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Editors: j o c k y o u n g and p a u l w a l t o n
P U B L IS H E D
F O R T H C O M IN G
Alfred Sohn-Rethel
B o g a z i c i U n iv e rs ity L ib rary
39001103418185
M
A lfred Sohn-R ethel 1978
IS B N 0 - 3 3 3 - 2 3 0 4 .5 - 0
IS B N 0 - 3 3 3 - 2 3 0 4 6 - 9 Pbk
T h is b o o k is s o ld s u b je c t to th e s t a n d a r d c o n d it io n s o f th e N e t B o o k A g r e e m e n t
T h e p a p e r b a c k e d it i o n o f th is b o o k is s o ld s u b je c t to th e c o n d it io n t h a t i t s h a ll
n o t, b y w a y o f t r a d e o r o th e r w is e , b e le n t , re - s o ld , h ir e d o u t, o r o th e r w is e
c i r c u l a t e d w i t h o u t t h e p u b lis h e r s p r io r c o n s e n t in a n y fo r m o f b in d i n g o r c o v e r
o t h e r th a n t h a t in w h i c h i t is p u b lis h e d a n d w i t h o u t a s im ila r c o n d it io n
in c lu d i n g th is c o n d it io n b e in g im p o s e d o n th e s u b s e q u e n t p u r c h a s e r .
Contents
Translator s Foreword ix
Preface xi
Introduction i
M A R T IN S O H N -R E T H E L
Preface
This enquiry is concerned with the relationship between base
and superstructure in the M arxian sense. This, to a large extent,
leads into new territory. M arx and Engels have clarified the
general architecture o f history consisting o f productive forces and
production relations w hich together form the m aterial basis for
consciousness as superstructure. But they have not left us a
blueprint for the staircase that should lead from the base to the
superstructure. A n d it is this w ith w hich we are concerned, or at
least w ith its barest scaffolding o f formal precision. T o continue
with our m etaphor, the staircase must be given a firm anchorage
in the basem ent, and this, for com m odity-producing societies,
can only be found in the form al analysis of com m odity itself. T h is
analysis, how ever, requires considerable enlargement and d eep
ening before it can carry the full w eight I intend to place o n it.
For M a rx it served to carry the critique of political econom y. For
us it must carry in addition the critique of the traditional theories
o f science and cognition.
W h at is new and bew ildering in the present undertaking is that
it must la y h and upon the com m odity analysis as we h ave it from
M arx, and thus upon that part o f his theory com m only regarded
as the untouchable foundation stone. It m ay therefore not be
amiss to preface the theoretical presentation with a short sketch o f
thought-biography to show how the deviating offshoot o rig
inated and has taken shape. M oreover it m ay also be necessary to
explain w h y the investigation has taken fifty years to m ature
before reachin g the light o f day.
It began tow ards the end o f the First W orld W a r and in its
afterm ath, at a time when the G erm an proletarian revolution
should have occurred and tragically failed. This period led me
into personal con tact with Ernst Bloch, W alter Benjam in, M a x
Horkheim er, Siegfried K racau er and Theodor W . A d orno and
the writings o f G eorg Lukacs and H erbert M arcuse. Strange
x ii INTELLECTUAL AND MANUAL LABOUR
ALFRED S O H N -R E T H E L
Introduction
O u r epoch is w idely regarded as the A ge o f Science . Indeed
science, and especially scientific technology, exerts an influence
upon production and through production upon the economics
and the class relations o f society. T h e effects o f this have thrown
into disarray the historical expectations and conceptions o f
people convinced o f the need for socialism. W e are no longer sure
o f our most trusted ideas o f scientific socialism or o f our
theoretical im age o f capitalism . H ow is the progressive de
struction o f m oney through inflation in accord with the labour
law o f value? A re the profits o f m ultinational corporations in
keeping w ith the m echanics o f surplus-value? W hat are the social
im plications and economics o f a technology which tends to
absorb the w ork o f hum an labour? Does this technology w iden or
narrow the g u lf between m ental and m anual labour? Does it help
or hinder a socialist revolution? H ow does the profit and loss
account on the balance sheets o f capital relate to the balance
between m an and nature? Is m odern technology class-neutral? Is
modern science class-biased?
Has M arxist analysis kept up w ith the changes o f society we
have witnessed since the two W orld Wars? O ur insights must
reach sufficiently deep to enable us to understand our m odern
world in M arxist terms and guide our revolutionary practice.
Historical m aterialism was conceived b y M a rx as the m ethod o f
the scientific understanding o f h istory. No other position can offer
an alternative.
T h e present study has been undertaken in the b elief that an
extension to M arxist theory is needed for a fuller understanding
o f our own epoch. F a r from m oving aw ay from M arxism this
should lead deeper into it. T h e reason w h y m any essential
questions o f today cause such difficulties is that our thinking is not
M arxist e n o u g h - it leaves im portant areas unexplored.
W e understand our epoch as th at in w hich the transition from
2 INTELLECTUAL AND MANUAL LABOUR
C R IT IQ U E
O F P H IL O S O P H IC A L
E P IS T E M O L O G Y
I
T h e Fetishism of
Intellectual Labour
A critique needs a well-defined object at w hich it is directed; we
choose philosophical epistem ology. W hat is the salient feature
w hich marks it as our particular object? W hich philosophy most
significantly represents it and is most rewarding, to criticise? From
the Introduction it is clear that our choice has fallen upon the
K an tian th e o r y o f cognition. This does not, however, m ean that
the reader must be a specialist in this particularly daunting
philosophy - far from it.
M arx clarifies the object of his critique as follows: L e t me
point out once and for all that by classical political econom y I
mean all the economists w ho, since the time o f W . Petty, have
investigated the real internal fram ework o f bourgeois relations o f
production, as opposed to the vulgar economists. . . f 1 Classical
political econom y in the sense o f this definition culm inated in the
work o f A d am Sm ith (172 3 -9 0 ) and D avid R icard o
(17 7 2 -18 2 3 ) and accordingly the discussion of their theories
bulks largest in M a r x s critical studies - for instance those
collected as Theories o f Surplus V a lu e . This does not, however,
oblige anyone to em bark upon a study o f Smith and R icard o
before reading M arx, even though, conversely, it is essential to
have read M arx before looking at Sm ith and R icardo. M a r x s
work in economics starts where the peak o f bourgeois economics
reaches its lim its.*
C an we draw any parallel to this framework of the M arxian
critique to elucidate our own undertaking in the field o f
philosophical epistemology? I understand by this nam e the
* In P art I V the read er w ill find m ore on the m ethodological significance o f this order
o f things.
14 CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
d ialectic fin ally entitles the m ind not only to p rim acy over
m an ual w ork but endows it w ith om nipotence.
M arx , on the other hand, understands the tim e governing the
genesis and the m utation o f forms as being, from the ve ry first,
historical tim e - the tim e o f natural and o f hum an h istory.6 *
T h a t is w h y the form processes cannot be m ade out in
anticipation. N o primaphilosophia under any guise has a place in
M arxism . W h a t is to be asserted must first be established by
investigation; historical m aterialism is m erely the nam e for a
m ethodological postulate and even this only becam e clear to
M a rx as a result o f m y studies .
T h u s one must not ignore the processes o f abstraction at work
in the em ergence o f historical forms o f consciousness. A bstraction
can be likened to the workshop o f conceptual th ough t and its
process m ust be a m aterialistic one i f the assertion that conscious
ness is determ ined by social being is to hold true. A derivation of
consciousness from social being presupposes a process o f abstrac
tion w hich is part o f this being. O n ly so can we validate the
statem ent that the social being o f m an determ ines his conscious
ness . B ut w ith this point o f view the historical m aterialist stands
in irreconcilable opposition to all traditional, theoretical philo
sophy. F or this entire tradition it is an established fact that
abstraction is the inherent a ctivity and the exclusive p rivilege of
thought; to speak o f abstraction in any other sense is regarded as
irresponsible, unless o f course one uses the w ord m erely m eta
p h orically. B ut to acquiesce in this philosophical tradition
w ould preclude the realisation o f the postulate o f historical
m aterialism . I f the form ation o f the consciousness, b y the
procedure o f abstraction, is exclusively a m atter for the con
sciousness itself, then a chasm opens up betw een the forms o f
consciousness on the one side and its alleged determ ination in
being on the other. T h e historical m aterialist w o u ld deny in
theory the existence o f this chasm , but in practice has no solution
to offer, none at any rate that w ould bridge the chasm .
A d m itted ly it must be taken into consideration that the
* W e k n o w o n ly one science, th e science o f history. H isto ry can be re g a rd e d from tw o
sides: th e h istory o f n atu re and th e history o f m an . N eith e r side, h o w ev e r can b e separated
from tim e. . . ( The German Ideology (in G erm an : Friihschriften, ed. S . L a n d sh u t and J . P.
M a y e r, p . 10). ) T h e p a ra g ra p h th a t begins these lines is crossed o u t in M a rx s
h an d w ritten m an uscript, but th e y retain th eir v a lu e as an essential expression o f his
th ou gh t.
THE COMMODITY ABSTRACTION *9
philosophical tradition is itself a product o f the division between
m ental and m an ual labour, and since its beginning with
Pythagoras, H eraclitus and Parm enides has been a preserve of
intellectuals for intellectuals, inaccessible to m anual workers.
Little has changed here, even today. F or this reason the
testimony o f this tradition, even if unanim ous, does not carry the
weight o f authority for those who take their stand w ith the
m anual worker. T h e view that abstraction was not the exclusive -\
property o f the m ind, but arises in com m odity exchange was first I
expressed by M a rx in the beginning o f Capital and earlier in the S
Critique o f Political Economy o f 1859, where he speaks o f an j
abstraction other than that o f thought.
3
The Com m odity Abstraction
T h e form o f com m odity is abstract and abstractness governs its
whole orbit. T o begin with, exchange-value is itself abstract
value in contrast to the use-value of com m odities. T h e exchange-
value is subject only to quantitative differentiation, and this
quantification is again abstract com pared with the qu antity
w hich measures use-values. M arx points out with p articu lar
emphasis that even labour, when determ ining the m agnitude
and substance o f value, becomes abstract human la b o u r,
hum an labour purely as such. T he form in which com m od ity -
value takes on its concrete appearance as money - be it as
coinage or bank-notes - is an abstract thing which, strictly
speaking, is a contradiction in terms. In the form of m oney riches
become abstract riches and, as owner o f such riches, m an him self
becomes an abstract m an, a private property-owner. L astly a
society in w hich com m odity exchange forms the nexus rerum is a
purely abstract set o f relations where everything concrete is in
private hands.
20 CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
T h e Phenomenon o f the
Exchange Abstraction
T h e M arxist concept o f com m odity abstraction refers to the
labour w hich is em bodied in the com modities and w hich
determ ines the m agnitude o f their valu e. T h e value-creating
labour is term ed abstract hu m an lab ou r to differentiate it from
concrete lab ou r w h ich creates use-values. O u r m ain concern is to
clarify this com m odity abstraction and to trace its origin to its
roots.
It must be stated from the outset that our analysis o f exchange
and valu e differs in certain respects from that o f M a rx in the
opening o f volum e I o f Capital w ithout, for th at m atter,
contradicting his analysis. M a rx was concerned with the critique
o f p olitical econom y , w hile our subject is the theory o f scientific
THE PHENOMENON OF THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION 23
in tim e. It is in its cap acity o f a real event in tim e and space that
the abstraction applies to exchange, it is in its precise m eaning a
real abstraction and the use from w hich the abstraction is m ade
encompasses the entire range o f sense reality.
T h u s w e have, on the basis o f com m odity production, two
spheres o f spatio-temporal- reality side b y side, yet m utually
exclusive and o f sharply contrasting description. It w ould help us
to have names by w hich w e could designate them . In G erm an the
w orld o f use is often called the first or prim ary n atu re, m aterial
in substance, w hile the sphere o f exchange is term ed a second,
pu rely social, nature entirely abstract in m ake-up. T h e y are
both called nature to point to the fact that they constitute
worlds equally spatio-tem poral by reality and inextricably
interw oven in our social life. T h e ancient legend o f K in g M idas,
w ho wished for everything he touched to turn to gold and died
upon havin g his wish fulfilled, viv id ly illustrates h ow contrasting
in reality and yet how closely associated in our minds both these
natures are.
T his, in the briefest w a y , is the foundation on w h ich I shall
base m y historical and lo gical explanation o f the birth of
philosophy in G reek society o f slave-labour, and o f the birth o f
m odern science in E uropean society based on w age-labour. T o
substantiate m y view s three points have to be established:
(a) that com m odity exchange is an original source o f abstrac-
, tion; (b) that this abstraction contains the form al elements
essential for the cognitive facu lty o f conceptual thinking; (c) that
the real abstraction o peratin g in exchange engenders the
ideal abstraction basic to G reek philosophy and to m odern
science.
O n the first point, it is necessary to recapitu late the points
m ade so far: com m odity exch ange is abstract because it excludes
use; that is to say, the action o f exchange excludes the action of
use. But w hile exchange banishes use from the actions o f people,
it does not banish it from their m inds. T h e minds o f the
exch anging agents m ust be occupied w ith the purposes which
prom pt them to perform their d eal o f exchange. Therefore while
it is necessary that their action o f exchange should be abstract
from use, there is also necessity that their minds should not be.
T h e action alone is abstract. T h e abstractness o f their action
w ill, as a consequence, escape the minds o f the people perform ing
EC O N O M IC S A N D K N O W L E D G E 2 9
it. In exchange, the action is social, the minds are private. Thus, the
action and the thinking o f people part com pany in exchange and
go different w ays. In pursuing point (b) o f our theses w e shall take
the w ay o f the action o f exchange, and this w ill occu py the next
two chapters. F or point (c) w e shall turn to the thinking o f the
com m odity owners and o f their philosophical spokesmen, in Part
II o f the book.
5
Economics and Know ledge
H ow does society hold together w hen production is carried out
independently b y private producers, and all forms o f previous
production in com m on have broken asunder? O n such a basis
society can cohere in no other w a y than by the buying and selling
o f the products as-com m odities. Private production becomes
increasingly specialised and the producers becom e increasingly
dependent upon one another according to the division o f labour
reigning between them . T h e only solution to their in
terdependence is com m odity exchange.
T h e nexus o f society is established b y the network o f exchange
and by nothing else. It is m y buyin g m y coat, not m y w earing it,
w hich forms part o f the social nexus, ju st as it is the selling, not the
m aking o f it. Therefore, to talk o f the social nexus, or, as we m ay
call it, the social synthesis, we have to talk o f exchange and not of
use. In enforcing the separation from use, or m ore precisely, from
the actions o f use, the activities o f exchange presuppose the
m arket as a time- and space-bound vacu u m devoid o f all inter
exchange of m an w ith nature.
W h at enables com m odity exchange to perform its socialising
function - to effect the social synthesis - is its abstractness from
30 CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
A n d m ore clearly:
6
T h e Analysis of the
Exchange Abstraction
(a) S T A T IN G T H E Q U E ST IO N
solipsism. T h e d octrine that betw een all people, for every one o f
them, solus ipse (I alone) exist is only a philosophical form ulation
o f the principles that in practice regulate exchange. W h at the
com m odity owners do in an exchange relation is p ractical
solipsism - irrespective o f w h a t they think and say about it.
T h is practical solipsism does not need to coincide w ith self-
interest. Som eone w h o takes part in an act o f exchange on b e h a lf
o f another must o b ey exactly the same principles. I f he does not,
then the resulting relation is no longer exchange, bu t one th at is
qu alitatively different, for instance ch arity . T h e principles w h ich
concern us here belo n g to the form o f interrelation o f com m odity
exchange, not to the psychology o f the individuals involved. It is
rather this form th at m oulds the psychological m echanism s o f the
people whose lives it rules - mechanisms w h ich they then
conceive o f as inborn, hu m an nature. T his m akes itself apparen t
in the w a y that those in subservience often act to the advan tage o f
those above them . T h e y consider themselves to have acted in self-
interest although in fact th ey have m erely obeyed the laws o f the
exchange nexus.* T h e practical solipsism o f com m odity ex
changing owners is nothing but the practice o f private p rop erty
as a basis o f social relations. A n d this is not b y peo p les choice but
b y the m aterial necessity o f the stage o f developm ent o f their
productive forces - the u m bilical cord that ties h um an to
natural history.
T h e principle w e ca ll practical solipsism is described above as
a reciprocal exclusion o f ownership. A s the tw o parties m u tu ally
recognise each other as private property owners, each exclusion
o f property in one direction is answered by an equ al one in the
other. For w hat in fact m akes them agree to the exch ange is that
the m utual change o f possession w hich they negotiate leaves their
opposing areas o f property unim paired. C om m o d ity exchange
can thus be form ulated as a social interrelationship betw een
sharply delim ited, separate areas o f property, or, as M a rx puts it,
a relation betw een strangers (ein V erh altn is wechselseitiger
F rem dheit ) ; it opposes p eople to each other as strangers. A ll that
matters is that, finally, tw o lots o f com m odities a ctu a lly change
(c) T H E F O R M O F E X C H A N G E A B IL IT Y O F C O M M O D ITIES
T h e answer is sim ply that it gives the social synthesis its unity.
W h en tradin g in com m odities has reached the stage where it
constitutes the all-decisive nexus rerum then the duplication o f
the com m odity into com m od ity and m oney (M arx) must
already h ave occurred. B ut the reverse is possible too that this
dup lication very soon leads to com m odity exchange becom ing a
decisive m edium o f social synthesis (a stage first reached in Ionia
in the seventh century b . c .) M on ey, then, acts as the concrete,
m aterial bearer o f the form o f exchangeability o f com modities.
T h a t this form can be expressed as the oneness o f the com
m odities existence explains w h y there attaches to m oney an
essential, functional unity: there can, at bottom , be only one
m oney in the w o rld .20* T h ere can, o f course, be different
currencies, but so long as these do effective m on etary service
w ithin their own orbit, th ey must be interchangeable at definite
rates and thus com m unicate to becom e one, and only one,
universal m oney system .f T h u s all com m unicating societies o f
exchange effect a functional unity. T h is applies even to geo
graph ically isolated places where exchange systems, w'hen
contact w ith each other is being m ade, w ill sooner or later
coalesce to form one extended econom ic nexus. Needless to say,
w ithout this essential oneness o f the exchange nexus, the very
viab ility o f exchange itself breaks dow n.
T h e form o f exch an geability applies to com modities regardless
o f their m aterial description. T h e abstraction comes about by
force o f the action o f exchange, or, in other words, out o f the
exchanging agents practising their solipsism against each other.
* I f tw o d ifferent com m odities, such as gold a n d silver, serve sim u ltan eou sly as
m easures o f v a lu e , all com m od ities w ill h a v e tw o separate price-expressions, th e p rice in
go ld arid th e p rice in silver, w h ich w ill q u ie tly co-exist as lo n g as th e ra tio o f the v a lu e
o f silver to that o f go ld rem ains u n ch a n ged , say at 15 to i . H o w e v e r, ev e ry alteration
in this ratio disturbs th e ratio b etw een the gold -prices an d the silver-prices o f the
com m odities, an d this proves in fact th a t a d u p lica tio n o f valu e contrad icts the fu n ction o f
th a t m easure.
t T h e re can b e excep tio n al circum stan ces m ak in g for m ore th an one ra te. T h is was so
in th e 1930s as a result o f fo reign -ex ch an ge controls an d before th a t in 1923 in th e G erm an
ru n a w a y inflation, w h en the M a r k ceased to do effective m on etary service before the
in trod u ction o f th e R e n te m a rk . T h e d ev alu a tio n o f cu rren cy w en t on a t su ch a p a c e that
large firm s even p aid w a ge-bills in co m p a n y cu rren cy o f their ow n issue; for in stan ce, in
O sram m on ey5 i f I rem em ber rig h t - in term s o f O sra m bulbs. N e ith e r these p rivate
cu rrencies nor th e rem ain in g o fficial one h ad effective gen eral ex ch a n g e a b ility w ithin
their ow n hom e m arket an d no in te rn atio n a l rate either. G erm an y th en offered th e very
rare p ictu re o f a m odern ex ch an ge so ciety w ith o u t a socially syn th etic cu rre n cy .
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION 45
T h e abstraction belongs to the interrelationship of the exchang
ing agents and not to the agents them selves. For it is not the
individuals who cause the social synthesis but their actions. A n d
their actions do it in such a w a y that, at the m om ent it happens,
the actors know nothing o f it.
These are some o f the extraordinary paradoxes o f a relation
ship in which m en act o f their own w ill, am ong themselves, w ith
no external interference from nature nor from outside sources.
Nothing seems to be beyond their ken; their actions are b y
m utual agreem ent for their own benefit, and yet they are
enmeshed in the most unsuspected contradictions. W e face a
pure abstraction but it is a spatio-tem poral reality which assumes
separate representation in m oney, a relationship which is
formalised only on standards o f pu rely hum an understanding.
M oney is an abstract thing, a parad ox in itself - a thing that
performs its socially synthetic function w ithout any hum an
understanding. A n d yet no anim al can ever grasp the m eaning o f
money; it is accessible only to m an. T a k e you r dog with you to the
butcher and w atch how m uch he understands o f the goings on
when you- purchase your m eat. It is a great deal and even
includes a keen sense o f property w hich w ill m ake him snap at a
strangers hand daring to com e near the m eat his master has
obtained and w hich he w ill be allow ed to carry home in his
mouth. But w hen you have to tell him W a it, doggy, I haven t
paid yet! his understanding is at an end. T h e pieces o f m etal or
paper w hich he w atches you hand over, and w hich carry your
scent, he knows, o f course; he has seen them before. But their
function as m oney lies outside the anim al range. It is not related
to our natural or physical being, but com prehensible only in our
interrelations as hum an beings. It has reality in time and space,
has the quality o f a real occurrence taking place between me and
the butcher and requiring a means o f paym ent o f m aterial
reality. T h e m eaning o f this action registers exclusively in our
hum an minds and yet has definite reality outside it - a social
reality, though, sharply contrasting w ith the natural realities
accessible to m y dog. H ere we have the spiheres o f the first and
second nature w hich we distinguished earlier side by side, and
unm istakably divided.
46 CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
[ d ) A B S T R A C T Q U A N T IT Y A N D T H E P O S T U L A T E O F T H E E X C H A N G E
E Q U A T IO N
(e) A B S T R A C T T IM E A N D S P A C E
A n d in a footnote he adds:
(jf) SU B ST A N C E A N D A C C ID E N T S
It has been shown that the forms o f the exchange abstraction are
parts o f the act o f exchange; they constitute the law s b y w hich
exchange operates. T h e com m odities m ust not be exposed to
physical change. T h e ir condition is thus m aterially constant, and
although this is m erely a postulate, it is a socially necessary one.
T h a t m eans that on the standard o f the act o f exchange, the
com modities are positively qualityless. O n the other hand, as
they are only exchanged for the purpose o f use th ey present
themselves to the exchanging agents in the garb o f their use-
values. T hus they exist in a twofold ca p a city on the m arket; in
that o f the qualityless condition and in the q u alitative splendour
o f their use-value. T h e property o f qualitylessness is w h a t gives
them their reality in exchange, w hile their use-properties are only
stored in the minds o f people.
In the course o f the evolution o f exchange the necessities o f
trade enforce the differentiation o f com m odities into com
modities and m on ey . A s a result the intrinsic d u ality o f the
com m odity as such takes on the shape o f an external contrast.
T h e qualityless abstractness o f the o bject o f exch ange is semi
concealed in the uniform ity o f m oney. A s non-descrip tive m atter
does n ot exist in nature, gold, silver, copper, etc., or sim ply paper
must stand in for it. These em pirical m aterials serve their abstract
function, how ever, in a p u rely m etaph orical ca p a city and
cannot, therefore, im pair the d u ality at its root.
L ater on w e shall recognise in this d u ality the well-known
relationship o f substance and accidents. These are conceptual
terms, whereas our analysis here is still concerned w ith the
. THE ANALYSIS OF THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION 53
(k ) A T O M IC IT Y
use, this description o f the m ovem ent o f the com m odities in their
circulation comprises the exchange abstraction in all its elements.
It also shares the sam e conversion o f the actual historical
happening into historical timelessness and universality w hich
attaches to the abstractness o f tim e and space as dimensions of
com m odity exchange.
T h e m ovem ent o f the com m odities can vary, it can suffer
interruptions or take devious w ays, w h ile tim e and space
m aintain their abstract uniform ity. But w hatever the vicissitudes
o f their m ovem ent through the processes o f circulation m ay be,
the com m odities are supposed to retain throughout the value at
which they w ere bought. W hile this constancy o f their exchange-
value conveys an overall continuity to the act o f transfer, the
m ovem ent can at a n y place and tim e be stopped and the state
and value o f the com m odities be reascertained, and this provision
cuts their m ovem ent into discrete m om ents. Both continuity and
discreteness attach to the abstract m ovem ent o f the com modities
side by side. This contradictory nature accrues to the m ovem ent
o f the com modities from the social origin o f its abstractness. In
antiquity it has given rise to the paradoxes o f Zeno, whereas in
m odem times it has been absorbed in the analysis o f m ovem ent
by m eans o f the calculus.
( j ) S T R IC T C A U S A L IT Y
(k ) C O N C L U D IN G R E M A R K S T O T H E A N A LY SIS
7
T h e Evolution o f Coined
M oney
T h e analysis in the foregoing chapters concerns a form al aspect o f
com m odity exchange w hich m igh t seem to be com m on to
exchange o f all ages, so that the question occurs as to w h y
com m odity exchange gives rise to abstract thinking only at the
relatively late date o f classical an tiq u ity and not from the very
first exchange, p rob ably tens o f thousands o f years earlier. W e
have seen from our analysis that com m odity exchange serves as a
means o f social synthesis only from G reek an tiqu ity onwards, but
w e now ask w h at distinguishes it then from previous stages. W e
must therefore very briefly peruse the m ain phases o f develop
m ent o f exchange w ith an eye to their form al characteristics.
In a m ere isolated, accidental case o f exchange betw een any
two parties the exchange abstraction evidently shows no trace at
all. A t a high er stage, w hich M a rx calls the expanded form o f
va lu e , w hen exchange becom es m ultilateral and comprises a
variety o f com m odities, one o f these must serve as a m eans o f
exchange o f the others. H ere too, this role does not convey to the
com m odity in question any appearance different from its use-
value, although the latter is now vested w ith a postulate not to
undergo a n y m aterial change w hile it acts in this cap acity. Still,
the choice for this role falls upon a com m odity w h ich by its
physical durability, divisibility and m obility easily com plies with
the postulate. In this w a y the postulate o f im m utability, although
springing from the nature o f exchange, soon again appears to all
concerned to be the outcom e o f the pecu liar use-value o f the
com m odity in question. T h e fact that a pecu liar halo is likely to
accrue to the latter w ill seem to confirm rather than to contradict
the m isleading appearance. T h is is notoriously so w hen the role
THE EVOLUTION OF COINED MONEY 59
o f equivalent settles upon one or the other o f the precious metals.
A ll this w as still very undeveloped; the precious m etals w ere
beginning to be the predom inant and general m oney com
m odity, but still uncoined, exchanging simply by their naked
w eigh t,29 that is, in the appearance o f objects o f use.
T herefore at each transaction they had to be w eighed and cut
or m elted and tested for their m etallic purity; in short, th ey had to
be treated in accordance w ith their physical nature. B ut precisely
this was the reason w h y they did not conform very w e ll to the
requirem ents o f the m arket, and their inadequacies w ere not
rem edied until the invention o f coinage. This portentous step was
taken for the first tim e in history about 680 B .C . on the Ionian side
o f the A egean, in L y d ia or P hrygia. T h e institution quickly
spread, following, as w ell as helping, the m arked com m ercial
expansion in process at that epoch and finding im itation in the
m ain G reek centres o f m aritim e trade. T h e very introduction o f
coinage is a sure sign o f com m odity production entering upon its
stage o f full grow th .
In coinage the previous relationship by which the va lu e status
o f a com m odity serving as m oney was subordinated to, and
covered up by, its m aterial status is reversed. A coin has it
stam ped upon its bo d y that it is to serve as a means o f exchange
and not as an object o f use. Its weight and m etallic p u rity are
guaranteed by the issuing authority so that, if b y the w ear and
tear o f circulation it has lost in weight, full replacem ent is
provided. Its physical m atter has visibly becom e a m ere carrier o f
its social function. A coin, therefore, is a thing which conforms to
the postulates o f the exchange abstraction and is supposed,
am ong other things, to consist o f an im m utable substance, a
substance over w hich tim e has no power, and w hich stands in
antithetic contrast to any m atter found in nature.
A n yb o d y who carries coins in his pocket and understands their
functions bears in his m ind, w hether or not he is aw are o f it, ideas
which, no m atter how hazily, reflect the postulates o f the
exchange abstraction. T o go about his m arketing activities o f
buying and selling and to take advantage o f the pow er o f his
m oney no clearer awareness is required. But to reflect upon the
ideas involved, to becom e conscious o f them, to form ulate them,
to take stock o f them and to w ork out their interrelations, to probe
into their uses and their im plications, to recognise their antithetic
6o CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
contrast to the w orld o f the senses and yet their intrinsic reference
to it, etc. - this does not follow autom atically from the use of
coined m oney, it constitutes a clearly definable conditioned
potentiality inherent in a m onetary econom y.
T h e social upheavals and class struggles ensuing from the
developm ent o f this econom y in the various city-states o f ancient
G reece created under the existing historical conditions the
necessary incentives for tackling these tasks. T o w ork out their
solutions occupied the long line o f philosophers from T h a les to
A ristotle throughout three hundred years o f astounding in
tellectual effort. W h at cam e into existence here is the ca p a city o f
conceptual reasoning in terms o f abstract universals, a cap acity
w hich established full intellectual independence from m an ual
labour.
8
Conversion o f the R eal
Abstraction into the
Conceptual Abstraction
T h e form al structure o f com m odity exchange constitutes the core
o f the second nature: the purely social, abstract, functional
reality w h ich I earlier contrasted w ith prim ary nature where
m an exists on the same level as anim als. Second nature finds its
external expression in m oney, and in it the specifically h um an
elem ent in us finds its first separate and objectively real
m anifestation in history. T h is occurs through the necessity for a
social synthesis w hich is in total separation from any o f the
operations o f m an s m aterial interchange w ith nature. These
CONVERSION OF THE REAL ABSTRACTION 61
9
T h e Independent Intellect
(a ) S E L F -A L IE N A T IO N A N D S E L F -D IR E C T IO N
(b) T H E R E L A T IO N A L S H IF T
This statem ent does not in itself provide the full explanation
required. F or these postulates apply d irectly only to social
relations and to peoples m anner o f action and are a far cry from
the norm ative character o f the abstract intellect in its under
standing o f nature. T h e truth is that the process o f conversion
yield ing this intellect undergoes a most rem arkable shift even
THE INDEPENDENT INTELLECT 69
(c) C O N V E R S I O N P O S T F E S T U M O F E X C H A N G E ( M A R X - A F T E R T H E
E V E N T )
(d ) D IV IS IO N O F S O C IE T Y A N D N A T U R E
(e) R E IF IC A T IO N A T T H E R O O T O F T H E IN T E L L E C T
(/) K N O W L E D G E FR O M SO U RCES O T H E R T H A N M A N U A L L A B O U R
(g ) LAW S OF NATURE
(h ) T H E G U ID E -L IN E O F H IS T O R IC A L M A T E R IA L IS M
(i) M O N E Y AS A M IR R O R O F R E F L E C T IO N
(j) T H E SO C IA L F O R M O F T H IN K IN G
(k ) T H E SO C IA L SY N T H E SIS AS T H E F O U N D A T IO N O F S C IE N C E
S O C I A L S Y N T H E S IS
A N D P R O D U C T IO N
10
* In this p art, as elsew here in th e book, w e shall lim it ourselves in th e m ain to the
b ro ad er aspects o f historical u n d erstan d in g w ith out d ealin g w ith them in detail.
84 SOCIAL SYNTHESIS AND PRODUCTION
I I
But for us the essential question is: in whose head is the intended
result o f the labour process anticipated?
1 2
T h e Beginnings o f Surplus
Production and Exploitation
By this title w e understand the transition from the prim itive,
com m unistic society o f production to the first forms o f society o f
appropriation. T h e beginnings o f appropriation w ithin society
presuppose a grow th in p rod u ctivity or a developm ent in the
SURPLUS PRODUCTION AND EXPLOITATION 87
productive forces o f collective com m unal labour sufficient to
expect regular surpluses o f a worth-while dim ension over and
above subsistence level. As M a rx puts it:
trade, ju st as trade becam e the prom oting force for the grow th o f
the secondary crafts. T h e production o f surplus and the class-
character o f w ealth underw ent a massive im petus through the
developm ent and interaction o f these two factors, secondary
industries and trade, and so set in m otion such an incredible
achievem ent as the cu ltivation o f the great fertile river valleys,
which, from the N ile to the Y ello w R iv e r occurred w ithin the
same tim e span, betw een the fifth and third m illennia B.C.
* 3
x4
T h e Classical Society
o f Appropriation
T h e new iron m etallurgy w hich em erged onwards from around
io o o B.C. brought about the civilisations o f the Phoenicians and
then o f the Greeks, the Etruscans and the R om ans. These
civilisations required far less space for food production than their
predecessors; they could populate hilly country, coastal strips
and islands and gain advantages from their m obility. In order to
produce a surplus o f their prim ary production w ith iron
im plem ents they w ere no longer dependent upon the cultivation
THE CLASSICAL SOCIETY OF APPROPRIATION 95
o f alluvial river soils. T h e legends o f their heroic ea rly phase
prove that they w aged raids o f destruction, plu n d er and
abduction in the fabulously w ealthy territories o f the ancient
oriental B ronze A g e civilisation. In the process they acqu ired the
superior craftsm anship and techniques o f these older civilis
ations. T h e y soon caught up and even overtook their prede
cessors in secondary production and particularly in the m akin g o f
weapons and building o f ships.
T h e individualisation o f production that now em erged is
reflected in the fact that these adventurers indulged their deeds o f
robbery and p illage on their own account and at their o w n risk;
they were n o longer in the service o f theocratic rulers or backed
by the pow er o f a whole State. T h e y acted as heroes, independent
individuals, w ith w hom their people and State could identify,
devoting them selves in this w ay to their particular function, the
appropriation o f existing alien w ealth. T h eir m ythological frame
o f reference is still related to that o f the Bronze A ge civilisations
except that the gods are transformed from w hat w ere, in effect,
legitim ations o f the appropriators in the im age o f a h igher power
into deities guardin g the destinies o f the heroes them selves. Here
one sees the nucleus o f private wealth and o f com m odity
exchange before this exchange leads to the em ergence o f m oney.
T h e social revolution brought about by the developm ent o f the
iron technique is summed up b y George Thom son in the
following words: by increasing productivity and so rendering
possible new divisions o f labour, the use o f iron carried still
further the process o f transforming collective prod u ction and
appropriation into individual production and appropriation.
H ence it m arked a new stage in the growth o f com m odity
production. T h e village com mune, resting on com m on ow ner
ship and surrendering its surplus in the form o f tribu te, was
succeeded b y a com m unity o f individual proprietors, each
producing independently for the open m arket. Su ch w as the
G reek polis, based on the use o f iron . 8
Engels follows Lewis M organ in seeing developed com m odity
production as synonymous with the first stage o f civilisation,
w hich he describes as follows: T h e first stage o f com m odity
production w ith w hich civilisation begins is distinguished
econom ically by the introduction o f ( i ) m etal m oney, a n d with
it m oney capital, interest and usury; (2) merchants, as th e class
96 SOCIAL SYNTHESIS AND PRODUCTION
w ith the Greeks a new and most im portant elem ent did enter
science. T h is is the elem ent o f speculative philosophy, w hich
constitutes the specific qu ality, the real originality, o f G reek
science; . . .
T h e organised know ledge o f E gypt and Babylon h ad been a
tradition handed dow n from generation to generation by
priestly colleges. B ut the scientific m ovem ent w hich began in
the sixth century am ong the Greeks was entirely a lay
m ovem ent, it was the creation and the property, not o f priests
who claim ed to represent the gods, but o f men whose o n ly
claim to b e listened to lay in their appeal to the com m on reason
in m an kind. T h e G reek thinker who advanced a n opinion
stood behind the opinion himself. H e claim ed objective
validity for his statements; but they were his o w n personal
contribution to know ledge and he was prepared to defend
them as such. Consequently w ith the Greeks in d ivid ual
scientists begin to em erge, and the specific quality o f scientific
thinking begins to be recognised.
T o p u t the m atter in another way, the w orld-view o f the
E gyptians and Babylonians was conditioned b y the teach in g o f
sacred books; it thus constituted an orthodoxy, the m ainten
ance o f w hich was in the charge o f colleges o f priests. T h e
Greeks h a d no sacred books, . . .
T h ales [born about 630 B .C ., who founded the E a rly Ionian
School] is the first m an known to history to have offered a
general explanation o f nature w ithout invoking the aid o f any
power outside n a tu re.13
1 5
1 6
17
T h e Forms of Transition
from Artisanry to Science
M edieval handicraft began with the personal unity o f h ead and
hand; G alilean science established their clear-cut division. In this
chapter we are concerned w ith the transition from artisanry to
science from this view point. T h e causes o f the transform ation can
be found in the change from one-man production to production
on an ever-increasing social scale. This occurred, as we h ave seen,
m ainly as a result o f the com m ercial revolution.
T h e form ation o f towns as urban communities started in the
era o f late feudalism . W ith their developm ent sprang the need for
com m unal walls, com m unal defences, com m unal tow n halls,
cathedrals, roads and bridges, water-supplies and d rain age
systems, harbour installations and river control, m onuments and
so on. These w ere all due to the activities of capital, com m ercial
and m onetary, antediluvian forms o f capital, as M a rx calls
them . T h e social character o f all this developm ent is the direct
outcom e and m anifestation o f the originally social p ow er o f
capital. U n d er this pow er the great mass o f the artisans w ere
ruthlessly exploited. T h e y still retained the status o f producers
owning their own means o f production, but the bulk of them did
so as im poverished cottage labourers, hopelessly indebted to the
capitalist for w hom they produced the merchandise. T h e y w ere
dow ngraded and depressed to the standard o f proletarian lab ou r
long before they actu ally assumed the status o f m ere w age-
labourers. P roduction taking place in artisan workshops, on the
other hand, increased in volum e and changed in labour m ethods.
T h e em ploym ent o f more and more semi-skilled workers resulted
in class divisions w ithin the workshops.
112 SOCIAL SYNTHESIS AND PRODUCTION
From our view point, how ever, these econom ic and sociologi
cal changes are not the m ain focus o f interest. T h e y are not the
ones that can explain the lo g ica l and historical steps lead in g to
the form ation o f science. P arallel to the econom ic developm ents
m aking for the eventual dissolution o f the artisan m ode o f
production go technological changes caused b y the increasingly
social scale o f the order o f life as a whole exem plified b y the town
developm ents.
Construction and production tasks o f such dim ensions and
novelty stretched the craftsm en to the limits o f their resources and
inventiveness. B y the necessity to tackle the problem s there rose
from the ranks o f o rd in ary producers the great Renaissance
craftsm en, the experim enting m asters , artists, architects, and
also engineers o f the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. T h e m ain
qualification w hich the craftsm en lacked in their ca p a city as
artisans for solving the problem s facing them can be nam ed in
one w ord - m athem atics. W e h ave defined m athem atics as the
logic o f socialised thought. C a p ita l and m athem atics correlate:
the one wields its influence in the fields o f econom y, the other
rules the intellectual powers o f social production.
W e must be clear about the lim its that are set to the ca p a city o f
w ork tied to the personal u n ity o f head and hand. T h e artisan or
ind ivid ual m an ual w orker masters his production, not through
abstract know ledge, bu t b y p ractical know -how and b y the
expertise o f his hands. In terms o f know led ge , it is the
know ledge o f how one does, not o f how one explains things. This
p ractical know ledge can be conveyed b y dem onstration, rep
etition or words, depen ding on practical understanding o f the
task in volved. C ookery books are a clear exam p le. T h is is,
m oreover, not only true o f hu m an functions. L et us suppose w e
deal w ith w orking a pum p, a threshing-flail or a w ater mill,
irrespective o f w hether th ey replace hum an lab ou r or w hether
m an can n ot perform their task. In speaking to m an u al workers
one could not express oneself in any other w a y than b y treating
these things as i f they took the part o f hum an agents. T h e
lan gu age o f com m on usage (devoid o f special technical terms)
cannot articulate a division o f intellectual and m an ual labour.
T h e only sym bol lan gu age w h ich rends itself free from this tie-up
w ith hu m an activity is th at o f m athem atics. M ath em atics cuts a
deep cleft between a context o f thought and h u m an action,
FORMS OF TRANSITION FROM ARTISANRY TO SCIENCE I I3
18
I9
G alilean Science and the
D ynam ic Concept of Inertia
T h e break w ith tradition resulting in the foundation o f exact
science occurred when G alileo extended the concept o f inertia to
124 SOCIAL SYNTHESIS AND PRODUCTION
m ovem ent and thereby initiated the science o f dynam ics. U n til
then inertia h ad alw ays been understood as rest, and rest only, so
that m ovem ent had required an effort or impetus to bring it about
or to sustain it. T h is effort did not reside in things bu t had to be
supplied in the last resort b y a hu m an being, handicraftsm an or
peasant, independent producer or slave or serf or w age-labourer;
and even w hen the m ovem ent occurred in nature outside the
hum an ran ge the effort im agined to be causing it was o f m aterial
forces actin g as i f w ith an agen cy analogous to that o f m an.
T hese assumptions o f a static inertia and o f the need o f an
im petus to accoun t for m ovem ent are in keeping w ith a
handicraft m ode o f production. T h e ir rational use is lim ited to
the solving o f tasks lyin g w ithin the scope o f hum an strength and
skill. T h e y becom e irrational and fail w hen applied to problem s
transcending this scope b y a substantial m argin, as was notab ly
the case w ith the ballistics o f gun nery w hich in turn governed the
entire range o f m ilitary engineering and architecture w hen
Europe was gripped by the fear o f the Tu rkish m enace (from the
fall o f Constantinople 1453 and o f O tran to 1490).
T h e calculation o f the trajectory o f cannon balls was am ong
the foremost problem s on w hich G alileo brought to bear his
concept o f inertial m ovem ent and w h ich he was the first to solve
successfully. H e proved it to be an exercise o f pure m ath em atical
analysis consisting o f the com bination o f two geom etrical
principles, that o f a straight line w ith a horizontal or an upw ard
tilt and that o f a vertical fall in volvin g an even acceleration of
know n arithm etical m easure. T h e com bination yielded a p a ra
bola and the actu al trajectory o f cann on balls proved experim en
tally to conform w ith this rule ad van ced b y w a y o f hypothesis,
w hile m aking allow ance for air resistance. W e know that N ew ton
later repeated on an astronom ical scale in his calculation o f
celestial orbits the feat w hich G alileo performed in terrestrial
m echanics.
T h e G alilean assum ption o f inertial m otion opened the
app licability o f m athem atics to the calculation o f natural
phenom ena o f m otion. This calculation carries scientific re
liability, providing that the phenom ena can be isolated from
uncontrolled environm ental influences and then tested experim
entally. T h is briefly epitomises the guiding features o f the
m athem atical and experim ental m ethod o f science w h ich , in
GALILEAN SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF INERTIA I 25
20
Bourgeois Science
Is it correct to class science as w e know it, or rather as w e knew it
until the end o f the nineteenth century, as bourgeois science? C an
w e expect a m ajor transform ation o f science i f socialism w ere to
supersede capitalism ? It all depends w hat w e understand by
science . T h e science that w e have is a product o f intellectual
labour divided from m anual labour. For that reason alone it
BOURGEOIS SCIENCE : 33
cannot represent our possession o f nature, our true relation to
nature. B y adhering to a concept o f science which keeps to this
intellectual one-sidedness w e should not ju d g e it ca p a b le of
essential alterations, for instance, m ajor alterations in m ethod
and in the use o f m athem atics. In his Parisian Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844 M a rx is m ore outspoken than in
his later w ork about his demands on science and there are two
passages w hich I shall quote. T h e one has regard o f the notion
o f lab ou r w hich we ought to keep in m ind, the other shows us
w h at conception o f science anim ated M a r x s ideas.
T H E D U A L E C O N O M IC S
OF ADVANCED
C A P IT A L IS M
2 1
From De-socialised to
Re-socialised Labour
In Part I o f this book we have argued that intellectual lab ou r
divided from m an u al labour is ruled by a logic o f appropriation.
Socialism, how ever, dem ands a mode o f thinking in accord ance
with a logic o f production. This implies thinking by the d irect
producers them selves and it w ould necessitate the unity o f head
and hand.
It is our purpose now to investigate trends w hich d om inate our
present epoch w ith regard to this contrast. T he reasoning
involved is, o f course, grounded in w h at has been set out in the
preceding chapters. It is bound, however, to be a great d eal m ore
speculative since it is concerned with the present and future, and
serves, it is hoped, as a basis for further research by others.
W e have seen that the abstract intellectual work associated
with the system o f com m odity production is an a priori socialised
form o f thinking, in antithesis to physical labour carried on
independently and privately by individual producers 1 since
only products o f m utually independent acts o f labour, perfor
med in isolation, can confront each other as com m odities .2 T h e
abstract intellect arose because labour lost its prim itive collective
form of w orking and becam e de-socialised in such a w a y that the
cohesion o f society grew dependent on exchange instead o f
production. As the veh icle of the social synthesis, or o f societis-
ation, as w e m igh t call it, exchange becomes m onetary exch ange
activated b y m oney being utilised as capital. In the initial epochs
o f com m odity exch ange capital figured in the antediluvian
form , as M arx called it, o f m onetary and m erchant cap ital, only
since then to seize upon the means o f production and to operate
them by w age-labour.
I4 0 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
22
A T hird Stage o f the
Capitalist M ode o f
Production?
In the era o f flow -production the socialisation o f labour has
reached a stage high er than ever before, but o f course in
subordination to cap ital. T h e re-socialisation o f labour has been
a m ajor trend, i f not indeed the m ain one, in capitalist history.
M arx distinguishes two stages o f the process: the stage o f
m anufacture followed b y that o f m achinery and large-scale
industry - m achin ofacture in short. W e feel there m ay be good
reasons for distinguishing a third stage. As M a rx says:
and again:
23
T h e T u rn to
M onopoly Capitalism
In line w ith L enin w e consider these developm ents as distinctive
characteristics o f a new stage o f the capitalist m ode o f pro
d uction. L enin related the change to the level o f the organic
com position o f capital or the high grad e o f cap ital intensity
reached in the last quarter o f the nineteenth century (in the
h ea vy industries o f iron and steel m anufacture, synthetic chem
istry and electro-industry). T h is is, in fact, synonym ous with the
term inology o f M a rx in Grundrisse, w h ich Lenin, o f course, did
not know . But his theoretical reasoning has been refined and
substantiated b y certain non-M arxist studies bearing on the same
subject. T h e most pertinent ones are Studies in the Economics o f
Overhead Cost by J . M . C la r k 11 and the works by E ugen
Schm alenbach, the founder and most im portan t representative
o f m odern m anagem ent sciences in G erm an y .12
T h e reasoning is sim ple and incontrovertible. G row in g capital
intensity and a rising organic com position o f cap ital leads, at a
certain point, to a ch anging costing structure o f production,
am ounting to an increasing dom inance o f the so-called indirect
or fixed elem ent o f the cost. T h is does not va ry w ith output and
still rem ains constant even w hen production, as in a severe slump,
m igh t h ave to stop tem porarily altogether. T hese invariable
overheads a re m ade up o f the interest on loaned capital,
depreciation, insurance, m aintenance, leases, rents and so on.
Firm s w herein this part o f the cost is h igh in relation to the direct
costs, in the m ain o f m aterials and wages w h ich v a ry according to
the volum e o f output, cannot easily respond to the m arket
regulatives o f social econom y controlling the p la y o f the law o f
valu e. W hen dem and recedes and prices tend to slum p, pro-
IMPERIALISM AND SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT I4 5
Imperialism and
Scientific M anagem ent
These conditions occurred increasingly and over a spreading
range o f industry during the last quarter o f the nineteenth
century. T h e y assumed a spectacular m anifestation in the long
depression follow ing upon the slump o f 1873/4 and lasting almost
uninterruptedly for more than tw enty years. T h e period,
rem em bered as the hungry eighties , was a tim e o f mass '
unem ploym ent com parable to that o f the 1930s; a tim e o f hunger
m arches and mass demonstrations, o f strikes an d riots and
revolutionary class struggle. Socialism for the first tim e becam e
the catchw ord o f broad political movements resulting in the
founding o f social mass parties m atched by the organisation o f the
semi-skilled and even the unskilled workers in a new type o f trade
unionism. T h e most ominous features o f the picture draw n by
14 6 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
T h e Econom y o f T im e
and Scientific M anagem ent
T h e dom inance o f overhead cost is associated with a specific
econom y o f time relatin g to the labour process o f production.
T h e m ore h ighly the production cap acity o f a given plant is
utilised, that is to say, the m ore products are turned out in a given
tim e and, as a consequence, the quicker the cap ital can be turned
over, then the low er is the unit cost o f the output and the greater
the com petitiveness o f the enterprise. T h e speed o f operations in
utilising the given plan t o f a firm is the all-im portant factor in the
com petitive struggle for profit under conditions o f m onopoly
capitalism .
I f w e look back to the beginnings o f the search for m odern so-
called scientific m anagem ent we can see that it was this econom y
o f tim e w h ich spurred it on. H arry B raverm an points to the vital
interconnection:
I w ould say that they grew out o f the root cause w hich gave rise
to m onopoly capitalism , the dom inance o f overhead cost, i.e. the
THE ESSENTIALS OF TAYLORISM 149
rise in the organic com position o f capital. A nd coupled with the
speeding o f operations was the question o f its control.
F rom the lecture b y F. W . T ay lor already m entioned there
ensued a discussion w ith H . R . Tow ne and F. A . H alsey, his m ain
rivals, w ho had put their Prem ium P lan o f m an agem en t before
the sam e Society in 1891. T h e central issue o f the debate concerns
the question o f control. In the Tow ne - H a ls e y p la n 17 the
control o f the speed problem is turned over to the m en , whereas
according to T a y lo r s scheme it lies with the m an agem en t . A n d
the m ain reasoning involved is one o f the economics o f overhead
cost. In direct expenses equal or exceed the w ages paid directly
and rem ain approxim ately constant whether the output is great
or sm all. G reater output justifies higher wages, the dim inution o f
the indirect portion o f the cost per piece being greater than the
increase in w'ages.
T h e operating econom ic factor is the effect that the volum e o f
output has on the unit cost. O r, as T a y lo r later puts it in his
Principles o f Scientific Management (19 11)18 it pays the em ployer to
p ay higher wages as long as the higher output does not increase
overheads . A n d there is no doubt that T a y lo r grasped the
im plications o f this economics o f time with greater system atic
consistency from the standpoint of m onopoly cap ital than
a n ybo dy else am ong the w ould-be founders o f the appropriate
sort o f m anagem ent at that time. T aylo r was the one to w hom the
claim to be its founder rightfully belongs. L et us go through some
o f the salient points o f his system.
2 6
T h e Essentials of Taylorism
F rederick W inslow T a y lo r s first writing was the lecture of 1895
given to the A m erican Society o f M echanical Engineers, from
150 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
and again:
T h e gain from these slide rules is far greater than that o f all the
other im provem ents combined, because it accom plishes the
152 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
original object for w h ich in 1880 the experim ents were started;
i.e., that o f taking the control o f the m achine shop out of the
hands o f the m an y workm en, and p lacin g it com pletely in the
hands o f the m anagem ent, thus superseding the rule o f
thum b b y scientific control, [para. 52] U n d er our system the
w orkm an is told m inutely ju st w h at he is to do and how he is to
do it; and any im provem ent w h ich he m akes upon the orders
given him is fatal to success, [para. 118]
T h e cru cial advan tage and novelty he claim ed for his system o f
m anagem ent was that it m ade the rise o f profits for the
m anufacturer com patible w ith rising w ages for the workers. In
his own words: H ig h wages and low lab ou r cost are not only
com patible, but are, in the m ajority o f cases m u tu ally con
d ition al. {Shop Management, p p. 2 1 2.) T his is w h y he saw in it a
partial solution o f the labour problem , and in 1895 h-e even
expressed the hope that it w ould contribute to the elim ination o f
the trade cycle, thus freeing capitalism o f its two m ajor evils.
T a y lo r s exam ples given in Shop Management show increases in
w orkers output up to 300 per cent and even 400 per cent relative
to a w age increase o f 60 per cent! In flexibility o f the cost structure
being also the m ain elem ent m akin g for m onopolism , it becomes
apparent w h y T aylorism has its roots in m onopoly capitalism .
N or does the causality stop there. T a y lo r s personal history serves
to illustrate how T aylorism itself acts on m onopolism . A fter
three or four years w ork at the M id va le Steel C o m p an y he
transferred his activity to the Bethlehem Steel C o m p an y, where
he totally reorganised the system o f m anagem ent; subsequently
the latter forged a m erger w ith the form er to found the U nited
C R IT IQ U E OF TAYLORISM ! 53
Steel C om pan y, the biggest o f its kind in the U nited States. Thus
Taylorism , in its turn, helped to increase the stimulus instigating
m onopolism .
Critique of Taylorism
A n explanation is needed for the quotations in the last chapter
dealing w ith T a y lo rs m u ch advertised slide rules w hich hardly
reached any practical im portance after the introduction of
transfer mechanisms and the flow-m ethod o f production had
rendered them redundant. H ow ever I quote them for a number
o f reasons. In the first p lace the immense tim e and trouble which
T a y lo r devoted to them explain w h y he spent tw enty-six years on
the com pletion o f his m ain work. Second, th ey demonstrated
T a y lo r s singleness o f purpose in wanting to transfer the whole
skill and experience possessed b y the craftsmen o f m etal trades
upon the m anagem ent. T h is knowledge in the hands o f m anage
m ent was transformed into an intellectual feat transcribed into a
set o f norms and rules. I t thereby becam e a possession o f the
m anagers to deal w ith in the interests o f capital; they could carve
it up, mechanise the subdivisions and even autom ate it as a
w hole. T a y lo r refers to this knowledge in its original form as all
the im portant decisions and planning w hich vitally affect the
output o f the shop .
T h e third reason w h y I regard T a y lo rs w ork on his slide rules
o f such im portance is the clarity w ith which it shows that such
knowledge, i f left in the possession of the craftsm an, must be
linked inseparably w ith his m anual labour, representing his
productive capacity as an individual worker. B u t it also enshrines
everything w hich makes possible the link-up o f co-operating
craftsmen into one collective worker . This socialisation o f their
154 THE DUAL e c o n o m i c s o f a d v a n c e d c a p i t a l i s m
2 8
The Foundation o f
Flow Production
In keeping with M arxian thinking we have interpreted the
increase in labour productivity as occurring concurrently w ith
increased association o f labour. But it is clearly not the tim e-and-
m otion study as instituted b y T a y lo r w hich socialises labour. T h e
most striking and best-known exam ples o f T a y lo rs w ork, famous
from his ow n writings, refer to operations o f building workers and
to sim ple loading tasks in a yard of the Bethlehem Steel Co.; not
only w ere these loading operations done b y hand w ith shovels,
b u t they had been done collectively as gang labour before T a y lo r
individualised them. Indeed, one o f the essentials in his in
structions on tim e-and-motion study reads that each analysis
must be applied to the operation concerned in strict isolation .26
T h is ruling would make it quite im m aterial w hether the
operation studied was done singly or as p art o f co-ordinated
labour. T h e relevance o f T aylorism to highly socialised pro
duction is not that the specific norm o f labour it imposes either
causes the socialisation nor presumes its previous existence. It lies
in the fact that Taylorism serves to im plem ent the specific
econom y o f time inherent in m onopoly capitalism ; and the
econom y o f time ensues from high overhead costs and the need
for continuous production.
T h e classical example best suited for illustrating this re
lationship is Fords foundation o f his motor works on the basis of
flow production from 1913 onwards. In the building up o f the
operation Taylorism played no part. T h e stop w atch need hardly
have been invented, it seems, from the description H en ry Ford
him self gives in M y Life and Work. T h e decisive elem ent was the
organisation o f mass-production of a uniform product. H e left
l6 o THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
m uch room for the inventiveness o f his workers, and the scheme
did not develop at one stroke bu t evolved piecem eal, always
follow ing the logic o f continuous m ass-production. F o rd s idea
was to concentrate on one m odel car, his m odel T , designed by
him personally for sim plicity o f operation, ease o f repair,
lightness o f w eight and m u ltiplicity o f use. H e was the first to
anticipate that the m arket for cars was unlim ited, p roviding that
the price could be kept at a low er level than anyone at the time
thought possible. O th er m anufacturers w ere designing in
d ivid u al cars w ith a variety o f models at high prices aim ed at a
restricted m arket for use as a privilege by the rich. F ord s famous
rem ark illustrates his w a y o f thinking. A n y custom er can have a
car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is b lack . 27
In cid en tally he was also the first to realise the value o f the
uniform ity o f a product acting as its own advertisem ent.
In the bu ild ing up o f his production process overhead cost was
not a com pelling factor. T h e relation was the reverse: the
overheads and their increasing dom inance resulted from the flow
m ethods applied in creating this new and revolution ary type o f
m echanised m ass-production. T h e application o f Taylorism
becam e a necessity, apparently even to F ord s personal dislike,
but indispensable i f he was to m aintain his profits and his
com petitiveness.
Th u s it is not sufficient to look from the view poin t o f the
engineer only at the history o f flow production in capitalism since
the industrial revolution and the grow th o f large-scale industry.
T ru e, seen from a pu rely technological angle no m ore than a
replacem ent o f m ulti-purpose b y single-purpose m achine-tools is
needed for introducing some m easure o f flow production. T h ere
is no reason w h y this should not h ave happened as far back as the
beginning o f the nineteenth century or still earlier if the product
was sim ple enough and the dem and for it sufficiently large and
pressing. Em ergencies arising from w ar w ere the most likely
occasions, such as the sudden mass requirem ents for small arms in
the A m erican C ivil W ar. M ass-production on a flow-m ethod
basis appeared as the only device w h ich could supply dem ands
q u ickly. T h e need for m unitions in the First W orld W a r created
sim ilar conditions on a m uch larger scale. But does the tech
nological sim ilarity place these instances on the same level with
the Ford works o f Detroit? T h e difference should be easy to
THE UNITY OF MEASUREMENT OF MAN AND MACHINE 16 1
recognise. T h e instances prior to the em ergence o f m onopoly
capitalism were m otivated by reasons o f use-value and the
urgency o f w ar-tim e need, whereas twentieth-century flow
production follows the logic o f exchange-value and the time
econom y enforced b y heavy overheads. Thus the serial small-
arms m anufacture o f the 1860s went out o f existence and was
forgotten as soon as the C iv il W a r was over, while H enry F ord s
initiative introduced a new epoch o f the capitalist mode of
production.
29
T he U n ity of Measurement
o f M an and M achine
T h e flow m ethod o f m anufacture is the m ode o f production most
perfectly adapted to the dem ands o f the econom y o f time in
m onopoly capital. T h e entirety o f a workshop or factory is
integrated into one continuous process in the service o f the rule o f
speed. W e rem em ber M a rx saying: T h e collective working
m achine . . . becomes all the m ore perfect the m ore the process
as a whole becomes a continuous one. . . . 28 T h is continuity is
now im plem ented b y a m achine, a conveyor belt or other transfer
mechanism subjecting to the set speed the action o f all the
productive m achinery and the hum an labour serving it. T h e
identical rhythm o f time o f the transfer m echanism and the unity
o f measurement it imposes between the men and machines
constitute the distinguishing principle o f the flow m ethod o f
modern m ass-production. Com pound m achinery with com
pound lab ou r works under this unity o f m easurement. Linked by
the action o f a transfer m echanism the workers operate like one
com prehensive functional labourer using perhaps 400, 800 or
1 62 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
assembly lines out o f the hands o f the m anagem ent into their
own, and reduced the flow to as low as 30 per cent o f the rated
speed.
T h is and m any strikes o f a sim ilar kind, as w ell as numerous
factory occupations in Italy, France, England and elsewhere,
illustrate the fact that the fetishism, observed by M a rx , involving
the inversion o f the relationship between labour and cap ital has
worn thin in a type o f production where both lab ou r and
m achinery assume compound structure.
C a p ita l continuously faces the necessity for restructuring its
production process, not only to reduce unit costs and to elude
recessions, bu t even more com pellingly to retain its hold over the
class struggle. T hus the present drive towards group-w ork to
replace the rigid linear pattern o f assembly w o rk m ay be
apparent concessions to the workers, but in fact are n e arly always
aimed at breaking the bargaining power w hich the w orkin g class
have learn ed to exert from line w ork. A nother response o f capital
to industrial strife is continuous rationalisation o f production by
h aving less and less workers and more and more autom ation
regardless o f the long-term perils o f this trend.
30
T h e Dual Economics o f
M onopoly Capitalism
T h e system o f m onopoly capitalism is m arked by a d u ality of
economics, the one located in the market and going b a ck to roots
as old as com m odity production itself, the other p ecu liar to the
most recen t form o f production and pointing to the latest, if not
the last, stage o f capitalism. But the rules o f the m arket are no
longer the same as in free-m arket capitalism . In the free-m arket
system production was, as a rule, tied to the m an ufacture o f
16 4 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
31
T h e Necessity for a
Com mensuration o f Labour
W e must now turn to the fundam entals o f m an s historical
existence as a social being. T hese fundam entals are nowhere
stated m ore convincingly nor m ore concisely than in a famous
letter o f M a rx to K u gelm a n n d ated 11 J u ly 1868, shortly after the
first appearance o f volum e 1 o f Capital, w hen M a rx was irked by
the lack o f com prehension o f one o f its reviewers.
32
T h e Com m ensuration of
L abour in A ction
W e m ust now return to Frederick W inslow T a y lo r and focus
upon his m ethod o f accu rate and scientific study o f u nit times
declared to be by far the most im portant elem ent in scientific
m an agem en t . H is analysis w as done in the service o f capital and
therefore as a m ethod for speeding labour. U n d er our view point,
how ever, the m ethod need not serve this objective, nor be
w ielded b y cap ital as a m eans o f enforcing its control o ver labour.
It could even be a m ethod operated b y the workers themselves,
although then it w ould certain ly differ substantially from
T aylorism . B ut in order to have a firm base for our own
considerations w e take as a starting-point the w a y in w hich it is
practised in m onopoly capitalist m ass-production.
T a y lo r s aims in analysing m an ual operations w ere, in the first
place, to find out how the studied operation can be done w ith least
waste o f tim e and m inim al effort and fatigue; then to norm the
operation as a com posite o f strictly repetitive and standard parts;
to reduce these parts to the sm allest particles or units o f m otion,
assumed to be hom ogeneous in all m an ual operations; to time
these units w ith the precision o f fractions o f a second; fin ally to use
these unit tim es as a foundation o f the jo b evalu ation for fixing
correct w age and bonus rates. Som e o f these features have
undergone m ore or less considerable m odifications since the days
o f T aylo r; m odifications, how ever, w hich m ain ly serve to m ake
T aylorism m ore acceptable to the workers to sell it to them .
These are o f lesser im portan ce from our point o f view . It still is a
m ethod o f direct tim e-and-m otion study, or, better, o f jo b
analysis allow ing for the possibility that the jo b in question
could be a collective perform ance o f a h igh ly autom ated
THE COMMENSURATION OF LABOUR IN ACTION 17 1
workshop or o f a section o f it as it is in the measured day-rate
system o f m anagem ent.
O u r interest lies in the fa ct that here operations o f different
qualitative descripdon are being expressed as different multiples
o f each other in quantitative terms o f labour time. W e have, in
other words, a systematic quantification on standards o f uniform
time measures and thus a com m ensuration oflabou r in the literal
meaning o f it, over a range o f operations. Since T a y lo r s time
these operations have expanded to one industry after another and
even to agriculture, mining, transportation and m an y o f the
service industries as w ell as to adm inistration, to clerical work
and design.33 I f w e com pare this mode o f com m ensurating
labour with the one effected b y the social exchange process as
analysed by M arx, it becomes obvious at a glance that both are
diam etrical opposites to each other in every vital characteristic.
T h e m ode initiated by T a y lo r is:
33
T h e W ay to A utom ation
W e h ave seen how the econom y o f tim e not only forces every firm
to aim at the uninterrupted continu ity o f its production process
but also to apply the highest possible speed and the greatest
econom y in the use o f constant capital. Com petitiveness d e
m ands the quickest capital turnover, and this again adds to the
pressure for speed o f operations. A s a result there is a shortening
cycle o f renew al o f plan t at a rising level o f tech nology and
increased cost. T h ereb y the proportion o f the circu latin g part o f
the cap ital relative to the fixed p a rt tends continuously to rise.
Since it is only the circu latin g part o f the prod u ctive capital
THE WAY TO AUTOMATION 173
which carries surplus value (cf. Grundrisse 34) the tendency helps
to countervail the trend toward a falling rate of profit.
In short, the cum ulative pressures o f the monopolistic econ
om y o f time devolve upon the work force b y an ever-increasing
speed o f operations. E ven before the Second W orld W a r this
speeding had in some cases reached the degree where it surpassed
the limits o f hum an capability, and technological agencies w ere
introduced to obtain the required results. O n e o f the first o f these,
to m y knowledge, was the photo-electric cell, or electric ey e
whose action replaces and exceeds the attention possible b y a
hum an person. T h ere is hardly any need to remind ourselves o f
the stress M arx lays upon this elem ent o f hum an w ork. A p a rt
from the exertion o f the working bodily organs, a purposeful w ill
is required for the entire duration o f the w ork. This means close
attention. 35
T o give an exam ple, in the early 1930s the m anufacture o f
razor blades was transformed in G erm any from the operations o f
small-scale cutlers to autom ated mass-production by large-scale
mechanisms relying on photo-electric cells for retaining the
flawless blades and rejecting failures at a rate and reliability
com pletely unattainable by a hum an operator. T h e H ollerith
m achine also based on an electric eye - was in use for office
work very m uch earlier. H igh speed and mass-production was
only m ade possible b y the introduction o f such technological
agencies in place o f hum an labour pow er. From the 1950s
onwards their use has been enorm ously extended, tending to
make for com plete autom ation o f an increasing range o f
m anufacturing processes.
I believe that the essential aspect o f this type o f autom ation is
ultim ately the total replacem ent of the subjectivity o f a hum an
labour-power. B y this I m ean the entirety o f the hum an persons
m ental and sensorial activities in the particular jobs o f w ork
involved. Details o f this replacem ent have been so frequently and
lavishly described that we can spare ourselves the tedium o f
renewed repetition. It serves our purpose better to quote a very
apt, though ironical, passage by R o bert Boguslaw:
3 4
T h e Curse of the
Second-Nature .
W ith the achievem ent o f autom ation the postulate o f the
autom atism w hich we described in Part I I o f this book has
reached its final stage. In autom ation the second nature reigns
suprem e. R u led as it is by the logic o f appropriation, the second
nature cannot enrich itself out o f any other source th an real
nature, and labour is the channel through w hich it does so.
C a p ita l grew fat and m ighty by sucking the surplus out o flab o u r.
C a n it continue to grow fat out o f its own products? C a p ita l faces
the ultim ate contradiction. T h e labour process has to function for
capital as autom atism to enable capital to exploit labour. But
now the autom atism alone remains and labour is discarded.
O bviously, labour is fully discarded only in the rarest o f cases; as a
rule, autom ation only covers part-processes. A n d although its
scope and its range are increasing, in the great mass o f industries
the global size o f the hum an work-force still grows, both in the
advanced and in the developing countries, even w ith unem ploy
m ent form ing stagnant pools.
A n autom ated labour process is still a labour process, but a
labour process o f a com pletely social scope, social in the terms o f a
science and a technology resting on the logic o f appropriation
p ecu liar to com m odity value. T h e subjectivity o f the individual
labour-pow er, the mental, sensorial and nervous functions o f an
ind ivid ual w hile at work, has been replaced by the electronics of
autom ation. Technological devices, in substituting for the
workers personal attributes, em ancipate the su bjectivity o f
labour from the organic limitations o f the in d ivid u al and
transform it into a social power o f m achinery. T h u s the
e le ctro n ics'o f an autom ated labour process act, not for the
I 76 THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
35
T h e Epoch o f Transition
A s M arxists w e w ere brought up to think th at o f all the
contradictions inherent in capitalism the one betw een the ever-
increasing social dimension o f production and private appropri
ation is the most fundam ental. It expresses the historical trend o f
the capitalist m ode o f production and asserts its transient
ch aracter. This teachin g has gained enhanced relevance in
m onopoly capitalism . W ith the introduction o f flow production
the social dim ension assumed a specific structural form o f its own
and henceforth increased in a conclusive m an ner reach in g in our
THE EPOCH OF TRANSITION I 79
days the size o f the giant m ulti-national corporations. T h is
provides convincing evidence o f the im portance o f the new
com m ensuration o f labour in m aking the developm ent o f
production and the developm ent o f the markets proceed at
variance. T h eir discrepancy creates problems w hich tend to
exceed the controlling pow er o f private capital and dem ands
supplem entation b y the social resources and pow er o f the State.
T h e epoch in w hich we live is the epoch o f transition w hich must
either lead to socialism or to social disaster.
Science and technology have developed to new forms. B u t
while classical physics is securely based on its m athem atical and
experim ental m ethod, the relativity theory and quantum physics
have thrown science into m ethodological uncertainty. Classical
physics in its unchallenged reign shared the lifespan o f m odern
capitalism up to the end o f its classical free-m arket period.
A lth ou gh now relegated to second place, it still has an im portant
role to p lay and rem ains an adequate scientific m ethod for a great
mass o f the technological tasks in the present w orld, not
excluding the socialist parts. W ere w e then entitled to speak o f
classical science as bourgeois science as w e did in C h ap ter 20?
L e t us be quite clear: m ethodologically, classical physics has
nothing to do w ith the exploitation o f labour b y capital. Its
findings are valid irrespective o f any particular production
relations. Inasm uch as it is based on the m athem atical and
experim ental m ethod science is one and one only. E xact science
carries objectivity because the elements o f the exchange abstrac
tion, w h ich in themselves are entirely o f the second nature, h ave
substantial identity w ith the corresponding elements o f real
nature ow ing to the fact th at the separation of exchange from use
and hence the creation o f the exchange abstraction itself happens
as an event in tim e and space in every occurrence o f exchange.
O n the other hand, looking at nature under the categories o f
the com m odity form, science affords precisely the technology on
w hich hinges the controlling power o f capital over production. It
cuts up nature piecem eal b y isolating its objects o f study from the
context in w hich they occur, ignoring nature in its im portance as
the h abitat o f society. T h e environm ental conditions are treated
as a mass o f interfering circumstances which must at all cost be
kept out o f the experim ents. In this w ay the phenom ena are
severed from the h um an w orld and cut down to recurrent events;
l8 o THE DUAL ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED CAPITALISM
Logic o f A ppropriation
and Logic o f Production
T h e basic difference o f socialism from capitalism , as seen from
our view point, is in the relationship o f society to nature. W hereas
in capitalism the existing technology serves as m ach in ery for the
LOGIC OF APPROPRIATION AND LOGIC OF PRODUCTION l8 l
science is com pelled to single out its objects as isolates; and that it
must be carried out as an intellectual exploit.
A ll these properties are capable o f rem edy b y the feature, the
essential one o f socialism, that the people as direct producers
must be the controlling masters o f both the m aterial and
intellectual m eans o f production, and that they act in concert to
establish their prosperity w ithin nature in its global unity. For
this feature signifies that the m aterial practice o f the people in
their social exploits com m ands the need for scientific findings to
be integrated into the relationship o f society to nature. In the
service o f ca p ita l the findings o f science are each o f them items in
com m odity form presented to cap ital for its exploitation. T h is
position does not alter w hen a num ber o f such findings are
com bined to be exploited in their association; whereas in the
practice o f a socialist project, as evidenced also b y the w ork o f the
T .V .A ., the findings o f science never rem ain single, bu t are
alw ays com bined under the logic o f production regu lating any
collective interaction w ith nature.
T h e difference then betw een the status o f science in capitalism
and in socialism is not in that the logic o f science w ill change from
a logic o f appropriation to one o f production. It is rather th at the
relationship betw een them differs. In capitalism the logic o f
appropriation reigning in the econom ics o f profit-m aking and in
science dom inates the logic o f production in the m anual activities
o f the w age-labourers, whereas in socialism the relationship is the
opposite: that the logic o f production anim ating any socialist
p roject dom inates the logic o f appropriation o f a science
belonging to the producers. It cannot, o f course, be ruled out that
in the long run the logic and m ethod o f science w ill alter as a
result o f socialist developm ents. B u t w hat is certain to change is
the technology'taken over from capitalism . A n d this change w ill
not only be one o f the m ach in ery itself but also a change in the
m anner o f prod u cin g it. Its construction w ill increasingly becom e
the w ork o f the direct producers rather than that o f professional
experts. W e can see m an y exam ples o f this change in C h in a,
p articu larly since the C u ltu ral R evolu tion . G ive n a new,
qu alitatively different technology a new theoretical conception
o f its m ode o f w orkin g m ay em erge deepening its understanding
and giving it the universality needed for its general social
utilisation.48
LOGIC OF APPROPRIATION AND LOGIC OF PRODUCTION 1 85
H IS T O R IC A L
M A T E R IA L IS M
A S M E T H O D O L O G IC A L
PO STU LATE
3 7
T h e Theory o f Reflection
and its Incompatibilities
as a Theory o f Science
T h e theory o f knowledge and of science prevalent am ong some
M arxists and particularly those payin g allegiance to the Soviet
U n io n is the theory o f reflection. W hile I fully recognise the
political im portance o f this theory and its ideological purpose for
use against idealism and positivism , I consider its theoretical
value to be nil. In fact it has the d am aging effect o f m itigating
against all serious historical-m aterialist investigation o f the
phenom ena o f cognition. T h e theory o f reflection is not historical
m aterialistic but is an offshoot o f n atural m aterialism.
T hese remarks will, o f course, arouse violent contradiction
am ong reflectionists, and pronounced boldly in this w ay they
m ay appear incorrect. But are they really so? I w ould answer
those who reject my statement that I am aware that the
reflectionists em brace m ore into their epistemology o f the
sciences than mere external nature; they also take into account
historical and social factors. Nevertheless, these additional
factors are only arrayed to m ake the reflection o f nature appear
more plausible. H ence, w hat they serve to support is the assertion
o f a reflection o f nature. O r, p u t another way: rem ove the
reflection o f nature from the whole com plex argum ent, then all
the subsidiary elements w ould lose their m eaning. Even taking
into account T odor P aw lo w s seven hundred and fifty pages1
presenting the theory o f reflection there only remains the
assertion that the form ation, m ethod and objectivity o f science
are explained by the scientific m ind reflecting its object of
190 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
M aterialism versus
Empiricism
O ne of the objections M arxists frequently encounter in academ ic
circles is that the whole juxtaposition o f social existence (or social
being)1 to consciousness am ounts to a naive ontologism . W h at
do we know o f social existence except through our own
consciousness o f it? A nd how is it possible to guard against the
hypostatisation o f all m anner o f ideas, preconceptions and
standards o f value in our approach and our description o f w hat
we think is social existence? Y e t w e claim to ju d g e and criticise
all ideas, inclu din g our own, in the light of their determ ination
from outside consciousness. N ot a single step could w e take in
carrying ou t our proclaim ed principle without h avin g to beg it.
Before starting on our task we need a critical sifting o f our own
assumptions, and this necessarily requires a prima philosophia
w hich Aristotelians seek in ontology, Kantians in epistem ology.
Thus, before w e can start to follow out the postulate of
materialism we find ourselves landed in idealism.
194 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
39
M a rx s O w n O b ject Lesson
M a rx s Capital bears the sub-title Critique o f Political Economy, the
same as form ed the m ain title o f the earlier study. W e have
already quoted M arx in the m eaning o f the term political
econom y : L e t me point out once for all that by classical political
econom y I m ean all the economists w ho, since the tim e of
W illiam Petty, have investigated the real internal fram ework
(Zusam m enhang) o f bourgeois relations o f production. . . . 6
T hus m ethodologically the subject-m atter o f M a r x s critique is
M ARXS OWN OBJECT LESSON T95
not the historical reality o f this or that form o f social existence
but, in the first instance, a particular mode of
consciousness - nam ely, that o f political economy; it is thoughts,
not things. It is the concepts o f va lu e , capital, profit , rent,
etc., as he found them defined and discussed in the writings o f the
economists. H e does not deal directly w ith realities, does not
elaborate concepts o f his own w hich, as correct ones, he would
oppose to the false ones o f the economists. His approach is
characteristically different. It is an approach to reality, but by
w ay o f the critique o f the historically given consciousness.
F ollow ing the Sm ith - R ica rd ia n concept o f valu e M arx
defines as com m odity the reality to w hich it refers: it is as an
immense collection o f com m odities that capitalist society ap
pears, 7 appears that is, as seen through the spectacles o f the
established m ode o f thinking. M a rx then analyses com m odity
(not value) insisting all the tim e on finding in it the cor
respondence to the concepts and distinctions o f the economists,
and w hat he finds is the historical origin of the seem ingly
timeless concept o f va lu e . It is on this purely critical line o f
procedure, on the standards o f the very concepts he is out to
criticise, that he establishes the determ ination o f a given mode o f
consciousness by social existence, and thereby, as the intended
result, succeeds in uncovering the true reality o f that social
existence.
T hus, far from hypostatising an y concepts and assumptions,
M arx, on the contrary, starts out from suspecting everybodys
ideas and notions, his ow n included. T h ey are the notions and
ideas which the w orld o f ours imposes upon us. T o the empiricist
they are the prim e m aterial from w hich he coins the truth . M arx
looks upon them all as potentially false, as the deceit o f our world
just as likely as a glim pse o f truth.
T h e truth about our w orld is concealed to everybody under the
spell o f his false consciousness. W h en our academ ic opponents ask
w hat we know o f that social existence w hich w e oppose to
consciousness our answer w ould be: w e know o f it as little as you
do. B ut we know how to find out. T h e w ay to do so is to trace the
genetical origin o f any current ideas and concepts, on the very
standards o f them . Social existence is that w hich we shall find
determines these ideas and concepts.
R ead as a statem ent o f an inherent truth M a rx s sentence is
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
Necessary False
Consciousness
T h is term is an all-im portant one in historical m aterialism . T h e
various notions and ideas m en form in their historical w orld and
surroundings are o f ve ry different w eight and consistency. Som e
are form ed in a slipshod m anner, held one d ay and dropped or
m odified the next. Som e are cranky and neurotic, p ecu liar to one
individual or another. Som e are freakish, based on m uddled
thinking. V e r y little o f valu e to a m aterialist can, as a rule, be
gained from tracing ideas o f this kind to their genetical condition.
I f the ideas are accidental themselves, their genetical basis is
accidental too. T h e sam e is true resulting from a personal bias for
this or that political or social cause. T h e y do not reflect a n y o f the
necessities and im personal forces governing the historical course
o f our social world. In order to penetrate into the foundations o f
this world and to learn how it holds together and h ow it could be
NECESSARY FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS 197
changed effectively we must seize upon necessary false con
sciousness as subject-matter for m aterialistic critique.
Before M arx started on the w riting o f Capital he spent fifteen
years reading the whole o f econom ic literature available in the
British M useum . These studies w ere on the line o f purely inherent
criticism o f the theories as they stood, and were aim ed at sifting
the logically sound, unim peachable core o f econom ic thinking
from anything traceable to faulty argum ent. T h e fau lty parts he
discarded and only on the hard, system atically valid core o f the
science did he base his Critique o f Political Economy. W ith these
critical siftings M arx filled copious notebooks, an im portant
selection o f which was posthum ously edited b y K a u tsk y in three
volumes as Theorien iiber den Mehrwert ( Theories o f Surplus-Value) .8
A ccording to M arxs own original plans they were to form the
fourth volum e of Capital.
Necessary false consciousness, then, is not faulty consciousness.
It is, on the contrary, logically correct, inherently incorrigible
consciousness. It is called false, not against its own standards of
truth, but as against social existence. R ou ghly, the M arxist
approach to historical reality can b e understood as answering the
question: w h at must the existential reality o f society be like to
necessitate such and such a form o f consciousness? Consciousness
fit to serve as the theme o f enquiry o f this kind must be socially
valid, free from accidental flaws and personal bias. Necessary
false consciousness, then, is (1) necessary in the sense o f faultless
systematic stringency.
Necessary false consciousness is (2) necessarily determ ined
genetically. It is necessary by historical causation. T h is is a truth
of existence, not im m anently inferable from the consciousness
concerned. It is the truth specific o f materialism .
Necessary false consciousness is (3) necessarily false conscious
ness determ ined genetically so as to be false by necessity. Its
falseness cannot be straightened out by means o f logic and by
conceptual adjustments. H istorical m aterialism rejects the K a n
tian idea o f epistemology as ultim ate arbiter philosophiae. C o n
sciousness is not the function o f a m in d capable o f absolute self-
criticism on lines o f pure logic. Pure logic itself does not control,
but is controlled by, its timeless idea o f the truth; o f this idea itself
there is no im m anent criticism or confirm ation. Necessary false
consciousness is false, not as a fault o f consciousness, bu t by fault
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
T he Philosophical Issue
T h e reality, then, to w hich M a rx critically opposes the various
forms o f consciousness o f m en is the historical one o f their own
social existence. It is not m atter or the external m aterial world
independent of any consciousness . O u r notions o f things and the
concepts in which we undertake their systematisation are
historical products themselves. So are science, m athem atics,
natural philosophy, etc. It is for the historical materialist to
account for the rise as well as the objective validity o f science in
history, not for the logic o f n atural science as a logic reflected
from nature to supply the principles o f historical materialism.
T o reason about the w orld s existence is not one o f a historical
m aterialists commitments. I f ever he finds him self involved in
arguments o f this nature, the lin e to take is the historical-
materialist critique o f the standards o f thinking on w hich the
w orlds existence ever cam e to be questioned. B ut for a
m aterialist to em bark on dogm atic speculation o f this style
him self to com bat idealism is like throw ing oneself in the fire in
order to extinguish it. T h e contrast betw een M arxist materialism
and idealism is m uch more fundam ental than that. It is between
the M arxian mode o f thinking and the whole of dogm atic
traditional thinking, idealistic and m aterialistic. In fact, the issue
can be expressed by the contrast o f tw o incom patible conceptions
o f the truth itself.
Dogm atic thinking, in all its variants, is pledged to the
conception o f the truth as timeless; M arxist materialism con
200 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
T h e Essentially C ritical
Power o f Historical
Materialism
T u rn in g now to our own treatm ent o f the intellectual form ation
o f societies based on com m odity production we can safely claim
that our approach is historical m aterialistic. W e do n o t merely
assert th at cognitive concepts are derivatives from m aterial
being, w e actually derive them one by one from being, not the
being o f external nature and the m aterial world, b u t from the
social being o f the historical epochs in w hich these concepts arise
and p lay their part.
I m aintain, moreover, that this derivation has its de
m onstrative strength in the fact that it satisfies historical
m aterialism in its capacity o f a m ethodological postulate. In the
202 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS POSTULATE
IN T R O D U C T IO N
PA RT I
P A R T II
P A R T III
P A R T IV
A R T IC L E S IN E N G L IS H B Y A L F R E D S O H N -R E T H E L