Name: CALO, Michael John T.

Citation: G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE

FACTS:

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint

(First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and
culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al.

against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public
trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the

House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time.

On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First

and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010,
the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints
were sufficient in form.

On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the
Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment
proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining
order.
 Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe

for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the
proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent
argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the
determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the
two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.

The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14

September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue
a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment
proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a
matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should have
been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition
before voting on the issuance of the status quo ante order.
Unfortunately, this was not done.)

Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to

determine whether public respondent committed a violation of
the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to
impeachment proceeding?

HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The

Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the

Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the
Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.

ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication?
HELD: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on
the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules)
present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two

impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely
when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable
officer within a period of one year.

ISSUE #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed

initiated?

HELD: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint:
the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House
Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period.

ISSUE #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for

comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of
form and substance?
HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee.

In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of

sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article
XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that
a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process,
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of
facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis petitioners
submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?

HELD: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.)

ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of

the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between
publication and promulgation.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on
August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on
September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially
identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general
circulation.

Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of

due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention
on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
"Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section."

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to

"the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily
in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."

While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there

is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses
the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves
the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating
from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as
well as other constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms

"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules
for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to
the clerk of court for filing and publication.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally

understoodthat is, to make known. Since the Constitutional
Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate
its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for
the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific
method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode
of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.

Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the

Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does

not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would
already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day
period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules.
In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for
its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the
completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what
happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the
15th Congress open its first session)

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the
rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the
purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt
the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency
in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress
Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of

legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for
the punishment of the offender.

ISSUE #6: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?

Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first

impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file
the complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice.

Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of

initiation because "something prior to that had already been done.
This is wrong. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification
of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House
steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment
proceedings.

ISSUE #7: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only

one impeachable offense?

Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion

when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that
"the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far
as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."
Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner,
the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and
substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint
need not allege only one impeachable offense.

Citation:GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON.
ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R.
Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 ]

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9,

1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine
navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official
documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to
quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has
jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the
Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for
the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police
and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines

2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does

not fall within the rank requirement stated in Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is
vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which
states that In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has

the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner
in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial
powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared

to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman
and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision
dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman

extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the
Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.

RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct

preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving
public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by
law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any
act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is
broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.

The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of
offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the
most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the
Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to
make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.

Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of the
Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the
amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its
inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the
power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

Citation: [ G.R. No. 120422, September 27, 1995 ] CHIEF SUPT.

ROMEO ACOP VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND HON.
MANUEL B. CASACLANG
[G.R. NO. 120428] P/CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON et al VS.
BGEN. MANUEL B. CASACLANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY et al.

FACTS: On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious

robbery gang, "Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout
with composite teams of the National Capital Regional Command
(NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).

SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC)

then made an expose', stating that there was no shootout and that the
"Kuratong Baleleng" members were victims of summary execution.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the complaint of the
relatives of the slain suspected gang members, accusing the PACC,
NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder. Acting Ombudsman Villa directed
public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to create a panel to
monitor the investigations being conducted by the Commission on
Human Rights, the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for Investigation
regarding the alleged shootout.
The panel recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted
against petitioners and all the participating personnel listed in the After
Operations Report of the PNP. Casaclang then issued the order
directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence within ten days from receipt thereof, which
the petitioners failed to comply.
The petitioners instead filed a motion with Casaclang to suspend the
preliminary investigation against them pending resolution of the
petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court. Casaclang granted
the motion, only to be reversed by Villa. Villa then took over "the
direct supervision and control of the preliminary investigation". The
petitioners challenged the take-over, asserting that neither the
Ombudsman nor his Deputy may conduct preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations
Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Manuel Casaclang committed grave abuse of discretion when he set
the case for preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to
submit their counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of the
complaint as required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No.
07 of the Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING:
 1. Yes. By express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution, among the functions of the Ombudsman are those
other powers, functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Through the passage of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was made an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman, while the Ombudsman was granted the following powers,
among others:

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases;

2. Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority

or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers,
functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners have not proven any distinction between "the duty to investigate"
and "the power to conduct preliminary investigations"; neither have the petitioners
established that the power remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special
Prosecutor.

Deputy Ombudsman - Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.

The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not

yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from
performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel.
On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions
reveals otherwise.

As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other

powers or perform such functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe
through legislation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from
giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman's
deputies, one being the deputy for the military establishment.

2. The Court does not share the petitioners' view that Casaclang set
the case for preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to
file their counter-affidavits without the conduct of a preliminary
evaluation of the complaint as required by the Rules of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In this case, no evidence to that effect was adduced. On
the contrary, the Panel of Investigators submitted its evaluation report
on 8 June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 that respondent
Casaclang issued the questioned order.
Moreover, the evaluation required is merely preliminary in nature and
scope, not a detailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such evaluation
involves the exercise of discretion which has not been shown to be
abused in the instant case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129124 March 15, 2002
RENATO A. TAPIADOR, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA,
respondents.
FACTS:

The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit3

dated July 4, 1994 lodged with the Resident Ombudsman at the main
office in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID for
brevity) by Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner, Renato
A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical
Assistant in the office of the then Associate Commissioner Bayani M.
Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador
demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate
of registration (ACR for brevity) which was subsequently withheld
deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by Beck,
unless the latter pay an additional amount of Seven Thousand Pesos
(P7,000.00). Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit4 executed
by a certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate
the alleged payment of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in
consideration for the issuance of the subject ACR.

The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit5 dated July

11, 1994 that he demanded nor received any amount of money from
Walter Beck in consideration for the issuance of the latter's ACR. In
addition, the petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife, Monica Beck,
came to the BID office in Manila on June 29, 1994 to follow-up his visa
application. On the said occasion, when the petitioner advised the
couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa application,
Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner
with having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the
petitioner to file a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioner's allegations were
corroborated by Rosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee and officemate of
the petitioner, in her affidavit dated July 15, 1994.

After investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma

found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules and
regulations as well as penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal
and administrative charges be filed against the petitioner.

The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was

accorded due process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed and
furnished a copy of the complaint against him as evidenced by his
letters dated July 22 and 26, 1996 addressed to the investigating
officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to
prepare for his defense. Likewise, there was no undue delay in the
conduct of the administrative proceedings since the preliminary
investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was filed
in 1994; and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved,
the administrative proceeding was conducted shortly thereafter. That
no preliminary conference had been conducted in the case was
primarily due to the petitioner's manifestation to dispense thereof and
submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his
memorandum of evidence. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the
petitioner was absolved of criminal liability during the preliminary
investigation of this case due to insufficiency of evidence constituting
probable cause contrary to his claim that there was absolutely no
evidence against him. However, the Ombudsman asserts that the
sworn statements of Walter Beck a and his witness, Purisima Terencio,
substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for
grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of
money in exchange for the issuance of the latter's ACR; and for that
offense, petitioner should be imposed the corresponding penalty of
dismissal from the government service.

Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the

Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence extant in the record
of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary conference required under
Republic Act No. 677019 was dispensed with after the nominal
complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma,
manifested on July 29, 1996 that he was submitting the case for
resolution on the basis of the documents on record20 while the
petitioner agreed to simply file his memorandum.21 Consequently, the
only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing
the petitioner from the government service was the unverified
complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness,
Purisima Terencio.

A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject

affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by the
respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by
the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did
they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their
respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the
investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of
the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner "was not
supported by any evidence".22 Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and
inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone, the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should have
dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the
first instance.

Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does

not categorically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally
demanded from Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
in consideration for the issuance of the latter's ACR. On the other hand,
it appears that Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of
Purisima Terencio sometime in the later part of 1992 in facilitating the
issuance of his ACR and in the process, Terencio allegedly informed the
couple that Beck could be granted the same and would be allowed to
stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitioner and
a certain Mr. Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Hence, Beck and his wife did not appear
to have any direct or personal knowledge of the alleged demand of the
petitioner except through the information allegedly relayed to them by
Terencio. Likewise, although Beck claimed to have subsequently paid
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), his affidavit is silent as to the
identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him.
The pertinent portion of his affidavit reads, thus:

1. That during the months of Sept[ember] and Oct[ober] 1992 a certain

Baby (Purisima)Terencio informed us that I could be granted an ACR
and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr.
Tapiador and Mr. Angeles, both from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila
and the fees was agreed at P10,000.00, official receipts inclusive (sic);
2. That after completing all the requirements and the amount of
P10,000.00 was given I waited but no ACR was given to me;

3. That sometime in February 1993 my wife went to see Mr. Tapiador

and was informed that he will hold my passport while I have my ACR,
which I refused;

4. That when we transferred (sic) our residence to Negros Occ[idental]

we arranged with Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will leave
for that place, and when my wife went again to see Mr. Tapiador to pick
up the ACR he was not in the office, and that Baby Terencio promised
to (sic) us that the ACR will be mailed to us, but it was never mailed;23

xxx xxx xxx

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the
said amount directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who
actually received the same, but he did not. This significant omission in
his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of
the petitioner. It also appears that Beck and the petitioner would
eventually meet personally for the first time only later, more
specifically on June 23, 1994, at the office of the latter. On the said
occasion, so Beck's affidavit went on to state, petitioner even informed
him that his ACR had been approved but that he still needed to submit
his quarantine clearance before the same could be issued to him.
Before the said date however, it appears that Purisima Terencio had
apparently been doing most of the legwork for the Beck couple in
facilitating the release of the subject ACR. Consequently, there is
logical basis to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged
payment was made by the Beck couple.
Anent the affidavit of Purisima Terencio, the Ombudsman gave full faith
and credit to her statement that the "spouses paid the full amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on February 23, 1992 to Mr. Tapiador
as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for
the immediate release of the same"24 on the mere assumption that
there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements against
the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than
thirty (30) years.25 On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are
presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise26 does not apply to
the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute
falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for reneging
on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The
Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according credence to
the allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed "fixer".

Besides, Purisima Terencio was adroit enough to make it appear in her

affidavit that the Beck spouses had paid Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) in "grease money" to the petitioner on February 23, 1992
even without categorically stating that she had personal knowledge or
had actually witnessed the alleged pay off. A close scrutiny of the
allegations in her affidavit show that the alleged pay off had taken
place as early as February 23, 1992. However, Beck claimed in his own
affidavit that he was informed by Terencio only between the period
from September to October 1992 that the processing of his ACR could
be facilitated through the assistance of the petitioner and a certain Mr.
Angeles. This glaring inconsistency more than sufficiently impeached
Terencio's credibility thereby belying the assessment of the
Ombudsman in the assailed resolution.

ISSUE: W/N The Ombudsman had the authority to dismiss the

petitioner?
HELD:

In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary anymore to pass upon the

other grounds raised by the petitioner in his petition. The complainant
clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the
charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence.27 Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,28 the Ombudsman can only
"recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to
be at fault, to the public official concerned.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution

of the Ombudsman dated January 22, 1997 dismissing the petitioner
from the government service and the Order dated April 7, 1997 in
OMB-ADM-0-94-0983 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the
government service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation
and Deportation, Manila, without loss nor diminution in his salaries and
benefits.
SO ORDERED.

Citation: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES

MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO
503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsmans authority to impose administrative penalty

and enforce compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory but mandatory within the bounds of the law.

FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school
principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo,
Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of
Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently
found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted
out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month

suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga
and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the
Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority
to impose administrative sanctions over public officials

HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the

Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the
Ombudsman of the power to recommend the imposition of penalty
on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or
employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That
the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an
order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a
ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but
is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be
interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the
head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal
act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be
taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would
be the head of the BID.

The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction

with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In
fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and
enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the
order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.