Risos Vidal v Comelec

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Powers and functions of the President | Special Powers | Executive clemencies
Petitioner: ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
Respondents: COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J., Certiorari

FACTS
- Sept 12, 2007 - the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada of plunder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, civil interdiction
during period of sentence, perpetual absolute disqualification.
- Oct 25, 2007 pres Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada
- WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of seventy (70),

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,

IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.

Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.

- Oct 26, 2007 Pres Estrada received and accepted the pardon by signing beside his handwritten notation thereon
- Nov 30, 2009 Pres Estrada filed a COC for President, and 3 peititons for disqualification were filed at the Comelec, which dismissed
the petitions on grounds that
(i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and
(ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the formers right to vote and be voted for a
public office.
- May 10, 2010 Pres Estrada got only second highest number of votes
- One of the abovementioned petitioners that sought to disqualify Pres Estrada filed a petition for certiorari at the SC, but it was
dismissed due to mootness
- Oct 2, 2012 Pres Estrada filed COC for post of Mayor of Manila
- Jan 24, 2013, Atty Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification for conviction of plunder disqualified by the Local Government
Code
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

April 1, 2013 petition was dismissed because the Comelec had earlier ruled that [former President Estradas] right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon the petitioner hasnt brought forward basis to reverse it
- May 13, 2013 While the petition was pending, Pres Estrada was elected as Mayor
- June 7, 2013 Mayor Lim, Pres Estradas opponent intervened in the case, agreeing that Pres Estrada is disqualified to run as the
pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification; all the votes obtained by the latter should
be declared stray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful
winning candidate

ISSUE: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.

HELD: NO
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En banc,
both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
- Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office
- The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

- The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

- Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency,
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted
by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
- the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President. (As ruled by the court in Monsanto v FActoran - a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action.)
- Doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through
legislation, - strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution framers did not want
an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of offenses involving graft and corruption that would
be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. - Aside from the fact that it is a derogation of the
power of the President to grant executive clemency, it is also defective in that it singles out just one kind of crime. (34-4
votes amendment to delete phrase was approved)

- Petitioner invoked Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
- Justice Leonens dissent: agreed with Risos-Vidal that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage
and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC.
that the aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the
Presidents power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the Presidents pardoning power.
- Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency
granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the
import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President

- Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.[36] to justify her argument that an
absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has been remitted.
- this is incorrect. The concurring opinions do not form part of the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land.

- the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. - by
reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
- Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
- [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,
- the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term civil and political
rights as being restored.
- a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word whereas. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute.
- Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its text. If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to
seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. (Comelec
resolution)
- the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon
which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.