Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

GR No. L-46892 June 28, 1940

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, recurring,

Vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Appealed.

DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile in representation of the appellant.

Messrs. Paguia and Lerum in representation of the defendant, National Labor Union.

IMPERIAL, J .:

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant against the order issued by the Industrial
Relations Tribunal on May 6, 1939, which obliged it to replace in its previous work or in others
substantially equivalent to the 45 workers listed in the petition March 31, 1939 and the 10 workers
headed by A. Haber who were excluded indefinitely, within 10 days of receiving a copy of the order;
To pay to these 55 workers the wages they should have received from the date of their suspension
or separation until their replacement; And that pending the other issues that the parties have
submitted, the appellant refrains, on pain of contempt, from dismissing or excluding, without the prior
permission of the court, any worker or employee who was under his service at that time in That the
dispute that is currently working in the mines has arisen or that it is replaced in its work in
accordance with the order; And against the decision of the same court of August 17, 1939 that I
deny the motion of reconsideration of the appellant filed on May 26, 1939.

On December 12, 1938, the defendant National Labor Union, Inc., representing the workers and
employees of the appellant who were members of the labor union, addressed a letter to the
appellant requesting 21 claims in favor of its members. The letter was received by the appellant's
office in Manila in a letter stamped by Baguio's correspondent on the 30th of the same month. The
officials of the Complainant summoned a meeting to their employees on January 2, 1939, and
informed all their workers that some of the demands had been accepted and had already been put
into practice, others would be considered and the rest would go to Be rejected for being
unreasonable, and advised not to resort to violence and to observe legal methods in the settlement
of their differences with the appellants. On the evening of the same day the workers and employees
of the appellant went on strike and abandoned their work. The appellant immediately reported this
strike to the Department of Labor and requested its intervention in order to solve it. The Secretary of
Labor appointed Adolfo Umengan, Special Investigator of the Department, and Eladio C. Leano,
Public Defender of the Mountain Province, to intervene and see how to solve the strike. These
officials convened a conference attended by officials of the complainant, Luis Lardizabal, head of the
Baguio Federation of Labor, a labor organization affiliated with the National Labor Union, Inc. As a
result of the conference the parties agreed on The following friendly arrangement:

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

In order to have the present strike of the contractors and laborers of the respondent
company who staged a walkout on January 3, 1939, amicably settled, the parties
hereby mutually agree to the said strike under the condition that all laborers will be
readmitted upon the Execution of this agreement; Provided, that all laborers whose
 services should be dispensed with due to lack of work in those tunnels where they
are no longer needed will be less than fifteen days employment from the date of this
settlement or resumption of work, and provided, further, That as soon as the stops in
1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the services of men are needed, the company
will give preference to efficient laborers when reducing the personnel as mentioned
in those working places and may transfer them to other division to replace inefficient
Men

In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a committee composed of Messrs.

Luis Lardizabal, Tomas Dirige, Victoriano Madayag, Maximo Conaoi, Daniel
Lambinicio, and Juan Cerilo and the Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. as represented
by its President, Mr. Andres Soriano, have hereunto placed their signatures this 4th
day of January, 1939.

The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not appear until
9:00 am on the 6th of the same month. The appellant's management did not, however, allow any
worker to enter the underground section known as "830 level" because of the fact that the air had
become vitiated by the strike, and it was necessary to renew it with pure air. To avoid personal
misfortune. This precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal of the appellant to have them
work again, so they went on strike again. The workers who worked in the mine called "680 division,"
which is another separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory, joined the strikers
sympathetically. Once again the Department of Labor and through the mediation of Eladio C.
Leao, the workers returned to work on the night of January 6, 1939, when the mine work resumed
gradually.

On January 9, 1939 the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial Relations
Tribunal in accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and said Court held the first
hearing of the case on the 13th of the same month in the City of Baguio. In this view, the 21 claims
of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. were discussed one by one, and the parties reached
agreement on some of them, others were submitted to the Triunal's decision and the others were left
pending Be seen and resolved later.

On March 31, 1939, with most of the aforementioned claims still pending, the National Labor Union,
Inc., filed a motion alleging that the foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers of the appellant had Been
suspended indefinitely on the 29th of the same month; That these workers had previously been
transferred to outside work in order to provide the appellant with an excuse to separate them later
from service; That another group of about 30 workers were dismissed by the company without any
reason and without authorization from the court; And that the suspensions and separations thus
made were acts of revenge and discriminatory for the workers, for which reason it was requested
that the staff of the appellant responsible for such acts be punished by contempt and that the
appellant be forced to replace the workers In their primitive works inside the mines and to pay their
wages corresponding to the period in which they were separated from the service. The appellant
contested the motion by denying the imputed acts and claimed that Haber and his 9 companions
were suspended for their continued laziness during working hours and for having consistently
refused to work, and that the 45 workers headed by foreman Victoriano Madayag were dismissed for
Having refused to point out those responsible for the ill-treatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the
morning of March 30, 1939. The motion was seen on April 3, 1939 and at the hearing the parties
presented their witnesses. The court designated one of its special agents to be constituted in the
mines of the appellant and to conduct an investigation in order to supplement the facts that are
proved during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented to him and the facts found by
the appointed commissioner, the court in its order of May 6, 1939, declared the following facts
proven:
 1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by
the respondent without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order
of this Court of January 23, 1939.

2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent without
just cause.

The same order the Industrial Relations Court makes the following considerations that support the
conclusions reached:

In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was enjoined to refrain from
discharging any laborer involved in the dispute without just cause and without
previous authority of the Court. It appears and is not denial of the fact is made by the
respondent that the dismissal is one case and alleged suspension for an indefinite
time in the other, which has all the effects of a discharge, were made without seeking
the authority of the Court.

The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended
from continuous loafing and refusal to work was not established. The real motive
behind the lay was the completion of their work "outside." Under the circumstances,
the provision of the March 21 order, to the effect that these men should be returned
to their underground work after the completion of their work "outside" should have
been observed. The respondent instead of complying with the order laid off the men.

The discharge of Victoriano Madayag and his forty-four companions as a result of

the Moldero incident also lacks justification. In the case of Madayag, although he
was present when Molder was attacked, neither one is accused of the aggression.
The two of them were conversing with Moldero with the latter stoned from behind
without anybody apparently being able to point out the aggressor. Less justification
can be found for the discharge of the forty-four men as a result of the incident. The
investigation disclosed that at the time of the assault, they were at the Creek busy
with their work. Both the distance and the topographical situation of the place where
the men were working, which is far and well below the bank of the place of the
incident, precluded their hearing of seeing clearly what transpired above them in the
place where Moldero was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the premises made by
the investigator confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the investigations
conducted by the officials of the company and the policeman of the camp and by the
constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning
has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five
men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an anxious desire on the part
of the company to get rid of these men.

As previously found, in the order of this Court of March 21, 1939, about 134
underground laborers of the respondent were transferred and made to work 'outside
the mines' or surface work. The majority of these men were muckers, miners,
timbermen, trammers, and mine helpers and had their favor from 6 months to 5 years
service in the mines of the company and not a few of them have done underground
work in several capacities and in Different tunnels and divisions of the mine. Among
them are found leaders of the movement of the laborers for higher pay and better
working conditions which culminated in the strike called on January 3, 1939. These
leaders have been prominent in the formation of the union its activities and in
connection with the strike. The temporary transfer of these men to "outside" work
was authorized by the Court in said order on the strength of the assurance of the
respondent that no more work suited for them inside the mines existed. It was
directed, however, in the aforesaid order that as soon as they were completed the
laborers should be immediately returned to their respective work within the mines.
Subsequent events and acts of the officials of the respondent in charge of the mines
have agreed to the Court work existed and exist for the men inside the tunnels and
their transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the company to dispense with
their services as soon as the Work is completed. The unwarranted discharges of
Haber and nine others and those of Victoriano Madayag and his forty-four
companions amply demonstrated this conclusion. Upon the company's own
admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon the findings of the
investigator of the Court, more than four hundred (400) workers of different classes
among them, muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers and foremen coming from
Different mines in the region have been employed by the respondent as fresh
laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not members of the petitioner, the
National Labor Union, Inc.

At the same time the work in different tunnels and division in the mines are allegedly
being completed, the old workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the
men found transfer to other divisions being operated, the majority are being left
without work. Instead of laying hands on the old men laid off and making them work
in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work those transferred to
the 'outside' department, the respondent preferred to take on and hire other workers
coming from different places because Evidently they are not members of the union.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that to good number of the position given
of the men who were employed after the strike numbering more than four hundred to
date could have been offered to the strikes who are now doing work "outside" and
Other who have been laid off on the allegation that the underground work in which
they were engaged had been completed. To believe that not a single man or say a
few among the latter could have met the requirements set by the technical men of
the company to perform the different classes of work for which the fresh men were
engaged because they lack the required efficiency, experience, Physique.
Intelligence and skill of the four hundred fresh laborers would be shutting the eyes of
the court to realities. These men should be aware of the fact that they have not been
able to answer the question, and that they have been working for the past few years.
That attained by the other workmen in other mines in the district for an equal period
of time. Their inefficiency as a whole group can not be successfully sustained
because they were not transferred to surface work for this reason but because of the
alleged lack of work or completion of their underground work. They have been
inefficient in the past, it can not be explained why the company is working in the
service the records of the company abound with discharges made in the past of
laborers who were found either inefficient or incompetent or whose services Were
unsatisfactory.

The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the mine but
the evidence stands uncontradicted that the strike was called to petition was
presented by the men to the management carrying the signatures of about eight
hundred (800) worker demanding higher pay and Better working conditions. When
the men struck, the operation of the mine was completely paralyzed and there is a
strong indication that a great majority of the workers joined openly the strike. It
would not have been difficult for the respondent, with the means at its command, to
 find for itself the employees and laborers who remained loyal to the company and to
consider those who struck either the members of the union or its sympathizer.

The respondent's claim to the motive for the suspension and discharges lacks
substance and support in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From
all that appears, it is inferred that the respondent desire to discourage membership in
the union and to rout if possible. The wholesale discharges were the expression of
such desire. The acts in the mind of the Court are calculated to have two effects.
They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but would also
discourage other laborers from joining or remaining members of the union.

The allegation that it has always been policy to consider the laborer's connection
with the company terminated upon the termination of the working place in which he is
employed is not supported by the facts. It has been shown that as a general rule
when working in a place is completed, workers are transferred to another working
place in one level or to another level, although in some instances days may elapse
before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in Different levels.

It is alleged that mining operations in the property vary and involve several types,
and that a miner, for example, may be good in one type, but that does not
necessarily follow that he can of good work in another type. And that the
employment of men in particular jobs not suitable for them increased the cost of
production as a result of lower output. Consequently, the respondent vehemently
insists on its right of selecting the one that it should employ and that in the exercise
of this right it should not be restrained or interfered with by the Court. It contends
that the work of the particular type of work of the management or its technical men
should be respected. But all these arguments are meaningless in the face of the
finding of the Court that the underground laborers transferred to the 'outside' work
are not wanting in experience, efficiency and other conditions alleged to be found
among the fresh laborers. The special qualifications of the particular work can not be
rightly invoked in favor of the employment of new laborers most especially in those
cases of common or unskilled labor like muckers, trammers, helpers, etc.

Under normal circumstances, the exercise of judgment of the employer in selecting

men should be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the
prejudice of members of a labor union whose rights should be safeguarded in
consonance with the laws of the law, the Court not only feels justified but rightly its
duty to interfere to afford protection to the laborers affected .

The appellant filed an extensive motion for reconsideration of the said order, a motion that was
denied by the resolution of August 17, 1939. The order of May 6, 1939, and the resolution of August
17, 1939, To the appeal lodged by the appellant.

The Appellant contends that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by Acts Nos. 254 and 355,
is unconstitutional (1) because it violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) because by it the
National Assembly abdicates its legislative power violating the doctrine on delegation of powers; (3)
because the judicial powers conferred by the law on the Industrial Relations Tribunal, considered
separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and permit the deprivation of freedom and property
without due process of law; And (4) because, supposing that the law is valid and constitutional in its
entirety, the at least part of Article 20 which provides that the Industrial Relations Court "adopt its
procedural regulations" must be declared null and void because it infringes Article 13 of Title VIII of
the Constitution of the Philippines which obliges the Industrial Relations Court to observe the general
rules of procedure applicable to the courts of justice. The appellant alleges in this respect that as
she has been subjected to arbitrary and different procedure from that which applies to other litigants
in the Philippine courts, she has been denied due process of law and the principle of equal
protection before laws.

Commonwealth Law No. 103 which, as its title indicates, provides for the protection of the worker by
creating an Industrial Relations Court empowered to fix a minimum wage for the workers and the
maximum rent to be paid by the tenants; To enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or
owners and employees or tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties for violating their decrees,
has been promulgated by the National Assembly pursuant to the precepts contained in Article 5,
Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; And articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines
which provide:

ART. 5. The State shall endeavor to promote social justice in order to ensure the
welfare and economic stability of the entire people.

ART. 6. The State should protect all workers, especially women and minors, and
should regulate the relations between owners and tenants, and between labor and
capital in industry and agriculture. The State may establish compulsory arbitration.

ART. 1. The Judiciary shall be invested in a Supreme Court and other lower courts
established by law.

ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe and
distribute the jurisdiction of the various courts,. . .

In compliance with the constitutional precepts transcribed, the National Assembly enacted
Commonwealth Law No. 103 creating the Industrial Relations Tribunal which is a special court with
judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union v. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No Ang Tibay
et al., V. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No. 46496, concurrent opinion of Judge Jose P.
Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction
to consider, investigate, decide and settle any question, matter, dispute or dispute that affects or
arises between employers and employees or between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, And to
regulate the relations between them, according to and subject to the provisions of the law. Article 4
provides that the tribunal shall take cognizance of any agrarian or industrial conflict that motivates or
causes a strike or strike for the purpose of prevention, arbitration, decision and adjustment, because
of differences arising in the matter of wages, participation Or compensation, hours of work or
conditions of hiring or employment, between employers and employees or workers, and between
owners and tenants or sharecroppers, provided that the number of affected employees, workers,
tenants or sharecroppers exceeds thirty, and that agrarian conflict Or industry is submitted to the
court by the Secretary of Labor, or by one or both interested parties, when said Secretary of Labor
certifies as to its existence and the convenience of the intervention of the court in the interest of
public interest. And Article 20 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of any
question or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the court shall act in
accordance with justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case, Without regard to
technicalities and legal formulations, and will not be subject to any technical rules of legal proof, but
will form a judgment in the way that creates fair and equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the Industrial
Relations Tribunal full facultative faculty for resolving and deciding agrarian and industrial disputes in
the manner it believes to be fair and equitable, dispensing with technicalities and legal formulations,
and the faculty thus granted is judicial rather than legislative , So it does not violate the principle of
separation of powers, prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or equal protection before the
law. As has been said in the Cincinnati case, W. & ZR Co. v . Comm., Of Clinton County, 1852), 1
Ohio St., 88, quoted in the Rubi et al. Against the Provincial Council of Mindoro, 39 Jur. Fil., 675,
"There is a real difference between delegating the power to dictate laws, which necessarily
presupposes discretion as to what they are to be, and confer attribution or discretion to do them The
first can not be done in any way, and the second can not be objected. "

In order to reinforce the arguments in favor of the unconstitutionality of Law No. 103, the appellant
emphasizes the resolution of the case of Schechter v. United States (1935), 295 US, 496, 79 Law.
Ed. 270, in which the National Supreme Court of the United States declared the National Recovery
Act unconstitutional. There is, however, a marked difference between that case and the one
considered because the National Recovery Act, rather than creating a court of law, I believe together
With legislative powers and authorize the President of the United States to promulgate codes that
prescribe the rules of precedence in order to carry out the purposes of the law.

The last plea that is alleged against the validity of Law No. 103 is that the judicial powers it grants to
the Industrial Relations Tribunal are so artificial and unreasonable that they allow deprivation of
liberty and property without due Process of law; And that Article 20 at least suffers from this
fundamental defect because it confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal the power to dictate its
own rules of procedure, which contravenes Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution, which prescribes
that the Court Supreme Court shall issue rules concerning written pleadings, uniform practice and
procedure for all courts of the same category.

Article 20 of Law No. 103 reads as follows:

ART. 20. Rules of the Court . - The Industrial Relations Tribunal shall promulgate
its rules of procedure and shall have the other attributions that generally correspond
to a court of law: It being understood, however , that in the hearing, investigation and
resolution of any question or conflict, and in the exercise of Any of its duties and
powers under this Act, the Court shall act in accordance with the fairness and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
formulations, and shall not be subject to any rules, Legal proof, but to form judgment
in the way it creates fair and equitable.

A simple reading of this article shows that the law has not empowered the Industrial Relations
Tribunal to investigate and resolve questions and disputes between workers and employers, tenants
and owners in an arbitrary and capricious manner without being subject to a specific rule of conduct .
The article clearly stipulates that the rules of procedure which it adopts, to which the tribunal must
conform, must be guided by justice and equity, and prescribes that the criterion which is formed
must be based on the substantial merits of the case without regard to Technicalities or legal
formulations. Law No. 103, which creates a special court called the Industrial Relations Court with
the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial disputes in
accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, can not be challenged on the ground That it
deprives the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law; Nor does it conflict with
the precept of Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of
the same category as the municipal courts, courts of justice and courts of first instance for which the
regulations of the Courts by the Supreme Court.

In relation to the validity and constitutionality of Law No. 103 and its amendments, we insert below
the concurrent opinion of Judge Lauren in the case of Ang Tibay, supra , whose remarks serve to
reassure the seated proposition that the said law and its Amendments is valid and does not violate
the Constitution.
 It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst of
surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distresswhich
was threatening the stability of theworld over governments. Alive to the social and
economic forces atwork, the farmers of our Constitution boldly met the problems and
difficulties which faced them and endeavored to crystallize, with more or less fidelity,
the political, social; And economic proposition of their age, and this they did, with the
consciousness that the political and philosophicalaphorism of their generation will, in
the language of a great jurist, "be doubted by the next and perhaps entirely discarded
by the third." (Chief Justice Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327; 133 NW,
209.) Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in
the Constitution which are intended to bring about the necessary social and
economic Equilibrium between components of society through the application of what
may be termed the justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years
ago to be secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and
opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it
were, in custodia societatis . "The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all people" was thus enshrined in the Constitution (Article 5,
Art. II, Constitution). For example, section 6 of Articles XIII declares that the State
"shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, And shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. "The same section also states that" the State may
provide for compulsory arbitration. " The Constitution, the President of the Philippines
may be authorized by law, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the
National Assembly may prescribed, to "promulgate rules and regulations t The
National Labor Regulations Act (49 Stat., 449) on July 5, 1935, commonly known as
the Wagner Act, were in the Philippines headway towards the adoption of our
fundamental law, pursuant to congressional authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie
Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the
following provision "The right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged." (Par. 6, section 1, Art. III, Constitution.) What
was an agitation in the United States Which Brought About the recommendation by
the Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for
the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the United States
Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle, Which May be expanded
and vitalized by legislation to keep pace With the development of time and
Circumstances.

By and large, our Constitution These Provisions in all evince and express the need of
shifting emphasis to community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of
human values. In conformity With the constitutional objective and cognizant of the
historical fact and agricultural disputes Industrial That HAD Given rise to disquietude,
bloodshed and revolution in our country, the National Assembly enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 103, Entitled "An Act to Afford protection of labor by creating
a Court of Industrial Relations empowered to fix minimum wages for laborers and
maximum rental to be paid tenants, and to enforce compulsory arbitration Between
Employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively, and by prescribing
penalties for the violation of the orders "and , later, Commonwealth Act. No. 213,
Entitled "An Act to define and Regulate legitimate labor organizations." (Asto esta
last act, vide "finding and policy," preamble [sec. 1] of the Wagner Act [49 Sta., 449]).

Commonwealth Act No. 103, approved October 29, 1936, was originally Bill No. 700
of the National Assembly. More light is shed by the explanatory statement of the Bill
than by what transpired in the course of the deliberation of the measure in the
legislative chamber. "This bill," thus the explanatory statement of Bill No. 700,
'creates a Board of Industrial Relations. . . and provides for compulsory arbitration. .
.in accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the Constitution, it provides that "The State
podrs establacerel binding arbitration." "Incorporating the Conclusion Reached by a
committee appointed, a year or so before it was Observed that 'under current
legislation'" - evidently Act No. 4055 Referring to -. "There is no suitable instrument to
prevent strikes The Departamentode work plays maramente the role of
pacificadorentre the disputing parties and their decisions are not sonobligatorias or
for employers and for workers. the people's aide at a level of industrial development,
imperious quehace which government intervention in estosconflictos more
effective.... " The creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was THUS Proposed,
endowed "not only the power to arbitrate but also the deberde investigate, decide
and make recommendations on issues in conflict and the problem as affecting
Capitaly to Work in Industry and Agricultuta bajola the direction of the President of
the Association of Filipinaso at the request of the Secretary of Labor.

xxxxxxxxx

From what has-been Stated, it Appears That the legislation Which are now called
upon to construe was enacted in pursuance of what Appears to be deliberate
Embodiment of a new social policy, founded on the conception of a society
integrated not by independent Individuals dealing at arms 'length, but by
interdependent members of a consolidated whole Whose interests must be protected
against mutual aggression and warfare Among and Between divers and diverse units
Which are impelled by counter vailing and opposite Individual and group interests,
and this is Particularly true in the relationship Between labor and capital. Social and
Industrial disturbances fifty years ago Which Were feudal-like and isolated
Importance of May now well result in a serious strain upon the economic organism of
the Entire Nation. In the United States labor legislation has undergone a long
process of development too long to nature here, culminating in the enactments of
what Were commonly Known as the Clayton Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and
finally, the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Wagner Act
created the National labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the Federal
Government in the settlement of labor disputes, Which device is Aimed at the
avoidance of unnecessary friction Between labor and Capital and the Industrial
establishment of peace. Scrutiny of Legislation in That Country and of
pronouncement made by ITS Supreme Court reveals a continuous renovation and
change made by the impact of Necessary changing needs and economic pressure
Brought About by the overwhelming momentum of social and economic forces
developed new there. In the light of changes That Have occured, it is doubted if the
pronouncement made by the Said Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v. New York,
198 US, 45) or in 1908 (Adair v. US, 52 Law. Ed. 430, 208 US, 161, and Coppage v
Kansas, US 236, 1) -. Which are relied upon cases by the petitioner in Its printed
memorandum - Retain Their virtuality still at the present time. In the Philippines,
social legislation has had a development, Although of course like to a much smaller
degree and of giving rise to different adaptation Several Attempts at our unique
meeting and solving social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth to the
National Assembly, September 2.1936, Executive Order No. 49, S. 1936). The
system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act No. 4055 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature has apparently abandoned by the enactment Been of the aforementioned
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of Changes That Have taken
place, it May be doubted if Likewise the pronouncement made by esta court in the
case of People vs. Pomar (Phil 46, 440.) - also relied upon by the petitioner in Its
 printed memorandum - still Retains ITS living virtually as a principle. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent Given the way the assumption by government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations AFFECTED With public interests.

xxxxxxxxx

In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and it, our Government no longer performs the role
of a mediator or intervenor but mere That of the supreme arbiter.

In his next senalmiento error the recurrentealega that the behavior of the researcher, the
quepracticio research and how heard the case the Tribunalde Relaciobes Industrial deprived him of
a view i, just parcialy, and constitute deprivation of SINEL supropiedad due process of law. To prove
the groundlessness of senalmiento error, we suficientereproducir below how the investigation by the
commissioner appointed by the Court of Relacionbes Industrial and how secelebro view by that court
practicio as set forth in Laorden of May 6, 1939.

Hearing was held on April 3, 1939, witnessesfor Where Both the Petitioners and the
Respondent testified. To supplement the facts Brought out at the hearing, the Court
ordered one of Its Special Agents to proceed to the premises of the mines to conduct
a further investigation.

The commissioner was appointed by the Tribumal of RelacionesIndustriales in its power

conferidapor Article 10 of Law No. 103 of Commonwealth yel the inspection and views that held the
commissioner and The Tribunal respectively, the parties were representadasdebidamente were
heard and presented the pruebasque had available and believed convenient inspection and views
ofrecerTales had the character of a fair and just vistajudicial and are due procesode law guaranteed
by the Constitution.

The appellant also contends that the order of 6 demayo 1939 is arbitrary because there are
pruebassubstanciales not competent to support it. About esteextremo, the findings of fact which has
laid the Tribunalde Industrial Relations show that ordenimpugnada is supported by the result of the
investigation conducted by the commissioner and evidence presented PARTIES directly to the
Court. Endichas conclusions have been considered and analyzed by The Tribunal of Industrial
Relations chelae all parties submitted evidence and unavoidable concludedthat order is not arbitrary
and justified and sotenida by the proven facts.

The last senalmiento related withthe error of the order of 6 May 1939 that the appellant pay
disponeque 55 repustos losjornales workers who stopped receiving during his separaciondel
service. The appellant maintains that this part dela order equivalent to a judgment for damages and
perjuiciosque the Industrial Relations Court can not pronounce for lack of jurisdiction. The claim
noes meritorious. The Industrial Relations Court, as has already been said, is a special and comotal
court has power to dispose that the appellant pay them wages of their employees and workers who
have been repuestos.Los Articles 1 and 4 of Law No. 103 of Commonwealth , as has been amended
first by elarticulo 1 of Law No. 254, confer authority and jurisdiction to the Court of Inbdustriales
Relations to hear, resolve and decide all issues, controversiasy disputes between employers and
workers and owners and landowners, and wages spares workers, duranteel time they were
separated from service, esteban included in the controversial, but sometidasal disputes and
Department of Labor and certified this to the Court of Industrial Relations.

The appeal is denied certiorari and Laorden of 6 May 1939 and the resolution of 17 deagosto the
same year, with costs to the appellant confiman. Asise orders.
Avancea, Diaz, Laurel and Moran, JJ., Concur.