Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997)1
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel.
Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at
P41.58/share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the
declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which respondent
GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is
part of the national patrimony, petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls
under the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
WON selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered
part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is
self-executing which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The
Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
the foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award
to petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of
petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for the purchase of
the subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Tanada vs. Angara (G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997)2
FACTS:
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which resolved that the Senate concur, in the ratification by the President
of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. The instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods."
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a justiciable controversy?
2. WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene with
Sec.19,Art. 2 and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. 12 of the Philippine Constitution?
3. WON the provisions of WTO Unduly impair or interfere with the
exercise of judicial and legislative power by the court and congress
respectively?
1 sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an
A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
4. WON there is grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
1. Yes. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The court
however is limited to determine whether or not there had been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and shall not inquire upon
the wisdom of the President and Senate in ratifying the same.
2. No. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation. Furthermore, Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of
Economy While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
3. No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international
law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be
performed in good faith.
4. No. Grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the
part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition.
Wherefore, Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Domino vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999)3
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a
resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in
the list of voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least
one year immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present
petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes
can be proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs
disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and
not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases

another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion
cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list
of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in
the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
winning, no matter how slim. It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
Yrasuegui vs. PAL (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)5

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the FACTS:
decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
essential that there must be between the first and the second action inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
action. (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means ISSUE/S:
the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside 1. WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under the Labor
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with Code.
conduct indicative of such intention. 2. WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational disqualification defense.
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection clause guaranty
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully
RULING:
effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or
1. Yes. It would fall under Article 282 of the Labor Code. A reading of the
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the
which correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must
job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of
2. Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs may not be
obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin. However,
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate
if the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can
qualification for performing the job, the qualification is then considered
be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering
valid and referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the
Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be
Applying the Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy
deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the
is justified, the following must concur: (1) the employer must show that it
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the
issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
purpose.
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most important activity
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety
him.
goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors,
the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
Pamatong vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004)4
3. No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
FACTS:
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. 87 Put differently, the
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks
individuals. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of
equal protection guarantee.91
his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities
People vs. Siton6
for public office" grants a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
FACTS:
RULING:
In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, lucidly shows
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that
imposed by law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the respondents
Article II of the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally
(among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and
considered not self-executing.
soliciting male customer. Hence, respondents Evangeline Siton and
Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
202 (2) of the Revised Penal. In turn, the respondents filed separate
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of the
being vague and overbroad.
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
ISSUE/S:
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
1. WON the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
2. WON Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the
discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed,
thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially
in the case of candidates for national positions because the election
RULING:
process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
1 No. The trial court in its assailed ruling relied on the underlying
national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be
principles in Papachristou vs. City of Jacksonville case:
printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and
the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if

they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of
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Rights C. Due Process in General

[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law] Page 2
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
First, that the assailed ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by a
statute and;
Second, it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of
discriminatory law enforcement.
However, the aforementioned principles do not apply in the case at bar
since:
The first principle finds no application here because under our legal
system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
and;
Second, the fear exhibited by the respondents, that unfettered discretion
is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is
assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is
one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.
The requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police
or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the
search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2).
Furthermore, it may be note worthy that the Jacksonville ordinance was
declared unconstitutional for provisions that are not found in the
questioned Vagrancy law in the case at bar.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to
maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature
however, must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it
intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has
come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
2. No. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of
public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as
to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to
act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered
constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes
persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which
orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a
justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
DLSU vs. CA7
FACTS:
The private respondents were involved in mauling incidents that were a
result of a fraternity war. On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were
meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED
Order No. 4.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON private respondents accorded due process of law?
RULING:
1. Yes. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating
school discipline, "[t]here are minimum standards which must be met
before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are:
that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
In the case at bar, the Private respondents were duly informed in writing
of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board.
They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as
they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed
of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings
before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to
7 9
C. Due Process in General
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision
can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings
and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.
Romualdez vs. Comelec8
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez registered as new
voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, in spite of the fact that they
were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City. That being the case,
they are guilty of an election offense due to double registration under R.A.
8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registation Act of 1996.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioners are accorded due process of law
2. WON 45(j) of the Voters registration Act can be declared vague on the
ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Yes. The petitioners are accorded due process of law.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged
by private respondent (Section 261(y)(2) and (y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act) are entirely
different from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by
the COMELEC(.Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the
Voters Registration Act). The petitioners contentions are untenable.
The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to
support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189;
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim
that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are
entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before
the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears
to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-
Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC. Evidently, the
informations directed to be filed by the Comelec against petitioners, and
which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of
facts as originally alleged in the private respondents Complaint-Affidavit.
2. No. Section 45(j) of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be facially invalidated as it is
a criminal statute.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations
by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. On-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate as such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions
to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.
Garcillano vs. Committees9
FACTS:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of
the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in
G.R. No. 179275.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering
that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being
apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but
also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
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C. Due Process in General
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. However,
with respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates
internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of any amendment to the rules dispenses the
requirement of due publication of the rules of procedure in a legislative
inquiry.
RULING:
No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement under Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only
in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make
any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments
or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Furthermore, the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. The law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
Placido vs. NLRC10
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case aver that they were denied due process when
PLDT refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and
grant them a formal hearing in which they could be represented by
counsel of their choice.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given several
written invitations to submit themselves to PLDTs Investigation Unit to
explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A hearing, which
petitioners attended along with their union MKP representatives, was
conducted on June 25, 2001 during which the principal witnesses to the
incident were presented. Petitioners were thus afforded the opportunity to
confront those witnesses and present evidence in their behalf, but they
failed to do so.
Mendoza vs. Comelec11
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the
Province of Bulacan. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate
and assumed the office of Governor, while the respondent seasonably
filed an election protest with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC approved the parties formal offer of evidence and then
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
complied with the COMELECs order. The case was thereafter submitted
for resolution.
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C. Due Process in General
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes,
including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET).
ISSUE:
Whether there were proceedings within the SET premises, entitling the
petitioner to notice and participation, which were denied to him; in other
words, the issue is whether the petitioners right to due process has been
violated.
RULING:
No. The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC,
as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the
seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. These are
now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings to wit;
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a
party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of
due process, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay
requirements are applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These
standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial components of decision-making.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly
the facts and the law upon which it is based.
After consideration of the respondents Comments and the petitioners
petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET
("contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of
the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the
participation of the parties
What took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the
COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the
evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the
merits.
To conclude, the COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either
party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of
the provincial election contest.
Surigao Electric vs. ERC12
FACTS:
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that
the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier should be
deducted from the computation of the power cost upon ascertaining that
12
C. Due Process in General
Page 4
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) of SURNECO resulted to an
over-recovery amounting to PhP18,188,794.
ISSUE:
WON SURNECO was deprived of the opportunity to be heard in ordering
it to refund alleged over-recoveries arrived at by the ERC.
RULING:
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA
policies, which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a purely
cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the
electric cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate
and approve the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their
consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public
interest imbued in those rates.
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can
regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon
the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When
private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to
regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as
long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation.
We likewise differ from SURNECOs stance that it was denied due
process when the ERC issued its questioned Orders. Administrative due
process simply requires an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It means being
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose,
a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their
respective positions and to present evidence in support thereof.
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric
cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to substantiate their
PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other
required supporting documents and were allowed to submit them
accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and
to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In
addition, after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives
were allowed to file their respective motions for reconsideration. It cannot
claimed, therefore, that SURNECO was denied due process.
Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism13
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON petitioners possess locus standi
2. WON there is an actual case or controversy
3. WON RA9372 Regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
validity
RULING:
It must be noted that in constitutional limitations, the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
1. Petitioners lack locus standi
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it
must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners in this case have not presented any personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military;
13
C. Due Process in General
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While jurisprudence holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, this does not apply in
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation.
2. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
Herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of
RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they
seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
real and existing one.
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is; only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
Vagueness vs. Overbreadth:
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what
a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior,
even though some of it is protected.
Facial Challenge vs. As-applied Challenge:
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
3. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to
permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3
of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and
(3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
Hence petitions are dismissed.
Page 5
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Lejano vs. People14
FACTS:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused of the charges against them on
the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims,
asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; as it seriously misappreciated the facts;
and decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of
justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in
Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been
absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there
is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after
he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a
sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
A motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible but only for
exceptional and narrow grounds such as when the court that absolved
the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction,
or when a mistrial has occurred.
ISSUE:
WON the complainant was able to specify the violations of due process
or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly
committed.
RULING:
No. Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts
appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution
witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that
Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the
Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant
wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally
allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als
conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer
be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.
Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila15
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
Petitioners herein are operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila
which are directly affected by the said ordinance.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioners has legal standing
2. WON the petitioners have the requisite standing to plead for protection
of their patrons' equal protection rights.
3. WON the ordinance is unconstitutional
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioners in this case are owners of establishments offering
"wash-up" rates and their business is being unlawfully interfered with by
the Ordinance. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to
demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law
or action challenged to support party's participation in the case.
2. Yes. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial
system derived directly from the Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the
extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious
cause for a petitioner's standing. Nonetheless, the general rules on
14
C. Due Process in General
15
D. Due Process and Police Power
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the
doctrine of transcendental importance.
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as
an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate.
In Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have
suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete
interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a
close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."Herein, it is
clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by
the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of
the Ordinance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to
government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains
even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim
that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the
Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. It is thus recognized that the
petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
3. Yes. The said ordinance is unconstitutional.
3a. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a
day.
3b. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due
process. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural
due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process
refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property However, if due process were
confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities
are followed. Substantive due process then completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the
government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.
3c. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote
4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products,
to wit;
First, the rational basis examination - laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Second, the intermediate review - governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Third, applying strict scrutiny- the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem
that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act
upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that
would warrant the application of the most deferential standard the
rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the
petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these
customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political
consequence. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone.
Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people
reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
Page 6
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty
enjoyed by the people.
3d. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is
the curtailment of sexual behavior. Whether or not this depiction of a
mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate
sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which
is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount
other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for
more than twice a day. E.g. Entire families are known to choose pass the
time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes.
3e. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Based on the foregoing facts, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Office of the Solicitor vs. City of Manila16
FACTS:
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and
operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila. The
shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking
facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, they collect parking fees from the
persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of whether said
persons are mall patrons or not.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice
and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation on which the following
purpose is included: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent
practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees. The Committees
found that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to
the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal.
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information enjoining
respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking
fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under
Presidential Decree No. 1096.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compelling the respondent to provide parking spaces in
their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of
charge constitutes:
1. A lawful exercise of police power or
2. It is an unlawful taking of property without just Compensation?
RULING:
1. The Court finds that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the
owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to
prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
2. Yes. Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the
parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their
collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The
State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters
16
D. Due Process and Police Power
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give
the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they
wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of
the required parking facilities.
BSP vs ANTONIO-VALENZUELA17
ISSUE/S:
(1) Are banks entitled copies of ROE (report on examination) or audit
findings?
(2) Is failure to furnished copy/copies of ROE to a bank is a violation of
due process?
HELD:
1. No. There is no provision in the law, nor sections in the procedures
of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give the
(audited)banks the copies of ROEs.
2. No. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed upon a
bank by the BSP even without notice and hearing. This close now,
and hear later scheme is grounded on the practical and legal
considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the banks
assets and as a valid exercise of POLICE POWER to protect the
depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public.
ROXAS & CO vs DAMBA-NFSW18
FACTS:
Petitioner voluntarily offered to sell its Hacienda Palico to DAR pursuant
to CARL. Subsequently, it withdraw its offer believing said hacienda was
already converted as non-agricultural land, not covered by CARL, under
PP1520 declaring the municipalities of maragondon and ternate in cavite
province and the municipality of nasugbu as a TOURIST ZONE and for
OTHER PURPOSES.
HELD:
Hacienda Palico was not automatically converted as non-agricultural
land. Under the whereas clause of PP 1520, it merely recognizes the
potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared
as tourist zone clearly does not allocated reserve, or intend the entirety of
the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes.
CARL is both an exercise of police power and eminent domain. It
prescribes retention limits for landowners and it provides for the
compulsory acquisition of private agricultural lands. Objective: the
expropriation b4 us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found
and for whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is
intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels
of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner.
CHEVRON vs BCDA19
ISSUE/S:
1. Is the royalty charged by the BOD of the CDC(Clark Development
Dorporation) a tax imposition or a regulation police power?
2. Is royalty fee per liter unreasonable and grossly in excess of
regulation costs?
HELD:
1. Regulation-police power. The purpose is the determining factor. If it
is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even
though the measure results in some form of regulation. If it is
primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation-police power,
even though incidentally, revenue is generated. In the case, from the
declaration of policy, it can be gleaned that the policy is issued, first
and foremost, to ensure the safety, security and good condition of
the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ.
17
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due
Process and Police Power
18
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due
Process and Police Power
19
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due
Process and Police Power
Page 7
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
2. No. Fuel is highly combustible which, if left unchecked, poses a
serious threat to the life and property. The reasonable relation
between the fee imposed on a per liter basis and the regulation
sought to be obtained is that the higher the volume of fuel entering
the said economic zone, the greater the extent and the frequency of
supervision and inspection required to ensure safety, security, and
order within the zone.
ESPINA vs ZAMORA20
ISSUE:
Is RA 8762(Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2002) which allow foreign
nationals from engaging in the retail trade business under 4 categories,
unconstitutional(not a valid exercise of police power), because it runs
afoul of several provisions in the constitution(denial of Filipinos right to
property and due process)?
HELD:
No. The control and regulation of the trade in the interest of the public
welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the state. RA 8762,
merely lessens the restriction or restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinary lawful business.
Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail
business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors.
In summary
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the 4
categories;
Second, only nationals from, or judicial entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to
engage in ratial trade business; and
Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain
retailing activities outside their accredited stores thorugh the use of
mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-
door selling, restaurants and sari2 stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
SOLGEN VS AYALA21
FACTS:
The respondents, Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and
operate shopping malls while SM Prime constructs and leases building
structures.
The shopping malls that respondents operate have parking facilities in
which they collect parking fees from the persons making use of their
facilities.
In May 2000, a joint investigation conducted by the Senate Committees
on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights issued
Senate Committee Report No. 225 in which they find that the collection of
parking fees by herein respondents are contrary to the National Building
Code. The Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without
specifying whether it is free or not.
On 4 October 2000, the OSG, herein petitioner, filed a petition to the RTC
of Makati praying that the practice of respondents in charging parking
fees is violative of the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA denied the
petition and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of OSG is a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
HELD:
No. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection
of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not
20
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due
Process and Police Power
21
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due
Process and Eminent Domain
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties
for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive
intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they
are further prohibited from its use or even just recovering therefrom the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents
of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no
basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot
impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since
said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.
ORTEGA VS CITY OF CEBU22
FACTS:
The spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land. On
May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted City
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate
portion of such land, and appropriating for that purpose the amount of
P3,284,400.00. The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-
310, Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334.
Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent
Domain before the RTC against the Spouses Ortega. RTC then declared
that [Cebu City] "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the
instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon
payment of just compensation."
Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners, RTC
issued another order, ordering Cebu City to pay the spouses the sum of
P31,416,000.00 as just compensation for the expropriated land.
RTCs decision became final and executory after Cebu City failed to
perfect an appeal on time. RTC then issued another order stating that
Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment
of the subject lot is chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334 and is now
subject for execution or garnishment for it is no longer exempted from
execution.
Cebu City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of
Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by
the RTC as just compensation to be paid to the Spouses is way beyond
the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program.
The motion was denied by the RTC. Cebu Citys Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
By virtue of the said order, a Notice of Garnishment was served to
Philippine Postal Bank.
Cebu City then filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or
Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that the account mentioned in
Ordinance No. 1519 is not an existing bank account and the garnishment
of Cebu Citys bank account with Philippine Postal Bank is illegal,
because government funds and properties may not be seized under writ
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgement, on obvious
reason of public policy. RTC denied the said motion and likewise denied
its Motion for Reconsideration.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs denial of Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to
Modify Judgement and to be allowed to withdraw from the Expropriation
Proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu Citys
Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from
the Expropriation Proceedings.
2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank,
appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod,
can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot
covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.
HELD:
1. No. Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation speaks
of 2 stages:
a. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit.
b. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
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An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of
expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stagethe
determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of
expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the
petitioner to condemn the respondents properties. Because an order of
expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not
hinge on the payment of just compensation. After all, there would be no
point in determining just compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiffs
right to expropriate the property was not first clearly established.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court
fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As
applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of
the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal
even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative.7 In Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, we declared:
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela
Cruz and Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National
Railways, we emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the
ascertainment of just compensation as aided by the appointed
commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative,
the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation
cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted
to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial
right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.
2. No. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus
case against Cebu City in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod
to enact an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of the Spouses
Ortegas claim.
It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments,
based on obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
LBP VS RUFINO23
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of land.
By respondents claim, in 1989, they voluntarily offered the aforesaid
property to the government for CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare.
Acting thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a
Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996
declaring that out of the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares
was subject to immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40
based on the assessment of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP).
Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was
referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation. DARAB then sustained
LBPs valuation upon respondents failure to present any evidence to
warrant increase.
On February 23, 1998, respondents lodged with Sorsogon RTC a
complaint for determination of just compensation. Respondents
23
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
contended that LBPs valuation was not full and fair equivalent of the
property at the time of its taking.
LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP
coverage in 1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents
voluntary offer to sell; and that it determined the valuation thereof in
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1998 and pertinent DAR regulations.
The trial court appointed the parties respective nominated
commissioners to appraise the property.
Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo, LBPs nominee, appraised the property
based on, among other things, the applicable DAR issuances, average
gross production, and prevailing selling prices of the crops planted
thereon which included coconut, abaca, coffee, and rice. He arrived at a
valuation of P13,449,579.08.
Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., respondents
nominee, used the market data approach which relies primarily on sales
and listings of comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding the
secondary crops planted thereon, he valued the property at P29,925,725.
The trial court then found the market data approach to be more realistic
and consistent with law and jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent
of the property. RTC then denied LBPs Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon appeal, CA sustained RTCs decision.
LBP contends that its determination should be given weight since its
valuation of the property was based on the factors mentioned in RA 6657
and the formula prescribed by DAR; and the taking of private property for
agrarian reform is not a traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain as it also involves the exercise of police power, hence, part of the
loss is not compensable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the market data approach should govern in the valuation
of the property.
HELD:
No. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657. These factors
have been translated into a basic formula in [DAO 6-92], as amended by
[DAO 11-94], issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry
out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657. While the determination of just
compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such
discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the
RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations.
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court,
adopting the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied,
merely put premium on the location of the property and the crops planted
thereon which are not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA
6657. And the trial court did not apply the formula provided in DAR AO 6-
92, as amended. This is a clear departure from the settled doctrine
regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR
issuances implementing it.
LBP VS JOCSON24
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of two parcels of tenanted rice
land located at Negros Occidental. The property was placed under the
coverage of the governments Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued the
compensation therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the
formula prescribed in PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6%
annual interest increment due on the property per DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, series of 1994.
Finding the DARs offer of compensation for the property to be grossly
inadequate, respondent filed a complaint before the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), praying that petitioner and DAR be
ordered to compute the just compensation for the property in accordance
with the guidelines laid down in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998.
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the
property was acquired by the government under its OLT program and
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their valuation thereof constituted just compensation, having been made
pursuant to the guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
The RTC, after noting the report of the Commissioners appointed, fixed
the just compensation at P2,564,403.58.
Petitioner filed a MR of the SAC decision which was denied.
Upon appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or
RA No. 6657, as claimed by respondent, should govern in determining
the value of the property.
HELD:
RA No 6657 should govern in determining the value of the property. Citing
the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs Chico, the Court declared in
no uncertain terms that RA No. 6657 is the relevant law in determining
just compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court
found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the
value of the property at the time of payment.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases
involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228
where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in
the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just
compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on
just compensation control.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function, and the Court does not find the SAC to have acted
capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P93,657.00 per hectare as
the said amount does not appear to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise
unjustified. For the Court notes that the SAC properly took into account
various factors such as the nature of the land, when it is irrigated, the
average harvests per hectare (expressed as AGP based on three normal
crop years) at 117.73 cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation
applied by the DAR.
EUSEBIO VS LUIS25
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land which was
taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and was used as a
municipal road.
On February 1, 1983, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of
land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land
only at P150/sqm. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents
requested the Appraisal Commiitte to consider P2,000/sqm as the value
of their land.
Respondents counsel sent a letter to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the
amount of P5,000.00/sqm as just compensation for respondents property.
In his reply, Mayor Eusebio said that the City of Pasig cannot pay them
more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a complaint before the RTC
praying that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable
rental for 16 years of use, or in the event said property can no longer be
returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not property taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceeding required by law in the taking of private property for public use
can be regained.
HELD:
Citing the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, the
Court emphasized that where private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either
through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe. The Court went on to remind
government agencies not to exercise the power of eminent domain with
wanton disregard for property rights as Section 9, Article III of the
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
In Forform Development Corporation vs Philippine National Railways, the
court declared that recovery of possession of the property by the
landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and,
more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case
for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to
the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
It is settled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot. Herein
respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long
period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990s).
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is
that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the
trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling
in National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz that trial with the aid of
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all. It was also emphasized therein that
although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the
commissioners findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the
trial courts own estimation of the propertys value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted
to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it
is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit
of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
In this case, the trial court should have fixed just compensation for the
property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing
on record showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court,
therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land on
the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city
government only sometime in the year 1994.
City of Iloilo vs. Contreras and Javellana (G.R. No. 168967)26
Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private
respondent Elpidio T. Javellana and Southern Negros Development Bank,
the latter as mortgagee which sought to expropriate two parcels of land
registered in Javellanas name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High
School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax
purposes to have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value
of P43,560.00. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of
his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter. Petitioner was
able to take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle
of 1985. Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as
well as interest. Private respondent alleged that since he had not been
compensated for the Subject Property, petitioners possession was illegal,
and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. Private
respondent could only demand for the payment of just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the fair market
value of a property at the time of the filing of complaint.
Held:
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of filing
of the complaint. The reckoning date should be in 2004 because of the
clear injustice to the private respondent who all these years has been
deprived of the beneficial use of his properties. City of Iloilo is held liable for
damages for taking private respondents property without payment of just
compensation.
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RP vs. MANGOTARA27
FACTS:
Dona Demetria owns two parcels of land and has titles to prove
ownership. 83 years later authenticity of said ownership was still in doubt
and the government filed a case of expropriation against occupants of the
land (not really the owners, just renters). The occupants questioned the
expropriation case contending that expropriation cases can only be filed
against owners, not mere occupants, of the land. The government also
filed a case of Reversion against Dona Demetrias heirs contending two
parcels of land were fraudulently acquired. The owners of the land
questioned the case for Reversion contending that, since they filed a
case for Reconstitution of Titles in 1914 and they still have said titles at
present, the government has no right to the land.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON owners of parcels of land are indispensable parties to an
expropriation proceeding? NO
2. WON the government erred in filing both a case for expropriation
and a case for Reversion against the occupants and the owners of
the land? NO
3. WON, in filing the case for Reversion, the government is barred by
res judicata and prescription? NO
HELD:
1. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons,
owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When property is
taken by eminent domain, the owner is not an indispensable party to
the proceeding.
2. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted
both expropriation/reversion proceedings for the same parcels of
land. Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows filing of
expropriation even when the title to any property sought to be
condemned appears to be the Republic, although occupied by
private individuals.
3. (a prior case filed by an heir asking for a Reconstitution of titles was
granted and said titles are still with said heir up to the time of the
filing of the case for Reversion. They have titles to prove
ownership. However, the 1914 case for Reconstitution of Title never
delved into the issue of ownership, only reconstitution of title and it
turns out said two lands were questionably acquired by Dona
Demetria. Government, then, still has the right to impugn ownership
claimed by Demetria and her heirs)
Elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the
State. The indefeasibility of a Title over land previously public is not
a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title
has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to
determine w/n fraud had been committed in securing such title in
order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
government.
Republic vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. 185091)28
Facts:
PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas
since 1957 for its school. However some portions of the property were
registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza. The
Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City
Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over
the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan.
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought
permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never
relinquished their right to it.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the
subject property that it had used for a public school.
Held:
The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. It may be assumed that
the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot
about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to
possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it
upon payment of just compensation. Where the owner agrees voluntarily
to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby
waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding
covering such property. As to the time when just compensation should be
fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of
possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is
the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
LBP vs. Livioco (G.R. No. 170685)29
Facts:
Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a
total of P9, 189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form submitted
to the DAR indicated that the said property is adjacent to residential
subdivisions and to an international paper mill. LBP set the price at P3.21
per square meter. Liviocos request for a reevaluation of the compensation on
the ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it was first offered
for sale was denied by the reason that there was already a perfected sale.
Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation against respondents maintaining that the location of his
property has become predominantly residential hence he should be paid
his propertys value as such.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for respondents property was
determined in accordance with law.
Held:
In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the
propertys character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential
uses. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time
he offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. The coverage of RA 6657 only extends
to agricultural lands; respondents property should be conclusively treated
as an agricultural land and valued as such. LBPs valuation is not in
accordance with Section 17 of R.A. 6675. It is reminded to adhere strictly
to the doctrine that just compensation must be valued at the time of
taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to
the Republic. Valuation of property must be based on the values
prevalent in 1994 for agricultural lands.
APO Fruits Corp. vs. LBP (G.R. No. 164195)30
Facts:
AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation
of their properties from the DAR-PARO. HPI and AFC rejected the
valuations of DAR-PARO for being very low. DAR requested the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26, 409,549.86 in AFCs bank
account and P45, 481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts the
petitioners then withdrew. AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for
determination of just compensation with the DARAB which the latter
failed to act upon thus forcing AFC and HPI to file separate complaints for
determination of just compensation. The RTC fixed the just compensation
for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of land at P1, 383,179,000.00,
with interest on this amount at the prevailing market interest rates,
computed from the taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until
fully paid, minus the amounts the petitioners already received under the
initial valuation.
Issue:
Whether or not just compensation was given to AFC and HPI.
Held:
The 5% initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners
landholdings were taken, although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners,
could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values at the
time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit could not be said to be
substantial even from the original LBP valuation of P251,379,103.90.
Deposits were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the potential
income the landholdings could have earned for them if no immediate
taking had taken place. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
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be considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the property
owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or
income. Petitioners were made to wait for more than a decade after the
taking of their property before they actually received the full amount of the
principal of the just compensation due them. When the LBP took the
petitioners landholdings without the corresponding full payment, it
became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would
have earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners.
Spouses Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty (G.R. No. 189239)31
Facts:
On June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation proceedings
covering the lots owned by respondents before the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing
project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. No
payment had been made to respondents for the lots therefore they still
maintain ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not there was just compensation.
Held:
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates
private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A
socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in
furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice. the mere
issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only
the first stage in expropriation. It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation. To effectuate the
transfer of ownership, it is necessary to pay the property owners the final
just compensation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had
been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the
lots.
Dumlao vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245)32
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the
equal protection and due process rights.
Held:
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification
based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case,
employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the
latter are not.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What
is proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
There is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to
run for office because there is the need for new blood to assume
relevance. When an official has retired he has already declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid.
Quinto vs. COMELEC (G. R. No. 189698)33
Facts:
31
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due
Process and Eminent Domain
32
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection, 2. Political Equality
33
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection, 2. Political Equality
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are not deemed resigned
upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, however, appointive officials
are considered deemed resigned upon filing of the COCs.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is
violative of the equal protection clause.
Held:
2009 Decision
Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned upon
filing of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants,
specifically elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the first class
(appointive officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classification,
the Court finds that treatment of persons holding appointive officers as
opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
law (Requisite No. 2). There is no valid justification to treat appointive
officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of law.
2010 Decision
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is not violative of the
equal protection clause.
There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are elected by his
constituents, if they are deemed resigned, the constituents will be
affected. On the other hand, in the case of appointive officials, they do not
have ordinary succession, thus, there will be vacancy during resignation.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not
merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public
service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC (GR No. 190582)34
Facts:
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.
LGBT tolerates immorality, sexual immorality and will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith.
Issue:
Whether or not denying the application of Ang Ladlad is violative of the equal
protection clause.
Held:
Yes. COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification
not justified by the circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC,
the majority of Filipinos considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable. Such reason is sufficient to disqualify the petitioner.
Homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of equal
protection clause. Moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy the rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. LGBT has the same interest in
participating in the party-list system. Laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs.
Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)35
Facts:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup dtat in relation to the Oakwood
Incident. In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-
year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks
the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is
still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was
already conviction. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Petitioner
also illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral
turpitude, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."
Issue:
34
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection, 2. Political Equality
35
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection
Page 12
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to attend the Senate sessions.
Held:
No. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. The Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.
ABAKADA v. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715)36
Facts:
Petit ioners are cha llenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9335, a tax
reform legislation to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC . They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercena ri es
and boun ty hun ters" as they wi ll do their best onl y
in c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f s u c h r e w a r d s . T h u s , t h e s y s t e m o
f rewards and incentives invites corrup tion and
undermine s the con stitutionall y manda ted du ty o f these
o fficial s and employees.
Issue:
Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of BIR and BOC is violative of
the equal protection clause.
Held:
N o . The classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 does not violate the equal protection clause. The subject
of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. The law concerns only the BIR and
the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC
are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of
its great inherent functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Soriano v. Laguardia (G.R. No. 164785)37
Facts:
The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive suspension to Sorianos And
Dating Daan TV program for defamatory utterances against an INC
minister. Soriano was later imposed with a three-month suspension from
his TV program
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension order by the MTRCB denied
him his right to the equal protection clause.
Held:
Petitioner next faults MTRCBs preventive suspension order which made
him unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection clause
demands that "all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred
and liabilities imposed." It guards against undue favor and individual
privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under
the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who,
for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For
36
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection
37
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs,
use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the
MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive
suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is
unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the
equal protection guarantee.
League of Cities vs. COMELEC (GR No. 176951)38
The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001,
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20million to P100million. 16 municipalities filed cityhood bills
containing a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100million income requirement of R.A. 9009. The cityhood bills were
approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed
into law without the Presidents signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the
conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
HELD:
2008 Ruling
Cityhood laws are violative of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. 9009, does not contain
any exemption to theP100 million annual income requirement. Even if the
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely
states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no
classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
In the 11th Congress, the exemption which is based solely on the fact that
the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills that were pending when RA 9009
was enacted is not a valid classification between those entitled and those
not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. The
classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which
is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is
to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
2009 Ruling
Petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by
virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA
of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the
conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it
within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. The favorable treatment
accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on
substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected
only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the
stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially
different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. The exemption of
respondent LGUs/municipalities from the P100M income requirement
was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the
amendatory RA 9009 and also to insure that fairness and justice would
be accorded respondent LGUs making the classification is also germane
to the purpose of the law. The non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not
limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment because it is intended to apply for all time. The uniform
exemption clause would apply to all municipalities that had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of R.A. 9009 and were compliant with
the LGC of 1991.
2010 Ruling
2008 ruling is reinstated. No substantial distinction between municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did
not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income requirement. Pendency of a
38
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection
Page 13
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific
condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009therefore violating
the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only (pendency of the cityhood bills adverted to can no longer
be repeated). Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates
the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
2011 Ruling
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the
equal protection clause. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009
was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country
will be a country of cities and without municipalities. Substantial
distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondents to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of the respondents
to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the
LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly,
the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th
Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of
PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
Chamber of Real vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 160756)39
Facts:
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. is
questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act 8424
and the revenue regulations issued by the BIR to implement said
provision and those involving creditable withholding taxes. Imposition of
minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable
withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary
assets. CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises.
Issue:
Whether or not the revenue regulations are violative of the equal
protection clause.
Held:
The equal protection clause under the Constitution as applied in this case
means that all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.
It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes
of taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The
real estate industry is a class and can be validly treated differently from
other business enterprises.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. No. 192935)40
Facts:
EO No. 1 was issued by President Aquino to investigate reported cases
of graft and corruption of previous administration. The petitioners assail
EO No. 1 is violative of the constitutional safeguard because it does not
apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the
PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." To be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
Issue:
Whether or not the Truth Commission is violative of the equal protection
clause.
Held:
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The previous administration was picked out was deliberate and
39
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
40
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at
least three times in the assailed executive order. The Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Executive Order No. 1 suffers
from arbitrary classification.
In Re: Morales (A.M. No. .M. No. P-08-2519)41
Facts:
Atty. Morales has been alleged of consuming his working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against
employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. A
spot investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four
NBI agents, a crime photographer and a support staff in the office of Atty.
Morales. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty.
Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive which were
pleadings not related to his work. Atty. Morales's computer was seized
and taken to the custody of the OCA.
Issue:
Whether or not the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal computer
are admissible in the cases against him.
Held:
Atty. Morales argues that the pleadings were acquired from his personal
computer without any valid search and seizure order and without his
consent, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous
tree as it violated his right to privacy. Consent must be voluntary in order
to validate an otherwise illegal search. To constitute a valid consent or
waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must
be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
There is no showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to
relinquish his right. He may have agreed to the opening of his personal
computer and the printing of files in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his
staff and some NBI agents during the spot investigation, it is also of
record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against
said persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically
invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer
against him for it violated his constitutional right. The case has been
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
People vs. Nunez (G.R. No. 177148)42
Facts:
Laguna Police Detectives and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the
house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug possession. Police
officers found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised
burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet
containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant was invalid for failing to state the exact
address to be searched.
Held:
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any
other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
impliedly. This right has been deemed waived by Nunez for failing to raise
any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained during trial.
DEL ROSARIO vs. DONATO, SR. (G.R. No. 180595, 5-MAR-2010)43
HELD:
A judicially ordered search warrant that fails to yield the described illicit
article does not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by
fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the
search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully
obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While in a motion to
dismiss assumes as true the fact alleged in the complaint, such
41
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
42
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
43
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
Page 14
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
admission does not extend to conclusions of law. Statements of mere
conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground
of failure to state a cause of action.
The allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a
malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice
and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are
mere conclusions of law.
The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide
for the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have
improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the
Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances
warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an
improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their
complaint, as worded, failed to state a proper cause of action.
Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents
wrongfully included him as respondent in their application for a search
warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor
resided in it. But the rules do not require respondents in search warrant
proceedings to be residents of the premises to be searched. If this were
the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other
peoples residence for storing such articles to avoid being raided and
searched.
PEOPLE vs. TUAN (G.R. No. 176066, 11-AUG-2010)44
HELD:
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses
as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
In People vs. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it
generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. It ought to
be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he
relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be
issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and
that the items will be found in the place to be searched. A magistrates
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the
Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located
at the stated address, which was accused-appellants residence,
consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL (G.R. No. 171980, 6-OCT-2010)45
44
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
45
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
HELD:
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known
to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.
TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE (G.R. NO. 174570, 15-DEC-2010)46
HELD:
Even if an information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the
same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner
cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary
to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in
any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants
were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an
application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or
her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of
Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.
TY vs. DE JAMIL (G.R. No. 182147, 15-DEC-2010)47
HELD:
For one, while it is the consistent principle in this jurisdiction that the
determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the
case; such determination is subject to judicial review where it is
established that grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination.
For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice is an alter
ego of the President who may opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her
power of review over the formers determination in criminal investigation
cases. As aptly noted by Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable
cause by the Secretary of Justice is, under the doctrine of qualified
political agency, presumably that of the Chief Executive unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter.
Chan v. Secretary of Justice delineated the proper remedy from the
determination of the Secretary of Justice. Therein, the Court, after
expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of the
existence of probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the
part of the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice, however,
concluded, citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez and Preferred Home Specialties,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice may directly resort to judicial review on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, thus:
46
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
47
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1.
Requirements for Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure
Page 15
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the allegation
that he acted with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is
available to the aggrieved party.
As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were
indeed owned by customers, such fact does not authorize Omni to refill
these branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from the brand
owners Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total. In Yao, Sr. v. People, a case
involving criminal infringement of property rights under Sec. 155 of RA
8293, in affirming the courts a quos determination of the presence of
probable cause, this Court held that from Sec. 155.1of RA 8293 can be
gleaned that mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods
or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception
among the buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark
infringement. The Court affirmed the presence of infringement involving
the unauthorized sale of Gasul and Shellane LPG cylinders and
the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas Corporation as
duly attested to and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted the
surveillance and test-buys.
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded
LPG cylinders even if owned by its customers but without authority from
brand owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable violation of
BP 33, as amended. As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People,
only the duly authorized dealers and refillers ofShellane, Petron
Gasul and, by extension, Total may refill these branded LPG
cylinders. Our laws sought to deter the pernicious practices of
unscrupulous businessmen.
The issue of ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders is irrelevant
and hence need no belaboring. BP 33, as amended, does not require
ownership of the branded LPG cylinders as a condition sine qua non for
the commission of offenses involving petroleum and petroleum
products. Verily, the offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without
the written consent of the brand owner constitutes the offense regardless
of the buyer or possessor of the branded LPG cylinder.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized. Petitioners cannot deny that the seized
LPG cylinders were in the possession of Omni, found as they were inside
the Omni compound.
In fine, we also note that among those seized by the NBI are 16 LPG
cylinders bearing the embossed brand names
of Shellane, Gasul and Totalgaz but were marked as Omnigas. Evidently,
this pernicious practice of tampering or changing the appearance of a
branded LPG cylinder to look like another brand violates the brand
owners property rights as infringement under Sec. 155.1 of RA
8293. Moreover, tampering of LPG cylinders is a mode of perpetrating
the criminal offenses under BP 33, as amended, and clearly enunciated
under DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 which provided penalties on a per
cylinder basis for each violation.
Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of evidence
required to support a finding of probable cause, we agree with the
appellate court and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which
conducted the preliminary investigation, that there exists probable cause
for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as
amended. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. After all, probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon
reasonable beliefprobable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction.
ANIAG vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 104961, 7-OCT-1994)48
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Gun Ban, the Sergeant-at-Arms wrote to petitioner,
requesting the return of the two firearms issued to him. Thereafter,
petitioner instructed his driver to pick the firearms from petitioners house
and return them to Congress. Upon heading to the Congress, the driver
was apprehended at a checkpoint. The car was searched and the gun
was found neatly packed in their cases.
48
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of
Moving Vehicles
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
ISSUE:
Whether ANIAG can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two
firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the
warrantless search of his car. NO.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search. According to him, without warrant and without
informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his
car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate
reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped
in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that
yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2
and 3, par. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain
view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints
which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that
the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search.
The records do not show that the manner by which the package was
bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no
mention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or
unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and
searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual
observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well
as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of
probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the
facts of each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search
in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee.
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by
police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters.
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20)
meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were
impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier,
was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that
could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such
justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner
and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the
policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security
of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as
evidence in any proceeding.
EPIE vs. ULAT-MARREDO (G.R. No. 148117, 22-MAR-2007)49
FACTS:
Upon receiving a call from an informant that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB
117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber, the
PNP swiftly established a checkpoint. As the jeepney was spotted, the
PNP flagged it down but the jeepney did not stop. Hence, they chased
the jeepney loaded with vegetables, beneath it are the pine lumbers. Pine
lumbers were also carried without any valid permit to do so.
ISSUE:
49
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of
Moving Vehicles
Page 16
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the
subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be
stopped and searched without warrant. YES.
HELD:
YES. Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained
in violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through
with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes
derogation of a constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v.
Sarap, we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be
conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only
requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable
cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, we
ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based
on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or
fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies
according to the facts of each case.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential
informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate
No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok,
Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP
roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the
jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the
vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police
to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the
vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine
lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to
cut and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after
noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police
officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding
with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable
belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said
vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects
which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to
the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that
respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless search
is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners.
PEOPLE vs. TUAZON (G.R. No. 175783, 3-SEPT-2007)50
FACTS:
Upon receiving through phone call a confidential information that a
Gemini car bearing plate no. PFC 411 would deliver an unspecified
amount of shabu in Mariville Subd., Antipolo City, the PNP then
dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance.
Upon arriving to the place stated, they saw the Gemini car and flagged it
down, 5 sachets of shabu were then found on the drivers seat, 2 more
were also found in appellants pocket when he was frisked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest. YES.
HELD:
YES. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the
performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, this Court had the occasion to
elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving
vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search
on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
50
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of
Moving Vehicles
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of
a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it
comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled
discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so
would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and
expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount
to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the
exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such
arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the
possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that
probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a
vehicle.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the term "probable cause" was explained
to mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but
is resolved according to the facts of the case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the
warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential
informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at
Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a
team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information
provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini
car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu.
When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist.
Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said
firearm which all the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After he
was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance. These circumstances,
taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into
evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the
evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained through
a warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on
the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
by the police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.
PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS (G.R. No. 188611, 16-JUN-2010)51
FACTS:
The O.K. bag that was described to have in it the marijuana as reported
by a confidential informant was found by the policeman. He then asked
the other passengers in the jeepney who owns the bag, but nobody knew.
Meanwhile, as the jeepney reached its destination, the bag was carried
by accused-appellant, hence, the police caught them up and introduced
himself as a policeman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was probable cause to warrant the warrantless
arrest. YES.
HELD:
YES. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Bagista, the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
51
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of
Moving Vehicles
Page 17
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving
vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on
the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as
exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the
officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so
because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause
must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be
admitted in evidence against the person arrested.
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It
refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the
place to be searched.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search
on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be
obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the
search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this
case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs
was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act
fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence
in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant.
Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same
left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before
appellants arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to
be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint
around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005,
PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence
Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc
had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest.
Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of
Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search
is also valid.
PEOPLE vs. AGULAY (G.R. No. 181747, 26-SEPT-2008)52
FACTS:
A certain informant went to the police station to report about a certain
Sing who had been selling shabu. A police entrapment team was then
formed. Upon entrapment, the informant pointed the target pusher to
poseur-buyer. Poseur-buyer was then introduced to Sing, bought shabu,
made the signal, then the team rushed to the crime, Sing was then
frisked, and 2 sachets of shabu were found.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. YES.
HELD:
YES. It is a well-established rule that an arrest made after
an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest, in line with the provisions of Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense.[16] If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.[17]
There are eight (8) instances when a warrantless search and seizure is
valid, to wit:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;
(3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of
immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving
vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
plain view; (7) searches of buildings and premises to
enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop
and frisk operations.
Considering that the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is beyond
question, the subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless search and
seizure, were permissible. The search, clearly being incident to a lawful
arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. Thus, contrary to accused-
appellant's contention, the contraband seized from him, having been
obtained as a result of the buy-bust operation to which the defense failed
to impute any irregularity, was correctly admitted in evidence.
On this premise, this Court has laid down the objective test in
scrutinizing buy-bust operations. In People v. Doria,[31] we said:
52
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search
Incident to a Valid Arrest
Page 18
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust
operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and
the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by
which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether
to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. x x
x.
CHING vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 177237, 17-OCT-2008)53
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner was illegal. NO.
2) Whether or not the search conducted on the premised is illegal. NO.
3) Whether or not the buy-bust operation against the petitioner was a
sham. NO.
HELD:
1) NO. According to the records, the entrapment operation started
when Police Chief Suan received information from an informant that
the latter was arranging a drug deal with Ching. Since the
transaction was to be carried out almost immediately, Police Chief
Suan no longer required the conduct of a surveillance operation to
verify the information. Police Chief Suan lost no time in briefing his
men. He then assembled a team to apprehend Ching in the
arranged drug deal. He designated SPO1 Cadoy to act as the
poseur-buyer and gave him the marked money to be used in the
transaction. Inspector Arsenal was also tasked to lead the group in
the target area. Police Chief Suan was monitoring his men nearby
the area and communicated to them through a radio. Although he
did not witness the actual sale, he was able to recount the incidents
prior and immediately after the buy-bust operations.
2) NO. This Court observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their
prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or
not, in private as well as in public places, even in the
daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring,
dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what
matters is not the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of
agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the
prohibited drugs.
3) NO. The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does
not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid
warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court 47 which states:
SEC. 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Having established that the buy-bust operation is factual and
legitimate, the subsequent warrantless arrest of Ching and as well
as the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs was permissible, thus:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest
effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution was able to establish the abovementioned rule.
PEOPLE vs. RACHO (G.R. No. L-186529, 3-AUG-2010)54
53
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search
Incident to a Valid Arrest
54
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search
Incident to a Valid Arrest
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search, which yielded the alleged contraband, was
lawful
HELD:
NO. The showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design is
required. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of
the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was
waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to
suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant
would not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated.
PEOPLE vs. ARANETA (G.R. No. 191064, 20-OCT-2010)55
HELD:
The objective test in buy-bust operation was overcome. We therefore
stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that
the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and
adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer,
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must
be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the
conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the
accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming
evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity,
then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far
as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.[6] [Emphasis supplied]
Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that
the members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular
manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith
and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search
warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust
operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely
legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot
because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug
pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and
means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.
ABENES vs. CA (G.R. No. 156320, 14-FEB-2007)56
HELD:
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in
plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his
shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
55
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search
Incident to a Valid Arrest
56
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When
things seized are within plain view of a searching party
Page 19
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
ESQUILLO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 182010, 25-AUG-2010)57
HELD:
That law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant
may conduct a search is settled. The same, however, admits of
exceptions,viz :
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches
of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug
laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at
borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
"plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk"
operations.20 (emphasis underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk"
practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the
police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The
search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's
possession - later voluntarily exhibited 24 to the police operative - was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a
cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a
police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting
suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer
had identified himself.
PEOPLE vs. MARTINEZ (G.R. No. 1911366, 13-DEC-2010)58
FACTS:
Upon the receipt of the report, police authorities and members of the
SWAT team hied to Trinidad Subd., Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from the
people in the area, the house of the accused was located. As the police
officers entered the gate of the house. However, nothing from outside the
house could be seen what is happening inside, such as the alleged
paraphernalia and plastic sachet of shabu on the table while they were
outside the premises of the property of accused. Before entering, they
only relied on the information that that there was an ongoing pot session
inside the house of accused. Thereafter, they immediately barged in and
arrested accused.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was an express waiver on the part of the accused. NO.
2. WON the items were seized in plain view. NO.
HELD:
1. The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
fails to raise such issue before arraignment. However, this waiver is
limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of
an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
57
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When
things seized are within plain view of a searching party; d.) Stop and
Frisk
58
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When
things seized are within plain view of a searching party, e.) Express
Waiver
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional
guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. X x x the constitutional
guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all
searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in
the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant
(i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and
frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 s clearly inapplicable to this case.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and
both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless
arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does
not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce,
their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had
just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.
Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a
crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to
believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-
appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal
establishment.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrest without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is
based on actual facts, that is supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested.
2. Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain
view. The elements of plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the
accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance
and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search
warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result
thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of
an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus
inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus
precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
POSADAS vs. CA (G.R. No. 89139, 2-AUG-1990)59
FACTS:
Pat. Ungab and Pat. Umpar, both members of INP of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force were conducting
surveillance along Magallanes St., Davao City. While they were within the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying
a BURI bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
approached petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by
the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the buri bag
and found a revolver, rounds of live ammunition, and tear gas. Petitioner
failed to show the necessary license or authority to possess the same.
Thereafter, he was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was a lawful arrest or search and seizure. YES.
2. WON the arrest is justified by stop and search. YES.
59
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and
Frisk
Page 20
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
HELD:
1. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
2. There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost
of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military
or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has
been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had
been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his light
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the
Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at
military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at
bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was
a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the
bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag
in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have
obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may
prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE (G.R. No. 87059, 22-JUN-1992)60
60
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and
Frisk
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
FACTS:
Shortly after a phone call received in the Western Police District, that
there was a suspicious-looking persons (one of whom was holding his
abdomen, and both men looking from side-to-side) at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard, Pat. Mercado and Alberto Juan
proceeded to the said place and approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were
unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. Suspects
were searched, and one of them was found a revolver with live bullets in
the chamber, the other (MENGOTE) had a fan knife secreted in his front
right pants pocket. They were then turned over to the HQ for
investigation. Thereafter, they were accused of violation of PD 1866.
ISSUE:
1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid. NO
2. WON the evidence obtained was inadmissible evidence. YES
HELD:
Warrantless search in broad daylight of a person merely looking
from side to side and holding his stomach is illegal.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had
committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could
possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side"
and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a
busy street on mere unexplained suspicion.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was
holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because
of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-
looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at
North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of
the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
MANALILI vs. CA (G.R. No. 113447, 9-OCT-1997)61
FACTS:
Due to the information that drug addicts were roaming the area of
Kalookan City; a surveillance was conducted by Pat. Espiritu and Pat.
Lumabas. Upon reaching the city, they alighted from the official car of the
Police Station. Thereafter, they chanced upon a male (MANALILI) whose
eyes were reddish and was walking in a swaying manner. Manalili tried to
avoid them; policemen approached him and introduced their selves as
police officers. Police then asked what Manalili was holding in his hands,
but he tried to resist. Espiritu again asked Manalili of what he was
holding, then the latter showed his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine
the same. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it, found suspected
crushed marijuana residue inside; kept it.
Thereafter, an examination was conducted to Manalili and to the
confiscated marijuana. Results are all positive.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless search and arrest. YES.
HELD:
61
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and
Frisk
Page 21
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court
of Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were many instances where a
search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed
during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling
like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience
as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high."
The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in petitioner's possession.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that
petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the
trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following
requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it
had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. 26Otherwise, the Courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards
and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to
have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial
court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary
appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
VEROY vs. LAYAGUE (G.R. No. 95630, 18-JUN-1992)62
FACTS:
As the Veroy Spouses already lived in Quezon City; left their house in
Davao City under the care of two houseboys and Edna Sooguilon (only
the key to the kitchen was left, keys to the bedrooms were still kept by
spouses); Capt. Obrero contacted Luisa Veroy asking for perimission that
they would search her house because of the report they received that
their was being used as safehouse of rebel soldiers. Luisa responded
and gave her permission that the search be conducted, but it should be
done in the presence of Major Macasaet. True enough, upon the search
being conducted, a gun, bullets, clothes of men and a book entitled
Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation were all found in the
house. An arraignment was then set and an information was filed against
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1866.
ISSUE:
WON there was the petitioners validly waived their right against
warrantless search and seizure. NO.
HELD:
Where permission to enter a residence was given to search for
rebels, it is illegal to search on the rooms therein and seize firearms
without a search warrant. None of these exceptions pertains to the
case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is
that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for
rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he
did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and
the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the
need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house
but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house
but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but
the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence
against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal
possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]).
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there isno crime.
62
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express
Waiver
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS (G.R. No. 170233, 22-FEB-2007)63
FACTS:
PO3 Fami and SPO3 Cabling conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter St., Brgy. Pag-asa,
Olongapo City. They received an information that a person would make a
delievery of marijuana dried leaves; person was described for them to
recognize. While stationed thereat, they saw a male (Nuevas) fit to the
decription, alight from a motor vehicle; was carrying a bag. Fami and
Cabiling accosted Nuevas and informed him that they were police
officers; Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray language. Thereafter,
Nuevas informed Fami that there were other stuff in the possession of a
certain Vangie, and two other male persons (Inocencio and Din). Later
on, Nuevas pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in blue
cloth. Shortly, Nueva disclosed where the two other male persons would
deliver the marijuana. Then, they all went to the place, Fami and Cabiling
then introduced themselves as police officers; asked Din what he was
carrying, replied that it was Nuevas, Fami then took the bag and upon
inspection, founf marijuana packed in newspaper.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was consent on the part of Nuevas for the warrantless
search. YES.
2. WON there was consent on the part of Din and Inocencio for the
warrantless search. NONE.
HELD:
The SC held that the search conducted in Nuevas case was made with
his consent. In Dins case, there was none.
1. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted
the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers.
It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself
from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave
them the plastic bag and even revealed his associates, offering
himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the
lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others and
save oneself even at the cost of others lives.
2. The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. While it may
not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into
surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Famis and
Cablings testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of
mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on Dins
composurewhether he felt surprised or frightened at the time
which fact we find necessary to provide basis for the surrender of
the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by the
police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by
Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases
where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of
the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof.
Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was
sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag
that Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this
case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as
taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act
attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession
of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The
prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew
of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess
the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his
testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried
leaves.
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must
be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent
was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to
this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
63
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express
Waiver
Page 22
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)
the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.
Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver
of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. OGARIO (G.R. No. 138081, 30-MAR-
2000)64
HELD:
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, [10] this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line
of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs
and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on
the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial
Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters
even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise
known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the
proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections
or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there
to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular
courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of probable
cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles
under Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture
proceedings."[11] They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the
question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the
subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine.
The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from
abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may
exercise the power to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests
provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of
injunction, the Supreme Court issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative
Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled re: exercise
of utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in issuance of
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. The
circular states in part:
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically
declared in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y
express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot
interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is
immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
RIETA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 147817, 12-AUG-2004)65
64
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of
Warehouse in Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce
custom laws
65
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of
Warehouse in Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
HELD:
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may
be made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs
and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial
warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through
or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board; or
to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law
SALVADOR vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 146706, 15-JUL-2005)66
HELD:
The Constitutional provisions (Section 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas
where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search
warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the
special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance
operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain
PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search
made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the
nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the
search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised
police authority under the customs law.
The power of the State to foul any fraudulent schemes resorted to
by importers who evade payment of customs duties clearly
recognized In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held that
law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs
and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced
into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may
likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle
or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the
case at bar.
The search of a moving vehicle is recognized on this jurisdiction as
a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. We recall
that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on
board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand.
A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a
store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable
to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobileship,
aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
People vs. Rolando De Gracia67
G.R.Nos.102009-10,July 6,1994
FACTS:
On the height of the coup detat in December 1989 headed by the
elements of Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government, a team from the Intelligence
Division of the NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales office in Quezon City pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by
elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. While
conducting the said surveillance, a group of 5 men approached the car of
the surveillance team and started firing at them. As a consequence, a
searching team was sent to raid the Eurocar Sales office (without search
warrants because of the disorder during that time and the courts are
consequently closed.) where they found ammunitions, dynamites and
molotoy bombs. As a result of the raid, the appellant who was found to
be a former Philippine Constabulary and 2 other men who were janitors
of the said building were arrested.
custom laws
66
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of
Warehouse in Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce
custom laws
67
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures - (G)
Exigency
Page 23
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
The accused appellant herein was charged in two separate informations
for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
rebellion, and for attempted homicide which were tried jointly by the RTC
of Quezon City. Appellant was convicted for the first charge, but was
acquitted of the latter. He was then sentenced to serve the penalty of
*reclusion perpetua, * with a recommendation that he be extended with
executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good
behavior. Thus this appeal.
The appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal
possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical
or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to
possess the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building
where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely
employed asan errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in
behalf of a certain Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession
of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess is necessary before
one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a valid search and seizure in this case.
RULING:
Yes, given the circumstances, the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions against a warrantless search. The military operatives in this
case had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on the day when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.
People vs. Andre68
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991
FACTS:
The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, attempted to
send 4 gift wrapped packages containing marijuana through a packing
and forwarder company owned by Anita Reyes and her husband Job
Reyes. The appellant disguised the said packages by stacking it with
books, gloves and cigars. However before delivery of the package, as a
Standard Operating Procedure, Mr. Job Reyes opened the boxes for final
inspection and found marijuana leaves inside. He then reported the
incident to the NBI and sent a sample of the suspected marijuana leaves
for examination. The NBI Forensics was able to determine that the
samples were indeed marijuana leaves and so they seized the package
and located the appellant. The appellant was charged for violation of
R.A. 6425 and was consequently convicted by the RTC, thus this appeal.
The appellant contends that the evidence against him is not admissible
as evidence because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.
ISSUE
Whether or not there has been a violation of the appellants constitutional
right thereby making the obtained evidence inadmissible.
RULING
No. There has been no violation of the appellants Constitutional Right,
specifically his right against unreasonable search and seizure. It must be
noted that the evidence obtained was not procured by the state through
its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies but through a
private individual acting in his private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. Furthermore, the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not
upon private individuals.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case
at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
68
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Waterous Drug vs NLRC69
G.R.NO. 113271; 16 OCT 1997
FACTS:
Antonia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma
R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to
the latter's accounts as it was a prohibited practice and not to negotiate
with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department,
as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she
was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was
"due to negligence". In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989,
WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against
the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29
January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co
that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., wherein it was found that there was a discrepancy
in the per bottle price of Voren tablets between the recent and previous
Purchase Orders. Upon verification, the discrepancy showed that the cost
per bottle in the recent Purchase Order was overpriced.
The Accounting Department of Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. then
confirmed that the refund for the jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren
tablets was paid to Ms. Catolico. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding
the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of
the overpriced.
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by
Ms. Catolico.
As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened
the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
"talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question
(P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension. However, before
the 48-hour extension expires, she was informed she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also
averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang
from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990,
Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of
10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of
Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as
complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was
conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due
process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement.
Petitioners appealed the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside
because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due
process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
The NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal
from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of
the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her
co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared
that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and
3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the
dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for
illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation
of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Having their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed special
civil action for *certiorari*, which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of
facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
69
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
Page 24
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Whether or not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of
the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights
RULING
The Court held that Catolico was denied due process. Although Catolico
was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
service in the memorandum issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her
letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the
issues were joined through said letters.
The Court also held that Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. The
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee. However, in the case at bar, WATEROUS failed to discharge
that burden which resulted in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was
dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.
Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there
was an overcharge since it appears that Catolicos dismissal is based on
hearsay information.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its
decision, that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It
is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's
reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly
awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of
service.
In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay
at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of
separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations except as to its reason for
upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, *viz*., that the evidence against
private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation
of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures which was set aside.
People vs. Mendoza70
301 SCRA 66
FACTS
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and their 10-
year old daughter Charmaine went to the birthday party of a relative of
Octavio in Mcdo, Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without
telling his wife and kid, and went to KFC.
Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldnt find him in the party, they went
home in Las Pinas. They arrived home at 7 pm and left again to go to
Cecilias parents in Bacoor to bring perfume. Octavio still was not home.
They got home around 9pm and saw Octavios car parked in the garage
of their neighbor. All the lights were opened but the front door was locked.
After a while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was
drunk and told Charmaine to get cold water and douse him. She followed
and was instructed to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed.
She heard her parents arguing about them leaving the party without
Octavio. Afterwards, she heard three gunshots, ran to their room and saw
her mom on the floor bleeding. She also saw her dad hide a gun under
the bed.
Octavio then called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac
arrived, they all brought him to Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecilia was
declared dead on arrival. The policemen investigated Gabac and found
a .38 caliber revolver in his waist. Gabac told them that Octavio handed it
over to him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilias father,
Alipio Eusebio learned of his daughters death and that valuables were
being taken away from her house. He and his sons decided to go there
and decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of
property therein, including accused-appellant's personal effects such as
memorandum receipt and mission order authorizing Mendoza to carry
weapon.
At court, Charmaine testified that she saw her father hide the gun under
the bed. In her second testimony, she said she saw no such act. Octavio
also denied that he killed his wife and that he owned that gun. He said
that the memorandum receipt and mission order were illegally procured
by Eusebio in violation of his right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
70
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
ISSUE
Was Octavios constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure violated when Eusebio took the memorandum receipt and
mission order and brought it to court?
RULING
The court held that Eusebio did not violate Octavios constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. The constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity of ones
person from interference from THE GOVERNMENT and it cannot be
extended to acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the case at
bar, the articles were discovered by Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, a
private individual. Besides, other evidence proved his guilt. Test showed
nitrate in his hands and the testimony of his daughter was accorded great
weight. He was charged of the crime parricide with the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm.
People vs. Bongcarawan71
384 SCRA 525
FACTS
Accused Basher Bongcarawan was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972). He was found with the possession, custody and control of
eight packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), without the
corresponding license or prescription.
The contraband article was discovered incidentally when the vessel
security personnel, Mark Diesmo, addressed the complaint of one Lorena
Canoy that her jewelry were missing and she suspects that her co-
passenger (Bongcarawan) at cabin no. 106 was the culprit. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. The security
personnel then asked the accused to get his baggage and requested to
open it. When the accused opened his baggage it was found that there
are eight small plastic packs containing white crystals which the security
personnel suspected that it was shabu. The item was then turned over to
the Philippine Coast Guard.
On the defense of the accused, he averts that the contraband article was
not his but belong to Alican Alex Macapudi as he was requested by the
former to bring the Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and
watches to Iligan. He also claimed that the security personnel forcibly
opened the suitcase when he refused to do the same, when he was
asked by the security personnel, as he did not know the secret
combination lock.
ISSUE
WON there is a violation on the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
RULING
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this
right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the
search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is
against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held
by this Court in the case of *People v. Marti*, in the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found
shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband
items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and
hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the
search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be
considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The
vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does
not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of
the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of
the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be invoked.
71
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
Page 25
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson72
G.R. No. 138881 Dec. 18, 2000
FACTS
On July 26, 1998 accused 58 year-old Mrs. Leila Johnson was due to fly
back to the USA after visiting her family in the Philippines. While inside
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport waiting for her departure, she was
subjected to routine frisking by Olivia Ramirez, a lady frisker on duty.
When Ramirez frisked Mrs. Johnson, she felt something hard on the
accused abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she
needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation
as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation,
she reported the matter to her superior which directed her to take
accused to the rest room and asked accused to bring out the thing under
her girdle. There, accused brought out three (3) plastic packs later found
out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu totaling to 580.2
grams without corresponding license or prescription to possess or use
said regulated drug. Thereafter, she was immediately arrested.
The Regional Trial Court, Br 110, Pasay City found accused guilty of
violation of Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the
suit. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WON accused constitutional right against search and seizure was
violated when she was subjected to airport security procedure of frisking.
RULING
No. The court held that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during
the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
Further the court held that the accused was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in
either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited.
People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton73
G.R.No. 148825. December 27, 2002
FACTS
On February 12, 1998 at about 1:30pm accused, Susan Canton was at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger
bound for Saigon, Vietman. When she passed through the metal detector
72
(I) Airport Security
73
(I) Airport Security
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a
civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and
Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her
attention, saying Excuse me maam, can I search you? Upon frisking
the accused, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area.
Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of accused, pinched the
package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt
like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
packages in front of accused genital area and thighs. She asked Susan
to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money
only. Mylene forthwith reported the matter to her supervisor on duty.
Her supervisor instructed to bring accused to a comfort room for a
thorough physical examination. There they discovered (3) three
packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape,
which after examination turned out to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu (totaling 998.2809 grams), of a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
The trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act), as amended, and
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1M. Accused filed a MR and/or New Trial as well as the Motion to
Inhibit the Judge. The trial court issued an order denying the same.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the warrantless search and seizure of the shabu were violative of
her constitutional rights.
RULING
No. The Court do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent
seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest accused, were
violative of her constitutional rights. Though Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
However, the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. There are recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence:
(1)search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular
case is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,
which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger
and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures.
The Court also found the ruling in *People v. Johnson* *(see previous
case)*to be applicable to the instant case, which involves similar facts
and issues.
Page 26
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
People vs. Conde74
356 SCRA 478
FACTS
On appeal is the decision dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan
Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of *reclusion perpetua *with the accessory penalties under the law.
On May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 AM, the accused block the path of the two
Indian Nationals on a motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as
Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions
approached and stabbed the Indians. Allan Atis took the goods which
were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the
four men fled from the crime scene. Of the four assailants, only three
were identified.
On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police
recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare,
Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to the accused. These
weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection.
Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest
when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant
when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house
of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. The three denied
the accusations and presented alibis that Alejandro Perez, Jr. went to
Pulang Lupa Cemetery and visited the graves of his uncle and
grandfather. From the cemetery, they went home where they drank some
beer until late afternoon. Oscar Conde testified that he was mending his
fish net at Barangay Polo Street, Paranaque when the crime was
committed. Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a
construction worker for certain Romy Ramos when the incident occurred.
ISSUE
WON the arrest of the appellants were illegal.
RULING
The records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants came
after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the
crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any
warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when an arrest can be
made without warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were
merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any
crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed. Five
days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It
cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based
on personal knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about
the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. The
third circumstance is patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the
police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants
and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, appellants' rights provided in
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to
their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of
the Information against him before his arraignment. When the appellants
entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to
question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests,
they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their
arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. It is much
too late for appellants to raise the question of their warrantless arrests.
Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers
of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
74
(J) Jail Safety
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Valmonte vs. De Villa75
G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As
part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights
(ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners
contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures?
RULING
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures. (The Court, voting
13-2, DISMISSED the petition.)
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably
in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow
units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of
which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse
by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE vs.DE VILLA76
G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
FACTS
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional
and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have
filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of
said decision.
ISSUE
RULING
The Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED.
75
3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and areal target zonings
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3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and areal target zonings
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be
denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during
which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or
two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to
a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is
a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments of some offense.
The Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The
Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once
that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power
implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a
particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has
become aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of
thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the
increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the
Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely blamed on the
checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become
"experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of course, is a national
tragedy .
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that
the men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that
the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are
assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the
citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves the
military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these
checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed unless the men
behind it are honest, noble and dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the
citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law.
And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including
those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the
scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for
their abusive acts; 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the
clearest of terms by higher military authorities.
PEOPLE VS. EXALA77
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS
On November 2, 1982, a private jeepney driven by the accused-
appellant, Restituto Bocalan,was stopped at a police checkpoint for
routing inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited
items. Along with Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime Fernandez and
Rodelio Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team,
went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside,
and in which the occupants answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then
noticed a black bag inside the jeepney, as he became suspicious, he
asked the occupants of what the bag contained, but nobody answered.
Pfc. Galang then opened the bag and found a number of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused were brought to the police station for further
investigation. The accused were all charged for violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended. Bocalan now assails his conviction.
He contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence
against him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid and legal, thus proper in
using the marijuana as evidence for convicting the accused (Bocalan) of
the crime charged against him.
HELD
Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues
that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in
the proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the
evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless
search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the
77
3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and areal target zonings
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the
evidence. But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still
appellant's contention deserves scant consideration. There are indeed
instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest. The instant case is an incident to or an
offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with
"Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to search for unlicensed
firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized
persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband
passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants
were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed
a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that
moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became
suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from
Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being
discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of
the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause
justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and
the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of
any protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even
after their arrest. Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when
arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence but
also confirms their acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was
waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
GUANZON vs. DE VILLA78
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
FACTS
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the
military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
Petitioners allege that the saturation drives abused their human rights.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation
drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places
where the subversives are hiding. Raiders, without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest went destroying the doors of the houses of the
petitioners rousing them from their sleeps early in the morning. The public
respondents stressed two points, First, the respondents have legal
authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human
rights are total lies.
ISSUE
Whether or not the saturation drives were unconstitutional.
HELD
The case did not rule on the constitutionality of the saturation drives.
Instead, the case was remanded to the lower court for further reception of
evidence. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements which would bring down constituted
authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of
Rights. Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may
not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to
take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions,
where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given,
and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation
drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened. On one hand, Under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution
it is stated that The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. There can be no question that under ordinary
circumstances, the police action of the nature described by the petitioners
would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct concerted
campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people
affected by such actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and
other police measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in the
manner on which the police action is executed.
ABENES vs. CA79
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007
78
3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and areal target zonings
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Page 28
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
FACTS
Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, created a team
composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun
Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC.
The Team leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman
of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the marking
"COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were
required by the team to stop and their occupants were then politely
requested to alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking of
their vehicles. Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do
so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying
to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to
park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not
be seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of
the team, knocked on the vehicles window and requested the occupants
to step down for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which
included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay
Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted
from the vehicle.
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was
tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the
policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was
then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to
carry the firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the
Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the
affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to
be shown to support Abenes claim. He could not show any. Hence,
SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes firearm, which was later identified as
a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its
magazine containing seven live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters.
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives
License Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that
Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder.
ISSUE
1. Was the check-point validly established?
2. Was the petitioners constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure violated?
RULING
The Court upheld the validity of the checkpoint.
the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact
that the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998
elections; and, the circumstances under which the policemen found the
gun warranted its seizure without a warrant.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free
passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search
of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know
that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure.
PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if
the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely
direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the
cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is
nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in
plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his
shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which
they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist.
The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the
petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
GAANAN vs.IAC80
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
FACTS
Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint
for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000
from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently
arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since
Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices
in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner was acquitted of
the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of
electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables
are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what
are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to
inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep.
Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around
the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an
extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would
subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien?
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized
groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court
or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA
4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not among
such devices or arrangements.
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STONEHILL vs DIOKNO81
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against
petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers
directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there
seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then
were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some
documents and papers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.
RULING
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al.
The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity
of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not
the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the
officers or board members of the corporation.
The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search
and seizure. It provides;
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In
the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from
mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be
particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise
abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search
warrant is emphasized.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission
of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
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requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
PASTRANO vs. CA82
G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997
FACTS
A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, then intelligence
operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at
Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by
his father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify
but expressed fear of the petitioner who, according to them, had firearms.
Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the victim of
foul play. Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife also saw
Capt. Maoza, seeking his assistance in connection with the death of
their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and his
common-law wife were keeping unlicensed firearms in their house. They
executed a joint affidavit which they stated that they had personal
knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three
(3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of his house.
On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza
applied for a search warrant on the same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M.
Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a
search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men later served at the
residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized
from petitioner's dwelling was a sack containing the following:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in
Germany ROHMGMBH SONTHEM/BRENZ;
One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.;
Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y
Capapas and his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were
charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as
penalized under P.D. No. 1866, 1.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is
invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution.
RULING
The Court held that petitioner waived any objection based on the illegality
of the search.
Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the
judge had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of
searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126,
4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 126, 4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his
witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But although this is a
ground for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing
to this end. He did not move to quash the information before the trial
court. Nor did he object to the presentation of the evidence obtained as
being the product of an illegal search.
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search.
As held in People v. Omaweng, the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived
and the waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
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The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of
the crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
ABERCA vs. VER83
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS
Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the
Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against
known communist terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila. The
TFM raided some places using defective warrants; they seized personal
belongings of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their
right to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated.
Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations of their
constitutional rights.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution.
RULING
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146
of the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action
(for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out
of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise
of powers or authority arising from martial law including the arrest,
detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus suspends petitioners right of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of respondents confiscation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the
PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
PP vs. DELA CRUZ84
G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008
FACTS
In the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher
Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo,
Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. They saw Boy Bicol by a
table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka
na may warrant of arrest ka. Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them
in a shootout and was fatally shot. He dropped his shotgun when a police
officer pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and
apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of
suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia,
ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the
markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing
the seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized
from the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime
laboratory for examination and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of
RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house
having been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While
accused-appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as
police officers approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to
scamper away. He lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
team then helped him get up. He saw the police officers searching the
premises and finding shabu and firearms, which were on top of a table or
drawer.
When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was
because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the
gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he
was only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING
The Court ruled that since the accused-appellant was not in possession
of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also
invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless
arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec.
5(a), arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would
have been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the
prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was
committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied
possessing the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak absent the
presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the
trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust
operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not
proved to be committing any offense.
PEOPLE v. AGOJO85
GR. NO. 181318 APRIL 16, 2009
FACTS
AGOJO was arrested via a buy-bust operation, wherein he was selling
and delivering (4) plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu,", with a total weight of 206.32 grams, a
regulated dangerous drug. AGOJO also have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol Ithaca with defaced serial number,
one (1) magazine and seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions for caliber .
45, without having secured the necessary license and/or permit from the
proper authorities to possess the same. Subsequently, he waqs convicted
by the trial court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. On the
other hand, AGOJO assails his arrest by giving his own version of the
story, that he was in fact framed-up by the buy-bust team.
ISSUE
Whether or not the ARREST of AGOJO is proper even though the
ARREST was made WITHOUT A WARRANT?
RULING
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto,
the existence of discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust
money and a prior attempt to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up.
However, the fact that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no
consequence. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5,
paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
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(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph
(b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. A
review of the records shows that both requirements were met in this
case.
People vs. Tan G.R. No. 182310 December 9, 200986
Facts: Francisco "Bobby" Tan, his wife and one of his daughters was
killed at their residence. The suspects of the brutal killing was his two
illegitimate sons by another woman, herein respondents, Archie and Jan
Michael (Jan-Jan) who are living with them.
According to respondents, prior to the incident they climbed down the
high concrete fence of the compound at about 12:45 a.m to go out. They
returned home at around 3:30 a.m. Respondent Jan-Jan entered the
house ahead of his brother. On reaching the door of his room at the end
of the hallway, he noticed his stepsister Katherine, lying on the floor near
the masters bedroom. As Jan-Jan switched on the light in his room, he
beheld her lying on a pool of blood. He quickly stepped into the masters
bedroom and there saw his father, Bobby, lying on the bed with his chest
drenched in blood. Almost simultaneously, respondent Archie who had
come into the house after his brother Jan-Jan noticed that the door of his
room, which he locked earlier, was partly open. As he went in and
switched on the light, he saw his stepmother Cindy, lying in her blood
near the wall below the air conditioner.
A few days after the incident police officers from the Regional CIDG
submitted their investigation report to the City Prosecutors Office of Iloilo
City, which pointed to respondents as principal suspects on the killing of
their parents and stepsister. Separate informations for two (2) murders
and parricide were filed at RTC against respondents.
Thereafter respondents filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with a prayer to suspend the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them.
Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, and thereafter, reversed the
order of the previous presiding judge. He found probable cause against
respondents and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
Respondents filed the present petition for certiorari with the CA. CA
granted the petition, set aside the RTC order of Judge Justalero, and
annulled the warrants of arrest issued. The CA also dismissed the
criminal cases against the respondents.
Issue: WON there was probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of
respondents.
Held: What is probable cause? Probable cause assumes the existence of
facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the
person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor
clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of
arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the
accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the
accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his
arrest.
Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents is merely
circumstantial. The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in
that they had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had
opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took
place. Archie took two pairs of new gloves from his car late that evening.
Cindy was apparently executed inside Archies room. The separate rooms
of the two accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their
own fingerprints. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more
evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses
either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is important is
that there is some rational basis for going ahead with judicial inquiry into
the case. This Court does not subscribe to the CAs position that the
prosecution had nothing to go on with.
Ong vs. Genio G.R. No.182336 December 23, 200987
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Facts: Petitioner Elvira O. Ong filed a criminal complaint against
respondent Jose Genio for Robbery. The information states that
respondent carry away kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her
personal things valued at Php 700,000.00.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable
Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View
of Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance
the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Motion to Dismiss).
RTC of Makati City dismissed the case because the other elements of the
crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were
not specifically alleged in the Information filed. The RTC held that the
evidence on record failed to establish probable cause to charge
respondent with the crime of Robbery.
Issue: WON the court erred in not finding probable cause to merit the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissal of the case.
Held: Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ' Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing
of an Information, has the following options:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause;
(2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and
(3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the
issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
information.
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in
this case.
People vs Pepino GR No. 183479 June 29, 2010
Facts: On October 18, 1997 in Quezon City, Metro Manila
accused/appellant Pepino, Daisy and Pelenio (died in a shootout) kidnap
Anita Ching, a businesswoman, and brought her to a safehouse for the
purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of P500,000.00, after which
it was paid the victim was released.
An information for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal
detention was filed against accused.
RTC, by Decision found Pepino and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime charged.
Pepino did not testify, and for that matter presented no evidence to defeat
or attenuate the charge or evidence brought against him. All he did in his
defense was to raise the constitutional presumption of innocence, and to
present his kins (Renato, Larex, Zeny to testify that they and Pepino were
illegally arrested. He challenged his warrantless arrest for kidnapping as
illegal.
Issue: WON accused Pepino was illegally arrested.
Held:
Pepino assails his conviction on, among others, the illegality of his
arrest.
The court opines that as to the alleged illegality of Pepinos arrest, it is
settled that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be
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timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing which he is deemed to have waived. Since Pepino did
not raise such alleged irregularity early on, he is now estopped.
Rebellion vs People G.R. No. 175700 July 5, 201088
Held: Petitioners claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit.
We note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed
by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has
been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the
quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 5 In
this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and
actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived
any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not
even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private individual under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Pineda-Ng vs. People G.R. No. 189533 November 15, 201089
Facts: On December 19, 2007, an Information for Qualified Theft was
filed against: Richard Francisco, Branch Mgr. of private complainant
Philippine Business Bank, Mailada Marilag-Aquino; and petitioner Ma.
Imelda Pineda-Ng.
The prosecution found that Aquino had drawn and issued the seven (7)
checks in favor of petitioner amounting to P8,735,000.00. Petitioner
presented these 7 checks for payment before the bank by virtue of her
Bill Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco, who, in excess
of his authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact
that the same were actually drawn from Closed Accounts and/or drawn
against insufficient funds.
At first, Judge Reyes found probable cause to hold Francisco liable, while
ordered the dismissal of the case against Aquino and petitioner for
absence of probable cause. Aggrieved, the bank filed its MR.
Judge Reyes, acting on the banks MR, issued an Order reversing her
earlier ruling, this time finding probable cause against Aquino and
petitioner and directing the issuance of warrants of arrest to all the
accused. No bail was recommended.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA, which was denied for lack
of merit.
Hence, this Petition ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the CA for
decision and resolution which are inconsistent with and not supported by
the law, the facts, and the settled jurisprudence laid down by the SC on
the matter of filing of criminal cases against the accused where there is
no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense
was committed.
Issue:
WON there is probable cause in this case.
Held:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is
guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on
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[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable
cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion,
but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.
The general rule is that this Court does not review factual findings of the
trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this
Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court
judge on the existence of probable cause, such as cases when the Court
finds it necessary in order to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the
law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining
in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.
Moreover, we respect the findings of the CA when it held that Judge
Reyes did not solely rely on the findings of the City Prosecutor in
reversing her earlier Order. We observed, among others, that when
Judge Reyes quoted our ruling in People v. CA, she underscored a
portion thereof, clearly indicative of her reliance on said jurisprudence.
Thus, it cannot be validly argued that Judge Reyes simply and blindly
adhered to the recommendation of the City Prosecutor in rendering the
assailed Order, bereft of any factual and legal basis. Furthermore, we
also accord respect to the factual findings of the City Prosecutor and the
CA that petitioner indeed encashed these allegedly anomalous checks.
Suffice it to state that a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction
it is enough that there is a reasonable belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
People vs, Martinez G.R. No. 191366 Dec. 13, 201090
Held: Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both
require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to
be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they
had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in
order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that the accused had just committed an offense.
People vs. Quebral G.R. No. 185379 Nov. 27, 200991
Held:
The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested
even without a warrant only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a
crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer
pursued him, or c) if he escaped from a legal confinement. But in the first
two instances, the officer must have personal knowledge of the facts
underlying the arrest. The target persons observable acts must clearly
spell a crime. If no crime is evident from those acts, no valid arrest can be
made. An informant whispering to the police officers ear that the person
walking or standing on the street has committed or is committing a crime
will not do. The arresting officer must himself perceive the manifestations
of a crime.
As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had
an inkling of the personal circumstances of the persons they were looking
for and the criminal act they were about to commit. That these
circumstances played out in their presence supplied probable cause for
the search. The police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or is about to
be committed. Since the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is
admissible in evidence against the accused.
90
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7.
Requirements for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
91
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of
rule
Page 33
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
People vs. Ara G.R. No. 185011 Dec. 23, 200992
Held: One of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to
arrest accused-appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches,
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard
and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable cause, for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case. Probable cause
was provided by information gathered from the CI and from accused-
appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their
vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside
accused-appellants vehicle was afterwards clearly established. Thus, as
we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the
arrests as accused-appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold
shabu to PO1 Ayao. Talib and Musa were also frisked for contraband as it
may be logically inferred that they were also part of Aras drug activities
inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by Musas
attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.
Esquillo vs People G.R. No. 82010 Aug. 25, 201093
Held:
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of
a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of
exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches
of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug
laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at
borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
"plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
Lumanog vs. People G.R. No.182555 Sept. 7, 201094
Held:
The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six
days after the killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to
secure an arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest Joel and
the other accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was
conducted in "hot pursuit." In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer
to an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the
warrantless arrrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall
within the ambit of "hot pursuit." The question now is whether the
successive warrantless arrests of the accused are legal. The pertinent
provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless
arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
92
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of
rule
93
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of
rule
94
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of
rule
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above instances is present in this case: (1) the accused were
not arrested in flagrante delicto; (2) the arrest was not based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officers that there is probable cause that the
accused were the authors of the crime which had just been committed;
(3) the accused were not prisoners who have escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while their case is pending.
There is no question that all the accused were apprehended several days
after the crime while doing ordinary and unsuspicious activities. There is
also no question that the police had no personal knowledge of probable
cause that the accused were responsible for the crime which had been
committed. The third situation is inapplicable since the accused are not
prison escapees. Considering these facts, there is indeed no justification
for the warrantless arrests effected by the police in their so-called "hot
pursuit." Such warrantless arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful
warrantless arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to
rely solely on the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they
failed to obtain any description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses,
including the owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the
suspects as a get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to
assist him in identifying the "suspect"; and (4) they arrested the other
accused based entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession
of Joel.
People vs Araneta G.R. No. 191064 Oct. 20, 201095
Held:
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search
warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust
operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely
legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot
because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug
pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and
means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.
People v Penaflorida 551 SCRA 111 (2008)
Facts: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of
the Investigation and Operation Division of the PNP station in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of
marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from
another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante,
chief of police in Tigaon, then organized a team composed of
Competente as team leader, SPO2 Callo, SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and
PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and
proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook
appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant
down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also
found in appellants possession. The police officers confiscated these
items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the
headquarters where he was booked.
Major Lorlie Arroyo, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory
Regional Office No. V, was presented as an expert witness to identify the
subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative
sample from the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested
positive of marijuana.
95
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of
rule
Page 34
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home,
they met Boyet Obias (Obias) who requested appellant to bring a
package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the
basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town
proper. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was
invited to go with them to the headquarters.
TC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.
In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he
had freely and consciously possessed marijuana. One of the issues
raised is that, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the
police officers should have first investigated and tried to obtain a
warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting
him.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?
Ruling: No.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that appellant was
transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to
secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already
committing a crime. The arrest as effected after appellant as caught in
flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with
him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then
already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had
probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime.
Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.
Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No 7659, states:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such
transactions. x x x.
Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to
another. In the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he
was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the
package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.
Appellant, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession
contained marijuana. But TC rejected his contention, noting that it was
impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package
because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma which
would have alarmed him.
Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being
mala prohibita, one commits the crime under RA No. 6425 by mere
possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
knowledge thereof is not necessary.
Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos by
virtue of the amendment to Section 4, RA No. 6425 by RA No. 7659.
TCs decision is affirmed.
People vs. Sembrano G.R. No.185848 Aug. 16, 201096
Held: On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We reiterate that appellant
was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an
entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line
with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of
Court allowing warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving appellant,
deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant
96
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, b.) Exceptions to strict
enforcement, 1. Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
were allowed under the circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful
arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt
that the sachets of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust
operation, are admissible and were properly admitted in evidence against
him.
Appellants defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-serving and
uncorroborated, and must fail in light of straightforward and positive
testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. The twin
defenses of denial and frame-up hold little weight vis--vis the strong
evidence gathered by the prosecution in proving his complicity to the
offenses. To recall, PO1 Manaols testimony was corroborated on
material points by PO1 Bagay, who identified appellant as the one who
handed the sachet of shabu to PO1 Manaol after being handed two (2)
One Hundred Peso bills. Contrary to the defenses claim, it is not
impossible for a buy-bust operation to be conducted in broad daylight, as
in the case at bar. Frame-up, like denial, is viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted.
People vs. Racho G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 201097
Held:
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that
will be discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the
validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the
warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises
the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in
the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence that appellant,
having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed
to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for
us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable
and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant
with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding." Without the confiscated shabu,
appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant
of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his
active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
PEOPLE vs. BIYOC 532 SCRA 20198
Facts:
At 4pm of Dec 5, 2000, private complainant AAA was in a room on the 2 nd
floor of the family house taking care of here one year old sister. Her
father, herein appellant, entered the room and touched here genitals,
after which he told her to lie down on the floor.
97
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, c.) Waiver of Illegality of
Arrest
98
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration
of Illegal Arrest
Page 35
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at
once pulled her short pants down and touched her genitals again, after
which he went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
Appellant was not able to fully penetrate AAAs vagina, however, as her
elder sister BBB went up the 2nd floor and saw appellant sitting in front of
AAA who was lying down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB
not to tell their mother about what she saw. After BBB left appellant
inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina.
BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in
partner of appellant, what she saw, CCC thus immediately confronted
AAA who did confirm that appellant had inserted his penis inside her
vagina that afternoon, and that appellant had been doing the same act to
her since she was nine years old. Incensed, CCC accompanied AAA the
following day, December 6, 2000, DSWD to report the incident, and also
to the police officers.
PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the
family home and on their way, they met appellant. PO1 Javier at once
informed him of his rights, arrested him and brought him to the police
station. AAAs and CCCs statements were thereupon taken.
TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In his brief,
appellant raised the issue that the trial court failed to consider the fact
that the accuseds arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that his
arrest was illegal because a warrantless arrest was effected even before
the statement of the private complainant was taken.
Issue
WON the contention of the accused-appellant is correct?
Ruling
NO. Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made
prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are
considered waived.
We have also ruled that an accused may be stopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information
against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what was done by the
appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter their pleas during
arraignment, but they also actively participated during the trial which
constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their arrest.
In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest
before entering his please, hence, he is deemed to waive the same.
Valdez v People 538 SCRA 611 (2007)99
Facts: Bautista testified that at around 8:00pm of March 17, 2003, he
was conducting the routing patrol along the National Highway La Union
together with Aratas and Ordono when they noticed petitioner, lugging a
bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who
appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They
thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away.
They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the
house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag.
Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen
pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper
and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station
for further investigation.
Police Inspector Laya, the forensic chemist who conducted the
examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya
maintained that the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of
the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag,
tested positive of marijuana. The charges were denied by petitioner. TC
ruled in favour of the prosecution.
In appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He
argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest
effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized
from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous
tree.
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal arrest? YES. What is the effect
of the declaration of illegal arrest?
99
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration
of Illegal Arrest
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Ruling: At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we
find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in
itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it
is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating
the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as
well.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay
tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time
petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not
committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense. 20 The tanod did not have
probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.21 Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke
with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. 26 If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-
and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless
arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.
Ruling in Issue No. 2
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search
cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As we pronounced in People
v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot
pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from
the warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had
consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in
Caballes v. Court of Appeals31
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must
be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and
search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating
upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light
of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo
neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material issues in
the determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the
fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information or even harass civilians.
Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug
cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses."52 In the same vein, let this serve as an
admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform their
mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.
SC reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted the accused.
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS 555 SCRA 578100
Facts:
On March 8, 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police
conducted a buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto
Antonio Avenue, on the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching
Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said locality. Accompanied by a
confidential informant, the police team, proceeded to the ratget area at
around 1:15 to 1:20 a.am. PO3 Carlo Luna was to act as the poseur-
buyer, whereas the other members of the team were to serve as his
backup.
The informant the pointed to 2 pesons standing along the target area,
one of whom was Monching Labo, later indentified as appellant Ramon
Catoc Picayo. After approaching , the informant introduced PO3 Luna as
a shabu customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant
Jerry Santos. Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of
shabu he was buying and asked for the money. PO3 Luna gave appellant
Santos the buy-bust money consisting of a pre-marked p100 bill. Santos
handed this money to appellant Catoc, who took out from his pocket a
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance, which he handed back to appellant Santos. When Santos
gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the latter nabbed the former and
introduced himself as a policeman.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting the, as their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the
prosecution failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that
their arrests without warrant were not legally effected.
Issue
WON the arrest was legally effected?
Ruling
YES. The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal
lacks merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any
objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their
arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of
an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. It is
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a
100
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8.
When arrest may be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration
of Illegal Arrest
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
valid information ha been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced
and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
Nevertheless, our ruling in Pp vs Cabugatan provides that:
The rule is settled that an arrest made after entrapment does not require
a warrant inasmuch as it Is considered as valid warrantless arrest
pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
Ople v Torres 293 SCRA 141 (1998)101
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that this Court invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National Computerized
Indentification Reference System on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenrys protected zone of
privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling: Yes.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons and
punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or
employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of
the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letter and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an
offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information.
Unlike the dissenters, we rescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is
the burden of government to show that AO No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transaction and misrepresentations by person seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of AO No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of AO No. 308 which if
implemented will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
AO No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. That lack of proper safeguards in this regard od AO
No. 308 may interfere with individuals liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent
the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing
expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the date encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man
living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the
case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government
which by issuing AO No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of
the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier
against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take not of the well-worded
warning of Kalvin, Jr., the disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a
way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget. Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents
still say we shout not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy
was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
101
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy & 11. Privacy of Communications
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In Re Sabio 504 SCRA 214 (2006)102
Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.455, directing an inquiry in
aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring
Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio
Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nrio to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to
the matters specified in Senate Res. 455. However, said invitation was
refused by them, invoking 4 (b) of EO No. 1 which provides that, No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee
on Public Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose
Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order
bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the
Committees members.
In GR No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its
directors and officers alleged among others that the subpoena violated
petitioners right to privacy and against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the subpoena violated petitioners rights to privacy.
Ruling: No.
One important on the Congress power of inquiry is that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be
subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government
action. As held in Barenblatt v United States, the Congress, in common
with all other branches of the Government, must exercise its powers
subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and
in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized
men, but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which mandates that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy and everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zone of
privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right
to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about
himself shall be disclosed. Section 2 guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose. Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of
communication and correspondence and further cautions that any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this
determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a
reasonable expectation; and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
102
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy & 11. Privacy of Communications
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operation by
their respective board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focuses on
petitioners acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the
government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern
and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v Mutuc, the Court, in
line with Whalen v Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test
when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official
corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote
morality in public administration. In Valmonte v Belmonte, the Court
remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy
of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC, and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation
to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy
determination regarding PCGGs efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the
subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to
privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
SJS vs DDB 570 SCRA 410 (2008)103
Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put
in issue.
Issue1: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices in violation of right to privacy.
Ruling: No.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature
of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of
the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a
large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the
scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople
v Torres, is the enabling law, authorzing a search narrowly drawn or
narrowly focused?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched,
contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be
a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance
for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling advance
anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient
by providing that the employee concerned shall be subjected to random
drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x
for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
103
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employees
privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that
the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test
and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in
access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health
(DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate
chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that
access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the
drug test result and the records shall be kept confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the tests results.
Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug
in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially
the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law
intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting
an resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider
that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social
economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components
of any such activities. The drug problem has already abated since the
martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can
no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day
scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug
test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among
employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method
is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely
to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labour under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service Law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if
RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Issue2: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses is in violation of right
to privacy.
Ruling: Yes.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165,
the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right
to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable
with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In
the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicionless are antiethical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
hauled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case do not necessarily consent
to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
Lee vs CA G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010104
Held:
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the
subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was
unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be
badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory
that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee
children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and
oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a
command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of
privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena
duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before
the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the
person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof.
Manila Electric Company vs. Lim G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010105
Held:
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under
the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from
those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact
trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious,
104
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy
105
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10.
Privacy
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 Constitutional Law 2 Cases
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Zulueta v CA 253 SCRA 699 (1996)106
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers seized were admissible in
evidence.
Ruling: No.
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouse by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent if the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
In Re Alejano 468 SCRA 188 (2005)107
Facts: This case results from the Oakwood incident in July 2003.
One of the petitioners argument is that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy when ISAFP
officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out
that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because
there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners
contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens
privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not
deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the officials of ISAFP Detention Center violated detainees
right to privacy of communication.
Ruling: No.
The opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case did
not violate the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters
were not in sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters
for the inspection of contraband.
106
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
107
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law]
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and
not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the
present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a
citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at
large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very
fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.
KMU v Director 487 SCRA 623 (2006)108
Facts: On 13 April 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO
420 (REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS,
AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES).
Petitioners alleged that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional provisions on the right to privacy.
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the
owners consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or
penalties for any violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the
necessity of EO 420.
Issue: Whether or not EO 420 violates the constitutional provision on the
right to privacy.
Ruling: No.
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens
that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy.
There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government
entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems
of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to
complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected
and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only
14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data.
The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will
even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the
disparate systems prior to EO 420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the
kind, nature, and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID
systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only
the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition,
government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific
data, seven less data than what Supreme Courts ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government
entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and
disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:
a. The date to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only
for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be
limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or tolerated
under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification
system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written
authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and
disclosure of data;
108
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11.
Privacy of Communications
Page 40
 Constitutional Law 2 Cases

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by

advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall
be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or
under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the
identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even

narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown
compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data
collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of
EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording
and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v
Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy
because in that case, the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and
devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject
matter required legislation. As the Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v Torres,
The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it
is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID

systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power
that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the
assailed executive issuance in Ople v Torres sought to establish a
National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it
creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable, and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control
over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.

[for the class of Atty. Pascua - Ateneo de Davao College of Law] Page 41