Sec.

2
League of Cities vs. Comelec
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case
is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001
while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for
the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or

resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.

Basco vs. PAGCOR

No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly
on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject
to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right
to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.
It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress
which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its
general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the

National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over
local governments.

Sec. 6 & 7
Mariano vs. Comelec
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of
Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying
metes and bounds with technical descriptions
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as
the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did
not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was
meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz

3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now
barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those
barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes
and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly
ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the
municipality & consequently to which municipality the barangays in question
belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the
carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial
Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary
to the technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding. If
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.

Sec. 16
Macasiano vs. Diokno
No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of
respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence,
local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use
the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the
public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be

considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by
the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition
of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the
respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to
clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.

Tano vs. Socrates

The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization
and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

MMDA vs. Bel Air

WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of
the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic
and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory
(LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code
and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the
Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of
authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an
LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is
not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA
is illegal.

Lina vs. Pano

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the

lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air
its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given
this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our
system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As
held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted
by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp

Sec. 19 Eminent Domain

Daet vs. CA
For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value as
declared by the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that laws
shall have only prospective effect. The provisional value of the property in this case
having already been fixed, the deposit on February 9, 1973 of the amount of
P54,370.00 representing the assessed value of the land and the deposit on October
21, 1977 of the amount of P25,830.00 representing the assessed value of the
improvement, both pursuant to the said decree, are not sufficient. Nevertheless,
said amounts should be deducted from the total amount due to private respondent.
To explain and clarify the judgment of the Court in affirming the decision appealed,
the demolition of the building of private respondent standing on the land by the
Municipal Mayor, Engr. Jose P. Timoner on February 14, 1978 constituted the actual
taking of possession of the property sought to be expropriated by the Municipality of
Daet. And from said date, February 14, 1978, interest at the legal rate shall be paid
by the municipality until the full amount is paid.

Mun. of Paranaque vs. VM Realty

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and
ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA

This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the
expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be
public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has
no real or substantial relation to the public use.

Provice of Cebu vs. Apolonio

Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of

the filing of the complaint.
No. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for
the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which
expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain
is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule
"admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings."

Sec. 20 LGU Conversation of Lands

Patalinghod vs CA
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is
an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. 10 Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance
which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered
thereunder.

Fortich Vs. Corona

It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have
acquired experties in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court,
24 considering that the Office of the President is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.
we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao,
Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and
bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of
the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries
(who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject
property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the
law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local
affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is
clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal
mandate, it grants local governments units autonomy in their local affairs
including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

Sec 21 opening/closure of road

Macasiano vs. Diokno see section 16