Case Digest: Rubrico vs.

Arroyo
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G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine
Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her
detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean
Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were
also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued,
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the

President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-
members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for
the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to

enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power

of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when
it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively

targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of

petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate

funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection

clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,

powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in

danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to
the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-
in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the

plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations

of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of
the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations
so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function
of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of

Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated

should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a

valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of

the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class

of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the

nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is

hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December
7, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

OF 2010, respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between
parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make
recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.

It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department,
to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Senate v. Executive Secretary Digest

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

 Facts:

1. Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the
President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law
be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of
the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one
conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or confidential
information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.

2. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project.
Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering
the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations to officials of the AFP.

3. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On
the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the
investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the
AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the Presidents
order.

4. Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and
prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress

YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.

1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the

Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry with
process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does
not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This
power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the
government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.
2. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. It is defined by
Schwartz as the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the
courts and the Congress. (e.g. state secret privilege, informers privilege, generic privilege)

3. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. The
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible.

5. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably
absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character
of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and
22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of
eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
 Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.

7. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the
Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from
this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as
well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and
the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited
in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in
the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will
render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances
to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.

9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore,
cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive
privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the
Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead
of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could
refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have
merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government,
but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people to take
part in government.

BALAO VS GMA
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

BALAO et al vs. GMA

G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011
FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed
with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by
unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition
were then President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec
Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno, National Security
Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander .
Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-
Baguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of
indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.

According to witnesses testimony, James was abducted by

unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were arresting
him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.

petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise

prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11
military and police facilities which have been previously reported as
detention centers for activists abducted by military and police
operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain
evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List
and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a
witness protection order.

the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:

ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose

where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James
considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to
cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person; and

DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and

WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to
comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo and substantiate the same

ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof

required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced
disappearance.
HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on
October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this
Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations. Extralegal
killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such person outside the protection of law.
**
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the
petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP
indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under
the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of
identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the
CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state.

We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the

militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the
evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an
enforced disappearance.

In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the

similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of
abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to
prove that the government orchestrated such abduction.
Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer
government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar
incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA
and other left-leaning groups.

**
The petition further premised government complicity in the
abduction of James on the very positions held by the respondents.
The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to
expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and why it has
little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal

basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international
law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form
of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents
criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In
other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As
the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
(Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious
and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of
violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons;
the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x
x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings. Of the same tenor, and by
way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the
Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes
of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance
[or extrajudicial killings].

xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry
out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter;
the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x
x[

Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in

any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of
James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the
abductors have not been established, much less their link to any
military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence
indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or
with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial
court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made
given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial
court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are
very limited, superficial and one-sided. Its candid and forthright
observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by
the evidence on record.

**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order
to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the
place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance
of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners
specified several military and police establishments based merely
on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in
previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists disclosed
that those premises were used as detention centers. In the same
vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated
on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained confidential
information from an unidentified military source, that the name of
James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial
court could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by
precipitate issuance of inspection and production orders on the basis
of insufficient claims of one party.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS.

DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known
as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded not guilty.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid
being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the
1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake
of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another).
Posted by LAPADIDAY at 9:55 PM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March
2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting
his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to
petition the government for
exercise of the people power redress of grievances which
of revolution which overthrew only affected the office of the
the whole government. President.
 extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from President that it caused and
it cannot be the subject of the succession of the Vice
judicial review President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political
question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right
of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As
Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress
recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge,
who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by
mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to
show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the
judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were
still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really
have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto
Case Digest
Legarda vs. De Castro

Facts:

Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright
dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the
correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots;
that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or
election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing
bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be
made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power
to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based
on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing
election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions
of law which are inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations
are not supported by facts. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the
manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).

Issues:

1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?

2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?

3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?

Held:

1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and
Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and
COCs.

2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an
election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is
involved. However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of
the protest, considering that theprotestant concedes the correctness of the ballot
results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee,
and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of
manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels oftransposition and
addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities

and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest
here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a
challenge to protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists of alleged
ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.

Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again
stress thatnothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The
protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said
rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from
allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals
rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.(Legarda vs De
Castro, P.E.T. Case 0003, March 31, 2005)

Facts:

Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
1998 elections. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010 elections.
Pormento opposed Estradas candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as well as his
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En Banc). Pormento then filed the
present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was
able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue:

Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view
of the prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall
not be eligible for any reelection?

Held:

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed
upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As
such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in
this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The

Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable

controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of

a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will
serve no useful or practical purpose. (Pormento vs. Estrada, G.R. No.
191988, August 31, 2010)

Case Digest: Atty. Pormento v. Estrada & COMELEC

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph "Erap" Estrada and Commission on
Elections

G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

Facts: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President
Joseph Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The
petition was denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC
en banc.
Issue: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the
May 2010 elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he
President shall not be eligible for any reelection."
Held: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not
win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase
"any reelection" will be premised on a person second election as President.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and

Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
RESOLUTION
 CORONA, C.J.:

I. THE FACTS

Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned
according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2,
2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and
filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC
2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of
Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private
respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

II. THE ISSUE

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for any re-election?

III. THE RULING

[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.]

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010
elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.
 As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because

the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has
been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who
has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or
practical purpose.

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