G.R. No. L-1716 June 28, 1949 (f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.

(g) Manila Laundry Company

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.), INC., and HARRY (h) Filipino Businessmen's Syndicate
LYONS, petitioner, (i) Material Distributors Inc., Wichita,
vs. Kansas
FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and (j) Harry Lyons
LOPE SARREAL, respondents.
4. All letters exchanged between Material
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner. Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material Distributors, Inc.
Claro M. Recto for respondent Lope Sarreal. of Wichita, Kansas and Harry Lyons, between
No appearance for respondent Judge. October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.

PERFECTO, J.: 5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material

On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on
April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money
judgment against petitioners on three causes of action in the
total of P1,256,229.30.
Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and Material
Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas, between
October 9, 1946 to March 31, 1947.
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons.

On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and
inspection of the following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the
following persons or entities
(a) British-American Engineering
Corporation
(b) Philippine Refinery
(c) Felipe Buencamino
(d) Luzon Stevedoring
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York
1. Letters exchanged between Harry Lyons and
Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas
between September 14, 1946 and March 24,
1947.
2. Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons
and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas,
between September 14, 1946 and March 24,
1947.
3. Cash Receipts Journal.
4. Cash Payments Journal.
On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the
production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of
the complaint.
On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition
to Sarreal's above mentioned original and supplemental motion
on the ground that he failed to show good cause and that the
motion were evidently filed for the purpose of fishing evidence.
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions,
required petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in
question on July 24, 1947.
On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons,
petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights they have under the
Rules of Court, to postpone the inspection of the documents and
annexes in question and accordingly respondent judge
postponed it to August 15, 1947.
On August 13, 1947, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of
the order of July 16, on the following grounds:
"(a) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits
the delivery, communication and general examination of
the correspondence of merchants, a substantial right, as
well as the petitioners' right to the inviolability of their
correspondence as guaranteed by the Constitution would
be violated by the order requiring the production of the
following documents:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS
(1) Letters exchange between Harry Lyons and Material
Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between Sept. 14,
1946 and March 24,1947;
(2) Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and
Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between
September 14, 1946 and March 24, 1947.
(4-5) All letters and cablegrams exchanged between
Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., Material Distributors,
Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, and Harry Lyons between
October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
"(b) That the production for the plaintiff's inspection of
all the foregoing documents above enumerated, as well
as of the following documents, would constitute a
"fishing expedition," not allowed by Rule 21 of the Rules
of Court, since their materiality or probable materiality is
not shown by the pleadings of the parties except by
movant's bare allegation which are disputed by your
petitioners:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS
(PHIL.) INC.
1-2. Cash Receipts Journal and Cash Payments Journal.
3. All individual Ledgers, specially of the following
persons or entities.
(b) Philippine Refinery.
(c) Felipe Buencamino.
(d) Luzon Stevedoring.
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York.
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company.
 "(c) That plaintiff is not entitled to the production and
inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B because
his only purpose, as stated in his supplemental motion,
Exhibit D, was to find out if a case of falsification has been
made; that the issue between the parties in this regard is
material only to your petitioners' affirmative defense,
and if the plaintiff's purpose was as stated in said
supplemental motion, then your petitioners claimed their
privilege against self-incrimination. That this letter
privilege was also claimed insofar as the production and
inspection of the other documents were concerned by
your petitioners in view of counsel for respondent Lope
Sarreal's charge to the Honorable City Fiscal for the City
of Manila that your petitioners were violating our
Corporation Law."
On September 27, 1947, respondent judge denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and
September 27, 1947, as were issued by the respondent judge in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion,
and prayed for the annulment or modification of the order of July
16, 1947.a
Respondent Sarreal advanced the following reasons to show that
the orders complained of were not issued in excess of the trial
court's jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion:
(a) The motions of the respondent Lope Sarreal of May
27, 1947 and June 4, 1947 contain allegations of the
ultimate fact that the books and papers mentioned in said
motions constitute or contain evidence material to the
matters involved in the case and are in the possession,
custody or control of the petitioners herein, and
allegation to this effect is adequate showing of good
cause for the production and inspection of the documents
mentioned therein, being an allegation in the very words
used in Form 11 of the Appendix Forms of our Rules of
Court, and therefore a sufficient compliance with said
Rule (Go Tianco vs. Judge Diaz, G. R. L-7, January 22,
1946, reported in the June 1946 issue of the official
Gazette).
(b) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce invoked by the
petitioners does not apply to cases of production and
inspection of books and papers belonging to a party to
the action in which such production and inspection are
sought(Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of March 30,
1894). At any rate, said Article of the Code of Commerce
has been impliedly repealed by Act No. 190, pertinent
portions of which are now embodied in our Rules of
Court (3 Op. of Atty. Gen., 380).
(c) Neither would the inspection of books and papers of
the petitioners amount to a violation of the inviolability
of the correspondence under Sec. 1, No. 5, Article III of
the Constitution of the Philippines, considering that the
inspection of said books and papers are sought through
proper order of the trial court, and the Constitutional
provision invoked by the petitioners precisely allows
inspection of communication and correspondence upon
lawful order of the court. Moreover, this provision of our
Constitution creates no new right, being merely a re-
enforcement of the Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures (Sinco,
Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th Edition, p.
632), and when the inspection of such books and papers
was allowed "upon lawful order of the court" made
through the respondent Judge, such inspection cannot be
considered as unreasonable although such books and
papers are private in character (First National Bank vs.
Hughes, 6 Fed., C 737, 741, appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction in 106 U.S., 523, 27 Law ed., 268, 1 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 489; Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. vs. North Branch
Steel Co., 48 Fed., 191; Victor G. Beede Co. vs. Joseph
Bancroft and Sons Co., 98 Fed., 175, affirmed in 52 L. R.
A., 734, 45 C. C. A., 354, 106 Fed., 396, where this
question was not involved; Burnham vs. Morrissey, 14
Gray, 226, 74 A. Dec., 676; United States vs. Terminal R.
Assoc., 148 Fed., 486; Re Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 225; Elder
and Bogardus, 1 Edm. Sel Cas., 110; Boston and M. R.
Co. vs. States [N. H.], 77 Atl., 996; Hopkinson vs. Burghley,
L. R. 2ch., 447; Groker-Wheeler Co. vs. Bullock [C. C.], 134
Fed., 241; Re Bolster, 110 Pac., 547.).
(d) The inspection of the said documents is not for the
purpose of "fishing evidence" but with a view to enabling
the respondent Lope Sarreal to designate with the
particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be obtained
in connection with trial of the case on its merits the
specific books and papers containing the entry of receipts
and payments made by the petitioners, such books and
papers being material to the case in view, among others,
of the allegation in the amended complaint that the
defendants, the petitioners herein, had been remitting all
or the greater volume of the proceeds from the sales of
equipment and materials of the defendants in Civil Case
No. 2059 outside the jurisdiction of the trial court and
had been disposing of their properties with the intention
of defrauding their creditors. At any rate, "fishing
expedition" is allowed and is precisely contemplated in
Rule 21 of our Rules of Court as a weapon of discovery
(XXVI Am. Bar. Ass. Jur. No. 1, Jan. 1940, 48; Golden vs.
Arcadia Mutual Casualty Company, D. C. III., 1942, 3 F. R.
D., 26; Leach vs. Griff Bros. Coop. Corp., D. C. Miss, 1942 2
F. R. D., 444; Civil Aeronautics Board of Aeronautics
Authority vs. Canadian Colonial Airways, D. C., 1941, 41 F.
S., 1006; Quemus Theatre Co. vs. Warner Bros. Pictures,
D. C. N. J., 1940, 35 F. S., 949; United Mercantile
Agency vs. Silver Fleet Motor Express, D. C. Ky., 1941, F. R.
D., 709; Walling vs. Richmon Screw Anchor Company, D.
C. N. Y., 1943,4 F. R. D., 265; Monarch Liquor Corp. vs.
Schenley Distillers Corp., D. C. N.Y., 1941, 2 F. R. D., 51;
Walsh vs. Comm. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Hartford, Conn. [1939], 26 F. Supp., 556; Olson
Transportation Company vs. Socony Vacuum Oil
Company, 7 F. R. D., 234).
(e) The originals of Annexes A and B are relevant not only
to the case of the defendants but also to that of the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2059 here involved, in view of
the issue of fact raised by the pleadings of the parties as
to whether the originals of Annexes A and B have been
falsified by the insertion therein of the names of Gil J.
Puyat and Raymond Lehmann after said Annexes were
signed by respondent Lope Sarreal and delivered to the
petitioner Harry Lysons, in view of which respondent
Lope Sarreal is entitled to the production and inspection
thereof under the provisions of Rule 21 of our Rules of
Court.
(f) Even if ocular inspection of said Annexes A and B may
reveal falsification thereof by the petitioners amounting
to a violation of the applicable provisions of our Revised
Penal Code, the petitioners cannot exempt themselves
from the production of said exhibits for mere
inspection and copying, inasmuch as the Constitutional
prohibition against self-incrimination has been extended
in specific case only to the production of documents as
evidence, and only when the person producing them is
made to take the witness stand and identify them under
oath, and not to the production of such documents
for mere inspection (Comm. vs. Southern Express Co.,
1914, 160 Ky., 1, 169 SW., 517, annotated cases 1916A,
373, L. R. A., 1915B, 913; U. S. vs. Hughes, 12 Blatchff,
553); the reason being that the Constitutional prohibition
is one against compelling a person to be a "witness
against himself", and this has been held to
mean testimonial compulsion or extraction of admission
form the person's own lips (4 Wigmore, 865, 2263;
Wilson vs. U. S., 55 Law, ed., 776, citing cases).
(g) Moreover, the corporate records sought to be
inspected are not covered by the Constitutional
prohibition against self-incrimination, even though such
documents may contain evidence tending to subject any
or all of the officers of a corporation to a criminal
indictment (Wilson vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 361, 51 Law. ed.,
771; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. vs. Walling, 327 U. S.,186,
90 Law. ed., 614, 627-629; U. S. vs. Baunch & Lamp
Optical Co., 321U. S., 707, 88 Law. ed., 1024, 1037 [1944];
U. S. vs. White, 88 Law. ed., 1547).
(h) Production and inspection of documents have been
allowed and sustained in decided cases, under Orders
which were broader than those here assailed, for the
production and inspection of all books of
accounts, all memoranda and records, stocks book,
ledger, journal, cash book, bank book, bank deposit slip,
check book, voucher, contract, income tax return,
booking record and correspondence (U. S. vs. Duoder, 1 F.
R. S., 466, U. S. D. C. June 16, 1939; Orange Country
Theater Corp. vs. League, 1 F. R. S., 448).
(i) The respondent Judge, before issuing the Orders
complained of, gave the parties full opportunity, not only
to discuss the question involved by repeated oral
arguments but also by written memoranda, and in the
exercise of his discretion issued the Orders complained
of only after full consideration of all the questions of fact
and law involved.
The production and inspection of documents and books here in
question call for the interpretation and application of section 1 of
Rule 21, which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor
and upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry
upon designated land or other property in his possession
or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The
order shall specify the time, place and manner of making
the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Petitioners contend that in filling his original and supplemental
motions, Sarreal has failed to show good cause for the issuance
of the requested order. It appears, however, in the original
motion of May 27, 1947, that the books and papers therein
mentioned "constitute or contain the evidence material to the
matters involved in the above entitled case."
In the supplemental motion of June 4, 1947, it is alleged that
there is direct conflict between the allegations of the complaint
and amended complaint and those of the answer and amended
answer as to whether or not the names of Gil J. Puyat and
Raymond W. Lehmann appear in any part of the originals of
Annexes A and B of the complaint, and plaintiff Sarreal wanted
the production and inspection of said originals to show that they
did not contain the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W.
Lehmann, and that if said names should appear now typed in
said Annexes A and B, said additional names must have been
typed by direction of Harry Lysons without the knowledge or
consent of Sarreal and after said originals were delivered by
Harry Lysons and filed by the latter and that the changes so
introduced are a forgery.
With these allegations in the original and supplemental motions
Sarreal has fulfilled the requirements of showing good cause for
the production and inspection of the books and documents in
question under Rule 21.
Petitioners contained that the order of the trial judge violated
petitioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
We have considered carefully persons advanced by petitioners
and memoranda in support of this allegation and we found
nothing in them to show how, without the inspection of Annexes
A and B of the complaint, petitioners may incriminate
themselves. We have, therefore, to dismiss such contention.
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizure shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1.
Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court
or when public safety and order require otherwise. (Sec.
1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule
21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or
confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the
production and inspection of books and documents in question is
tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule
21 and followed by respondent judge place them outside the
realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no
question that, upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an
interest in the books and documents in question, that they are
material and important to the issues between him and
petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the facts
pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and
correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has
power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and
inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of
the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in
favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence
upon lawful order of a court of justice.
After a careful consideration of the legal question raised by
petitioners, this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the trial
judge, in issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his
jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition denied with costs against petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.: Mr. Justice Pablo voted for this decision.
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE. The general
rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person,
personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue
of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The
basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any
evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall,
among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN
EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of
moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no way, however,
gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The
NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop
and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay,
Benguet in view of the confidential information they received
from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to
search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a
valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence
obtained during the course of said search is admissible
against Accused-Appellant.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS;
FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND EXCEPTION; CASE AT
BAR. The prosecution had shown, primarily through the
positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the
dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants
possession. She denies this fact and contends that the bag in
question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the
passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two
opposing versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint
in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-
appellants apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the
defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning values to
the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts
because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony
in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. The exception is when the trial court has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, which We do not find in the
instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES; CASE
AT BAR. As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecutions
case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained
the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-
appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these
are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecutions
case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, which
was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE; SEARCH OF
MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES PROBABLE
CAUSE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the
NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis
alone of an information they received that a woman, 23 years of
age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53" in height would be
transporting marijuana. The extensive search was
indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers of
the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female,
and whether or not their physical appearance answered the
description of the suspect as described in the alleged
information. If there really was such an information, as claimed
by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had
to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of
those who appeared to answer the description of the woman
suspected of carrying marijuana. Moreover, the accused was not
at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her
bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana. From the
circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM
agents were only fishing for evidence when they searched the
baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused.
They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the
accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless
search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the
basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of
probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was
inadmissible in evidence.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision
dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around
8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road,
Baguio City, received information from one of its regular
informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally
curly hair, and with a height of 52" or 53", would be
transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece
of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo
Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop,
Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00
oclock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and
flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from
the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying
marijuana leaves on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa
Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which
came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the
bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that
they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search
their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus
while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair
seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last
seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange
stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and
discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by
assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to
the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and
investigated. The woman was then identified as Accused-
Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were subjected to
laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana. 6
->Accused-appellants defense rests solely on denial. She claimed
that she was engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables,
particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the
Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten
(10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain
Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached
the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of
cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her
later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the
NARCOM agents who boarded the same and began inspecting the
baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the
bag containing the marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning the
bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag
on her lap, and asked her to come with them for investigation as
she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the
marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied having
anything to do with the marijuana found on the
bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the
conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He
testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at
Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the luggage carrier,
opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the
passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody
answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time looking
at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached
accused-appellant, who was seated at the rear of the bus, the
former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkins cross-examination, it came out that the 10
sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by
a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon
arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City but that the owner of
the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not
seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also
testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered
to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-appellants
testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a
quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and
straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of the
entrapment operation they conducted based on an information
provided by a coordinating individual. His testimony reveals that
the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of
the accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt.
Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the carrying out of
his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and
nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 495)." 9
The trial court brushed aside the defenses observation that
there were discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas
and the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly
taken from accused-appellant and the kind of marijuana taken
from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defenses contention that the evidence against accused-appellant,
such as the Receipt of Property Seized 10 and her signature
thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her
signature thereon, 13 were inadmissible due to the absence of
counsel, since these were not confessions or extra-judicial
statements.
Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of
accused-appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the
marijuana from accused-appellants lap. Moreover, the court a
quo observed that there was a discrepancy between the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of
the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that the
former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of
her arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that the marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was
inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless
search, which motion was denied by the trial court for lack of
merit on November 22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging
that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding the warrantless
search conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and
unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the illegally obtained
evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in
this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his
person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by
virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence
obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld
in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in
plain view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes
it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop,
Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the
same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to
search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM
agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is
admissible against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in
the court below on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her
on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless
search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality
of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit
the evidence. 20
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive
testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the dried
marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was
actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger
seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing
versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16,
Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In
situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts
because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony
in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court
has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in
the instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellants defense was weakened by the fact
that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter
of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought
with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded
the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its fare,
but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims
otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who
told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in
Baguio City, and that no one on the bus offered to pay for the
same.cralawnad
In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater
weight must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than the denials of the Accused-Appellant.
23
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly
disregarded the corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The
matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material
since appellants reason for being on the bus was to deliver these
sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers, then
the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way
to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.
As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as
the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana
and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were
marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in
character and do not detract from the prosecutions case since it
was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was
signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against Accused-
Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Although there is a similarity in the factual circumstances of the
case at bar with those of the Malmstedt case (GR No. 91107, 19
June 1991, 198 SCRA 101) where the Court upheld the validity of
the warrantless search, however, in the present case, I am of the
view that the information alone received by the NARCOM agents,
without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the
accused, did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the
warrantless search made on the bag of the accused.
In the Malmstedt case, it will be recalled that no extensive search
was immediately made of the Personal effects of the accused. It
was only after the NARCOM agents noticed a bulge on the waist
of the accused (causing them to suspect that he was carrying a
gun) and only after he failed or refused to present his passport
when required to do so, that a warrantless search was made of
the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the
information received by the NARCOM agents that a certain
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying
prohibited drugs together with the suspicious failure or refusal
of the accused to present his passport, supplied the probable
cause that reasonably led the NARCOM agents to believe that the
said accused was then and there committing a crime. Thus
"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has
been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee."cralaw virtua1aw information. If there really was such an information, as claimed
library by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had
to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of
x x x those who appeared to answer the description of the woman
suspected of carrying marijuana.

"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably
believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal
from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on
the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the
NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag
and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag
(which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2)
travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accuseds own attempt to
hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive
the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society."
(198 SCRA 401).
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when
the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly
found the marijuana.
From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the
NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence when they
searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the
accused. They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that
the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless
search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the
basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of
probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was
inadmissible in evidence.
Endnotes:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the
accused on the basis alone of an information they received that a
woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53"
in height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search
was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers
of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or
female, and whether or not their physical appearance answered
the description of the suspect as described in the alleged