CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
BRILLANTES, JR. V. YORAC
Facts:
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines
of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been
named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December
1989 coup d etat attempt
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101,
where President Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting
member of the Commission on Elections and the Court revoked the designation
as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even
the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate
Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior
Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice.
No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC
Held:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman
comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with
its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines
at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent,
having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary
designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not
of men
BORROMEO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts:
On August 18, 1988, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Commission on Audit
(COA) Chairman, coursed through the CSC Chairman, requesting an opinion on
whether or not the money value of the terminal leave of retired Constitutional
Commission members should include the allowances received at the time of
retirement. The petitioner, in his letter, further stated that while retired members
of other Constitutional Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on
the basis of highest monthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal
leave was computed solely on the basis of highest monthly salary.
Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential
representing the unpaid COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC
Chairman informed the petitioner that the release of the corresponding advice of
allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his terminal leave differential
had already been requested from the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM).
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On January 25, 1990, in a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied
the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential for the
following reasons, among others:
1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on "basic
pay" or "basic salary" pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1081.
2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay or
salary received by an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay and
allowance.
3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot be validly
invoked as precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action since said claims
were processed without prior involvement of the DBM
The petitioner seeks the nullification of CSC Resolution Nos. 90-514 and 90-945.
He urges that the COA decision which interposed no objection to the computation
of his terminal leave pay based on salary plus allowances had already become
final and executory since no timely appeal had been taken therefrom.
Issue:
W/n the terminal leave pay of petitioner Borromeo, Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) until his retirement on April 1, 1986, be computed on the basis
of the highest monthly salary plus cost of living allowance (COLA) and
representation and transportation allowance (RATA) or solely on the basis of
highest monthly salary without said allowances?
Held:
Yes. It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based on
highest monthly salary plus transportation, living and representation allowance.
The computation of terminal leave pay, which is given on the same occasion of
retirement and which arises from the same considerations of government
gratitude that for most retirees is based on a lifetime of service, be accorded
similar treatment.
The Solicitor General stresses that under Section 286 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1081 and Executive Order
No. 1077, the computation of the money value of the terminal leave pay is based
only on monthly basic salary.
Since terminal leave pay may also be considered a gratuity, then applying the rule
on liberal interpretation of retirement laws, the basis for its computation in the
case of members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions must be the
same as that used in computing the 5-year lump sum gratuity under RA 910 as
amended and Administrative Order No. 444. The Court is cognizant of the
incongruity that may ensue if the terminal leave pay of members of the Judiciary
and Constitutional Commissions is computed only on the basis of highest basic
monthly salary.
GAMINDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed Thelma P. Gaminde,
ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June
22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission
on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment.
However, on February 24, 1998, Thelma sought clarification from the Office
of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998
opined that Thelma's term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not
on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, Thelma remained in
office after February 02, 1999.
On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission
on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde
and her coterminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the
General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Consequently, on
March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of
disallowance No. 99002 101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and
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emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her coterminous staff, effective
February 02, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired
on February 02, 1999.
Held:
YES, the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February
02, 1999.
The court ruled that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or
cycle in the membership of the Civil Service Commission. While all the members
of the Commissions are deemed to start on the same date, their terms of office
expire on different dates.
In Republic vs. Imperial, the court held that the operation of the rotational plan
requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the
terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date,
and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance
of the term. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on
a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments
and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first
terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the
two year interval between the expiration of the terms.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of
a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, the Court considered the plain language of
Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D),
Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven year
term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
reappointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three
years, without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as
de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other
emoluments, including that of her coterminous staff
In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the
start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be
counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled
distinction between term and tenure. The term of an office must be
distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. The term of office is not affected by the holdover. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
FUNA V. VILLAR
Doctrine:
A COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than
seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became
vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the
constitutional ban.
Facts:
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Funa, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, challenged the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of
COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman
of the COA.
Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as
COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up
to February 2, 2011
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the term of his office
as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse.
He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February
2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to
that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22,
2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step
down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word,
Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma.
Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman.
This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic. To Villar, all the requisites have not been met, it being
alleged in particular that petitioner, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, lacks the
necessary standing to challenge his appointment.
The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to
which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import,
has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they
may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
Issue:
Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body
and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid
Held:
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for
a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five
years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed
by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then
he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment.
In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years
who likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed.
In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term
ofseven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of
Chairman or Commissioner.
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The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more
commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has
not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of
Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must
conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said
position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman
must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made
under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the
7-year aggregate rule.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the
first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7)
years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7)
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire
period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under
the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less
than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies
that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to
one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement
to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense,
a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity
FUNA V. DUQUE III
Doctrine:
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by
the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although their respective
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functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of
the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the
Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,
orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as
provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the
independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,
imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity,
to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which
in any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Facts:
Duque was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Chairman of
the CSC which was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Subsequently, President Arroyo issued EO 864. Pursuant to it, Duque was
designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio
capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled
corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the
designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against
the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
Held:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares
unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as
a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification in Section 2, Article IX-A, which
is the disqualification from holding any other office or employment during
Duques tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret
this disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the
Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section
7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the
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Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen
the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions
of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the
career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity
in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the
primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its
Chairman. The CSC Chairmans membership therein must, therefore, be
considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters
with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were
created. While powers and functions associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers
and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman
sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore
derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid
or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health
care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid
loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duques designation as member of
the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to
receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the
concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation
goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be
held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in
the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the
President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of
a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health
and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and
HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards,
members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the
CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by
the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC
Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he
served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one
who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of
office has not expired.
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That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director
or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. A de facto officer is one who
derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may
also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as
a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed
valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified
for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and
integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Duques official actions covered by this clarification
extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda
approving appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of
policies and guidelines on compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of
programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF.
MACALINTAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Doctrine:
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is,
to review its decisions, orders and rulings.
Facts:
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
as suffering from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated.
R.A. No. 9189 appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its
provisions.
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public
funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number
of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases
whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people.
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional
right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
Issues:
Macalintal argues, among others,
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can
be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for President and Vice-President, is
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unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
Held:
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee
voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election
laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to
return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the
vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation
of the P and VP elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred
to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators
and Party-list Reps.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is,
to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to
hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election
laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court
holds that Section 25 which created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from
the said law
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
Doctrine:
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary,
the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus
be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other
agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
In granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription
against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year
is clearly absent. The plain implication of Article IX (A), Section 5 of the omission
of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the
previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations
of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the
previous year.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested
with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced
against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section
5 of the Constitution.
Facts:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus
seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its
Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total
allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to
P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund releases by
9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis
of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld
pending their submission of the documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the application of the no report, no release policy upon
independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle
of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. Respondents justification for the withholding of funds
from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first
place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even
assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-
compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution.
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended
every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby
emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether,
such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to
the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to
naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
While the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally
allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in
conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a
revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of
petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64
of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the
present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding.
What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total
revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total
appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it
would be practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or
any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without
violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own
appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional
mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower
than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be
rejected. In the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations
below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. The plain implication of
Article IX (A), Section 5 of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction
of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress
is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions
below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [XYZA - 3]
MERAM V. EDRALIN
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, permanently enjoining the Minister of
Natural Resources and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD)
10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
from enforcing and implementing the decisions of the Merit Systems Board and
the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the appointment
of the petitioner to the contested position of Administrative Officer V in the
Bureau of Forest Development.
On July 29, 1982, the private respondent Filipina V. Edralin, who was a training
officer of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) was proposed for appointment
to the position of Administrative Officer V, R-73, Administrative Division of the
BFD. Petitioner herein and Mr. Hermecio M. Agravio who hold the positions of
Administrative Officer III, R-70 and Supply Officer V, R-70 respectively, filed their
protest against the proposal.
In his memorandum, the Director also pointed out that the Board found that Mrs.
Filipina V. Edralin, Training Officer, Range 60, assigned in the Training Center was
not next-in-rank.
On August 12, 1982, the respondent Minister forwarded the permanent
appointment of respondent Edralin to take effect on August 17, 1982, as
Administrative Officer V to the Commission for appropriate action.
In his letter, the Minister explained that he assessed the recommendation of the
Promotions Board and considered also other aspects which are vital to the
dynamism of the service; and upon seeing that respondent Edralin is eminently
qualified for the position, the person on whom he can repose his trust and
confidence, and who possesses the necessary integrity, knowledgeability and
sound judgment, he decided to appoint her to the said position for the best
interest of the service.
On September 1, 1982, the respondent Minister rendered a decision, embodied
in two separate letters, dismissing the protests. In his letter to the petitioner
which was received by the latter on September 10, 1982, the Minister assured
her "that when another opportunity comes, and I have had a chance to better
appreciate your qualities and capabilities, then I would certainly consider you for
the appointment to a more senior position."
Petitioner and Agravio appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB) pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1409. On January 13,
1983, the Merit Systems Board promulgated a decision in favor of Hermecio M.
Agravio, revoking the previous approval of the appointment of respondent
Edralin and directing the Minister to appoint, in her stead, Agravio to the
contested position.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of
respondent's letter-petition, and passing upon the same, and thereafter, setting
aside the decisions of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
Held:
No. P.D. No. 807 was promulgated on October 6, 1975. Section 19 (6) of this
decree provides:
"Sec. 19 (6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal
initially to the department head and finally to the Office of the President an
appointment made (1) in favor of another next-in-rank employee who is not
qualified, or (2) in favor of one who is not next-in-rank, or (3) in favor of one who
is appointed by transfer and not next-in-rank, or by reinstatement, or by original
appointment if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the written
special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for such appointment:
Provided, That final appeal shall be to the department head concerned if the
appointment is issued to a qualified next-in-rank employee. Before deciding a
contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service
Commission. x x x"
There is nothing in the above-quoted provision which connotes exclusivity of
jurisdiction in the Office of the President to take cognizance of the specific cases
cited above. Furthermore, even if it were so, with the promulgation of P.D. No.
1409, this power of review by the Office of the President was not only divested
of its exclusivity but was, in fact, repealed altogether. The petitioner, therefore,
correctly filed her protest with the MSB in accordance with P.D. No. 1409.
Moreover, respondent Edralin is now estopped from questioning the orders of
the MSB and the Commission since she submitted to the jurisdiction of these two
bodies by filing for reconsideration with the MSB and upon denial of the same, by
appealing to the Commission.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Furthermore, civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone. They are
designed to eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on
political considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the element of
partisanship and personal favoritism in making appointments. These laws intend
to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of appointment;
to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better government.
(See Gervais v. New Orleans Police Department, 77 So 2d. 393; Civil Service Board
of City of Phoenix v. Warren, 244 P 2d. 1157 citing State ex rel. Kos v. Adamson,
226 Minn. 177, 32 N. W. 2d 281, 284)
In the case at bar, the BFD personnel who are considered next-in-rank to the
vacated position were identified. Respondent Edralin was not one of them. In
fact, she was nine or ten salary ranges below the next-in-rank personnel.
Subsequently, the MSB made the same finding in its decision. Evidently,
therefore, the foremost consideration why respondent's appointment was
ordered by the Office of the President notwithstanding the fact that petitioner
was more qualified and that she was next-in-rank was because of her petition to
the President in the form of a letter rather than an appeal and which started by
introducing herself as "Filipina Villeses-Edralin, wife of Efren E. Edralin of Sarrat,
Ilocos Norte."
The clear intent of her letter-petition was not to appeal in accordance with P.D.
No. 807 but to elicit some kind of favorable response from the President based
on considerations of blood ties, influence, or ethnic and regional affiliations. To
a certain extent she succeeded but this Court must strike down the practice of
political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties being used to get choice appointments for
it goes against the very purpose behind the establishment of the civil service in
our country. As earlier stated, appointments under the civil service law should be
based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or
how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be. And granting that the
respondent possesses the qualifications required for the contested position, it
cannot be denied that the petitioner equally possesses the same qualifications, if
not in greater degree, and more important, she is next-in-rank to the vacated
position. Therefore, she deserves to be appointed to the disputed item.
DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE
Facts:
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on
July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he
qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.
On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the
President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the
Department of Public Works and Communication directed Santos to report to the
Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the
office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-
defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the
position, he commenced these proceedings.
The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, Section 4 of which
reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law."
It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to
the unclassified service." An d this Court, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice
Montemayor in the case of Lacson vs. Romero, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778, involving the
office of provincial fiscal, ruled that officers or employees in the unclassified as
well as those in the classified service are protected by the above-cited provision
of the organic law. But there is this difference between the Lacsott case and the
case at bar: Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under
Chapter 61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the
President) to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of
whom is the city engineer.
Issue:
Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for
assignment to another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Held:
Yes. It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service
should be brought within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 1 of this Article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and
subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the
Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit
and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination."
The first clause is a definition of the scope of Civil Service, the men and women
which Section 4 protects. It seems obvious from that definition that the entire
Civil Service is contemplated, except positions "which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." This theory is confirmed by
the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936, to
implement Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains
Civil Service almost in the identical words of that Article of the organic law. As a
contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil
Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. "The principle of
contemporaneous construction may be applied to the construction given by the
legislature to the constitutional provisions dealing with legislative powers and
procedure. Though not conclusive, such interpretation is generally conceded as
being entitled to great weight."
We are led to the same conclusion by the existing provisions at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. Civil Service as embracing both classes of officers
and employees possessed definite legal and statutory meaning when the
Constitution was approved. Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code
already provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the
classified or unclassified service." and went on to say that "The classified service
embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then
Section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than
the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed
by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
The rules of construction inform us that the words used in the constitution are to
be given the sense they have in common use. It has been said that we must look
to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the
Constitution was framed and adopted, and interprets it in the light of the law then
in operation.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence
is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter
phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is. the position of city engineer
policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the
government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it.
With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are
carefully laid down for him by Section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code
and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is
technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to
possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is
the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution.
There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the
duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very
well be discharged by non- technical men possessing executive ability.
Section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution requires that "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court in banc," and warns that "no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Court." The
question arises as to whether this judgment operates as invalidation of Section
2545 of the Revised Administrative Code or a part of it so as to need at least eight
votes to make it effective.
The Court therefore held that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City
Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments,
rights and privileges.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE V. GONZALES
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION V. ANGARA
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. JAVIER
Doctrines:
1. The Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as
to which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise
2. A primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the
positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and
confidence inherent in their relationship.
Facts:
Respondent Javier was first employed as Private Secretary in the GSIS, a GOCC,
on February 23, 1960, on a "confidential" status. On July 1, 1962, respondent was
promoted to Tabulating Equipment Operator with "permanent" status. The
"permanent" status stayed with respondent throughout her career. She spent her
entire career with GSIS, earning several more promotions, until on December 16,
1986, she was appointed Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the
corporation.
On July 16, 2001, a month shy of her 64th birthday, respondent opted for early
retirement and received the corresponding monetary benefits.
On April 3, 2002, GSIS President Garcia, with the approval of the Board of
Trustees, reappointed respondent as Corporate Secretary, the same position she
left and retired from barely a year earlier.
Respondent was 64 years old at the time of her reappointment. In its Resolution,
the Board of Trustees classified her appointment as "confidential in nature and
the tenure of office is at the pleasure of the Board."
Petitioner alleges that respondent's reappointment on confidential status was
meant to illegally extend her service and circumvent the laws on compulsory
retirement.
R.A. 8291, or the GSIS Act of 1997 was petitioners basis for her claim. According
to the said law, the compulsory retirement age for government employees is 65
years.
Respondent's appointment was characterized as "confidential" by the GSIS
following the exception under Rule XIII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as amended that a person who has
already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be appointed to a
coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government.
On November 2, 2002, the CSC invalidated the appointment of Ms. Javier as
Corporate Secretary, in a letter for the reason that the position was not declared
primarily confidential by the Civil Service Commission or by any law.
CSC replied that the position of Corporate Secretary is a permanent (career)
position, and not primarily confidential (non-career); thus, it was wrong to
appoint respondent to this position since she no longer complies with eligibility
requirements for a permanent career status. More importantly, as respondent by
then has reached compulsory retirement at age 65, respondent was no longer
qualified for a permanent career position.
The Court of Appeals concluded that indeed, such a position is primarily
confidential in nature.
Issues:
1. Whether the courts may determine the proper classification of a position in
government
2. Whether the position of corporate secretary in a GOCC is primarily confidential
in nature
Held:
CAREER vs NON-CAREER
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) security of tenure
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career
positions, which are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of
the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure
which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Examples of non-career positions are elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff and secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold
their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential
staff.
1. YES. The courts may determine the proper classification of a position in
government.
At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite
criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither
is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily
confidential.
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of
positions in the civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even
by a constitutional body like the petitioner.
The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a
particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not,
without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies.
It is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government,
such as the petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court
must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies
and disputes.
2. The position of corporate secretary in a government owned and controlled
corporation, currently classified as a permanent career position, is primarily
confidential in nature.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence
is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter
phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
[discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
It still stands that a position is primarily confidential when by the nature of the
functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the appointee and
appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment
or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state. In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not
be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character.
The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes
investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints
against judges of first instance, which are confidential in nature.
It is from De los Santos that the so-called "proximity rule" was derived. A position
is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy
between the appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest
degree of trust and unfettered communication and discussion on the most
confidential of matters.
The following were declared by the Court to be not primarily confidential
positions: City Engineer; Assistant Secretary to the Mayor; members of the
Customs Police Force or Port Patrol; Special Assistant of the Governor of the
Central Bank, etc.
In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of
the positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust
and confidence inherent in their relationship.
Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC,
for that matter, is a primarily confidential position. The position is clearly in close
15
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
proximity and intimacy with the appointing power. It also calls for the highest
degree of confidence between the appointer and appointee.
The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its highly
confidential character. The secretary reports directly to the board of directors,
without an intervening officer in between them.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine:
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even
without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a
preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation
Facts:
On June 29, 1989, Icasiano (private res) was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Cory.
On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the
President of the Philippines that the Icasiano be reassigned as Superintendent of
the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary
Gloria.
On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for Icasianos reassignment,
as approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director
Rosas for implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the Icasiano of his reassignment,
effective October 17, 1994.
Private Respondent Icasiano requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider
the reassignment, but the latter denied the request.
He then prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the
Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy
of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and
refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
The Court of Appeals ruled that for lack of a period or any indication that it is only
temporary, the reassignment of Icasiano from Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools, QC, to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the MIST
pursuant to the Memorandum of Sec. Gloria to the President of the Philippines,
is hereby declared to be violative of Icasianos right to security of tenure, and the
respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same.
Issue:
Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division
Superintendent of QC to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of
his security of tenure
Held:
YES. The Court upholds the finding of the CA that the reassignment of petitioner
to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for the President to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education."
It can thus be gleaned that the subject reassignment is more than temporary as
the private respondent has been described as fit for the reassigned job, being an
expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment
of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed.
Said fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment
in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent.
Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of
our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees
16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are
tantamount to illegal removals.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even
without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a
preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative
of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be
countenanced.
DARIO V. MISON
Doctrine:
Transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a
restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so
in clearer terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution of 1987 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of constitutional
revamps - whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution - and only
secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization.
In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16, two requisites,
one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. The separation must not be for cause
2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned.
Facts:
In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL
POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE... the
mandate of the people to completely reorganize the government.
In January 1987, she promulgated EO 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE". Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern
therefor.
In February 1987, a brand new constitution was adopted. On January 1988,
incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in
the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive
Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that
by February 1988, all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered another position in the same
department or agency, or c) informed of their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials stating that they
shall continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-
over capacity, and that those incumbents whose positions are not carried in the
new reorganization pattern, or who are not re-appointed, shall be deemed
separated from the service. A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau
of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with
the CSC.
On June 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner
Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF
TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," was signed into law containing the
provision:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this
Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be
without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of
separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees,
including casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the
appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits xxx
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners
appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization
subject of this controversy, petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the
statute. On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil
Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988 Resolution filed
their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the
said Resolution.
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until
his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he
questions the legality of his dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 (SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon
approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall,
in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the
meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive
Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution. Incumbents whose
positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed
separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the
retirement benefits to which they may be entitled.
A provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers
that he could not have been legally deemed to be an "incumbent whose position
is not included therein or who is not reappointed to justify his separation from
the service. He contends that neither the Executive Order (under the second
paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather,
increased it to three. Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not
been "reappointed" (under the second paragraph of the section) because
"reappointment therein presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new
one in lieu of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has
absorbed that which has been abolished." He claims, finally, that under the
Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause
ended on February 25, 1987, and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed security
of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Vicente Feria asserts his security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be
covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April
22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that
under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," the Commissioner of Customs has the power
"to appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," and
that his position, which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control
of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.
Provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) explicitly authorize
the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution. For this reason,
Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense.
That contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127
is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria), in the sense that retention in the
Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position
in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered
legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents
are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those positions were
considered vacant."
The Commissioner's two petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil
Service Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265
customs employees above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988,
denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated November 16, 1988,
reinstating five employees.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a
license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have
validly done under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them
without rhyme or reason
18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Held:
No. The State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it is done in good
faith. Removal of career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing
of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not
for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate
separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them
under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be
considered for employment in the Government or in any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision
also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy.
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its
offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution. Transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to
the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of
tenure.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional
Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February
2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is
upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its
provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage - that inferred from the
provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document. After
February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired security of
tenure.
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result
of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for
"automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith. As a general rule,
a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may,
if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is
void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the
existence of ample funds.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after
February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy - except
for the change of personnel - has occurred, which would have justified (all things
being equal) the contested dismissals. There is also no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually undertaken, for
that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which
would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that
under Section 59 thereof, "Those incumbents whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service."
He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not been
"reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order
No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may
"appoint all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the President." Thus,
with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being
Presidential appointees.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been
on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had
become vacant. The occupancy of a position in a holdover capacity was conceived
to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under
the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution became effective. After the said date the provisions of the latter on
security of tenure govern.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY
Doctrine:
Nepotism is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated
whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. One is guilty of nepotism if an
appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or
recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court?
Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the
complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence,
as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. We overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law
does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges
Facts:
George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President in Northern Samar, filed a
complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and
nepotism. The Civil Service Commission found no substantial evidence to support
the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, they found
Dacoycoy guilty on two counts of nepotism as a result of appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School
Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. On Dacoycoys appeal to the
CA, it ruled that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons, hence,
not guilty of nepotism.
Issue:
Whether or not Pedro O. Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
Held:
Yes, Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. He is behind the appointing or recommending
authority in the appointment of his two sons. While it is true that he did not
appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker,
Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who
recommended the appointment of Rito and appointed Ped, was a subordinate of
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. Dacoycoy authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend
the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision.
Furthermore, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available
for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as very
satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form
that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on
nepotism is quite obvious.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. CORTES
Facts:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) issued Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the
position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes.
Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from
voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the
respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren
Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment
is not covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the
Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its members.
CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a
letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.
On April 4, 2008 the Civil Service Commission-NCR (CSC-NCR) Field Office
informed Chairperson Quisumbing that it will conduct an investigation on the
appointment of respondent Cortes.
On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed
Chairperson Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid
because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the
CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with
respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission
En Banc.
On August 11, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and
nullified Resolution 10-0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12,
2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes be reinstated to her position as IO V in the
CHR.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent
Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Held:
Yes. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1)
appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or
office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of
Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the
daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1)
persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4)
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2 In the present case, however,
the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of
the exemptions provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing
authority referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission
En Banc and not the individual Commissioners who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the
discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of
appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the
objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that
objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is
intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil
service and the efficiency of its personnel
Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must
interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule
that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual
members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently,
the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have
relatives to speak of.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not
include appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a
body.1wphi1 What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This
principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that
21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the
Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.
Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic
character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the
prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the
appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the
impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
VELOSO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040
entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service
Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3)
Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three
(3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City
Treasurer. .xxx..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to some former city
councilors including herein petitioners the total amount of P9, 923,257.00.
On August 8,2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the
City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-
100(05)07(05) stating that Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal basis and the
amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double
compensation. After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and Adjudication
Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance.
Upon review, the COA rendered the assailed the decision sustaining ND (Notice
of Disallowance) No. 06-010-100-05. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. The COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by
the term compensation. Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it
emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary
reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by
Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to
the former councilors. In response to the question on its jurisdiction to rule on
the legality of the disbursement, the COA held that it is vested by the Constitution
the power to determine whether government entities comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds and to disallow irregular
disbursements.
The petitioners come before the court claiming that the respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that the monetary award given under the EPSA partakes of the nature of an
additional compensation prohibited under the Salary Standardization Law, and
other existing laws, rules and regulations, and not a GRATUITY voluntarily given
in return for a favor or services rendered purely out of generosity of the giver or
grantor.
Issue:
Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local
government funds
Held:
Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority
to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and
functions of the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions
22
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in
this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 echoes this constitutional mandate to COA. Under the first paragraph of the
above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers,
albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and
universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from
or through the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit
government agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of
the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of
the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of
public funds, from the jurisdiction of the [COA]."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with
broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately
the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove
payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to
determine the meaning of "public bidding" and when there is failure in the
bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules
even if disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a
contract even after it has been executed and goods have been delivered. Thus,
LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction
of the COA.
DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [XYZA 1, V 4]
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
JALOSJOS, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BUAC V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila
on the conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by
23
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were asked this question: Do you
approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act
No. 8487
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing
the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the No votes
won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and
completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the
negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes,
private respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of
the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of
the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as
EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the
conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an
election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion
and dismissing the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of
jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in
EPC No. 98-102 constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the
plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its
termination, the Committees on Revision submitted their complete and final
reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no
witnesses were presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their
respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied
upon for the determination of the will of the electorate because the revision is
incomplete. He claims that:
Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8)
Revision Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for
Yes and a total of 12,602 votes for No. The revision committee thus canvassed
only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of
votes reflected in the Final Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the
voting results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the
uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
Held:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded,
not only respect, but finality. This is so because the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and
not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is
best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field
of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin
petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion
GOH V. BAYRON
Doctrine:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
One of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall
elections. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current
Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out
its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." The 1987 Constitution not
only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as
authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The
2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
Facts:
Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, against Mayor Bayron due to loss
of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence,
and other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual
dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No. 9864 found the
recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the funding of any
and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue. Mayor Bayron
filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Clarification which prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit.
Goh filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Lift Suspension, as well as to
direct COMELEC's authorized representative to immediately carry out the
publication of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the verification process,
and the recall election of Mayor Bayron.
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882. Commissioner Tagle stated that "in
order for the Commission to effectively undertake actions relative to recall
petitions, First, the budget proposal to Congress for the FY 201 should contain a
specific line item appropriated for the funding of the conduct of recall elections;
or Second, if feasible, we can request a supplemental budget from Congress for
the FY 2014 to specifically answer for the funding of recall proceedings."
Commissioner Padaca called for a holistic look of the GAA. She submitted that
"the allocation for the Commission in the GAA is primarily geared toward our
Constitutional mandate, that is, the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall xx x." Therefore, the interpretation of the provisions of
the GAA should be read with the intent to pursue COMELEC's mandate.
Commissioner Padaca further pointed out that the COMELEC was "able to
conduct special elections, all of which lack a specific line item in the applicable
GAA. The lack of a specific appropriation or line item in the GAA did not deter
[COMELEC] from conducting and supervising an electoral exercise that was legally
called upon by the people." However, Commissioner Padaca recognized the
limitations set by Section 2 of the 2014 GAA on the COMELEC's use of its savings.
The Office of the Chairman, on the other hand, submits the COMELEC's annual
budget for the COMELEC En Banc's approval and directs and supervises the
operations and internal administrations of the COMELEC.
Commissioner Guia states that the majority opinion suggests that recall elections
can only be funded through a supplemental budget law. He opines that the
majority adopts a strict interpretation of the budget law when it states that there
is no line item for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA. Commissioner
Guia proposes a liberal approach: that the 2014 GAA should be construed as
merely failing to provide sufficient funds for the actual conduct of recall elections,
and not as preventing COMELEC from exercising its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. Commissioner Guia's liberal approach to interpreting
the budget law makes the remedy of funding recall elections by way of
augmenting an existing line item from savings a theoretical possibility.
Commissioner Guia, however, recognizes that the GAA's Sec. 69 of the General
Provisions and Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the COMELEC limit the items
that can be funded from the COMELEC's savings. He suggests that curative
legislation be made to enable COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos.
9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to
conduct recall elections for 2014.
COMELECs budget in the 2014 GAA:
Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014
GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections,
we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a line item
appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in
the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its
Resolution No. 9882 is a "line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'"
Also, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a
line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites.'" This admission of the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this
specific budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a
specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be specific
even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature.
For example, the purpose can be to '"conduct elections," which even if not
expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of
the appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which naturally and logically
include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall
elections.
On savings:
Nowhere in the COMELEC's comment, however, does it dispute the existence of
savings. In the transcript of the hearing for the COMELEC's 2014 budget, the
COMELEC estimated to have PhPl0.7 billion savings around the end of 2013.
However, since the DBM did not include a line budget for certain items, Chairman
Brillantes estimated that the PhP 10.7 billion savings will be reduced to about
PhP2 billion after the COMELEC augments expenses for the purchase of its land,
warehouse, building, and the overseas absentee voting. This estimate was made
under the assumption that the 2014 GAA will provide a line item budget for the
COMELEC's land, warehouse, building, and the overseas absentee voting.
The COMELECs alleged lack of authority to augment the project recall
elections from savings:
We reiterate that the 2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the
COMELEC's conduct of recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it
does not have sufficient funds from its current line item appropriation for the
"Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" to conduct an actual recall
election, then there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the
current year. This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC
Chairman's power to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the "Conduct
and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" in its budget appropriation. Also, we
thus find unnecessary the COMELEC's protests regarding the difference between
"Projects" and "Programs" for their failure to allocate funds for any recall process
in 2014. Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC
is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall." Should the funds
appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC
Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation
from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly
authorized in the 2014 GAA.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS V. TAGLE
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY LIST V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
COMMISSION ON AUDIT [XYZA 2]
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
On 2 February 1989, the COA sent a letter to Caltex Philippines, Inc. (CPI),
hereinafter referred to as Petitioner, directing the latter to remit to the OPSF its
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
collection, excluding that unremitted for the years 1986 and 1988, of the
additional tax on petroleum products authorized under the aforesaid Section 8 of
P.D. No. 1956 which, as of 31 December 1987, amounted to P335,037,649.00 and
informing it that, pending such remittance, all of its claims for reimbursement
from the OPSF shall be held in abeyance. 6
On 9 March 1989, the COA sent another letter to petitioner informing it that
partial verification with the OEA showed that the grand total of its unremitted
collections of the above tax is P1,287,668,820.00, broken down as follows:
1986 P233,190,916.00
1987 335,065,650.00
1988 719,412,254.00;
directing it to remit the same, with interest and surcharges thereon, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the letter; advising it that the COA will hold in abeyance
the audit of all its claims for reimbursement from the OPSF; and directing it to
desist from further offsetting the taxes collected against outstanding claims in
1989 and subsequent periods.
In its letter of 3 May 1989, petitioner requested the COA for an early release of
its reimbursement certificates from the OPSF covering claims with the Office of
Energy Affairs since June 1987 up to March 1989, invoking in support thereof COA
Circular No. 89-299 on the lifting of pre-audit of government transactions of
national government agencies and government-owned or controlled
corporations.
In its Answer dated 8 May 1989, the COA denied petitioner's request for the early
release of the reimbursement certificates from the OPSF and repeated its earlier
directive to petitioner to forward payment of the latter's unremitted collections
to the OPSF to facilitate COA's audit action on the reimbursement claims.
By way of a reply, petitioner, in a letter dated 31 May 1989, submitted to the COA
a proposal for the payment of the collections and the recovery of claims, since
the outright payment of the sum of P1.287 billion to the OEA as a prerequisite for
the processing of said claims against the OPSF will cause a very serious
impairment of its cash position.
On 7 June 1989, the COA, with the Chairman taking no part, handed down
Decision No. 921 accepting the above-stated proposal but prohibiting petitioner
from further offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the current and
ensuing years.
On 16 February 1990, the COA, with Chairman Domingo taking no part and with
Commissioner Fernandez dissenting in part, handed down Decision No. 1171
affirming the disallowance for recovery of financing charges, inventory losses, and
sales to MARCOPPER and ATLAS, while allowing the recovery of product sales or
those arising from export sales.
Issue:
Whether or not COA lost its jurisdiction in completely ignoring and showing
absolutely no respect for the findings and rulings of the administrator of the fund
itself and in disallowing a claim which is still pending resolution at the OEA level
Held:
No. As to the power of the COA, which must first be resolved in view of its
primacy, the Court finds the theory of petitioner that such does not extend to the
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or use of government funds and properties, but only to the
promulgation of accounting and auditing rules for, among others, such
disallowance to be untenable in the light of the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and related laws.
Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 2(l). The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts, of the
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in
this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or,
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
These present powers, consistent with the declared independence of the
Commission, are broader and more extensive than that conferred by the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the Commission was empowered to:
Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts
pertaining to the revenues, and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities including government-owned or
controlled corporations, keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto;
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for
the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures
or uses of funds and property.
Upon the other hand, under the 1935 Constitution, the power and authority of
the COA's precursor, the General Auditing Office, were, unfortunately, limited; its
very role was markedly passive. Section 2 of Article XI thereof provided:
Sec. 2. The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenues and receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived
from bond issues; and audit, in accordance with law and administrative
regulations, all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by
the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and the preserve the vouchers pertaining
thereto. It shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring to the attention of the
proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his
opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also
perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
As clearly shown above, in respect to irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of funds, the 1935 Constitution did not grant
the Auditor General the power to issue rules and regulations to prevent the same.
His was merely to bring that matter to the attention of the proper administrative
officer.
The ruling on this particular point, quoted by petitioner from the cases
of Guevarra vs. Gimenez and Ramos vs.Aquino, are no longer controlling as the
two (2) were decided in the light of the 1935 Constitution.
There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the Auditor General
under the 1935 Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973
Constitution authorized them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of
funds and property. Our present Constitution retains that same power and
authority, further strengthened by the definition of the COA's general jurisdiction
in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and
Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds, the COA promulgated on
29 March 1977 COA Circular No. 77-55. Since the COA is responsible for the
enforcement of the rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to
comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of the proposed
expenditure.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
Facts:
In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan
(ERL for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely
from the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos
regime.
As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine
government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-
performing loans. Accordingly, the government committed to rehabilitate the
DBP to make it a viable and self-sustaining financial institution in recognition of
its developmental role in the economy. The DBP was expected to continue
providing principally medium and long-term financing to projects with risks higher
than the private sector may be willing to accept under reasonable terms. The
governments commitment was embodied in the Policy Statement for the
Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part:
4. Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP
will now be required to have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors
will now be opened to adequate private sector representation. It is hoped that
with these commitments, DBP can avoid the difficulties of the past and can
function as a competitive and viable financial institution within the Philippine
financial system.
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079
amending the Central Banks Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial
Intermediaries, in line with the governments commitment to the World Bank to
require a private external auditor for DBP. Thus, on December 5, 1986, the
Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private
auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP
Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any
payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and
unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's
contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA's
concurrence to the contract.
During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the
DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of
P487,321.14despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA
Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the
following persons personally liable for such payment.
Issue:
Whether or not the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by
private external auditors under any circumstance?
Held:
COAs power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs
authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies,
the COAs findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private
auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The
superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over private audit can be gleaned
from the records of the Constitutional Commission, as follows:
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, after consultation with the honorable
members of the Committee, I have amended my proposed amendment by
deleting the word EXCLUSIVE because I was made to understand that the
Commission on Audit will still have the preponderant power and authority to
examine, audit and settle.
The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or
creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials,
however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the
matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such
findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-
exclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution mandates that:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not
divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings
nor conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a
private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar
when the government borrows money from abroad.
In these instances, the government enters the marketplace and competes with
the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the
government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the
marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the
government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure
loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly
shattered national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is
flexible enough to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in
the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence
of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal eloquently the intent
of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution. As this Court, has ruled repeatedly,
the intent of the law is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the law. If a
law needs interpretation, the most dominant influence is the intent of the law.
The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the words of the law, which
should be discovered within its four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative
history. In the case of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution is evident from the bare language of Section 2
itself. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm expressly and
even elucidate further this intent beyond any doubt whatsoever.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Doctrine:
To determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of
the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the
State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it
is private.
In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact
that a corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily
qualify it as a public corporation.
Facts:
PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the
Philippine Commission in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted
upon animals and for the protection of and to perform all things which may tend
to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.
In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines
imposed and collected through its efforts pursuant to the violations of related
laws. However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said powers. President
Quezon then issued Executive Order No. 63 directing the Commission of Public
Safety, Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the
Philippine Army, Mayors of chartered cities and every municipal president to
detail and organize special officers to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders of
criminal-cruelty laws.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on Audit visited
petitioners office to conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was
a private entity and not under the CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be
subject to audit by respondent COA
Held:
No, petitioner is a private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. At the time the petitioner was formed, the applicable law was the Philippine
Bill of 1902, and, emphatically, as also stated above, no proscription similar to the
charter test can be found therein. The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148
made it clear that the petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of
the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63, issued by then
President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of
the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest corrected a
serious defect in one of the laws existing in the statute books.
As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148
has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of
corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind
of private domestic corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on under
the fourth point.
2. A reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled
corporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are
determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws,
and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and
so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be
managed or operated by its officers in accordance with its by-laws in force.
3. Employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS and not
through the GSIS
4. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not,
by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a
corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public
character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may
be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that
render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary
objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. It must be
stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but
the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it
performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation. On the
other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts
or donations from private individuals.
Amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked the powers of the petitioner to
arrest offenders of animal welfare laws and the power to serve processes in
connection therewith.
5. All corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the
reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations as creatures of the
State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a
corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it
that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
Petitioner Tirso B. Savellano furnished the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with
a confidential affidavit of information denouncing the National Coal Authority
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
(NCA) and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) for non-payment of taxes
totalling P234 Million on interest earnings of their respective money placements
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) since October 15, 1984 to said date.
Investigation by the BIR confirmed the reported tax liabilities, and upon demands
thereafter made, NCA and PNOC paid to the BIR a total of 15,986,165.05 and
93,955,479.12, respectively.
By a letter dated November 28, 1986, then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr.
recommended to the Minister of Finance payment to petitioner Savellano of an
informer's reward equivalent to 15% of the amount of P15,986,165.00 paid by
NCA, or P2,397,924.75.
The records do not show when the informer's reward in the PNOC case was
recommended for payment; only that it was approved by then Finance
Undersecretary Marcelo Fernando. Petitioner Savellano was paid his informer's
reward in the PNOC case in the total amount of P14,093,321.89 in four (4)
installments, the last of them on December 1, 1987.
On February 8, 1989, respondent Commission on Audit (COA) rendered COA
Decision No. 740 7 disallowing in audit the payment of informer's reward to
petitioner Savellano in the NCA case on the ground that payment of an informer's
reward under Section 281 of the National Internal Revenue Code is conditioned
upon the actual recovery or collection of revenues, and no such revenue or
income was actually realized or recovered on any benefit accrued to the
government, since two (2) government agencies were involved. The income
realized by the BIR out of the withholding taxes paid by the NCA was a reduction
of the income of the latter, resulting in a zero effect in revenues realized or
recovered. Respondent COA also impugned the propriety of the claim for
informer's reward based on inter-governmental violations. In its view, allowance
of claims of the kind would not only place a premium upon violations committed
by government agencies but also induce collusion among government offices in
order to obtain the informer's reward. It reasoned that if the State cannot be held
responsible for the tortious acts of its employees unless the latter acted as special
agents, with more reason it should not be held liable to pay informer's reward
upon violations committed by government agencies.
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought reconsideration of COA
Decision No. 740. He was followed by petitioner Tirso Savellano and Mrs.
Potenciana Evangelista, former Chief of the BIR Accounting Division after the COA
Resident Auditor issued Revised Certificate of Settlement and Balances dated July
20, 1989, directing the withholding of salaries or any amount due them and to
the following BIR officials/employees/persons who were being held personally
liable for the disallowed amount of P11,397,924.75.
These pleas were denied due course in COA Decision No. 1930. Hence, these
separate petitions, which were ordered consolidated in the Court's Resolution
dated March 10, 1992 in G.R. No. 102258.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent COAs disallowance is unlawful
Held:
No, the exercise by respondent COA of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check-and-balance system
inherent in a republican form of government such as ours. Such exercise cannot
be regarded as an unlawful or unwarranted invasion of, or interference with, the
authority and power of the executive agency concerned to determine whether or
not a person is entitled to a reward provided by law and the amount thereof. This
is not to say, however, that the disallowance in audit by respondent COA is in
itself final. The same may be set aside and nullified by this Court, if done with
grave abuse of discretion.
The informer's reward granted to petitioner Savellano is based on Section 316
(now 281) of the National Internal Revenue Code. One of the reasons for
respondent COA's disallowance of the informer's reward under consideration is
that there was actually no revenue realized or recovered as two (2) government
agencies were involved. This view is simplistic and merits no concurrence. It
overlooks the fact that the two (2) government agencies involved, NCA and PNOC,
possess legal personalities separate and distinct from the Philippine government.
Although both are government-owned and controlled corporations, NCA and
PNOC perform proprietary functions. Their revenues do not automatically
devolve to the general coffers of the government. Unless transferred to the
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Philippine government through the vehicle of taxation, no part of their revenues
is available for appropriation by the Legislature for expenditure in government
projects; such revenues remain said agencies' in their entirety, to be applied to
and expended for their own exclusive purpose. Clearly, then, when said revenues
are subjected to tax, the portion thereof corresponding to such tax becomes, in
its own, revenue for the government accruing to the General Fund.
That the informer's reward was sought and given in relation to tax delinquencies
of government agencies provides no reason for disallowance. The law on the
matter makes no distinction whatsoever between delinquent taxpayers in this
regard, whether private persons or corporations, or public or quasi-public
agencies, it being sufficient for its operation that the person or entity concerned
is subject to, and violated, revenue laws, and the informer's report thereof
resulted in the recovery of revenues.
Collusion cannot be presumed. In the case at bar, there is no showing of collusion
between petitioner Savellano as informer and any official or employee of the BIR
or the Department of Finance. Neither is there any evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity enjoyed by the official acts of the BIR and the
Department of Finance in approving the claim of petitioner Savellano for
informer's reward.
Respondent COA considers the payment of informer's reward in this case as
placing a premium upon violations committed by government agencies and
therefore, improper. At first blush, it would appear that by paying the informer's
reward, the government punishes itself for violations committed by its own
agencies. This, however, is more apparent than real. The delinquencies of these
agencies are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is the person whose
information led to the discovery of their transgressions who is being rewarded.
Although this results in a reduction in the amount of revenues actually received,
the net effect is that the government still gains from the remaining amount paid,
which otherwise would have been lost to it.
UY V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DELA LLANA V. CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS [X 5, A 2, V 5,
C -5]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V. PURISIMA
CARPIO MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS (6TH DIVISION)
LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
CUENCO V. FERNAN
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
FRANCISCO, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GUTIERREZ V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE
CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Doctrine:
The precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in
this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Facts:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona,
assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the
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House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate
of the Philippines.
Petitioner was charged with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
public trust and graft and corruption. He argued at length that the acts, misdeeds
or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal
nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to
meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter
a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment. On the other hand,
the prosecution told the media that it is possible that some of his properties were
not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) which had not been made available to the public. Reacting to this media
campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the
Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials they are not allowed to make
any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment
case. Respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
however, commenced the trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioners
motion for a preliminary hearing was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail
matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain
injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being
tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court
Held:
No, by the nature of the functions of the Senate discharged when sitting as an
Impeachment Court, Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions
on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed
to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But
whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review
Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy, was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that the decision will
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt. Impeachment refers to the power of
Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided
in the Constitution; it is a mechanism designed to check abuse of power.
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power
of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Doctrine:
The Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at
fault, to the public official concerned.
Facts:
Complaint-affidavit was lodged with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office
in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) by Walter H. Beck,
a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator
and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate
Commissioner Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance that
petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of
10,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration (ACR)
which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated
demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of 7,000.00.
Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a certain Purisima C.
Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment by Walter
Beck and his wife to the petitioner.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit that he demanded nor
received any amount of money from Walter Beck. In addition, the petitioner
alleged that Beck and his wife, Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila to
follow-up his visa application. On the said occasion, when the petitioner advised
the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa application, Beck and
his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner with having
demanded money from them. This incident prompted the petitioner to file a
criminal complaint for oral defamation.
BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for
violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus,
recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the
petitioner. Upon review of the case, the criminal charge was dismissed by the
Ombudsman for lack of evidence; however, the Ombudsman found the petitioner
liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed
the penalty of dismissal from the government service. His subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant administrative case should also have been dismissed
Held:
Yes, the complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to
prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required
in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount
directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the
same, but he did not. This significant omission in his affidavit is fatal in
establishing the alleged administrative liability of the petitioner. It also appears
that Purisima Terencio had apparently been doing most of the legwork for the
Beck couple in facilitating the release of the subject ACR. Consequently, there is
logical basis to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged payment was made
by the Beck couple. The rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until
proven otherwise does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio
had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck
spouses for reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The
Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according credence to the
allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer.
ESTARIJA V. RANADA
MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
CAOIBES, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN
FRIVALDO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Doctrine:
If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also
suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he
was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. In his
answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he
had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means
of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor
in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that
Held: he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
No. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution provides that all public officials and of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the this country. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
Omnibus Election Code also provides that a qualified voter must be, among other Further, the Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
If the petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There
laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor
naturalization, or by repatriation. He claims he has reacquired Philippine do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating Filipinos.
in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country.
However, even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in
the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened
as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS V. DESIERTO
URBANO V. CHAVEZ
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS [XYZA & CHAD]

SANTIAGO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LAMBINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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