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Labor Market Regulation via Trade Union Combinations and Multi-Employer

Bargaining: Context, Processes and Outcomes in the Philippines

Dr. Jonathan P. Sale


University of the Philippines

1. Introduction

The Philippine Constitution directs the State to promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and expresses a preference for voluntary
modes in settling labor disputes. It declares that all workers have the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining. (1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XIII,
Section 3)

On March 15, 2003, the rules implementing the Philippine law on labor relations,
otherwise known as Department of Labor and Employment (DoLE) Department Order
(DO) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, became effective, supplanting DO No. 9, Series of
1997. According to the Philippine Bureau of Labor Relations, DO No. 40-03 has four
aims: (1) to uphold the right to self-organization, (2) to advocate for responsible and
accountable unionism, (3) to promote the doctrine of shared responsibility, and (4) to
provide for speedy labor justice. There are two interesting innovations under DO No. 40-
03 trade union mergers and consolidations and multi-employer bargaining. Merger
refers to a process where a labor organization absorbs another resulting in the
cessation of the absorbed labor organizations existence, and the continued existence
of the absorbing labor organization. Consolidation refers to the creation or formation of
a new union arising from the unification of two or more unions. The other significant
change in the rules is multi-employer bargaining. Legitimate labor unions and employers
may agree in writing to come together for the purpose of collective bargaining. But only
legitimate labor unions that are incumbent exclusive bargaining agents and their
counterpart employers may participate and negotiate in multi-employer bargaining. Also,
only legitimate labor unions belonging to employer units consenting to multi-employer
bargaining may participate therein. (Sale 2003)

This study takes a closer look at the context, processes and outcomes of trade union
combinations and multi-employer bargaining in the Philippines. What institutions helped
shape these rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining? What
are the processes involved? What are the outcomes? To what extent have the aims of
the rules been achieved, if at all? Have more centralized bargaining structures
emerged? Do conceptualizations of work matter (Budd 2011)? These are basic
questions this research tries to answer by analyzing, among others, aggregate,
quantitative empirical evidence over time and across regions in the country.
2

2. Context: Nexus of bargaining structure, coverage and trade union density in


general1

According to Kochan (1980),2 bargaining structure refers to the scope of employees and
employers who are covered by or are in some ways affected by the terms of a labor
agreement. Thus, the bargaining structure is more centralized if the scope of
employees and employers covered by a CBA is larger.

Thomson (1981)3 noted that the North American systems of collective bargaining are
the most decentralized in the world compared to Western Europe where employer
cooperation has a history. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4 Based on Figure 1 the
degree of centralization is low if bargaining happens at the enterprise or workplace
level. The degree of centralization is medium when bargaining takes place at the
industry or regional level, and high if at the national level.

Thomson (1981)

In Figure 1, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland represent highly


centralized systems. United States and Canada typify decentralized systems.

As depicted, the differences in bargaining structure reflected two distinctive models: (A)
the system generally in the United States manufacturing sector; and (B) the model
found in much of Europe, which Thomson described thus:
3

Model (A) involves the negotiating of wages, fringes, and some


working conditions between the company and one or more national
unions, the latter connecting the company-wide wage settlements in the
industry via pattern bargaining. Working conditions and, to a lesser
degree, some pay questions are also negotiated at the plant level with
local unions, and local and national unions are sequentially involved in
grievance handling . . . . giving management an arrangement designed to
connect the wage setting and productivity determining activities as closely
as possible and as permitting the national union, for its part, to perform
vital and highly visible services for local officers and members alike in
processing their grievances and policing the contract. Model (B) on other
hand is characterized by wider separation of the centers of decision-
making and more overlap in the determination of pay. Pay is determined
by formal industry-wide bargaining and again, less formally at plant level
by management activity either unilaterally or under pressure from shop
stewards or local shop committees; the company-wide level tends to drop
out as a visible locus of wage determination. The role of the national union
in the determination of non-pecuniary conditions and in the disposition of
grievances is minimal; these functions tend to be discharged by
management and/or local work groups, as in the determination of local
wage supplements, and also by legislative enactment and labour courts.5

Figures 2.1 to 2.4 are from the Global Report under the Follow-up to the International
Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
for year 2000.6 The figures depict the relationship between voice regulation and
representational security. In voice regulation, systems of consultation and negotiation
supplement minimum legal frameworks.7 On the other hand, representational security
at work is based on the freedom of workers and employers to form and join
organizations of their own choosing without fear of reprisal or intimidation.8 Thus, the
greater the coverage of collective bargaining, the higher the level of voice regulation,
and the higher the level of trade union density, the greater the extent of representational
security.

Each figure has four quadrants. The upper left quadrant shows industrial relations
systems that are high on collective bargaining coverage, but low on trade union density.
The upper right quadrant reflects systems which are high on both collective bargaining
coverage and trade union density. In the lower left quadrant are systems with low
collective bargaining coverage and low trade union density. The lower right quadrant
represents systems with low collective bargaining coverage but high trade union
density.

Systems in Asia and the Pacific are grouped in the lower left quadrant, which signifies
that they are low on both collective bargaining coverage and trade union density (Figure
2.1).
4

ILO (2000)

With the exception of South Africa, African systems are also generally low on both
collective bargaining coverage and trade union density (Figure 2.2.).

ILO (2000)
5

In the Americas, industrial relations systems are typically low on collective bargaining
coverage and trade union density, except for Argentina (Figure 2.3).

ILO (2000)

While collective bargaining coverage and trade union density in Asia and the Pacific,
Africa and the Americas reflect some degree of homogeneity in that the systems therein
appear to converge in the lower left quadrant, with a few exceptions, Europe conveys
a different picture (Figure 2.4).

Only the United Kingdom shows a seeming resemblance to Asia and the Pacific, Africa
and the Americas, while Hungary appears to resemble South Africa. The rest of
Europe is found in the upper quadrants.
6

ILO (2000)

Significantly, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark are representative of industrial


relations systems that have high levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade
union density. This indicates that the extent of voice regulation and representational
security in these countries is greater than in others. In Austria, recognition of unions as
a prerequisite for collective bargaining appears to be of little significance considering
that collective bargaining coverage is almost 100%, albeit trade union density is below
40%. The situation is similar in France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Belgium and the
Netherlands. The evidence seems to validate the hypothesis of Thomson that under
centralized bargaining, recognition of unions as a prerequisite for collective bargaining
is only of limited significance once a certain threshold density has been achieved.9

Therefore, these (Figures 1 to 2.4) suggest that countries with centralized bargaining
structures have higher levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density.
This is typified by the industry-wide bargaining system of Sweden where ILO reported
collective bargaining coverage and trade union density at above 70 percent.
(Previously, Sweden had an economy-wide bargaining system.) Although in others,
like Austria, trade union density does not appear to be very significant to collective
bargaining. Conversely, countries with decentralized bargaining structures have low
levels of collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. This is exemplified by
the enterprise or workplace bargaining system of the United States where collective
bargaining coverage and trade union density fell below 20% as reported by the ILO. In
this regard, countries in Asia and the Pacific tend to be homogenous as collective
bargaining coverage and trade union density in the region failed to surpass the 30%
threshold based on the ILO report.
7

3. Context: Institutions that helped shape the rules on trade union combinations
and multi-employer bargaining in the Philippines10

As already noted, there are two interesting innovations in DO No. 40-03 trade union
mergers and consolidations and multi-employer bargaining.

Why did these rules emerge?

These rules emerged chiefly because of failure of institutions, incompleteness of statute


and administrative action via regulation.

a. Failure of institutions

Labor organizations and collective bargaining are key institutions in Philippine industrial
relations, as may be ascertained from the basic policy declared in Article 3 of the
Philippine Labor Code:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work. (Emphasis supplied.)

Recognized and protected by public policy, yet they have been declining, and thus
failing, over time.

The Philippine Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics (BLES) reported that in
January 2004 the services sector accounted for about 48% of employed persons in the
Philippines, an increase of more than 7% from the 2002 figure.11

But the preponderance of low-productivity, low-paying jobs in the services sector


creates doubts about the quality of employment generated.12 The growth in
underemployment in recent years came from the services sector and the extent of
underemployment is a measure or gauge of the severity of the lack of jobs, which
makes workers accept shorter work hours or low-paying jobs instead of open
unemployment.13

Non-regular, temporary and peripheral workers have been increasing in number. Work
is temporary if time-bound and peripheral if indirectly related to the employers main
business. BLES reported that as of June 30, 2003, contractor/agency-hired workers and
non-regular staff comprised 10.8% and 25%, respectively, of total employment in
establishments with 20 or more workers.14

The number of establishments that resorted to permanent closure/retrenchment due to


economic reasons rose from 2,859 in 2001 to 3,403 in 2002 while the number of
8

displaced workers went up from 71,864 to 80,091, an indication that more regular jobs
had been lost.15 Significantly, in terms of labor turnover, separation rate was higher
than accession rate in the first and second quarters of 2002 for the construction, hotel
and restaurant, and financial intermediation industries.16

Therefore, the number of unions registered went down from 910 in 2002 to 647 in
2003.17 Membership in newly registered unions also declined from 89,187 in 2002 to
44,794 in 2003.18 The number of CBAs registered decreased from 588 in 2002 to 415
in 2003 while the number of workers covered by new CBAs fell from 114,412 in 2002 to
66,824 in 2003.19

The extent of unionism as of June 2003 was also reported by BLES. The figures were
not encouraging. Of the total number of establishments surveyed, 14.8% were
unionized and 14.2% had CBAs.20 Survey results also showed that union membership
and CBA coverage reached 20.2% and 19.7%, respectively, of the total 2,582,000 paid
employees.21

The downward trend in trade union density and CBA coverage coincided with the
growth of employment in the services sector. There appeared an inverse relationship
between the two, which is explained by the fact that unions usually organize regular
employees. The usual source of union members has been shrinking. Also, the falling
level of trade union density has been influenced by increases in company closures over
the years. Employers downsize, rightsize, outsource and adopt other measures to
increase efficiency and streamline operations in the face of competition. The result has
been fragmentation of the workforce, i.e., various types of work and employment
contracts co-existing simultaneously.22 Atypical forms of employment have been
replacing typical employer-employee relationships.23

And labor organizations have argued that the State has failed to assure the rights of
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining.

b. Incompleteness of statute

As already pointed out, another reason why the rules on trade union combinations and
multi-employer bargaining emerged is the incompleteness of statute the 1974
Philippine Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended). The Philippine
Labor Code does not have provisions on trade union combinations
(mergers/consolidations) and multi-employer bargaining.

Changes and developments in social conditions, markets and technologies may give
rise to circumstances not contemplated when a particular law was enacted, and
therefore law may be incomplete because it broadly circumscribes outcomes without
identifying particular actions, or enumerating only few actions.24

According to Pistor and Xu (2003), because law is incomplete and cannot cover every
situation, institutions exist to handle residual law-making and enforcement, i.e., courts
9

and regulations.25 Courts tend to be reactive, while regulators may be proactive.26 And
different factors may affect how governments rely on courts or regulators for residual
law-making and enforcement, e.g., legal origins (whether a country is of common law
origin or of civil law origin), existing institutions for residual law-making and
enforcement, experience of other countries, economic context, among others.27

c. Administrative action via regulation

In the Philippines, the hybridity of the legal system, existing institutions for residual law-
making and enforcement, experience of other countries, and the economic context
combined to enable regulators, specifically the Department of Labor and Employment
(DoLE), to exercise residual law-making and enforcement through the issuance of DO
No. 40-03, Series of 2003 which introduced the novel processes of trade union
combinations and multi-employer bargaining.

The legal system of the Philippines is characterized as a hybrid, having elements of


both Spanish civil law and American common law due to the countrys colonial
experience.28 Civil law systems are based on fixed codes or rules while common law
systems rely on judicial decisions and precedents.29 (Sale 2011) The issuance of DO
No. 40-03 by DoLE is characteristic of the civil law traditions focus on rules and
regulations setting.

Moreover, it cannot be gainsaid that the experience of other countries (as discussed in
Section 2, Context: Nexus of bargaining structure, coverage and trade union density in
general) and the economic context as described above (in this Section) influenced in
some way the introduction of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining in
2003 through DO No. 40-03.

4. Processes of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining under DO


No. 40-0330

Trade union merger refers to a process where a labor organization absorbs another
resulting in the cessation of the absorbed labor organizations existence, and the
continued existence of the absorbing labor organization. Consolidation refers to the
creation or formation of a new union arising from the unification of two or more unions.

Procedurally, notice of merger or consolidation of independent labor unions, chartered


locals and workers associations shall be filed with and recorded by the DoLE Regional
Office that issued the certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local
of either the merging or consolidating labor organization. Notice of merger or
consolidation of federations or national unions shall be filed with and recorded by the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The notice of merger or consolidation shall be
accompanied by the minutes of merger or consolidation convention or general
membership meetings of all the merging or consolidating labor organizations, with the
list of their respective members who approved the same. The amended constitution and
by-laws and minutes of its ratification shall also accompany the notice. The certificate of
10

registration issued to the merged or consolidated labor organizations shall bear the
registration number of one of the merging or consolidating entities as agreed upon by
the parties to the merger or consolidation, its new name and its business address,
among others.

This relatively new procedure is especially useful when employers merge or


consolidate.

Curiously, the rules are silent on the consequences or effects of trade union mergers or
consolidations.

In corporate mergers or consolidations, the effects and consequences are clear insofar
as the surviving or consolidated entity is concerned by operation of law it
automatically assumes all rights and obligations, assets and liabilities of the combining
corporations.31

It is submitted that union mergers and consolidations have the same effects or
consequences. The surviving or consolidated union automatically assumes the rights,
franchises and privileges as well as the obligations, assets and liabilities of the
combining unions. Such effects or consequences should be embodied in the rules to
avoid confusion.

The other significant change in the rules has to do with multi-employer bargaining.
Legitimate labor unions and employers may agree in writing to come together for the
purpose of collective bargaining. There are conditions. Only legitimate labor unions that
are incumbent exclusive bargaining agents and their counterpart employers may
participate and negotiate in multi-employer bargaining. Also, only legitimate labor unions
belonging to employer units consenting to multi-employer bargaining may participate
therein.

Labor unions or employers may initiate multi-employer bargaining. Legitimate labor


unions desiring to negotiate with their employers collectively shall execute a written
agreement among themselves. Legitimate labor unions who are members of the same
registered federation, national or industry unions are exempt from execution of such an
agreement. The legitimate labor unions who desire to bargain with multi-employers shall
send a written notice to each employer concerned which shall be accompanied by the
agreement mentioned above and their certificates of registration. Employers who agree
to group themselves or use their existing associations to engage in multi-employer
bargaining shall send a written notice to each of their counterpart legitimate labor unions
indicating their desire to engage in multi-employer bargaining. Negotiations may
commence only with respect to employers and labor unions that consent to participate
in multi-employer bargaining. During the negotiations, employers and legitimate labor
unions shall discuss and agree on the manner, scope and coverage of negotiations and
agreements as well as the effect of the negotiations on existing agreements or
employment conditions.
11

Thus, a multi-employer CBA may cover two or more certified or recognized bargaining
units in two or more enterprises.32

Multi-employer bargaining could actually pave the way for more centralized bargaining
structures, like industry- or economy-wide collective bargaining. At present, what exists
in the Philippines is a decentralized structure where collective bargaining occurs at the
plant or company level. Studies tend to show that an industry- or economy-wide
bargaining structure correlates with higher trade union density and lower strike activity.
For instance, Douglas Hibbs (1976) suggests, in a study involving some advanced
societies, that strike activity is higher in countries where the bargaining structure is
decentralized (company and plant bargaining) and lower in countries that have
centralized or highly centralized bargaining systems (industry-wide or economy-wide
bargaining).33 Also, a more centralized bargaining structure would be consistent with the
constitutional principle of shared responsibility between employer and labor34 under
which rights and interests are balanced and/or coordinated by the State.

The consensual character of trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining,


however, is a limiting factor.

In the absence of a statute that requires trade union combinations and multi-employer
bargaining in defined situations, DoLE has no authority to require the same through a
mere administrative action.

5. Outcomes: Less unions and bargaining and fewer workers covered by bargaining

Thus far, there are no reported cases of trade union merger or consolidation and multi-
employer bargaining in the Philippines. The quantitative, aggregate data sets of BLES
in the Current Labor Statistics, which is a quarterly DoLE publication, do not even
mention trade union merger or consolidation and multi-employer bargaining. Notably,
the numbers for union and CBA registration as well as workers covered by CBAs have
continued to decrease over time. Across regions in the country, only the National
Capital Region has shown somewhat moderate numbers in terms of union and CBA
registration and CBA coverage. These are ascertainable from the Tables that follow:35
12

BLES (2015)
13

BLES (2015)
14

BLES (2015)
15

BLES (2015)

In a 2012 research,36 it was reported that there was no registered multi-employer CBA
in the country. Among the hindering factors identified were the voluntariness of the
process (as to the employer) and limited coverage (as it excludes the public sector).
Certain facilitating factors were also identified strengthening tripartism, presence of
industry-wide bargaining, formation of industry unions, requiring multi-employer
bargaining, benchmarking and disseminating/publishing successful models of multi-
employer bargaining. (Alcantara 2012)

In an earlier research,37 it was observed that parent and subsidiary corporate relations,
among others, could foster multi-employer bargaining. In De La Salle University v.
DLSU Employees Association (G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000), the Philippine
Supreme Court held that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be
excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of De La Salle
University, because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical
personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction. The College of St. Benilde is a subsidiary of De La Salle University.
16

Thus, parent and subsidiary corporations are not treated as one and the same employer
in Philippine law, unless it is shown that their legal personalities are being used to justify
wrong, perpetrate fraud, commit crime or defeat public convenience. This means that
parent and subsidiary corporations have distinct bargaining units as well. Under DoLE
DO No. 40-03, a bargaining unit is defined as that group of employees sharing mutual
interests within a given employer unit, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body
of employees in the employer unit or any specific occupational or geographical grouping
within such employer unit.38 Mutual interests could refer to substantial similarity of work,
duties, compensation, working conditions.39

Multi-employer bargaining is possible in parent and subsidiary corporations because


employer cooperation is easier to coordinate among interrelated companies. In fact, a
step in this direction has been taken by Banco De Oro (BDO), a bank, and the National
Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), a labor federation, in the Philippines. The parties
signed a memorandum of agreement (MoA) that resulted in one (1) CBA for the rank
and file employees of the parent and subsidiary corporations. Based on the MoA, the
recognized bargaining unit shall cover all rank and file employees of BDO and its
subsidiaries, effectively placing within the scope of the negotiated CBA employees of
the subsidiary corporations of BDO as well.

More recently, too, proposed legislation requiring multi-employer bargaining in defined


situations had been submitted to the Fifteenth Congress of the Philippines. These are
Senate Bill No. 874 and House Bill No. 2826. The Explanatory Notes (first page) of the
Senate and House Bills are reproduced in the pages that follow:40
17
18
19

The following proposed provisions in Senate Bill No. 874 are illustrative of the defined
situations that require multi-employer bargaining:

xxx
20

House Bill No. 2826 has similar proposed provisions:

xxx
21

These proposed Senate and House Bills show that the existing Philippine Labor Code
fails to lay down guiding rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer
bargaining and, in that sense, is incomplete.

Notably, more centralized bargaining structures have not emerged notwithstanding that
conceptualizations of work do matter, as articulated by Budd (2011). The processes of
trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining as expressed in DO No. 40-03
are indicative of how work is seen by Philippine regulators, i.e., as an activity done by
human members of a community entitled to certain rights or occupational citizenship.41
But as already pointed out, their consensual nature under DO No. 40-03 is a
constraining factor.
22

6. Conclusion

Public policy should enable trade unions to organize contractor/agency-hired, casual,


contractual, and other temporary or non-regular staff. Such would broaden the base of
union organizing and widen the scope of collective bargaining. Also, through public
policy, the duty to bargain collectively should be extended, for example, to multi-
employer situations where direct hires (regular and non-regular staff) work side by side
with indirect hires (contractor/agency-hired workers). Trade union mergers and
consolidations could strengthen the right to self-organization especially in times of
employer (corporate) mergers. Multi-employer bargaining could pave the way for more
centralized bargaining structures.

The rules on trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining came about in
2003 because of failure of institutions, incompleteness of statute and administrative
action via regulation.

However, there are no reported trade union mergers or consolidations and/or multi-
employer CBAs in the Philippines. There are fewer unions and CBAs, and fewer
workers covered by CBAs. The consensual character of trade union combinations and
multi-employer bargaining under DO No. 40-03 is a limiting factor. And the DoLE could
not have mandated trade union combinations and multi-employer bargaining via
administrative rule-making alone, in the absence of a statute authorizing it to do so.

As noted by Kahn-Freund (1974), it is the power structure of a society that is critical in


determining the transferability or transplantability of laws and legal institutions to other
societies, and the disparities in the power and influence of organized interests, such as
economic groups and trade unions, are part of the power structure.42 Such disparities
could be removed by specific legislation requiring trade union combinations and multi-
employer bargaining in defined situations.

Therefore, the Senate and House Bills are a step in the right direction.

Endnotes and References


1
See Sale, J.P. 2005. GATS and Multi-Employer Bargaining: An Analysis in TUs and
NGOs Challenge GATS. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Scout Path, Austin Road, Hong Kong held on
11th to 12th April 2005. See also Sale, J.P. 2005. Labor Dispute Settlement and Decision
Making. Philippine Journal of Labor and Industrial Relations, XXV (1 & 2), pp. 13-43.
2
Kochan, T.A. 1980. Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations from Theory to
Policy and Practice. New York: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
3
Thomson, A. 1981. A View from Abroad in U.S. Industrial Relations 1950 1980: A
Critical Assessment. University of Wisconsin, U.S.A.: Industrial Relations Research
Association.
23

4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
International Labour Office (ILO). 2000. Your Voice at Work. Geneva, Switzerland:
ILO, p. 20.
7
Id., at 19.
8
Id., at 13.
9
Thomson, A., op. cit. supra, note 3.
10
See Sale, J.P. op. cit. supra, note 1.
11
Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment.
2004. Current Labor Statistics, p.12.
12
Congressional Commission on Labor Report and Recommendations. 2001. Human
Capital in the Emerging Economy. Philippines: Congress of the Philippines, p. 27.
13
Id., at 32-35.
14
Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment.
2004. LABSTAT Updates, Statistics on Non-Regular Workers, 8 (21) (December), p. 2.
15
Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, op. cit. supra, note 11, p.19.
16
Id., at 18.
17
Id., at 76.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and Employment.
2004. LABSTAT Updates, Extent of Unionism, 8 (13) (October), p. 1.
21
Id., at 2.
22
Szal, R. 2000. Globalization, Employment and Industrial Relations: The Case of the
Philippines in Philippine Industrial Relations for the 21st Century: Emerging Issues,
Challenges and Strategies. Quezon City: UP School of Labor and Industrial Relations
and Philippine Industrial Relations Society, p. 56.
23
Ibid.
24
Pistor, Katharina and Xu, Chenggang, Incomplete Law - A Conceptual and Analytical
Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation. Journal
of International Law and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 931-1013, 2003. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=310588 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310588 . See
Center on Law and Globalization. 2015. How Countries Deal with Incomplete Law.
https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=26.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Sale, J. P. 2011. The governance of decision making and labor dispute settlement in
the Philippines: Shifting methods from command to collaboration or vice-versa?
Doctoral Dissertation, University of the Philippines National College of Public
Administration and Governance, 08 March 2011.
29
Ibid.
30
See Sale, J.P. 2003. Trade Union Combinations and Multi-Employer Bargaining in
Business Focus, Manila Bulletin, June 27. Available at
24

http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/centers/cberd/pdf/bus_focus/Trade_Union.pdf. See
also DoLE DO No. 40-03, Series of 2003.
31
CORPORATION CODE, sec. 80.
32
Sale, J.P. op. cit. supra, note 1.
33
Hibbs, Jr., D.A. 1976. Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), pp. 1033-1058.
Available at http://www.douglas-hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/APSR%201976.pdf. See Sale,
J.P. 2003. Industrial Conflict in Business Focus, Manila Bulletin, June 31. Available at
http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/centers/cberd/pdf/bus_focus/Industrial_conflict.pdf.
34
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article XIII, Section 3.
35
Taken from Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics Department of Labor and
Employment. 2015. Current Labor Statistics.
http://www.bles.dole.gov.ph/PUBLICATIONS/Current%20Labor%20Statistics/index.html
36
Alcantara, L.C. 2012. Shall we call it off? A Study on Multi-Employer Bargaining in
the Philippines: Knowledge, Attitude and Practices among Social Partners. 1st DoLE
Cluster Research Conference on Decent Work, November 28, Institute for Labor
Studies, Department of Labor and Employment.
37
Sale, J.P., op. cit. supra, note 1.
38
See DoLE DO No. 40-03, Series of 2003.
39
2 C. Azucena, The Labor Code With Comments and Cases (5th ed., 2004).
40
Taken from http://www.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/83376891!.pdf and
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/basic_15/HB02826.pdf, respectively.
41
Budd, J.W. 2011. The Thought of Work. U.S.A.: Cornell University Press.
42
Cooney, S. and Mitchell, R. 2000. Labour Relations and the Law in Three East Asian
NICs: Some Problems and Issues for Comparative Labour Law Inquiry in Labor Law
Reform for the 21st Century: Responding to Globalization and Social Challenges,
Japan/US/EU Joint Research, Tokyo, Japan, citing Kahn-Freund (1974).