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INSTITUT FOR ERHVERVSKOMMUNIKATION

Department of Business Communication
STUDIENUMMER Dado Klinac 201209343

Student No. Rasmus Ladefoged RL94323
HOLD NR.:
Class No.
Ex.: U02
FAGETS NAVN: International Business Communication - English & European Studies

Course/Exam Title Bachelor Thesis
VEJLEDER: Amin Alavi

Name of Supervisor
ANTAL TYPEENHEDER I DK (201209343): 46220

DIN BESVARELSE RL (RL94323): 48872
(ekskl. blanktegn):
Number of Characters in I alt: 95092
your Assignment
(exclusive of blanks):
Russian Identity in Contemporary International Relations
Dado Klinac (DK) 201209343 & Rasmus Ladefoged (RL) RL94323
The Russian Federation in Contemporary

International Relations
A Constructivist Analysis of Russian Identity in its Relationship
with the West
Written by Rasmus Ladefoged (RL94323) & Dado Klinac (201209343)
International Business Communication - English & European Studies Bachelor Thesis
Supervisor: Amin Alavi
Signs Excluding Blanks: 95092
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Abstract
A Constructivist Analysis of Russian Identity in its Relationship
with the West
The Federation of Russia has undergone comprehensive political and economic readjustments in a
relative short period. Firstly, Russia was part of the USSR, which constituted one of two
superpowers in a bipolar world. Secondly, it had to re-establish itself in the post-Soviet years, where
it chose to follow a more liberal course of action that saw it draw closer to the West. Lately, Russia
has distanced itself from the West while simultaneously pursuing increasingly closer integration
with Western institutions.
The thesis is a case study of Russian identity in international relations with focus on its relations
with the West. Three parameters have been chosen as subjects for analysis. These are use of force,
economic relations and protection of its diaspora. They were found to be central to Russian identity
due to its increased economic integration in Western institutions such as the European Union and
World Trade Organization, its engagement in the war with Georgia and most recently, the
annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea.
Additionally, the three parameters are examined through three periods: The USSR era, the post-
Soviet years and contemporary Russia in international relations from Putins speech at the Munich
Conference of Security Policy in 2007 up until the Russian annexation of Crimea and the immediate
aftermath.
To analyse Russian identity, the thesis applies the international relations theory of constructivism,
Foucauldian notion of discourse and Gramscian concept of hegemony as the analytical framework.
Foucaults notion of discourse is used to establish the Western discourse in relation to economic
cooperation as well as rightful use of force in international relations. This will establish the roles
and their expectations to which Russia is supposed to act according to. Further, Russian statements
and actions are also subject to analysis in order to explore Russian discourse within the three
parameters. The findings are put into the context of Gramscian hegemony, where the West and its
institutions are assumed to be the hegemony and Russia is the subordinate. This will examine
whether Russia acts according to the values and ideals of the hegemon or whether it attempts to
oppose the hegemony.
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The analysis shows that Russias discourses within the three parameters are largely aligned with the
corresponding Western discourses. It has reformed what was once a closed plan economy into a free
and open economy, so that it now has a continually expanding cooperation with the EU and was
granted membership into the WTO in 2012. Russia claimed its involvement in the war in Georgia
was an act of self-defence, enforcement of international law and preventing ethnic cleansing.
Additionally, the same discourse was drawn upon when Russia chose to annex Crimea: it was to
safeguard the lives of Russians.
However, in all parameters it also diverges from Western discourse. In both Crimea and Georgia,
its actions were not UN sanctioned. Where it appears to have internalised WTOs norms and values,
in its relations with the EU, it resists the EUs normative pressure with regards to democratic and
judicial reforms.
The thesis concludes that Russia seeks wider economic integration with the West, but does not wish
to conform to Western mode of governance. Likewise, it moves close to the Western discourse for
securing national peace and stability, but is using it to pursue its own national agenda.
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Contents
1.0 Introduction DK & RL ................................................................................................................................ 7

2.0 Methodology - RL ........................................................................................................................................ 8
2.1 Research Design - RL................................................................................................................................ 8
2.1.1 Replicability & Reliability - RL ........................................................................................................... 9
2.1.2 Validity - RL ....................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 Inference - RL .................................................................................................................................. 10
2.2 Data - RL................................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3 Operationalisation - RL .......................................................................................................................... 11
2.4 Scope - RL .............................................................................................................................................. 12
2.5 Structure of the Paper - RL .................................................................................................................... 12
3.0 Theory DK ............................................................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Constructivism - DK ............................................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Constructivism, Discourse and Hegemony DK................................................................................ 15
3.3 Foucault Discourse Theory DK ........................................................................................................ 15
3.4 Gramsci Hegemony - DK ................................................................................................................. 16
3.5 Theoretical Considerations - DK ........................................................................................................ 18
4.0 Russian Role & Identity in Retrospect DK & RL ...................................................................................... 18
4.1 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - DK ......................................................................................... 19
4.1.1 Use of Force - DK ............................................................................................................................ 20
4.1.2 Economic Relations - DK ................................................................................................................. 22
4.1.3 Diaspora and the USSR - DK............................................................................................................ 23
4.1.4 Conclusive Remarks - DK ................................................................................................................ 23
4.2 Post-Soviet Russia RL .......................................................................................................................... 24
4.2.1 Use of Force - RL ............................................................................................................................. 24
4.2.2 Economic Relations - RL.................................................................................................................. 25
4.2.2.1 Applying for the World Trade Organization- RL ...................................................................... 27
4.2.3 The Russian Federation and its Diaspora - RL................................................................................. 28
4.2.3.1 Russia and its Diaspora in the Baltic States - RL ...................................................................... 28
4.2.3.2 Russia and its Diaspora in Ukraine - RL.................................................................................... 29
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4.2.3.3 Russia and Moldova - RL .......................................................................................................... 29

4.2.3.4 Later developments - RL .......................................................................................................... 30
4.2.4 Conclusive Remarks - RL ..................................................................................................................... 30
5.0 The Federation of Russia in Contemporary Foreign Affairs: Changes and Continuities DK & RL ........... 30
5.1 Use of Force - RL .................................................................................................................................... 31
5.1.1 NATO - RL ........................................................................................................................................ 31
5.1.2 Putins Munich Speech RL............................................................................................................ 32
5.1.3 The war in Georgia - RL................................................................................................................... 34
5.2 Economic Relations DK - RL ................................................................................................................ 36
5.2.1 Russia and the European Union RL .............................................................................................. 36
5.2.2 Russia and the World Trade Organization - DK .............................................................................. 38
5.3 The Russian Diaspora in contemporary Politics - DK ............................................................................. 41
5.3.1 Russias Role and Identity - DK ....................................................................................................... 41
5.4 Display of Western Hegemony & Russia DK & RL............................................................................... 43
6.0 Contesting Norms & Values DK & RL ...................................................................................................... 44
6.1 The Discursive Practice of International Security - DK .......................................................................... 44
6.2 Use of Force and the Construction of the Russian Identity - RL ............................................................ 45
6.3 Economic Relations and the Construction of the Russian Identity - DK ................................................ 47
6.3.1 Western Discourse and Hegemony - DK......................................................................................... 48
6.4 Display of the Changes & Continuities during the Three Periods DK & RL ......................................... 50
7.0 Conclusion DK & RL ................................................................................................................................. 51
7.1 Methodological Reflections DK & RL .................................................................................................. 53
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................... 54
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1.0 Introduction DK & RL
Through history, Russia has cemented its legacy as an ambitious nation in both military and
economic endeavours. It continuously gained territory and power until the height of the Russian
empire before the 1st World War and had shortly after the 2nd World War established itself as a
global power in a bipolar world order (Rosenfeldt 1987). However, in the past 20 years Russia has
undergone a vast political and economic transformation in an astoundingly short time (Matz 2001).
During the existence of USSR, the Russian foreign policy was constituted by expansionist and
imperial propensities combined with an ideological outlook on world politics. Indeed, the socialist
agenda reigned supreme in the minds of Soviet leadership. This was suddenly replaced by a more
liberal attitude in both foreign and domestic politics during Gorbachevs leadership. He issued a
series of liberal reforms, which had substantial consequences in the domain of foreign affairs (Matz
2001: 9 11). This new political direction was also briefly embraced and employed by the new
administration in post-Soviet Russia. This changed quickly as Russia began to focus its attention on
the former Russian territories, which it labelled its sphere of interests (Matz 2001: 1 7). During
this period, the Russian presence in Europe was marked by a status quo, as the nation tried to re-
establish itself.
However, since 2007 events have started to unfold that are calling for a re-evaluation of the Russian
role and identity in foreign political affairs between Russia and the West. Indeed, the deepening ties
with the European Union and its accession into the World Trade Organization herald converging
interests with Western norms and values, while the annexation of Crimea indicate1 a divergence.
Thus, the focus of this study is to shed light on what characterises Russia in the international
political arena in terms of its relationship with the West. This will be examined through the use of
specific international relations theories, which consist of a constructivist approach. The method of
the analysis will rely on a Foucauldian notion of discourse combined with the Gramscian concept of
hegemony, in addition to the overall constructivist framework. These theories will thus be applied
in the attempt to answer the problem statement, which is as follows:
What does it mean to be Russia in terms of contemporary international relations?
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The thesis is divided into three periods: the USSR era, the post-Soviet period and contemporary
Russia. The initial two are descriptive accounts of the Russian past roles and identities. These will
serve as a historical background, which the contemporary Russian role and identity will be mirrored
against.
Moreover, the three periods will be analysed in terms of three parameters; use of force, economic
relations and diaspora, which will be expanded upon in operationalisation, cf. section 2.3.
2.0 Methodology - RL
The data that has been acquired for this study is text-based, ranging from books and official
government documents to academic papers. Therefore, the findings are drawn from a textual
analysis of cases. Consequently, the methodology of this study is based on a qualitative approach
(Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 37).
It is not a theory-testing problem statement that attempts to falsify a theory or tries to rank the
explanatory capacities of different theories. Rather, the structure of the thesis is that of a theory-
applying problem statement in order understand an empirical phenomenon. Therefore we have
chosen theories that complement each other in order to improve the collective explanatory
capabilities instead of using theories that oppose each other.
2.1 Research Design - RL
The aim of this project is to understand an empirical phenomenon. The question What does it
mean to be Russia in terms of contemporary international relations? makes the thesis explorative in
nature. The research design is, as such, bound to be a case study by the problem statement. The unit
of the thesis is Russia with a number of subcases. According to Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen
(2012: 85), a case is an observation of the unit at a certain time. For our subcases, it is rather a
policy area over time than at a specific time.
The design of a case study has some strengths and weaknesses: E.g. it will not allow for us to rank
the importance of the policy areas on Russian agenda, effectiveness of the Russian policies nor rank
the effectiveness of the theories applied. These subjects would be better placed in a comparative
case study. However, those subjects are not the interests of this research, and as such is not a
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problem. The interest of the thesis is to obtain a deeper understanding of Russian identity in
international relations.
2.1.1 Replicability & Reliability - RL
Research must be systematic in its efforts in creating new knowledge for the conclusions to be true
(Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 98). This is important, as research must build upon
others, so that knowledge can be expanded and accumulated. Therefore, ones research should be
conducted in a manner, so it is possible for others to repeat it and reach the same result (Andersen,
Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 98). Reliability concerns the occurrence of random mistakes in the
research (Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 102).
Our research is a case study with a text-analytical approach. A text-based approach is always in
danger of subjectivity interfering with the findings. In order to rein the subjectivity, the Russian
identity is analysed through three parameters to which the theories of constructivism, Foucauldian
discourse analysis and Gramscian hegemony are applied. This will work to guide the analysis,
decrease the effects of subjectivity, thus heightening replicability.
The data used is, in principle, available to everyone. We have not conducted interviews or in other
ways produced data ourselves. Thus, the choice of data should not be an obstacle in replicating the
research.
Subjectivity could also cause misinterpretation of the data, thus lowering reliability. To lower this
risk, all three parameters will be analysed through the same theories. In this way, the parameters are
analysed in a consistent way. This should create concord between the findings, which will allow us
to combine the findings into the same identity.
However, there will always be an element of subjectivity in interpretation of data. The aim is to
acknowledge its existence and attempt to minimize it.
2.1.2 Validity - RL
Validity is the concern of whether the right measures are taken to actually carry out the research
(Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 100). This could be choosing the right theories or
correct data.
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The research question is What does it mean to be Russia in terms of contemporary international
relations?. Therefore, we have chosen theories that can analyse the components of the identity of
an actor, and not a theory like realism, where the identity of an actor is predetermined, cf. theory in
section 3.0. Further, the data for the analysis for the third period consists almost entirely of
statements in form of official documents, speeches or press releases from the European Union
(hereafter EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter WTO), Russia, United Nations
(hereafter UN) or World Trade Organization (hereafter). Therefore, they are valid subjects for a
discourse analysis, which will allow for conclusions on Russian identity.
2.1.3 Inference - RL
Andersen, Hansen and Klemmensen (2012: 105) states: King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 7) goes
as far as to write, that the first characteristic of science is that the goal is inference (Andersen,
Hansen and Klemmensen 2012: 105 translated from Danish). Case studies generally have low
inference validity (Andersen, Hansen & Klemmensen 2012: 110). This holds true in our work as
well. Our problem statement What does it mean to be Russia in terms of contemporary
international relations? is focused on Russias behaviour in Europe up till and in the current
situation in Ukraine in 2014, and the validity of inferring the result of the analysis to cases and
contexts very different from this would be very low. The findings of the thesis only apply to
contexts in which Russian history and other stakeholders are similar.
2.2 Data - RL
The thesis uses a wide array of empirical data. The greater part of the analyses will be based on
primary sources such as official documents, speeches and press statements from the EU, WTO and
Kremlin.
It will also make use of other sources such as academic papers, reports from think-tanks and books.
These are used primarily for descriptive purposes.
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2.3 Operationalisation - RL
To answer the problem statement, we have made the following choices for the operationalisation.
Three aspects of Russian foreign policy have been chosen. In these parameters, the discourse of
both Russia and the hegemon will be analysed, in order to find out whether and where they diverge.
These parameters are:
i. Use of force, defined by how Russia has utilised its military forces in international
relations. Therefore, use of force does not entail an assessment of its military capacity
per se, but rather how the use of military defines it as an actor.
ii. Economic relations, defined by which institutions Russia has aligned itself with, and
how these relations have impacted Russias identity.
iii. Diaspora policies, defined by how Russia has sought to secure the interest of Russians
outside of the Russian border. This entails what means have been employed for this end,
ranging from economic subsidies for nationals in foreign countries to applying military
force.
These parameters are used within three periods with the first being the period of the USSR, the
second the period from the creation of the Russian Federation up until Putins Munich speech and
the third starting with Putins Munich speech up until and including the annexation of Crimea.
The analysis will examine the discourse constructed by the statements and the discursive practises
of the actors, in order to reveal the role, which the hegemony expects Russia to conform to, as well
as Russias own discourse.
Further, there are two assumptions upon which the analysis is made:
i. The Western institutions of the EU and NATO constitute a hegemony to which Russia is
a subordinate to. The global institutions of UN and WTO are assumed to be founded on
Western values and ideals. Therefore they are also a part of the Western hegemony.
ii. Speeches, statements and official documents from the parties subject to analysis are
assumed to be expressed as statements of coherent units. Thus, when analysing Putins
speech in Munich in 2007, it is assumed to represent Russian discourse.
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2.4 Scope - RL
The thesis has chosen to focus on three parameters. These were found to be central to Russias
identity in international relations in recent years, as evident by its growing economic integration in
the West, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Georgia. That is not to say that other parameters
could not have been chosen. For instance, Russias energy policy and the institutions that follow
could also have been included as it may reveal relevant aspects in the relationship between Russia
and West. However, this constitutes an entire subject in itself, and is too large to exhaustively
include in this paper. Instead, the thesis stays at a more general level, in order to include other
aspects of Russian identity, rather than delving into energy policy.
The scope of the parameters is limited to a European context and the relationship with the West. To
include Russias politics in rest of the world would require more time and space. The thesis
acknowledges that it cannot give an exhaustive understanding of Russian identity in international
relations, but such an undertaking is beyond the limits set for the bachelor thesis.
Finally, the timeframe for empirical data used for the thesis is limited to Putins speech at the Duma
regarding the annexation of Crimea and the sanctions this action caused. Therefore, events of a
more recent date, such as the threats against Denmark or the closer cooperation with South Ossetia
have not been used, even though these events could have been subject to analysis (Reuters 2015;
The Washington Post 2015).
2.5 Structure of the Paper - RL
This paper is constituted by 7 sections, including the introduction and methodology.
An introduction has already been made of the problem statement that this paper will delve into.
Moreover, the methodological considerations have been presented thoroughly. In the following
section 3.0, the theoretical framework will be introduced, including theoretical considerations
regarding the explanatory force of the theories applied and the reason for this specific approach.
In section 4.0, and its subsections, a detailed account will be made of two periods of Russian
history; the USSR and the post-Soviet era. This includes an exposition of the outlook that was
characteristic for these two periods in terms of international relations.
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Thereafter, an analysis will follow in section 5.0, and its subsections, of the three parameters, which
comprise the case of the Russian identity for this study. Furthermore, section 6 will expand on the
findings of the analysis in section 5.0. Lastly, a conclusion will be made upon the findings in
section 7.0.
3.0 Theory DK
In the following sections the theoretical approach of this paper will be outlined. There are three
theories that will shape the analytical framework. There is the overall notion of constructivism,
which will be used in conjunction with the two following theories: discourse & hegemony. These
theories will complement each other and set the framework for our analysis of what it means to be
Russia in terms of contemporary international relations.
However, there are also the theories of realism and liberalism, which are not included in the
analytical spectrum of this study. The two theories share priori assumptions in respect to how the
international system is constructed and the rules that govern it are made. Indeed, the theories
emphasize that the existence of anarchy, balance of power, alongside identities and interests of the
various states, are predetermined. According to the theories, these concepts are implied to be natural
and immutable (Ruggie 1998: 9 cited in Matz 2001: 19 20).
Consequently, the identities and interests of a state can be reduced to a few fixed characteristics. In
terms of identity, anarchy and sovereignty presupposes that each state has to safeguard its
population from the international anarchy and not submit itself to a superior force. In respect to
interests, the state is expected to maximize security, power and welfare with regard to preserving
their identity as states (Matz 2001: 19 20).
Likewise, Constructivism also engages in phenomena such as the above mentioned. However,
according to this theory, identities and interests are malleable; they are shaped by cultural, political,
historical and social contexts (Matz 2001: 20).
Therefore, this study will emphasise a constructivist approach due to the explanatory force the
theory provides in relation to identities and roles and how states act through these in their
international relations.
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3.1 Constructivism - DK
It may initially appear as a dubious choice to drawn on a theoretical framework that is generally
applied to scientific fields such as the philosophy of language and sociology (Rittberger 2004: 6).
Indeed, the school of constructivism seeks to unearth the underlying dynamics of social relations
(Hill & Smith 2011: 35). However, the notion of constructivism is also applicable in terms of
international relations as it proves a useful tool in the attempt to comprehend why states and
institutions behave as they do. That is, constructivists investigate how norms, values and ideologies
affect state behaviour, both domestically and in foreign affairs (Rittberger 2004: 6 7). According
to Rittberger (2004: 9) the following questions can be posed in order to answer what compels an
actors behaviour:
i. What kind of situation am I in?

ii. Which of my several roles is called upon in this situation?
iii. To what extent does each of the behavioral options I face conform to this role?
iv. Which is the most appropriate course of behavior (given my situation, my roles, and my
options)?
This school of thought is a comparatively disparate approach to the study of international relations.
It stands in opposition to the traditional theories of realism and liberalism as it does not adhere to
rationalist logic. Indeed, the various aims of the state are not guided by predetermined behaviour,
such as the balance of power in realist theory or game theory thought by liberalists. Rather, their
conduct is a direct consequence of an international context, the norms, values and ideologies that
shape their identity, which governs their actions (Rittberger 2004 6 7).
Accordingly, Rittberger (2004: 9) emphasizes the process of socialization in relation to the

constructivist approach to international relations. This notion accounts for the social environment,
of which the actor is a part of. Through the process of socialization the state actor is moulded by
norms, values and expectations that stem from the international community. Consequently, an
identity is forged that is both the result of a domestic as well as an international context. Thus, a
comprehension of appropriateness is also established: the rules, norms and values that govern a
states conduct in foreign affairs. As a result, actors pursue to act in accordance to the expectations
of them in international relations (Rittberger 2004: 24).
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3.2 Constructivism, Discourse and Hegemony DK
By using constructivism, it thus becomes possible to examine the underlying intentions of states and
the dynamics of international relations. However, in order to determine what role states adhere to
and what is expected of them, there is a need for concrete analytical tools that are able to yield such
results. Thus, this study draws upon the theories of discourse and hegemony.
Firstly, the theory of discourse will serve as a foundation of how discourse affects the way that
Russian identity is perceived from both Russian and European points of view. Thus, the theory of
discourse will present a definition of discourse that will be applicable in a concrete analysis of
speeches and acts, which will discern how Russia is constructed in the eyes of the beholder. In
terms of Foucault, his conceptualisation of discourse will serve the purpose of explaining how the
concepts of power and discourse are deeply embedded with social interactions (Barker 2012: 93).
For the purpose of this paper, his notion will therefore be used to analyse exactly how a certain
discourse is projected through texts, which in this case are speech acts.
Secondly, the Gramscian theory of hegemony will be used in conjunction with discourse theory to
add to the depth of how certain discourses are constructed regarding Russian identity and activities
in foreign affairs. This includes both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices. Additionally, the
Gramscian theory of hegemony will be used in conjunction with Foucaults discourse theory to
ascertain how certain societal interests can be established as dominant (Barker 2012: 66 72). This
concept will be combined with Foucaults discourse theory to describe how certain discourses can
be established as the most prevailing in a given society or institution and how this can contrast with
other hegemonic discourses. As a result, these two theories will illustrate some of the mechanisms
behind the inner workings of the construction of identities, and how these identities influence state
behaviour in terms of foreign affairs.
3.3 Foucault Discourse Theory DK
Foucault belongs to the more radical school of constructivism; as he argues that everything, from
culture, social identities and even the concept of truth are social constructions, or in other words,
that people construct these concepts through discursive practices. Nonetheless, he acknowledges the
fact that social practices and the material does exist outside of social construction. However, it is
only within discursive practices that social practices and the material are given meaning. Therefore,
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discourse can be understood as the tool that enables us to understand and speak of certain subjects
and themes (Barker 2012: 90 95).
Using Foucauldian theory requires some precision, as he has theorized more than one concept of
discourse and power through his studies. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the interpretation
that will figure as the foundation for the material subject to analysis is discursive practice perceived
as: individualizable group of statements (Foucault 1972: 80 cited in Mills 1997: 7). As a result,
by subjecting a group of statements to analysis it becomes feasible to determine whether there is a
common theme or structure residing in a given discourse. Additionally, this enables the analysis of
a specific category of discourse, for example the discourse of trade or the discourse of
membership, which has various entailments. These discourses will be further explored in section
5.2 and its subsections.
However, Foucaults account of power is less tangible. His characterisation of power implies that
power permeates all aspects of society. Therefore, power is not exercised by a specific agent, such
as individuals, groups, institutions or even the state. Rather, power is an element of all social
interactions as an omnipresent force. As such, power is therefore also infused in all aspects of
discourse (Taylor 2011: 14 26). This implies that discourse can be regarded as an instrument of
power if it is given agency. However, discourse is not a one-way phenomenon or a relation of
complete subordination. Discourse is able to transmit and produce power but also able to oppose or
counter power (Mills 1997: 36 45). Therefore, it is possible to speak of discursive practices that
actually can have significant effect on power relations, including discourse that stems from head of
states. This can be done by using the theoretical framework of Foucault in conjunction with
Gramscis own notion of hegemony. This will be elaborated under the theoretical considerations cf.
section 3.5.
3.4 Gramsci Hegemony - DK
The interpretation of Gramscis prison notes laid the foundation of what came to be the notion of
hegemony. Since Gramsci drew inspiration from Marxist theory, his conceptualization of hegemony
includes aspects of class struggle, resistance and the achievement of hegemony through a
combination of the winning of consent and the use of force. Traditional interpretations of Gramsci
characterise the notion of hegemony by four components:
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I. It (hegemony) is associated with a strategy that is directed at the construction of consent,

contrary to the use of coercion.
II. It emphasized the civil society as its arena of contestation instead of the state
III. It operates in the West, where the emphasis is the creation of consent, in contrast to
The East, which has emphasis on the use of coercion.
IV. It can be applied to both of the social classes, the bourgeois and proletarians alike, as
hegemony denotes a universal theory of social power (Thomas 2009: 160).
Indeed, traditional interpretations of Gramsci are based on the understanding that a dominant
societal group will attain leadership by either the use of consent and / or force (Thomas 2009),
depending on whether the society is in the West or the East.
Other interpretations, namely ones used by theorists interested in cultural studies (Barker 2012: 66),
have used elements of Gramscis theory of hegemony to explain how certain discourses in a culture
and society can be perceived as the most prominent. According to Barker (2012) hegemony is
defined as:
[...] the normal exercise of hegemony on the classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is
characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally
without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always to ensure that
force would appear to be based on the consent of the majority expressed by the so-called organs of
public opinion newspapers and association (Gramsci 1971: 80 cited in Barker 2012: 67).
This interpretation of hegemony is therefore not based on ideological classes that struggle against
each other per se. Rather, it is based on the concept that various groups in any given society vie for
control to establish a coalition that may maintain the majoritys interests through the construction of
consent (Thomas 2009: 160 195). Furthermore, this view on hegemony would also include the
concept of ideology in a modified version. This means that ideology becomes synonymous with
ideas, meanings and practices that are cultivated by the most prevailing group (Barker 2012: 68).
However, this cooperation between certain groups is not permanent. Indeed, it is important to stress
that the prevailing hegemony can be subject to change depending on which group or coalition
attains most influence in society. Ultimately, hegemony is thus founded on temporary alliances that
need to be re-negotiated perpetually in an arena where distinct groups battle for hegemony (Barker
2012: 66 68). Consequently, if a discourse or hegemony exists, there is bound to be counter-
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hegemonic views and practices as well as counter-discourses that will act as resistance to the
existing views, norms and values (Cox 1983: 18 19).
3.5 Theoretical Considerations - DK
There are some theoretical limits posed by Foucaults discourse theory in relation to its feasibility in
terms of international relations theory. Indeed, Foucaults assumptions in respect to discourse and
power are founded on the supposition that these concepts are ubiquitous: that power and discourse
pervade every aspect of human society. Therefore, according to his understanding, power is
exercised throughout society but without any agency. Thus, his theory rejects the notion of agency
altogether (Barker 2012: 484).
However, this lack can be mitigated by combining Foucauldian discourse theory with Gramscis
notion of hegemony. Due to the fact that Gramscian theory is based on the assumption of power
struggle, it can provide agency to the theory of discourse. Therefore, in terms of international
relations and the construction of identities, the theories can be combined to analyse speeches and
acts to gain insight into how these speeches and acts constitute an arena for discursive and
hegemonic power struggles.
Thus, it is highly relevant to combine both theories to attain a greater degree of understanding of the
complex nature of roles and identities in international relations. By using both theories, it is thus
possible to use the notion of discourse in all its complexity while Gramscis theory of hegemony
can be used to illustrate how actors can use discourse to create and maintain hegemony within a
specific discourse.
It should be noted that the theories presented here are interpreted with the intention to answer the
problem statement presented in the introduction. Therefore, the theories will not be used
exhaustively, but only to the extent of their relevance in relation to the analysis of the case material.
4.0 Russian Role & Identity in Retrospect DK & RL
This study delves into the question of what it means to be Russia in terms of contemporary
international relations. Therefore, a historical background is needed to understand how current
events reflect a broader Russian identity in contemporary politics. The historical background is
divided into two sections. Firstly, the USSR era will be presented, with emphasis on the three
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parameters presented in the introduction. Secondly, the post-Soviet period will be accounted for in
the same manner as the first period. These two sections will be used to mirror Russias current
activities with the intention to contrast this to Russias current state of affair in section 6.0.
4.1 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - DK
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter USSR) was a multinational state governed by
the communists and varying interpretations of the communist ideology for more than 70 years
(Geoffrey 1998). Therefore, a very brief account will be made of how the USSR came to be, and to
which extent ideology played a role in state governance.
The beginning of the Soviet Union has its roots in the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, whose agenda
was to ignite a new world order, comprised by the socialist ideology. In terms of the state, the
revolution was believed to bring radical change to the state apparatus, in which conventional state
power politics would become obsolete (Rosenfeldt 1987: 21).
The Bolsheviks of that time were anti-national and sought to cut ties with tradition. As such, they
did not seek to unite the different people of the world through the Slavic spirit, but rather through
the principles of theoretical Socialism (Rosenfeldt 1987: 21 22). However, the ideology of
Socialism and the communist regime has changed through time, depending on the leadership of the
USSR. Indeed, in the early days of USSRs existence, the leaders were arguably more driven by
ideology than the later leadership was. For example, when much of Europe proved resilient towards
the socialist ideals, Lenin was forced to gradually adhere to state interests. Later, Stalin would prove
successful in merging state interest with the ideals of Socialism by focusing on the construction of
Socialism in one country at a time (Rosenfeldt 1987: 21-22). However, nearing the end of the
USSR, Gorbachev became progressively more influenced by Liberalism, which was evident with
reforms such as uskoreniie (acceleration), glasnost (transparency), perestroika (restructuring)
and demokratizatsia (democratisation) (Matz 2001: 8 10). Subsequently, these reforms heralded
the end of the Soviet reign, most notably with Gorbachevs statement that: universal security [...]
rests on the recognition of the right of every nation to choose its own path of social development
(Matz 2001: 10).
Thus, a few examples of how they measured in terms of use of force, economic relations and what
role diaspora played will be presented to shed light on how these aspects comprised what it meant
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to be Russian in an age of where the communist ideology reigned supreme in the Russian self-
understanding and conduct in foreign affairs. This is by no means meant as an exhaustive account
of the three afore mentioned parameters. Rather, it is meant as a qualitative insight into what it
meant to be a Russian at that time, and how that affected Russias foreign policy activities.
Therefore, due to reasons of space, this study will not relate to all aspects of use of force, economic
relations and diaspora except for those with direct and significant relevance for the study and its
aim. Neither will the focus lie on events as they unfolded chronologically.
There are a number of exploits and institutions that solidified the Soviet Unions identity as not
merely a regional power but a global superpower. These are both of military and economic nature
and they will be elaborated upon in the following sections.
4.1.1 Use of Force - DK
In terms of defence policy, this section will briefly examine what treaties and collaboration the
USSR participated in that reinforced their powerful position in global politics, thus emphasising
their role and identity as a global superpower.
There are two aspects of USSR that are of essence for this study in terms of politics and use of
force: Firstly, the ideological paradigm, which figured as an important, if not the most important
element in the USSRs foreign affairs agenda and secondly, the imperial legacy and the ambition to
seize territories which belonged to Russia during its Tsardom (Rosenfeldt 1987). These two aspects
are salient in the conduct of the USSR in foreign affairs.
An example of imperial tendencies would be the conquest that was executed in the beginning of the
2nd World War. The territories of eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia1, which
previously belonged to Russia during its Tsardom but were subsequently lost, were reclaimed
during the German-Soviet non-aggression pact in 1939-1940, in which there were agreements on
the divide of territories that fell within the two states personal sphere of interest (Rosenfeldt 1987:
26). Additionally, in the same period Finland relinquished territory to the USSR in the Russian-
Finnish war (BBC 2006).
However, merely a few years later, the founding of the United Nations in 1945, on the basis of the
great four powers, would take place. The membership of this organisation also serves as an
1
Historical region, where modern day Moldova is situated.
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indication of the significance that was attributed to the USSR and its role in international politics.
Indeed, the USSR, together with the rest of the permanent members, was expected to play a leading
role in the management of the post-war international order (Bureau of Public Affairs 2005).
After the creation of the United Nations and the end of the 2nd World War, tensions began to rise
among the East and the West. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, also known as the Warsaw Pact,
was founded in 1955. At this time, the USSR was already well-established by the time the treaty
came into existence, claiming large portions of Europe. However, the alliance proved advantageous
as it came to institutionalize Soviet dominance of the Easts political and military matters (Thies &
Podbielski 1997).
In short, the Warsaw Pact was characterised by two features, which are relevant for a comparative
view on contemporary Russian influence on foreign affairs:
i. The Warsaw Pact member states endorsed a unanimous military dogma, which
originated from Soviet practice.
ii. The Warsaw Pact member states were willing to echo Soviet views on important
political and economic issues (Thies & Podbielski 1997).
This stood in contrast to how NATO functioned, where each member state had complete autonomy
of its military as well as heterogeneous views on economy and politics (Thies & Podbielski 1997).
The significance of this alliance was the Soviets capacity to influence foreign affairs with
tremendous efficacy. Consequently, the entire East became a bloc which echoed the Socialist ideals
of politics and economy. In addition, the Warsaw Pact posed a threatening counterpart and rival to
NATO, which personified the West and its ideals. Therefore, the two institutions, the NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, were often compared with the intention to measure how the two blocs faired in
spreading their ideals of Liberalism and Communism, respectively (Thies & Podbielski 1997). At
the height of its power, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were a force that
could arguably outmatch the military capacity of the USA and NATO (Taylor 2014).
Finally, the situation of dtente signified the weight of the Soviet Union in terms of political
influence: namely that the Soviet had become a superpower that had equal power with regard to
agenda setting in an international context. Furthermore, the agreements also indicated that the
USSR had not only achieved parity, but that it was also acknowledged by the US as an actor with
legitimate interests in international security politics (Rosenfeldt 1987: 33). Indeed, the objective
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behind dtente and the SALT agreements were to prevent nuclear hostilities between the two
parties, which were predicted to have disastrous consequences for the entire world (Wallensteen
1985: 2). Therefore, both sides desired a predictable relationship in order to lessen tensions.
However, neither side was eager to reduce the number of armaments already available. Therefore,
they agreed to reduce the production of additional nuclear weapons. Thus, by reducing nuclear
propagation, it was possible to achieve a larger degree of predictability and a more productive
relationship (Wallensteen 1985: 1 8).
Consequently, the Soviets identity and role in international power politics was synonymous with
its state ideology and its conquest to ensure socialism as the prevailing world ideology. It competed
with its greatest opponent, the US. Thus, the world order was constituted by a bipolar power
system. In terms of cooperation with other states, the USSR controlled its nearest allies with an iron
grip (Thies & Podbielski 1997).
4.1.2 Economic Relations - DK
The previous section has examined the implications of the ideological stance that the Soviet had
taken in their world view and the impact it has had in their conduct in respect to foreign affairs. This
section will delve into how the USSR engaged in economics, and how it affected their role and
identity.
Ideologically distinct from Capitalism, which prevailed in the West, the adaptation of the Five-
Year-Plan in 1928 signified the onset of the socialistic state. As a result, the state emerged as the
supreme entity in relation to the setting of the economic agenda. Indeed, it dictated the goals and
priorities of all aspects of the USSRs economic endeavours (Sloin & Sanchez-Sibony 2014: 11 -
12).
If the Warsaw Pact was the military counterpart to NATO, the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (hereafter COMECON) figured as the economic equivalent of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation. Characteristic for the members of COMECON was that each
nation had adopted a five-year-plan and all production was state controlled (Fleischer 2011: 9- 10).
Thus, the realm of economics was also an essential realm of contestation between the two blocs. It
was here where the campaign for economic primacy was led, as the victor would prove the
superiority of his system. Thus, variables such as employment, productivity and economic growth
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became the arena of comparison, where the two systems were measured (Sloin & Sanchez-Sibony
2014: 8 9).
Therefore, the sphere of economics also demonstrated the capacity of the Soviet ideology as a
viable alternative to the Western ideals. As mentioned before, an example of this was the transfer of
ownership of private companies to the government. Another example is the projection of these
ideals into other states, which can be observed in the case of the COMECON (Thies & Podbielski
1997; Fleischer 2011: 9).
However, this does not mean that the two blocs did not trade with each other. On the contrary, the
beginning of dtente, as mentioned in section 4.1.1, brought stability and predictability, which also
gave rise to trade and exchanges between the US and the Soviet Union, which largely consisted of
grain and technology (Wallensteen 1985: 3).
To sum up, Russia favoured economic relations with the members of COMECON, where the union
was also able to project its ideals. In addition, when trading with other parties, such as the US, the
union conducted trade as an equal partner.
4.1.3 Diaspora and the USSR - DK
The concept of diaspora refers to a group of people, who have been dislodged from their native
country (Heleniak 2004). This concept is therefore hardly applicable to the case of the Soviet
Union, while it was still united. However, after the breakup of the USSR in 1991, there were
approximately 25 million Russians who suddenly became part of a considerable diaspora overnight
(Heleniak 2004). The notion of diaspora will figure more prominently in section 4.2.3: The Russian
Federation and its Diaspora and section 5.3: The Russian Diaspora in contemporary Politics.
4.1.4 Conclusive Remarks - DK
Thus, the USSR provided Russia with a clearly defined identity and role in foreign politics.
Together with the US, the USSR constituted a bipolar world order where the identities of both
parties were that of adversaries. The role of an adversary permeated both the political and economic
spectrum. In terms of politics and military the Warsaw Pact and NATO were established and in
economics, the COMECON constituted the counterpart of Western economic institutions.
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Thus, the bipolar world was split between two agendas, the liberal norms and values from the West
and the socialist agenda of the East.
4.2 Post-Soviet Russia RL
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union the former republics declared independence. The Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was now The Russian Federation. Boris Yeltsin was the
president. With him at the steering wheel, the new Russia now started a process of democratisation
and liberalisation, which saw the country try to align itself with Western entities such as the EU,
NATO and WTO. It was also in a situation where many Russians had become inhabitants in new,
independent countries, countries that did not necessarily wish them to stay or become a part of the
country. The following section will give an account of Russias attempts at a process of
democratisation and liberalisation in its relations with the EU and WTO. Moreover, its policies for
protecting and assisting its diaspora in the Baltic States, Ukraine and Moldova and its use of force
in its foreign policy will be examined. The timeframe for this period is from the forming of the
Russian Federation up until Putins Munich speech in 2007.
4.2.1 Use of Force - RL
This section will account for Russias use of force in the period from the formation of the Russian
Federation up to Putins speech at the Munich summit.
An aspect of this part of Russias history is related to its diaspora. This will be further elaborated on
in section 4.2.3.
In the early, new years of the Russian federations existence it sought closer ties with the west. The
NATO-Founding Act was signed in 1997, and through it, Russia hoped to influence decision-
making on matters where Russian interests were involved (Mller 2008: 297). The war in Kosovo
and NATOs involvement, however, proved this hope wrong. This would be the beginning of
Russia detaching itself from the West.
Putins first years in office, however, continued a Western friendly path, as he showed good will by
closing old military bases in Cuba and Vietnam, as well as accepting construction of American
airbases in former Soviet republics (Mller 2008: 299). However, Russia felt that NATO
continually ignored its interests and encroached on its sphere of interests by granting membership to
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the Baltic countries. This led Russia onto a path of opposition of NATO. As potential NATO
membership for Georgia and Ukraine became a topic, the situation worsened for Russia (Mller
2008: 301).
In 2004, Georgia elected a new president, Mikhail Saakashvili. He wanted to align Georgia with the
West, which angered Russia. It led to a total embargo on Georgian exports, which were a serious
blow to Georgia (Mller 2008: 301). Further, Saakashvili wanted to protect Georgias territorial
integrity by bringing the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Georgian
rule2 (Mller 2008: 302). These two republics were part of the so-called frozen conflicts, the
others being Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Partly because of the presence of Russian armed
forces, these conflicts have remained unsolved. In the case of Georgia, it is important to Kremlin as
NATO does not accept members engaged in territorial disputes (Mller 2008: 302).
In all, the period from the formation of the Russian Federation up till Putins Munich speech only
saw Russias military in action in the time immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union and in
its domestic problems with Chechnya. But the lingering and continual presence of Russian military
in the Baltic States and in the frozen conflicts still held coercive meaning and later played a part in
distancing Russia from NATO.
4.2.2 Economic Relations - RL
This section will account for development in economic cooperation between Russia and the EU as
well as its steps towards a WTO membership. Mapping the cooperation with the EU also presents
the need to account for parts of the political dialogue between the parties, as the EU sets demands
for the quality of the democratic and judicial structures in its partners.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly formed Russian Federation sought integration in a
region it had previously regarded as existing of enemies. Economic and institutional chaos followed
the reforms of the newly formed government (Braithwaite 1999: 9-13). Through the 1990s the state
had to sell off its enterprises at giveaway prices, the rouble lost most of its value, the stock market
collapsed and the liberalisation process ran into the brick wall that were the old Soviet institutions,
which were characterised by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, institution inadequacy and
ideological distortion (Braithwaite 1999: 11). But among the policymakers there was a desire to
2
These squabbles between Russia and Georgia would later start the war in 2008, but that is just outside the scope of
this section.
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reform the economy and this led to increased cooperation with the former adversaries. Among these
was the European Union. This resulted in the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (hereafter
PCA) (Barysch 2004: 10). The agreement was signed in 1994, however, it did not come into force
before 1997. This would serve as the basis for future cooperation with the EU.
The PCA demonstrated a difference in Russia from other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The
PCA did not present the offer of a potential EU-membership (Barysch 2004: 10). However, contrary
to other Central and Eastern European countries negotiating with the EU, Russia was not interested
in becoming an EU member (Barysch 2010: 7).
The PCA is the foundation for cooperation between the EU and Russia, not only on economic
matters, but also on political issues. The potential economic benefits of the agreement for Russia
stand out: Russia was to be granted the most-favoured nation status3 with the outlook of creating a
free-trade area between the parties (EU Commission 1994: Article 1, Article 5). With the future EU
enlargement in Eastern Europe looming, an even larger portion of Russias international trade
would be with EU members. Thus, obtaining the perks and security of the PCA was economically
very beneficial (Barysch 2004). The agreement provided the guidelines for dealings between the
parties covering aspects such as tariffs, anti-dumping measures and trade with nuclear material.
Thus, it provided a complete outset for economic cooperation (EU Commission 1994. However, it
was not free of charge. EU also put forward expectations for Russia to reform its political and
democratic climate and its desire to project its own values and practises onto Russia is evident
throughout the PCA as when it states: BELIEVING that the full implementation of partnership
presupposes the continuation and accomplishment of Russia's political and economic reforms, (EU
Commission 1994).
Despite not seeking an EU membership, Russia showed willingness to adhere to the principles of
the EU by signing the PCA. The EU, in turn, committed itself to assist in implementing the reforms.
Thus, the wish for making the cooperation work was reciprocal. Apparently, Russias willingness
to adopt the EUs principles and desired reforms continued as the parties continued to expand their
cooperation (EU n.d.4). However, the relationship was not without its squabbles and setbacks. When
Vladimir Putin took control the situation changed. His outlook was that Russia needed the
3
The most favoured nation (MFN) principle. WTO members have to apply the same regulations, including tariffs, to all
other member countries (Barysch et al. 2002: 8).
4
This is a reference to the overview of all agreements relating to the PCA, which illustrates the expanding cooperation
between the two parties.
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improvements to the Russian economy that the EU could bring in order to restore Russias political
influence, but he was not interested in the Unions interference in Russian domestic policies
(Barysch 2004: 11). The EU Commission (2004: 3) questions Russian commitment and ability to
improve the democratic climate in the country, to protect and improve the rule of law and to respect
human rights in Chechnya. Thus, the EU was not encouraged by the progress Russia had made on
implementing core values that were to serve as the basis for the relation between the two parties.
The different perceptions of the importance of the democratic values were evident in the progress of
expanding their relations as well: despite expansion in areas of cooperation, progress in cooperation
tended to be slow. The partners could agree to new areas of cooperation, but not on the specific
content and practises within these areas (Barysch 2004: 14). The integration between the two parties
was made increasingly difficult as Russia blamed the EU for protectionism of its own market
(Barysch 2004: 16). Russia also felt that the democratic, legislative and societal reforms demanded
by the EU were an encroachment of its sovereignty (Barysch 2004: 13).
As a result, Russia and the EU were both interested in a partnership, but during the early 2000s
they seem to differ more and more on how it should function and what its contents should be.
Where Russia may have seen the EU as an example to aspire to in the early 1990s, its view
changed, so that strengthened ties with the EU was a part of improving the domestic economic
conditions, in order to restore the influence Russia had once held. The EU, however, continued to
stress the need for reforms in Russia, so that it would implement the same democratic values which
the Union is built on.
4.2.2.1 Applying for the World Trade Organization- RL
The EU was not the only institution where Russia sought integration in the Western world. In 1993
it applied for membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which would later
become the World Trade Organization.
During the latter parts of the 1990s, Russias work to conform to the rules of WTO stalled. It was
only when the Putin administration took office that the process was again resumed (Barysch et al.
2002: 14). Russias first wave of liberalisation had brought about a free market economy with no
import tariffs and a currency exchange rate determined by the market, which plunged the economic
system into chaos. To re-establish stability, authorities took several protectionist measures, for
example import tariffs, quotas and license requirements (Barysch et al. 2002: 12). These tariffs had
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risen to 15% by 1995. According to WTO rules, they should fall to 4% and quotas must be removed
completely. Further reforms for opening Russian economy were needed to be granted a membership
of the WTO. This held back support for the reforms by some groups in Russia as the costs could
prove to be high (Barysch et al. 2002: 1, 16).
Like the PCA with the EU, the application for WTO membership brought about reforms of parts of
Russias society, this time more strictly held to the economic sector. However, it is another example
of a Russia conforming to some of the principles of the Western world.
4.2.3 The Russian Federation and its Diaspora - RL
The following will be an account of the diaspora politics of the Russian Federation with a limited
scope to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in the period after the fall of the Soviet Union. It will
expand on how Russia protected its diaspora. It will not deal with the multiple definitions of the
term diaspora but go with the one presented in section 4.1.3, and simply describe the relating
Russian actions.
4.2.3.1 Russia and its Diaspora in the Baltic States - RL
Smith (1999: 506-509) describes different stages in Russias diaspora policy. The first period, from
1990 till 1992, was in the liberalisation period around the fall of the Soviet Union. In these years,
the discourse was that all citizens of the former Soviet republics should be granted citizenship in
Russia if they so desired. They were, however, encouraged to obtain citizenship in their newly
formed countries, whose sovereignty Russia were quick to recognise (Smith 1999: 506). However,
this discourse was challenged, as Russia began worrying about their compatriots in these newly
formed countries. In 1992, Estonia passed a law that limited the Russian diaspora greatly in political
participation and influence (Smith and Wilson 1997: 851-852). Latvia would adopt similar
legislation in 1994 (Smith 1999: 508). This stirred an emotional Russian response, as it accused the
two Baltic states of social apartheid and ethnic cleansing (Smith 1999: 508). Further, the
Yeltsin administration urged the UN to take measures in ending human rights violations
(Simonsen 2001: 775). These diplomatic measures are somewhat remarkable in the light of the fact
that at the time Russia still had a significant amount of troops stationed in the Baltic States. Partly
because of the ill-treatment of the Russian minorities, Russia was slow to withdraw these forces. A
full withdrawal was completed in August 1994 (Simonsen 2001: 771), both countries obtained
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independence in 1991. But the threat of military intervention and diplomatic appeals of empathy for
its diaspora was not the only measures taken be Russia to ensure the safety of its diaspora. It
increased its criticism of Estonia and [] continued to threaten the republic with a variety of
economic sanctions, including trade embargoes, imposing punitive tariffs and charging world
market prices for energy and other commodities (Smith and Wilson 1997: 859).
A different strategy was granting extra-territorial citizenship, which allowed members of the
diaspora into the Russian polity and pursuing dual-citizenship (Smith and Wilson 1997: 859). The
latter brought no success. Further, Yeltsin set up an institution for funding []humanitarian
programmes, including legal, economic and socio-cultural undertakings[] (Smith and Wilson
1997: 860).
4.2.3.2 Russia and its Diaspora in Ukraine - RL
In Ukraine, all residents at the time of the independence were granted citizenship and the political
opportunities and influence was not limited as was seen in the Baltic States. Thus, Russia did not
have the same cause for involvement as in the Baltic States (Smith and Wilson 1997: 848-49). The
major area of contention was the Crimean peninsula. The peninsula had historical ties to Russia, as
well as the majority of the population being Russian (Kolst 1993: 206). It had been transferred to
the Ukrainian Soviet republic in 1954. Now Russias parliament looked into the legality of the
transfer and found it faulty, and insisted that Russia should have influence on the future of the
peninsula (Kolst 1993: 206). However, Yeltsin and his foreign minister would not pursue the
policy-line set forward by the parliament, describing it rash and playing with fire (Kolst 1993:
206).
4.2.3.3 Russia and Moldova - RL
Despite the presence of significant forces in the Baltic countries, they only remained a threat as
Russia never deployed them actively to force through protection of the minorities or to separate the
enclaves of Russians from the host-countries. In Moldova, however, the present Russian forces
actively supported the Russian minority when it in 1992 declared independence for the region of
Transnistria (Smith 1999: 508). To this day, this conflict is unresolved and is one of the so-called
frozen conflicts.
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4.2.3.4 Later developments - RL
After the military threats and actions during the early 1990s, Russia kept to diplomatic channels for
protecting its diaspora as well as improving the system of support as well as increasing the funds
allocated to the projects. In 2001, Putin set about reforming the system of funding as well as that for
integrating those returning from the abroad to Russia (Kremlin 2001). Later in 2006, he would
reiterate the importance of supporting the diaspora, by significantly raising the funding to the
cultural support and integration of returning Russians (Kremlin 2006).
4.2.4 Conclusive Remarks - RL
Russias politics on protecting its diaspora can thus be summed up in the following strategies: 1)
military intervention, 2) economic sanctions against the host-country, 3) funding for political
mobilisation and maintaining Russian culture, 4) extra-territorial citizenship and 5) giving members
of the diaspora the opportunity to return to Russia.
5.0 The Federation of Russia in Contemporary Foreign Affairs: Changes

and Continuities DK & RL
In the previous sections, we have established what elements constituted the Russian identity in
foreign affairs by three parameters: Use of force, economic relations and diaspora. In this section,
we will use these parameters in the context of contemporary politics in order to understand what
comprises the present-day Russian identity and role in respect to international relations. Therefore,
in order to establish the Russian identity in foreign affairs, we have taken the approach of
constructivism, which we will use to determine what elements are essential in shaping the interests
and identities of the state.
Firstly, the use of force in the context of Russia will be analysed. Secondly, in terms of economic
relations, the paper has chosen to emphasise Russias relationship with the EU and the WTO,
respectively. Finally, the parameter of diaspora will deal with the case of Ukraine, which presently
comprises the most influential case in terms of Russian involvement in respect to its diaspora.
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5.1 Use of Force - RL
This section is an analysis of Russian discourse and identity in foreign policy with regards to the
use of military force. Additionally, an analysis of NATOs discourse on military intervention will
be carried out. This analysis will draw upon NATOs founding treaty as well as its involvement in
the conflict in Kosovo, as this was not a UN sanctioned action. It will draw upon Putins speech at
the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, from which it will establish how Putin
describes the Western discourse of security politics. Furthermore, the war in Georgia in 2008 will
be used to analyse the discourse Russia used there.
5.1.1 NATO - RL
The foundation of NATO was laid in 1949 with the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The
treaty defines the nature of the institution. It is an institution centred on security matters. Article 5
states that an armed attack against one of the members is to be regarded as an attack on all the
members and consequently, all will come to the aid of the member(s) under attack (NATO 1949).
Further, article 5 draws on the UN Charter article 51, which states that: Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, [] (UN 1945b).
Thus, the NATO discourse on use of force is based on self-defence. It was not intended to be an
institution for handling conflicts that did not involve the members. In the context of conflicts where
no NATO member was a victim of aggression, the treaty in its opening remarks adhered to UNs
Security Council: The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of
the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments (NATO 1949). Both quotes relate the use of military force to the UN charter, thereby
including another facet into the discourse. The use of force should be carried out according to
international law; states should not arbitrarily apply military force in solving conflicts.
The war in Kosovo would see NATO expand this discourse. Earlier in the 1990s, it had followed
the instructions of the UN, and had been engaged in solving the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (NATO
2015). However, the alliance did not follow UN directions when it started its campaign to end the
war in Kosovo. In a press statement, NATOs Secretary General justified the launch of NATO air
strikes saying: Our actions are directed against the repressive policy of the Yugoslav leadership.
We must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in
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Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so (NATO 1999). In this, NATOs actions are only justified
by its moral duty, there is not an aspect of self-defence, nor is it referring to the UN. It is only based
on a humanitarian aspect.
Thus, NATOs discourse for use of military force had been expanded to now also consist of moral
obligations. NATO could now engage in solving conflicts to aid those in dire need that could not
fend for themselves.
In all, the NATO discourse for use of military force as justified can be summed up as to be based on
three pillars:
i. Application of use of military force in the act of self-defence.

ii. Application of use of force to enforce international law through the UN.
iii. Application of use of force in humanitarian campaigns.
As this is the discourse of the hegemony, it sets the role for other states in this context. Thus, Russia
should conduct itself according to this in foreign matters that involve the application of military
force.
5.1.2 Putins Munich Speech RL
In 2007 Putin gave a speech at the Munich Conference of Security Policy. It appears as a break
from the strategy of the past decade and half, where Russia had sought closer cooperation with the
West.
In the speech, Putin describes the unipolar system of international politics, which was predicted to
dominate after the end of the Cold War. He criticizes the system calling it undemocratic (Kremlin
2007). Further, he goes on to state that a unipolar system is unacceptable and impossible, as the
military, economic and political resources would not suffice in the maintenance of international
peace and stability and that such a system would have no moral foundations (Kremlin 2007).
Where the unipolar model have not materialised, Putin finds that USA has attempted to implement
this system (Kremlin 2007). By describing the Western, led by the US, model for international
relations, he establishes their discourse for security policies:
We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. [] One
state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in
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every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on
other nations (Kremlin 2007).
In this quote it is clear, that Putin finds that USs unilateral decision making is wrong: It is
illegitimate, as the US has infringed the sovereignty of other states. Further, it forces its ideas and
thoughts of economy, politics, culture and education onto other states, which serves to legitimise its
policies, as American ideas are now internalised by other states. Moreover, it has fostered a climate
in international relations where there is an: [] uncontained hyper use of force military force
[] (Kremlin 2007). This inclination to ignore international law and make use of military force is
creating an environment of insecurity, which leads to an arms race (Kremlin 2007). Thus, Putin
finds that the US discourse is claiming to be according to international law, while it really is one of
law of power, the powerful can do whatever he so desires.
Instead of the international system affected by Americas attempt at imposing a unipolar model on
it, Putin argues for a different system. He argues for a multipolar system that not only considers the
opinions of the West, but instead considers all the participants in the international dialogue
(Kremlin 2007). In this multipolar system: The need for principles such as openness, transparency
and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional
measure [] (Kremlin 2007). This differs from the system he had just described with its regard
and respect for international law, as well as being less inclined to the use of force. Thus, Putin is
establishing a discourse for the use of force that is built upon the values also called upon in Western
discourse. He builds upon this by clearly stating that the international community should interfere in
countries domestic affairs to deal with authoritarian regimes, tyrants and threats of weapons of
mass destruction. This is also seen in Western discourse, e.g. in NATOs discourse in Kosovo.
However, when addressing remarks from the Italian Defence Minister at the same conference, he
further expands the discourse as to who are allowed to make the decisions:
I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a
last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. [] The use of force can only be considered
legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN (Kremlin 2007).
The Italian Defence Minister had stated that the use of force could only be legitimate if the decision
was taken by NATO, the EU or the UN (Kremlin 2007). Putin wants that limited to the UN, so that
it is in a multilateral setting.
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To sum up, Putin criticizes the effect of the US dominated Western discourse has had on
international relations. It has become an unstable system with too many conflicts, and where too
often and too easily military force is applied to solve conflicts. Further, there have been too many
illegitimate actions, and especially the US has been a bad transgressor. Instead Putin proposes a
multilateral world where the discourse for use of force is based on:
i. The international system of security politics needs to open, transparent and predictable,
with the use of force as an exceptional measure.
ii. The decision of applying military force must be according to international law; therefore
it can only be approved by the UN.
iii. The international community should intervene on humanitarian grounds or against
global threats (weapons of mass destruction).
The discourse Putin sets forward is very much alike that of NATO outlined in the previous section.
However, Putin does not see the two discourses as similar, or he contests what really is the content
of the Western discourse. He outlines how he finds the Western discourse to be the hegemonic
discourse, or at least how it is attempted to be made the hegemonic one: This is visible in the
economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations (Kremlin 2007).
5.1.3 The war in Georgia - RL
The night between the 7th and 8th of August 2008, Georgia attacked the breakaway region of South
Ossetia after there had been an increased amount of clashes between Georgian and separatist forces
(BBC 2008a). Russia stepped in and pushed back the Georgian forces, before pressing into Georgia.
Five days later, a ceasefire was agreed upon (BBC 2009). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the
region of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had declared independence, which had led to armed conflicts
as Georgia saw the two regions as part of its territory. Russia had stepped in to enforce a truce, and
had maintained forces in the regions as well as deepening relations with the two regions. This had
led them to extent the possibility of Russian citizenship to South Ossetians (BBC 2008b).
Dmitry Medvedev was the Russian president at the time. At a press conference after the signing of
the ceasefire, he called Russian involvement for our peace enforcement mission (Kremlin 2008).
By first naming the mission a peacekeeping mission, the statement draws on the hegemonic
discourse, and the course of action is thus made more legitimate. It signals that it is not out of
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aggression or seeking benefits for Russia itself, but to invoke peace. It appears as if Russia was
reluctant to get involved. Also, Medvedev, and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy who had
functioned as the mediator, both lists the principles upon which the ceasefire is based (Kremlin
2008). The third, out of six, principle is: Free access to humanitarian assistance (Kremlin 2008).
Who insisted on listing it as one of the principles is unknown, but Russia had at least agreed to it,
along with cessation of the use of force, as well as a withdrawal of its forces. This reinforces the
Russian discourse of peacekeeping: It allows or wants the humanitarian aid for refugees, as well as
signalling that Russia is not aggressive, as it is ready to withdraw its forces. The humanitarian
aspect is reiterated and expanded when Medvedev states that the mission was also to prevent
Georgia from carrying out ethnic cleansing (Kremlin 2008).
There are two other aspects of the discourse: Self-defence and enforcement of international law.
Some South Ossetians had taken up the offer of Russian citizenship. Further, there were Russian
peacekeepers in the region. With the outbreak of war, these were in danger: Faced with the killing
of several thousand citizens the state had to take the appropriate course of action (Kremlin 2008).
Thereby, the discourse is expanded to also encompass self-defence, which is lawful by the UN
Charter article 51 (UN 1945b). Further, Medvedev relates the mission to international law: The
stability of our world rests on the system of international law (Kremlin 2008). He thus reiterates
the world view brought forward by Putin. Medvedev claims that Georgia was the aggressor, and
that their campaign was a breach of international law (Kremlin 2008). Russia then had to step in and
enforce this law.
Conclusively, the Russian discourse for its engagement in the war between Georgia and its
breakaway region of South Ossetia consists of the following points:
i. It was lawful, as it was peacekeeping and an enforcement of international law.

ii. It was lawful according to UN Charter article 51, as it was protecting Russian citizens.
iii. It was humanitarian, as it prevented incidents of ethnic cleansing.
In all, the war in Georgia saw Russia apply military force very much within the hegemonic
discourse. Russias discourse contained a humanitarian aspect as well as those of self-defence and
enforcement of international law. However, it was not a UN sanctioned action (UN 2008). UN
(1945b) does allow states to use its military in cases of self-defence, but the Russias enforcement
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of international law was not UN sanctioned. Thus, a part of its discourse in Georgia is contradictory
with the discourse Putin established in Munich.
5.2 Economic Relations DK - RL
In relation to Russias economic relations, there are two aspects which this paper has chosen to
focus one in order to determine Russias identity in terms of trade. The aspects are Russias
continued economic relationship with the EU and its accession into WTO. These will be analysed
and the theoretical implications will be expanded upon.
5.2.1 Russia and the European Union RL
The following will be an analysis of EUs discourse towards Russia. EUs discourse constructs the
role which Russia will have to consider in different contexts, cf. section 3.0. The basis for the
analysis will be the PCA. Steps have been taken to create a new framework for the partnership, but
as of yet, the PCA is still the framework on which cooperation in other areas is based.
The PCA was signed in 1994 and came into force in 1997 (EU n.d.). The PCA states the principles
behind political dialogue and the opening of the Russian market, so that it could transform into an
open and free market. After the PCA, the relationship between the two parties would expand to
encompass cooperation on different areas such as energy and nuclear policies, battling trans-border
crime and terrorism, development of human rights and tourism (EU n.d.). However, following
Russias annexation of Crimea in March 2014, cooperation would be replaced by sanctions.
The opening of the PCA states the assumptions on which the rest of the contents of the agreement
are built. One of these statements reads: CONVINCED of the paramount importance of the rule of
law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, establishment of a multi-party
system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market
economy (EU Commission 1994). The next statement builds upon the preceding: BELIEVING
that the full implementation of partnership presupposes the continuation and completion of Russias
political and economic reforms, (EU Commission 1994). Both of these statements relate to
economic cooperation, despite the lack of technical terms related to the field of economics.
However, the absence of technical instructions and regulations do not hinder the statements from
projecting certain normative aspects. The first quote establish the importance of a set of ethical
values and a democratic political system, neither are linked to economy, while the second statement
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dictates the future of the partnership based on Russias commitment to the first statement. Thus, the
two statements attempt to influence behaviour: If Russia wishes to reap the (full) benefits of
cooperation with the EU, its own discourse of economy must become more uniform with EUs.
Thus, these statements from the PCA are a part of EUs discourse of economic cooperation towards
Russia. They do not contain technical aspects, e.g. instructions on tariffs, labour market and
investment. Yet they attempt to influence norms, values and practises regarding economic
cooperation. As a result, Russia is needed to reform its ethical, political and economic climate.
After the PCA the cooperation between the two parties was expanded. It would come to include
biannually meetings on relevant policy matters such as visa legislation, trans-border crime fighting,
handling of classified information. As such, the discourse of economic cooperation was continued.
The EU would carry on its attempt to influence Russia to conform to the EUs own ideals.
However, seemingly Russia was not so eager to partake in the EUs discourse.
In its report in 2004, the EU Commission raises concerns of the slow Russian progress in the
implementation of reforms of its democracy and judiciary, which it deems to be unsatisfactory (EU
Commission 2004: 3). Later in the report it goes on to state: The EU as whole should confirm that
shared European values remain the basis for deepening relations (EU Commission 2004: 5).
This statement reproduces the discourse the EU started with the PCA, yet also slightly reshapes it. It
builds on the concerns raised earlier in the report, where it questioned Russias commitment to
uphold these values and reform its political and judicial structure. However, this quote has a
different character: In the PCA, it was mentioned more as assumptions. Additionally, this is more
regulatory, bordering on being a warning. If Russia wishes to deepen the relationship, thus
expanding the benefits of the relationship, it must comply with EUs discourse by reforming its
democracy and judiciary and upholding European values.
Thus, EUs discourse shown here allows for a description of the role and the expectations it entails
of Russia in international relations when dealing with the EU, cf. section 3.1. To engage in a
cooperative relationship with the EU, it is expected of Russia that:
i. It is a free democracy.
ii. The rule of law is strong.
iii. Respect for human rights reside.
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iv. It has an open and free market economy.
Thus, the discourse of EU designates a defined role to Russia. In Gramscian terms, EUs discourse
would be the hegemonic discourse, c.f. section 3.4.
The concerns raised in the report and the regulatory statement quoted earlier makes it clear that
Russia is not subscribing fully to the discourse of EU. Rather, it appears Russia only conforms to
the part that is more strictly related to economy as evidenced by its lack of progress in democratic
and legislative aspects of the discourse. Even a committed subscription to the purely economic part
of the role can be questioned as EU in 2014 claimed Russia was not fully living up to its WTO
commitments (EU Commission 2014). These divergences from the role designated to it would
suggest that Russia proposes a different discourse, which differs noticeably from the EUs on the
importance of democratic and judiciary structures.
5.2.2 Russia and the World Trade Organization - DK
In the case of WTO, it can be said that Vladimir Putin has ended what Yeltsin had started. The
symbolic significance of Russia joining the WTO is substantial and will be elaborated further upon
in the following section.
Russia petitioned in 1993 for membership in the World Trade Organization and was incorporated in
the institution recently in 2012 (WTO 2012). In relation to its accession, it had to revise and modify
several of its policies in order to become compatible with WTOs (2012) standards for international
trade:
i. Access to goods market: revisions had to be done in relation to import customs duty.
ii. Agricultural subsidies: adjustments in terms of domestic support for the agricultural
sector.
iii. Access to service market: changes to the rules and regulations of foreign services and
service suppliers to the Russian service market.
Thus, the newly acquired membership of WTO bears considerable implications for the Russian
Federation in terms of its identity in relation to trade. Most notably, it has to conform to already
established rules and regulations prescribed by the WTO:
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Indeed, the WTO agreements are integrated in a single undertaking, which forms a single
coherent entity. [...] On several occasions, the Dispute Settlement Body has reaffirmed that
Members must comply with all of the WTO provisions, which must be interpreted harmoniously
and applied cumulatively and simultaneously (WTO 2008).
As such, the WTO is an organization which is built on certain values that characterize WTO
members and what it means to be an international trade partner. Indeed, some of the norms and
values at question may be discerned by a speech given by Pascal Lamy, the director-general (DG)
of WTO, who stated that:
[...] the practice of taking decisions by consensus is now broadly accepted in all stages of the WTO
decision-making process. [] it does enable all states, whatever their share in international trade, to
express their views and to participate on an equal footing (WTO 2008).
Thus, a discourse of membership is established, which emphasises decision making by consensus,

the right to express different views as well as participation on equal premises. Additionally, he also
states that: [] the WTO goes beyond formal equality and seeks to establish real equality. True
equality can only exist between equals (WTO 2008). Therefore, the discourse of membership also
encompasses values and norms that not only concern trade matters, but also the bedrock for trade
which is equality and consensus among states. As a result, the discourse of membership becomes
based on normative aspects. Consequently, its members reproduce these core values. If they deviate
from the regulations set by the WTO or disagree with other members on some issues, then these
issues may be raised before the Dispute Settlement Body (hereafter DSB) on matters regarding
WTO agreements (WTO 2008). Thus, the norms and values of WTO are also enforced, which is the
new political and economic reality that Russia will have to face in respect to its membership.
Consequently, this can be interpreted as a hegemonic practice that is now being projected onto the
Russian perception of trade through both consensual and coercive means. Firstly, it is consensual
because Russia has itself agreed to the terms and conditions of a WTO membership. Secondly, the
coercive aspect appears when Russia transgresses WTO agreements regarding trade. Therefore, the
discourse of membership also affects how trade is conducted between its members, alongside the
rights and obligations that its members enjoy. Consequently, the discourse of membership is a
prerequisite for the conduct of trade.
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Moreover, the norms and values that constitute the WTO can be discerned. They are comprised of
decision-making by consensus, the capacity to express and share views on various subjects and be
able to participate in economic undertakings equally. Therefore, an actor within WTO would have
to comply with these norms and values in order to be perceived as a constructive player in this
arena.
As a result, Russia subscribes to the normative institution that the WTO produces and reproduces in
relation to trade and how trade is regulated and conducted. Thus, through its membership Russia
now shares an identity and role with that of WTO and its other members. In other words, it is part of
an institution, where the role of an active and constructive trade partner is played.
However, this does not necessarily mean that it has subjected itself entirely to the norms and values
of another institution, but it may entail that its own national interests concerning trade has
converged in some respects with that of WTO. Thus, its membership with the WTO brings Russia
closer to the West, among other actors, as they now share the same arena for trade, dispute settling
and discussion.
Moreover, as described in section 4.2.2, Russia has been institutionally affiliated with the EU since
the late 1990s. Thus, it has some experience in dealing with an institution that attempts to persuade
it to conform to another set of norms and values.
Therefore, this may initially not seem as an entirely new role which Russia has to conform to. In the
USSR, it was part of the COMECON, which was an economical institution. However, the Russian
state was the main actor in that respect and the agenda-setter (Fleischer 2011). Thus it had the
ability to project its ideals of politics and trade unto other states (Thies & Podbielski 1997;
Fleischer 2011: 9). It had arguably a tremendous normative power, which it could use to influence
the surrounding nations according to the norms and values it prioritised. Therefore, the accession
into WTO will add another aspect to the Russian identity in terms of international engagement in
relation to trade. Indeed, it has already made changes in its policy within market access and
agricultural subsidies in order to conform to the norms that are held by the WTO. Thus, it carries
the label of an international trading partner conforming to the WTO trade norms.
However, there are some indications of conflict in relation to the Russian WTO membership. An
example can be observed in Reuters (2014), who states that Russia is increasingly resorting to
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protectionist measures in violation to WTO rules and regulation. Additionally, a concern is voiced
that Russia perhaps may not become a constructive member of the community. This is connected to
a wider divergence on norms and values, which will be addressed in section 6.0.
5.3 The Russian Diaspora in contemporary Politics - DK
In the case of Russian diaspora, some radical change has occurred between the disintegration of the
USSR and the creation of the Russian Federation. Indeed, Russians who were located throughout
the USSR found themselves overnight to have become strangers in a sovereign country. Therefore,
Russia has had to develop various means and policies to deal with the new situation. These points
have been elaborated upon in previous sections, cf. 4.2.3. However, it is important to emphasise the
development that has occurred, from being a unified nation to having a population displaced in
former USSR countries. At the present time, there is an intriguing case in terms of Russian diaspora
that preoccupies many facets of Russian international relations. Indeed, the annexation of Crimea
has cast a large shadow over Russia. In relation to section 4.2.3, the annexation constitutes an
entirely new method of preserving the national interests of diaspora. Under the claim that the
Russian diaspora in Ukraine was in immediate danger, Russia aided in protecting the population of
Crimea while the population of Crimea held a referendum that would allow them to dislodge the
region of Crimea from Ukraine and permit it to be annexed by Russia (Kremlin 2014). Thus, this
method stands in stark contrast to the measures applied in previous periods, especially in respect to
section 4.2.3.4.
5.3.1 Russias Role and Identity - DK
It is possible to draw several theoretical inferences from this occurrence. One being that the
annexation can arguably be perceived as a deviating mode of maintaining national interests
according to the norm. Indeed, it is evident that this course of action is not in line with the
established institution governing the rules and norms of foreign affairs, and will therefore be sought
rectified. For example, the ramifications are made salient by observing the temporary exclusion of
Russia from the G8, the sanctions raining down from both EU and the US in addition to the UN
Assembly declaring the Crimean referendum invalid (UN News Centre 2014; The Moscow Times
2014; BBC 2014).
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The UN is an institution which defines what a constructive actor is. Accordingly, a constructive
actor is a nation who participates in securing international peace and security by adhering to the
principles of the international law set by the UN (1945a). Therefore, by choosing to annex Crimea,
Russia has arguably deviated from the identity of a constructive player in the eyes of the UN.
Consequently, it is currently being subjected to a multitude of normative and coercive measures, as
exemplified above.
What can be discerned from this analysis is the following: Russia has two identities, which it draws
upon in this specific context. Firstly, there is the identity of being a member of UN, where it has to
comply with the given norms. Therefore, if Russia does not perform its role as a constructive
member of the international community, it does not conform to its role, and thus becomes a
counterproductive player on the international stage. Secondly, its national goal of protecting its
diaspora also carries weight. Russia is in its own right an institution comprised of norms and values
that govern what an efficient and successful government is. Therefore, the two identities may
conflict, which is evident in this situation because infringement of another states sovereignty goes
directly against the norm established by the international community.
As a result, it assumes the role of the contestant, who goes against the hegemonic practices that
govern international conduct in foreign policy.
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5.4 Display of Western Hegemony & Russia DK & RL
This display is comprised of the findings of the analysis. Thus, it illustrates how the different
institutions express expectations for Russias role and identity and how Russia chooses to act in
these different situations.
Western Hegemony Russia

Use of
Force
NATO i. Application of military force as Munich i. UN as the only institution to
self-defence according to UN Speech sanction military force.
Charter article 51. ii. The system of international
ii. Application of military force to relations must be open,
carry out UN sanctions. transparent and predictable.
iii. Application of military force for
humanitarian reasons.
UN i. Application of military force as a War in i. It was lawful, as it was
last resort to uphold Georgia peacekeeping and an
international law as set out in enforcement of international
the UN Charter. law.
ii. It was lawful according to UN
Charter article 51, as it was
protecting Russian citizens.
iii. It was humanitarian, as it
prevented incidents of ethnic
cleansing.
.
Economic
relations
EU i. Expects Russia: to be a free EU I. Increasingly broadening its
democracy. trade relations with the EU.
ii. to have a strong rule of law II. Does not conform to the
iii. to respect human rights. normative demands in terms
iv. to have an free and open market of democratic and judicial
economy . reforms.
WTO i. Expects Russia: to lower its WTO i. Conforms to the discourse of
import customs duty. membership by following the
ii. To change regulation of foreign norms established by the
services and service suppliers to WTO by complying with its
the Russian market. rules and regulations.
iii. to lower its agricultural
subsidies.
Diaspora
UN Emphasis on securing international peace and Annexati i. Deviates from the role that is
stability through the preservation and respect on of expected from it by annexing
for states territorial integrity and Crimea a region part of a sovereign
sovereignty. state through a contested
referendum.
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6.0 Contesting Norms & Values DK & RL
This section will delve further into the analysis and use the findings of the analysis to expand
further upon what defines Russia in contemporary foreign politics in terms of the three parameters
that have been consistently used.
6.1 The Discursive Practice of International Security - DK
As stated before, within the UN as an institution Russia is contesting the established norms.
Evidently, Russias annexation is not in line with the UNs goal to preserve the territorial integrity
of sovereign countries (UN 1945a). However, Russia does this by subscribing to the same discourse
that characterises the critique of its annexation within the UN.
In terms of the international peace and security, a discourse can be discerned from the Charter of the
United Nations, which this paper labels as the discourse of international security. The elements
that constitute this discourse are numerous, but the main points include: respect of sovereignty,
human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and the right of self-determination (UN
1945a). Finally, the charter concludes by stating that the UN is a: centre for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (UN 1945a). Thus, a hegemonic
practice is revealed, as the institution pursues to enforce its values in throughout the realm of
international relations in its endeavour for stability and peace.
To this end, Russia has adopted the discursive practice of international security, which it uses to
legitimise its course of action in Crimea. Indeed, in a speech held by Putin, in an address to the
State Duma concerning the annexation of Crimea, he states that: we hoped that Russian citizens
and Russian speakers in Ukraine [...] would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that
would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law (Kremlin 2014 my
emphasis). Thus, Putin subscribes to the discursive practice of international relations in an attempt
to legitimise his actions. The emphasis is on the rights of the Crimean population and draws on a
rhetoric based on democratic values. Additionally, he emphasises other aspects of this discursive
practice in relation to Crimea when he states that: [...] the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol
turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives [...] (Kremlin 2014 my emphasis).
Accordingly, the infringement of the Crimean peoples rights apparently constituted a life-
threatening situation. Therefore, according to Putin, this prompted the referendum and Russias
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direct involvement in the affair. However, he claims that this course of action was aligned with the
international law, or discourse of international security: As it declared independence and decided
to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which
speaks of the right of nations to self-determination (Kremlin 2014 my emphasis). As a result,
Putin seeks to align his actions within an accepted discourse. Indeed, this can be exemplified by the
comparison he draws on between the case of Crimea and the case of Kosovo, which he claims has
set a precedent for future cases5 (Kremlin 2014):
They (the UN) agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia [] was legitimate
and did not require any permission from the countrys central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2,
Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach
[].
Thus, Russia attempts to refer to the collective agreement of the UN from a past case in addition to
drawing on a discourse set in the Charter of the UN. Consequently, Russia both agrees to the widely
accepted norms and values set by the UN in terms of foreign policy while at the same time they
challenge the established norms by using the very same discourse.
As a result, Russia becomes affiliated with the contestation of norms through its attempt to secure
its diaspora. Additionally, due to the UNs significant role in determining the agenda in terms of
what is permitted in foreign affairs, Russia also becomes an actor contesting the hegemonic
practices of the West. However, it applies the same discourse associated with the UN but interprets
it differently.
6.2 Use of Force and the Construction of the Russian Identity - RL
Russias discourse on use of force should perhaps be seen in the light of Russias changed position
in the world. During the Cold War, it was part of one of two superpowers in a bipolar world. As a
consequence, there were was no community to whose role it should it conform, as in todays world.
Today, based on how Putin criticised the system of international relations in Munich, Russia is
arguably a subordinate of the hegemony, a hegemony which was shaped against the Soviet Union,
and as such Russia, as the adversary. Realising that its economy was failing, the Soviet Union, and
5
Whether the events in Kosovo have, or have not, set a precedent is an entirely other discussion, which is not relevant
for the point made here.
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later Russia, sought to alter its discourse and identity. The new Russia tried to conform to fit
appropriately into Western discourse. Apart from the conflict in Moldova and other frozen conflicts,
it abstained from deploying its military forces; it withdrew, however slowly, its forces peacefully
from the Baltic States, as well as cooperating with NATO and assisting in the war against terror.
Putins speech in Munich is seen as a break from this. In the speech, Putin called out for the virtues
and values the West claimed to be exercising to become a reality. He asked for the Western system
of a democratic, multipolar model for international relations, where respect for international law
with UN as the centre resides to be true, and not just something the West spoke off, but actually
lived. On the basis of Putins Munich speech, the war in Georgia may appear somewhat a paradox.
In its principles for a peaceful and stable world, the UN Charter article 2 states that: All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations (UN 1945a). Thus, a discourse for peaceful relations is established,
as it outlines how such relations are meant to be maintained. Further, it must be regarded as the
discourse of the hegemony, as all the members must subscribe to this. As a result, UN members are
expecting to adhere to this principle, as well as the others in the UN Charter, in international
relations. In the war in Georgia, however, Russia had two identities that could not converge.
After having repelled the Georgian forces, Russian forces pushed into Georgia and destroyed the
Georgian military infrastructure, despite there being no UN-mandate for such actions (Mller 2008:
313; UN 2008). Mller (2008: 313) states that Russia sought to demonstrate to the former Soviet
republics, that Russia is still powerful and it is not worth going against Russian interests. Thus,
Russia chose to follow its own interests. As described by Rittberger (2004: 9), states can have
several roles in a single context. In the situation in Georgia, the role of caretaker of domestic
interests weighed heavier on Russia than that as a law abiding member of the international
community.
However, Russia justified its actions by pointing to the Russian citizens in the region. Those
citizens were the remains of a Russian peacekeeping force and South Ossetians holding Russian
citizenship (BBC 2008a). Further, it justified its actions as hindering ethnic cleansing and
enforcement of international law. These reasons for warfare draw on the discursive practises of the
hegemonic discourse of the UN and NATO, cf. 5.1.1. Thus, Russia stayed within the hegemonic
discourses for military intervention. However, Russia also strayed from it as the invasion was
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considered an intrusion of Georgian sovereignty. Thereby, Russia only conformed to part of the
discourse. As a result, it became a counter-hegemonic act.
The Western hegemony obtains its position and maintains it through consent. It is rule-based
through treaties founded on a set of values and norms in institutions such as the EU, NATO and
UN, where sanctions, and lastly military means, are seen as a last resort (UN 1945b). Russias
actions in Georgia distance Russia from the hegemonic discourse and are as such a counter-
hegemonic act. The Russian discourse contains the same elements as the hegemonic discourse, e.g.
humanitarian intervention, enforcement of international law, but coercive measures have taken a
front seat over seeking consent. The counter-hegemonic act of the war in Georgia differs from that
of Putins Munich speech. Where the Munich speech seemed to propose an alternative to the
existing hegemonic discourse, the war in Georgia was rather an example of applying elements of
the hegemonic discourse to use coercion to pursue its national interests.
6.3 Economic Relations and the Construction of the Russian Identity - DK
The case of Russian interaction with the EU and the WTO has been analysed in section 5.2.1 &
5.2.2 and it is evident that both institutions converge on various perspectives in respect to norms
and values in relation to trade.
The participation in the WTO and the increasingly closer ties to the EU has several implications for
the Russian identity and role. The discourse of membership projected by the WTO, which
constitutes the prerequisite for the discourse of trade, is a normative practice that influences the way
that Russia interacts with actors related to the WTO. Furthermore, Russias interaction with the EU
in relation to trade is also subject to normative practises.
Thus, both institutions have an emphasis on trade relations. However, there is a difference in the
expectations from the two institutions. Firstly, the EU anticipates that Russia, in order to trade with
the EU, will revise its outlook on issues such as human rights, and make institutional changes in
respect to its democracy and judiciary. Moreover, EU has expanded its cooperation through the
PCA with Russia to include aspects such as trans-border crime fighting and visa legislation. Thus,
EU attempts to persuade Russia into a normative reconfiguration of its political climate. Secondly,
the Russian membership of WTO has had consequences for Russias economic institution. This can
Side 47 of 58
be observed in the revisions it has had to perform in relation to access to goods market, access to
foreign service providers in addition to reducing agricultural subsidies.
However, the EU has not, so far, been successful in compelling Russia to conform to its discourse
of trade, which is evident in Russias reluctance to comply with the expectations of the EU. Rather,
Russia has been more motivated to satisfy the requirements of its WTO membership, which may
indicate that Russia is keen to converge on the Western ideology of trade, but less so on conforming
to Western ideology of governance.
Therefore, despite the increasingly closer ties to the Western institutions of trade, Russia can opt to
shrug off the expectations from the EU in relation to democratic and judicial reforms. Indeed, cf.
section 4.2.2 Russia has been institutionally affiliated with the EU through the PCA since 1994, but
it remains yet to be seen whether Russia will conform to the expectations of the hegemony, or
continue to contest them by proceeding to neglect the demands.
Thus, the expected changes have yet to take place. Therefore, it can be argued that Russia has
converged with Western ideals of trade, which can be interpreted by its accession into WTO and
conforming to the discourse of membership. But it does not conform to the demands for democratic
and judicial changes, which stem from the EU.
6.3.1 Western Discourse and Hegemony - DK
The Western discourse of trade can be perceived as the hegemonic practice due to the power it
wields. Thus, there are consequences for Russia if it transgresses the established norms, which
extend beyond the realm of economics. Therefore, it can be argued that it has joined a group that
proliferates a certain hegemonic discourse, which includes certain norms and values.
An implication of this convergence on this hegemonic practice is that transgression of the discursive
boundaries is sought rectified. For example, if a member does not follow the established rules and
regulations of set by the WTO agreements, a dispute may be brought to the DSB. Furthermore,
despite the EU being a trade partner, there are normative aspects of their relationship which are
sought preserved, as presented in section 5.2.1. It becomes more salient if one considers the
sanctions6 that are now raining down on Russia after it chose to annex Crimea, which the West
6
The sanctions referred to are the ones presented in section 5.3 and include: temporary exclusion from the G8,
economic sanctions from both the EU and the US.
Side 48 of 58
broadly condemns. As a result, the coercive force of this hegemonic discourse becomes evident
when Russia does not conform to the ideals it has, in some sense, agreed to follow.
Therefore, despite Russia enjoying its newfound membership with WTO and increasing trade with
the EU, it has consequences when Russia decides to act outside of the established discourse. As
such, it has established a new identity, which commits Russia to follow these institutions.
This has already been contrasted in section 5.2.2 where Russia played a substantial part in the
agenda-setting in the COMECON. Therefore, its present situation is a profoundly different one in
comparison to that. Nonetheless, the role of adversaries has influenced the relationship between and
the West heavily through a long period of history. However, with the collapse of the USSR, Russia
has had to redefine its political and economic agenda, which seemed to favour cooperation with the
West in many respects. Thus, Russia has consistently been integrating its economy with that of the
West and its ties to the EU has grown thick. Indeed, there has been created economic
interdependence between the two actors, which is evident in the amount of trade that flows between
the two countries (EU Commission 2015).
Cf. section 3.1, Russia is now in a situation where it is subject to the influence of the trade
institutions it has come to associate itself with. Thus, its behavioural options that are available have
been restricted due to the normative nature of its economic relations. Consequently, the appropriate
course of action for Russia, both in trade but also in use of force, is increasingly becoming
synonymous with the appropriate course of action that is defined by the norms and values set by the
relationships it seeks to further.
Side 49 of 58
6.4 Display of the Changes & Continuities during the Three Periods DK & RL
The paper has comprised a display that gives an overview of the most significant changes that have
occurred in Russian international relations in terms of the three parameters.
Use of Force Economic Relations Diaspora

The Union of Soviet Completely ideologically Completely ideologically A united nation: It did not
Socialist Republics distinct from the West. distinct from the West. trouble itself with borders
It participated in the It participated in the and boundaries. Russians
creation of: creation of: were free to move within
the USSR.
Warsaw Treaty COMECON.
Organisation.
This also constituted a
Thus, it was part of a hegemony. Russia had an
hegemony, who engaged economic agenda, which it
in setting the agenda in proliferated through this
respect to international institution.
peace and stability.
Post-Soviet Russia With the fall of the USSR, Initially, Russia had to Had to develop various
Russia sought closer perform economic and policies in dealing with its
relations to the West. institutional reforms. It diaspora:
Russia was optimistic in its began engaging with: i. Military
relationship to the West intervention.
and NATO. EU (who saw that ii. Economic
Russia reformed its sanctions against
However, Russia felt democracy and the host-country.
threatened by NATO judiciary). iii. Funding for
impinging on its sphere of WTO. political
interest and thus began mobilisation.
detaching itself from the It initiated the Partnership iv. Extra-territorial
West. and Co-operation citizenship.
agreement with the EU, v. Giving members
whom it formerly regarded of the diaspora
as an adversary. Moreover, the opportunity to
it applied for membership return to Russia.
in the WTO.
The Russian Federation in Invades Georgia, referring Broadens its cooperation Annexes the region of
contemporary politics to international law as with the EU. However, Crimea into Russia, after
legitimising factor. Russia is less inclined to referendum by the people
Thereby, contesting the perform changes to its of Crimea. Thereby,
hegemonic norms of democratic and judicial contesting the hegemonic
international relations. structure. norms of international
relations.
Achieves WTO-
membership, thus
broadening its affiliation
with the West.
Side 50 of 58
7.0 Conclusion DK & RL
This thesis has sought to shed light on the question of what does it mean to be Russia in terms of
contemporary international relations?. It has done so by conducting a case analysis of the Russian
role and identity in international relations by looking at three parameters throughout the last three
periods Russia has undergone. The three parameters are the use of force, economic relations and
diaspora, which were examined consistently through the three periods. The periods that were
analysed are the USSR era, the post-Soviet years and contemporary Russian international relations.
Firstly, during the USSR era, the relationship between Russia and the West was characterised by the
contestation for ideological supremacy. Thus, the two parties were adversaries. Secondly, the post-
Soviet period initially saw Russia draw closer to Western ideals: economically so through the
signing of the PCA with the EU and politically through the NATO-Founding Act. In the years after
Putins speech in Munich 2007, Russia began, in some aspects, detaching itself more from the West
politically, while retaining closer economical cooperation.
As such, the thesis has drawn on a constructivist approach in its analysis of the case. The
Foucauldian notion of discourse alongside the Gramscian concept of hegemony was used to
conduct a discourse analysis from the various actors. By using these theories, the thesis sought to
examine how the discourse of various institutions (the EU, NATO, UN & WTO) affected the
Russian identity and role in its relation to the West.
In terms of use of force and diaspora, the war in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea constitutes
two cases with relevance for the definition of the Russian identity. The UN Charter demands its
members to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of foreign states, as well as upholding
international law as set forth in the UN Charter. Putin reiterated this discourse in his Munich
speech, where he criticised past unilateral actions of the U.S. and called for an international system
that was multilateral with UN as the centre of international law. In 2008, however, Russia became
involved in the war in Georgian. Its actions had not been approved by the channels it had itself
called the only body that could legitimise use of force. In 2014, Russia again used its military
outside of its own borders, when it annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea under the claim of
protecting the lives and interests of the Russian diaspora.
Consequently, Russia is the contestant of the hegemony established by the UN and NATO, whose
norms and values dictate the rules of conduct in foreign affairs. It has done so by choosing to pursue
Side 51 of 58
national interests by seemingly drawing on the hegemonic discourse, while simultaneously

transgressing the boundaries set by the institutions governing the conduct of international relations.
In terms of economic relations, there are two institutions that play a substantial role in determining
Russias role and identity. Firstly, Russias accession into the WTO means that Russia will have to
face a new economic reality. It has to conform to the established rules and norms, which means
opening its market to a higher degree to foreign goods and service suppliers. As such, it conforms to
the discourse of membership, which it reproduces through its active membership in the institution.
Secondly, Russias continued relationship with the EU is broadening. Therefore, it still has to face
the normative pressure that the EU exerts. However, despite the EUs expectations for changes in
the Russian democratic and judicial structure, Russia is less inclined in changing its political
climate than its economic climate.
Therefore, Russia seeks broader integration within the Western discourse of trade, which
consequently affects its role as more conform to the Western norms and ideals. However, it
simultaneously attempts to preserve its own institutional structure in terms of democracy and
judiciary.
As a result, to be Russia in contemporary foreign politics means to deal with the normative
demands from the EU, who anticipates that Russia makes institutional changes to its democratic
structure and its judiciary. Moreover, it also entails becoming acclimatised with the discourse of
membership which is a consequence of its accession into the WTO. Conclusively, the Russian role
and identity in terms of international relations is characterised by:
i. Converging interests with the West in terms of trade. Russia is keen on

developing trade relations on Western terms. However, it is less inclined to make
changes to its democratic and judicial structure.
ii. Diverging interests in terms of use of force and diaspora. Russia seemingly
conforms to the established hegemonic practice of securing peace and stability in
international relations, set by the UN and NATO. However, its use of force in
Georgia and its annexation of Crimea constitute a practice that does not conform
to the hegemonic practice of the West. Consequently, Russia becomes a
contestant of the hegemonic practice by pursuing national interests through the
use of force.
Side 52 of 58
7.1 Methodological Reflections DK & RL
This case study specifically examined the formation of the Russian role and identity by focusing on
three specific parameters. While they did give an insight into the Russian identity in terms of
international relations, other factors could have been chosen instead, which may have yielded
similar or different results. For instance, the issue of minority rights in general may have been
examined, due to the EUs emphasis on that subject, instead of being limited to the issue of the
Russian diaspora. Likewise, Russias relationship to the West may also have included other
institutions, like its cooperation with the G8.
Therefore, the findings of this thesis point towards rising tensions between Russia and the West,
especially in respect to use of force and diaspora. However, by applying the theories to other issues
where the West and Russia are more in concord, such as the fight against terrorism or North
Koreas development of nuclear weapons, the findings may have indicated a less hostile
relationship between the two parties.
Additionally, the West is assumed to be one coherent entity with an identical outlook on
international relations. Consequently, the findings may have differed if the focus had been on
examining Russias relationship with individual countries or institutions, which may have given a
more precise indication of the role and identity of Russia in relation to these actors.
Moreover, if the thesis had not been limited by the issue of space, it would have been interesting to
investigate the actual role and identity Russia plays in the world by also including its cooperation in
other contexts, such as the BRIC and other institutions that are both located in America and Asia.
By doing so, it would have been possible to give a more complete picture of the Russian identity in
global politics. However, this thesis may act as a stepping stone for such future research of both
Russias relationship with the West and examining Russia in a more global context.
Side 53 of 58
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HJEMMEOPGAVER, PROJEKTER, SYNOPSER U/ MUNDTLIGT FORSVAR

INSTITUT FOR ERHVERVSKOMMUNIKATION

STUDIENUMMER Dado Klinac 201209343

FAGETS NAVN: International Business Communication - English & European Studies

VEJLEDER: Amin Alavi

ANTAL TYPEENHEDER I DK (201209343): 46220

The Russian Federation in Contemporary

Written by Rasmus Ladefoged (RL94323) & Dado Klinac (201209343)

International Business Communication - English & European Studies Bachelor Thesis

Supervisor: Amin Alavi

Signs Excluding Blanks: 95092

1.0 Introduction DK & RL ................................................................................................................................ 7

4.2.3.3 Russia and Moldova - RL .......................................................................................................... 29

1.0 Introduction DK & RL

What does it mean to be Russia in terms of contemporary international relations?

2.1 Research Design - RL

2.1.1 Replicability & Reliability - RL

2.5 Structure of the Paper - RL

This paper is constituted by 7 sections, including the introduction and methodology.

i. What kind of situation am I in?

Accordingly, Rittberger (2004: 9) emphasizes the process of socialization in relation to the

3.2 Constructivism, Discourse and Hegemony DK

3.3 Foucault Discourse Theory DK

3.4 Gramsci Hegemony - DK

I. It (hegemony) is associated with a strategy that is directed at the construction of consent,

3.5 Theoretical Considerations - DK

4.0 Russian Role & Identity in Retrospect DK & RL

4.1 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - DK

4.1.1 Use of Force - DK

4.1.2 Economic Relations - DK

4.1.3 Diaspora and the USSR - DK

4.1.4 Conclusive Remarks - DK

4.2 Post-Soviet Russia RL

4.2.1 Use of Force - RL

4.2.2 Economic Relations - RL

4.2.2.1 Applying for the World Trade Organization- RL

4.2.3 The Russian Federation and its Diaspora - RL

4.2.3.1 Russia and its Diaspora in the Baltic States - RL

4.2.3.2 Russia and its Diaspora in Ukraine - RL

4.2.3.3 Russia and Moldova - RL

4.2.3.4 Later developments - RL

4.2.4 Conclusive Remarks - RL

5.0 The Federation of Russia in Contemporary Foreign Affairs: Changes

5.1 Use of Force - RL

i. Application of use of military force in the act of self-defence.

5.1.2 Putins Munich Speech RL

5.1.3 The war in Georgia - RL

i. It was lawful, as it was peacekeeping and an enforcement of international law.

5.2 Economic Relations DK - RL

5.2.1 Russia and the European Union RL

iv. It has an open and free market economy.

5.2.2 Russia and the World Trade Organization - DK

Thus, a discourse of membership is established, which emphasises decision making by consensus,

5.3 The Russian Diaspora in contemporary Politics - DK

5.3.1 Russias Role and Identity - DK

5.4 Display of Western Hegemony & Russia DK & RL

Western Hegemony Russia

6.0 Contesting Norms & Values DK & RL

6.1 The Discursive Practice of International Security - DK

6.2 Use of Force and the Construction of the Russian Identity - RL

6.3 Economic Relations and the Construction of the Russian Identity - DK