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BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,

CHRONICLE BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,


and
MONSERRAT BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDO VALENCIA,
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications
and
ROBERT SAN ANDRES of the Radio Control Division,
respondents.

FACTS:
-Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They
operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines.

- They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for


operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to
his department

- Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it
should befiled two month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of
Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications(formerly Commerce And Communications), he
may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license,
provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be disapproved without giving
the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to
petitioners.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD:

-No, The Supreme Court ruled against Valencia being entitled to claim damages.
Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to
cease operation. Furthermore, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation
to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made
by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim
damages there from. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

Astorga v. Villegas Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved
by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its
approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill.
The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made
a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of
the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by
the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and
denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding
officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal.
An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the
bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.
Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved
and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the
court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.

United States Vs. Pons


Fact: Juan Pons and GabinoBeliso where trading partners. On April 5,1914 the
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels
of wine. The said barrels where delivered all to Beliso, Beliso directed Cornelius
Sese to deliver 5 barrels to Pons house.

The customs noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant. And so customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins
of opium. Since the act trading and dealing opium against Act No. 2381, Pons
and Beliso were charged illegally importing and introducing such contraband
material to the Philippines.

Pons appealed the sentence arguing the Act no. 2381 was approved while the
Phil. Commission was not in session. His witness claims that the said law was
passes, approved on 01 March 1994, while the special session of the
commission was adjourned at 12 MN on February 28,1914

Issue: Wether or not, the Act no. 2381 was indeed made a law

Held: Act. 2381 is null and void.

The SC looked into the journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the
SC refused beyond the recitals in the legislative journals. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is
an act of legislature. The journal say that the legislature adjourned at 12 MN
on Feb 28, 1914. This settles the question, and court did not err in declining to
go beyond journals. The SC passes upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill
in the case.

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council


G.R. No. 2002242
April 16, 2013

Fact: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of thr Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of
the Supreme Court and a representative of the private sector. (Sec.8, Art. XVIII of the
1987 Constitution)
In 1994, an eighth member was added to JBC as two representatives from the
Congress began sitting simultaneously, with each having one-half of a vote.
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the two representative s one full vote each. It
has been the situation since then.
On July 17, 2012 the Court decided, in favor of the petitioners, that the number of
members in JBC is unconstitutional and that it is to enjoin to reconstitute itself.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents' motion for reconsideration, the Court
suspended the second paragrap of its July 17, 2012 Decision which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."
Respondents pray that the Court reconsiders on the grounds: 1) that allowing only one
representative from the Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its
bicameral nature; 2) that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when
there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3) that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate
the JBC from political partidanship; and 4) that the rationale of the Court in declaring a
seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not
exactly correct.

Issue: Whether or not the existence of two representatives from Congress in JBC is
constitutional based on its bicameral nature.

Held: No. The practice of Congress of its bicameral nature is only limited to their
exercise of legislative and constituent powers (Art. VI and Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution, respectively). JBC was created to support the executive powet to appoint,
and Congress, with its one representative as stressed by Sec. 8, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
Thus, the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provisions on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function.
The suspension of the second paragraph of the Court's July 17, 2012 Decision was
lifted.
G.R. No. 188179 January 22, 2013
HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-
Intervention.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
Henry Giron et al are filing for certiorari and prohibition regarding the constitutionality of section 12-
substitution of candidates and section 14- repealing clause of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) contending
that it violates section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution (One Subject One Title Provision).
They also seek to prohibit COMELEC from implementing the said sections assailing it would enable
elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds during their
campaign period.
Then COMELEC chairman Jose Melo counters that SC has already resolved the matter in Farinas v.
Executive Secretary

Issue:
Whether or not section 12 and section 14 of Fair Election Act violates section 26 (1) Article VI of the
1987 constitution?

Holding:
No. Section 12 and 14 does not violate the one-subject-one-title provision- case was dismissed
because petition fails to show clear breach of the Constitution. The petitioners should prove section
12 as a rider but failed to do so.
Court provided a transcription where bicameral legislature were indeed deliberating on the matter of
title (Senators Roco and Legarda together with Chairman Syjuco). Both houses agreed with the title
broadening it enough to accommodate the spirit of FAIR
Sec. 12 is not a rider
The unfairness were in the opportunity lang to run and then youre disqualified when you run for
something else. Ngayon we restrict it only for President and Vice President- Sen. Roco
Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing through various laws,
they found other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of these practices
included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates and the ipso
facto resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to
"level the playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they determined were
unfair election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.
Sec. 12 and 14 are germane to the subject and title of RA 9006
The decision ends pointing out that the question is more legislative rather than judicial- something for
congress rather than the courts to decide on.

G.R. no. 17033 December 23,2008


Garcilliano
v.s
House Representatives Committee on public informatio
n, public order and safety, national
defense and security, information and technology, and
suffrage and electoral reforms

Facts:
- During Arroyo's administration, an issue about the el
ection had risen; the 'Hello Garci' Tapes , a
wiretapped conversation between the petitioner and t
he president about the expected favorable
outcome of the elections was played during the investigation.

A petition was filed before the court praying that the respondents had
committed a violation against R.A 4200 or the Anti- Wiretapping law. In
addition, it mentioned that the senate should be compelled from conducting
further investigations since the senate procedure was not
published in any publication prescribed by the law. Meanwhile, the
respondents argued that it had been published on the senate's web page, and
they had provided booklets accessible to anyone.

Issue: should the senate continue the investigation?

held: No, the procedure can not go further, since the law prescribes official
gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. The R.A 8792 or the
Electronic commerce act of 2000 does not permit Internet to be a medium of
publication. Moreover, sec 21 art 6 of the 1987 constitution makes the
publication of senate procedure imperative.

RANDOLF DAVID, et al.


v.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424,
3 May 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the
government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national
emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and
their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she
ssued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and
prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases for
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers;
and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies.
Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA
Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party-list
president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a
warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
andDetection Group (CIDG) raided theDaily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the
editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and
seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition
paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would take over
any media organization that would not follow standards set by the government during the state of
national emergency.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after
all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021
(PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP 1017.
These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials
of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional
Held:
The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction .
The operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former President Marcos
legislative power. The ordinance power granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative Code of
1987 is limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders,memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of
the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state
of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.She cannot
call the military to enforce or implement certain laws. She can only order the military,under PP 1017,
to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ
G. R. No. 13945 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. INC., petitioner
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL
MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
FACTS:
- Petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc.
- R.A. No. 2609 - Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law: fixes a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions.
- Resoluton No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of Central Bank declares that imporation of "Urea" and
"Formaldehyde" are exempt from margin fee. Petitioner relied upon such declaration and asked for
refunds on the previous foreign exchange purchases he has made in the importation of "Urea" and
"Formaldehyde".
- Auditor General refused to refund petitioner on grounds of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. No.
2609 - "The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the folloowing:
"XVIII. Urea Formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users."
He assails that "Urea Formaldehyde", as provided, should be construed as the finished product and
not separately as "Urea" and "Formaldehyde"
ISSUE:
Whether the enrolled bill -- which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea" and
"formaldehyde" is conclusive upon courts
HELD:
Yes, the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If there is a mistake in the printing of a bill, the
remedy is amendment or curative legislation and not by judicial decree, hence, the enrolled bill, in
this case, must be construed as urea formaldehyde as it is.

La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. CA and CIR

CIR vs. Fortune Tobacco

CIR vs. La Suerte


Sterling Tobacco vs. CIR

La Suerte vs. CIR

La Suerte vs. CIR

Nov. 11, 2014

Facts:

* This is a consolidation of 6 cases. They are appeals from decisions of the Court of
Appeals regarding the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco. Stemmed leaf tobacco is
used as raw material for cigarettes.

* The tobacco companies were assessed deficiency specific taxes for not having paid
the excise tax for stemmed leaf tobacco in separate occasions from 1986 to 1989, and
in 1994 and 1995.

* The 1986 Tax Code is the basis for tax assessed on the companies.

* Sec. 137 provides for the exemption of tobacco products entirely unfit for chewing
or smoking from the excise tax. This includes stemmed leaf tobacco, which was
described as having the stem or midrib removed, and without using the term broken
leaf tobacco.

* Sec. 141, however, provides that P.0.75 will be collected per kilogram of partially
prepared tobacco, processed either by hand or by machine.

* Then BIR Commissioner Jose Ong collected taxes on La Suerte in the years 1986-
1989, La Suerte contested.

* The BIR relies on Revenue Regulation (RR) 17-67 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE in 1967, where the definition of partially prepared tobacco includes
stemmed leaf tobacco, defined as handstripped tobacco, clean, good, partially broken
leaf only, free from mold and dust.
* One of the arguments used by La Suerte is that RR 17-67 exceeded the allowable
limits of legislative delegation, because it technically allowed the Department of
Finance to make tax laws, when the ability to legislate tax laws may not be delegated
by the legislature.

Issue:

* Did RR 17-67 exceed the allowable limits of legislative delegation?

Held:

* NO.

* While the power to tax is inherently legislative, the power to fill in the details and
manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to
specialized government agencies such as the Department of Finance.

* The trend is that with the ever-increasing complexity of society, delegation has been
the rule. The legislature may not have the competence, let alone the time, to provide
the specific and detailed solutions.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. Vs. Pedro Gimenez


G.R. no. L-23326 December 18, 1965
(Title of Bills)
Facts: Republic Act no. 3836 which is An act amending subsection (c ), section twelve of
Commonwealth Act numbered one hundred eighty-six, as amended by Republic Act number Thirty
Hundred Ninety-Six is questioned by Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. of its constitutionality
in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution where it did not provide the provision for
the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress in the title. According to the Solicitor
Generals office, the title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Issue: Whether the Republic Act no. 3836 violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Held: Yes. The title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is
a violation of Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. The purpose of Article 21 as explained by
Cooley are (1) to prevent surprise of or fraud upon Legislature and (2) to fairly apprise the people so
that they may have the opportunity to be heard by petition if they desire. It is not only a mere rule of
legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory.
Banat vs comelec

FACTS:
Petitioners Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoin respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute alleging that
RA 9369 violated Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution. RA 9639 is a
consolidation of Senate Bill 2231 and House Bill 5352. They also assail the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38 and 43 of said Act because the provisions are
of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution.

Petitioners allege the following:

1. RA 9639 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial


provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.

2. Sections 37 and 38 impair the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (SET)

3. Section 43 gives the other prosecuting arm of the government concurrent power
with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.

4. Section 34 violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the
terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just.

ISSUES:

1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Consti?

2. Whether Sec. 37 and 28 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Sec 4,
Article VII of the Consti?

3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Consti?

4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Consti?

RULING:

For all issues: The Petition has no merit. EVERY STATURE IS PRESUMED TO BE
CONSTITUTIONAL. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional
must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution. The
petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be
declared unconstitutional. Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968


ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO as Commissioner of
Civil Service, respondent.

FACTS:

Enrique V. Morales began his career in 1984 as patrolman and gradually rose to the
chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14,
1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila. On September
24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved
the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the
minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements stated in Section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966.

In Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 it says that one qualification for appointment
as Chief of Policy Agency is any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces, however, when the act is deliberated upon, the approved version
was actually any high school graduate who has served the police department of a
city. Petitioner argued that the second statement was actually the one approved by the
Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change
made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not enrolled bill theory is adopted in this jurisdiction.

(2) Whether or not that enrolled bill prevails over the legislative journal is an absolute
rule.

HELD:

(1) In Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil. 1, we held that an enrolled bill "imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts." This Court held itself bound by an
authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the
members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to approve proposals
for constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account of the
suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate. Thus in Mabanag, the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt
there might have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines,
in view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, was finally laid to rest by
the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, L-
17931, Feb. 28, 1963.

(2)We are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must
yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the
validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered
on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.