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is
being replaced by a civil service eligible. In September
1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil service
exam he took in 1950; he passed. He then appealed his
separation from service alleging that because of his
success in passing the civil service exam, his
temporary appointment is now that of a permanent
one.
Issue: Whether or not Jimenez should be reinstated.
Ruling: No. In fact, he should have been separated
from the service even before 1951. Under the law, he
was supposed to only hold such temporary
appointment for three months while the appointing
power is still looking for a civil service eligible. His
extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of
the appointing power. Further, there is no law which
provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to a
permanent one. When he met the civil service
eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a
permanent position in the PVD. The power to appoint
is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper
authority, in this case the head of the department. The
appointing power has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified for any competitive
position in the Civil Service. Mere certification as a
civil service eligible does not amount to an
appointment. The Civil Service Commission does not
insure any appointment; it only certifies an eligible to
be possessed of the qualification as required for a
position classified under its rules.
21. PEOPLE VS CARLOS?
Cannot be found
22. IGNACIO VS BANATE
Facts: Leoncio Banate, Jr., was appointed as a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas
by Minister Aquilino Pimintel in 1986 to replace
Ignacio.
Ignacio was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay
Tanza, Roxas City on May 17, 1982. He was also
elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils or Katipunang Panlungsod Ng Mga Barangay
in Roxas. By virtue of such he was appointed a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or City
Council of the Roxas City by then President Marcos.
Ignacio contends that he camnot be replaced by Banate
as he was not "elected" as provided under Local
Government Code (BP Blg. 337), particularly Sec. 173
which provides that:
Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. (l)
sangguniang panlungsod as the legislative body of the
city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding
officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod members,
and the members who may be appointed by the
President of the Philippines consisting of the
presidents of the katipunan panlungsod ng mga
barangay and the kabataang barangay city federation.
And that the appointment was invalid as the Minister
cannot appoint, it is the President who has the power to
do so.
Issue: WON the appointment of Banate is invalid
Ruling: Yes. Banate is not qualified thus his
appointment is in valid. The law expressly provides
that members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod should be
should elected. Banate was neither a Barangay capatin
nor was he elected to be the President of the
Sanggunian. He lacks the eleigibility and qualifications
required by law.
23. VARGAS VS RILLOROZA
Facts: Jorge Vargas assails the validity of Sec. 14 of
the The People's Court Act (CA No. 682) under which
the President could designate Judges of First Instance,
Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to
sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
treason cases without them necessarily having to
possess the required constitutional qualifications of a
regular Supreme Court Justice.
Issue: WON it is constitutional
Ruling: No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do
not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other
than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein
mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the
infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a
majority of the members of the Court as in this case
are replaced by judges of first instance. It is
distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this.
And the constitution provides for only one Supreme
Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but
positively violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides
that the members of the Supreme Court should be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would
alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as
determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation
of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is
no escaping the fact the he would be participating in
the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate
tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any
regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member"
therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not
contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art.
VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate
Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed
(Sec. 5).
24 & 25. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Facts: On March 20, 1995, Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Sorsogon. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee(rival) filed a
petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office
or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. Comelec granted. Frivaldo filed MR but it
remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections, thushis candidacy continued and was voted
for during the election. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec
en banc affirmed the cancellation.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the
canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor of
Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.
51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
RaulR.Lee
53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo
1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition
praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected
Governor of Sorsogon.
Comelec en banc directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29,1995. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of
June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed a new petition for the annulment of the
June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as
a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September
1994 had been granted. As such, when order of
cacellation was released and received by Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was
no more legal impediment to Frivaldos proclamation
as governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding
that Lee, not having garnered the highest number of
votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor. Frivaldo, having garnered the
highest number of votes, and having reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is
qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon.
Issues:
1. Won Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification
for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the
governorship of Sorsogon
2. Won the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the
election, valid and legal
Ruling:
1. No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under
any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
2. No. Court held in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second
placer, just that, a second placer."
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Moreso, Frivaldo have seasonably re-acquired his
citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest
number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was
patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The citizenship requirement in the Local Government
Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We
further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect
up to the present, not having been suspended or
repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been
properly granted and thus valid and effective.
Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as
well as his unique situation of having been forced to
give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the
date of his application therefor, during the pendency of
which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S.
nationality.
26. GARVIDA VS SALES JR
Facts: The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections
nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996.
On March 16, 1996, Lynette Garvida applied for
registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte however it was denied on the ground that she is
twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, thus
exceeding the age limit under Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. She filed an
inclusion and certificate of candidancy as chairman. It
was disapproved on the same ground. Florencio Sales
Jr petitioned Comelec to deny the same to which
comelec granted en banc.
Election day came and Garvida garnered 78 and Sales
had 76. The Board of Election did not proclaim
garvida thus the case.
Issue: Won comelec en banc has jurisdiction to cancel
her cert of candidacy
Ruling: NO. Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective
office may be filed on the ground that the candidate
has made a false material representation in his
certificate (which in this case did not happen). It may
be heard and evidence received by any official
designated by the COMELEC after which the case
shall be decided by the COMELEC sitting in Division,
not en banc.
Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the
COMELEC en banc when the required number of
votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is
not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions
to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings
of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc.
27. NUVAL VS GURAY
Facts: Gregorio Nuval, running for municipal president
of Luna, La Union (1928 pa kasi to) within the period
fixed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3387, filed a case against his rival
candidate Norberto Guray. Nuval contends that Guray
is not qualified to vote as he did not satisfy the
residency requirements since he has not been a
resident for at least 6 months. The court dismissed his
petition since Guray was a bona fide resident of the
municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that
order was not appealable, Guray's name remained in
the election list of the municipality of Luna.
Election day came and Guray won. Nuval filed the
present action of quo warranto as provided in section
408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3387, asking that Guray be declared ineligible
since he had not fulfilled the required legal residence
of one year previuos to the election as required by
section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order
to be eligible to an elective municipal office.
Issue: won the present case is barred by res judicata
Ruling: No the previous case of the petition for
exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the
municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof,
while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the
case of this action is that Guray does not have the one
year legal residence required for the eligibility to the
office of municipal president of Luna. Thus there is no
identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are
necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things;
and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as in the case of the petition
for exclusion and in the present quo warranto
proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or
of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of
action, there is no res judicata.
28. PAMIL VS TELERON
Facts: Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, won as Mayor in
Albuquerque, Bohol. Pamil, a rival candidate filed a
quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning his
eligibility for tje position. He argued that as provided
for in the Revised Administrative Code; in no case
shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality. In this case, the elected mayor is a
priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the
Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code
of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of the revised
administrative code.
Issue: won teleron is correct
Ruling: The court was indecisive, it failed to obtain the
majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order for
this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For
this, the petition must be granted and the decision of
the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is
hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is
also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve
the Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce
state policies which at times may conflict with church
tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the
church and state. The Revised Administrative Code
still stands because there is no implied repeal.
29. LEON G. MAQUERA VS JUAN BORRA
L- 24761 September 7, 1965
Facts: RA 4421 was passed which requires that a
candidate must post a bond amounting to the one year
salary of the position he runs for. Such bond will be
further confiscated in favor of the Government, unless
declared the winner, if the total votes did not reach at
least 10% of the casted votes.
Issue: WON RA 4421 is constitutional?
Ruling: No. The effect of said RA 4421 is to impose
additional qualifications laid down by the constitution
and that is property qualifications. In order for a
person could run to any position in the public office
they must post a bond which is clearly inconsistent
with the nature and essence of the republican system
ordained in the Constitution and the principles of
social justice. Hence RA 4421 is null and void.
30. ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN VS ABELARDO
SUBIDO
L-31683 January 31 1983
Facts: Ernesto was appointed as a patrolman in the
Qeuzon City Police Department. He was considered to
be qualified after taking series of examinations and
physical tests or trainings. However in a form for
application of the position that he filled up it was
asked if he was ever accused, indicted or tried for the
violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before
any court or tribunal. In his answer he wrote Yes,
Jaywalking fined P5.0 and violation of Municipal
Order 1187 (Cochero) which is fined by P5.5. He was
then disqualified because under the Police Act Sec. 9,
Par. 5 one of the qualification is that the person to be
appointed must have no criminal record.
Isuue: WON the act of jaywalking and Cochero is
considered as a crime pursuant to Sec. 9 Par. 5 of the
Police Act.
Ruling: No. A person who violated a municipal
ordinance against jaywalking and against a cochero
occupying a sit or a part of his calesa other than the
one reserved for him is not disqualified for
appointment as a police officer and cannot be
construed to have a criminal record. The act of
disqualifying him of such would be unreasonable if not
oppressive.
31. HERNANDO C. LAYNO VS. PEOPLE
Facts: Hernando Layno, an incumbent mayor
appointed his son Fernando to be the meat inspector in
the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga.
Hernando signed the appointment and administered his
sons oath of office, He also issued a certificate which
states that Fernando is not related to him for it is one
of the requirements. Hernando was then accused of
falsification of public documents. He alleged that
nowhere in Sec. 49(a) of PD 807 which makes it a
legal obligation of the appointing public official to
discliose his true relationship with the appointee in the
form of certification.
Issue: WON Hernandos contention is correct?
Ruling: No. The law on nepotism, as provided in sec.
49(a) of PD 807 prohibits the appointing or
recommending authority for making any appointment
in the national provincial, city or municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality
thereof including government owned and controlled
corporations, in favor of his relative within the third
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although the law
does not explicitly provide that the appointing
authority shall disclose his true relationship with the
appointee in the form of certification nonetheless it is
the legal obligation of Hernando to state the true facts
required to be stated in the certification is inherent in
the law on prohibition against nepotism.
32. ) EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ VS COMELEC
Facts: Rodriguez run for the position of governor in
Quezon Province, Marquez his rival questions his
qualifications being a fugitive from justice in U.S.
Rodriguez avers that when he left from U.S. to the
Philippines no criminal charge was yet filed against
him. Hence he cannot be considered as a fugitive or is
running away from his crime.
Issue: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
Ruling:
No he is not.
The Court ruled that a fugitive from justice indicates
that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction
which includes those not only flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but also fleeing after being charged
to avoid prosecution.
Premises considered, Rodriguez case just cannot fit in
this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the
Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per
certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations
dated April 27 and June June 26 of 1995, preceded the
filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of even
date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court,
by almost five(5) months. It was clearly impossible for
Rodriguez to have known about such at the time he left
the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest
much less conviction so to speak at such time. What
prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure
from the US? Hence he cannot be considered as a
fugitive from justice.
33. ) BORROMEO VS MARIANO
Facts: Andres Borromeo was appointed and
commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and
took possession of the office on that date. On February,
25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first
Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge
Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused
to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial
District.
RELEVANT LAWS:
Administrative Code, Secs 65, 66, and 148
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the
Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years.
Administrative Code, Sec 155 Judges of
First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of
Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their
own for the purpose of trying land registration cases
and for vacation duty.
Concluding portion of Sec 155
"but nothing herein shall be construed
to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from
being appointed to be judge of another district."
Administrative Code, Sec 173 A Judge of
First Instance can be removed from office by the
Governor-General only if in the judgment of the
Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving
serious misconduct or inefficiency in office.
ISSUE:
WON Borromeo refuse his appointment as a Twenty
first Dustrict Judge.
RULING:
YES he can refuse.
The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is
corroborated by the principles of the law of public
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are
separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole
act of those vested with the power to make it.
Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons
may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power
in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the
office. If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment
as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when
once appointment to this district is accepted, he has
exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to
another district. No other person could be placed in the
position of this Judge of First Instance since another
rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not
be made to an office which is not vacant. The Court
stated that the language of the proviso to section 155
of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference
to the law of public officers, does not empower the
Governor-General to force upon the judge of one
district an appointment to another district against his
will, thereby removing him from his district. The court
holds that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully
entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial
District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin
Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed
in possession of the same.
34. LORDE VS NATIONAL TABACCO CORP
Cannot be found
35. GOVERNMENT VS. SPRINGER?
Cannot be found
36. PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG
MAYNILA VS HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
Facts: Private respondent Hernani Esteban's was
appointed VP for Administration of the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila. He had been extended several
"ad-interim" appointments by the president when he
discovered that he was not included in the list of
permanent employees. He then requested the
conversion of his temporary appointment to a
permanent one. The president withdrew the
appointment before it could be confirmed by the
Pamantasan Board of Regents. He then appealed to the
Civil Service Commission for the protection of his
tenure in the Pamantasan who ruled in his favor.
Issue: whether the position is in a permanent capacity
as to guarantee as security of tenure?
Ruling: YES. the Constitution guarantee private
respondent's security of tenure as 'No officer or
employe in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law"
(Section 3, Article XII, the 1973 Philippine
Constitution). Petitioner has failed to substantiate its
allegations of incompetence against respondent
Esteban whose record of government service appears
quite impressive. Esteban was not dimissed for cause
as required by due process." The termination of his
services was obviously illegal.
In referring to ad interim appointments, the term is not
descriptive of the nature of the appointments but the
manner in which said appointments were made. It is
done by the President of the Pamantasan in the
meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is
originally vested with the power of appointment, is
unable to act. lt is an appointment permanent in nature
but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them, If confirmed, the appointee's term is converted
into the regular term inherent in the position.
37. VIOLETA T. TEOLOGO VS THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner questions the appointment of private
respondent Ruby G. Gelvezon as Chief Nurse of Pedro
Trono Memorial Hospital. She claims she has a
preferential right to be appointed to the said position,
which she had held in an acting capacity for more than
a year. She stresses that she is next-in-rank and not
disqualified; Gelvezon, on the other hand, is not
eligible. The Civil Service Commission justified the
appointment of on grounds of the "exigency of the
service" and her superior qualifications compared to
those of the other applicants.
Issue: whether the CSC has authority to direct the
appointment of Gelvezon?
Ruling: We hold, in sum, that as a retiree, Gelvezon
could not be simply be appointed like any new
appointee but had to satisfy the stringent requirements
laid down by CSC. While it is true that the appointing
authority has wide discretion with regards
appointment, the CSC has the function to ascertain
whether the appointee possesses the prescribed
qualifications. The only ground upon which the
appointment may be disallowed is that the appointee is
not qualified. If The appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred.
38. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
ANGELA P. JORDAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
Facts: The Promotions Board of the Central Bank
found Dr. Jordan qualified to the position of Assistant
Bank Physician and ordered her appointment. On the
other hand, it appears that private respondent Borja
filed an application for the same position so he
appealed to the csc who in turn ruled in his favor. the
petitioner Central Bank assils the CSC decision and
contends that the department head enjoys wide latitude
of discretion as regards the appointment of department
personnel and that the question as to who is more
competent is of no consequence.
Issue:
whether the CSC can disapprove an appointment and
require the appointment of another person ?
Ruling:
It must be stressed that the law does not impose a rigid
or mechanical standard on the appointing power. The
appointing person enjoys sufficient discretion to select
and appoint employees on the basis of their fitness to
perform the duties and to assume the responsibilities of
the position to be filled. Unless the law speaks in
mandatory and peremptory tone, there should be full
recognition of the wide scope of such discretionary
authority.
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified,
as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority
39. CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO
and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the
incumbent Mayor in Negros Occidental, he appointed
his wife Victoria as General Services Officer. Public
respondent CSC received a report regarding the
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor
in favor of his wife. Acting on the report the
appointment was disapproved upon the ground that
that promotion violated the statutory prohibition
against nepotic appointments.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against nepotic
appointments is applicable only to original
appointments and not to promotional appointments?
Ruling: Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition
was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. It
follows the Constitutional mandate that appointments
in the Civil Service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all
appointments", without seeking to make any
distinction between differing kinds or types of
appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal government, as well as any branch or
instrumentality thereof and all government owned or
controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of
exceptions set out but it is exclusive:
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity;
(b) teachers;
(c) physicians; and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
40. ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: CORPUZ was appointed as the MTRCBs
supervising legal Counsel -- Prosecutor and
Investigation Services. subsequently, the MTRCB
passed a resolution to declare the appointments of the
administrative and subordinate employees of this
board as null and void. This is on the basis of failure to
submit the appointments for approval of the board
before forwarding them to the CSC.
Petitioner then contends that all the are presumed to
have been made after complying with all the legal
requirements including the Board approval, if
defective, could have been the subject of a direct
action for revocation within a reasonable period of
time after its approval.
Issue: Whether Corpuz had already acquired security
of tenure in the said position.
Ruling: It appearing that respondent Atty. Corpuz
appointment was not approved by the Board, the same
cannot be considered as a valid appointment
Compliance with the legal requirements for an
appointment to a civil service position is essential in
order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable
certification or approval of the Commission, no title to
the office can yet be deemed to be permanent. the
appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the
appointing authority and he cannot invoke security of
tenure, even if he has rendered service for a number of
years.
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper
officials, resulting in the non-observance of the
pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of the approval of the
Commissioner on Civil Service of appointments,
ineffective and unenforceable. The employee, whose
appointment was not approved, may only be
considered as a de facto officer for the duration of his
occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed
office under color of a known appointment which is
void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise
41. CONRADO ESPINOSA SIGUIENTE vs. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Facts: Petitioner SIGUIENTE took his oath as justice
of the peace of Balimbing, Sulu upon the appointment
of former President Carlos P. Garcia. such appointment
was confirmed by his Commission on Appointments
only after a new president is elected. Subsequently,
President Diosdado Macapagal, who assumed office
ordered the revocation of all appointments extended or
released by President Garcia citing the same as
midnight appointments. Furthermore respondent
contends that the confirmation should be regarded as a
mistake because there was no such ad-interim
appointment acted upon, since appointee had not up to
that time qualified for the office.
Issue: Whether the revocation of the appointment is
valid?
Ruling: Yes. President Garcia's appointment of
Siguiente could be recalled by President Macapagal
before the Commission on Appointment began its
session wherein it could confirm appointments.
Moreover the President Garcia could not be presumed
to have made a valid appointment, for the reason that
as the Commission on Appointments was at recess
and would meet after he had left the Presidency. It is
settled that "an officer has no right to forestall the
rights and prerogatives of his successor by making a
prospective appointment to fill an office, the term of
which is not to begin until his own term and power
have expired."
42. GODOFREDO N. FAVIS vs. NICOMEDES T.
RUPISAN
Facts: By virtue of a resolution, petitioner Godofredo
N. Favis was extended an appointment to the position
of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration. However the BOD ,
wherein respondents are members declared the
position vacant and appointed thereto, Canuto Farias,
Jr. on the allegation that Manager Favis has been
remiss in the performance his of duties and has
committed acts constituting a breach of the trust and
confidence.
Issue: Whether petitioner's appointment to the position
of Assistant General Manager entitled him to the right
to security of tenure?
Ruling: All officers and employees of the PVTA shall
be subject to the Civil Service Law and Rules, except
those whose positions declared by the President of the
Philippines as policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature.
Positions in the civil service are classified into three
categories the competitive or classified, non-
competitive or unclassified, and exempt. Considering
that the position involved in this controversy is not one
of those enumerated in the law as falling in the exempt
classes, it follows that the same belongs to the
classified or competitive service.
An appointee to a classified position to be entitled to
the protection of the law against unjust removal must
receive the proper approval of the Commissioner of
Civil Service. The appointment in this case is merely
temporary and he may consequently be removed from
office even without cause.
43. JAVIER vs. REYES
Facts: Petitioner allegedly was the duly appointed
Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan by the then Mayor
Victorino B. Aldaba, which appointment was
confirmed and approved by the Municipal Council of
the said municipality on the same date as per
Resolution No. 210, Series of 1967. The following day,
petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter
assumed and discharged the rights, prerogatives and
duties of the office.Pending approval and attestation of
his appointment by the Civil Service Commission,
respondent, who had then assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor, recalled petitioner's appointment
from the Civil Service Commission in her letter of said
date. Not satisfied with her letter of recall, respondent
summarily, arbitrarily and illegally ousted and relieved
petitioner as Chief of Police and at the same time,
designated Police Lt. Romualdo F. Clements, a non-
eligible, as Officer-in-Charge of the Police
Department. On May 2, 1968, the Civil Service
Commission attested and approved the appointment of
petitioner as such Chief of Police. The mayor, on the
other hand, quickly installed Bayani Bernardo as Chief
of Police of Malolos.
For lack of the mandatory requirement of confirmation
by the municipal council under Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No.
1551, the Civil Service Commission pronounced the
appointment of the replacement null and void and
directed respondent "that steps be taken immediately
to install Mr. Javier as Chief of Police of that
Municipality (Malolos)". Notwithstanding the
aforementioned ruling and directive, respondent
neglected and refused to reinstate petitioner to tile
position of Chief of Police of Malolos which act is
specifically enjoined upon her as Municipal Mayor and
public officer, in Sec. 19, Article IV of Rep. Act 2260
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Issue: Between two appointees, the first complying
with all the legal requirements to hold office, and the
second one made by the incumbent appointing power
but without assuming office or taking his oath of
office, which one prevails?
Ruling: The first appointee which complies with all the
legal requisites for appointment prevails. Bernardo
never assumed office or took his oath. It cannot be
said, then, that he had accepted his appointment. Such
an appointment being ineffective, we hold that the
petitioner's appointment prevails.
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. The fact that Bernardo's appointment was
confirmed by the Civil Service Commission does not
complete it since confirmation or attestation by the
Commission, although an essential part of the
appointing process, serves merely to assure the
eligibility of the appointee.
Furthermore, Bernardo never contested the petitioner's
right to office. In the case at bar, Bayani Bernardo
never undertook steps that would have convinced us
that he was interested in, or had accepted, the
appointment. He did, of course, intervene in the
mandamus suit, but it was a belated effort to assert his
alleged rights. It is not indicative of an interested party.
It was too little and too late.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing as far
as the petitioner is concerned. The records show that
he was appointed on November 7, 1967, and the
following day, November 8, 1967, he took his oath of
office and discharged the duties appurtenant thereto
until January 13, 1968, when the succeeding mayor,
the herein respondent Purificacion Reyes, recalled his
appointment and appointed another. Thereupon, the
petitioner went to the Civil Service Commission to ask
for reinstatement. Finally, he brought suit for
mandamus. These acts amounted to acceptance and
gave rise to a vested right to the office in his favor.
Respondent Mayor is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petitioner to office of Chief of Police, Malolos,
Bulacan, or its equivalent, or to any position
equivalent in rank and pay, subject to the requirements
of age and fitness, and to PAY him back salaries
equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or
deduction.
44. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA,
petitioner, vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
Facts: The President appointed Mary Concepcion
Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the
CoA because they are among the officers of
government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Appointments.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to
CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad
interim appointment.

Ruling:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16
Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the
appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority
of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive
officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual
exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power
to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim
appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by
their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend
only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why
ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make,
that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
45. ELPIDIO VALENCIA VS. MACARIO
PERALTA, JR.,
Facts: Valencia was designated Acting Chairman of the
board of directors of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority by the then Pres. Garcia.
Allegedly upon information that the then Pres. Garcia
had extended him as an ad interim appointment,
petitioner took an oath of office to the position of
Chairman Ad Interim of said Authority of which the
Commission on Appointments confirmed and specified
the expiration date of his term of office. However,
Pres. Macapagal appointed respondent as ad interim to
the same position. Thereafter, the petitioner ceased to
attend any board meeting and eventually instituted the
present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Valencia is
valid.
Ruling: No. The designation of petitioner as Acting
Chairman of the NAWASA Board of Directors is of
revocable and temporary character which could not
ripen into a permanent appointment, even if it was
subsequently confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, because confirmation presupposes a
valid nomination or recess appointment, of which there
is no trace. Neither does the fact that petitioner
Valencia subscribed an oath of office as ad
interim appointee to the position help his case, since
the oath clearly does not correspond to the temporary
designation as Acting Chairman that was accorded
him. There is on record only one written designation of
petitioner, a mere Acting Chairman, that was not a
permanent appointment, was revocable at any time by
the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by the
subsequent designation of respondent Peralta.
46. RAMON VS MITRA, petitioner-appellee, vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service, ET AL.,
respondents-appellants.
Facts: Effective July 1, 1962, Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas, of the City of Manila, appointed the
petitioner as Senior Technology Assistant in his office,
with compensation at the rate of P8,400 per annum.
This appointment was forwarded to the Civil Service
Commission for approval which was approved subject
to the usual physical and medical examination.
The appointee Ramon V. Mitra qualified for and
assumed the position of Senior Technical Assistant in
the Office of the Mayor of Manila. Since then, he
discharged the duties of the position and was paid the
corresponding salary for his services, until January 15,
1963.
On January 11, 1963, the Acting Commissioner of
Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, wrote to the City
Mayor informing him that the appointment extended to
the petitioner was in violation of the certification
requirement prescribed by the Civil Service Law and
was incomplete, because the approval thereof by Epi
Rey Pangramuyen, Chief, Personnel Transactions
Division, was "ultra vires," the latter having acted
beyond the scope of his delegated authority. In the
same communication, the acting Commissioner of
Civil Service ordered the termination of the services of
Ramon V. Mitra, upon receipt of said letter by the City
Mayor, who was "requested to notify accordingly the
employee affected and to advise" the Civil Service
Commission of the date of said notice.
Consequently, Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila praying for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain
the Acting Commisisoner of Civil Service from
enforcing his order terminating his services as Senior
Technical Assistant in the Office of the Mayor, and to
order the City Auditor and City Treasurer to authorize
and pay, respectively, his salary corresponding to the
period from January 16 to 31, 1963, and those which
may thereafter become due and payable. The court a
quo then rendered the decision holding that the
appointment of petitioner Ramon V. Mitra as Senior
Technical Assistant in the Office of the Mayor at
P8,400.00 per annum effective July 1, 1962, bears,
among others, the valid approval of the Civil Service
Commission and is complete and that the certification
requirement of the law is not necessary in the
appointment.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment of petitioner
Ramon Mitra as Senior Technical Assistant is valid and
complete.
Ruling: Yes, the appointment of petitioner Ramon
Mitra is valid and complete.
It is apparent from the provisions of the Civil Service
Law that prior certification of eligibles is required only
if a position is not filled by promotion, by transfer of
persons already in the government service, and by
reinstatement or reemployment of persons separated
from the service through reduction in force. In the case
at bar, it was shown during the trial that the appointee
was formerly employed in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Central Bank of the Philippines.
Obviously, therefore, the appointment was a
reinstatement, and there was no necessity of obtaining
prior certification of eligibles from the Civil Service
Commission.
Moreover, it may be stated as a general rule that an
appointment once made is irrevocable and not subject
to reconsideration. The rule is qualified, however,
where the assent, confirmation or approval of some
other officer or body is needed before the appointment
may issue and be deemed complete. Necessarily, this
calls for a determination in any given situation whether
or not all the acts necessary to make an appointment
complete have been performed. Where the power of
appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been
determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment,
the commission, may issue at once. Where, however,
the assent or confirmation of some other officer or
body is required, the commission can issue or the
appointment be complete only when such assent or
confirmation is obtained.
Under our Civil Service Law and the rules
promulgated thereunder, an appointment to a position
in the civil service must be submitted to the
Commissioner of Civil Service for approval, i.e., for
determination whether the proposed appointee is
qualified to hold the position, and whether or not the
pertinent rules had been followed in making the
appointment. We have said in this connection that the
appointment made by an officer duly empowered to
make it, is not final and complete until after the
Commissioner of Civil Service has certified that such
appointment may be made The acts of the head of
Department or Office making the appointment and the
Commissioner of Civil Service acting together, though
not concurrently, but consecutively, are necessary to
make an appointment complete. And there should be
no question that for an appointee in the classified
position in the civil service to be entitled to the
protection of the law against unjust removal, his
appointment must receive the approval of the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Applying the rules above-explained, it was held that
the appointment of the appellee had become complete
when the appellant Commissioner of Civil Service
issued his order terminating the services of the former.
The appointment in question was extended to the
appellee on July 1, 1962, by virtue of which the
appointee assumed the duties of his position. Under the
same appointment as approved by the Chief, Personnel
Transactions Division in the name of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the City Auditor and
City Treasurer allowed and paid, respectively, the
salary of the appellee for the period from July 1, 1962
to January 15, 1963, a period of six and a half months.
In the case of appointments made by local officials and
attested to by Provincial Treasurers and City
Treasurers under Section 20 of the Civil Service Law,
the appointments are deemed to have been properly
made if within a period of one hundred eighty days the
Commissioner of Civil Service fails to make any
correction or revision thereof. After the lapse of the
period therein allowed, corrections of mistakes may no
longer be had, considering that after the lapse of that
time the probationary period of an employee under his
appointment also ends, and his appointment
automatically becomes permanent.
A removal from office takes place after title to the
office has become vested in the appointee, whereas
revocation of an appointment is had, if it is to be
successful, before the appointment is complete. The
moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected
not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and it
cannot be taken away from him, either by revocation
of the appointment or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing, consistent with
Section 4 of Article XII of our fundamental law, and
with the constitutional requirement of due process.
And when, as in this case, the appointee has been
regularly performing the duties of his office and been
paid the corresponding salary for more than six months
already under a known appointment that was never
questioned by either the City Treasurer or the City
Auditor of Manila before granting the salary of the
appellee, the act of the Acting Commissioner of Civil
Service in summarily terminating the services of the
appointee may not be said to be a reconsideration of
the appointment, but is in fact a removal from office.
Like a judgment that is not void upon its face, the
appointment in question is not "the serpent that may be
attacked or slain at sight." The power to remove from
office cannot lightly be inferred from the duty of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to make investigations
and take corrective measures when unsatisfactory
situations are found to exist. Under the circumstances
of this case, that duty should be exercised, if it is to be
exercise at all, with the end in view of ratifying the
appointment in question should he believe that the act
of his subordinate in approving the appointment is not
sufficient, considering that the appellee has been found
qualified for the position to which he was appointed.
47. VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE
LA PAZ, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge
of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional
Director in view of the retirement of the Supply
Officer I. Two years thereafter, the Division
Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional
appointment to private respondent as Supply Officer I
in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional
Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.
Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary
questioning the qualification and competence of
private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.
Finding the petitioner better qualified than the
respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision
sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of
private respondent, and petitioner was issued a
permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the
DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.
In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found
the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment
of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her
position under her previously approved appointment.
In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of
his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous
jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke
an appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position for that would
have constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the appointing authority.
Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent
can be revoked.
Ruling: No. It is well settled that once an appointment
is issued and the moment the appointee assumes
position, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable
right, which is protected not only by statute, but also
by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from
him either by revocation of the appointment, or by
removal, except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing.
Said appointment cannot also be revoked on the
ground that the protestant is more qualified than the
first appointee. The protest must be for a cause or
predicated on those grounds provided for under Sect
19 (6) of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), namely:
1) that the appointee is not qualified;
2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and
3) in case of appointment transfer, reinstatement, or by
original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied
with the written special reasons or reason given by the
appointing authority.
Note: for a cause means for reasons which the law that need the consent (confirmation) of the
and sound public policy recognized as sufficient
warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is
implied that officers may not be removed at the mere
will of those vested with the power of removal, or
without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to
and affect the administration of office and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public.
48. SARMIENTO III VS MISON
Facts: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of
the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its
not having been confirmed by CoA.
Issue: Whether or not the appointment is valid.
Ruling: Yes. The President acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to
the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office
and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there
are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus
heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by
the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone
of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments
Commission on Appointments.
49. AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Facts: Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed
by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last
day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad
interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next
president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he
issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position
and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as
the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then
filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is
qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and
that he was validly appointed by the former president.
Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents
appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly
done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it
was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or
administration.
Issue: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his
post.
Ruling: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done
in good faith then he would have the right to continue
office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain
in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment
can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias
appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the
upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a
person is qualified his appointment should not be
revoked but in here it may be since his appointment
was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality
that is considered but also justice, fairness and
righteousness.
50. RODRIGUEZ, JR VS QUIRINO
Facts: Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr. claims the right to hold
the position of Dir. of Public Libraries, against Carlos
Quirino, as he was appointed ad interim to the said
position by Pres. Garcia. While the petitioner's ad
interim appointment appears to be dated on June 1,
1961, it was not communicated until Dec 30 of the
same year, the last days of the outgoing president's
term, and nothing in the record indicates that its
existence was made known to any. However, said
appointment was later confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
Issue: WoN Rodriguez' ad interim appointment is valid
Ruling: No, it is held that said appointment is covered
by the rule laid down on "midnight appointment,"
referred in the case of Aytona vs Castillo.
In the absence of an exigency that made the
appointment urgent or peremptory, the latter
constitutes an abuse of power on the part of the
Executive. In the case at bar, no paralyzation or
blocking of functions impended that could justify and
call forth the ad interim appointing power, because
although the appointment was made as early as June
1,1961, it was neither made public nor even notified to
the appointee for six months.
The fact that the COA subsequently confirmed such
appointment, will not amount to its validity. It will still
be considered as void ab initio as it is in violation of
the purpose and spirit of the Constitution.
51. ROSALES VS YENKO
Facts : July 26, 1958, President Carlos P Garcia
appointed petitioner ad interim chairman of the bureau
of examiners for chemists.
On July 16, 1961, petitioner was reappointed as the
acting chairman of the same board. On November 6 of
the same year, pres . Garcia signed petitioners ad
interim appointment to the same office for term
expiring on July 15, 1964, however this ad interim
appointment was not released and delivered to the
petitioner, but the commission on appointment confirm
the said appointment.
On July 31, 1962, CSC informed the petitioner that his
appointment had been recalled, withdrawn and
declared without effect.
On November 5, 1962, president Macapagal appointed
respondent Yenko as acting chairman of the board of
the examiners for chemists who thereafter assumed the
functions and duties of the said office.
Issue: w/n the appointment is valid, legal and
subsisting as chairman of the board of examiners for
chemist for a term expiring on july 15 1964 which
appointment has been confirmed by the commission on
appointment.
Ruling: No. Ad interim appointment must be released
to and delivered to the appointee before action by
commission on appointment.
When there is no clear allegation and proof that an ad
interim appointment was released to and accepted by
the appointee, and that the latter duly qualified for the
position, (it is held that) such appointment is
incomplete and as a result, there is in fact and law
nomad interim appointment that could be validly
transmitted to and acted upon the commission on
appointment.
Since, petitioner having failed to allege and prove that
he is rightfully entitled to the office of chairman of the
board of examiners for chemists. Therefore, the
appointment of the petitioner is hereby null and void.
52. SEVILLA VS CA
Facts: Generoso R. Sevilla was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by Pres. Marcos.
However, on 1986, the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan City
appointed Neri Santos as the new city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Meanwhile, Sevilla was designated
by Rogaciano Mercado, the Minister of Public Works
and Highways as Acting District Engineer of Pasay
City, which he served for two months. After such, he
went back to Cabanatuan and filed a petition for quo
warranto against Neri Santos, on the ground that being
a presidential appointee, he could not be removed from
office by an OIC mayor. And even supposing that the
OIC mayor had such authority, his separation from
office was illegal because none of the grounds for
separation or replacement of office was met.
Both lower court and appellate court dismissed his
petition
Issue: WON an acting officer may bring a quo
warranto action against the permanent appointee to the
position
Ruling: No. An acting appointment is merely
temporary, one which is good only until another
appointment is made to take its place. Hence,
petitioner's right to hold office as Acting City Engineer
of Cabanatuan City was merely temporary. It kapsed
upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the
permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City.
An action for quo warranto may be commence by "a
person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another." Inasmuch as the petitioner aver that he is
entitled to the position and that Santos is a mere
usurper of said office, the CA committed no reversible
error. Petitioner's ouster was not illegal for his office
was extinguished when a permanent appointment to
the same office was made in favor of Santos
53. GAYATAO VS CSC
GR No. 93064 June 22, 1992
Facts: Bayani Fernandez was appointed as custom
operation chief (COC) at NAIA customhouse.
However upon the enactment of E.O 127 which
reorganized the Bureau of Customs, fernandez was
demoted as custom operation assistant chief (coac) of
the aircraft division, meanwhile, the then Supervising
customs trade examiner, petitioner Gayatao appointed
as COC at NAIA customhouse.
Aggrived by the said circumstances, private petitioner,
filed a protest before the merit system protection board
of respondent CSC contending that (1.) he was
unjustifiable demoted since he had been holding the
position prior to the reorganization and (2.) he is more
qualified that herein petitioner.
CSC revoked the appointment, petitioner questioned
the authority of the CSC as its authority is limited to
approval and renewal of an appointment in the light of
requisites of the law and not to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for
the position.
Issue: w/n CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: No. The revocation of the appointment was
based primarily of its finding that the said appointment
was null and void by reason of the fact that it resulted
in the demotion of private respondent without lawful
cause in violation of the latter's security of tenure. The
advertence of the CSC to the fact that private
respondent is better qualified was merely to lend
futher support to its stand that the removal of the
private respondent was unlawful and tainted his
reinstatement to his former position is imperative and
justified.
Also, no person may be appointed during a
reorganization to a position that was not abolished and
not vacant, hence, in the case at bar no position was
intent to be demolished and therefore , the appointment
of the petitioner amounts to illegal removal of the
private respondent hence, said removal is null and
void.
54. SUMMERS VS. OZEATO
Facts: Judge Ricardo Summers (petitioner) was an
incumbent cadastral judge. On February 11, 1946
petitioner received an ad interim appointment wherein
on February 16, 1946 he qualified and assumed the
position of judge-at-large of first instance (CFI) by
Secretary of Justice. However, on July 9, 1946 such ad
interim appointment was disapproved by the
Commission on Appointment (CoA).
Petitioner then alleged that under the constitution he is
still entitled to continue as a cadastral judge until he
reaches the age of seventy years old or become
incapacitated and furthermore that the two positions
were compatible which means that upon the
acceptance of his position as judge-at-large he did not
cease to be a cadstral judge especially where his ad
interim appointment was dis approved by the CoA.
Issue: WON Judge Summers did cease to be a
cadastral judge upon acceptance of an ad interim
appointment as a judge-at-large.
Ruling: YES.
An ad interim appointment is the power of the
president to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature
and the circumstance that it is subject to the
confirmation by the CoA does not alter its permanent
character. Once disapproved it becomes ineffective and
would cease discharging the office.
In this case it is clear that the two positions is
incompatible with each other, meaning you cannot
hold two positions at the same time. Although it was
the presFident who appointed the petitioner without his
consent, he was at a complete liberty to accept or
refuse the same. His acceptance amounted to a waiver
of his right to hold the position as a cadastral judge
during the term fixed by the constitution. The safer
course that he should take is to wait for the CoA to
approve his ad interim appointment before qualifying
and taking an oath of office.
Furthermore, he cannot rely on the general principle
that the acceptance of a second office may be held as
amounting to a vacation of the first, the two offices
must be incompatible. The Court considered that the
two offices are clearly incompatible with each other,
and that one person cannot and should not hold both of
them at the same time. The law has created a fixed
number of cadastral judges (Republic Act No. 156 and
Executive Order No. 94, at P8,400 per annum each),
and a fixed number of judge-at-large (Republic Act
No. 156 and Executive Order No. 94, at P9,000 per
annum each), and considerations of public interest
must have been the basis thereof. If the petitioner can
be a cadastral judge and a judge-at-large at the same
time, the judicial positions as specified and created by
law will be diminished by one.
55. RAFAEL VS EA
Cannot be found
56. CHUA VS. CSC
Facts: RA 6683 came into effect, providing for
benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
from the government service as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of
the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all
appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as well
as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years of government service as of
the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner, Lydia O. Chua, filed an application with
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same because she is a mere co-
terminous employee. A recourse was made to CSC, to
no avail. NIA and CSC contend that petitioner is not a
regular and career employee of NIA her position is
not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the
non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the
other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a
long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is
financial assistance.
Issue: WON petitioner has the right to avail the
benefits of early retirement law
Ruling: Yes.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. Casual,
temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter
periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2)
years of continuous service to qualify. Here, violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the
plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of
early retirement. Co-terminous or project personnel, on
the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application
prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they
comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such
purpose.
Hence, the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within
a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits
of said law.
57. RAUL R. INGLES, ROALDO G. ADVIENTO,
ISABEL C. CORPUS, CONSUELO M.
VILLANUEVA and ESPERANZA M.
GUTIERREZ VS AMELITO R. MUTUC and
BALDOMERO DAVOCOL
Facts: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles,
holding positions, under the Office of the President.
January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication of
the then Executive Secretary, Amelito R. Mutuc,
advising them that their services in the Government
were terminated. Plaintiffs appealed from this action to
the President. On February 1962, they received a letter
of Mr. Mutuc, acting "by authority of the President,"
denying the reconsideration. On March 1962, Plaintiffs
commenced the action.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs are occupying
positions which are primarily confidential and,
therefore, are subject to removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power
Ruling: NO. As regards to the nature of the positions
held by plaintiffs for "The President's Private Office,"
they handled "confidential matters"; and that, "while
plaintiffs perform purely clerical work, the papers
handled by them are highly confidential in nature but
does not suffice to characterize their " positions" as
primarily confidential. Indeed, it is admitted that
plaintiffs, handle "other routine matters," and it has not
even been shown that their work is, at least,
principally confidential.
Regarding the power to dismiss at pleasure officers
holding policy-determining, primarily confidential and
highly technical positions, the Court added, in the case
of De los Santos vs. Mallare, that "it may truly be said
that the good of the service itself demands that
appointments coming under this category be
terminable at the will of the officer that makes them."
58. DELOS SANTOS VS MALLARE
Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was
appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946,
by the President, appointment which was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on
the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to
exercise the duties and functions of the position. On
June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad
interim appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of
the Department of Public Works and Communications
directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public
Works for another assignment. Santos refused to
vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the
other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants
ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding
to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
Issue: whether or not the removal of the petitioner
from his present position for assignment to another
position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides that "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Ruling: Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution
ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and
subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by
law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive examination." Section
670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that
"Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to
the classified service," and went on to say that "The
classified service embraces all not expressly declared
to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671
described persons in the unclassified service as
"officers, other than the provincial treasurers and
assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by
the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, and all other officers of the government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President
of the Philippines alone."
Three specified classes of positions policy-
determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical are excluded from the merit system and
dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None
of these exceptions obtain in the present case.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily
confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.
A confidential position denotes not only confidence in
the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office
but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city
engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not
formulate a method of action for the government or
any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not
to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer
of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid
down for him be section 2557 of the Revised
Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in
character. Finally, the position of city engineer is
technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not
required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill
or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is
the sense in which "highly technical" is employed in
the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men
in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer.
As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are
eminently administrative in character and could very
well be discharged by non-technical men possessing
executive ability.
59. TOMAS BESA, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondent
Facts: The constitutional safeguard against removal
from office except for cause is invoked by petitioner
Tomas Besa, Appointed Chief Legal Counsel with the
rank of Vice-President of respondent Philippine
National Bank in 1962, he was shifted by virtue of a
resolution of respondent Bank on October 19, 1966, to
the office of its President, respondent Roberto S.
Benedicto, as Consultant on Legal Matters, with
respondent Conrado E. Medina being assigned to his
position. The justification for such a move was
Resolution No. 1053 of respondent Board of Directors
of the Bank, wherein it was expressly stated "that Vice
President Tomas Besa be shifted to the Office of the
President as Consultant on Legal Matters, without
change in salary and other privileges."
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was removed from his
position.
Ruling: There was no removal, what did take place
was a termination of official relation. Accepting as he
did the position of chief legal adviser, the essence of
which is the utmost degree of confidence, As was
made clear by Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who penned the
opinion: "The tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential positions (such as private secretaries of
public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence,
because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation
involves no removal.
60. DOLORES A. PAREDES, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND REMEDIOS A.
AMOR, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Dolores Paredes assails the decision
of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
directing the revocation of her appointment as HS
Project Coordinator in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and declaring the said position
vacant.
Petitioner Paredes entered the government as a public
school teacher. Later she transferred to the General
Auditing Office as Auditing Clerk detailed at the
Philippine Tobacco Administration. Then joined
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission as Project
Officer II. She was promoted to H.S. Project Officer
III then to H.S. Project Officer II and was extended a
promotional appointment as H.S. Project Supervisor
which in this case has been contested by Atty.
Remedios A. Amor, H.S. Project Officer IV, on the
ground that she is the qualified next-in-rank.
Issue: Whether or not CSC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in the revocation of petitioner Paredes'
appointment as HS Project Coordinator and in
declaring the said position vacant.
Ruling: In the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions,
Civil Service Commission committed an error in
applying the Qualification Standards which it admitted
it has not approved. Exigency of the service does not
justify the use of Qualification Standard it has not
approved. However, the error is not so grave as would
warrant the nullification of its resolution declaring the
position of H.S. Project Coordinator vacant. The
absence of a Qualification Standard does not justify
the appointment of petitioner Paredes or anybody for
that matter to the contested position. Without a duly
approved Qualification Standard it would be extremely
difficult if not impossible for the appointing authority
to determine the qualification and fitness of the
applicant for the particular position. Without an
approved Qualification Standard, the appointing
authority would have no basis or guide in extending a
promotional or original appointment in filling up
vacant positions in its department or agency. Public
interest therefore requires that a Qualification Standard
must exist to guide the appointing authority not only in
extending an appointment but also in setting contested
appointments.
In declaring the Position of HS Project Coordinator
vacant; CSC has therefore not abused its discretion as
the Qualification Standards of the HSRC which should
be the basis and guide for appointment has not been
approved by the Civil Service Commission.
61. MELANIO S. TORIO, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL
PRINTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY and EFREN
CAMACHO, Respondents.
-------------------
JAIME ESPANOLA, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, LETTY CANGAYDA,
NATIONAL PRINTING OFFICE and THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY
Facts: Executive Order No. 285 issued on July 25,
1987 abolished the General Services Administration
(GSA) including all offices and agencies under it. The
General Printing Office (GPO) which was under the
GSA was merged with the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and out of the
merger arose the National Printing Office (NPO)
which was placed under the control and supervision of
the Office of the Press Secretary (OPS).
Melanio Torio, was the Chief of the Production Staff
of the Printing Division, PIA, while the petitioner,
Jaime Espanola, was a Bindery Foreman at the PIA.
They continued discharging their functions in a hold-
over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA.
in accordance with the new staffing pattern of the
NPO, petitioner Torio was temporarily appointed as
Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing while
petitioner Espanola was appointed as Temporary
Supervising Book-binder. Espanola was issued another
appointment as Supervising Bookbinder with a
permanent status. Eventually, the position of both were
upgraded. Torio was given a permanent position as
Espanola, while Espanola on the other hand, was given
only a notice of the upgrading of his position inasmuch
as he was already holding it in a permanent capacity.
Prior to the appointments of the petitioners to the
permanent items, protests were lodged with the CSC.
The protestants were Efren Camacho and Letty
Cangayda, the private respondents.
The CSC issued a resolution in CSC Case No. 796
revoking the appointment of Torio and ordering those
qualified, including Camacho, to be evaluated for the
position. Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, the CSC
rendered another resolution in CSC Case No. 832
cancelling Espanolas appointment and ordering the
reappointment of Cangayda to the position.
These two consolidated petitions assail the resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) revoking the
appointment of herein petitioners on the ground that
they lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the
time of the issuance of their appointments
Issue: Whether or not the revoking of the appointment
of petitioners by the CSC were valid
Ruling: A permanent appointment is not a continuation
of the temporary appointmentthese are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority. The fact that the
appointees in the two appointments are one and the
same person is purely incidental. Any irregularities in
the former appointment are not to be automatically
carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed
against the temporary appointment, it would be
illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the
subsequent permanent appointment.
The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean,
however, that by the mere expedient of appointing the
temporary appointee to a permanent status, the
appointing authority can deprive the protestant of an
opportunity to question the appointment. First, the
protestant is not precluded from filing another protest
directed against the permanent appointment. Second, if
it can be shown that the appointment was purposely
done to moot the protest or is characterized by malice,
then corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the
erring officials can be proceeded against
administratively.
It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a
temporary appointment is carried over to the
subsequent permanent appointment to the same
position of the same person, an anomalous situation
will arise wherein the permanent appointees security
to his position would be jeopardized by considerations
outside of his permanent appointment.
The questioned resolutions of the CSC should be
declared inapplicable to the petitioners because they
refer to the temporary appointments which had already
lapsed when they were issued.
At the time of the temporary appointment of petitioner
Espanola, a civil service eligible who was willing to
accept the position was available in the person of
private respondent Cangayda. Apparently, there was
disregard of the mandate of the law when Espanolas
temporary appointment was issued. Nevertheless, the
petitioner has correctly pointed out that the protest
lodged by private respondent Cangayda had become
moot and academic inasmuch as petitioner Espanolas
temporary appointment had already lapsed on
February 28, 1989. It is erroneous for the CSC to treat
Cangaydas protest as a continuing one. The same
holds true for the protest lodged by Camacho.