Angela Alonso - June - Demonstrations - in - Brazil - Repertoire PDF

From Contention to Social Change: Rethinking the Consequences of Social Movements and Cycles of Protests-
ESA Research Network on Social Movements Midterm Conference 19-20 February 2015 Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
June demonstrations in Brazil: repertoires of contention and governments response to
protest
Angela Alonso
University of So Paulo
and
Ann Mische
University of Notre Dame
Abstract: This article analyzes the recent wave of political protests in Brazil,
highlighting student movement participation. We will raise four points. First all, this was not a
single student movement, but a cycle of protest, consisting of many different actors, issues, and
forms of demonstration. Second, protesters built what we call "hybrid performances", drawing
on three repertoires of contention: socialist, autonomist and patriotic. Third, the protests
presented a strong rejection of political parties and problematized the relationship between
social movements, political parties, and institutional politics. Finally, we discuss the outcomes
and consequences of these mobilization, especially the state responses to them.
THE JUNE PROTESTS IN BRAZIL
In June 2013, Brazil experienced its biggest national protest wave in two decades. Coming on the
heels of the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, and beginning to ebb as Egyptians were returning to
the street, the Brazilian protests were, in equal measures, exhilarating, perplexing, and troubling.
While many of the participants were young, these protests were not youth or student based per
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se. The immediate trigger was an increase in public transportation fares, although the list of
grievances quickly expanded to the precarious state of public infrastructure and services, public
spending on mega-events (including the World Cup and Olympics), corruption, urban violence,
and a fed-up-ness with the state of the country. As with the Turkish protests, the Brazilian ones
expressed a fierce rejection of political parties and institutional politics. Strangely enough,
protest took place in the midst of an economic expansion, a recent increase in the ranks of the
middle class, and a left-of-center government until them enjoying high levels of popular support.
The Brazilian protest also incorporated tools from the repertoire of contention that has
circulating in the recent wave of global protest. Demonstrators faced extensive repression - as in
Turkey - which made the protests more confrontational , although still marked by irreverent
symbolism.
This article aims to understand what happened in Brazil in 2013, with an eye to historical
patterns as well as broader trends in global protest that were unfolding at the same time. We are
not explaining the process of mobilization as a whole, but rather focusing on the upsurge of
massive street protests during June (leaving to the side subsequent developments). We will argue
that the protests in Brazil did not constitute a single social movement, but a cycle of protest,
consisting of many different actors, issues, processes and outcomes that changed quickly over
time, unfolding in divergent ways. While focusing on this broader protest field, we take an in-
depth look at one of the multiple actors protesting, the student movement.
We will focus on understanding two features of this cycle. First, we analyze the repertoire
of contention mobilized through the demonstrations, comparing it to previous Brazilian protest
waves (a diachronic angle) and to other protests in the contemporary global cycle (a synchronic
angle). We argue that protesters performances can be analytically split into two "strategic action
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fields" (Fligstein & Mc Adam, 2011), one on the left and the other on the right of the federal
government. Within those fields, many small and independent configurations of actors, with
different goals and backgrounds, performed their own protest at the same time. We will highlight
the tension and competition between socialist, patriotic and autonomist repertoires, from
which actors borrowed forms of expression and action during the events. Second, we examine
the strong rejection of partisanship during the protests, a hallmark also of many other recent
protests around the world. This raises broader questions about the relationship between social
movements, political parties, and institutional politics in the recent wave of global protest.
This is still very preliminary research. Our analysis is based on three types of research.
First, we examined social media discussions, following the protest through Facebook status
updates, links, commentary, and online chats with participants, including those who had taken
part in Brazils previous protest surges (e.g., the urban popular movements, student movement,
labor movement, feminist movement and partisan activism). Additionally, we interviewed
members of groups active during the So Paulo protests (e.g., Movimento Passe Livre -
MPL/Free Fare Movement), local Occupy groups, the urban land occupation movement,
anarchist groups, and adepts of the black blocs tactic, in the immediate aftermath of the protests,
asking them to draw cognitive maps situating the groups they were able to identify in the protests
along a line expressing proximity to and distance from their own positions. We also compiled
data on protest events from the national newspaper Folha de So Paulo. We used these materials
to identify the groups organizing the protests, to map the networks of relations among them, and
the repertoire of contention they relied on.
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CONTENDING FIELDS IN A CYCLE OF PROTEST
To understand the June 2014 protests, we draw upon recent reconceptualizations of the
contentious politics approach, which has moved toward a dynamic, relational, and culturally
embedded understanding of social movement processes and mechanisms (McAdam et al, 2001;
Tilly, 2008; Tarrow, 2011). We also build upon classical conceptions of cycles of collective
action and repertoires of contention, putting these in dialogue with the concept of strategic
action fields (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). We argue that as the protest cycle developed, the
protest arena increasingly split into two (partially overlapping) strategic actions fields,
distinguished by different sets of grievances, targets, repertoires, and aesthetic styles. As they
composed these fields, participants generated "hybrid performances" that drew upon elements of
autonomist, socialist and nationalist repertoires, although with different combinations and
emphases across the two fields.
According to Tarrow (1995), a protest cycle consists of a sequence of escalating
collective public demonstrations, with greater than usual frequency and intensity, that spread
through several sectors of society and involve new forms of protesting and organizing. At the
peak of mobilization, social routines are suspended and social creativity brews: innovations in
collective action that they produce are diffused, tested, and refined (Tarrow, 1995:92).
However, innovation and reproduction intermingle and challenge each other. Actors invent, but
they rely on a protest tradition. Tilly describes this interaction between scriptedness and
improvisation:
"Once we look closely at collective claim-making, we can see that particular instances
improvise on shared scripts. []. The theatrical metaphor calls attention to the clustered,
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learned, yet improvisational character of peoples interactions as they make and receive
each others claims. [...] Like a jazz trio or an improvisatory theater group, people who
participate in contentious politics normally can play several pieces, but not an infinity
[]. " (Tilly, 2006, p. 35).
The finite forms of contention used in a certain society in a given time compose its
repertoire. While acting contentiously, actors build up their performances by borrowing from
modular strategies of political action and expression tested by former movements elsewhere.
Within that limited array [the repertoire], the players choose which pieces they will perform
here and now, in what order (Tilly, 2008, p. 14). Actors deal with repertoires as if they were
"tools kits" (Swidler, 2001), without concern about coherence, rather they adapt them to their
local context and political tradition. In the June protests, participants acted in this fashion,
picking tools from contemporary global repertoires and from local traditions; they adapted and
mixed them, while building up their own, hybrid and original political performances.
Since actors mix symbols and expressive forms, using available political tools to express
their grievances in a particular conflict, there was not a perfect match between specific actors and
specific repertoire. Repertoires work as loose orientation to action. The multiplicity of possible
combinations of elements made feasible many ways to perform non-satisfaction in the June
protest in Brazil. Actors created manifold hybrid political performances to expressed claims,
which were not just hybrid but also competitive among themselves.
The notion of "strategic action fields" helps to understand this heterogeneity. Fligstein &
McAdam (2001:7) define these as "socially constructed arenas within which actors with varying
resource endowments vie for advantage" . Strategic action would be "the attempt by social actors
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to create and maintain stable social worlds by securing the cooperation of others. (...). The
creation of identities, political coalitions, and interests serves to promote the control of actors
vis-a-vis other actors". In the Brazilian protests, we distinguish between two oppositional
strategic action fields, composed of diverse but mutually-oriented sets of challengers to state
authority who constructed loosely convergent understandings of what the protests were about,
even if they did not all converge to same claims, targets, and practices. Although all of the
protesters made claims on and against the government, they drew boundaries among themselves,
creating two separate fields, in terms of the symbols, images and slogans that they presented.
ATTRIBUTIONS OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
Protest cycles are fueled by changing attributions of political opportunities and threats on the part
of protestors; actors shifting interpretations of and responses to the evolving political
conjuncture can both intensify and dampen protest (McAdam et al, 2001). These shifts are both
political and cultural they include political events, institutions, and policies at the local,
national, and international levels, as well as the public images, discourse, and debate that inform
interpretations and responses to this conjuncture on the part of the population.
The attributions of political opportunities and threats feeding the emerging protest cycle
in Brazil had five main factors. The first opportunity was generated externally, consisting of the
two recent global cycles of protest, in 2011 and 2013, in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America
and the United States. These protests had given global salience to the autonomist repertoire of
contention, which had emerged in the 1999 Seattle protest, but assumed visibility in recent
protests, e.g., the Spanish Indignados, anti-austerity protests in Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and
elsewhere, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, student protests in Chile, Argentina, and in the
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Occupy movement. Together they diffused the image of a return to the streets, highlighting
protest as an efficient way to make claims visible, especially to media-savvy young people, who
usually rely on internet to express themselves.
Although connected to the international scene, another factor was internal: the placement
of global mega-events, the 2013 Confederation Cup and the 2014 World Cup, in Brazil. Those
events, and the construction related to them (stadiums, airports, roads, etc), brought to the public
sphere a discussion of state priorities, while pointing out FIFAs stadiums both as a model to
follow in terms of public policy efficiency, and as something to be avoided in terms of process
(accusations of corruption, over-spending, and worker endangerment). This discussion appeared
in newspapers, the internet and television broadcasts, generating a "discursive opportunity" to
frame grievances in terms of a "FIFA standard" in public services.
A third factor changing assessments of political opportunities was the weakening of the
public appeal of the Workers Party (PT) government among some social sectors. After a long
stretch at the federal government (since 2000) and the success of its policies for inequality
reduction, the government started to face the limits of its politics. In the last decade, Brazil
experienced a rapid social change, including a redistribution of income that affected the social
structure. As a result, there were social groups who won and who lost prestige, power and
resources. While this transformation may have been the result of a long-term process, it has
largely been identified with the PT government. The effects of redistributive policies were
accentuated by the expansion of higher education, thanks to focal policies bringing members of
lower social strata into the university. As a result, there is a new and larger segment of educated
youth, coming from mixed social origins, and that grew up in the context of a stable economy
and democratic regime. Unlike their parents generation, they do not view Brazil through the
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prism of dictatorship and inflation, rather, they see the PT government as the status quo, an
unable to respond to their expectations in terms of quality of public policies and services,
especially related to education, urban mobility and access to consumption.
A fourth factor is the style of interaction between the state and social movements that
President Dilma Roussefs government put in motion. During Fernando Henrique Cardosos
term (1995-2002), the government incorporated agendas from some social movements (such as
the environmental movement), and restricted the power of unions, while implementing popular
councils and public hearings as a space to voice social grievances without mobilization. These,
plus a stable economic and institutional landscape, contributed to the decline of mobilizations,
with some protests, but not huge demonstrations (Alonso et al, 2005. Hochstetler and
Keck, 2007; Guimares, 2013). The pattern continued into the Lula government (2003-2011),
which pursued a systematic policy of incorporation of social agendas and activists in the
formulation of policies (the black and feminist movements are examples). At the same time,
economic prosperity and the effectiveness of public policies deflated many of the material
demands and created a new, huge, urban middle social strata, which entered the market by way
of consumption. Although the Lula government suffered corruption accusations (the "monthly
allowance scandal"/mensalo), those charges were mostly prosecuted within political and
juridical institutions, without provoking a cycle of protest.
Roussef started her presidency (2011-2014) in a less favorable economic environment,
but still anchored in high approval rates and following Lulas path of poverty reduction policies,
which benefited mostly the Northeast and small municipalities. However, urban services and
infrastructure, on the agenda since the 1970s, were not addressed by policies of the same scope.
And while her antecessors incorporated social movement agendas and activists, the Roussef
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government largely closed its doors to them. She conveyed her government as more technical
than political, showing little flexibility and openness to negotiate. This combination of unsolved
urban problems, public concern with corruption and absence of dialogue between the
government and social movements provided the conditions for the emergence of protests in June
2013, while signalizing to the new malcontents that protest would be a more viable strategy to
express grievances.
The final important component of the political conjuncture was the backfiring of police
repression in the early days of the protests. All of the preceding factors describe reasons to
criticize the government, and many social movements had been voicing these criticisms for a
long time. However, the immediate trigger that brought a multitude to the streets seems to have
been the violent police response to the early protests against transportation fare increases
(initiated by the PSDB-controlled state government of So Paulo, but spread to Rio de Janeiro
and cities run by other political parties). This in turn generated a cascade of "indignados", who
came to the streets in response to police violence.
These political conjuncture were common to all actors in June. However, actors act
according the interpretations they build of it (Kurzman, 1997). Actors located in different
regions of the political field perceived the situation quite differently, and thus protested for
different reasons, with different motivations, grievances, and repertoires of protest.
AN EMERGING CYCLE OF PROTEST
When demonstrations began in Brazil, many commentators described them as a single social
movement with a clear target the public transportation fare increases comparable to the 1984
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Diretas J [Direct Elections Now] and 1992 Fora Collor [Out with Collor] campaigns.
However, the following days revealed a more heterogeneous scene.
According to Tilly (2004:308), a social movement consists of repeated public
demonstrations in the public space by a large number of people in defiance of the state and in the
name of securing more rights for a given population. This definition would apply to the Free
Fare Movement (Movimento Passe Livre MPL), which organized the first protests against the
transportation fare hikes. However, afterwards, many other actors, including different social
movements, came to the street and many protests emerged, one after the other, without a clear
coordination, forming a cycle of collective action (Tarrow, 1995). During the peak month of the
cycle (June 2013), at least 178 events took place, with the highest concentration on June 20.
The Free Fare Movement (MPL) consists of a small, flexible direct action style group
that had been staging innovative protests in several cities over the past decade, calling for free
access to public transportation. While it had developed out of former student groups, it adopted
a more autonomist direct action approach that distinguished it from the traditional student
movement. The MPL is officially apartisan, although it had formed alliances with some left-
wing opposition parties. MPL protests just entered the national stage after June 11, came to
public attention after violent repression was captured on social and mainstream media, creating
a media boom." As the mobilization expanded over the next week in protest over police
violence (along with solidarity protests by the Brazilian diaspora worldwide). Figure 1 consists
of an online graphic (posted on June 18) that describes this evolution through the explosion of
nationwide protests on June 17, and the peak, huge nationwide protests on June 20, with
millions of people in the streets in over 100 cities. The term "revolution" is exaggerated, but it
gives an idea of the intensity that the actors attributed to their experience.
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Figure 1: "The Evolution of the Brazilian Revolution"
Source: http://kajuink.wordpress.com/2013/06/18/understand-the-evolution-of-the-brazilian-
revolution/
This mechanism of rapid movement expansion is familiar to social movement analysts:
disproportionate police response to a small, radical flank movement, captured on media sources,
provokes a backlash of indignation and anger among a broader swath of the population, bringing
more people to the streets. This generates a scale shift (McAdam et al 2001) as the movement
bursts the borders of the original claims and becomes home to a somewhat unruly intermingling
of actors and projects, including many people who had never protested before. This is the
exhilarating part of the recent wave of worldwide protests with similar patterns in Tahrir
Square, Zuccotti Park, Gezi Park.
After the episodes of police repression by state and municipal governments (most of
which were not run by the PT), the diversity of social groups engaged in protest multiplied. As
common in cycles of protest, there was an escalating sequence of collective public
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demonstrations, with higher frequency and intensity, that spread across sectors of society and
turned to new forms of protest and organization. Several consecutive demonstrations planned on
Facebook materialized in the streets, as well as several micro-movements, many of them
relatively new, such as MAL (Autonomous Libertarian movement), MAU (Unified Autonomous
Movement), Milharal, Acampa/Ocupa (Camp/Occupy), CMI (Independent Media Center), DAR
(De-stupefying Reason). Added to these were the new independent media (Ninja Media, Black
Media, Vrzea Radio, Brasil de Fato, etc.) and some of the more established social movements,
such as the black, LGBT, and housing movements. The traditional student organizations (UNE,
UBES, etc.) were also present in most of the major protests, but they played a different role than
in Brazils previous protest cycles, raising the question of to what degree the June protests can be
considered a student movement.
WAS THIS A STUDENT MOVEMENT?
The cycle of protest brought many people to the streets, on a broad geographical scale. Most
demonstrations occurred in the major metropolises; however the mobilization reached even the
small towns. Demonstrators were also diverse among themselves. Broad, mass-based social
mobilizations are usually cross-class. The broader the platform, the more varied its support. In
So Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two largest cities in the country, a diversity of actors came to
the streets: the professional middle class; the new and precarious working middle class; an
expanded sector of higher education students; and even lower social strata from the marginalized
urban peripheries. Hence, demonstrations were not class-based; rather they expressed older
social strata as well as newer ones, produced by the demographics changes and social
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distribution of income policies. All this complexity appeared in the demonstrations; however we
will focus just on one specific participant, the students, the theme of this special issue.
Students and student-based organizations participated in many of the protests. The MPL
grew out of student-initiated protests in Salvador and Florianopolis against fare increases in
2003-05 (the movement of the turnstyles). MPL organized at least seven protests in So Paulo
in June. Their tactics involved semi-anarchistic direct action techniques such street occupations
and turnstyle jumping. The movements statement of principles (approved by consensus at
several national encounters) describes itself as autonomous, apartisan, independent and
horizontal, with a focus on changing the logic of urban mobility and fighting inequalities,
broadly defined. While not specifically socialist (and rejecting formal associations with
political parties, NGOs, religious organizations and financial institutions), the MPL fights for
for a free public transportation for all and allied with an anti-capitalist, collectivist social
movement sector:
The perspective of the MPL must be to mobilize young people and workers towards the
expropriation of public transportation, removing it from the private sector, without
compensation, and placing it under the control of workers and the population. Thus, the
MPL should be built based on demands that exceed the limits of capitalism, therefore
joining other revolutionary movements that challenge the existing order. (Charter of
Principles, MPL website, http://saopaulo.mpl.org.br/apresentacao/carta-de-principios)
In addition to the MPLs leadership of the early rallies, the press pointed out the presence
of "student movements" in a generic fashion. There were many different registers of "students"
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participating in demonstrations, coming to the streets via diverse pathways, however, the
traditional student organizations, that were coordinating the campaign for President Collors
impeachment in 1992, did not have the same protagonism in the initial stages of 2013
mobilization. Historical centralized student associations (UNE, UBES, UEE, etc.) and the
DCEs (Diretrios Centrais dos Estudantes/university-based student directorates) joined the
protests more as "latecomers" than as "early risers" (McAdam, 1995). In fact, UNE held its
national congress in early June, just as the transportation rallies organized by MPL were starting
up, and there is barely any foreshadowing on its Facebook page of the coming protest wave or
against the transportation fare hikes. The first mention of the transportation protests on UNEs
Facebook page is in reference to the June 11 rally organized by the MPL in So Paulo (in which
UNE and UBES participated, but not as organizers). The webpage also posted a notice that
UNE had signed a letter repudiating the police violence after the June 13 protests. During the
major national protests on June 17-20 they posted pictures of the rallies and sent out team to do
reporting, but did not play a coordinating role. In the weeks that followed, UNE tried to focus
its mobilizing efforts on its own ongoing campaign for Brazil to dedicate new state oil profits
for education.
The participation of traditional student organizations in the mobilizations was met with
skepticism by many of the protestors, including some of the organizers of the early protests. In
an interview, an MPL member complained that the student organizations were taking a (free)
ride on the protests. They denounced the intense use of the media by the traditional student
organizations in trying to present themselves as earlier partners or organizers of the first
protests, which they were not. This sentiment echoed in the many hostile comments posted on
UNEs Facebook page, many of which accused UNE of opportunism and selling out (an
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accusation repudiated by UNEs defenders on the site). As the rallies became about more than
the 20 cents [of the fare increase], some commenters questioned why UNE was less quick to
embrace the anti-corruption banner and the critique of spending on the World Cup and
Olympics. The answer had to do with UNEs presumed alliance with the governing PT and
with the fact that the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), the party controlling UNE for the
past three decades, was in charge of the Ministry of Sports.
In this context, many of the traditional leftist student groups feared a loss of control of
student protests, an uneasiness that was often expressed as a critique of the lack of direction
of the mobilizations. These fears have some grounding. Although our dataset is still not
completed, the data we have for June shows that while media reports mention participation of
students or student movement in most of the events, only a few of these mentioned a
specific organizational name. UNE and UBES were not mentioned at all. University-based
student organizations such as the DCEs are mentioned more in regional protests (in Porto
Alegre, Florianoplis, Santa Maria and Recife). Some dissident left-wing student organizations
do show up in the reporting of the protests in early June (as well as one in favor of the
legalization of marijuana on June 8). These include Juntos!, a student faction associated with
left opposition party PSOL, as well as ANEL (Free National Assembly of Students), a smaller
national student organization founded as an alternative to UNE in 2009, with ties to the PSTU.
ANEL advocated political independence in relation to the federal and state governments,
positioning itself against many PT and PC do B student leaders, who were seen as connected to
the Roussef government. While socialist in orientation, ANEL advocated direct action tactics
and internal democracy within the student movement and thus had some affinities (and
possibly collaborations) with the autonomist direct action approach advocated by the MPL.
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The earliest protests (June 3-10) thus stemmed from a radical autonomist direct-action
style student group (the MPL) with loose ties to dissident opposition wings of the socialist
student movement. During the next phase of movement expansion in response to police
repression (June 11-20), many activists and organizations in Brazils broad progressive sector
turned out to the streets. However, as Brazilians began to appear in the streets at a massive scale
including people who had never before taken part in a political mobilization - it became clear
that the tone, and emerging repertoire of these protests was diversified.
REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION: CULTURAL SOURCES
During the June cycle of protest, actors borrowed from three broad repertoires of contention
while constructing their political performances. We will call them the socialist, autonomist and
patriotic repertoires, and consider these as "tools kits" (Swidler, 2001) from which actors took
elements to build their hybrid performances. These repertoires are international, in the sense of
having being used by social movements worldwide. The socialist repertoire is well known and
had been highly visible in Brazils earlier protest waves in the 80s and 90s; it consists of highly
committed activist communities, public displays of organizational membership (e.g., via red
banners, T-shirts with partisan or movement symbols, party badges, flags), centralized and
hierarchical organization, and high leadership visibility, both in public forums (assemblies,
councils, coalitions) and in street protest. Their claims center around a critique of capitalist
exploitation, social inequality and exclusion, and political and economic elites. Many of Brazils
previous protest cycles had a strong presence of the socialist repertoire, which was shared to
varying degrees by the student, popular, labor, and land reform movements.
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The autonomist repertoire, which gained global attention during Seattle protests, can be
seen as reframing of the 19th century anarchist forms of organizing that reject centralized
leadership and authority, particularly the state, and the acceptation of confrontational forms of
contestation. Recent elements that have be appearing in youth-based movements worldwide
include conventional non-violent marches, direct action (such as sit-ins and occupations), and
public displays of resistance, including black bloc tactics, the burning of objects and damage of
symbols of state and economic power. This repertoire includes horizontal organizing forms that
generate alternative sources of power outside of the state, and rejects the goal of seizing state
power altogether (Holloway 2003; Sitrin 2006; Zibechi 2010).
The third repertoire, which we call "patriotic," is a form of nationalism that always has
particular historical and situational meaning. In Brazil it received its content from a local
political tradition built up during two previous major waves of nationwide protest, the Diretas-
J, and Fora Collor.
The first cycle, Diretas J, consisted of a campaign for direct elections for president the
1984, with millions of people in the streets, during the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy. The protest cycle was composed of huge demonstrations and strikes, involving
independent trade unions and urban popular social movements originating in the urban
peripheries, often informed by a socialist rhetoric, as well as teachers, public servants, religious
leaders and professional movements (Sader, 1986). This cycle brought together groups of
different social positions rallying for different causes for changes in labor and urban living
conditions (e.g., sanitation, education, health, and transportation services), against inflation and
unemployment, and for political amnesty -, but coalesced into an unifying masterframe of
"Redemocratization." The events consolidated a patriotic repertoire of contestation, with
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preferential actions (marches), symbols (the anthem, the flag, national colors), and organizational
models (the verticalized internal hierarchy). The effects of this cycle have remained visible in
Brazilian politics. Many of its claims came to be codified as political and social rights in the
1988 Constitution, which became an authoritative document supporting the agenda of many
social movements, concerned with health, social services, education, housing, land reform, the
environment, minority rights, and similar issues
Another major cycle of protests arose in Brazil in late 1991, when a number of civic,
religious, labor and student organizations began to articulate their opposition to corruption in the
government of Fernando Collor de Melo, along with criticisms of high inflation and economic
liberalization. As the extent of government corruption was revealed in media and congressional
investigations in 1992, this opposition began to hit the streets. During the Rio-92 (the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June),
traditional and "new" social movements indigenous, labor, environmental, feminist and other
movements confronted the government and provided some of the organizational basis for an
Impeachment campaign, which erupted into massive demonstrations in August. The Fora Collor
mobilization, like the Diretas J, congregated various social movements, oppositional parties,
trade unions, professional associations, religious leadership and wide swath of Brazils organized
civil society. However, the 1992 protests were largely identified as youth and student
protests, projecting the leadership of the National Union of Students (UNE) - and secondarily
other student organizations - UBES, UEE, DCEs, CAs (Mische, 2008). This cycle congregated
claims around the common masterframe of "ethics in politics," along with a negative agenda, the
critique of corruption in the political system. It also revived the Diretas J campaigns patriotic
repertoire: massive non-violent marches through the countrys major cities and uses of national
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symbols and slogans, with the addition of an aesthetic innovation: the festive pageantry of the
caras pintadas (painted-faces), young protestors who painted their faces the colors of the
Brazilian flag.
The June 2013 cycle of demonstrations inherited from the two previous ones this patriotic
repertoire, with its national symbols and focus on public demonstrations (from the
Redemocratization cycle) and anti-corruption claims (from the Fora Collor). While some sectors
of the 2013 protests explicitly positioned themselves against the organizational legacy of these
previous waves especially the hierarchical structures of traditional parties, unions and social
movement organizations - the continuities are also clear.
HYBRID REPERTOIRES IN STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS
In the June 2013 protests, actors created hybrid political performances, drawing upon different
combinations, adaptations and uses of the symbols, expressive forms and slogans from global
(autonomist and socialist) and local (patriotic) repertoires in order to express their claims.
Although there is no correspondence between actors and repertoires, two distinct "strategic
action fields" stand clear, when considerating the uses of repertoires and positioning of actors in
the social space. These fields are in tension with each other, and are not internally consistent, but
consist of hybrid repertoires, multiple organizational foci, and smaller independent mobilization
outbreaks. Nevertheless, some dominant trends reflect the main dimensions of differentiation
within the protest cycle.
We call one of the fields patriotic, since it was dominated by the patriotic repertoire;
this field was often antagonistic towards the socialist repertoire, even as it incorporated some of
the calls for expanded social services that had traditionally been associated with the socialist left.
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The other field calls itself autonomist, although it had elements of the socialist orientation
(e.g., in the collectivist demands of MPL), even while rejecting traditional hierarchical forms of
organization. There is also evidence of some fascist and right-wings groups, who gravitate
toward the patriotic register. However these do not seem to be either prevalent or precocious in
the mobilization. The early round of smaller protests were dominated by the autonomist field
(MPL and allied groups), while the patriotic field grew as the protests expanded to the broader
population. While there was overlap and exception, our data suggests that these two repertoires
encompass the two major fields of engagement during the June protests, displacing the earlier
dominance of the socialist repertoire.
The patriotic field consisted mostly of protesters without any previous activism, who
joined the protests individually, summoned to the streets by what they saw in the press and the
internet. Their actions were expressive and playful, without any coordination. Their purpose was
immediate and expressive. They were moved by vague nationalism and a strong anti-PT
sentiment, and stood mostly to the right of the government. Posters, clothing, flags and face
painting revived patriotic symbols from the Diretas J and Fora Collor cycles, echoing the
latters slogans of opposition to corruption and ethics in politics. In terms of symbolism, the
patriotic repertoire was visible in its use of national colors (green/yellow); conventional symbols
such as the flag, the national anthems (you will see that your child does not run from a fight);
slogans (the giant has awakened); and canonical spaces (such as the Avenida Paulista, used in
the former cycles).
The autonomist field has a much clearer delineation, composed of many small but well-
organized movements (such as the MPL), that had previously engaged in sustained, multi-year
campaigns of political activism, with in-person meetings for the planning of events. In this case,
20
new technologies and social media (such as text messages) were used less for organizing the
protest than for coordination between the groups during the events. This field was guided by the
autonomist repertoire that emerged in the Seattle protests in 1999 and had been adopted by
global justice activism , with strong expression during the World Social Forums that began in
Porto Alegre in 2001, and not just from Latin America and Western Europe, which has always
served as a model for Brazil, but also to places such as Egypt and Turkey. The Turkish and
Egyptian protests were developing concurrently with the Brazilian mobilizations, with cross-
posting on social media.
From this global repertoire, Brazilian protesters appropriated slogans, images, symbols
and protest techniques. This includes horizontal forms of organization, rejection of gender
hierarchy and formal political leadership, and decision-making by consensus, in contrast with the
hierarchical socialist movements of the 1980s and 1990s (such as the student organizations, the
labor unions, and the landless workers movement). These groups replaced electronically
amplified sound-trucks with playful chants (the jogral), in which the first row of protestors
shouts out short phrases repeated by consecutive rows all the way down to the last row. Global
symbols were incorporated, such as the punk aesthetic (wearing black), the use of arts and music
(such as the fanfare of MAL the Autonomist Libertarian Movement), performatic actions (the
burning of turnstiles and the occupation of symbolic spaces (such as a fancy new bridge in a
neighborhood recently occupied by banks, businesses and major media outlets). Autonomists
favor direct action, often taking disruptive and confrontational forms. Organizational forms are
not a mere means; they express the guiding matrix of the demonstrations, the anarchism, which
sometimes brings along with it forms of violent action, such as the Black Bloc strategy (Dupuis-
Deri, 2010).
21
The autonomist repertoire was the novelty of this cycle of protest. The more
decentralized form of organization can be seen as a reaction to the democratic centralism that
long characterized the Brazilian left and is the basis of small leftist parties. It also points to the
exhaustion of the socialist ideal as the only guide to movements and the emergence of a new
normative orientation to public demonstrations. Groups that are explicitly socialist have, for the
most part, become parties (PSTU, PSOL, PCO, etc.), while new movements (environmental,
feminist, anti-discrimination) crystallized as NGOs. Dissatisfaction with both models paved the
way for a reframing of anarchist ideals, in which horizontal form of organization align nicely
with the new technology based in the internet. An old ideology is thus combined with a
contemporary form
The two "strategic action fields" in the June mobilization constituted social spaces in
which hybrid performances were created and disseminated in the public arena. In one field,
patriotic symbols and slogans appeared more consistently, while on the other, the autonomist
repertoires were more widespread. However, these were not pure types; some actors mixed both
repertoires, or combined them with claims and symbols associated with the socialist repertoire.
So we are talking here about repertorial dominance, not exclusivity or purity.
CONTENDING CLAIMS IN A DIVIDED FIELD
A parallel cleavage between strategic action fields can be detected in the criticisms and demands
voiced by different groups of protestors. As it expanded, the June cycle of protest attracted a
broader array of adherents who brought their own agendas, often leading the early risers to
modify their grievances. Through the cycle three broad areas of claims coalesced:
22
Table 1. Protest Themes
Category Protest theme Examples of slogans
Incitement to protest Call to mobilization Come to the streets, the giant has
and reaction to awakened, wake up, Brazil
violence
Against violence and Without Violence, Enough of war: for
defense of peaceful another police
protests
Better state services Improvement in public If the fare does not go down So Paulo will
and policies and policies and services stop, Schools and Hospitals at Fifa Standards
guarantee of rights (transportation, education,
health)
For justice, freedom of For the Liberty to Proclaim ones own Beliefs
expression, against Against the Gay Cure
homophobia
A smaller state and Against corruption, Passive people, active corruption, Either the
anticorruption political institutions, robbery stops or we stop Brazil
legislative, executive,
political parties and
politicians
One of the thematic axes is the inciting of the protest itself (Come to the streets), i.e.,
the call for more people to take to the streets. This theme emerged after the police repression,
23
often accompanied by a plea against violence (sem violncia!/ no violence), police violence in
particular.
The two other axes point to major themes, both of them related to the former cycles. On
one side, there was a positive agenda, for the expansion of public services and social rights. The
original public transportation claims expanded to include a plethora of grievances: complaints
about precarious urban infrastructure and urban violence. The agendas of consolidated social
movements appeared a bit later: issues related to sexuality and gender (LGBT rights, slut
walks, etc), race equity, and labor rights (teachers, doctors, truck drivers). As a whole, those
actors presented a plea for more efficient state administration and the improvement of social
policies and services such as transportation, health care, and education, as well as guarantees of
human and social rights (and an end to police violence). This was a demand for a stronger and
better state (as in the common trope during the protests: to live up to Fifa Standards).
On the other side, there was a negative agenda, against the expansion of the state, which
was depicted as inefficient, dysfunctional and corrupt. Grievances included calls for less
taxation, less corruption and a reduction in swollen government spending. This conservative
sector saw the state as obstacle to their business, careers and even values; they criticized political
institutions and politicians and demanded the elimination of malfunctioning state agencies. They
wanted a reduced state, and they tended to be virulently opposed to President Roussef and the PT
government.
Hence, varied social segments shared some of the same frustrations as dissatisfaction
with state inefficiency but not all of the same demands. The same can be said about the
normative orientation of the protests. Some protestors questioned capitalism as a way of
24
organizing society and the economy, whether from a socialist or autonomist perspective.
However, others protested in favor of market freedom, and in favor of a neoliberal state.
This differentiation in claims separates the two strategic action fields. All of the
protesters were making claims on and against the government: for state efficiency (including
pleas for a better and/or a smaller state), against partisanship (opposition to political
representation by parties, to the PT government or for self-government), and against police
repression. However they did not make these claims in a homogeneous fashion. Instead, they
constituted two oppositional fields, one situated to the left and the other to the right of the
national government, which is occupied by a center-left coalition.
PARTISAN HOSTILITY ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT
Protesters and analysts have classified these events as non-partisan. However, protesters
referred to political parties the entire time, provoking a de facto national debate about the role of
partisanship in Brazilian politics. Interviews with demonstrators suggest that they were
distributed across a spectrum of political positioning. When asked to map the field, interviewees
split the spectrum of protestors into two halves; they identified one half as being to the left of
center and the other to the right, with the center occupied by the state. Since the government had
been led by the PT since 2003, it is therefore appropriate to ask whether the protesters genuinely
had no party, or were anti-PT. In this sense, participants were still guided by the party system,
either in their quest for alliances or as an object of contestation. There was no general entity that
we can characterize as the streets"; rather there was a major divide within the demonstrations,
which mirrored the divide within the political system itself. This point is worth highlighting.
Since the Redemocratization period, Brazil's demonstrations had been mostly leftist in
25
orientation. After a decade of center-left governments, a more eclectic mix has taken to the
streets.
The traditional left was taken aback by the ferocity of opposition to political parties,
expressed at many of the protests with chants such as The people, united, dont need parties
and We dont have a party. We are Brazil. This aggressive response was exacerbated by the
fact that the night before the massive June 20 protests, the national president of the PT urged its
militants to proudly reassert their right to the streets by wearing red (a symbol of the socialist
repertoire). To many first time protestors, this display signaled the same old, same old." In So
Paulo, Rio, and other cities, identifiable partisan activists (i.e., those carrying flags or banners, or
wearing party T-shirts) were harassed, shouted down, and in some cases beaten or chased off the
streets. In So Paulo, partisan activists had to form a human chain to protect themselves from
attack, as party flags were seized and burned by hostile protestors.
This is not to say, however, that most of the protestors were physically attacking party
activists; the vast majority of participants were non-violent. Calls for the rallies to be without
violence" were as strong as the call for them to be without party". Just who was responsible for
the violence was not clear. In any case, these actions were denounced by many on the left as
fascist and right-wing, drawing analogies to the suppression of political parties by Mussolini
and the Brazilian dictatorship. Many long-time progressive activists were deeply unsettled by the
virulence of the anti-partisan hostility, and began to withdraw from the rallies after June 20. The
MPL denounced the anti-partisan aggression and declared that, having won a fare reduction, it
would stop organizing protests (only to reappear a few days later calling for protests focusing on
health and housing alongside popular movements in So Paulos poor periphery). Other groups
of varying political persuasions vowed to continue the mobilizations, but after that point the
26
mobilization began to split and fragment into a number of smaller, more thematic protests. Some
of these focused on corruption and taxes, some on improving social services (transportation,
health care, education, housing), and others on LGBTQ rights and gender equity.
Why this intense hostility towards parties? The answers are complex, and cannot be fully
elaborated here; suffice it to say that there many good reasons to be frustrated with political
parties, in Brazil and elsewhere. Brazil has a long history of ambivalence toward parties and
partisanship, given the history of corporatism and cooptation. On the left, parties have played
crucial roles in movements for democracy, workers rights, public services, education and land
reform since the 1980s (Mische, 2008). But they have also struggled with a tendency toward
sectarianism, opportunism, and bureaucratism. Recently, there has been widespread
disappointment with the corruption that some PT leaders have engaged in, as well as with many
government projects (such as the costly of the World Cup and Olympics). In the progressive
sector, there was also anger at the fact that the government had appointed a racist, gay-bashing
pastor to head the congressional human rights commission. A general apoliticism on the part of
much of the population intensifies this hostility toward parties.
The opposition to political parties taps into both the patriotic and autonomist fields. To
the patriotic sector, the anti-partisan sentiment signaled a craving for unity as a nation above
partisan divisions, and a sense that they did not feel represented by any of the existing parties.
These assertions of national unity were often associated with varying degrees of criticism of the
PT regime. Some of these sectors focused most often on government corruption and the need for
tax reforms; others focused on precarious social services and general frustration with urban life.
Another important source of partisan pushback came from the autonomist sector. For
example, the Occupy Brazil Facebook site aligned with the autonomist wing posted a series
27
of images challenging the left-wing equation of anti-partisanship with fascism. Rather, they
argued for direct democracy as an alternative horizontalist model, not based on partisan
representation. Working on this model, participatory assemblies sprang up in a number of cities,
including Belo Horizonte, Rio and So Paulo, combining traditional movement actors (e.g.,
student, labor and community-based organizations) with newer arrivals. For example, in Belo
Horizonte, the Assembleia Popular Horizontal [Horizontal Popular Assembly] spun off
multiple thematic working groups, carried out an extended occupation of the Municipal Council
building, and campaigned for an investigation of the public transportation sector (among other
issues).
In short, the opposition to partisanship in the June protests was multi-faceted. Among
some protesters, it reflected a craving for national unity, as well as a frustration with the
manipulation, corruption and ineffectiveness of the political class as a whole. For others, it
represented an opportunity to push forward their opposition to the PT regime from the right.
And for still others, it involved a rejection of hierarchical political forms and an affirmation of
the decentralized, horizontal organizing strategy that characterizes emergent sectors of the global
left.
OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES
By definition, a protest cycle has a short life span. As quickly as it grows, it dies.
The June protests in Brazil worked in this fashion. However, this does not mean that everything
that happened in June vanished along with the huge mobilizations. This protest cycle occurred
very recently, so it is not yet possible to identify its legacy. Certain effects may only appear in
28
the long run. Nevertheless, some impacts and outcomes have already been quite visible in the
short run.
Four types of consequences can be distinguished: innovations to the repertoires of
contention guiding protests; an innovation to the strategies of repression; changes to public
policies in areas targeted by the protests, and a shift in the style of interaction between state and
social movements.
The first outcome concerns the main topic addressed in this article, the innovations to the
repertoires of contention. The June protest cycle inaugurated in Brazil the extensive use of the
autonomist repertoire, with the proliferation of its symbols, forms of organizing and strategies.
The most astonishing innovation for Brazilian standards was the black bloc tactic. There is no
record of usage of this protest technique in the country - at least not in massive scale - before the
June protests. In this sense, one of the consequences of this protest cycle was the renovation and
expansion of the repertoire of contention, opening new possibilities of political performances and
ways of displaying grievances for social movements. This new repertoire has been in use since
June 2014, and the black bloc tactic, especially, has been extensively adopted by claim-makers at
the end of demonstrations. Once a novelty, this new tactic was quickly incorporated as a routine
practice in the field of protests and has been used continuously since then. Hence, one of the
consequences of this specific social mobilization was a change in the local political tradition,
expanding the available ways of expressing grievances in the public arena.
The second feature this cycle of protests makes clear is that the outcomes of a protest
depend very much on the kind of interaction that state and movements establish through the
conflict, in particular how authorities react to mobilizations. As students of social movements
know, the state can tolerate, try to co-opt or repress claim-makers. Different reactions from the
29
state produce different outcomes in the political process. So Paulo is a good case for observing
state responses. As the biggest city in Brazil, with the largest constituency in the country and the
most dynamic in economic matters, So Paulo is a relevant zone for municipal, state and federal
levels of government. The city is also a symbol - nicknamed the "countrys locomotive" -,
disputed by politicians. Hence, So Paulo is a good case for bringing to light how different levels
of authority can respond very differently and even in a conflicting manner to the same political
protest. In the case we are analyzing, there was no such a thing as a unified state response; rather
there was a plurality of governmental responses, and they were quite distinctive, depending on
the party in charge at each level of government.
At the national level, the federal government, occupied by PT, had a hard time and found
great difficulty in dealing with the protests during the cycle, with many contradictory moves -
among them a proposal to hold a plebiscite. However, after the protest cycle started to die down,
the PT government gradually began to approach the social movements, calling meetings,
becoming more open to suggestions, advertising public policies around the key protest themes,
and especially showing no tolerance for any corruption charges, which they had been accused of
by the protesters. The federal government thus responded in two directions: by incorporating
grievances of the movements into the government agenda, and by opening a dialogue with social
movement representatives during Roussefs second term.
At the state level, the response was quite different. The So Paulo state government is run
by PSDB, the main opposition party to the federal government. The governor himself has a
center-right orientation, with a strong focus on security. Accordingly, since the very start of the
protests, the state governments response to the demonstrations was marked by an ostensive
show of police force and massive repression, including momentary brutal violence plus the
30
coercion and arrest of protesters. This choice to repress, however, should not be seen simply as
the use of force. Throughout the process, the state government had been learning how to repress.
In the same fashion that protesters resorted to a new repertoire - the autonomist one - the
authorities, in the same vein, looked for new strategies to repress the new specific protest
techniques, especially the black bloc tactic. In the weeks that followed the June protests, the state
government invited police specialists from abroad to come to So Paulo and present more
effective ways of repressing the black bloc tactic. As Della Porta and Tarrow (2013) argue,
claim-makers are not the only ones who rely on common repertoires; authorities can also share a
repertoire of repressive tactics. And, as the authors show, the same repressive repertoire has been
spreading practically alongside the protest tactics developed in Seattle: ostensive policing,
enclosures of streets where demonstrators intend to march, enveloping techniques, rubber bullets,
pepper spray, mass arrests. In Brazils case, we can conclude that one of the effects of the protest
cycle - complementary to the expansion of the repertoire of ways to protest - was an innovation
in the ways to repress protests.
As for the municipal level of government, So Paulo is run, as in the federal level, by PT.
Again, the local answer to the protests in the very beginning was quite confusing, with the mayor
giving signs that he would not attend to the grievances and might even support repressive
measures. However, as the protests grew, his response changed to negotiation and, after the
protests, he made an aggressive turn in public policy concerning the main issue in the beginning
of the protests, public transportation. The mayor started an extensive - and ostensive - shift in
public transportation policy, trying to migrate from the city tradition of privileging cars as the
main type of displacement, to a clear preference for public transportation - with the expansion of
bus corridors along main city avenues. This action was coupled with the creation of bike lanes,
31
especially downtown. This shift in orientation is already well under way, but it would have been
unimaginable just months before the protest, when all of the residents of So Paulo had resigned
themselves to living in a car-oriented city. Hence, one of the consequences of social movements
that we can see is a dramatic shift in public policy, which never would have occurred in the short
run had it not been for the June protests: in one year the mayor implemented more bus corridor
kilometers than he had promised for his entire four-year term.
The varied reactions at the national, state and city levels of government show that there is
no such a thing as a "state response" as a whole to protests. Reactions from the authorities are as
multiple and complex as actions from protesters. Therefore, to understand the consequences of
social movements means to look at both sides of the conflict and open both black boxes.
CONCLUSION
The mobilizations in Brazil did not end in June, and neither does our research. Many
demonstrations followed over the next year, and the actors and repertoires shifted. Our goal was
to give an organized account of what happened in June (it was a cycle of mobilization, not a
unified social movement), how it happened (it was oriented mainly by two repertoires), and in
which direction it pointed (toward more or less state intervention, against partisanship), with
particular attention to the role of student groups.
We have emphasized here the diversity of claims, actors and forms of action that
converged to constitute the Brazilian cycle of protest. Hybrid performances were constructed by
the combination of elements from three different repertoires, with the patriotic and autonomist
repertoires dominating. Performances divided into two fields of collective action, with some
actors on the right, others on the left, with the national government as the watershed between
32
them. This heterogeneity shows that there was not a single social movement, but the mobilization
of diverse and sometimes contending groups: a cycle of protest, in Tarrows terms.
Despite of that, common traits can be found between the autonomist and patriotic
performances. Both position themselves against the state and demand more autonomy for society
vis-a-vis political institutions. And both contain a romantic trace, a sort of desire for
community," a call for a new social foundation and a new form of political belonging.
While the June protests have continuities with previous Brazilian protest cycles, they also
mark notable shifts. Although the socialist repertoire, which have been dominated Brazilian
mobilizations on the left in the last half century appeared in June, it lost its dominant position
and was displaced by autonomist repertoire. Along with the direct action model and the internal
democratization of the movement, there was also a receptivity among some sectors toward the
use of violence as a political weapon (especially via black bloc tactics), which has grounding
in anarchist roots.
These shifts have provoked discussions on the left on the crisis of representativity of
traditional partisan organizations, leading to the formation of some new movement groups (on
the model of the MPL), asserting their autonomy from parties. Where these diverse and
contending groups will take this newly stirred up mobilizing energy is not clear. Nor it is clear
what relationship these challenger movements will develop with institutional politics. Will they
continue to reject them, or will they develop a multi-pronged repertoire capable of working both
inside and outside of the state?
This analysis leads us to consider some of the limits to the anti-institutionalism of recent
transnational movements. After you throw the bums out, what then? The improvements of
urban services and infrastructure and reducing of social inequalities, the cornerstone demand of
33
the protests, depend upon effective functioning government and on electing people to govern.
Despite their limitations, political parties are bridging mechanisms, by which social grievances
and aspirations can be carried into the structures of government. In this light, some recent
commentary has questioned the dichotomy between state and counter-state approaches, calling
for hybrid approach that combines electoral and autonomist movement strategies of social
transformation (Artidti 2008; Foran 2014).
In its strong anti-institutionalist stance, the Brazilian cycle of protest is closely linked to
the recent global waves of protests, in 2011 (the Arab uprisings, the Occupy Movement, the
Spanish Indignados and other European anti-austerity protests, the Chilean student protests) and
2013-14 (Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Ukraine). In all of those cases there were mass
mobilizations, intense anti-partisanship, criticism of the state and the plea for new and good ways
of governing, along with actors emphasizing their autonomy and "spontaneity".
Those conclusions are preliminary, since our fieldwork is still in progress. We hope to
have given you a sense of the internally complex and contested nature of the June protests in
Brazil, while raising broader questions about the relationship between social movements,
political parties, and institutional politics. The fierce debates provoked by the chants of sem
partido continue to reverberate, in Brazil and elsewere. As these movements challenge
powerholders in provocative new ways, they also pose challenges to analysts, who need to
understand these protests in their full breadth and complexity.
34
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Dupuis-Deri, Francis (2010). 'The Black Blocs Ten Years After Seattle. Anarchism, Direct
Action and Deliberative Practices'. Journal for the study of radicalism, 4 (2)
Foran, John. (2013). Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation. Studies
in Social Justice 9 (1): 4-25.
Fligstein, Neil & Mcadam, Doug (2011). 'Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields'.
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Fligstein, Neil & McADam, Doug (2012). A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C. (2001), Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This is a completely co-authored article, the order of authorship is just alphabetic. We are
grateful to comments received when this paper was presented, through 2014, at the Seminrio
Sociologia, Poltica, Histria, University of So Paulo, Cebraps seminar series, the Studies of
36
Politics and Movements Workshop at the University of Notre Dame, the Latin American Studies
Association meeting in Chicago, and the Conference on Catching Up to the Future? Advances
and Challenges in the Politics, Society and Social Policies of Contemporary Brazil, Watson
Institute for International Studies, Brown University.
37

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From Contention to Social Change: Rethinking the Consequences of Social Movements and Cycles of Protests-

June demonstrations in Brazil: repertoires of contention and governments response to

University of Notre Dame

and consequences of these mobilization, especially the state responses to them.

THE JUNE PROTESTS IN BRAZIL

of contention mobilized through the demonstrations, comparing it to previous Brazilian protest

labor movement, feminist movement and partisan activism). Additionally, we interviewed

the repertoire of contention they relied on.

CONTENDING FIELDS IN A CYCLE OF PROTEST

emphases across the two fields.

According to Tarrow (1995), a protest cycle consists of a sequence of escalating

[]. " (Tilly, 2006, p. 35).

ATTRIBUTIONS OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

of protestors; actors shifting interpretations of and responses to the evolving political

interpretations and responses to this conjuncture on the part of the population.

usually rely on internet to express themselves.

(accusations of corruption, over-spending, and worker endangerment). This discussion appeared

in newspapers, the internet and television broadcasts, generating a "discursive opportunity" to

frame grievances in terms of a "FIFA standard" in public services.

especially related to education, urban mobility and access to consumption.

juridical institutions, without provoking a cycle of protest.

Roussef started her presidency (2011-2014) in a less favorable economic environment,

came to the streets in response to police violence.

different reasons, with different motivations, grievances, and repertoires of protest.

AN EMERGING CYCLE OF PROTEST

However, the following days revealed a more heterogeneous scene.

According to Tilly (2004:308), a social movement consists of repeated public

Figure 1: "The Evolution of the Brazilian Revolution"

This mechanism of rapid movement expansion is familiar to social movement analysts:

Square, Zuccotti Park, Gezi Park.

common in cycles of protest, there was an escalating sequence of collective public

Facebook materialized in the streets, as well as several micro-movements, many of them

Movement), Milharal, Acampa/Ocupa (Camp/Occupy), CMI (Independent Media Center), DAR

considered a student movement.

WAS THIS A STUDENT MOVEMENT?

and turnstyle jumping. The movements statement of principles (approved by consensus at

several national encounters) describes itself as autonomous, apartisan, independent and

expropriation of public transportation, removing it from the private sector, without

Principles, MPL website, http://saopaulo.mpl.org.br/apresentacao/carta-de-principios)

DCEs (Diretrios Centrais dos Estudantes/university-based student directorates) joined the

organizations in trying to present themselves as earlier partners or organizers of the first

past three decades, was in charge of the Ministry of Sports.

REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION: CULTURAL SOURCES

contestation. Recent elements that have be appearing in youth-based movements worldwide

power altogether (Holloway 2003; Sitrin 2006; Zibechi 2010).

J, and Fora Collor.

"Redemocratization." The events consolidated a patriotic repertoire of contestation, with

environment, minority rights, and similar issues

Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June),

movement organizations - the continuities are also clear.

HYBRID REPERTOIRES IN STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS

within the protest cycle.

dominance of the socialist repertoire.

the former cycles).

posting on social media.

So we are talking here about repertorial dominance, not exclusivity or purity.

CONTENDING CLAIMS IN A DIVIDED FIELD

Table 1. Protest Themes

Category Protest theme Examples of slogans

and reaction to awakened, wake up, Brazil

Against violence and Without Violence, Enough of war: for

defense of peaceful another police

guarantee of rights (transportation, education,