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Charles P. JONES
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27607, USA
Henry A. LATANE
Unioersity oj North Carolina, Chapel Ifill, NC .?7514. USA
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Reinganumi study which indicates that abnormal
returns could not be earned using unexpected quarterly earnings mformation, and to document
precisely the response of stock prices to earmngs announcements. This study, using a very large
sample of stocks and daily returns, represents the most complete and detailed analysis of
quarterly earnings reports that has been performed to date. Our results are contrary to those of
Reinganum and show that abnormal returns could have been earned almost any time during the
1970s. Our analysis also indtcates that risk adJustments matter httle in this type of work.
Fmally, we find that roughly SO,; of the adjustment of stock returns to unexpected quarterly
earnings occurs over a 90-day period after the earnings are announced.
1. Introduction
Over the years a number of papers have appeared which analyze the issue
of market efficiency with respect to earnings reports. As discussed in Joy and
Jones (1979), while some of the earlier work may have had shortcomings,
later studies were more rigorous and dealt with the objections that were
raised concerning data limitations and risk adjustments. For example, Joy,
Litzenberger and McEnally (1977) took explicit cognizance of possible
biases in prior studies and concluded that price adjustments to the
information . . contained in unexpected highly favorable quarterly earnings
reports are gradual over time rather than instantaneous.
Recently, Ball (1978) surveyed the literature and found that it reveals
consistent excess returns after public announcements of firms earnings. And
*The tinancial support of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the North Carolina Institute
for Investments Research ts gratefully acknowledged.
where the latter has been forecast using a simple time series model.
Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE), in turn, is defined as unexpected
earnings statistically deflated for standardization purposes. It is important
to note that the earnings forecasting model is designed to capture investors
expectations and not the mathematical time series nature of the reported
earnings.2
Unexpected information should lead to a revision of probability beliefs
and, hence, a change in stock prices. Empirical evidence has indicated that
the adjustment in stock prices to the unexpected earnings is relatively slow,
occurring over a period of weeks. This adjustment usually has been measured
using either 3-month holding period returns (HPRs), (expressed in excess
form as the HPR for the individual stock minus the corresponding market
HPR), or abnormal returns (i.e., observed returns in excess of those predicted
by an equilibrium model). In those studies using the former, for example
Latant- and Jones (1977, 1979). this response has been measured beginning
either two or three months after the end of the fiscal quarter. Thus, the
performance from companies reporting soon after the close of the quarter is
mingled with the performance from those reporting later. In those studies
using abnormal returns, for example Joy. Litzenberger and McEnally (1977)
and Watts (1978), a relatively small sample of companies has been used (102
and 73 respectively).
This study uses daily returns from the CRSP tape to assess the response of
stock prices to quarterly earnings announcements before, on. and after the
announcement date. It uses a fresh source of quarterly earnings and
announcement dates (a customized PDE tape) and programs completely
independent of those used in previously published studies. Specifically, the
customized PDE tape was produced at the end of May, 1981 by Standard
and Poors Corporation, and provides quarterly earnings data and earnings
announcement dates for all companies on the Compustat PDE Tape.
Earnings announced after 3:30 p.m. by the wire services are recorded on the
tape as being announced the next day. Although we have not checked
specifically each earnings announcement, we have no evidence that this data
recording procedure significantly affected our results. Since few earnings
announcement dates are provided prior to the third quarter of 1971, our
study begins that quarter. The study is limited to companies with fiscal year
The exact procedure for calculating SUE can be found in Latank and Jones (1977, p. 1457) or
Reinganum (1981, pp. 22-23).
This point has been misunderstood by some researchers. See Joy and Jones (1979, pp. 60-61)
for a complete discussion of this model misspecdication criticism.
3Reinganum (1981) provides a distribution of quarterly earnings announcements by month of
release. For the 1st. 2nd, and 3rd quarters. roughly 4 times as many companies report within
one month of the fiscal quarter close compared to the second month following the quarters
close. For the 4th quarter, roughly 607; report in the second month and roughly 20% report in
the 1st and 3rd months following the close.
212 R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns
ends of March, June, September and December. The CRSP tape included
returns data through December, 1980, which required that our analysis end
with the earnings reports for the second quarter of 1980.
As shown in table 1, the sample size ranges from a minimum of 618
companies in the third quarter of 1971 to a maximum of 1496 companies in
the first quarter of 1980.4 The merger of the Compustat and CRSP tape
provides the largest sample of companies with daily returns that has been
used to date in a study of quarterly earnings announcements. We believe
that, within the confines of any large-scale computer study based on the
widely known and used data bases, this study represents the most complete
and detailed analysis of quarterly unexpected earnings that reasonably can be
performed.5 The magnitude by which the size and time span of this study
exceeds others will be apparent as we examine a recently published study by
Reinganum, and it is to the contrary evidence of his study that we now turn.
4The only reasons for excluding a company from the analysis in a given quarter were a lack
of 20 quarters of earnings (which are needed to calculate SUE), a lack of sufficient returns data
(which are needed to calculate beta), or a lack of a recorded earnings announcement date. Our
sample size is increasing for two reasons. First, in the mid-1970s Compustat significantly
expanded the number of companies covered. Second, Compustat has not gone back to a
common date for reporting earnings announcement dates; thus, Compustat did not necessarily
go back to 1971 in picking up all the earnings announcements. We found, for example, that in
the quarter preceding our starting date, there were only approximately 250 compantes available
with reported announcement dates that met our other criteria.
Possible biases in studies of thts type, such as the survivorship bias, have been dealt with in
earher papers. See Latani and Jones (1979, footnote 2). As dtscussrd tn footnote 13, we do not
believe that any signiticant survivorship bias exists in our data.
In correspondence with the authors, Reinganum points out that the 566 stock sample came
from a sample of 577 stocks provided to him by Latane and Jones. Eleven of the original
companies were eliminated because of missing data. Reinganum started with 566 companies, and
535 were left at the end of eight quarters. Thus he directly controlled for survivorship bias. Our
analysis is limtted to companies in business m May of 1981, and therefore does not control for
survivorship bias. However, as explained in footnote 13, we do not beheve that this bias poses a
significant problem.
For example, for a company reporting fourth quarter results in January of the next year,
portfolio returns would be examined for February-MarchhApril, MarchhAp&May, April-
May-June. and May-June-July.
R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns 213
Table 1
Number of companies analyzed by quarter
Number of Reinganums
companies sample Size
Number of reporting of companies
companies in earnings within reporting within
the sample I month of the 1 month of the
by quarter quarters close quarters closeb
This technique was borrowed from Watts (1978). Reinganums weights on individual
securities are based upon betas estimated using 60 days of daily data over the period
immediately preceding the first three month holding period. The index is an equally wetghted
NYSE-AMEX market index.
Like Reinganum, we have calculated the results for those companies releasing earnings in the
second month after the close, but do not report them. The results are similar to those reported
here, as is the case m Reinganums study.
R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns 275
Like Reinganum, we compute betas based on the 60 trading days prior to the lirst holding
period over which performance is assessed using the CRSP NYSE-AMEX equally weighted
index. In calculating Scholes+Williams betas, 62 days of stock and market returns are required.
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) beta, which is obtained from the Scholes~Williams
calculations, is the OLS beta that we employ in our analysis of Reinganums work. This beta is
actually measured over days 2-61. while Reinganums would be measured over days 3~62. This
difference of one day should not affect the results.
The abnormal returns reported in table I are three month returns, starting at the end of
one month after the close of the quarter (+ I), two months after the close of the quarter ( + 2),
etc. Reinganum, in his table 2, reports mean differences m daily returns. We have converted his
overall mean returns for eight quarters to a quarterly basis by assuming 63 trading days per
quarter. They are, for starting periods + I through +4, 0.0176, 0.0100, 0.0258, and - 0.0036.
t-statistics are calculated as follows: let p. denote the average portfolio return difference for
n quarters for the returns shown in a given column of table 2. and S,: the %lmple variance of
return differences over the same n quarters. Then, the r-statistic is calculated a\ I ~ pnL2 S,. I-tnr
calculation parallels that of Reinganum and implicitly assumes that there 1s no serial correlation
in the return differences. r-statistics shown in table 3 are also calculated accordmg to this
procedure.
276 R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns
closely to the mean for Reinganums sample period of eight quarters (0.059
vs 0.056) for the first three month holding period (+ 1). And, interestingly, the
results over Reinganums sample period for the first holding period (+ 1) are
more significant (i.e., a t-value of 6.10) than the corresponding means for the
other subperiods or the overall period.
Table 2
Differences in three month returns between the high and low standardized unexpected earnings
portfolios of 20 stocks of identical beta risk for companies reporting earnings in the month
following the liscal quarter close.
Quarter +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Table 2 (continued)
+I +2 +3 +4 +5
Mean
1st 17 quarters 0.05345 0.0403 1 0.03599 0.04949 0.04472
Reinganums period 0.05568 0.02791 0.02 162 -0.00434 ~ 0.00390
Last 11 quarters 0.07029 0.09517 0.07384 0.06095 0.04735
All 36 quarters 0.05909 0.05432 0.04436 0.04046 0.03436
t-statistic
1st 17 quarters 2.92942 2.48438 I .8603 1 2.33054 2.21438
Reinganums period 6.10068 2.09372 0.80486 ~0.20210 -0.21032
Last 11 quarters 2.64233 3.42195 4.074 18 4.27755 3.13832
All 36 quarters 5.01311 4.37837 3.58234 3.21516 2.91011
In this table beta calculations and portfolio formation parallels that of Reinganum (1981) in
which OLS betas are calculated using daily data 60 days prior to the earnings announcement.
The + 1 etc. refers to taking a posrtion one month, two months, etc. after the fiscal quarter close
and holding for three months. The returns for each quarter are calculated on a three month
basis, regardless of whether the three-month period begins at the end of the + 1, +2, +3, +4,
or +5 month.
Insufficient data prohibited us from computmg returns in the last quarter for the +4 and + 5
starting positions.
Not significant at the 0.05 level.
The second observation to be made is that for each of the four holding
periods beginning two months after the close of the fiscal quarter (+2, + 3,
+ 4, and + 5), the results for the Reinganum period are decidely inferior to
the periods before or after his analysis. Compare to the overall results, the
Reinganum-period abnormal returns are about 50% less for the 2nd and 3rd
holding periods, and drop to about 0.0 for the 4th and 5th holding periods.
In fact, the only three returns in this table that are not significant, at the 0.05
level or better, are those for Reinganums period for the + 3, + 4, and + 5
starting times. Thus, Reinganum may have chosen for his analysis the one
subperiod out of almost an entire decade that would lead him to his
conclusion that SUE cannot discriminate among over and under performing
stocks. (However, it is important to note that we find significant abnormal
returns for Reinganums period for the first and second portfolio starting
times, + 1 and +2.) Also, the small size of his sample does not allow for as
much variance in SUE as does ours. On average, our stock portfolios should
include more companies with extreme SUES, and therefore would be more
likely to show superior abnormal performance.
The vast majority of the other returns in table 2 are clear evidence that
SUE has been an effective discriminator over a long period of time. Also note
that the very high abnormal returns in the last 11 quarters after Reinganums
278 R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns
period are the largest means in table 2. Not only have SUE effects persisted,
they seem to have become stronger.13
Overall, these results strongly indicate the presence of a SUE effect. SUE
does discriminate among over and under performing stocks, and subsequent
positive and negative abnormal returns continue for a considerable amount
of time after the close of the fiscal quarter. Testing the hypothesis that the
difference in the expected returns between the high and low 20 stock
portfolios should equal zero (because of the beta risk being constructed to
equal one), the return differences shown in table 2 are, in almost all cases,
significantly different from zero. Thus, contrary to Reinganums conclusion,
we find that abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) returns typically could have been
earned on the basis of properly indentifying firms standardized unexpected
earnings during the very long period of nine years analyzed in this study. It
is worthwhile to note from the data in table 2 that signlicant abnormal
returns could also have been earned during Reinganums period for the first
two portfolio formation dates (+ 1 and + 2).
laThis provides some indirect evidence on the possibility of a survivorship bias in the
selection of firms employed in the analysis. If such a bias exists, the least amount of bias should
exist near the end of the sample period since very few firms that existed near the end would
have been removed from the PDE tape. Given the fact that the most favorable results occur
near the end of the sample period, we do not feel that the survivorship bias presents a signiticant
problem.
R.J. Rendleman. Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns 219
Table 3
Mean values and f-statistics for differences between the returns of the 20 high and low
standardized unexpected earnings portfolios wtth alternative rusk adjustments.
+1 +2 +3 f4 +5
OLS beta?
Mean
1st 17 periods 0.05345 0.0403 I 0.03599 0.04949 0.04472
Reinganums periods 0.05568 0.0279 1 0.02162 - 0.00434 0.00390
Last 11periods 0.07029 0.095 17 0.07384 0.06095 0.04735
All 0.05909 0.05432 0.04436 0.04046 0.03436
r-statistic
1st 17 periods 2.92942 2.48438 I .8603 I 2.33054 2.21438
Reinganums periods 6.10068 2.09372 0.80486 -0.20210 0.21032
Last 11 periods 2.64233 3.42195 4.074 18 4.27755 3.13832
All 501311 4.37837 3.58234 3.21516 2.9101 I
Scholes- Williums betas
Mean
1st 17 periods 0.05529 0.03389 0.02875 0.04580 0.04568
Reinganums periods 0.05234 0.02355 0.01760 - 0.00762 0.00290
Last 11 periods 0.06892 0.09 120 0.06939 0.06199 0.048 13
All 0.05880 0.049 10 0.03869 0.03822 0.03528
f-statistic
1st 17 periods 2.83274 2.00533 1.41480 2.10248 2.26077
Reinganums periods 3.18797 1.82950 0.82263 - 0.34095 0.14300
Last 11 periods 2.56404 3.40749 3.86703 4.32643 3.18813
All 4.66862 3.95307 3.15928 2.95540 2.953 15
No risk adjustment
Mean
1st 17 periods 0.05940 0.04993 0.04267 0.05367 0.04 197
Reinganums periods 0.05469 0.02898 0.01723 - 0.00086 0.00156
Last 11 periods 0.06934 0.08995 0.07107 0.06300 0.05080
Ah 0.06 I39 0.05750 0.04569 0.04387 0.03526
r-statistic
1st 17 pertods 3.85911 3.55644 1.96148 2.3500 2.11942
Reinganums periods 4.24423 2.96254 1.00323 -0.04641 0.07999
Last 11 periods 2.49892 3.15201 3.53486 4.29123 3.61005
All 5.45542 4.98550 3.59622 3.36720 3.05836
Within the OLS and ScholessWilliams panels of the table, portfolios are constructed to have
a beta of 1.0. In the no risk adjustment panel, return differences are calculated as unweighted
differences without risk adjustment.
%sed in the Reinganum (1981) analysis.
Not significant at the 0.05 level.
280 R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns
starting points after the close of the quarter for assuming a portfolio position
(+ 1 through + 5).
The results of this analysis are striking. Most of the corresponding means
are quite close together. The c-statistics are almost all significant, with the
only nonsignificant numbers (with one exception) occuring for Reinganums
period in the + 3, + 4, and + 5 starting times.
Comparing the two methods for calculating betas, it can be seen that for
the various subperiods the abnormal returns using ScholessWilliams betas
are typically somewhat lower than those which employ OLS betas. The
differences arc not very pronounced, however, and for the entire 36 periods
there is little overall difference. Thus, the gains from using the more
sophisticated Scholes-Williams methodology would seem to be small in the
sense that the abnormal returns are not affected to any large extent.
The bottom two panels of table 3 show the results of making no risk
adjustments. It is not surprising that some of these means are slightly larger
than the corresponding means under the two forms of risk adjustment for
some of the subperiods and portfolio position starting points. However, what
is surprising is that the differences are again slight, and on an overall basis
there is very little difference between them and the corresponding returns
using OLS betas. On average, adjusting these portfolio returns for risk, using
the Watts-Reinganum weighting scheme, does not make any significant
difference. SUE clearly demonstrates an ability to discriminate among over
and under performing stocks, with or without risk adjustments.
The early papers showing the value of quarterly earnings in stock selection
techniques were criticized for failing to make explicit adjustments for risk.
Later papers, such as Latane and Jones (1979) demonstrated the stability of
the excess returns over different types of markets, suggesting the beta effect
was not an important part of the explanation of the SUE effect. These results
show the small differences that occur in risk adjusted and non-risk adjusted
analyses. We will use this finding as a justification for examining the exact
pattern of SUE effects over time without recourse to detailed adjustment for
the risk factor.
AER,, =$ ,$ ERj,,.
qJ
These average excess returns are averaged across all 36 quarters of the
sample period to produce an aggregate average excess return for day r,
AAER,=& c AER,,.
4 1
The aggregate average excess returns are then added from days 71 to TV to
produce a cumulative aggregate average excess return,
CAAER,,,,, = 2 AAER,.
AAERs. (We ignore all higher order serial correlation.) The variance of the
cumulative aggregate average excess return is calculated as follows:
where
AAER=; g AAER,,
c 11
Table 4
Analysis of cumulative excess returns and betas over 36 quarters, 1971.%1980.2.
_
SUE category
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
,Excess returns are calculated on a dally basis as the difference between an individual stocks
return and an equally weighted NYSE-AMEX index. Within each SUE category these excess
returns are averaged on a daily basis for each quarter of the analysis. The cumulative averages
of the 36 average quarterly excess returns are shown in the table by SUE category. The sample
Size ranges from a minimum 618 companies (1971.3) to a maximum of 1946 in 1980.1 (see table
1 for additIonal details on sample size). l-values are calculated via the procedure outlined by
Ruback (1982).
The average beta IS calculated as follows. For each quarter, average the returns within each
of the 10 SUE categories by day and regress this mean daily return against the corresponding
market return. This provides a beta for each quarter for each of the 10 SUE categories. These
betas are then averaged over the 36 quarters.
Not significant at the 0.05 level.
dThe standard deviation of 36 betas.
substantial effects. This is to be expected since these are the companies that
had very small, if any, unexpected earnings, either positive or negative.
Taking the two highest SUE categories (#9 and # lo), we can make the
following generalization: of the total response in stock returns over the
period extending 20 days before the announcement of earnings to 90 days
after the announcement, 31% occurred before the day of announcement, 18:);
on the day of announcement, and 51% after the day of announcement. For
the corresponding two lowest SUE categories ( # 1 and #2), the response
averaged: 40% prior to announcement, 154 on the day of announcement,
and 45% after the announcement date. These results are remarkably
consistent in suggesting that the market does not assimilate unexpectedly
favorable or unfavorable quarterly earnings information by the day of
284 R.J. Rendleman, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns
This analysis was repeated using Scholes-Williams betas, and the results were virtually
identical.
R.J. Rem&man, Jr. et al., Unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns 285
lOY9-1
SUE
category
C
U
M 6% -
U
L
A
T 4% -
V
E
,
A
V
E
R
A
G
E
E 1
X -2% 7
C
E
S
S
-4%
R
E
T
U -6% :
I
R
N
-8% -
- 10%
i---L-
-20 -10 0 IO 20 30 40 50 60 70 60 so
Fig. 1. Cumulative excess returns averaged over the 36 quarter period 1971. 31980.2 for 10
SUE categories ranging from the most negative SUE category (#l, SUES -4.0) to the most
positive SUE category (# 10, SUE > +4.0). The sample size ranges from a minimum of 618
companies (1971.3) to a maximum of 1496 in 1980.1 (see table 1 for additional details on sample
size). Day 0 on the horizontal axis is the announcement date of earnings.
period, there are still very significant abnormal returns for the + 1 and +2
portfolio position starting points.
We have also concluded that the typical SUE portfolio has a beta of
approximately 1.0, and that risk adjustment procedures are not the critical
issue here. One must look elsewhere for an explanation of these results.
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