EVANGELISTA v.

JARENCIO

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the
Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1,
1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with
the following functions and responsibilities:

To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.

To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and
gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully
amassed wealth ... .

To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the
acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of
an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued
to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL
AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a
certain investigation pending therein."

ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.
HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not
only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is
to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and
may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may
conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies
and make recommendations for actions.

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive
Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer
oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production
of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena
power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-
paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would
have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated
in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal
aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency
is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the
Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling
authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should
the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be .
Salazar v. Achacoso

Salazars properties in her residence and dance studio were seized by virtue of a search warrant
issued by the POEA.

Facts:

Petitioner (Hortencia Horty Salazar) was charged by a Rosalie Tesoro wth the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. According to Tesoro, after she surrendered her PECC Card to petitioner,
she promised her of booking in Japan. However, after 9 months, Tesoro was still in the Philippines
and was never able to travel to Japan, and that her PECC card was not released by Salazar.

Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent a telegram to petitioner. Respondent requested the
petitioner before him being a part of POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit. On the same day, having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, administrator Tomas
Achacoso issued a closure and seizure order, numbered 1205.

The Director of POEA Licensing and Regulation (Atty. Estelita Espiritu) issued an order designation
Atty. Marquez, Atty. Abara and Atty. Vistro as members of the team tasked to implement the Closure
and Seizure Order rendered by Achacoso. After proceeding to petitioners residence, the team,
assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen, went to Hannalie Dance Studio, which petitioner
operated.

Before entering Hannalie Dance Studio, the team served said order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. When required to show credentials, Salazar
was unable to produce any. The team confiscated assorted costumes when they chanced upon 12
talent performers practicing a dance number. The confiscation was duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Salazar.

Petitioner, through a letter to POEA, requested that the personal properties seized at her residence
be returned.

Issue: Whether the POEA validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of
the Labor Code.

Ruling:

Under the present Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. It
was declared that mayors may not exercise this power, neither by a mere prosecuting body. The
exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for purpose
of deportation.

Section 38(c), as amended by PD 1920 and 2018, bestowed to the Minister of Labor the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. More so, PD 1920
gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure power. That, the Minister of Labor and Employment
has the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if
after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. Meanwhile, PD 2018 bestowed
upon the Minister of Labor search and seizure powers. However, the decrees in question stood as
dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. Thuss, the Secretary of Labor, not being
a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Article 38(c) of the Labor Code is declared
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
United States vs Ang Tang Ho

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the
GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the
price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6thof August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot
be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and
the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take
the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in
all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis Alcuaz

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed
to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal
or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe
Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has
placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the
necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC
based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction
of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order
mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental
is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some
standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature
is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process
since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Isidro Cario vs The Commission on Human Rights

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided
to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from
work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three
others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor
General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the
case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cario.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases
such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary
of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared
that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on
the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
CABUNGCAL vs. LORENZO

G.R. No. 160367 December 18, 2009

The Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,issued a resolution declaring the reorganization of
alloffices of the municipal government. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan issued another resolution
approvingand adopting the proposed new staffing pattern of themunicipal government.Subsequently,
the Mayor Lorenzo issued amemorandum informing all employees of the municipalgovernment that,
pursuant to the reorganization, allpositions were deemed vacant and that all employeesmust file their
respective applications for the newlycreated positions. Otherwise, they would not beconsidered for
any of the newly created positions.Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners filed
with the CA a Petition for Prohibition andMandamus with application for issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. Theyprayed for the nullification of the resolutions.

ISSUES:

Whether the case falls under the exceptions to therule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD:

This does not fall under any of the exceptions. Thepetition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA
waspremature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of
only whenthere is no appeal or any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may behad only in cases of extreme necessity
where theordinary forms of procedure are powerless to affordrelief.The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remediesprovides that a party must exhaust all administrativeremedies to give the
administrative agency anopportunity to decide the matter and to preventunnecessary and premature
resort to the courts. This,however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legalquestion;

3. when the administrative action is patentlyillegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of theadministrative agency concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a departmentsecretary whose acts as an alter ego of thePresident bears
the implied and assumedapproval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrativeremedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of aclaim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land inland case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain,speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating theurgency of judicial intervention

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the
National Telecommunications Commission, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to
the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability
of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and
void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As
such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution
is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.25
This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicialx power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
LAGUNA VS MARAAN

LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEX E. MARAAN, Regional Director, Region IV,
Dept. of Labor and Employment (DOLE), ENRICO SAGMIT, Acting Deputy Sheriff, DOLE Region IV,
PEDRO IGNACIO, DIOMEDES CASTRO, FE ESPERANZA CANDILLA, RUBEN LAMINA, JR., JOEL
PERSIUNCULA, ALVINO PRUDENTE, JOEL RAYMUNDO, REGIE ROCERO, LINDA RODRIGUEZ, JOHN
SELUDO, ALBERTO REYES, and ANACLETA VALOIS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents filed with the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for underpayment of wages
and non-payment of other employee benefits against their employer, Laguna CATV.

Private respondents filed their separate complaints pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7730.

DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna CATV and found that the
latter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits.

Thereupon, DOLE Region IV requested Laguna CATV to correct its violations but the latter refused,
prompting the Regional Director to set the case for summary investigation.

Thereafter, he issued an Order directing Laguna CATV to pay the concerned employees the sum of
P261,009.19 representing their unpaid claims.

Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration.

In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims of its
employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff to collect
in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified in the writ or, in lieu thereof, to attach its goods and
chattels or those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino Bailon.

Laguna CATV and Dr. Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy and sale on
execution and garnishment of bank deposits.

Regional Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution, stating
that Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal because it did not comply with the mandatory
requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the monetary award of P261,009.19; and that the writ of
execution should be considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs motion for reconsideration.

Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the CA a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review.

Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be an exercise in
futility considering that the said appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be
disapproved.

The CA denied Laguna CATVs motion for extension and dismissing the case.
The Appellate Court found, among others, that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated July 22, 1999.

Hence, it filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.

Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court
of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.

The SC, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the courts judicial power can be sought.

The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself
correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if
afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.

Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative process by appealing the questioned
Orders to the Secretary of Labor.
Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio

GR 186652, October 6, 2010

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate
Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.

The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu
proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.

The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly
and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).

Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art.
VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to
decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.

Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these
tribunals.

Issue:

Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.

Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:
No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine
the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused.

No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for
review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
LASTIMOSO VS. ASAYO

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR
JOSE J. ASAYO

G.R. No. 154243 December 22, 2007

FACTS: Sometime in 1997, a certain Delia Buo (Buo) filed with the Office of the Inspector General
of the PNP an administrative complaint for abuse of authority/harassment against P/Senior Inspector
Jose J. Asayo. The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto
Asayo, one of the suspects in the shooting of Buo's son. The complaint was referred to the
Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, Asayo did not appear but filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had
jurisdiction over the case. On September 23, 1998, the Inspector General submitted a report to the
PNP Chief recommending the commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against Asayo. Upon
approval of said recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service
for summary hearing. Asayo was asked by the hearing officer if he wanted to cross-examine Buo
and her witnesses but he declined and instead agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings. On December 28, 1998, the hearing officer recommended that Asayo be dismissed from
police service for grave misconduct. On January 22, 1999, the PNP Chief, then Deputy Director
General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief's Decision but withdrew the same and
instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). The
RTC granted his petition but the CA nullified such decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Asayo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to the filing of case
in court.

HELD: No. Asayo rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the
administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of
exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by
respondent in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP
Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said
Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel 2012 31 issue being a purely legal
one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case.
NOTE: However, as to the question of whether the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to act on a private
citizen's complaint against respondent, the Court finds merit in petitioners' position. The PNP Chief
and regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of
the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss
PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and
regional directors.
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa
Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of Infanta inquired
about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also
disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per
examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was eventually revealed that
Nery Remolonas name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no.
061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of
65%.Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in
a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however,
informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to
Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and
that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600pesos each plus bonus of Nery
Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no
knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC
found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory
penalties. On Motion for Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new
trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense
which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty.

HELD:

Yes. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably
reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of
the service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal
for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a
government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if
said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his
duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of
the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
United Resident of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
LAND PROBLEMS

G.R. No. 135945 March 7, 2001

TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.

FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said
bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the
subject property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated
that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human
settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.

On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of
Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and
projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).

On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may
purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as
originator, on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.

Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional
sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the
balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final
payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition
order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the
name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity)
filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents were able to obtain a
temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.

The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA.
It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal
with the Court of Appeals.

The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City
Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and
reconstructed the demolished structures.

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the
City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent
COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer
for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?

RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasi-
judicial functions:

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation
of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three
(3) branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal
and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by
its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

FACTS:

Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision
from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his
rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to
develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to,
and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due
thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent
Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay
the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought
his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA.

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to
hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA.

The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to
hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy.

HELD:

NHA was upheld by the SC.

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically
because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition
that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree", states that National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions
of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of
the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are
indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the
rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements,
as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in
computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as
well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect
protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957
expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees'
respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for
lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval
of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the
Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere
administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how
the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein. The details
and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted
with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore,
Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of
the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did
not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The
Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be

inharmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
itsgeneral provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative
agencycannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS:The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
whichpenalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand
the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that
the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicialdepartments cannot
consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, thisappeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD:NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheriesexceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does
notexpressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.Had
the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect couldhave
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to anexecutive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize theissuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where thelegislature has
delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgaterules to carry out
an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,which have the effect
of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do notrepresent a valid precise of
the rule-making power.
US VS BARRIAS

In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules
to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it
should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.

Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said
Circular, only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the
information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine
not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which
provides:

Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the
penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at
that time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).

ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.

HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified
by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the
power to legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or
authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain;
only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can
not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The
Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized
in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court
determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
US VS. PANLILIO

Doctrine:

The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute
have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense
punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS:

In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the
dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat,
Pampanga; that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to
do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said
carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one
place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said
carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working
them.

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contends
that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act
No. 1760

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.
1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful
are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense
unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is
such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the
Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to
epidemic disease among animals.
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional
Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination
day including the examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of
all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that
the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making
the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last
three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the
review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-
would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or
personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed
out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed,
then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent
commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of
the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be
curtailed.
DARAB vs. Lubrica

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,
Petitioners,

vs.

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of the rights and interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY,
Respondents.

Facts: This case is an appeal for certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
granting the respondents petition for prohibition and the Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Federico Suntay filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation against the DAR, DAR
Region IV Director and the Land Bank of the Philipines for his land which was valuated by the land
Bank as P4,251,141.68, which, according to Suntay was unconscionably low and tantamount to
taking of land without due process of law.

The RARAD ruled in favor of Suntay and ordered that Land Bank pay the P157,541,951.30 as just
compensation. Consequently, Land Bank filed a petition to the RTC praying that just compensation be
declared at P4,251,141.68. The Court dismissed the petition for failure to pay the docket fees within
the reglementary period.

While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of
Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order declaring its Decision as final and executory after noting that
Land Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the
fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
The RARAD issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to
implement its Decision.

Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further
proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals granted Lubricas prayer for a temporary restraining order. This
notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, directing RARAD not to implement
its Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubricas
petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and
could file a comment only when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also
ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or
statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from
its power of direct and functional supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared
that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of
Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its
dismissal.

Issue: WON the DARAB has jurisdiction over DSCA No. 0252.

Held: This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction
over Land Banks petition for certiorari.

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a
matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or
by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in
some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.

The quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative
entity may exercise such powers depends largely, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.
There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR is in the nature
of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases
within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions
on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the
DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is
only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for
certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to
the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A
hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed
the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is
presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation
because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in
provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant
probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional
for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the
said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not,
then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection
clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the
option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law however, the legislature
did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives power to
grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the
issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation
law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as
well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the
State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the
Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law
(estoppel).

ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using
an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal
protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply
providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the
accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces
where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law
did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in
determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only creates a roving
commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide
for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is
not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the
president to commute penalties.
People vs Que Po Lay

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment,
pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of
the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to
be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission

FACTS

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the
interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe
pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed
out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were equally
blameworthy and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value
Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC
Order.

ISSUES

Whether or not:

(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;

(2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;

RULING

(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing
SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS.
However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to
all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted,
however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will
continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smarts SMS offerings,
including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication
could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules
and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent
advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTCs role will become more crucial
than at any time before.

(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC
to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS
should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court
realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory
regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in
an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that
the industry would prosper. It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted
deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping
rules that are implemented haphazardly.
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines

Facts: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created on 11 July 1974, by virtue of PD 505. On 23

December 1975, PD 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control,
regulation,and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85
2 on 21 March1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots andPilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring
pilots must be holders of pilotlicenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for 3 months
and in the Port of Manila for 4 months.It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance
that they are given permanent and regularappointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage
until they reach the age of 70, unless soonerremoved by reason of mental or physical unfitness by
the PPA General Manager. Harbor pilots in everyharbor district are further required to organize
themselves into pilot associations which would make availablesuch equipment as may be required by
the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilotassociations invested in floating,
communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed bythe PPA automatically
becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or
capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the associationconcerned of
the amount it paid to his predecessor.

Administrative Law, 2003 ( 8 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

Subsequently, then PPA GM Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92 7 on 15 July 1992, whose
avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users
through the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all
existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or
the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot
positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of 1 year from date of effectivity
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance. On 12 August 1992, the

United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas,
questioned PPA-AO 04-92 before the DOTC, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus
B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. Meanwhile, on 31 August 1992, the PPA
issued Memorandum Order 08-92 8 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the
reappointment of harbor pilots viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: safety record and physical/mental medical
exam report and, (2)

Criteria for Evaluation: promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines,
number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations
as harbor pilot, and age. The Associations reiterated their request for the suspension of the
implementation of PPA-AO 04-92, but
Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of
Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed the ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his
arguments before the DOTC. On 23 December 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold
in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over
harbor pilots, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the
ports and to improve the quality of port services. On 17 March 1993, the OP, through then Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the
restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that PPAAO 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for
all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing
Section.6 of PD No .857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of
pilots in any port district.

Consequently, the Associations filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the RTC Manila (Civil
Case 93-65673). On 6 September 1993, the trial court rendered judgment holding that the PPA,
DOTC, and OP have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a
capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including
all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders, declaring that PPA Administrative Order 04-92
and its implementing Circulars and Orders are null and void. From this decision, the PPA, DOTC and
OP elevated their case to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and affirmed the assailed decision of the court a quo
dated 6 September 1993, without pronouncement as to costs.

1. Pilotage a profession, a property right; Withdrawal or alteration of right requires due process

The Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore,
a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which
that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots.

Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed
by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO 04-92; the
Associations allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. Indeed, PPA-AO
04-92 was issued in stark disregard of the pilots rights against deprivation of property without due
process of law.

2. Due process clause of the Constitution; Conditions that concur to fall within aegis of provision

Administrative Law, 2003 ( 9 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the
Constitution, viz.: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
. . . In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there
is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.

3. Procedural due process

When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.

4. Essence of due process of law; Lumiqued v. Exevea

As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.

Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to

seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea). In the present
case, the

Associations questioned PPA-AO 04-92 no less than 4 times before the matter was finally elevated to
the Supreme Court.

5. Coast Guard represented in the PPA; No consultation required of Coast Guard as there is no naval
defense involved

The MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard (issuing the
licenses of pilots after administering the pilots examinations), was duly represented in the Board of
Directors of the PPA. There being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the
administrative order, the

Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.

6. Notice and hearing not required in agencys performance of executive or legislative functions

The fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

7. Licensure and license defined

Licensure is the granting of license especially to practice a profession. It is also the system of
granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards. A license is
a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which,
without such license, would be illegal.
8. Pilotage as profession practiced only by duly licensed individuals; Vested right

Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Before harbor
pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial
eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and
practice. The five government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which
he must work, train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after
which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For chief Mate and after which he
must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must
work as Captain of vessels for at least 2 years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally,
of course, that given for pilots. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows
them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years.

This is a vested right.

Administrative Law, 2003 ( 10 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

9. PPA-AO 04-92 unduly restrict right of pilots to enjoy their profession

Under the terms of PPA-AO 04-92, it is readily apparent that PPA-AO 04-92 unduly restricts the right
of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. Under the new issuance,
they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or
permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes
alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted
only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term renewal It is this pre-
evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm.
In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

10. PPA-AO 04-92 a surplusage, an unnecessary enactment; must be struck down

PPA-AO 04-92 and PPA-MO 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO 03-85, which is still operational.

PPA-AO 04-92 is a surplusage and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a

comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are
duplicated in PPA-AO

04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO
04-92 must be struck down.

11. PPA GM Dayan presumed to have acted in accordance with law The Associations insinuation that
then PPA GM Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may
have some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and
regulations. The trial courts finding of animosity between him and the former might likewise have a
grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between Associatons and Dayan cannot certainly
be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO 04-92. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of
professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher
administrative authoritie
DAGAN VS. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION

WILLIAM C. DAGAN, CARLOS H. REYES, NARCISO MORALES, BONIFACIO MANTILLA, CESAR

AZURIN, WEITONG LIM, MA. TERESA TRINIDAD, MA. CARMELITA FLORENTINO vs. PHILIPPINE
RACING COMMISSION (Philracom), MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. (MJCI), and PHILIPPINE RACING
CLUB, INC (PRCI) . G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009

PROCEDURE: This case began when the petitioners and racehorse owners refused to comply with the
directive issued by Philracom. They lodged a complaint before the Office of the President (OP), which
instructed Philacrom to investigate the matter. However, Philacrom failed to act upon the directive of
the OP. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for injuction with the application for the issuance of a
TRO.

The trial court found no valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of injunction. Petitioner's appealed to
the Court of Appeals, of which it confirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Aggrieved, petitioner's filed the instant certiorari petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents in compelling petitioner's to subject their racehorses to blood testing.

FACTS: Philracom issued a directive requiring MJCI and PRCI to come up with their Clubs House
Rule to address the Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their facilities of horses
infected it. Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 55 by the Department of
Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses
from any locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI).

Thus, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the
horses to blood sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determine if they are infected.
Subsequently, Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA.

Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses, whose owners refused
to comply were banned from the races, were removed from the actual day of race, prohibited from
renewing their licenses or evicted from their stables.

ISSUE: WON Philracom had unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in
issuing the directive for them to come up with club rules.

HELD: PETITION is DISMISSED. The court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom
in issuing the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracoms
directive.

Philracoms authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is
valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable.

in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It
is valid only if the law is complete in itself and fixes a standard to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected.

Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1 of said law.
Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the
conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction and safety of
race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.

Section 9 of the law fixes the standards and limitations to which Philracom must conform in the
performance of its functions. Its discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted
with EIA is aimed at preserving the security and integrity of horse races.

As to the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making powers to MJCI and PRCI, there is no
delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as
delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. PRCI and MJCI followed-up
when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to
blood testing. Compliance with the Philracoms directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI.

As proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority of Philracom but arises
from the franchise granted to them by Congress. As justified by PRCI, "obeying the terms of the
franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty."

While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philracoms directive, this
circumstance does not render the directive nor the guidelines void. The directives validity and
effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines.

The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute.The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for
monitoring and eradicating EIA are in accord with Philracoms mandate under the law to regulate the
conduct of horse racing in the country. They do not appear to be unreasonable or discriminatory. In
fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCIs premises underwent the same procedure. They are
reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished.