Académique Documents
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F O i i G i H R AT I O N S
Scott B. Macdonald
Freedom of Information
Manager
Phone: (604) 623-3880
Fax: (604) 623-4556
17 March 2011
Please find attached all records responsive to your request as of 4 January 2011. We
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/end.
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www.bchydro.com
SLT Master Planning Initiatives and Decisions
CoV
Updated April 30, 2009
I
SLT Direction needed for continued planning:
1
Escalation to Board
New No additional development permits or activation approved in the False Creek region; including the green space around the ^ y ; ff !
i Science Centre and Andy Livingston Park ^^^
Directions (note: these decisions are intended to move planning forward and will only be revisited should information be confirmed that all parties agree change these
planning principals: i.e. there is no ability for the venue system to meet the clean vehicle criteria)
II "
Follow-up by SLT Members
1
4 Impact of Celebration Sites on other Olympic Activations and Venues Urban Domain Working Group June 15
iscoa) 9 Acceptable locations for newspaper boxes, waste receptacle, etc.. in proximity to venue
fencelines
Urban Domain Working Group mm
Lead: V2010-ISU
Municipalities to adjust placement given VISU standards
New Permitting strategy for Residents in GVA impacted by Venue Operations Urban Domain Working Group MSy20
10 Determine numbers of residents
Establish a process Lead: VANOC, OET, CoV and
Develop costing structure ISU
O E T: |
6,
June to .2011
GA-3951-3-02416/11
This is in response to your request under the Access to Information Act received on May 11, 2011,
seeking the speaking notes, transcript, audio/visual presentation and if available he recording
of the keynote address by RCMP A/Comm. Bud Mercer (leasons Learned from the Vancouver
2010 Olympics) from November 16,h, 2010 at the Fairmont Vancouver.
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For ease of reference, please quote the file number appearing on this letter.
rineau, Supt.
Departmental Privacy and
Access to Information Coordinator
RCMPMailstop#61
73 Leikin Drive
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K1A0R2
attach.
Canada
C h o w, B r a d l e y
Guys as you are probably aware there were some significant events which occurred in our area yesterday. Firstly the
generator at JOR failed on high bearing temperature which locked the generator out. Dwayne was attending the EL
training in Surrey and had to be recalled to carry isolation on the generator. Secondly we had a major outage at HSY
when we lost T12 on overload in the early evening. The crews responded very professional manner as we have come to
expect and got the job done. The city was restored in a short period of time thanks to a fantastic effort by both the
station EL's and CPC Techs on site. It is great to see such fine team work in action. In addition the JOR fault investigation
is ongoing and the same comments can be said of our crew who worked throughout yesterday evening to get the
generator isolated. A massive thanks from Dave Clarke and I am sure Neil and Glen will have something further to say in
recognition of the fantastic job you guys did yesterday. I will be heading out to JOR this morning and then on to Nanaimo
this afternoon for a training session.
Chow, Bradley
Thanks for the note, Paul. I wasn't as tuned in to the JOR outage so you guys really did have a banner day!
We don't often lose Horsey. So losing it at rush hour during Christmas shopping season on a cold, cold day just adds to
the pressure and profile. I was impressed with how quickly everyone were able to return the system under what I know
were hectic and intense pressures.
Original Message
From: Tutt, Paul
Sent: 2013, December 06 7:59 AM .
To: Hall, Allan; Walker, William; Blake, Daryl; Walsh, Dwayne; Pjecha, Juraj; Fusick, Ryan; Zolis, Alex; Fraser, Brett;
Hulme, Paul; Lavigne, David
Cc: Carter, Glen; Clark, David; Campbell, Neil; Dermody, Neal; McKenzie, Ross; Pollock, Bruce
Subject: Yesterday's events
Guys as you are probably aware there were some significant events which occurred in our area yesterday. Firstly the
generator at JOR failed on high bearing temperature which locked the generator out. Dwayne was attending the EL
training in Surrey and had to be recalled to carry isolation on the generator. Secondly we had a major outage at HSY
when we lost T12 on overload in the early evening. The crews responded very professional manner as we have come to
expect and got the job done. The city was restored in a short period of time thanks to a fantastic effort by both the
station EL's and CPCTechs on site. It is great to see such fine team work in action. In addition the JOR fault investigation
is ongoing and the same comments can be said of our crew who worked throughout yesterday evening to get the
generator isolated. A massive thanks from Dave Clarke and I am sure Neil and Glen will have something further to say in
recognition of the fantastic job you guys did yesterday. I will be heading out to JOR this morning and then on to Nanaimo
this afternoon for a training session.
Chow, Bradley
From: D e r m o d y, Neal
Sent: 2013, December 06 8:09 AM
To: Tutt, Paul; Hall, Allan; Walker, William; Blake, Daryl; Walsh, Dwayne; Pjecha, Juraj; Fusick,
Ryan; Zolis, Alex; Fraser, Brett; Hulme, Paul; Lavigne, David
Cc: Carter, Glen; Clark, David; Campbell, Neil; McKenzie, Ross; Pollock, Bruce; DL - CRI -
Campbell River Ironwood
S u b j e c t : R E : Ye s t e r d a y ' s e v e n t s
Work Continues at JOR today. I am continually impressed with the effective, professionalism of our field employees.
Great work by al) and fingers crossed for JOR.
Original Message
From: Tutt, Paul
Sent: 2013, December 06 7:59 AM
To: Hall, Allan; Walker, William; Blake, Daryl; Walsh, Dwayne; Pjecha, Juraj; Fusick, Ryan; Zolis, Alex; Fraser, Brett;
Hulme, Paul; Lavigne, David
Cc: Carter, Glen; Clark, David; Campbell, Neil; Dermody, Neal; McKenzie, Ross; Pollock, Bruce
Subject: Yesterday's events
Guys as you are probably aware there were some significant events which occurred in our area yesterday. Firstly the
generator at JOR failed on high bearing temperature which locked the generator out. Dwayne was attending the EL
training in Surrey and had to be recalled to carry isolation on the generator. Secondly we had a major outage at HSY
when we lost T12 on overload in the early evening. The crews responded very professional manner as we have come to
expect and got the job done. The city was restored in a short period of time thariks to a fantastic effort by both the
station EL's and CPC Techs on site. It is great to see such fine team work In action. In addition the JOR fault investigation
is ongoing and the same comments can be said of our crew who worked throughout yesterday evening to get the
generator isolated. A massive thanks from Dave Clarke and I am sure Neil and Glen will have something further to say in
recognition of the fantastic job you guys did yesterday. I will be heading out to JOR this morning and then on to Nanaimo
this afternoon for a training session.
Chow, Bradley ___^_
They always do.. it was overload. All P&C worked fine, even the stuff worked on recently by Nextgen
Half the station capacity has been OOS for a week, and we were probably an hour away from having everything back.
Bad timing.
Transformers don't usually have OL pn, but there is BU PN on the low side tfmr bus that has overcurrent (without torque
en)..I don't think anyone knew they needed to be watching the load. Ouch.
I saw the note in The Province and they blamed P&C equipment???
Thanks
Kelly
Even with this faulty conclusion, we knew to restore T12 and to bring Tl and T2 back i/s together to prevent/L on T2. Of
course this worked fine. Only remaining difficulty was that We couldn't get 12CB38 closed without opening the feeder
a r i a ' p Tc k i h g ^ .......... ,,
We got to the right place but incorrect conclusion about the B/F on 12CB38 and some delay out of concern for field
personnel safety delayed restoration. Total transformer outage time was about 43 minutes, best case with no mistakes
and delay would have been about 20 minutes.
There were a lot of people working in the station .at the time and we were very accommodating to not energize
equipment without knowing at all times that crew were in safe location but there were some small delays. I do not want
any negative criticism relayed to the crews as for the most part their cooperation and response was excellent. I will send
a note of thanks to their managers this morning.
Doug Pochailo
Fax: 604.455.1912
Email: doug.pochaHo.@bchvdro.com
bchvdro.com
Chow, Bradley
Doug, I think it is very beneficial to review and analyze the performance of the control room response in order to learn
and improve, Good for you for having a critical eye and. putting this together. I recommend a review with operators at
seminars.
However, if we really want to make a reliability improvement, we should look at how the outage could have been
prevented. What Is the process that has one of two transformers out of service during peak winter load? I know the
relay setting is subtle and the increased load may be unexpected but if we don't.focus on that, then we welcome similar
events in the future. This is especially true within increased pressure to take equipment out of service in winter due to
construction activity. Our past approval process is obviously not adequate to meet the new challenges.
The reliability improvement starts with looking at the current process to identify the gaps. Looking at protection settings
is most likely not on the schedulers checklist nor may they be competent to do so. Similarly, how are we predicting load
and what is our allowable error margin and risk tolerance? How can this be checked in real time to ensure we are not
creeping to the edge of the cliff?
This work can be done similar to how we are making safety system improvements. I recommend our primary focus here.
Thanks < .
In retrospect I drew, one bad conclusion during the restoration that cost us a little bit of time.
At the time of the initial event, crews were attempting to close 12D34 to energize up to the open 12CB31 breaker
through a new but previously tested cable. They reported that the switch stuck half way closed and that they were
fiddling with it when the trip occurred. AH focus was around how the disconnect switch could have caused the trip.
Flags were collected and they reported only overload on T2. We couldn't make sense of how a failed switch on 12 kV
could result in this trip.
We very quickly isolated the suspected switch and with no flags on T12 we put It back in service. We then reset l/o on
T2 and put it back in service. Everything held for a few minutes then we tost it all again.
Field checks flags and reports same T2 flags except they notice B/F on 12CB38. (BF indication was a red herring, CPC told
me a story about how SEL runs a PN health check which picks up the BF flag. CPC are going to delete the text message
displayed on the SEL when this script runs) Here I make a mistake, I guess that 12CB38 B/F has backed up into T12 and
that isolation of T12 has caused O/L on T2. Of course T12 oos cannot cause O/L on T2 because they are separate
isolated systems.
C h o w, B r a d l e y
Paul, equipment is scheduled out of service it returns to service when it is ready. There are so many factors that affect
equipment returning to service the return date and time are subject to many variables. All I can suggest is that RTO does
a risk assessment when energization plans are carried out and defer to a lower impact time. I don't know what's driving
this question but I'm watching the news and it looks like HSY energization plan didn't go well?
Original Message
From: Choudhury, Paul
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2013 05:53 PM
To: Quinn, Howard; Cielen, Bob
Subject: Returning equip to service - HSY outage today
Howard we should think about not allowing switching to return equipment to service> or commission it, during peak
hours. Please let me know what outages are being returned over the next few days of cold weather and what you think
the risk, if any is.
Thanks, Dave.
Background - HSY has four main transformers. For the past four weeks, two (Tl/Tll) have been taken OOS, and the
staion has been sourced via the remaining two (T2/T12) in order to:
1. Repair the failed section of 230 GIS bus, where both Tl/Tll connect;
2. Replace three of the four 12kV bus breakers coming off the low side of Til; and,
3. Replace the Til PN (advanced from next year's work, in order to simplify the CT connection to those new bus
breakers).
The reason for detailing this work for you here, is that upon the initial trip, there were many usual suspects being looked
at.
The situation was that initial switching was being done to return Tl/Tll to service. And T2 tripped out. There was a DS,
12D34, that may or may not have hung up or been seated properly. But current thinking from the station is that T2 went
out on overload (T2 BUPN covers its low side bus and has overcurrent pn). T2, which tripped, wasn't involved in the
recent construction work.
An attempt at quickly picking up the whole station didn't succeed, so they sectionalized and picked up load piece-by-
piece. They now have the station on three transformers (T2, T12, and Tl is switched back in as well) - FVO decided not
to try and bring Til back in tonight, sounds like we'll do that tomorrow.
CPC & EL crews remain at the station gathering info for analysis and reviewing settings; area manager is on site as well.
C h o w, B r a d l e y
Simple loading., this is a picture of the realtime metering at HSY-T2 this morning... Too much load for one
Txfmr
Chow, Bradley
Thanks Kelly,
Dave: These new settings will now permit T1/T2 transformer loading to their full rating. As Kelly mentioned that there
is some discomfort at our end because the new setting does not have the desired sensitivity under the weak source
condition, whose mitigation requires addition of the torque control. As per our file note, the protection was put in-
service in 1992 without torque to avoid the added cost at that time. Note that the under voltage torque control will be
added in the current HSY project.
Also, thanks for clarifying in your other email, that it is the bus backup protection because some non-protection folks are
calling it overload protection mis-operation, in fact, the backup protection operated exactly as designed. As I
understand, the protection limit was known.
Mukesh
Attached yo. Tl and T2 settings. The h tting sheets have been issued via OCS.
s.15
We are requesiin^jgJ^^^^Hp1ettmg to be increased tq^||ScoTOaTV for bot^^Mf transformers. This will
give us a pickup ofj^primary and an increased protection load limit capability ofJU^er transformer. This
setting change is in response to the overload conditions that we presently have at HSY. These settings are somewhat
higher than we would like but we are limited by the fact these relays have discreet taps and are not torque controlled.
The upcoming protection replacement for these transformers will address these issues and we can accept reduced
sensitivity for the time being.
Best regards,
BC Hydro
6911 Southpoint Drive, 5th Floor
Burnaby. B.C. V3N 4X8
Office: 604.528.7755
Email: kellv.stlch@bchvdro.com
bchydro.com
17 06:25CB10 Open
17 07:25CB1 Close
i710:12CB37 Cldse
17 11: 25CB125,124,123,122,121 Opened
1714:25CB 10 closed
1715 47:25CB121,122,123, Closed
1716 03:25CB124 control issued to Close
17 16 03:25CB1 Opened (tripped)
171617:2D1 Opened (tripped)
1716 25:25CB124,123,122,121 & 25CB10 Opened
1719:2D1 Closed
1719: 25CB1 Closed
17 20: 2D2 Closed
17 20:25D1CD30 & 12D31 Open
17 21:25CB2 Closed; 25C&121,124> 122, .123 & 125 Closed
17 22; 25CB.10 Closed
17 23:12CB38 Closed - Opened
17 24:12CB321,322,331,332,341,342,361, 362,371,372, 351,352,310 Opened
17 27:12CB38 Closed
17 27:12CB310,321,322,331, 341,342,361 Closed
17 37:12D2CB3!Open
17 45:12D34 Closed
17 47:12D1CB30,12D31,12CB30,12CB352,, 351 Closed
17 56:12D237 Closed. 12D137 Opened
17 59:12Cb371,372 Closed.
18 00:12CB361 Opened
18 01:12D236 Closed. 12D136 Opened
18 05:12CB361,362 Closed
Chow, Bradley
Update:
Steven created an outage event (8-163660) for HSY 25B115, based on feedback about the PN operation, including
transformers (assuming necessary for the SDR) and feeders. The event rolls up the related feeder outages to 47,860
CHL There were periods where some portion of the feeder load was returned but then tripped out again (after 4-5
min). To capture this return granularity will be difficult - if necessary to do so, we can to capture a second
interruption; or alternative we can shorten the outage duration. This event is available for updating now (to capture the
SDR tabs information).
BC
Steve, we're unable to enter a CROW event for this HSY station outage. It gives us a message back that there already is
an outage for this equipment. Can you please fix this and let us know. Well have to enter the outage details
tomorrow. Thanks
Hi Mark,
Just going thru AREVA system log, here is what I found. Looks like it all started at 16:36, & the last customers were
picked up at 18:05. Thanks.
BC Hydro
.Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.H3nlon@BCHvdro.com
bchvdro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1.720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin. Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
bchvdro.com
With both transformers back in totalized load current was'sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup. However, Dave
and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then. The concern is that if one
transformer goes out then the.other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload If we are down to one transformer again. FVO will
need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
Dave S
Please retrieve all flags and Include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casev.wonQ@bchvdro.com
MPP
Horsey restoration is in progress, ~50% of customer load currently restored. Causal analysis is ongoing without out a
clear answer at this time.
MH
T2, in addition to having PY differential and SY differential, also has "back-up protection" BU PN covering the low side
transformer bus. The timed bvercuf rent setting (for device 51TBB, which is what tripped) is listed as 1500A (station
setting sheets state that it's actqalry 1875A, providing a little bit more margin for ioad). We went out With' the station
25kV load at 1900A. Additionally, there Is no torque control on this protection (voltage supervision) which we usually
apply to bus protection to prevent tripping on overload instead of faults. This 1875A load threshold with no torque
control is not written in a way to be very evident to the system operator at FVO, and was likely a blind spot to FVO and
to the station electricians switching at HSY and to the.CPC Technologists at HSY as well.
File: HSY Prot Info.pdf
Because T2 and T12 are on the same 230 ring position (2B4), when T2 carrying the 25kV station load tripped, we also
lost the T12 carrying the 12kV station load.
Upon an attempt to re-energize, T2 went out again after about ten seconds oh timed overcurrent.
An attempt to pick up the load With Tl instead resulted in the same tripafter ten seconds (identical Tl pn as for T2,
same load conditions). Then an attempt was made to pick up feeder sections one by one. As the final load block was
picked up, same result, thereby resulting in the realization that we were tripping on overload.
Finally, both Tl and T2 Were switched in7 permitting the load to be picked up without overload. This morning> the
loading on T2 is therefore cut in half to 970A.
OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap)
Do we have the same risk of losing the 12kV load on the single T12 carrying the 12kV load today? (A decision was made
last night not to swjtch In Til.) A review of the "BU PN" for HSY T12 (on page 12 of the HSY Protection Info Sheets)
shows that the timed overcurrent setting for the T12 low side bus is 4000A and that torque control is applied (to guard
against tripping on heavy load) -the 12kV load here is presently 3000A. So, we're OK.
Recipients feel free to correct any points I may have Incorrect here.
BC Hydro
Vancouver Island Terminal,
7056 Bell McKlnnon Road
Duncan, B.C. V9L6B5
Office: 250.701.4672
Mobile: 250.701.3842
Fax: 250.701.4634
Email: dave.clark@bchvdro.com
bchydro.com
Hi everybody,
Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque control.
2
C h o w, B r a d l e y
Thanks Dave, excellent summary. From an operations, perspective as per SOO 6T-31 we would expect 100M.VA from HSY
T2 instead of the bank tripping at 82MVA.
John Marusenko
2.0 GUIDELINES
A short time emergency overload in excess of 133% rated transformer loading capability
is considered to be a single occurrence (i.e., the overload period is not repeated) not
exceeding any of the following parameters:
In a nutshell, no one was watching the load and the sudden cold snap caught us. It could have happened with a
snowstorm any time over the past four weeks.
HSY 2B2 - which sources the 25kV load via Tl and which also sources the 12kV load via Til - had been switched out for
the past four weeks, and Tl/Tll were an hour away from being returned to service (oh, so close)'.
For the past four weeks, the 25kV load was being sourced via T2, and the 12kV load was being sourced via T12. Both
these transformers are on 2B4 (as opposed to Tl/Tll which are both on 2B2).
The energization plan to return the station to full capacity was being worked through late yesterday afternoon, and they
were at step 19. (Note the plan to leave Tl off-loaded until the return of Til was complete. In hindsight, picking up 25I<V
load with Tl after step 13 would have saved us.)
File: HSY 12CB31 32 and 34 Energization Plan (R3).docx
At this point, T2 BUPN tripped on overload. Let me expand on this event, with reference to the Protection Info Sheets
for HSY. We don't often have overload protection on transformers - instead we alarm to the system operators at FVO
and allow them to offload rather than trip. However, on page four of the HSY Protection Info Sheets you'll see that HSY
l
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.Hanton@BCHvdro.com
bchvdro.com
From: FVO, System Control Manager
Sent: 2013, December 05 5:20 PM
To: DL - System Control Managers; Duty Coordinator; FVO, System Control Manager; McNamara, Don; DL - P&C Central
Disturbance Support
Subject: RE: System Event Report Horsey Substation Metro Victoria All Out
Horsey restoration is in progress, ~50% of customer load currently restored. Causal analysis is ongoing without out a
clear answer at this time.
MH
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin. Hanlon(5)BCHvdro.com
bchydro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out. Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
- P&C Central Disturbance Support
Cc: Rathlef, David; Babiy, Kevin; Clark, David; Ghangass, Devinder; Nagpal, Mukesh
Subject: Re: System Event Report Horsey Substation Metro Victoria All Out
Hi everybody,
Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque
control.
With both transformers back in totalized load current was sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup.
However, Dave and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then.
The concern is that if one transformer goes out then the other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload if we are down to one transformer
again. FVO will need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
DaveS
Please retrieve all flags and include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casev wong bchydro.com
MPP
to be very evident to the system operator at FVO, and was likely a blind spot to FVO and to the station
electricians switching at HSY and to the CPC Technologists at HSY as well.
Because T2 and T12 are on the same 230 ring position (2B4), when T2 carrying the 25kV station load tripped,
we also lost the T12 carrying the 12kV station load.
Upon an attempt to re-energize, T2 went out again after about ten seconds on timed overcurrent.
An attempt to pick up the load with Tl instead resulted in the same trip after ten seconds (identical Tl pn as
for T2, same load conditions). Then an attempt was made to pick up feeder sections one by one. As the final
load block was picked up, same result, thereby resulting in the realization that we were tripping on overload.
Finally, both Tl and T2 were switched in, permitting the load to be picked up without overload. This morning,
the loading on T2 is therefore cut in half to 970A.
a
Do we have the same risk of losing the 12kV load on the single T12 carrying the 12kV load today? (A decision
was made last night not to switch in Til.) A review of the "BU PN" for HSYT12 (on page 12 of the HSY
Protection Info Sheets) shows that the timed overcurrent setting for the T12 low side bus is 4000A and that
torque control is applied (to guard against tripping on heavy load) - the 12kV load here is presently 3000A. So,
we're OK.
Recipients feel free to correct any points I may have incorrect here.
BC Hydro
Vancouver Island Terminal,
Office: 250.701.4672
Mobile: 250.701.3842
Fax: 250.701.4634
Email: dave. dark (ajbchvdro.com
bchvdro.com
Good summary Dave. Thanks for info. I got tied up at JOR this morning trying to get the oil sample details sorted with
Powertech as we require the results today (was hoping to get this sorted yesterday evening but this got taken over by
other minor events!). This will basically mean that generation can make the decision to return the unit or have the
bearing stripped down which is a major job, especially this side of the holidays. Thanks
In a nutshell, no one was watching the load and the sudden cold snap caught us. It could have happened with
a snowstorm any time over the past four weeks.
HSY 2B2 - which sources the 25kV load via Tl and which also sources the 12kV load via Til - had been
switched out for the past four weeks, and Tl/Tll were an hour away from being returned to service (oh, so
close).
For the past four weeks, the 25kV load was being sourced via T2, and the 12kV load was being sourced via
T12. Both these transformers are on 2B4 (as opposed to Tl/Tll which are both on 2B2).
0
The energization plan to return the station to full capacity was being worked through late yesterday
afternoon, and they were at step 19. (Note the plan to leave Tl off-loaded until the return of Til was
complete. In hindsight, picking up 25kV load with Tl after step 13 would have saved us.)
At this point, T2 BUPN tripped on overload. Let me expand on this event, with reference to the Protection
Info Sheets for HSY. We don't often have overload protection on transformers - instead we alarm to the
system operators at FVO and allow them to offload rather than trip. However, on page four of the HSY
Protection Info Sheets you'll see that HSYT2, in addition to having PY differential and SY differential, also has
"back-up protection" BU PN covering the low side transformer bus. The timed overcurrent setting (for device
51TBB, which is what tripped) is listed as 1500A (station setting sheets state that it's actually 1875A, providing
a little bit more margin for load). We went out with the station 25kV load at 1900A. Additionally, there is no
torque control on this protection (voltage supervision) which we usually apply to bus protection to prevent
tripping on overload instead of faults. This 1875A load threshold with no torque control js not written in a way
s.22
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Dave,
What happened yesterday? CROW has nothing. Lorenz said something about FVO/Electrician switching errors.
bchydro.com
Chow, Bradley
Background - HSY has four main transformers. For the past four weeks, two (Tl/Tll) have been taken OOS, and the
staion has been sourced via the remaining two (T2/T12) in order to:
1. Repair the failed section of 230 GIS bus, where both Tl/Tll connect;
2. Replace three of the four 12kV bus breakers coming off the low side of Til; and,
3. Replace the Til PN (advanced from next year's work, in order to simplify the CT connection to those new bus
breakers).
The reason for detailing this work for you here, is that upon the initial trip, there were many usual suspects being looked
at.
The situation was that initial switching was being done to return Tl/Tll to service. And T2 tripped out. There was a DS,
12D34, that may or may not have hung up or been seated properly. But current thinking from the station is that T2 went
out on overload (T2 BUPN covers its low side bus and has overcurrent pn). T2, which tripped, wasn't involved in the
recent construction work.
An attempt at quickly picking up the whole station didn't succeed, so they sectionalized and picked up load piece-by-
piece. They now have the station on three transformers (T2, T12, and Tl is switched back in as well) - FVO decided not
to try and bring Til back in tonight, sounds like we'll do that tomorrow.
CPC & EL crews remain at the station gathering info for analysis and reviewing settings; area manager is on site as well.
Chow, Bradley
Simple loading., this is a picture of the realtime metering at HSY T2 this morning... Too much load for one
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Attached yoi^illfmd softcopies o^p-U^Tl and T2 settings. The harrkom^etting sheelsJiaMe been issued via OCS,
We are requesiingine! Htap setting to be increased t sBcoTTOcny for boOTo i t nge transformers. This wil
give us a pickup ofl primary and an increased protection load limit capability of} Bper transformer. This
setting change is in response to the overload conditions that we presently have at HSY. These settings are somewhat
higher than we would like but we are limited by the fact these relays have discreet taps and are not torque controlled.
The upcoming protection replacement for these transformers will address these issues and we can accept reduced
sensitivity for the time being.
Best regards,
BC Hydro
6911 Southpoint Drive, 5th Floor
Burnaby, B.C. V3N 4X8
Office: 604.528.7755
Email: kelly.stich@bchvdro.com
bchydro.com
s.15
[HSY 12CB31, 12CB32 and 12CB34] Energizing Plan
Revision 3
[Dec 5th 2013]
5.
or
Principal Engineer - Grid Operations System Control Manager
CONTROL ROOM CHECKLIST
Initials Initials
START: Date/Time:
PAUSE. Staqe/Step:
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Staqe/Step
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Staqe/Step:
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Staqe/Step:
Date/Time:
END: Date/Time:
4. Operators Notes:
Page 1
BG hydro HORSEY SUBSTATION - HSY Date 4 December 2013
Protection Information Sheet 19 of 19
HORSEY SUBSTATION - HSY
BGhydro Protection Information
Date 4 December 2013
Sheet 17 of 19
s.15
BC hydro HORSEY SUBSTATION - HSY Date 4 December 2013
Protection Information Sheet 15 of 19
HORSEY SUBSTATION - HSY s.15
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J O H N H A RT G E N E R AT I N G S TAT I O N R E P L A C E M E N T P R O J E C T - ^
WHEREAS BC Hydro, with assistance from Partnerships BC, has conducted an extensive public
procurement process in respect of the John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project (the
"Project"); J v
AND WHEREAS complete technical and financial proposals have now been received according to
the provisions of this procurement process and evaluated according to the evaluation criteria
established thereunder, the application of which has resulted in the identification of a preferred
proponent;
AND WHEREAS management has recommended to the John Hart Project Board that such
proponent be confirmed as the preferred proponent to proceed with the Project based on the
technical and financial proposals submitted;
AND WHEREAS the procurement process for the Project requires the preferred proponent, once
named, to achieve financial closing priorHHlHIB^^HHHaccording to the terms and
requirements of the procurement process;
AND WHEREAS further authority will be sought from the Board to approve project funding and to
authorize execution of the project agreements prior to the preferred proponent achieving
financial close; RESOLVED THAT, on the recommendation of the John Hart Project Board,
1. SNC-Lavalin Inc. be and is hereby confirmed as the preferred proponent for the Project, and
2. the CEO, or delegate, be and is hereby authorized to take such further steps as are necessary
to advance the project agreements to an execution-ready state and to assist the preferred
proponent, as appropriate, in achieving financial close, PROVIDED THAT execution of the Project
Agreements and associated commitments shall be subject to further approval of the Board.
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John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page i
(a) We, the Evaluation Committee for the John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project, have
completed the RFP Financial Evaluation for the Project and are unanimous in making the
recommendation presented in Section 6 of this report.
(1) evaluation process outlined in the RFP and the Evaluation Manual has been followed;
Steven Endler
(PBC)
Joanna Sofield
BC Hydro)
BG hydro * partnerships
British Columbia
F O R G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 1
3 F I N A N C I A L E VA L U AT I O N S T R U C T U R E A N D O R G A N I Z AT I O N 3
3.1 Evaluation Structure 3
3.2 Relationship Review 4
3.3 Completeness Review 4
3.4 Evaluator Orientation 4
4 FINANCIAL E VA L U AT I O N PROCESS 5
4.1 Monitoring of Evaluation 5
4.2 Due Diligence 5
4.3 C l a r i fi c a t i o n s 5
4.4 Reference Checks 6
4.5 Proponent Meetings 6
4.6 D i s q u a l i fi c a t i o n s 6
4.7 Changes and Additions 6
5 FINANCIAL E VA L U AT I O N R E S U LT S 8
6 R E C O M M E N D AT I O N 9
BG Hydro S partnerships
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S Bnt.sh Columbia
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 1
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the Technical and Supplemental Technical evaluation process, the Evaluation Committee
recommended to the EVP Generation that each of the Proponents below receive an invitation to submit a
Financial Submission as the next part of the RFP stage of the Competitive Selection Process:
SNC-Lavalin Inc.
The Financial Submissions were received on September 6, 2013 and the Supplemental Financial
Submissions were received on October 28, 2013 and were evaluated in accordance with the RFP. The
purpose of this document is to summarize the Financial Submission and Supplemental Financial
Submission evaluation process and results.
The capitalized terms in this report have the meanings ascribed in the John Hart Generating Station
Replacement Project Request for Proposals and the John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Manual.
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 2
The Submission Time for Financial Submissions was September 6, 2013 at 11:00a.m. Both Financial
Submissions were received prior to the Submission Time for Financial Submissions. The Submission
Time for Supplemental Financial Submissions was October 28, 2013 at 4:00p.m. Both Supplemental
Financial Submissions were received prior to the Submission Time for Supplemental Financial
Submissions and the delivery times were recorded in the Supplemental Financial Submission Receipt
Form.
Copies of the submission receipts for the Supplemental Financial Submission are attached as Appendix
A.
In accordance with Section 7 of the RFP, the evaluation of the Submissions was carried out by the
Evaluation Committee duly appointed by BC Hydro to identify the Preferred Proponent. Table 1 lists the
members of the Evaluation Committee.
Name Title
Diane McSherry ( BC Hydro) Chair
Joanna Sofield ( BC Hydro ) Evaluation Committee Member
Steven Endler ( Partnerships BC ) Evaluation Committee Member
The Evaluation Committee appointed a Financial Evaluation Team to provide assistance with the
evaluation of the Financial Submissions. The Financial Evaluation Team consisted of:
s.22
The Evaluation Committee also appointed a Valued Items Evaluation Team to provide assistance with the
evaluation of the Financial Submissions. The Valued Items Evaluation Team consisted of:
BG hydro ill
111
partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 4
In accordance with the Financial Evaluation Manual, the Relationship Review Committee received
Relationship Disclosure Forms from every person involved in the Financial Submission Evaluation,
including members of the Evaluation Committee, Fairness Advisor, Due Diligence Committee, Financial
Evaluation Team and Evaluation Management Team for all the Proponents. The Relationship Review
Committee also reviewed any relationships with restricted parties disclosed by each Proponent.
The Relationship Review Committee reviewed any disclosed relationships and took appropriate action to
be satisfied that no bias, unfair advantage or conflict of interest would arise with respect to any of the
individuals participating in the evaluation process and any of the members of a Proponent. All individuals
were cleared to participate in the evaluation process prior to any exposure to the Financial Submissions
and the Supplemental Financial Submissions. No issues were deemed necessary to be forwarded to the
Conflict of Interest Adjudicator.
The Completeness Review Team carried out the Completeness Review, according to the process
outlined in the Financial Evaluation Manual, on September 17, 2013 and October 28, 2013. The
Completeness Review verified that all Financial Submissions and Supplemental Financial Submissions
were substantially complete.
Prior to the Financial Evaluation Team being permitted access to the Financial Submissions, an
evaluation orientation meeting was held on August 26, 2013 to familiarize members of the Financial
Evaluation Team with the Financial Evaluation Manual and the evaluation process, schedule and
logistics.
BG hydro CS partnerships
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S British Colombia
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 5
The Financial Evaluation Process was described in the Financial Evaluation Manual which was reviewed
and approved by the Evaluation Committee prior to the Submission Time for Financial Submissions.
The Financial Evaluation Team was responsible for evaluating the Financial Submissions in accordance
with the RFP and producing a Financial Evaluation Summary Sheet, while the Valued Items Evaluation
Team was responsible for evaluating the Valued Items in accordance with the RFP and producing a
Valued Items Evaluation Summary Sheet. The Evaluators discussed their results with the Evaluation
Committee on a number of occasions and presented the teams' final results to both the Evaluation
Committee and the Due Diligence Committee.
The respective members of the Financial and Valued Items evaluation teams signed the completed
evaluation summary sheets, which were forwarded to the Evaluation Committee. Appendix D contains
The Evaluation Committee considered the information provided by the Financial Evaluation Team and the
Valued Items Evaluation Team and generated this recommendation report for the EVP Generation.
The Fairness Advisor, John Singleton, was notified of all organized meetings of the Evaluators and was
invited to attend any of these meetings or be present at any time. The Evaluation Committee met
frequently with the Evaluators and occasionally with the Fairness Advisor to test reasonableness of their
deliberations and compliance with process. The Fairness Advisor's Report will be submitted to the EVP
Generation at the completion of the Financial Submission evaluation process.
The Due Diligence Committee met with the Evaluators and the Evaluation Committee to test the
reasonableness of their deliberation and process compliance.
4 . 3 C L A R I F I C AT I O N S
The Evaluation Process permitted clarification questions to be issued to the Proponents. Clarification
questions were issued, and responses received, by the Contact Person. In total 13 clarifications were
sent to the Proponents. Table 2 summarizes the clarifications sought from Proponents and the number of
responses provided.
BG hydro f fi partnerships
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S British Columbia
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 6
Table 2: Clarifications
N u m b e r o f C l a r i fi c a t i o n s . . . , _ . . . . . .
P r o p o n e n t I s s u e d ( i n c l u d i n g m e e t i n g d u m b e r o f C l a r i fi c a t i o n
requests) Responses Received
Elk Falls Energy Partners 6 6
SNC-Lavalin 7 7
While the RFP did not require the Proponent to provide references for named Key Individuals, the RFP
allowed the Evaluators to ask for references should checks be deemed necessaryl
Meetings with both Proponents were held on September 24, 2013 to discuss affordability issues and
potential solutions for reducing the Project's scope.
4.6 DISQUALIFICATIONS
No Financial Submissions were disqualified during the process. An evaluation was completed for each
Proponent.
During the evaluation process, the following changes and additions were made by the Evaluation
Committee:
s. 17
Both Proponents' Financial Submissions!
The Evaluation Committee recommended that the RFP process
be amended to request Supplemental Financial Submissions from both Proponents based on
modified Project specifications. This decision was reviewed by the Due Diligence Advisors,
Fairness Advisor, Legal Advisor and approved by the John Hart Project Board.
As allowed for in the RFP, the Supplemental Financial Submission was formalized through
Addendum 20. The Supplemental Financial Submission asked for updated pricing from the
Proponents based on modified Project specifications as illustrated in the updated Final Draft
Project Agreement.
BG hydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 7
The Evaluation Manual was updated to reflect the specifics of the Supplemental Financial
Submission. The majority of the original Financial Submission Evaluation Manual remained the
same for the Supplemental Financial Submission, including the team members, roles and
responsibilities.
The Evaluation Summary Sheets completed at the end of the Financial Submission were updated
to incorporate the results of the Supplemental Financial Submission evaluation.
As discussed in Appendix A of the RFP, the Proponent with the lowest Adjusted Proposal Net
Present Cost in their Supplemental Financial Submission would be ranked the highest.
Upon opening both Proponents' Envelope 1 of the Supplemental Financial Submission, it was
determined that SNC-Lavalin had the lowest Adjusted Proposal Net Present Cost. On that basis,
the Evaluation Committee Chair instructed the evaluators to only open SNC-Lavalin's Envelope 2,
leaving Elk Falls Energy Partners' Envelope 2 unopened. As a result, Elk Falls Energy Partners'
financial evaluation summary sheet was not updated for the Supplemental Financial Submission.
BG hydro SB partnerships
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S British Columbia
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 8
The Evaluation Committee considered the requirements of the RFP and all evidence and information
provided by the Financial and Valued Items Evaluation Teams. The Financial Evaluation Summary
Sheets and the Valued Item Evaluation Summary Sheets are included in Appendix D and summarize the
key evidence supporting the Financial Evaluation Team and the Valued Item Evaluation Team's
evaluation. .
The Evaluation Committee concluded that both Proponents substantially satisfied the requirements of the
RFP.
The Adjusted Proposal Net Present Costs are as follows: s.21 fls.17
Cost Category (Net Present $M) Elk Falls Energy Partners SNC-Lavalii
Evaluation Ranking
m
BGhydro UJ
partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 9
RECOMMENDATION
(a) Accepts the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee and designate SNC-Lavalin, as the
Preferred Proponent; and
The recommendation was reviewed with the EVP Generation and John Hart Project Board. The John
Hart Project Board recommended acceptance of the Evaluation Committee recommendation to the
BC Hydro Board of Directors.
The BC Hydro Board of Directors approved the selection of the Preferred Proponent on November
6th, 2013.
BG hydro m
iii partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 10
BG hydro S3 partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 11
Receipt #: /* *"]
Tc)0CT2Bpk12'.42
1&12S112
Date (Montli/Day/Year] Time
-.\NJCL.
From Proponent
$N . : . I , , (
Name of Deliverer Organization Name
Signaturos:
BG hydro S3 partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 12
~7~V
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Copy to Deliverer: v Original to Receiver:
Receipt #: p /j ,l3QCT28flH.ll:41
From Proponent
Name of Deliverer
<s__% ' ^ " O C I ' ^ ^ V. ' O
Organization Name
BG hydro . partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 13
m
BGhydro iii
partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 14
IMiUi'OHLM ILAM
Unrjuaoa bl Entflali
Dslrvwy RacitvttC. by Submission Trrnft for Sopr,l#m*nW 7<xl"ic*
Suamssians and Financial .SubmlKsamii
Containers Ctearr/ labeled tih tue "RFP T*e', 'Contact Parson-, and
and 'Siipptemeottl T*<?infcat Submaston and Financial Sulxiifealon
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and wrui tha Properant'c name and moling address
fcoctt conttuw is Io ba daary labalcd to Irtwilfy WO njrrijar at
containers containing fie Prccoui as 'Number X & V, aid
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Financial: One ',1j weaurd master ccpy, marked 'Master' ord
fun (5) ocuid copies of lie Financial Submission each maned
Copy >olf
|s.21
Ons(1} UB-B flash rst.n, *Ut a U>M on e*"j-i describing
contents) apprcorialely packaged and ckuny marked "Hccjest
Itr Proposals for John Iterl Gcneratmc Station fiepiacenio(.
PtofrX RFP * EC12-1164') except the Financial Model a toUd
be submitted n electronic (USB flesli (MM) lixm only
Package 2 f financial
Eecull*e Surrirrary and Contents Lst
BG hydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 15
Ve-,lo Com
Swuclue ot Project Co and RHMJontii'p \Hh BC Hydro
2 Agreemenis within PicjoM Co
f-YKa Proposal
Basis el Financial Submiaaion
FtrnncM Cc^iscity
Financing
Fnarcial Model
Aff<..:..l.ilty|.'...t.J
-'. fag it;:-:
4.10 Pricing
I'acWau" *
Executive Sumnvmy and Oanlenls U
_E1
i I Rait Ctaoc/ Guarante*
4.2 Pier* energy Guarantee
SUjitrfaco Risk AdJw&nOfll
CoMlruciiwi Outaacs
I'..I {Tl ..:... T.lJI H.I
Bypass Imovaticn arfi tioalcrco
4.7 PassrVe I tyraiic Tranaient Managernent
.'I- Fecllty Safety and MafoUftsoHty
- Rttafei gxletng Site OWce Buloirg
1atB*>1 PlaM Energy, Plan CepacJty. and Common Condjit Haad loss
Guarantaos
Tuibna Model Efficency Cjanrtoe
i .i . . ' r '/ i.i. v Cr ... it..-
I.-...H:.: Construouin Outage Aciuitmort Form
O l A 'v.' __________
J. fj -
BChytfra SB partnerships
ro mrarioiii
m
BGhydro iii partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
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John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 17
s. 21
r- F7 /**
0.i.w" fyciVP^
BGhydro C partnerships
i..-'
F U O C M C l t AT l O H S
|iK<-,(
Language ; 1In English ., __
Delivery Received by Submission Time for Supplemental Financial
Submissions
Containers Clearly labelled with the "RFP Title", "Contact Person", and
and "Supplemental Technical Submission and Financial Submission
Labelling Location" all as shown on the RFP Summary of Key Information
and with the Proponent's name and mailing address.
Each container is to be clearly labelled to identify the number of
containers containing the Proposal, as 'Number X of Y", and to
identify and the package name and number contained therein.
Each package (all copies) is to be submitted in a separate sealed
container clearly labelled as described In this Section 6
Copies
Supplemental Financial: One (1) unbound master copy, marked
'Master" and five (5) bound copies of tha Supplemental Financial
Submission each marked "Copy x of 5".
One (1) USB flash drive, with a label on each describing its
contents) appropriately packaged and clearly marked "Request
for Proposals for John Hart Generating Station Replacement
Project, RFP EC 12-1164'), except the Financial Model should
be submitted In electronic (USB flash drive) form only.
s-21
Envelope 1
A letter that states the Proposal Net Present Cost of the combined
BC Hydro Payments (being the Progress Payments,
Decommissioning Payment, BC Hydro Geotechnlcal Reserve and
AvailabaHy Payments), as calculated using the updated
Affordability Model posted In the Data Room;
A signed letter from the independent model auditor stating that
there are no discrepancies between the values included In
Envelope 1 and those included in Envelope 2. This must include
a specific confirmation that the Proposal Net Present Cost
Included in Envelope 1 is equal to the Proposal Not Present Cost
included in Envelope 2.
ConfirmaUon that there have been no changes to the Proponent
Team other than those with respect to which the Proponent has
complied with Section 6.12 of the RFP; and
Cfij-iiinnaiion that there have either been no changes to the
Valued Items or a detailed description of each Valued Item that
has changed. ___
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 19
Envelope 2
Executive Summary and Contents List:
Briefly describe the technical changes that have been made to the
Technical Submission and the Supplemental Technical
Submission in order to address the changes to the Final Draft
Project Agreement Included In Addendum 20 and Addendum 21
of the RFP. This description can include any supporting
documents (e.g. drawings, narrative, schedules), as necessary,
although they are not required.
BGhydro * partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 20
Table B4-1 Plant Energy, Plant Capacity, and Common Conduit Head Loss
' Guarantees
od j^(\->
BGhydro m partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 21
Section Requirement
Language In English
Delivery Received by Submission Tone for Supplemental Financial
Submissions
Containers Clearly labelled with the 'RFP TWo", 'Contact Porson", and
and "Supplemental Technical Submission and Financial Submission
Labelling Location" all as shown on the RFP Summary of Key Information
and with the Proponent's name and mailing address.
Each container is to be clearly labelled to identify the number of
containers containing the Proposal, as 'Number X of Y", and to
identify and the package name and number contained therein.
Each package (all copies) Is to be submitted In a separate sealed
container clearly labelled as described In this Section 6 _E\
Copies
Supplemental Financial: One (1) unbound master copy, marked
"Master" and five (5) bound copies of the Supplemental Financial
Submission each marked 'Copy x of 5".
One (1) USB flash drive, with a label on each describing its
contents) appropriately packaged and dearly marked "Request
for Proposals for John Hart Generating Station Replacement
Project, RFP U EC12-1164"), except the Financial Model should
be submitted in electronic (USB flash drive) form only.
Supptamef.ua Financial Submission Contents
Envelope 1
A letter that states the Proposal Net Present Cost of the combined
BC Hydro Payments (being the Progress Payments,
Decommissioning Payment. BC Hydro Geolechnical Reserve and
Availability Payments), as calculated using the updated
Affordability Model posted in the Data Room;
A signed letter from the independent model auditor slating that
there are no discrepancies between the values Included in
Envelope 1 and those included in Envelope 2. This must Include
a specific confirmation that the Proposal Net Present Cost
included in Envelope 1 is equal to the Proposal Net Present Cost
included In Envelope 2.
Confirmation that there have been no changes to the Proponent
Team other than those with respect to which the Proponent has
complied with Section 6.12 of the RFP; and
Confirmation that there have either been no changes to the
Valued Items or a detailed description of each Valued Item that
has changed.
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
F O R G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 22
Briefly describe the technical changes that have been made to the 1
Technical Submission and the Supplemental Technical j
Submission in order to address the changes to the Final Draft
Project Agreement Included in Addendum 20 and Addendum 21
of the RFP. This description can include any supporting
documents (e.g. drawings, narrative, schedules), as necessary,
although thoy are not required.
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 23
F f fl l H M IrfflffllHiTEffllJ
, 4.10 Pricing
111
4.11 Valued Items (tied in with the package listed below)
Package 3 Valued Items
J
Executive Summary and Contents List
Table B4-1 Plant Energy, Plant Capacity, and Common Conduit Head Loss I
Guarantees
Table B4-2 \ Turbine Model Efficiency Guarantee
T a b l e B 4 - 3 ; G e n e r a t o r E f fi c i e n c y G u a r a n t e e |
Table B4-4 Construction Outage Adjustment Form
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 24
s.21
s.21
SNC-Lavalin
Team Member Na Team Member's Role
SNC-Lavalin Inc. Suite 1200 - 1075 West Georgia Street Design-Builder and
Vancouver, BC V6E 3C9 Services Provider
Industrias Metalurgicas Carril Rodriguez Pefia 2451 Turbine and Generator Supplier and
Pescarmona S.A.C.I. y F. San Francisco del Monte Services Provider
s.21 (IMPSA)
Departamento de Godoy Cruz
Provincia de Mendoza, Argentina
f fi
BGhydro ill partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 26
BGhydro S3 partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
John Hart Generating Station Replacement Project
Financial Evaluation Report
October 28, 2013
Page 27
See attached.
BGhydro partnerships
British Columbia
FOR G E N E R AT I O N S
JOHN HART GENERATING STATION REPLACEMENT PROJECT
LIST OF ALL PROPOSALS RECEIVED BY BC HYDRO
s.21
Importance: High
Preliminary investigation has confirmed the cause of outage (overload protection operated as designed) and found a
number of contributing factors into the downtown Victoria outage yesterday evening, including:
Incorrect load forecast - Horsey (HSY) substation has four step-down transformers (two 230kV/12kV
transformers Til and T12 and two 230kV/25kV transformers Tl and T2) supplied by two 230 kV cables (2L143
and 2L146). Two transformers (Til and Tl) was out-of-service at the time to facilitate Distribution Growth
capital projects. Operations studies based on incorrect load forecast indicated thatT2 and T12 would be
adequate to carry HSY load. T2 loading exceeded its continuous loading limit as the load peaked and overload
protection tripped the transformer and cleared the substation with its configuration at the time.
ACTION: Operations Planning to work with Distribution Engineering and Distribution Planning to improve load
forecast quality, and review operating policy for heavy load operations (e.g. more conservative margins for
recalling equipment).
Frozen telemetry on T2 MW - the telemetry for this data point went flat-line at 12:42 (cause unknown at this
point, may be due to telemetry instrument at HSY or EMS problem). The operator may have been alerted of the
pending loading problem and taken action to restore Til and/or Tl sooner if valid telemetry was available.
ACTION: Grid Ops to lead investigation to determine root cause of telemetry problem and make correction.
Cold Load Pickup (restoration delay) - during restoration, the Load Operator attempted to restore a larger area
of customers that the system can handle (known as cold load pickup- higher than normal consumption level
when the load is being restored) which resulted in customers restored momentarily and were out-of-service
again, and a longer outage period overall.
ACTION: Real Time Operations to review restoration procedures withall operators, and a lesson-learned session
at upcoming training seminars.
Outage Notification - the on-shift System Control Manager emailed outage notification out at 4:43 pm, 7 min
after the outage, but with an incorrect email distribution list. The mistake was noticed and corrected at 9pm.
ACTION: RTO to review incident with all System Control Managers on outage notification.
Martin
Load kept creeping higher and higher this week with the cold weather until we hit the T2 LV bus back up protection 1875
A pick up. As you can see telemetry gets frozen at some point today - we would have been reaching a new peak rather
than flat lining. The last value for T2 B phase A is 1819A at 12:40 (not shown here) - so for sure we would have gone
past the 1875 A pick up and eventually trip the transformer zone (T2 and T12) causing the station to go black. We were
vulnerable with only T2 and T12 in service, i.e. we could not handle this heavy peak load. The event happened within 2
minutes of the close of 12D34,1.2D44 and 12D5 (energization plan for 12CB31, 32 and 34 underway) - there was a
problem with 12D34 so there was some thought that maybe this had somehow triggered the event.
During restoration we tripped off again when we tried to restore the entire 25 kV feeder section - cold load pick up
caused us to shoot up to 2000 A according to our telemetry. We had to do things slower and in phases to avoid the cold
load pick up problem.
Protection Information Sheets have incorrect information regarding the LV phase overcurrent setting - it states 1500 A
rather than the 1875 A. This certainly doesn't help with understanding the situation in Real-time. I will also send a note
inquiring about the stuck telemetry.
Mark
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Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque control.
With both transformers back in totalized load current was sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup. However, Dave
and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then. The concern is that if one
transformer goes out then the other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload if we are down to one transformer again. FVO will
need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
DaveS
Please retrieve all flags and include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casey.wonq@bchvdro.com
MPP
MH
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin. Hanlon(5>BCHvdro.com
bchydro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out. Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
UiooojpAqoq
Chow, Bradley
Dave Clark explains it in a bit of detail but basically the load on the transformer crept up on the cold day as it got dark
and we tripped the transformer on the overload protection. This is a relatively unusual protection for a transformer and
no one in FVO or in the field foresaw that it might come in to play given the system configuration.
The configuration was that T2/T12 have been supplying the load for the last month while Tl/Tll have been out for
various work associated with the Horsey capital projects. And T2/T12 hang off the same bus position so when we
tripped T2, we also lost T12 and all 25kV and 12kV load was lost at once.
Because we were coincidentally switching Tl back into service at exactly the time this happened (about 30 more
minutes and we would have had T2 load reduced by sharing with Tl) there was some thinking that the switching was
somehow the cause of the trip. This led to the unsuccessful attempts to pick up load with Tl until we finally realized that
overload was an issue.
We will need to do some work to figure out how to avoid this type of situation happening again.
Excellent write-up.
Thanks Dave
BC Hydro .
6911 Southpoint Drive. B03
Burnaby, B.C. V3N 4X8
Office: 604.516.8904
Mobile: 604.992.2078
Email: dave.bains@bchydro.com
In a nutshell, no one was watching the load and the sudden cold snap caught us. It could have happened with a
snowstorm any time over the past four weeks.
HSY 2B2 - which sources the 25kV load via Tl and which also sources the 12kV load via Til -.had been switched out for
the past four weeks, and Tl/Tll were an hour away from being returned to service (oh, so close).
For the past four weeks, the 25kV load was being sourced via T2, and the 12kV load was being sourced via T12. Both
these transformers are on 2B4 (as opposed to Tl/Tll which are both on 2B2).
The energization plan to return the station to full capacity was being worked through late yesterday afternoon, and they
were at step 19. (Note the plan to leave Tl off-loaded until the return of Til was complete. In hindsight, picking up 25kV
load with Tl after step 13 would have saved us.)
File: HSY 12CB31 32 and 34 Energization Plan (R3).docx
At this point, T2 BUPN tripped on overload. Let me expand on this event, with reference to the Protection Info Sheets
for HSY. We don't often have overload protection on transformers - instead we alarm to the system operators at FVO
and allow them to offload rather than trip. However, on page four of the HSY Protection Info Sheets you'll see that HSY
T2, in addition to having PY differential and SY differential, also has "back-up protection" BU PN covering the low side
transformer bus. The timed overcurrent setting (for device 51TBB, which is what tripped) is listed as 1500A (station
setting sheets state that it's actually 1875A, providing a little bit more margin for load). We went out with the station
25kV load at 1900A. Additionally, there is no torque control on this protection (voltage supervision) which we usually
apply to bus protection to prevent tripping on overload instead of faults. This 1875A load threshold with no torque
control is not written in a way to be very evident to the system operator at FVO, and was likely a blind spot to FVO and
to the station electricians switching at HSY and to the CPC Technologists at HSY as well.
File: HSY Prot Info.pdf
Because T2 and T12 are on the same 230 ring position (2B4), when T2 carrying the 25kV station load tripped, we also
lost the T12 carrying the 12kV station load.
Upon an attempt to re-energize, T2 went out again after about ten seconds on timed overcurrent.
An attempt to pick up the load with Tl instead resulted in the same trip after ten seconds (identical Tl pn as for T2,
same load conditions). Then an attempt was made to pick up feeder sections one by one. As the final load block was
picked up, same result, thereby resulting in the realization that we were tripping on overload.
Finally, both Tl and T2 were switched in, permitting the load to be picked up without overload. This morning, the
loading on T2 is therefore cut in half to 970A.
OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap)
Do we have the same risk of losing the 12kV load on the single T12 carrying the 12kV load today? (A decision was made
last night not to switch in Til.) A review of the "BU PN" for HSYT12 (on page 12 of the HSY Protection Info Sheets)
shows that the timed overcurrent setting for the T12 low side bus is 4000A and that torque control is applied (to guard
against tripping on heavy load) -the 12kV load here is presently 3000A. So, we're OK.
Recipients feel free to correct any points I may have incorrect here.
BC Hydro
Vancouver Island Terminal.
7056 Bell McKinnon Road
Duncan, B.C. V9L6B5
Office: 250.701.4672
Mobile: 250.701.3842
Fax: 250.701.4634
Email: dave.clark@bchydro.com
bchydro.com
Hi everybody,
Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque control.
With both transformers back in totalized load current was sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup. However, Dave
and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then. The concern is that if one
transformer goes out then the other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload if we are down to one transformer again. FVO will
need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
DaveS
Please retrieve all flags and include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
3
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casev.wonq(S)bchvdro.com
MPP
Horsey restoration is in progress, ~50% of customer load currently restored. Causal analysis is ongoing without out a
clear answer at this time.
MH
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.HanlonOBCHydro com
bchydro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out. Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.HanlonOBCHvdro.com
bchvdro.com
Chowf Bradley .
Steve, we're unable to enter a CROW event for this HSY station outage. It gives us a message back that there already is
an outage for this equipment. Can you please fix this and let us know. Well have to enter the outage details
tomorrow. Thanks
Hi Mark,
Just going thru AREVA system log, here is what I found. Looks like it all started at 16:36, & the last customers were
picked up at 18:05. Thanks.
The problematic overload settings at HSY have been revised upwards (fromH |t0| __\ anc* have been applied at
the station. You may sleep a little more soundly this weekend.
Thank you.
David Rathlef
Victoria CPC
(250)893-4659
25267
Thanks Kelly,
Dave: These new settings will now permit T1/T2 transformer loading to their full rating. As Kelly mentioned that there
is some discomfort at our end because the new setting does not have the desired sensitivity under the weak source
condition, whose mitigation requires addition of the torque control. As per our file note, the protection was put in-
service in 1992 without torque to avoid the added cost at that time. Note that the under voltage torque control will be
added in the current HSY project.
1
Also, thanks for clarifying in your other email, that it is the bus backup protection because some non-protection folks are
calling it overload protection mis-operation. In fact, the backup protection operated exactly as designed. As I
understand, the protection limit was known.
Mukesh
Attached dlilind softc he HSYT1 and T2 settings. lheardg_x_)i setting sheetsJjaveheen issued via OCS.
s.15 s.15
We are requesun^heB Jtap setting to be increased to| Jecona'ary for botrfti irMPtransformers. This wil
give us a pickup of| Jprimary and an increased protection load limit capability of| Bper transformer. This
setting change is in response to the overload conditions that we presently have at HSY. These settings are somewhat
higher than we would like but we are limited by the fact these relays have discreet taps and are not torque controlled.
The upcoming protection replacement for these transformers will address these issues and we can accept reduced
sensitivity for the time being.
Best regards,
bchydro.com
Chow, Bradfey
Please remember to have Deana (Donna is away next week) update the HSY Protection Info Sheets before we forget
(add an explicit note that there is no torque control applied to these devices).
Thanks again
Thank you.
David Rathlef
Victoria CPC
(250)893-4659
25267
Thanks Kelly,
Dave: These new settings will now permit T1/T2 transformer loading to their full rating. As Kelly mentioned that there
is some discomfort at our end because the new setting does not have the desired sensitivity under the weak source
condition, whose mitigation requires addition of the torque control. As per our file note, the protection was put in-
service in 1992 without torque to avoid the added cost at that time. Note that the under voltage torque control will be
added in the current HSY project.
Also, thanks for clarifying in your other email, that it is the bus backup protection because some non-protection folks are
calling it overload protection mis-operation. In fact, the backup protection operated exactly as designed. As I
understand, the protection limit was known.
Mukesh
ma
Attached yooui^ilUind soitawimff the HSY Tl and T2 settinMpHpJwrdcopy setting sheetshayejpeen issued via OCS.
s. 15 r f|s. 15
We are requesting mei (tap setting to be increased to[ [secondary for bothW'tfeWransformers. This wil
;dto( |<
give us a pickup of | ^primary and an increased protection load limit capability of [ | per transformer. This
setting change is in response to the overload conditions that we presently have at HSY. These settings are somewhat
higher than we would like but we are limited by the fact these relays have discreet taps and are not torque controlled.
The upcoming protection replacement for these transformers will address these issues and we can accept reduced
sensitivity for the time being.
Best regards,
bchydro.com
Chowf Bradley
Any thoughts on why it looks like our telemetry flat lined at about 12:40 yesterday?
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Hi everybody,
Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque control.
With both transformers back in totalized load current was sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup. However, Dave
and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then. The concern is that if one
transformer goes out then the other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload if we are down to one transformer again. FVO will
need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
DaveS
Please retrieve all flags and include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casev. wonq@bchvdfO.com
MPP
MH
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
bchydro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out. Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin.Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
C h o w, B r a d l e y
Ted Olynyk has just done a bunch of media interviews on this issue and has indicated that it is an equipment problem
that we are still investigating and we don't know the cause. Please ensure that none of our staff speak with the media as
there are likely reporters around the station.
I have no details yet (Ted had his info from FVO) but please copy Ted on any updates as he will be doing further follow-
up interviews and the more information he has the better he can respond.
Please give me what you can when you can as Lanny, Greg and others have been looking for an update.
Thanks.
Ted Olynyk
BC Hydro
I have spoken to Dave Rathlef and they are working on it. No details as I didn't want to take them away from their
restoration work but I'm just leaving the office and heading there now.
More to follow,
Glen, if you start to get more details, please let me know so I can inform others.
I got a call from the Restoration Centre and their story is that FVO says back on at 18:00 but I'm not sure if that is an
estimate or based on an assessment of the situation.
Eric Ethier
Victoria Line Manager
BC Hydro
4400 West Saanich Rd.
Vctoria B.C. V8Z-3E9
Office: 250.727.5126
Mobile: 250.889.8121
Fax: 250.727.5139
Email: eric.ethier@bchydro.com
Chow, Bradley
In a nutshell, no one was watching the load and the sudden cold snap caught us. It could have happened with a
snowstorm any time over the past four weeks.
HSY 2B2 - which sources the 25kV load via Tl and which also sources the 12kV load via Til - had been switched out for
the past four weeks, and Tl/Tll were an hour away from being returned to service (oh, so close).
For the past four weeks, the 25kV load was being sourced via T2, and the 12kV load was being sourced via T12. Both
these transformers are on 2B4 (as opposed to Tl/Tll which are both on 2B2).
s.15
The energization plan to return the station to full capacity was being worked through late yesterday afternoon, and they
were at step 19. (Note the plan to leave Tl off-loaded until the return of Til was complete. In hindsight, picking up 25kV
load with Tl after step 13 would have saved us.)
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At this point, T2 BUPN tripped on overload. Let me expand on this event, with reference to the Protection Info Sheets
for HSY. We don't often have overload protection on transformers - instead we alarm to the system operators at FVO
and allow them to offload rather than trip. However, on page four of the HSY Protection Info Sheets you'll see that HSY
T2, in addition to having PY differential and SY differential, also has "back-up protection" BU PN covering the low side
transformer bus. The timed overcurrent setting (for device 51TBB, which is what tripped) is listed as 1500A (station
setting sheets state that it's actually 1875A, providing a little bit more margin for load). We went out with the station
25kV load at 1900A. Additionally, there is no torque control on this protection (voltage supervision) which we usually
apply to bus protection to prevent tripping on overload instead of faults. This 1875A load threshold with no torque
control is not written in a way to be very evident to the system operator at FVO, and.was likely a blind spot to FVO and
to the station electricians switching at HSY and to the CPC Technologists at HSY as well.
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Because T2 and T12 are on the same 230 ring position (2B4), when T2 carrying the 25kV station load tripped, we also
lost the T12 carrying the 12kV station load.
Upon an attempt to re-energize, T2 went out again after about ten seconds on timed overcurrent.
An attempt to pick up the load with Tl instead resulted in the same trip after ten seconds (identical Tl pn as for T2,
same load conditions). Then an attempt was made to pick up feeder sections one by one. As the final load block was
picked up, same result, thereby resulting in the realization that we were tripping on overload.
Finally, both Tl and T2 were switched in, permitting the load to be picked up without overload. This morning, the
loading on T2 is therefore cut in half to 970A.
Do we have the same risk of losing the 12kV load on the single T12 carrying the 12kV load today? (A decision was made
last night not to switch in Til.) A review of the "BU PN" for HSY T12 (on page 12 of the HSY Protection Info Sheets)
shows that the timed overcurrent setting for the T12 low side bus is 4000A and that torque control is applied (to guard
against tripping on heavy load) -the 12kV load here is presently 3000A. So, we're OK.
Recipients feel free to correct any points I may have incorrect here.
BC Hydro
Vancouver Island Terminal,
7056 Bell McKinnon Road
Duncan, B.C. V9L 6B5
Office: 250.701.4672
Mobile: 250.701.3842
Fax: 250.701.4634
Email: dave.clark@bchvdro.com
bchydro.com
Hi everybody,
Protection operations were via transformer bus backup protection. Pickup is 1875 A and there is no torque control.
With both transformers back in totalized load current was sitting around 2000A, so below relay pickup. However, Dave
and Kevin will block those relays until tomorrow. We have full protection coverage until then. The concern is that if one
transformer goes out then the other will follow.
Until we see what we can do with protection, the concern is overload if we are down to one transformer again. FVO will
need to keep an eye on loading if one transformer goes out.
Thanks,
DaveS
Please retrieve all flags and include them in the CROW report. We will look into this first thing tomorrow. Thanks.
Casey Wong
P&C Support Services
BC Hydro
Office: 604.528.3184 (73184)
Email: casev.wonq@bchydro.com
MPP
Horsey restoration is in progress, ~50% of customer load currently restored. Causal analysis is ongoing without out a
clear answer at this time.
MH
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
bchydro.com
At 16:36 while switching at Horsey sub, a trip has occurred causing the station to be all out. Further details will follow.
Martin Hanlon
Martin Han)on, P.Eng.
System Control Manager
Real Time Operations
BC Hydro
Fraser Valley Office
SCM: 604.455.1720
Office: 604.455.1869
Fax: 604.455.1809
Email: Martin Hanlon@BCHvdro.com
bchvdro.com
[HSY 12CB31.12CB32 and 12CB34J Eneigizlng Plan
Revision 3
[Dec 5th 2013]
or .
Principal Engineer- Grid Operations System Control Manager
Initials Initials
START: Date/Time:
PAUSE. Stage/Step:
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Stage/Step
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Stage/Step:
Date/Time:
PAUSE. Stage/Step:
Date/Time: .
. END: Date/Time:
4. Operators Notes:
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