Agrarian Reform: The lessons of Guatemala and the peace process

Gearid Loingsigh
14/05/2017

goloing@gmail.com

Twenty-one years ago a final agreement was reached between the URNG
(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) and the government of
Guatemala. It brought to an end a long armed uprising against the
Guatemalan oligarchy that began in the 1950s and despite the
difference of a few years; it had a lot to do with the 1954 CIA coup detat
against the Arbenz government and its agrarian reform programme. So
it comes as no surprise that the agrarian issue was a key issue in the
negotiations.

Guatemala resembles Colombia in many aspects, a long running armed

conflict, a rotten oligarchy, systematic repression of the peasants and
indigenous and a peace agreement that was supposedly going to bring
an end to the causes of the conflict. And the Agreement for a Firm and
Lasting Peace (Guatemala) is like the General Accord for the Termination
of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable Lasting Peace
(Colombia), more commonly known as the Definitive Final Accord, both
are in reality a series of accords on different points, amongst them the
agrarian question. Point 27 of the Socio-Economic Accord (Guatemala)
describes the importance of this issue in the following way:

It is essential and unavoidable to solve the problems of agrarian

reform and rural development in order to address the situation of
the majority population, which live in rural areas and is most
affected by poverty, extreme poverty, injustice and the weakness of
State institutions. The transformation of the structure of land use
and ownership must have as its objective the incorporation of the
rural population into economic, social and political development so
that the land constitutes, for those who work it, the basis of their
economic stability, the foundation of their progressive social well-
being and the guarantee of their freedom and dignity.1

The description is clearly accurate and is no different from the

description made about Colombia, nor is it different to the content of the
Final Accord signed between the FARC and the government. In fact the
1 Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation,
concluded on 6 May 1996 between the Presidential Peace Commission of
the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca Paragraph 27 Appendix to UN General Assembly
Document 6th of June 1996 A/50/956
situation in Guatemala is so similar to Colombia that the proposals of
Final Accord seem to be a copy and paste of the agreement signed by
the URNG. They are not just similar in name but in content. Point 34 (a)
of the Accord in Guatemala proposed to:

Establish a land trust fund within a broad-based banking institution

to provide credit and to promote savings, preferably among micro-,
small and medium-sized enterprises. The land trust fund will have
prime responsibility for the acquisition of land through Government
funding, will promote the establishment of a transparent land
market and will facilitate the updating of land development plans.
The fund will give priority to the allocation of land to rural men and
women who are organized for that purpose, taking into account
economic and environmental sustainability requirements;2

And amongst the measures agreed to in order to foment access to land,

were the following:

(i) Uncultivated State land and State-owned farms;

(ii) Illegally settled public land, especially in Petn and the Franja
Transversal del Norte, which the Government has pledged to
recover
through legal action;
(iii) Land acquired with the resources allocated by the Government
to the
National Land Fund and the National Peace Fund for that purpose;
(iv) Land purchased with grants from friendly Governments and
international
non-governmental organizations;
(v) Land purchased with loans secured from international financing
agencies;
(vi) Undeveloped land expropriated under article 40 of the
Constitution;3

And to round off with point X) miscellaneous donations. It is obvious to

anyone who has read the Final Accord in Colombia that they two accords
are very similar. Although it is worth pointing out that it is equally
obvious that not all those organisations and politicians that support the
Colombian peace process so much have actually read the Accord, as was
seen with a recent letter regarding a draft bill, where they committed
monumental mistakes that show that various left wing congress people
have not read it.4 However, despite the lack of reading on the part of
2 Ibd., Prrafo 34 (A)
3 Ibd., Prrafo 34 (C)
4
http://socialistdemocracy.org/RecentArticles/RecentColombiaImplementin
our congress people, the agreements are similar and deal with similar
issues with similar proposals. If they havent read the Colombian one, it
is unlikely that the congress people are going to read the Guatemalan
agreement, but I am honest, believe me and save yourself the effort.
But your lack of reading does not change the reality of the country.

As regards landownership, following the armed conflict and the

signing of the Peace Accords (December 1996) no structural
changes were made. Guatemala continued to be a country of a
small number of large landowners where 3% of them usufruct more
than 60% of properties. If we traced this data on a virtual map, we
would find that 3% of Guatemalans are the owners of the entire
arable surface of at least 13 of the 22 departments in the country.5

It is not for nothing that when the process with the FARC started the
NGOs invited various personalities from Guatemala to speak about the
peace process there. They didnt tell us what the current reality was,
they didnt speak of the constant murders of social leaders nor did they
say what the current state of play with the agrarian question was. Here
we propose to take a brief look at the agrarian situation in Guatemala
today and the lessens for Colombia in the post-accord period. To what
extent did the Accord achieve an agrarian reform? And what are they
current dynamics of the Guatemalan countryside?

Land Use

The first point to take note of is the dramatic change in land use since
1996. The area under permanent crops has almost doubled, just like De
Roux proposes for Colombia. In 1996 in Guatemala there were 549,000
hectares under permanent crops and in 2014, 1,061,000 of total
agricultural surface of 3,793,800 hectares down from the agricultural
surface area of 1996 which stood at 4,512,000 hectares. The expansion
of cash crop monocultures played a role in that.

In 1996, there were 15,000 hectares of African palm in Guatemala, and

after the Accord that slowly increased to reach the figure of 45,000
hectares in 2006. From that year on it began to expand rapidly through
the country.

Likewise sugar cane experienced an increase from 178,580 to 263,830

hectares in the same time frame. Agricultural production also changed
gThePeaceAccordADraftBill.html
5 Cabanas, A (2012) La paz, ese parntesis (1996-2011): Revisin crtica
del proceso de paz en Guatemala, Memorial de Guatemala, Guatemala
p. 108
regarding yields. In 1996 240,000 tonnes of oil palm fruit were produced
and in 2013, that figure reached 402,000 tonnes. Banana production
also underwent a dramatic rise, more than tripling the production levels
of 1996. In the same period the importation of basic staple products
such as wheat and corn increased dramatically. In 1996, the country
imported 216,852 tonnes of corn and in 2013, 689,013 tonnes and
354,069 tonnes of wheat in 1996 and 462,759 tonnes in 2013. These
are figures which have a real impact, they are not simply part of a
discourse on food sovereignty. Whilst the prevalence of
undernourishment is at the same level as 1996, the absolute number of
undernourished people has increased from 1.5 million to 2.5 million
people, reflecting an increase in the size of the population that
Guatemala has not been able to feed properly.6

The land that was planted with palm and sugar cane was peasant
land. It is not simply just a case of a change in the use of the soil,
but also of the owners of the land.

Whilst the land area given over to cane is double that of palm, the
sugar cane has been expanding, particularly in the lands of the
South Coast (Pacific), that were seized for export plantations during
the second historic milestone in the theft of indigenous and peasant
land from 1850 onwards.

However, 58% of the land suitable for palm and 78% of that under
palm in 2010 in agricultural colonisation and peasant development
territories7

Whilst it is true that sugar production is not new, there have been
expansions towards indigenous and peasant lands and the sugar
association has tried to underestimate the amount of land planted with
sugar cane. But social organisations have stated that sugar cane
occupies 9.6% of planted lands in the country, 4.5 times the 2.15%
reported by the sugar barons. 8 Palm, for its part increased to 146,563
hectares by 2014, according to the figures from the business
association.

The also introduced the same associative model promoted in Colombia

6 Figures on agricultural production, nutrition etc, are taken from the
web page of the FAO, except where otherwise stated.
7 Alonso-Fradejas, A. et al. (2011)Plantaciones agro-industriales,
dominacin y despojo indgena-campesino en la Guatemala del siglo XXI,
CONGCOOP y IDEAR, Guatemala. P. 34

8 Winkler, K (2013) La Territorialidad TzUtujil, frente a la expansin de la

caa de azcar, Guatemala, Magna Terra Editores S.A. p. 34
by nefarious personalities such as the priest De Roux and palm
companies such as Indupalma, which is now an integral part of the Final
Accord.9 In other words, they convinced or intimidated peasants into
covering the costs of the companies in what is known in Guatemala as
Contract Agriculture,10 and Productive Alliances, Strategic Alliances or
Integrated Peasant Farm in Colombia. The names of this model change
from one country to another, from one time to another and depend in
part on the national or international entity financing the projects, but the
result is the same.

For capitalism, who owns the land is not always important, but rather the
use it is put to and the final destiny of the produce is what is important.
Although the law on associative practices of peasant companies in
Guatemala is from the 1980s, it got a real boost from the peace process.

There are two strategies on territorialisation displayed by the state

that stand out in the recent historic context that have contributed
directly and indirectly-, to identifying, registering and dividing up of
the national territory with a view to awarding under exclusive
private property and/or usufructuary rights.

On the one hand, the dichotomy of the liberal agrarian policy and
the subsequent military regimes (for exporters and their
plantations/for peasant reproduction and the work force on the
plantations), and leaving behind the (agricultural) legal, financial
and productive protection of the state, applying the tabula rasa of
the Market Assisted Agrarian Reform (MAAR) subjecting, as was
done in the beginning of the liberal period, all claimants for land to
free competition in the market place, regardless of their financial
capabilities or political clout.

Under the guidance and partial financing of the World Bank, the
Guatemalan Land Trust (FONTIERRAS) was set up with the aim of
turning the landless rural population, or those with land but no title
deeds, into private property owners by: i) awarding loans to
landless rural groups or those with insufficient land, to buy land on
the market; and ii) give official title deeds to all those who held land
(See Decree 24-99, Land Trust Law).11

All of these factors are currently in play in Colombia and are included in
the Final Accord, such as the land trust, title deeds and also loans for a
market assisted agrarian reform, as can be seen in Point 1.1.2. Special
9 See Final Accord Point 1.3.3.6
10 Alonso-Fradejas, A. et al. (2011) Op. Cit. pp 35 & 36.

11 Ibd., p. 41
loans for purchasing: a new line of special credit with long term subsidies
for the purchase of land will be opened. This change towards a market
orientated agrarian reform, agreed to and accepted by the FARC and the
unarmed left will not solve the agrarian question in Colombia, just as it
didnt do it in Guatemala. Colombia already experimented with a market
assisted agrarian reform and it didnt work, and wont work now.

There is a lack of precise data on the current situation in Guatemala, but

in 2003, the last year for which data on the Gini Coefficient for land
distribution exists, the country had a Gini of 0,84, the highest rate in
Central America.12

Although the agricultural dynamics in Guatemala are neither new for the
country or the world, they do take place in the context of a supposed
post-conflict and a peace agreement, which as is the case with the Final
Accord signed with the FARC, promised to solve the agrarian problem, or
that is what they fans of the process claimed.

The production of African Palm in Guatemala and the Central

American region began in the context of the previous oil crisis (or
capitalist hyperaccumulation) of the first half of the 1970s. The
[palm] oil production flourished and grew in the country up to it
joining the WTO (in 1995), which produced the conditions for
liberalising its importation. It was after 2000 that the crop was
reactivated and its surface area grew exponentially in response to
the rise in international prices for crude palm oil encouraged by the
increasing demand from the food and cosmetics industry and
especially the agro-energy industry.13

In other words, the industry fell into decline before the Peace Accord and
its recovery after 2000 is due to international factors, (as is the case with
Colombia) but also the new dynamics of the country, both regarding the
war and agriculture. Amongst the international factors are the increase
in demand for palm oil in various sectors of the economy, plastics,
chemicals etc and although we shouldnt exaggerate the importance of
biofuels, they are a significant factor, where the same old imperial
powers come into play, the USA and the EU as well as the new champion
of biofuels and loyal minor partner of imperialism, Brazil under the PT.

The Framework Agreement signed in March 2007 between Brazil

12 Guerea, A. (2016) Desterrados: Tierra, Poder Y Desigualdad En
Amrica Latina, Oxfam, Reino Unido. P.22

13 Alonso Fradejas, A. et al (2008) Combustibles para un nuevo ciclo de

acumulacin y dominio en Guatemala, Guatemala, CONGCOOP y IDEAR,
p.33
 and the USA, with the aim of cooperating in the development and
promotion of biofuels as well as the strategic alliance with the EU
on cooperation on renewable energy, particularly biofuels, signed in
July of the same year is the backdrop to the new international
political economy of the agrofuels with concrete implications for
Central America.14

Brazil, under the supposedly progressive government of Lula began a

campaign to expand their energy based influence throughout Latin
America, even installing biofuel plants in Haiti and Guatemala, amongst
other countries and thus avoiding paying taxes on its exports to Europe.
Brazilian biofuels pay customs duties and those of Guatemala and Haiti
do not. Europe unlike the USA imports most of its biofuels. In
Guatemala we find all of the factors in play in Colombia, large scale
projects by multinationals from the agricultural sector, biofuel projects,
an agreement that promises to resolve the agrarian question (despite
the actual content of the agreement), a defeated guerrilla army and
rotten oligarchy entrenched in political and economic power.

The Final Accord signed by the FARC and the Colombian government is
very similar to the Guatemalan agreement, it offers similar guarantees
to the peasants and the indigenous, i.e. it offers no real guarantee, but
rather a signed declaration that will be a dead letter once the ratification
ceremonies are over. Colombia just like Guatemala is subject to the
same external pressures, from the USA and the EU. Unlike Guatemala,
Colombia has a long history of implementing large-scale agro-industrial
projects in the name of peace and experimenting with various
innovative models for exploiting the peasants, such as the social
component of Plan Colombia, the EUs Peace Laboratories etc. It is no
novice when it comes to peace, it does not have to implement very new
policies, but rather it has to refine a little, some of the already
established policies that have been endorsed by the Final Accord, such
as agro-industry and scale production, which are explicitly mentioned in
the Principles of the Accord (page 12). Guatemala is a clear beacon of
where we are going; a counter-agrarian reform and radical change in the
use of the land.

The reality of Guatemala is that despite the distribution of some land by

the Land Trust to peasants and indigenous people, there was a counter-
agrarian reform which continues its advance today at gunpoint. Not only
has the oligarchys dominance and that of international capital been
strengthened, they continue to use the same methodology; violence.

When the peace process fans invited the pals from other parts to
14 Ibd., p.46
conferences on peace, they did not talk of the real problems of
Guatemala. The peace process fans are real fans, they have a blind
loyalty to their team and they go to the stadium to shout hurrah. Even
when their team is losing 5-0 they do not lose faith. And when they lose,
they blame anything other than the team, the weather, the pitch, the
other teams fans, anything other than reality. They never question what
they are doing. Those who shouted victory in Oslo, when the process
with the FARC began continue to shout victory or blame everyone else.

The social organisations are faced with a wave of murders and the state
has already murdered the first demobilised members of the FARC and
also the son of one of them. This violence was foreseeable, but the fans
denied it would come to pass. Now we can state without fear of mistake
that as a result of the peace process there will be a counter-agrarian
reform in Colombia just like there was in Guatemala. That is one of the
lessons of Guatemala. The fans can deny it, or accept that it is so and
decide to struggle against it and that means discarding the Final Accord
as a reference point for transforming the countryside. History will not
forgive them nor will the uprooted peasants.