Axel Van Den Berg-Critical Theory, Is There Still Hope

Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope?
Author(s): Axel van den Berg

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 3 (Nov., 1980), pp. 449-478
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope?'
Axel van den Berg

McGill University
The first critical theorists were unable to give their notion of "sub-
stantive reason," as opposed to merely instrumental rationality, any
real meaning. They ran aground on the old dilemma inherent in at-
tempting to combine the ideals of freedom and reason, what might
be called the "dilemma of democratic radicalism." A second genera-
tion, led by Habermas, claims to have resolved the dilemma with (1)
a "systems analysis" demonstrating the persistent "irrationality" of
capitalism, and (2) a "consensus theory of truth" capable of estab-
lishing "rational" norms. These attempts, it is argued here, do nothing
to resolve the dilemma: the first lacks any empirically verifiable im-
plications; the second is merely a restatement of the dilemma. Some
of the possible reasons that critical theory has nevertheless com-
manded increasing attention among North American sociologists are
suggested.
THE DILEMMA OF CRITICAL THEORY
In recent years the critical theory of the Frankfurt school has received a
considerable amount of attention in the English-speaking world, as wit-
nessed by the rapidly growing literature explaining, introducing, criticizing,
or simply applauding the Frankfurt philosophy (see, e.g., Faught 1979;
Feuer 1972; Fuhrman 1979; Hearn 1974; Jay 1973, 1974; Leiss 1975;
O'Neill 1976; Slater 1977; Stewart 1978; Tar 1977; Therborn 1970,
1971). In addition, the story of the original members of the Frankfurt
school (particularly Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse), of their initially
hopeful attempts to reunite Marxist theory and praxis and their eventual
failure, has been told and critically analyzed often enough (e.g., Jay
1973; Slater 1977; Tar 1977). Thus, it does not need to be repeated here
in great detail. However, what has not always been sufficiently clear in
these accounts (except, perhaps, Jay [1973]) is that their eventual failure
was to a large extent the result of a fundamental ambivalence which has
always been the distinctive feature of critical theory and which turned
out to be an irresolvable dilemma for the first generation of Frankfurt
philosophers.
From the outset, critical theory was the search for a "third road," re-
1 I am indebted to Dick Batten, Richard F. Hamilton, Roger Krohn, Michael Lipkin,

Michael R. Smith, and an anonymous referee of the AJS for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
? 1980 by The University of Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8603-0001$01.50
AJS Volume 86 Number 3 449
jecting simultaneously "positivism" and all forms of "idealism" (see Jay

1973, chap. 2; O'Neill 1976, pp. 2, 8-9; Tar 1977, pp. 23-25; Wellmer
1971, pp. 51 ff.). Following in the footsteps of Lukacs, Korsch, and
Gramsci, the original members of the Frankfurt "Institut fur Sozial-
forschung" believed that a Hegelianized version of Marxism, reviving its
voluntaristic elements and conceived of as a "philosophy of praxis" of
Left-Hegelian inspiration, offered such a third road (see Agger 1977a,
pp. 4-7; Bottomore 1975, pp. 34-41; Jay 1973, pp. 41-44; Piccone 1976,
pp. 131-36; Tar 1977, pp. 21-24). They maintained that true insight into
the historical process could not be achieved by mere empiricism, since the
latter is concerned only with "appearances." Only "dialectical reason"
(Vernunft), they insisted, could grasp the "essence" of the social "total-
ity." Yet at the same time, they refused to specify the substance of the
"practical reason" on which they claimed their critical theory was based
for fear of commiting the error of idealism, which at best would make
them the victims of ridicule and at worst could lead to a new dogmatism
imposed from above. Thus they systematically rejected all claims to priv-
ileged insight into a "higher truth" as idealist, metaphysical, subjectivistic,
dogmatic, elitist, and hence ultimately self-defeating. Thereby, they also
rejected, although at first only implicitly, the Leninist position that a truly
rational social order could be established by means of a small "vanguard"
dogmatically claiming to possess exclusive insight into the proletariat's
"true interests" (see Adorno et al. 1976, pp. 128-29; Agger 1977a, pp.
7-9; Bottomore 1975, pp. 42-43; Jay 1973, pp. 43-44, 47; Piccone
1976, pp. 135-37; Slater 1977, pp. 22-25, 39-40; Tar 1977, pp. 23-25,
34-35).
Perhaps the first generation of Frankfurt philosophers can be accused
of a certain cowardice for not directly facing up to the seamier sides of
Soviet reality until after World War II (see Feuer 1972, p. 78; Jay 1973,
pp. 19-20), but from the start their anti-idealism entailed a tacit rejection
of Marxism-Leninism (see Jay 1973, pp. 53-55, 178-81; Slater 1977, pp.
56-62; also Davies 1976; Faught 1979, p. 5; Tar 1977, p. 34.)2 The
second generation of critical theorists was to go much further in linking
Stalinism with Leninism in no uncertain terms (see Habermas 1971, pp.
37-42; Schroyer 1973, p. 143; Wellmer 1971, pp. 54, 126-27), even trac-
ing it back to the "latent positivism" (Wellmer 1971), overemphasis on
"instrumental reason" (Habermas 1968b, pp. 38-68), and "centralist
2 The attitude of the early members of the Frankfurt Institute toward the Bolsheviks
is somewhat controversial. Kellner (1975) castigates Jay (1973) for failing to reveal
"the depth of [their] commitment to Marxism," for, he claims, "from the beginning,
the members of the Institute were pro-communist and supported the Revolution"
(Kellner 1975, p. 133). However, the point is a bit trivial since Kellner himself admits
that the later pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer was, in some measure, the result
of elements that were part of critical theory from the start (p. 148).
450
Critical Theory
tendencies" (Schroyer 1973, pp. 91-96) of Marx himself, which, they

argue, could be used as "a justification of the most brutal kind of genocide"
(Schroyer 1973, p. 96, also pp. 31-35, 132-36). Such heresies are, of
course, not looked upon very kindly in more orthodox circles, and as a
result Habermas in particular has been accused of being an "antisocialist,"
an "opportunist," a collaborator of the "class enemy," a "reactionary,"
etc. (see Beyer 1971; Heiseler, Steigerwald, and Schleifstein 1970; for
more examples, see Jay 1974, pp. 17-18, 38-42).
Yet, while being vilified by the guardians of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy
for having lost their moral-political commitment to the correct proletarian
line, the critical theorists have also opened themselves to attack from the
other side for being wholly unscientific, for propagating merely a vague
commitment to "something better." This line of criticism does not come
only from the traditional "positivist" foes. The "structuralist" Marxists-
who claim to have resurrected Marxism as a "pure science" by purging
it of all "nonscientific," that is Hegelian, aberrations (e.g., Althusser 1969)
-dismiss critical theory as nothing but a subjectivistic, "humanist" moral-
political ideology (see, e.g., Burawoy 1978; Therborn 1970, 1971). On
the other hand, critical theory has also been praised for being a moral-
political philosophy and for being "as such not open to empirical refutation
or Marxist accusations of failure" (Fuhrman 1979, p. 210). This interpre-
tation is perhaps not entirely incorrect (although it escapes me how im-
munity to criticism can be a virtue), but it is most certainly at odds with
the Frankfurt school's own conception of critical theory as something
more than merely another moral commitment. By far the greatest efforts
of critical theorists have gone into opposing the separation of facts and
values by positivism, and the consequent hegemony of "instrumental ra-
tionality." Instead, they have consistently argued, "reflection" and dia-
lectical reason should be accorded at least equal theoretical standing with
mere empirical instrumental rationality. They are convinced that the valid-
ity of substantive reason can be firmly established, albeit not with the
conventional methods of verification of the positivist sciences. Indeed, they
have relentlessly criticized all other attempts to formulate such a higher
truth for not being firmly rooted in "reality" (see Jay 1973, chap. 2).
However, apparently for fear of committing the same error of subjec-
tivistic dogmatism which they had attacked in others, the Frankfurt the-
orists have never been willing to specify what exactly their method of
establishing an intersubjectively transmissible notion of practical reason
would consist of. Rather, they have contented themselves with attacking
positivism for its inherent conservatism while vaguely alluding to the
obvious superiority of dialectical reason for uncovering the "essence" of
the "totality," without ever bothering to specify these concepts (e.g.,
"positivism . . . will only allow appearance to be valid, whilst dialectics
451
will not allow itself to be robbed of the distinction between essence and
appearance" [Adorno in Adorno et al. 1976, p. 11]). This posture of pos-
sessing a superior method while refusing to specify that method is par-
ticularly apparent in the famous "positivist dispute" (see Adorno et al.
1976), a misnomer which is the result of the Frankfurt school's dubious
habit of lumping all its non-Marxist opponents, from Comte to Popper,
together as positivists (e.g., Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 1972,
chap. 1; see also Faught 1979, p. 27, n. 6). Predictably, the empiricist
opponents have repeatedly accused critical theorists of elitism (Obernd6rfer
and Jager 1975, pp. 45-58; Tar 1977, pp. 154, 169 ff.), irrationalism (Al-
bert in Adorno et al. 1976, p. 187), and blind voluntarism (Oberndorfer and
Jager 1975, pp. 395-96).
This, then, is the fundamental ambiguity, and ultimately the dilemma,
of critical theory: on the one hand, the Frankfurt philosophers hold that
there is a higher truth over and beyond the verifiable "facts" of an em-
piricism which has reduced the quest for reason to the level of a mere
"value judgment," and that, furthermore, this higher truth is capable of
some sort of nonpositivist verification; on the other hand, they refuse to
unveil that higher truth, or the method of verification, fearing that it might
become petrified into another elitist, and possibly oppressive, dogma.
Adorno has expresssed the dilemma very clearly in one of his critiques
of positivism. He first criticizes empirical (opinion) research for equating
the opinions of respondents with the truth proper, arguing that such a
volonte de tous merely adds up to a collection of ideologies, "the socially
average illusion"; however, he goes on: "But it should not be dogmatically
confronted with the mere assertion of a 'volonte generale' as a truth in-
itself, for instance, in the form of postulated 'values.' Such a procedure
would be loaded with the same arbitrariness as the installation of popular
opinion as objectively valid. Historically, since Robespierre, the establish-
ment of the 'volonte generale' has possibly caused even more harm than
the concept-free assumption of a 'volonte de tous'" (Adorno et al. 1976,
p. 85).
Eventually, critical theory would be doomed by this ambivalence: in-
sisting on an "entirely other," yet unwilling to name it. Its critique of
ideology, particularly of instrumental rationality as the ideology of modern
society, foundered on its reluctance to specify the substance of the practical
reason on which the critique was said to be based (see Jay 1973, pp. 56-63;
Leiss 1975; Stewart 1978; Tar 1977, pp. 84-95). But worse still, even
the faint indications, of which at least a few remained during the turbulent
1930s, that the future might some day provide the key to the as yet un-
definable notion of practical reason seemed to disappear completely during
the 1940s and 1950s. In the eyes of the weary critical theorists, instead
452
Critical Theory
of offering a bold reassertion of man as the ultimate seat of reason, the

1940s and 1950s seemed to dash all hopes for man's emancipation from
domination. They saw the emergence of a totalitarian order in which
domination was exercised through the manipulation of consciousness rather
than through force, a domination that was all the more complete as it was
creating a world of cheerful robots. Far from being the ultimate seat of
reason, man seemed to be infinitely adaptable to a fundamentally irrational
order. Thus, having found themselves unable to "ground" reason, and see-
ing no prospect for the future, Horkheimer eventually turned into a con-
servative Kulturpessimist, Adorno into a nihilist, and Marcuse into the
prophet of abstract "negation," although he at least was to find one last,
albeit tenuous, connection with the student revolt of the late 1960s (see
Jay 1973, chap. 8; Tar 1977, pp. 51-55, 174-81).
Among the many reasons that may help explain this final abdication
of all faith (see, e.g., Slater 1977, pp. 62-67; Tar 1977, pp. 48-60), in
my opinion one stands out as fundamental: the critical theorists' perpetual
ambivalence between empiricism and dogma and their refusal to choose
between the two. This ambivalence is in fact a latter-day version of a
basic dilemma that has haunted all who have tried to be radicals and
democrats at the same time, at least since Rousseau. The wavering passage
by Adorno quoted above, contrasting the volonte de tous with the volonte
generale without embracing either, is quite revealing. What lies at the
heart of the dilemma is a belief in the inevitable unity of freedom and
reason, certainly not the least respectable of notions in our culture (cf.
Mills 1959, pp. 183-95). But as Joseph Schumpeter has so brilliantly
demonstrated (1950, pp. 235-68), this belief is inherently contradictory:
if there is such a thing as a priori reason, men cannot be truly free to
choose; if men are to be truly free to choose, they must also be able to
choose unreason. It is this dilemma, which might be called the "dilemma
of democratic radicalism,"3 which the first generation of Frankfurt theorists
was unable to resolve. It is to their credit, however, that at least they did
not embrace any easy solutions to the problem and that they have re-
mained acutely aware of it, unlike some of their facile critics on the left
(such as Slater 1977, p. 81; Therborn 1971, pp. 75, 81).
The failure of the first generation of critical theorists met with scorn
and ridicule in Europe (for some examples, see Jay 1973, p. 296; 1974,
pp. 27-28). But, as noted above, in recent years there has been a massive
revival of interest in critical theory, especially in the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries (see also Piccone 1976). This has almost entirely been the result of
the prolific writings of Jiirgen Habermas, the undisputed dean of a second
generation of critical theorists, who, his supporters claim, "opens up a
3 I am indebted to one of the anonymous AJS referees for suggesting this phrase.
453
new era for the critical philosophy of the social sciences and for critical
theory" (Schroyer 1973, p. 37).4 Habermas is said to have shown the
way toward the resolution of both major problems that plagued the first
Frankfurt philosophers: first, by means of a "systems analysis" he and
his one-time pupil Claus Offe have presumably demonstrated that "late"
capitalism, far from being the epitome of impermeable domination, is still
as contradiction ridden and crisis prone (albeit in a noneconomic way, see
Keane [1975a]) as it ever was; second, Habermas is said to have finally
found a theoretical foundation for the notion of practical reason, at last
allowing for the crucial distinction between "false" and "true" conscious-
ness on intersubjectively transmissible (i.e., nonsubjectivistic) grounds (see
Schroyer 1973, pp. 132-68). In the next two sections I will briefly sum-
marize the two arguments, and in the sections thereafter I will try to
determine whether they really offer the prospect of solving the dilemma of
the Frankfurt school.
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF LATE CAPITALISM: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The systems analysis proposed by Habermas and Offe (see Habermas

[1975]; Offe [1972]; Offe and Ronge [1975]; for useful summaries, see
Keane [1975b, 1978]; Schroyer [1975])5 begins with the observation that
modern capitalism has managed to avert, without changing its fundamen-
tal characteristics, practically all the consequences which Marx predicted
would result from the basic contradiction between the forces and the rela-
tions of production. Largely through state intervention, modern "orga-
nized" capitalism has prevented a long-run decline of profit rates, reduced
the frequency and gravity of "realization" crises, reversed the trend toward
class polarization, substantially raised living standards of the workers, and
reduced the class struggle to a harmless form of institutionalized bargain-
ing (Habermas 1975, pp. 33 ff.). The major burdens of the capitalist mode
of production are no longer borne by a homogeneous working class but
have instead been spread out over a heterogeneous set of quasi groups with
little political clout, such as consumers, housewives, students, and the aged
(Habermas 1968c, pp. 86-87; 1973a, p. 78; 1975, pp. 38-39; 1976, p.
4 According to some authors, Habermas deviates too much from early critical theory
to be considered as truly belonging in the Frankfurt tradition (Kellner 1975; Slater
1977, pp. xv-xvi; Therborn 1971). However, as I hope to show below, Habermas's
concerns and approach are in all essentials identical with those of the earlier genera-
tion (see also Faught 1979).
5The arguments of Habermas and Offe are not entirely identical, but they seem to
agree on virtually all major points, as Habermas's frequent approving references to
Offe suggest (e.g., Habermas 1973b, p. 397; 1975, pp. 1, 37-38, 47-48, 60, 62-63, 66-67;
1976, pp. 219, 283-86, 316). As will be seen at the end of this section, Habermas's
argument complements that of Offe in some respects.
454
Critical Theory
310; Offe 1972, p. 17), hardly a unitary "proletariat" in the conventional

sense of the word (Habermas 1971, p. 229; Offe 1972, p. 19).
All this means, according to Habermas and Offe, that for the moment
it would be impossible and premature, as well as somewhat naive, to base
a critique of advanced capitalism on the arbitrary designation of some
empirical social group or other as the new proletariat, the new "historical
subject" of societal change (as is done, e.g., by Mallet [1962]; see Haber-
mas 1975, pp. 23-24; Offe 1972, pp. 12-13, 18-19, 24-25). Instead, they
argue, for such a critique to deal adequately with the new dimensions of
advanced capitalism, it will have to begin by identifying anew the funda-
mental, "systemic" contradictions inherent in capitalism. Now, according
to Habermas, "We can speak of the 'fundamental contradiction' of a social
formation when, and only when, its organizational principle necessitates
that individuals and groups repeatedly confront one another with claims
and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible" (1975, p. 27). Only
from the fundamental contradictions thus identified, Habermas and Offe
insist, is it possible to locate the system's present crisis potential, and
only then can we proceed to verify the theory by empirical, "concrete"
analyses of the actual manifestations of those contradictions (Offe 1972,
pp. 13-14).
The above discussion illustrates the crucial feature of Habermas and
Offe's systems theory: the distinction between the "fundamental contradic-
tion" which identifies the system, that is, which is a property of the system
as such, on the one hand, and the historically variable empirical manifesta-
tions of the contradiction on the other, a distinction rather similar to that
of Lockwood (1964) between "social integration" and "system integra-
tion" (see also McQuarie and Amburgey 1978). According to Habermas
and Offe, a fundamental contradiction cannot be permanently resolved
without fundamentally changing the character of the system. Its manifesta-
tions, on the other hand, taking the form of crises and conflicts, can be
temporarily contained and displaced by adaptations within the system. But
as long as the system itself does not change fundamentally, and thus as
long as the contradiction remains, however latent, new conflicts invariably
arise elsewhere in the system. Thus, the crises and conflicts resulting from
a basic contradiction can only be displaced within the system and cannot
be permanently resolved except by a fundamental change of the system
(see, e.g., Habermas 1975, pp. 1-8; Offe 1976, pp. 6-9).
It follows from Habermas's definition of a fundamental contradiction
that in order to find it we must first identify the "organizational principle"
of the capitalist system. However, after rejecting some of the more con-
ventional definitions of capitalism as merely historically variable but func-
tionally equivalent manifestations of a much more abstract principle
(Habermas 1975, pp. 16-17; Offe 1972, p. 18), Habermas and Offe re-
455
main rather vague on the matter. Offe comes close to defining the "logic
of development of capitalism" (his version of the organizational principle)
by its very "contradictoriness," which is, of course, logically inadmissible
(see Offe 1972, pp. 9-10), and elsewhere vaguely refers to the "exchange
principle" and "commodity relations" (Offe and Ronge 1975, pp. 140-41).
Habermas is equally elusive, referring to "the relationship of wage labor
and capital," a "self-regulative market," and "economic exchange" without
ever clarifying these notions (1975, pp. 20-21). But elsewhere, apparently
somewhat more aware of the problems involved in attempting to capture
the "identity" of social systems (see Habermas 1975, pp. 1-8; 1976, pp.
231 if.; Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 146-70), he is a bit more
specific: "The boundaries of the system would be crossed to the extent that
the investment decisions of private economic actors would cease to be un-
ambiguously guided by the criterion of profit maximization" (Habermas
1973b, p. 45, n. 68, my translation). Although not even this is entirely
unambiguous, I think it can be safely concluded from the above and from
the rest of the argument (see Offe 1972, pp. 10-12) that Habermas and
Offe consider the organizational principle of capitalism to be the pursuit
of private profit by means of the exchange principle. It is this principle
which renders the system irrational and contradictory. Offe even considers
privateness to be practically synonymous with "irrationality" (1972, p.
16).
The reason is that this organizational principle leads the system to ignore
persistently all those legitimate needs which are not readily turned into
private gain. This constantly provokes antagonism, conflict, and increasing
demands on the state by politically vocal groups whose needs are not met
in the marketplace. Hence, state intervention and the rise of "organized"
capitalism are explained as the result of continuous adaptations necessary
to protect the system against its own inherently self-destructive tendencies,
that is, its contradictoriness (Habermas 1975, pp. 33-41; Offe 1972, pp.
11, 15-17, 20-25). However, without fundamental change of the system's
organizational principle its self-destructive tendencies are merely displaced,
not resolved. Not only does the state seem to have exhausted the number
of policy tools available that do not violate the system's fundamental logic
(hence the term "late" capitalism, which does not necessarily imply im-
minent collapse, however; see Offe [1972, pp. 19, 24-25]), the state's
efforts to maintain the viability of the system also create a "growing func-
tional incompatibility of composite structures" (Offe 1972, p. 12). For in
dealing with the dysfunctions of the system, the state is forced to extend
continually the social sector regulated by a use-value orientation which
is at odds with the system's fundamental logic and is bound to undermine
eventually the legitimacy of the exchange-value orientation which upholds
it (Habermas 1975, pp. 66 if.; Offe 1972, pp. 27-63).
456
Critical Theory
This situation is aggravated by the paradoxical manner in which the

state in capitalist society intervenes to secure the maintenance of the es-
sential features of the system. Because they maintain the viability of the
system, such interventions are in the long-run interest of the bourgeoisie
as a whole; yet they often meet with powerful resistance from those who
perceive them to be against their particular short-term interests. Thus,
the state needs an independent basis of legitimacy in order to overcome
bourgeois resistance against its interventionist policies. The emergence of
formal mass democracy provided such a basis of legitimacy. It has enabled
the state to channel massive popular support for fundamental change into
piecemeal reform, leaving the essential features of the capitalist system
intact (Habermas 1962, pp. 176-79; 1971, pp. 261-64; Offe 1972, pp.
33-35, 76 ff., 184-85).
However, this creates growing problems for the state. On the one hand,
it is forced to extend the sphere of individuals and organizations whose
activities and conditions of existence cannot be justified by the imperatives
of the self-regulating market (e.g., oligopolies and monopolies in the
private sector, government bureaucracies and the public and private com-
panies associated with them, in addition to housewives, draftees, students,
the disabled, welfare recipients, the unemployed, etc.). Since in the ab-
sence of "market forces" decisions must be justified on other grounds, this
tends to "politicize" decision making as well as to undermine people's un-
conditional commitment to the exchange-value orientation which is the tra-
ditional ideological rationale upholding the capitalist mode of production
(e.g., erosion of the achievement ideology [see Offe 1976]). On the other
hand, the state needs popular support for policies which essentially run
counter to the real interests of the mass of the population, since they are
designed to maintain the system, not to change it fundamentally. Thus, it
needs to depoliticize decision making by securing a kind of diffuse "mass ac-
clamation" while effectively blocking any real democratic participation, as
that could lead the people to call into question the legitimacy of the entire
system (Habermas 1962, pp. 236-39; 1968c, p. 80; 1973a, p. 75; 1975,
pp. 36-37; Offe 1972, pp. 74-151). Hence, instead of being resolved, the
basic contradiction of capitalist society has merely been displaced. In
Habermas's words, "With the receding of open class antagonism the con-
tradiction has changed in form: it now manifests itself as a de-politiciza-
tion of the masses accompanied by a progressing politicization of society
itself" (Habermas 1973a, p. 34, my translation). This contradiction, ac-
cording to Habermas and Offe, is likely to result in crises of acute loss
of legitimacy of the capitalist state (Habermas 1975, pt. 2; 1976, pt. 4;
Offe 1972, pp. 17-63).
To be sure, the rise of "organized" capitalism would have been impossi-
ble without the simultaneous emergence of a massive apparatus for the
457
"engineering of passive mass consent." The mass media, the mass political
parties, and the legislatures have replaced public debate with advertising
and "public relations" in order to generate mass acclamation to sanction
back-room compromises between powerful interest groups. The state, whole-
heartedly supported by the representatives of science (who depend on the
state for funding), masquerades as a politically neutral, problem-solving
"technocracy." The "positivistic" insistence that all values are "irrational"
helps justify a situation in which only the means are subjected to public
debate, not the ends to which they are put. Thus the capitalist state is
able to rest its claim to legitimacy on purely negative accomplishments:
its ability to remove dysfunctions and avoid crises brought on by the very
logic of the system it seeks to preserve (Habermas 1962, pp. 184-250;
1968c, pp. 48-104, 76-79; 1971, pp. 321-28, chap. 9; 1973a, chaps. 1-2;
Offe 1972, pp. 107-22).
However, this only seems to raise again the two basic questions that
lie at the heart of the Frankfurt school dilemma. First, given the past
success of the apparatus of mass manipulation in creating a "false" con-
sensus, what is there to suggest that it will be less effective in the future?
Second, how can one be sure that it is a false consensus in the first place?
Here the answers of Habermas and Offe diverge.
Offe seems to waver between two positions. On the one hand, he seems
to be content with the abstract, somewhat mechanical systems analysis:
the "functional incompatibility" of exchange-value and use-value orienta-
tion is bound to lead to a crisis sooner or later (see also Keane 1978, pp.
70 ff.). But on the other hand, he argues at length that the class character
of the capitalist state consists in part of its very capability to conceal that
class character (Offe 1972, pp. 74-105). Thus he states: "Simplifying
somwhat, one can say that political domination in industrial capitalist
societies is that method of class domination that does not allow itself to be
known as such" (1972, p. 91, emphasis in original, my translation). Hence
his somewhat paradoxical but consistent conclusion: the class character of
the capitalist state will be demonstrated empirically only when it finally
breaks down (1972, p. 92, n. 32). Proof of the validity of his systems
analysis of late capitalism, then, is not possible for the moment. It is "con-
tingent upon political action" (Offe and Ronge 1975, p. 146). It will be
validated only by successful future praxis, that is to say, by class struggle
that will eventually force the state to "show its real face" (Offe 1972, p.
90).
Habermas, however, is not so optimistic. He is not convinced that Offe's
"functional incompatibility" will automatically cause the machinery for
engineering passive mass consent to break down. After reviewing a number
of theories proclaiming "the end of the individual" (Habermas 1975, pp.
458
Critical Theory
117-42), he has to concede that he can find no compelling evidence to

prove them wrong, that is, no convincing evidence for believing that man's
basic norms and values are not infinitely malleable; hence they can be
manipulated to maintain a false consensus indefinitely (Habermas 1975,
pp. 93-94). In the end, Habermas admits, he has nothing left to fall back
on but his own "partiality for reason" (1975, pp. 142-43). But there is
some hope. For even though he is not certain that critical reason will
eventually be accepted by all, he does claim that he has discovered a
theoretically justifiable foundation for it.
HABERMAS'S CONSENSUS THEORY OF TRUTH6
Habermas categorically rejects Offe's "actionism" as the ultimate criterion

of the theory's validity, that is, the view that a rational political praxis
can only justify itself retroactively. Such a view, he argues, amounts to
admitting that all action is ultimately an irrational "act of faith," incapable
of theoretical justification in advance (Habermas 1975, pp. 142-43, n. 1).
This, in turn, amounts to a de facto acceptance of the "decisionistic"
position advocated by positivism, which, with its rigorous separation of
facts and values, its glorification of instrumental rationality, and its con-
sequent belief that only means, not ultimate ends, can be rationally de-
termined, has, perhaps unwittingly, contributed so much to the legitimation
of a fundamentally irrational social order.
Thus, following the earlier Frankfurt theorists, Habermas's critical the-
ory is a critique of instrumental reason as the legitimating ideology of
advanced capitalist society. Unlike his predecessors, however, Habermas
does not reject the legitimacy of analytical-empirical, "value-free" knowl-
edge as such. He merely opposes its unquestioned hegemony as the only
possible kind of verifiable knowledge. In the sphere of purposive-rational
action or labor, he concedes, the "cognitive" or "knowledge-guiding in-
terest" consists of the mastery of external nature, and in this sphere the
analytical-empirical sciences have a legitimate role to play. But, he argues,
in addition to this, the social life-world contains two other realms of human
activity, each with its own logic and legitimate type of knowledge: that
of symbolic interaction or language, and that of domination. In the former,
the cognitive interest is mutual understanding and it is the proper realm
of the hermeneutic sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). In the latter, the
cognitive interest is emancipation and its "science" is critical theory (see
Habermas 1968b, pp. 36-86, 234-62; 1968c, pp. 60-65, 146-68; see also
Habermas 1973b; Faught 1979; Jay 1974; Keane 1975b; Schroyer 1975).
In practice, however, this tripartite division boils down to a dichotomy
6 For a similar summary, see Faught (1979).
459
since Habermas's critical theory and its cognitive interest in emancipation

are based on a theory of "communicative competence" (see below) which
really belongs in the sphere of symbolic interaction, and, in fact, he has
dropped the third category in his later work (see Habermas 1975, pp. 24-27
and pt. 3; 1976, pt. 3; Keane 1975b). Also, Habermas singles out Freudian
psychoanalysis, which, he believes, aims at emancipating the "patient" until
he will no longer need the guidance of the psychoanalyst, as the only
"science" qualifying as "critical" (Habermas 1968b, chaps. 10-12) and
as an example of what the relationship between critical theorists and the
(Marxist) "mass" party leadership and rank and file ought to be (Haber-
mas 1971, pp. 33-45). This is an interesting choice, since it seems to
exemplify perfectly the true Frankfurt school ideal of avoiding both an
elitist imposition of "true" interests (whether the "patient" likes it or not)
and a complacent acceptance of the ruling "false" consciousness (in this
case, the "patient's" neurosis).
The distinction between two kinds of legitimate knowledge, one analyti-
cal-empirical and the other "practical," each "rooted in the basic life-in-
terests of the species" (Jay 1974, p. 31), clearly opposes the positivist
contention that values and norms cannot be empirically verified or refuted
because they ultimately rest on subjective choice, which implies, according
to Habermas, that norms and values are in fact irrational and arbitrary.
As a result, he argues, the Weberian tradition of social science has reduced
notions such as legitimacy and democracy to purely formal, value-free
concepts, with profoundly antidemocratic implications. For if legitimacy
is whatever people happen to consider legitimate, and if democracy is mere-
ly one formal procedure for arriving at essentially arbitrary decisions, if
ultimate ends cannot be established by means of a rational public discus-
sion, and if, hence, one goal is as good as the next, why should there be
any discussion at all, and what is the use of democracy? Thus, Habermas
contends, positivism helps to legitimize a social order that will allow only
the means to be subjected to public debate, not the ends (1968c, pp. 120-
31; 1971, pp. 316-21; 1975, pp. 97-102; 1976, pp. 9-60, 271-303).
Furthermore, Habermas argues, the positivist separation of fact from
value is in fact completely mistaken since it rests on a naive correspon-
dence theory of truth which is entirely circular: it holds that statements
are true if they reflect reality, but then it defines reality as that which
is described by true statements. However, in practice scientific truth-claims
are implicitly based on a very different theory of truth, namely, a "con-
sensus theory": a statement is considered true if its validity is confirmed
by an unconstrained consensus reached in a free debate by all those con-
sidered competent. "What we call a fact is the content of a statement after
it has been subjected to a discourse that is now (for the time being) con-
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Critical Theory
cluded" (Habermas 1973b, p. 168; see also Habermas 1968b, pp. 88-115;
Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 123 ff.; McCarthy 1973, p. 142). But
if, Habermas continues, scientific truth finally rests on the preempirical
belief in the validity of an unconstrained discourse among competent par-
ticipants, that is, a debate in which only "the force of reason" is allowed
to prevail, there is no reason to believe that norms and values could not
in principle be established as valid and binding in precisely the same way.
Of course, Habermas is well aware that no such "generalizable" norms
have been established yet, and that any imputations of such "correct"
norms can easily lead to an elitist dogmatism which would, of course,
defeat the whole purpose of emancipation (Habermas 1968a, p. 16; 1971,
pp. 33-42; 1973a, pp. 378-88). However, he insists that none of this pre-
cludes a priori the possibility that free and rational men could arrive at
a rational consensus concerning their collective interests, acceptable to all
and thus binding on all (Habermas 1975, p. 108; 1976, pp. 334-35).
In this way Habermas argues that norms can in principle claim empirical
validity, just as facts can, if it can be shown that they are truly "gen-
eralizable" (verallgemeinerungsfahig), that is, if they are capable of justi-
fication through a debate among truly free and equal men. Such a rational
discourse or "ideal speech situation" would be characterized by the rigorous
exclusion of all external and internal constraints except the logically com-
pelling force of reason, while all those who are affected by the outcome
of the debate should have free and equal access to it. Hence each individual
could plead for his own particular interest only in terms of the general
interest; and, thus, all ulterior motives except the collective search for
truth would be excluded. Finally, no one could be forced to obey any
norms to which he or she does not freely subscribe as rational and just
(Habermas 1971, pp. 42-45; 1975, pp. 107-8; 1976, pp. 334-35).
The notion of an ideal speech situation, Habermas believes, at last pro-
vides the criterion by which to distinguish between "true" and "false"
interests, and between a "true" and a "false" (because manipulated) con-
sensus on theoretically justifiable grounds. Of course, in a society which
will not permit a truly unconstrained discourse to take place, and in which,
in fact, all "practical" communication is systematically distorted and re-
pressed, it is not easy to make these distinctions. However, Habermas
seems to consider the living and working conditions of (social) scientists
and intellectuals, and the general character of scientific discourse, sufficient-
ly undistorted (see Faught 1979, p. 16) to permit them, in a free discourse
of their own, to infer such "generalizable interests" hypothetically by ask-
ing themselves the following question: "How would the members of a social
system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, collec-
tively and bindingly have interpreted their needs (and which norms would
461
they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on
organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with
adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives
of their society?" (Habermas 1975, p. 113). The provisional answers to
this question, Habermas argues, will serve as objective and theoretically
justifiable standards by which the irrationality and contradictoriness of the
capitalist system can be criticized. He seems quite confident that such a
procedure could provide the "scientifically explicated understanding of the
world" needed to "guide action" (Habermas 1968c, p. 113; 1971, p. 366).
But, of course, final verification must still come from actual society-wide
discourse, since any other way to proceed (such as imposing "generalizable"
norms before they have actually been unanimously accepted) would go
against the very logic of generalizability, which implies that nobody can
be compelled to obey any norms he has not freely accepted on the strength
of reason alone (Habermas 1975, pp. 111-17).
However, we still seem to be left with an ultimate value judgment: in
what sense is the above more than a personal and subjective commitment
to a particular form of "discursive" equality? To remove this last "de-
cisionistic" residue from his argument, Habermas sets out to formulate
a "theory of communicative competence" (analogous to Chomsky's lin-
guistic competence) which is based on a theory of "universal pragmatics"
and is eventually to provide the "universal rules of a communicative ethic"
by means of which the possibility and theoretical validity of the ideal
speech situation can be demonstrated (Habermas and Luhmann 1971, pp.
101-4). However, after some elaborate classifications and distinctions be-
tween different types of "pragmatics," "speech acts," "discourses," and
other forms of "communicative action" (the importance of which is not
entirely clear in terms of the rest of the argument [see also Faught 1979,
pp. 15-16]), he concludes that the possibility and the desirability of the
ideal speech situation is inescapably, albeit implicitly, presupposed by
the very act of communication. Any kind of communication (even refusal
to communicate is a communicative act in spite of itself [see Habermas
1975, pp. 110-11, n. 16]) unavoidably anticipates the possibility of an
unconstrained consensus and thus the ideal speech situation, no matter
how counterfactually. Even the simplest act of communication, and the
very idea of truth for that matter, would be completely senseless without
this implicit presupposition. In Habermas's own words: "What raises us
out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language.
Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility [Miindigkeit] are
posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of
universal and unconstrained consensus" (Habermas [1968c, p. 163]; see
also Habermas [1973b, p. 185]; Jay [1974, p. 33]; this translation can be
found in Keane [1975b, p. 95] and McCarthy [1973, p. 153]).
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Critical Theory
CONFLICT VERSUS CONTRADICTION: RENDERING MARXISM

INDETERMINATE
This, then, is how Habermas and Offe propose to reestablish the lost
Marxian unity of theory and praxis: first, by a structural-functional sys-
tems analysis of late capitalism presumably showing that the system is
still inherently contradictory, and, second, by a theoretical grounding of
the notion of reason as a guide to morally correct praxis without falling
back on a form of neo-idealist metaphysics. Many aspects of their argu-
ments are very much in the tradition of the early Frankfurt school: the
absence of the proletariat as the Marxist historical subject, the character-
istic reversal of the Marxist relation between base and superstructure, and
the resulting overriding emphasis on superstructural phenomena (the state,
mass culture, epistemology, ideology, etc.). There is also an interesting
analogy between the earlier Hegelian notion of a "totality" permeated
by a single "essence" that manifests itself in various "appearances" and
Habermas and Offe's "system" characterized by a profound "contradictori-
ness" that manifests itself in historically varying forms of "antagonism."
But most important, there is that typically "Frankfurterian" ambiguity
between empiricism and reason. However, whereas this was an irresolvable
dilemma for the early critical theorists, Habermas and Offe claim to have
found a way out. This claim is, it seems to me, hardly justified.
Although it may be true, as Habermas and Offe maintain (Habermas
1975, pp. 59-60; Offe 1972, pp. 32-35, 66-74), that their systems analysis
avoids the problems of other modern Marxist theories which view the
capitalist state as the willing instrument of the bourgeoisie (e.g., Miliband
1969; Parkin 1971), thereby assuming an unrealistically high degree of
secretiveness, foresight, and coherence on the part of the capitalist class
in order to keep the state from implementing any "fundamental" change,
their own explanation does not seem to be any more plausible. It is not
at all clear what compels the state to remain within the confines of "the
system" rather than simply implement some fundamental changes and
get it all over with. Offe argues that, for the purpose of collecting its taxes,
"the state depends on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power
to organize" (Offe and Ronge 1975, p. 140, emphasis in original) and
that it must therefore limit itself to smoothing the process of private ac-
cumulation. But this only begs the question. In what sense is the vast
body of interventions, regulations, and public agencies and companies
present in all modern capitalist societies (many of which are quite ob-
viously part of the "process of accumulation") something other than
"organization of the process of accumulation"? The answer is, presumably,
that all this does not affect the system "fundamentally."
But this only raises further questions. What would be fundamental
change? If modern, "organized" capitalism, with its expanding "decom-
463
modified" sectors under the auspices of the state (to use Offe's terminol-
ogy), is nevertheless fundamentally the same system as 19th-century
laissez-faire capitalism, what exactly is the fundamental organizational
principle they have in common? As noted above, Habermas and Offe are
never quite clear on what is the defining characteristic of the capitalist
system (exchange? private accumulation? commodity relations? class dom-
ination? contradictoriness? all of these are rather ambiguous), and which
are its consequences, let alone what distinguishes change within from
change of the system. Thus, all these crucial questions are tacitly bypassed
and the system's identity is simply taken for granted. It is portrayed as
one huge machine with the state functioning as some kind of homeostatic
device blindly obeying the "logic of systemic requirements." How this kind
of reification explains anything at all escapes me, but then, these are only
my minor objections.
One major objection should be raised against the ambiguous, indeed
self-contradictory, manner in which Habermas and Offe employ the con-
cept of a "social system." In fact, they seem to alternate between two
quite different concepts as it suits their argument, concealing this basic
inconsistency by the exceedingly abstract jargon of structural functional-
ism. At first, they appear to present capitalism as a Parsonian social sys-
tem: as a relatively coherent entity consisting of mutually reinforcing
components. What makes the system a capitalist one, and thus funda-
mentally the same as 19th-century liberal capitalism, is that it has the
same organizational principle, its components are permeated by an all-
encompassing exchange-value orientation. But such a Parsonian view of a
relatively well-integrated system does not of course automatically yield
irresolvable contradictions. If it contains any important "system-foreign"
elements at all, these may cause internal "strains," but their resolvability
would depend on the initial degree of integration and on the adaptability
of the system. However, rather than exploring these possibilities, Habermas
and Offe simply switch to quite another concept of the system, namely,
one that is inherently contradictory, one whose very logic compels it (or
compels one of its central components, the state, which apparently has
followed a different orientation all along) to infuse itself with use-value
oriented elements. But then Habermas and Offe return to the Parsonian
concept to argue that the survival of the system depends on its degree of
integration, which means that it can have one guiding principle only, and
since exchange- and use-value orientations are "functionally incompatible"
one of them will have to give way for the system to survive. Rather than
an explanation this is merely a silly play with words. There is not a single
substantive argument suggesting that the two orientations are, in fact,
incompatible, and that they could not continue to exist side by side within
464
Critical Theory
the same society, as they have done until now (for a similar criticism,
see Oberndorfer and Jager [1975, pp. 243-74]).
In fact, the abstract formulation helps to conceal the substantive, but
extremely implausible, presupposition on which the entire argument is
based. For the basic assumption crucial to the entire theory is that a wide-
spread commitment to exchange-value orientation (belief in the equity of
free-market exchange) is absolutely indispensable for the survival of the
capitalist system. Habermas even comes close to choosing exchange-value
orientation as the defining characteristic of a capitalist system (Habermas
1975, pp. 1-30). Yet, significantly, only once does he briefly consider
whether this orientation really is widespread, and then only with respect
to 19th-century capitalism. He concedes that the "socially integrative
effect of the value form" may have been restricted, "by and large, to the
bourgeoisie class" (Habermas 1975, p. 22). But then he argues that at
the time the bourgeoisie was the dominant class, and that, therefore, this
new ideology was very effective nonetheless. After that, he apparently
considers the matter settled and goes on to discuss late capitalism without
ever mentioning it again.
However, even though it might have been the value consensus of the
elite that mattered in the 19th century, in modern mass democracies it is
quite a different story. This is obviously implied by Habermas and Offe
themselves, since their discussion of crisis tendencies is clearly based on
the expected adoption of a use-value orientation by the masses, not by
the bourgeois elite. Thus, the Parsonian assumption that the stability
and very survival of the social system depends entirely on a value con-
sensus is essential to the theory. But Habermas and Offe make this as-
sumption only implicitly, so they never bother to examine its plausibility.
Had they done so, their argument would have become very unconvincing
indeed, for the value consensus theory has been under attack for years
and it has been effectively demolished time and again (see, e.g., Hamilton
1972; Mann 1970; Wright 1976). It seems, in fact, that different value
orientations can and do exist within the same system without any dis-
astrous effects on its stability.7 But this means that Offe's theory of "de-
commodification" and Habermas's theory of motivation and legitimacy
"deficits" do not lead to any predictions of impending crises at all. Simi-
larly, they cannot possibly demonstrate that capitalism is inherently con-
tradictory since this they themselves have made dependent on whether per-
sistent crisis tendencies could be "hypothetically" deduced from its organi-
7 And within the same person for that matter. Parkin (1971, p. 76) is probably quite
right that "perhaps only intellectuals are prone to find this troublesome" (see also
Hamilton 1972, pp. 413-14).
465
zational principle. In fact, their theory explains or predicts nothing at all,

hypothetically or otherwise.
Finally, by far the most fatal flaw of the systems analysis of Habermas
and Offe has to do with the uncertain meaning of their most central con-
cept, contradiction. They frequently insist that it is not merely synony-
inous with "antagonism," "opposition," or "conflict," which would be an
inadmissible attrition of the original meaning of "contradiction" (see,
e.g., Habermas 1975, pp. 26-2 7; Keane 1978, p. 63). "According to Hegel
and Marx," Habermas insists, " 'conflicts' are only the form of appear-
ance, the empirical side of a fundamentally logical contradiction" (1975,
p. 26). And indeed, Habermas's and Offe's formulations of the "funda-
mental contradiction" of capitalism are reminiscent of Marx. In almost
ritual repetition, they claim that it is "the contradiction between the in-
creasing societalization of capital accumulation on the one hand, and its
persistently private appropriation on the other" (see, e.g., Habermas
1975, pp. 28-29; Offe 1972, pp. 10-11). The phrasing and the general
idea derive directly from Marx's "contradiction between the forces and
the relations of production."
However, Marx's "contradiction" was merely an abstract formulation
of a number of very concrete developments which he predicted would take
place in capitalism. The test of the abstract concept of contradiction would
be whether his predictions would turn out to be correct. Marx predicted
an increasing frequency and gravity of "realization" crises, a secular de-
cline of the rate of profit, rising unemployment, Verelendung of the work-
ing class, etc., culminating in an increasingly bitter class struggle that
would eventually lead to the overthrow of the entire system by a proletarian
revolution. These developments would demonstrate, according to Marx,
that production for private gain is inherently contradictory rather than
merely the cause of some, in principle resolvable, conflicts and problems.
Now, none of these predictions (except perhaps a certain amount of
economic concentration) has actually occurred. Yet Habermas and Offe
are undaunted by this failure of the evidence (which was to demonstrate
the contradictoriness of capitalism in the first place) to materialize. To
thern it only shows the unexpected adaptability of the system, not its
capacity to overcome its fundamental contradictions, for these can be
overcome only by change of the system, not by change within. However,
this means that there is no independent evidence, apart from Marx's word,
to support the claim that capitalism remains contradiction ridden. In addi-
tion, although, like Marx, Habermas and Offe maintain that capitalism's
fundamental contradictions are bound to erupt eventually in actual con-
flicts and crises, unlike Marx, they categorically refuse to hazard any
cdefinite predictions about the likely forms, protagonists, and, most im-
portant, (ir-)resolvability of these new crises. That would be "premature
466
Critical Theory
sociologizing." Habermas even admits: "At the moment I can see no possi-
bility of cogently deciding the question about the chances for a self-
transformation of capitalism" (1975, p. 40). In other words, at the mo-
ment there is no way to tell whether the capitalist system might not be
able to continue to solve all its problems, without fundamental change,
indefinitely.
What, then, is the basis of the proposition that modern capitalism is
still inherently contradictory? The answer is: nothing at all. Habermas
and Offe strip the notion of contradiction of all the empirical referents it
may ever have had, and consequently of any possible meaning, while
retaining it apparently for its rhetorical appeal. Of course, it seems per-
fectly sensible to define capitalism in terms of the predominance of "pro-
duction for private gain." But it is quite another matter to maintain that
this makes it inherently contradictory irrespective of the actual conse-
quences. Since there are no actual, observable consequences flowing from
capitalism's contradictoriness, the term "contradiction" loses all its mean-
ing in Habermas and Offe's usage. It is not just reduced to a synonym
for "conflict," it is reduced to nothing but a word. What does it mean to
speak of a contradiction when its actual, real-life consequences can take
any shape or form, may or may not manifest themselves at any time (of
course, they do "in the long run," but that can take forever), may or may
not be observable, and may or may not be resolvable?
In the final analysis, these contradictions and crises boil down to nothing
but inflated triviality. What Habermas and Offe are saying in effect is
that in a predominantly private enterprise economy problems and conflicts
may, and probably will, arise from the fact that it is a predominantly
private enterprise economy. The great dialectical profundity of this in-
sight will be fully appreciated when one realizes that, by the same im-
peccable logic, in a centrally planned economy problems are not very likely
to be the result of private enterprise, but they will probably have some-
thing to do with the central planning of the economy. A somewhat less
than revolutionary discovery. Thus, according to Habermas and Offe, the
capitalist system will in the future have its problems and conflicts, as it
has in the past. I do not know of any sensible person who would deny
such a thing. But to deduce from this that capitalism is therefore inherently
contradictory is to argue that anything less than a model of cozy harmony
is, therefore, the very opposite: irresolvably contradiction ridden. Thius,
all the conflicts and problems of the world, no matter how resolvable and
inconsequential they turn out to be, are irrefutable evidence for the
existence of profound contradictions. To insist on retaining the term "con-
tradiction," so obviously devoid of any meaning, is simply making words,
not sense.
Rather ironically, the critical theorists' complete emasculation of the
467
Marxian concept of contradiction by means of an entirely indeterminate

systemic analysis bears a striking resemblance to the arguments of their
Marxist archenemies, the Althusserian "structuralists" (also noted by Jay
[1974, p. 41]).8 The convergence is ironic because Althusser starts out
from a position which is the exact opposite of that of the Frankfurt school.
Althusser claims that the "mature" Marx was not a Hegelian at all, but
that he founded a rigorous "science of history" by carrying out a radical
"epistemological break" with all Hegelian "ideology" (Althusser 1969,
pp. 21-86). However, this "science" must not be understood in the ordi-
nary empiricist sense, for Althusser also claims that Marx never intended
to make any definite predictions which were to demonstrate the validity
of his theory of the basic contradictoriness of capitalism. Rather than
being such an economic determinist, Althusser maintains, Marx really
invented the "structuralist" method, according to which it is impossible
to predict in advance exactly how the "general contradiction of capital-
ism" will work itself out in the many infra- and superstructural compo-
nents of the capitalist system, which all develop relatively autonomously
and unevenly, each with a whole set of contradictions of its own. Now,
under certain circumstances it is possible (but not predictably necessary)
that all these contradictions "fuse" through "overdetermination," because
these various contradictions do constitute a "structure in dominance,"1
which means that they are all determined by the general economic con-
tradiction "in the last instance," an instance which, however, according
to Althusser's own admission, may never come (Althusser 1969, pp. 87-
128, 161-218).
The similarity to Habermas and Offe's approach seems obvious: Marx's
thesis of the basic contradictoriness of capitalism is in no way affected
by the evidence to the contrary, and future falsification is ruled out in
advance. Like Habermas and Offe, for lack of any empirical evidence
Althusser retains the orthodox radical rhetoric by simply severing all
connections with verifiable facts. But I fail to see how Marxism can be
rendered a service by turning it into an indeterminate, "anything-may-
happen" systems theory. Of course, Marx was well aware that all things
are related in complex ways, but unlike our present-day "general systems
theorists" he did not think this platitude worthy of elaborate expression
8 This is clearly illustrated by Hyman and Brough (1975, pp. 246-51), who propose a
systems analysis virtually identical with that of Habermas and Offe but refer only to
Lockwood (1964) and Althusser (1969), apparently unaware of Habermas and Offe's
work. As a matter of fact, as Koch (1979) has shown, the structural-functional para-
digm as a way to circumvent the rather unpleasant empirical evidence is gaining wide
acceptance among modern Marxists, which suggests, it seems to me, a general malaise
underneath the triumphant proclamations of a revival of Marxist sociology (e.g.,
Flacks and Turkel 1978).
468
Critical Theory
in obscure, quasi-scientific language.9 Rather, he thought he could make

a contribution to a better understanding of man and society by trying to
find out which things are more closely related than others, and how they
are related. To turn Marx into a "structuralist" or a "systems theorist"10
is, it seems to me, to trivialize his work beyond recognition, and, in any
case, it is patently false.'1
At any rate, the contrast between structuralism and Hegelian Marxism
is apparently not as complete as the structuralists themselves, and some
observers (e.g., Burawoy 1978), would have it. There is, however, one
important difference. The structuralist insistence that Marxism is a rig-
orous science inaccessible to ordinary creatures and ordinary logic may
easily serve as a justification for Leninist authoritarianism (Althusser's
admiration for Lenin is only slightly less than his reverence for Marx
[see Althusser 1969, pp. 176-77; Therborn 1971, p. 75]; for a thorough
criticism of this latent authoritarianism see Kolakowski [1971, p. 122]).
Habermas and Offe clearly try to avoid such latent authoritarianism. Theirs
is the old Frankfurt school dilemma: how to show in an intersubjectively
transmissible manner that capitalism remains contradictory even though
it has turned out to be a surprisingly flexible and apparently viable sys-
tem. I hope I have shown in this section that their systems analysis does
little to overcome the dilemma, but has merely succeeded in temporarily
obscuring it by a dense thicket of perfectly meaningless verbiage.
THE CONSENSUS THEORY OF TRUTH: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

DILEMMA RESTATED
On closer inspection, Habermas's attempt to overcome the dilemma by

formulating the conditions under which reason can be verified, based on
a theory of communicative competence and a consensus theory of truth,
also turns out to be open to serious objections. For one thing, Habermas
persistently and completely misreads Weber as a "decisionist." Weber
9 For a grandiloquent attempt to show the obvious superiority of the "processual

logic" of general systems theory over "traditional positivism," see Ball (1978).
10 For another such attempt, see McQuarie and Amburgey (1978).
11 Kolakowski's (1971) devastating critique of Althusser brilliantly shows that the
rigid distinction between an "ideological" (young) Marx and a "scientific" (mature)
Marx is based primarily on Althusser's apparent ignorance of Marx's relevant works!
Rather than basing his interpretation on substantive arguments and appropriate quo-
tations, Althusser mainly establishes his pedigree by ritually repeating his religious
reverence for the master: "That acute sense of concepts, that implacably rigorous grasp
and that genius of conception," "the extraordinary theoretical temperament, animated
by an insatiable critical passion, an intransigent insistence on reality, and a prodigious
feeling for the concrete," etc. (1969, pp. 65 and 71). Even Marx, not particularly
known for his modesty, would probably have been embarrassed by such praise.
469
never held that values are "irrational" or that they are irrelevant to science
or vice versa, nor has Popper, for that matter. In fact, Weber's central
point in all his major statements on value judgments was precisely that
social science can and ought to contribute in a variety of ways to matters
of ultimate values and the debates about them (for a good summary see
Brecht [1959, pp. 221-31]). Nor did he ever claim that formal rationality
is somehow superior to substantive reason (i.e., the choice of ultimate
ends). On the contrary, he repeatedly stressed the importance of ultimate
values in all human activity and the humble place which the formal ra-
tionality of empirical science must therefore take (e.g., Weber 1948, pp.
77-156). From this perspective it is practically self-evident that every
"technocratic" justification really conceals a form of domination, and it
hardly requires the agonizing treatises that some have devoted to it (e.g.,
Habermas 1968c; Ellul 1964; Touraine 1969).
Second, Habermas's grounds for arguing that the ideal speech situa-
tion, the attainment of a rational consensus, and thus the emancipatory
interest are presupposed in the very act of communication are far from
clear. At times the argument seems to rest merely on a play with the
ambiguous meanings of his concepts. Thus, in one instance it sounds vague-
ly plausible only because he deceptively uses "practical discourse" in two
senses: simply as a neutral act of communication and in his own special
sense of unconstrained discourse (Habermas 1975, p. 110). Thus, simple
communication is discourse, discourse is by definition unconstrained, hence
communication implies the ideal speech situation: Q.E.D. Similarly, the
passage cited above (p. 462) sounds awfully obscure in the English transla-
tion, but in German it has a certain convincing ring to it because of the
ambiguous meaning of the German word Miindigkeit, which literally means
"having a mouth" (i.e., the capacity to use language), but it also happens
to be the conventional German term for "being of age" or being "com-
petent to judge for oneself."
At any rate, the argument is simply mistaken. Judging from history,
communication seems to lend itself just as well, or perhaps even better,
to (un-)intentional distortion as it lends itself to rational discourse. In
fact, a pretty strong case can be made for the theory that man's capacity
for symbolic manipulation is one of the prime causes of social inequality
(see Collins 1975, pp. 170-73). Besides, the one strong point in most
radical critiques, including Habermas's own, is that even in mass democ-
racies inequality may be maintained through the use of communicative
resources (media, etc.) to manipulate values and beliefs.12 It is hard to
understand, then, why the mere act of communication presupposes the
possibility and desirability of an unconstrained consensus. In the final
12 Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) formulation of this important (but hard to test em-
pirically) argument still seems the most plausible.
470
Critical Theory
analysis, the argument seems to be based on a belief in the good intentions

of the communicators, that is, a belief in the goodness of man, certainly
not an unrespectable belief, but not one than can be easily justified the-
oretically.
Habermas's faith in psychoanalysis as a model of "emancipatory praxis"
seems a bit naive, too. The relationship between patient and analyst is
essentially asymmetric and lacks any really reliable guarantees against
manipulation on the part of the analyst. The famous debates in the fields
of crime, deviance, and psychiatry are ample testimony for this assertion
(see, e.g., Cooper 1967; Matza 1969; Jay 1974, p. 37).
Furthermore, Habermas's argument does not at all provide either a way
to distinguish rational from distorted norms or a substantive guide for
political praxis. First, his definition of reason is entirely circular. Reason
is defined as the outcome of a truly unconstrained discourse; yet uncon-
strained discourse is defined as one that is subject only to the force of
reason. Similarly, communication that legitimizes merely particular inter-
ests is for that reason systematically distorted; yet undistorted communi-
cation is defined as being guided only by generalizable (i.e., not particular)
interests. With such circular reasoning it is absolutely impossible to assess
the degree of distortion of a particular discourse and the generalizability
of a particular norm independently of one another, that is, without im-
posing our own prejudices. Second, Habermas reduces reason to a set of
rules describing how it should be arrived at, the formal rules of uncon-
strained discourse. Thus, he does precisely what he so fiercely criticized
democratic "revisionism" for (Habermas 1973a, pp. 9-60): he reduces
democracy to a set of formal rules for arriving at decisions, only he calls
it reason. In addition, the notion of reason lacks any substance, since
Habermas, faithful to the Frankfurt tradition, refuses to specify it in terms
of actual substantive norms, for that must await a truly inclusive discourse.
But this means that for the moment we must content ourselves with slogans
that are as lofty as they are devoid of substance. Nobody in his right mind
objects to emancipation, the good society, reason, etc. But the trouble
begins when one tries to give these ideals any substance. It is on the
various proposals to achieve them, not on the abstract ideals themselves,
that we seem to have a very hard time reaching a rational consensus. Thus,
Habermas is just as guilty of "blind actionism" as Offe if he believes that
rational political praxis can be guided by a purely formal, abstract notion
of the good society.
Finally, instead of solving the dilemma between latent authoritarianism
and relativistic empiricism, Habermas merely ends up restating it. With
respect to the question of sufficient validation of rational norms he is
simply inconsistent. Most of the time, he states that only actual all-in-
clusive discourse constitutes final proof. Yet he also declares that "practical
471
questions" must be settled by a "scientifically explicated understanding

of the world," for they cannot be left to the "arbitrariness of uncontrolled
value judgments" (Habermas 1971, pp. 336; 1968c, p. 113), which seems
to mean that scientists can, here and now, supply definite justification for
rational norms. However, Habermas frequently backs away from the elitist
implications of this position by adding that such scientifically established
norms would only be hypothetical, of course (e.g., Habermas 1975, p. 114).
But then, this does not solve the dilemma.
Habermas's entire opus may be interpreted as an attempt to raise ra-
tional norms to the status which he thinks facts enjoy in the empirical
sciences (see Faught 1979, p. 9). Thus, he frequently insists that norms
established in unconstrained discourse are "binding," "compelling," "sci-
entific," etc. (see Habermas 1968c, pp. 62, 113; 1975, pp. 102-10; Ha-
bermas and Luhmann 1971, pp. 104-5; Schroyer 1975, p. 125). But what
does he mean by "binding"? There appear to be three possibilities. One
is that a select company of enlightened critical prophets, after a little
discourse of their own, already know the truth, and that from now on, or
whenever these philosophers will be kings, this higher truth is binding on
us all, whether we like it or not. But obviously this goes completely against
the notion of emancipation. The second possibility is a version of demo-
cratic centralism. You organize a grand debate among all free and reason-
able men, see which norms they adopt unanimously, then declare the
debate closed and proclaim those norms binding on all for all time, irre-
spective of those who may afterward change their minds or of the opinions
of future generations. Certainly, this is not what Habermas has in mind
either, for he repeatedly argues that generalized norms should at all times
be revisable and should never compel anyone against his will (Habermas
and Luhmann 1971, p. 281; Habermas 1973b, pp. 168, 179). He seems
to opt for the third possibility, based on the principle that no one should
be forced to obey a norm with which he disagrees in good faith (in itself
rather a tricky question). Obviously, this calls for a permanent discourse,
since anyone who changes his mind could reopen the debate, and it will
also have to be reopened for every generation or even for every individual
who reaches the age of discretion.'3 Thus, only norms that are spontaneous-
ly, sincerely, but most of all unanimously agreed upon could be binding.
13 Habermas acknowledges that in practice limitations of resources, time, and space

necessitate certain restrictions on the ideal of permanent discourse, such as representa-
tion, the majority principle, setting priorities in advance, etc. (Habermas 1973b, pp.
384-86). But these pragmatic considerations do not affect the ideal in principle, he
argues. However, with such restrictions, Habermas's "discourse" begins to take on an
uncanny resemblance to the parliamentary systems already existing in most advanced
capitalist countries, and we are left without any counterargument against those who
claim that these institutions are already the best feasible approximation of ideal dis-
course that we may expect. Nor do we have any way of knowing which norms pro-
duced by the present political process are truly generalizable and which are merely
472
Critical Theory
But what does "binding" mean under such conditions? In fact, it means
nothing at all. For in what sense can a person be bound by a norm with
which he himself fully agrees, and which he can put on the public agenda
and thus presumably suspend for the time being, whenever he likes? All
it means then, is that all people should do what they want to do. But
obviously, there is nothing to stop them from doing something if they
all want to do it, irrespective of whether the critical philosopher would
consider it rational. In such an idyllic state there is no need for any "factual
validity" or "binding force" of norms, and in fact these terms would not
make any sense. In other situations they can only mean authoritarianism.
Thus, Habermas's consensus theory of truth offers no way out of the
authoritarianism/value relativism dilemma. It is merely an elaborate re-
statement of the dilemma. Instead of embracing either alternative, he
wavers between the two. If unsympathetically interpreted, he could be
accused of latent totalitarianism (e.g., Oberndorfer and Jaiger 1975, pp.
45-58), for all his insistence that, as yet, only the critical theorist some-
how enjoys a privileged insight into the substance of reason. On the other
hand, if somewhat more benevolently interpreted, Habermas does not
appear to be saying that there is such a thing as a priori reason, only
that people ought to decide for themselves. He then turns out to be nothing
but a good-hearted liberal with a propensity to express his unshakable
faith in humanity rather frequently and in rather obscure prose. He is a
typical Frankfurt philosopher in that he cannot choose between these two
alternatives; he is somewhat exasperating in that he refuses to acknowledge
his indecision.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have shown that the second generation of critical theorists has
been just as unsuccessful as the first generation in trying to solve the
"dilemma of democratic radicalism." Habermas and Offe's systems analy-
sis, far from reestablishing critical theory's claim of being based on a
better future, the anticipation of which can already be discerned from
present trends, turns out to be merely a way of rendering Marxism in-
determinate and hence unfalsifiable, a way of retaining the rhetoric despite
the facts. Habermas's attempt to ground practical reason convincingly
appears to be nothing but a restatement of the old dilemma based on a
faith in the goodness of man without any further justification. Apparently
Schumpeter was right: there cannot be a priori reason if man is to be free
particular interest-group compromises legitimated by distorted communication. Finally,

what is the point of the whole theoretical exercise if, in practice, it will never be able
to provide us with definite answers to these questions?
473
to choose; there cannot be real freedom of choice if there is such a thing

as a priori reason.
Recently, Habermas has tried yet another approach to ground reason:
an evolutionary theory of practical reason analogous to Piaget's develop-
mental psychology (Habermas 1976, pts. 1 and 2). He now seems to be
arguing that the human species undergoes a very slow learning process (in-
terdependent with the development of productive forces) of successively
higher levels of moral-practical consciousness or levels of social integra-
tion, with norms and values becoming ever more universalistic. However,
there are a number of very strong prima facie counterarguments to such
a theory. The 20th century already seems to be no less barbaric than any
previous one (from Hitler and Stalin to Amin and Pol Pot). Rather than
the spread of a universalistic ethic, we have seen the increase of religious-
ethnic strife. Finally, it may well be that the evolution of our moral
standards lags far behind the rapid growth of the means of destruction,
as Habermas himself has argued (Habermas 1968c, pp. 104-19). As long
as such rather forceful objections have not been adequately dealt with, it
seems to me that an evolutionary theory of reason remains unconvincing.
Given all these obvious defects and the abstruse way in which it is
formulated, one cannot help wondering why critical theory has enjoyed the
attention and even enthusiastic response of so many academics for such
a long time. The answer is not immediately obvious, but I can think of
a few possibilities. For one thing, I suspect it has a lot to do with the
promise of offering a "third way." Interestingly, while critical theory
seems practically moribund in Germany and never really caught on in
countries with a strong orthodox Marxist tradition (e.g., France and Italy),
there has recently been a definite wave of renewed interest in the English-
speaking world (see Jay 1974; Piccone 1976). Perhaps on the Continent
the radical energies released in the 1960s have found an outlet in the
established organs of Marxist orthodoxy. But particularly in North Ameri-
ca, where there must be, by now, an entire generation of academics who
were strongly affected by the era of flower power and Students for a Demo-
cratic Society in their formative years, there is no such option available.
For such intellectuals with a commitment but no place to go-to whom a
world offering a choice only between Soviet repression and the capitalist
welfare state must look dismal indeed-critical theory offers a combination
of attractive features.
First, as I have tried to show, it mainly offers a moral-political com-
mitment to such worthy causes as "society's progressive forces," "emanci-
pation," a "reflexive sociology," etc. Second, it offers the status and re-
spectability that seem to accrue automatically to any theory that can trace
its lineage to the "great tradition of European culture" (see Hearn 1974).
Third, and of course most important, it offers the longed-for neither-
474
Critical Theory
capitalist-nor-communist alternative in the form of an unspecifiable en-

tirely other which must surely appeal to the romantic, countercultural pop
sociologist (such as Agger 1977a, 1977b; O'Neill 1976). Fourth, it offers
a rationale for reflection rather than action, which, in a world that seems
to provide the would-be radical with no alternative but an academic career,
is comforting. Fifth, the Frankfurt critique of positivism (see Adorno et al.
[1976], which is the result of a polemic that began in 1962) intensified at
just about the time when conservative North American social scientists
seemed to have successfully (though largely illegitimately) usurped the
"scientific method" (the "end of ideology" school and structural func-
tionalism). Significantly, outside radical circles in North America Haber-
mas is almost exclusively known for his major epistemological treatise
(Habermas 1968b). Finally, and I think this factor should not be under-
estimated, to the present generation of social scientists critical theory seems
to offer that same "splendid lack of intelligibility" (Mills 1963, p. 571)
that so profoundly fascinated the previous generation in the work of Tal-
cott Parsons. Such an ideal combination of attributes is, of course, very
hard to resist.
This brings me to my last point. Throughout I have maintained that
there was one excuse for critical theory's failure to produce a determinate
theory of modern society and to achieve a measure of mediation between
theory and praxis: the refusal to adopt a dogmatic elitism. Now, however,
I must retract that statement: they have not managed to avoid elitist
dogmatism. It would not be fair to reproach them for failing to achieve
the impossible, but the problem is that they have never seriously tried.
Their greatest failure is that they have been unable (and, one cannot but
suspect, unwilling) to understand that "positivism" (i.e., empiricism and
simple straightforward logic) is not at all inimical or irrelevant to practical
concerns.
There is no reason whatsoever that empirical research and ordinary
logic cannot be employed with the intention of furthering the cause of
emancipation, and, in fact, that cause would be rather hopeless without
them. For years, scholars with just as much of a commitment to the good
society as the Frankfurt philosophers have been producing perfectly re-
spectable empirical work and perfectly acceptable logical arguments to
support their visions. For years there have been scientifically irreproachable
debates about the possibilities of greater democratic participation, about
the causes and possible reduction of inequalities of all kinds, about the
probable costs and benefits of nationalization of the means of production,
etc. Nor has there been any lack of perfectly rational debates concerning
the substance of reason, that is, about what we mean when we say that
we strive for a just society allowing all its members to live a decent life
free from the socially determined miseries that seem capable of remedy.
475
Thus, the kind of free discourse that Habermas calls for has already been
going on among intellectuals and scientists for a very long time. Only it
turns out to be hard enough to collect "adequate knowledge of the limiting
conditions and functional imperatives of our society" (Habermas 1975, p.
113), let alone find norms that are both substantive and likely to meet with
unanimous consent if they were subjected to a truly inclusive discourse.'4
Yet for all their moral commitments, the critical theorists have con-
tributed absolutely nothing to any of these debates. Instead, they have
chosen the comfortable heights of philosophical abstraction and obscurity,
far away from the daily concerns of the rabble. To expect any public sup-
port for a philosophy whose only distinction is its sheer obscurity, for a
notion of reason lacking all substance, for a utopia without any indication
of its features or feasibility has absolutely nothing to do with emancipation
of any kind.'5 It is really an act of supreme arrogance toward those very
'masses" whose advocates the critical theorists claim to be.
One last word about the facts-and-values issue. If there is anything
that has helped to reduce bloody repression in recent centuries it is pre-
cisely, it seems to me, that positivistic separation of facts and values. Facts
conceived as something "out there," that is, as independent of our opinion
about them, can be considered verifiable without any disastrous conse-
quences for anybody concerned. The nice thing about them, thus con-
ceived, is that we can shrug our shoulders at nonbelievers: sooner or later
they are bound to find out the hard way, since the facts are there and
cannot be wished away. Norms and values are a different matter for they
can be wished away simply by refusing to honor them. As a result, every
time in history when norms and values were considered to be absolutely
valid, capable of some kind of irrefutable verification or other, a massacre
has resulted. I am perfectly willing to believe that Habermas has only
good intentions, but then again, so did Marx.
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Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope?

Author(s): Axel van den Berg

Axel van den Berg

THE DILEMMA OF CRITICAL THEORY

1 I am indebted to Dick Batten, Richard F. Hamilton, Roger Krohn, Michael Lipkin,

AJS Volume 86 Number 3 449

jecting simultaneously "positivism" and all forms of "idealism" (see Jay

tendencies" (Schroyer 1973, pp. 91-96) of Marx himself, which, they

of offering a bold reassertion of man as the ultimate seat of reason, the

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF LATE CAPITALISM: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

The systems analysis proposed by Habermas and Offe (see Habermas

310; Offe 1972, p. 17), hardly a unitary "proletariat" in the conventional

This situation is aggravated by the paradoxical manner in which the

117-42), he has to concede that he can find no compelling evidence to

HABERMAS'S CONSENSUS THEORY OF TRUTH6

Habermas categorically rejects Offe's "actionism" as the ultimate criterion

6 For a similar summary, see Faught (1979).

since Habermas's critical theory and its cognitive interest in emancipation

CONFLICT VERSUS CONTRADICTION: RENDERING MARXISM

zational principle. In fact, their theory explains or predicts nothing at all,

Marxian concept of contradiction by means of an entirely indeterminate

in obscure, quasi-scientific language.9 Rather, he thought he could make

THE CONSENSUS THEORY OF TRUTH: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

On closer inspection, Habermas's attempt to overcome the dilemma by

9 For a grandiloquent attempt to show the obvious superiority of the "processual

analysis, the argument seems to be based on a belief in the good intentions

questions" must be settled by a "scientifically explicated understanding

13 Habermas acknowledges that in practice limitations of resources, time, and space

particular interest-group compromises legitimated by distorted communication. Finally,

to choose; there cannot be real freedom of choice if there is such a thing

capitalist-nor-communist alternative in the form of an unspecifiable en-

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