SUPREME COURT IS A COURT OF LAST RESORT

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao, who were among the investors of Celso G.
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group), filed
several complaints for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al before the City
Prosecutor of Davao. In DOJ Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), the Secretary of Justice directed all
prosecutors to forward all cases filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. of Legacy Group to the
Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila, excluding cases filed in Cagayan De Oro which
are covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009. Thus, the complaints of petitioners were
forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the respondent
Secretary of Justice before the SC, claiming that the respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion for issuing DO No. 182 which violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners also
aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 is unconstitutional for it violated their right to
equal protection. The OSG, representing the respondent, maintains the validity of both DO No.
182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009.

ISSUES:

1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
directly to the SC?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No.
182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners
constitutionally guaranteed rights?

RULING:

1. No, it was not proper for petitioners to bring the petition under Rule 65 directly to the SC
because the SC is a court of last resort

Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the SC with
their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special,
important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition. As provided in Vergara,
Sr. v. Suelto, the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence,
that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the CA,
or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the CA. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the CA or an RTC, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

Even if direct resort to the SC was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed for the lack of
certain requisites of the reliefs. A civil action for certiorari will not prosper because the petition
did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure
his subordinates efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the
cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The petition also cannot be for prohibition because the petitioners have not shown in their
petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed
issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly, it cannot be for mandamus because the main
objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent. The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
or to compel a course of conduct, which was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the
Secretary of Justices assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.

2. No, respondent Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO
No. 182. DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of validity. To overcome this strong
presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to
prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of
1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that
DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws.
They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of the DOJs functions under
the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid
down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive
petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them
by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like
them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong
through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order
to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against
petitioners.

3. No, DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 did not violate petitioners
constitutionally guaranteed rights. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it
requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.

In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took
into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against
the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be
conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed
in the City Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the
considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice
was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO
No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground
that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.

DO No. 182 did not also violate petitioners right to the speedy disposition of cases. The
consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain
expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the
cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary
investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most
feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a
comprehensive investigation of the cases.

The assertion that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws
with retroactive effect is also baseless. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure
does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no
vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

Thus, the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was dismissed for lack of merit.
THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL UPON FAILURE TO FILE APPELLANTS BRIEF IS
DISCRETIONARY / THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IS THE GRAVAMEN OF
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

VICTORIO P. DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS [PHILS.], INC.,
G.R. No. 180677; February 18, 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Victorio Diaz was criminally charged with two counts of infringement of trademark filed
by herein private respondent Levis Strauss (Phil.) Inc. for allegedly reproducing, counterfeiting,
copying and colorably imitating Levis registered trademarks or dominant features thereof such
as the ARCUATE DESIGN, TWO HORSE BRAND, TWO HORSE PATCH, TWO HORSE LABEL
WITH PATTERNED ARCUATE DESIGN, TAB AND COMPOSITE ARCUATE/TAB/TWO HORSE
PATCH, and in connection thereto, sold, offered for sale, manufactured, distributed counterfeit
patches and jeans, including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of said
patches and jeans, which likely caused confusion, mistake, and /or deceived the general
consuming public, without the consent, permit or authority of the registered owner, LEVIS, thus
depriving and defrauding the latter of its right to the exclusive use of its trademarks and
legitimate trade, to the damage and prejudice of LEVIS.

On his part, Diaz stated that he did not manufacture Levis jeans, and that he used the label "LS
Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans that he made and sold; that the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" was
registered with the Intellectual Property Office; that his shops received clothes for sewing or
repair; that his shops offered made-to-order jeans, whose styles or designs were done in
accordance with instructions of the customers; that he had received no notice or warning
regarding his operations since the time his shops began operating in 1992; that the jeans he
produced were easily recognizable because the label "LS Jeans Tailoring," and the names of
the customers were placed inside the pockets, and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab;
that "LS" stood for "Latest Style;" and that the leather patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not
two horses.

The RTC convicted Diaz. Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that
Diaz had not filed his appellants brief on time despite being granted his requested three
extension periods. The appellants brief was filed 18 days beyond the third extension period
granted. Diazs subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this appeal wherein
Diaz assails the CAs rigid application of the rule on technicalities when it dismissed the appeal
for late filing of the appellants brief, thereby overriding substantial justice.

ISSUES:

1. Did the CA properly dismiss the appeal of Diaz due to the late filing of his appellants brief;
2. Is Diaz guilty of trademark infringement
RULING:

1. Yes, the dismissal is proper because Diazs counsel sought an extension of the period to file
the appellants brief thrice but did not comply.

Under Section 7 of Rule 44, the appellant is required to file the appellants brief in the CA "within
forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and
documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten,
mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the
appellee." Section 1(e) of Rule 50 grants to the CA the discretion to dismiss an appeal either
motu proprio or on motion of the appellee should the appellant fail to serve and file the required
number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court.

The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal
upon failure to file the appellants brief is not mandatory, but discretionary. Verily, the failure to
serve and file the required number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided by
the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of causing the outright dismissal of the
appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is lodged in the CA,
by virtue of which the CA may still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the
appellants brief, when the circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to dismiss the
appeal, then, the CA is bound to exercise its sound discretion upon taking all the pertinent
circumstances into due consideration.

In this case, Diazs counsel sought an extension of the period to file the appellants brief thrice
but did not comply. Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellants brief on time
rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. But since Diazs personal liberty is at stake
for being sentenced to suffer two to five years of imprisonment for each count and to pay fines
totalling P100,000 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency), the SC was impelled
to delve into the merits of the case.

2. No, Diaz is not guilty of trademark infringement because confusion and deception were
remote.

Sec. 155.1 and 155.2 of RA 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides
that the acts constituting infringement of trademark includes the use and application in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the
same container or a dominant feature thereof without the consent of the owner, in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

The likelihood of confusion is the gravamen of the offense of trademark infringement. The
holistic test was used by the SC in resolving this case. Accordingly, the jeans trademarks of
Levis Philippines and Diaz must be considered as a whole in determining the likelihood of
confusion between them. The maong pants or jeans made and sold by Levis Philippines, which
included LEVIS 501, were very popular in the Philippines. The consuming public knew that the
original LEVIS 501 jeans were under a foreign brand and quite expensive. Such jeans could be
purchased only in malls or boutiques as ready-to-wear items, and were not available in tailoring
shops like those of Diazs as well as not acquired on a "made-to-order" basis. Under the
circumstances, the consuming public could easily discern if the jeans were original or fake
LEVIS 501, or were manufactured by other brands of jeans. Confusion and deception were
remote, for, as the Court has observed in Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court
of Appeals:

First, the products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various kinds of jeans. These are
not your ordinary household items like catsup, soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost.
Maong pants or jeans are not inexpensive. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be
more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase. Confusion and
deception, then, is less likely.

Second, like his beer, the average Filipino consumer generally buys his jeans by brand. He
does not ask the sales clerk for generic jeans but for, say, a Levis, Guess, Wrangler or even an
Armani. He is, therefore, more or less knowledgeable and familiar with his preference and will
not easily be distracted.

Finally, more credit should be given to the "ordinary purchaser." Cast in this particular
controversy, the ordinary purchaser is not the "completely unwary consumer" but is the
"ordinarily intelligent buyer" considering the type of product involved.

Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" for the jeans he produced and sold in his
tailoring shops. His trademark was visually and aurally different from the trademark "LEVI
STRAUSS & CO" appearing on the patch of original jeans under the trademark LEVIS 501. The
word "LS" could not be confused as a derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS"
being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby openly suggesting that the jeans bearing
the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or were bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz,
not from the malls or boutiques selling original LEVIS 501 jeans to the consuming public.

There were other remarkable differences between the two trademarks that the consuming public
would easily perceive. The prosecution alleged that the accused copied the "two horse design"
of the Levis but the evidence will show that there was no such design in Diazs jeans. Instead,
what is shown is "buffalo design." Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals which
an ordinary customer can easily distinguish.

The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied by the accused. However, evidence
will show that the red tab used by the private complainant indicates the word "LEVIS" while that
of the accused indicates the letters "LSJT" which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even
an ordinary customer can distinguish the word LEVIS from the letters LSJT.

Moreover, based on the certificate issued by the Intellectual Property Office, "LS JEANS
TAILORING" was a registered trademark of Diaz. He had registered his trademark prior to the
filing of the present cases. The Intellectual Property Office would certainly not have allowed the
registration had Diazs trademark been confusingly similar with the registered trademark for
LEVIS 501 jeans.

As there was no likelihood of confusion between the trademarks involved, Diaz was acquitted
for the charges.
AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION BASED ON FRAUD DOES NOT RAISE A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION TO STOP THE PROCEEDINGS IN A PENDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161075; July 15, 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

For himself and his mother Cecilia de la Cruz, petitioner Rafael Jose-Consing, Jr. obtained
loans from Unicapital Inc. which were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel
of land under the name of de la Cruz. Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property by
off-setting the loans of Consing and de la Cruz and paying an additional amount. The other half
of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.

Unicapital and PBI learned that the title to the property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu
and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la
Cruz. The TCT held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious. Unicapital demanded the return of
the amount paid to de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.

Consing filed a civil case for injunctive relief to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for
the collection of the amount paid by Unicapital on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent
of his mother (Pasig civil case). On the same date, Unicapital filed an estafa complaint against
Consing and de la Cruz. Thereafter, Unicapital sued Consing for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati Civil
case).Based on Unicapitals complaint, the prosecutor filed an information for estafa through
falsification of public instrument against Consing and de la Cruz (Makati criminal case). Consing
moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. Another
information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and de
la Cruz based on the complaint initiated by PBI (Cavite criminal case) wherein Consing also
filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Since the Cavite RTC denied Consings motion and subsequent MR, the latter filed a special
civil action for certiorari before the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712).

On a later date, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment for the Makati
criminal case, citing the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA (Cavite criminal case) as
an additional ground. The Prosecution opposed the motion, but the RTC granted the same and
denied Prosecutions subsequent MR through an order. The State assailed the last two orders of
the RTC via petition for certiorari before the CA but the petition was dismissed and the RTCs
orders were upheld because according to the CA, the resolution of the Pasig civil case will
determine the guilt or innocence of Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases
considering that not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately
related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in
the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
In resolving the petition for certiorari filed from the order in Cavite criminal case, the CA in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 63712 permanently enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and
trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided. The State assailed the said
CA decision through this petition for review with the SC.

ISSUE: Does an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party raise a
prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification

RULING:

No, it does not raise a prejudicial question because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

The SC found no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother, de
la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment,
the question is whether Consing and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if Consing is declared merely an
agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public document.

Likewise, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price
plus damages will not necessarily absolve Consing of liability in the criminal case where his guilt
may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can proceed
independently of each other. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 111, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the ruling in the Cavite criminal case is applied
thereby ordering the RTC judge to proceed with hearing of the criminal case with dispatch.
IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COURTS PRESCRIBE THE PROPER PENALTIES AND
DETERMINE CIVIL LIABILITY, UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A RESERVATION OF THE
ACTION TO RECOVER CIVIL LIABILITY OR A WAIVER OF ITS RECOVERY

GILFREDO BACOLOD, a.k.a. GILARDO BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206236; July 15, 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

Gilfredo Bacolod was convicted of arson for the burning of the house of spouses Ceferino and
Gemma Cogtas. During trial, the following interconnected factual links were proved, namely: (1)
prosecution witness Ruben Gonzales heard the loud voices of the petitioner and his sister
coming from the Cogtas house that the Bacolod family had been renting, with the petitioner
demanding money from his sister Daisy Mae Bacolod but the latter not acceding to the demand;
he was then only about 15 arms lengths away from the Cogtas house; (2) not soon after,
Gonzales heard a commotion inside the Cogtas house, and then immediately saw Daisy Mae
and three other persons running out of the house asking for help; (3) Gonzales himself going
towards the house to see what was happening, saw the petitioner in the kitchen waving a
flaming blanket that he had lit from the burner stove; (4) the petitioner then came out of the
house, daring anyone to arrest him; (5) Gonzales turned off the burner stove in the kitchen,
even as he saw the ceiling of the kitchen already in flames; and (6) the fire immediately spread
to the other parts of the house, and which eventually burned down the house completely.
Gonzales account about the commotion inside the house was corroborated by Alexander
Cernal, a barangay tanod who happened to be on board his tricycle at the same subdivision
where the Cogtas house was located.

Bacolod was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor in
its medium period as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period
as maximum. The said decision was affirmed by the CA in full. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari wherein Bacolod submits that both the RTC and the CA erred in their appreciation of
the evidence. He insists that no witness had actually seen him set the house on fire; that the
State did not show that he had the motive to commit the arson; and that only circumstantial
evidence was presented against him, but such evidence, not being incompatible with the
hypothesis favoring his innocence, was insufficient to support a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

ISSUES:

1. Does the lack or absence of direct evidence necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence;
2. Is the penalty imposed upon Bacolod correct

RULING:

1. No, the lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence.
The RTCs reliance on circumstantial evidence was sanctioned by Sec. 4 of Rule 133, which
requires for circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of an accused that, firstly, there
are more than one circumstance; secondly, the facts from which the circumstances arose are
duly established in court; and, thirdly, the circumstances form and unbroken chain of events
leading to the fair conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is
convicted. Ostensibly, our rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in
either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.

The unbroken chain of circumstances established from the recollections of witnesses whose
motives had not been impugned at all by the petitioner warranted no conclusion but that the
petitioner had deliberately caused the burning of the house.

2. No, the Court needs to correct the penalty imposed because the fixing of the penalty by the
RTC is contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the RTC failed to adjudge Bacolod
civilly liable to the owners of the burned house.

Pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613 (Amending the Law on Arson), the
penalty to be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling is from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. Not being composed of three periods, however, such penalty
should be divided into three equal portions of time, and each portion forms one period of the
penalty. Yet, reclusion perpetua, being an indivisible penalty, immediately becomes the
maximum period, leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in order to fix the medium
and minimum periods of the penalty. The three periods of the prescribed penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua are then as follows:

Minimum period 12 years and 1 day to 16 years;

Medium period 16 years and 1 day to 20 years;
Maximum period reclusion perpetua.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the court, in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, to sentence the
accused "to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense." Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this case
should be within the range of the medium period of the penalty, i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to
20 years, because neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime; and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime, without regard to its periods.

Therefore, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty fixed by the RTC fell short by one day in
order to come within the medium period of the prescribed penalty. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is 16 years and one day of reclusion temporal.
Furthermore, since Bacolod was pronounced guilty of a crime against property, the RTC and CA
were bound to have adjudged Bacolod civilly liable to compensate spouses Cogtas for their
substantial economic damage and prejudice as the owners of the house.

The failure to present competent proof of actual damages should not deprive the Spouses
Cogtas of some degree of indemnity for the substantial economic damage and prejudice they
had suffered. According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. For this purpose, the determination of the temperate damages rests in the
sound discretion of the courts. To illustrate, in People v. Murcia, the Court reduced the amount
of P250,000 fixed by the RTC, although affirmed by the CA, to P200,000 by way of temperate
damages upon noting that the former amount had been based only on the complainants
estimate of the value of his house. Consequently, the Court holds that the amount of P500,000
in the form of temperate damages is reasonable considering that the dwelling of the Spouses
Cogtas had been completely burned down.

Therefore, the SC affirmed the CA decision with modifications as to the penalty and amount of
damages.