MIN-HYUNG KIM

South Koreas Strategy toward a Rising China,

Security Dynamics in East Asia, and International
Relations Theory

ABSTRACT

This article contends that South Koreas behaviors toward China since 1992 can be
fully understood when the structural variables of the strategic environmenti.e.,
economic interdependence, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system, and the North
Korean threatare combined with the domestic variable of Seouls leadership
change and its perception of threat.
K E Y W O R D S : Chinas rise, economic interdependence, leadership change, South
Koreas behavior, US-centered hub-and-spoke system

SINCE IT LAUNCHED ECONOMIC REFORM in 1978, China has grown remark-

ably. Its average growth rate over the past four decades or so is nearly 10%.1
As China rises rapidly, economic interdependence between China and its
neighboring countries is also deepening. The SinoROK (Republic of Korea
or South Korea) economic relationship is no exception. China is currently
South Koreas largest trading partner. The ties between China and South
Korea go far beyond economic matters. Indeed, their social, cultural, and
even political ties have expanded since the 1992 normalization of relations.
And yet, the unfolding SinoROK relations are puzzling, given that China
was a military adversary of ROK during the Korean War and is still a main
strategic ally as well as a key patron of North Korea, which is ROKs long-
term major external threat. Moreover, South Korea is a traditional military
ally of the US, which is Chinas strategic competitor in the Asia-Pacic

M IN - HYUNG K IM is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Kyung

Hee University in Seoul. He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. This
work was supported by an Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) grant funded by the Korean gov-
ernment (MEST) (AKS-2012-AAZ-2101). Email: <min-hyung@khu.ac.kr>.
1. World Bank, China Overview, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>,
accessed May 5, 2016.

Asian Survey, Vol. 56, Number 4, pp. 707730. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2016 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Reprints and
Permissions webpage, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?preprints. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2016.56.4.707.

707
708  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

region.2 Why has South Korea not balanced against China? In view of its
excessive economic dependence and their growing power disparity, shouldnt
South Korea be worried about Chinas rise? What drives South Koreas
behavior toward China? Do international relations theories provide a com-
pelling answer? If not, how can we make them more suitable for South
Koreas behavior toward China in particular and the evolving security
dynamics in East Asia in general?
The main goal of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to account for South
Koreas distinct behaviors toward China since the end of the Cold War.
Second, through the lens of South Koreas behaviors toward China, the
article assesses the relevance of major international relations theories for the
evolving structure of East Asian security in the 21st century and makes some
suggestions for their adequate application.
While the literature on South Koreas behavior toward China remains
poor, the topic has been explored by several scholars. Among others, Victor
Cha explains South Koreas engagement with China since the normalization
as an outcome of two factors: the shift in Seouls perception of China from
a revisionist power to a status quo power, and the strategic context change
surrounding the Korean Peninsula (most importantly, the end of the Cold
War and the SinoSoviet reconciliation). He praises South Koreas behavior
as the most successful example of engaging China in East Asia but emphasizes
that Seouls behavioral change is contingent on how the North Korean issue,
along with the transformation of SinoROK economic relations, develops in
the future.3 Criticizing the realist assumption of balancing behavior, which
focuses on material (particularly military) power, David Kang stresses Seouls
beliefs as well as interests in explaining the absence of South Koreas balanc-
ing behavior against China. His main claim is that since Beijings goals do not
directly threaten Seoul, South Korea does not fear Chinas rise. Rather, South
Korea adjusts to Chinas emergence as a great power in Northeast Asia and
seeks to benet from close ties with Beijing while maintaining good relations
with Washington.4 Jae Ho Chung, on the other hand, pays close attention to

2. Min-hyung Kim, South Koreas China Policy, Evolving Sino-ROK Relations, and Their
Implications for East Asian Security, Pacic Focus 31:1 (April 2016), p. 58.
3. Victor D. Cha, Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security, Survival 41:1
(Spring 1999), pp. 7398.
4. David Kang, Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Koreas Response to China,
Journal of East Asian Studies 9:1 (2009), pp. 128.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  709

South Koreas recent change in its perception of China and argues that Seoul
increasingly sees Chinas rise and Beijings assertiveness as an economic and
security threat, although, due to ever-growing economic ties between the two
countries, it has refrained from discussing the issue publicly, carefully prac-
ticing a policy of strategic ambiguity. He discourages blind optimism about
the future of SinoROK relations.5
While these studies agree that South Korea has so far engaged with China
successfully, there is signicant variation among them concerning Seouls
perceptions of China threat and the prospect for future SinoROK relations.
The variation results, in part, from insufcient attention to the policymaking
conditions under which Chinas rise and behavior are evaluated by Seoul.
Insufcient attention to policymaking conditions also leads to divergent ac-
counts of and disparate predictions for South Koreas behaviors toward China,
despite their emphasis on virtually the same variables, such as national interests,
threat perceptions, and the shift in the strategic environment. By highlighting
the specic policymaking conditions under which Seoul conducts its foreign
policy, this article seeks to provide a compelling account of South Koreas
distinct behaviors toward China over time. The central thesis here is that South
Koreas behaviors toward China since 1992 can be fully understood when the
structural variables of the strategic environmentin particular economic inter-
dependence, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system, and the North Korean
threatare effectively combined with the domestic variable of Seouls leader-
ship change and its perception of threat.
In what follows, the article rst addresses the changing dynamics of eco-
nomic ties among South Korea, China, and the US in the postCold War
world. Second, the article explains how South Koreas behavior toward China
has shifted since 1992 and theorizes this through the analysis of the impact of
South Koreas leadership changes on its behavioral shifts toward China.
Third, the article illustrates the shortcomings of major international relations
theories in explaining South Koreas behavior and discusses ways to make
them more suitable for not just South Koreas behavior but also the emerging
security dynamics in East Asia. The concluding section offers predictions of
South Koreas behavior toward China in the future as well as several sugges-
tions for future studies of East Asian security.

5. Jae Ho Chung, Korean Views of Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcom-
ing Challenges, Asian Perspective 36:2 (June 2012), pp. 219236.
710  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

table 1. South Koreas Exports and Imports with China and the US, 20032011
(% share)

Exports

Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 18.1 19.6 21.8 21.3 22.1 21.7 23.9 25.1 24.2
US 17.7 16.9 14.5 13.3 12.4 11.0 10.4 10.7 10.1

Imports

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

China 12.3 13.2 14.8 15.7 17.7 17.7 16.8 16.8 16.5
US 13.9 12.8 11.7 10.9 10.5 8.9 9.0 9.5 8.5

SOURCE :Asian Development Bank, <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/KI/2011/pdf/KOR.pdf> for

20032009 and <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/ki/2012/pdf/KOR.pdf> for 20102011. Data accessed
November 20, 2013.

THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF BILATERAL (SINOROK

AND USROK) ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Since 1992, South Korea has actively engaged China. Indeed, its successful
engagement with China has long been lauded as a positive model for culti-
vating interdependence between former adversaries.6 Above all, the ever-
growing Chinese economy provided Seoul with a huge incentive to strengthen
its economic ties with Beijing through increased trade and investment. As
Table 1 shows, China has replaced the US as South Koreas largest trading
partner since 2004. While there is no doubt that the US is still a key trading
partner of South Korea, its relative importance vis-a-vis China for South
Koreas trade in the postCold War world has decreased over time. For
instance, in 1990, the share of South Koreas exports to the US in its total
exports was 29.8% and the share of South Koreas imports from the US in its
total imports was 24.3%. For both exports and imports, the US was South
Koreas largest trading partner. In 2011, however, the former fell to 10.1% and
the latter fell to 8.5%. The US had become South Koreas second-largest export
market, after China (24.2%), and third-largest import market, after China

6. Chung, Korean Views of Korea-China Relations, p. 220.

 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  711

figure 1. South Koreas Balance of Trade with China, 19922011

SOURCE : Korea International Trade Association.

(16.5%) and Japan (13%).7 As Chinas economy continues to grow, the impor-
tance of the Chinese market vis-a-vis the American market for South Koreas
exports and imports will increase further.
The importance of China for South Koreas economy is illustrated by
Figure 1, which presents South Koreas balance of trade with China since
the 1992 normalization. It shows a general trend of growing bilateral trade (for
both exports and imports). The only exceptions are economic crisis periods
when South Koreas economy was seriously hit (i.e. the Asian nancial crisis
of 199798 and the global nancial crisis of 200809). What is more impor-
tant, bilateral trade data demonstrates that it was South Korea, not China,
that consistently had trade surpluses in the last two decades.
In addition, the pattern of bilateral trade between the two countries reveals
not only economic interdependence but also an uneven relationship of grow-
ing economic dependencethat is, South Korea has become far more eco-
nomically dependent on China than the other way around.8 Indeed, South
Koreas dependence ratio rose dramatically from 2.8% in 1990 to 21% in 2010,
whereas Chinas dependence ratio remained quite stable during the same
periodfor example 6.3% in 2010.9

7. Korea International Trade Association, Statistics&Reports 2006 and 2011, <http://www.

kita.org/>, accessed January 10, 2014.
8. For example, in 2010, Chinas share in South Koreas total exports was 25.1%, whereas South
Koreas share in Chinas total exports was only 4.4%.
9. Chung, Korean Views of Korea-China Relations, p. 220.
712  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

table 2. South Koreas FDI Outflows to China and the US (US$ millions)

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012*

China 141.3 675.6 1027.9 684.2 781.5 1113.1 2,404.0 3,452.4 3,832.1 3,620.7 2,285.3*
US 360.7 526.1 1,595.3 949.6 1437.4 616.2 1,410.5 1,910.7 5,099.3 3,374.4 3,017.7*

SOURCE : Korea EximBank, FDI Outflows, Invested Amount, <http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/en/fdi/

stat_01.jsp>, for South Koreas FDI outflows to China; <http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/en/fdi/stat_01.jsp>,
for South Koreas FDI outflows to the US. Data accessed December 15, 2013.
*As of September 2012.

Less remarkable than the bilateral trade data, South Koreas foreign
direct investment (FDI) outows to China also show a gradual but sub-
stantial increase since 1992, except for the nancial crisis periods of 199798
and 200810 (Table 2). For several years (e.g. 20022007 and 2010), China
even replaced the US as South Koreas destination for the largest outward
FDI in terms of investment amount. In 2011, China was the second-largest
destination for South Koreas outward FDI (with the invested amount of
US$ 3.57 billion), following the US (with the invested amount of US$ 5.87
billion).
All of these macroeconomic indicators exemplify Chinas growing eco-
nomic inuence over South Korea. Given South Koreas never-ending trade
surpluses with China since the 1992 normalization, there is little doubt that
China has become a major contributor to South Koreas economic growth as
well as its recovery from the Asian nancial crisis. What this implies for Sino
ROK relations is that, contrary to the thesis of the engagement school10
regarding how to deal with the rise of China, South Koreas strategic options
will be more restrained than Chinas because of South Koreas need for
economic interdependence.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND SOUTH KOREAS BEHAVIORAL SHIFTS

TOWARD CHINA

Growing bilateral economic ties are a key factor explaining Seouls engage-
ment behavior toward Beijing. It is important to note, however, that while
South Koreas behavior toward China has generally been one of engagement,

10. See e.g. David Shambaugh, Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijings
Responses, International Security 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180209.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  713

it nonetheless displayed several shifts in form and emphasis, depending on

Seouls leadership and its perception of Beijing and Washington.
For example, the Kim Young-sam governments (199398) engagement
with China was modest and carefully balanced with its desire to contain
Beijing. The Kim Young-sam governments engagement policy originated
from the segyehwa (globalization) drive, which was a more encompassing
version than the previous Roh Tae-woo governments (198893) nordpolitik
(northern diplomacy). In the rapidly changing international strategic envi-
ronment (in particular, the SinoSoviet reconciliation, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and the reunication of Germany), nordpolitik called for the
improvement of Seouls relations with socialist regimes on the basis of non-
ideological principles of equality, respect, and mutual prosperity. The great
success of nordpolitik, along with the inauguration of a moonmin (non-military,
civil) administration in Seoul in 1993 after a long struggle for democratization,
boosted South Korean leaderships effort for more ambitious foreign policy
initiatives toward all states, including former adversaries such as China, Russia,
and North Korea. The segyehwa drive particularly encouraged Seoul to imple-
ment engagement initiatives toward Beijing through various meetings of mul-
tilateral organizationsfor example the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)and bilat-
eral condence-building measures like high-level military exchanges.11 Never-
theless, it is worth stressing that, despite its occasional policy discords with
Washington as to how to respond to North Korean provocations (e.g. North
Koreas refusal to accept full international nuclear inspections in March 1994,
followed by its threat of war on the Korean Peninsula), a top policy priority of
the conservative Kim Young-sam government was to maintain strong bilateral
relations with the US, which had a new strategic goal of constructively engag-
ing (as opposed to containing) China in the postCold War world.12 In fact,
Seouls stance toward Washington at the time, compared to its stance toward
Beijing, was quite intimate and never doubted by anyone.
The Kim Dae-jung government (19982003) also pursued an engagement
strategy toward China. Like the Kim Young-sam government, the two key
ways Seoul engaged Beijing at that time were expanding the level of bilateral

11. Cha, Engaging China, p. 80.

12. Thomas J. Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and
U.S. Policy toward East Asia, International Security 31:1 (Summer 2006), p. 108; John J. Mearsheimer,
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 402.
714  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

trade and investment and opening bilateral security dialogues. In comparison

with the Kim Young-sam government, however, the Kim Dae-jung govern-
ments engagement with China was more proactive, as illustrated by its
ofcial endorsement of Beijings One China policy and public support for
Chinas membership in the World Trade Organization. More liberal in
nature than his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung actively reached out to Beijing
and sought to elicit its cooperation in dealing with North Korea, often
beyond Washingtons wishes and expectations. In particular, when the Kim
Dae-jung governments sunshine policy was implemented, Seouls policies
on how to respond to Pyongyang generally aligned more with Beijings than
with Washingtons. For example, while Washington and Tokyo considered
UN-level sanctions for North Korean provocations (such as the launch of
a Taepodong-1 three-stage ballistic missile over the East Sea/Sea of Japan in
August 1998, the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2002, and
the subsequent threat to abrogate the 1994 Agreed Framework on freezing
Pyongyangs nuclear weapons program in Yongbyon), both Seoul and Beijing
were quite restrained in their responses. They even opposed strong acts of
coercion against Pyongyang with a nearly single voice. In addition, to Wash-
ingtons surprise, Seoul not only explicitly dropped the Souths goal of uni-
cation by absorbing the North but also called for the lifting of US economic
sanctions on Pyongyang, exactly as Beijing had proposed. Although Seouls
active engagement with China during the Kim Dae-jung government was not
meant to stray from close political ties with Washington, it nonetheless
revealed Seouls recognition of Beijings strategic importance in resolving the
crises on the Korean Peninsula stemming from North Korean provocations.
Largely continuing but more substantially upgrading Kim Dae-jung gov-
ernments policies, the Roh Moo-hyun government (200308) pursued
a strategy of tilting toward China to a great extentin many observers eyes,
at the expense of the USROK alliance. (Tilting is dened later in the
article.) Rohs anti-American, proNorth Korean, pro-Chinese stance, com-
bined with the anti-American sentiment prevalent in South Korean society
during the early periods of Rohs tenure, often generated serious tensions and
policy disputes in the traditionally strong USROK relations.13 Above all, the

13. Suk-hee Han, From Engagement to Hedging: South Koreas New China Policy, Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis 20:4 (December 2008), p. 341. In fact, many progressives in the Roh
governments policy circle at that time put more weight on inter-Korean cooperation than on US
ROK cooperation and believed that the US was a main obstacle to Korean reconciliation and
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  715

Roh governments tilting behavior toward China was manifested in its policy
discord with the US over North Korea. In many respects, Seouls North
Korea policy of peace and prosperity during Rohs tenure was more con-
gruent with Beijings than with Washingtons. For example, despite Wash-
ingtons explicit opposition, the Roh government continuously provided
unconditional economic aid to North Korea. In fact, it parted from Wash-
ingtons hard-line policy of isolating the North and made the South the most
important source of economic aid and trade for North Korea, replacing
China.14 Also, criticizing the Bush administrations refusal to negotiate with
Pyongyang, Roh publicly opposed US strategic options of surgical military
attack, containment, and regime change in resolving North Koreas nuclear
crisis.15 Supporting Beijings position, Seoul emphasized the role of the Six-
Party Talks in dealing with Pyongyang and cooperated closely with Beijing,
while displaying sharply disparate views of the North Korean threat from
Washingtons. For example, the Roh government resisted further sanctions
against North Korea proposed by the US and Japan. While Washington and
Tokyo deemed them necessary, Seoul agreed with Beijing that they could
escalate undesirable tensions on the Korean Peninsula.16 Moreover, Roh
refused to cooperate with Washington in the Pentagons new defense plan
of strategic exibility, in which all American forces deployed abroad could
be exibly relocated and used for potential contingencies elsewhere. Roh
made it clear in 2005 that his government would oppose using South Koreas
territory and US bases for regional contingencies such as a Taiwan Strait
conict or a war against China.17 Furthermore, to Washingtons frustration,
the Roh government declined to participate in the US-led Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative, a global effort that aims to stop trafcking of weapons of mass

-
eventual reunication. See Norman D. Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind: The U.S.-ROK Security Rela-
tionship after 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).
14. James Brooke, 2 Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links, New York
Times, June 26, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/26/world/2-koreas-sidestep-us-to-forge-
pragmatic-links.html>, accessed July 10, 2014.
15. Jae-Yun Shim, Roh Opposes Sanctions against North Korea, Korea Times, November 14,
2004.
16. Zhimin Chen, Embracing the Complexities in China-ROK Relations: A View from China,
Asian Perspective 36:2 (April-June 2012), p. 212.
17. Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? p. 98; Robert S. Ross, Balance of
Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia, Security Studies
15:3 (July-September 2006), p. 381.
716  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern.18
The conservative Lee Myung-bak government (200813) terminated its
predecessors tilt toward China and instead implemented a strategy of hedg-
ing. Given the absence of a rigorous denition of hedging in the literature
of international relations in general and security studies in particular, it is
dened here as the security strategy of a weaker state against the uncertain
present and future intentions of a more powerful and potentially threatening
state through deepening bilateral economic ties and managing security con-
cerns not by apparent containment policies but by several risk-reduction
measures. Those include increasing bilateral political dialogue directly or
indirectly through international institutions, upgrading bilateral diplomatic
relationships, and maintaining (and strengthening) security ties with third
powers as insurance.19 Instead of simply choosing one side or one policy stance,
hedgers normally cherish a delicate middle ground between all-out balancing
and bandwagoning20 and, in so doing, seek to maximize the range of strategic
options available to them.21 To be sure, successful hedging demands a great
deal of skillful diplomacy.22 This is particularly true for South Korea since it
must content both China and the US simultaneously. The Lee Myung-bak
governments hedging strategy, which was designed to permit Seoul to deepen
economic interdependence with Beijing while remaining vigilant about uncer-
tainty in the evolving regional security structure, brought about a shift in South
Koreas China policy. First, on bilateral economic relations, the Lee govern-
ment further expanded trade and investment ties with China. In particular, it
agreed on May 2, 2012, to ofcially begin negotiations on a SinoROK free
trade agreement, seven years after joint feasibility studies between the two

18. Since its inception in 2003, 105 countries have endorsed the initiative. South Korea endorsed it
on May 26, 2009. US Department of State, Proliferation Security Initiative, <http://www.state.
gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>, accessed May 6, 2016.
19. For a slightly different meaning but a useful discussion of hedging, see Eric Heginbotham and
Richard J. Samuelson, Japans Dual Hedge, Foreign Affairs 81:5 (September/October 2002), pp.
110121; Evan S. Medeiros, Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacic Stability, Washington
Quarterly 29:1 (Winter 200506), pp. 145167; Evelyn Goh, Understanding Hedging in Asia-
Pacic Security, PacNet No. 43, August 31, 2006, <http://csis.org/les/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.
pdf>, accessed March 13, 2014.
20. Bandwagoning is a strategy of weak states to align with a stronger power.
21. Goh, Understanding Hedging.
22. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 115.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  717

figure 2. South Koreas Strategic Behavior toward China since 1992

Kim YS government Kim DJ government

Balancing Congaging Hedging Accommodang Tilng Bandwagoning

Lee & Park governments Roh government

SOURCE : By author.

countries. Second, in the security area, the Lee government upgraded the Sino
ROK political relationship from a comprehensive cooperative partnership to
a strategic cooperative partnership. Contrary to the previous Roh govern-
ment, however, it also reinforced the USROK security alliance and stressed its
importance as a strategic counterweight to Chinas regional inuence.23 In
addition, criticizing his predecessors conciliatory stance toward North Korea,
which was also encouraged by Beijing, Lee made it clear that denuclearization is
the precondition for inter-Korean economic cooperation and the renewal of
the Six-Party Talks. This directional change of South Koreas behavior was
clearly against Beijings preferencethat is, the weakening of USROK ties
and Seouls continuation of engagement toward North Korea.24 After all,
the Lee governments hedging behavior toward China was a result of the
combination of South Koreas leadership change from the anti-American,
pro-Chinese, proNorth Korean Roh to the pro-American Lee and Seouls
recognition of Chinas strategic importance for South Koreas security and
economic prosperity.
The variation in South Koreas behavior toward China described above
can be conceptualized as follows (see Figure 2). The Kim Young-sam govern-
ments behavior toward China was a sort of congagement: a delicate mix
of containment and engagement.25 On the continuum between the two
extremes (balancing and bandwagoning), it is closer to balancing. During
the congagement period, there was little tension in USROK relations since

23. Kim, South Koreas China Policy, p. 62.

24. Chen, Embracing the Complexities, p. 205.
25. See e.g. Zalmay Khalilzad, Congage China, Rand Issue Paper IP-187 (1999), <http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP187.pdf>, accessed March 28, 2014.
718  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

Seoul and Washington cooperated closely through policy tuning over North
Korean provocations and a potential China threat. The Kim Dae-jung gov-
ernments behavior toward China, on the other hand, could be characterized
as accommodating. Accommodating here refers to a gradual shift in a weak-
er states behavior in a way that aligns with the policy preferences of the target
state. Since it does not preclude a weaker states cooperation with the rivals of
the target state, it is different from bandwagoning.26 It is also different from
unprincipled appeasement, since it is strategically selective in that it accom-
modates some demands but refuses others.27
During the period of South Koreas accommodation of China, there were
occasional rifts/tensions in USROK relations due to policy discord between
Washington and Seoul (in contrast with policy concord between Beijing and
Seoul) over Pyongyangs provocations as well as over Kim Dae-jungs sun-
shine policy. Tilting toward Beijing describes the Roh Moo-hyun govern-
ments behavior toward China. Tilting is similar to accommodating but
entails a quicker inclination toward the policy preferences of the target state,
to the extent that it often results in damaging (and sometimes requires
sacricing) a weaker powers relations with third states. In terms of alignment
strategy, it is closer to the bandwagoning end of the spectrum. During Rohs
tenure, therefore, there were quite frequent and serious tensions in USROK
relations, since Seoul often disagreed with Washingtons policies (and aligned
more with Beijings proposals) over North Korean provocations, and vice versa.
The Lee Myung-bak governments behavior toward China can be termed
hedging. It is between congagement and accommodation on the continuum
of state behavior. Hedging is distinguished from congagement in that unlike
the latter, the former does not seek to contain the target state. Unsure of
strategic options of balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality, South Korea here
bet on both the US and China to minimize risk and thus avoided choosing
between the two dominant powers (i.e., not clearly picking one side at the
apparent expense of the other) for some sensitive security issues, while imple-
menting an engagement policy of deepening economic ties with Beijing.
In sum, South Koreas behavior toward China since 1992 has undergone
several shifts on the basis of its leadership changes and leaders perceptions of

26. Ross, Balance of Power Politics, p. 363.

27. Baogang He, Politics of Accommodation of the Rise of China: The Case of Australia,
Journal of Contemporary China 21:73 (January 2012), p. 58.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  719

Chinas ascent and what it means for South Korea. Nonetheless, it is impor-
tant to note that South Korea has never pursued a hard balancing strategy
against China despite its former adversarys rapid economic and military rise.
On this point, the argument that South Koreans do not really fear Chinas
growing power28 is not supported by empirical evidence. Several poll results
consistently show that South Koreans do fear Chinas growing economic and
military power.29 In fact, South Koreas perceptions of China as a security
threat have worsened, especially since the Koguryo history controversy in
200304.30 Beijings proNorth Korean stance on the Cheonan sinking and
Yeonpyeong shelling incidents in 2010 only reinforced those perceptions.31
Moreover, Chinas unilateral declaration of the air defense identication zone
in the East China Sea on November 23, 2013, aggravated South Koreans fear
of an assertive China, as it included South Koreas Ieodo (also known as
Socotra Rock), over which Beijing and Seoul have disputed sovereignty.32

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEM,

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, AND NORTH KOREAN THREAT

The question, then, is why South Korea is not actively balancing against
China, which is rapidly rising economically, militarily, and politically. While
the variable of South Koreas leadership change and its threat perception
explains delicate shifts in Seouls engagement behaviors toward Beijing over
time, it alone does not provide a full account for the absence of Seouls
balancing behavior against Chinas rise. Only when the domestic variable is
combined with key systemic variables of underlying policymaking conditions

28. Kang, Between Balancing and Bandwagoning.

29. See e.g. Chung, Korean Views of Korea-China Relations, pp. 220223; Nicholas Khoo,
Fear Factor: Northeast Asian Responses to Chinas Rise, Asian Security 7:2 (June 2011), 95118;
Chung-in Moon and Chun-fu Li, Reactive Nationalism and South Koreas Foreign Policy on
China and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, Pacic Focus 25:3 (December 2010), p. 352.
30. Chinas Dongbei gongcheng (Northeast Project) claims that Koreas ancient kingdom of
Goguryeo is a peripheral local government of China. While the history dispute did not escalate into
any specic retaliatory action, it provoked widespread anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korea and
forced South Koreans to reevaluate their view of Chinas rise and its long-term intentions. For
a detailed description, see Moon and Li, Reactive Nationalism.
31. Chung, Korean Views of Korea-China Relations, p. 226.
32. Outcry as China Maps New Air Defense Zone, Korea Joongang Daily, November 26, 2013,
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid2981024>, accessed March 5,
2014.
720  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

can South Koreas distinctive behavior be satisfactorily explained. The three

key systemic variables that comprise Seouls foreign policymaking conditions
are the US-centered hub-and-spoke alliance system, SinoROK economic
interdependence, and the North Korean threat.
First of all, an understanding of the role of the US-centered bilateral
security alliances in East Asiathat is, the US-centered hub-and-spoke sys-
tem of which the USROK alliance, along with the USJapan alliance, is
a key componentis essential to explain South Koreas behavior toward
China. While the USJapan alliance has solved Japans security problems
by allowing Tokyo to forgo its military buildup and reducing its neighbors
concerns about a resurgent and remilitarized Japan,33 the USROK alliance
has permitted Seoul to expand its economic ties with Beijing without being
paranoid about Chinas growing military power. Indeed, for South Korea, the
USROK alliance is the fundamental backbone of all of its security strategies
in the current international order. As long as the US security commitments to
South Korea and to the region remain strong as a counterweight to Chinas
rise, Seouls perception of Beijing as a security threat does not directly lead to
hard balancing behavior. Under these circumstances, Seoul is rather encour-
aged to deepen its ties with Beijing in order to reap economic and diplomatic
gains.
Another key factor that explains the absence of South Koreas hard bal-
ancing behavior against China is the ever-growing economic ties between the
two countries. As mentioned earlier, SinoROK economic interdependence
has substantially deepened since 1992. KITA reports that from 1992 to 2010,
the volume of the bilateral trade increased about 24 times. During the same
period, South Koreas cumulative trade surpluses with China totaled US$
217.6 billion.34 In addition, since the Asian nancial crisis of 199798, China
has become a major source of South Koreas trade surplus and thus made
a signicant contribution to Seouls economic recovery from the crisis. All of
these, along with the prospect of South Koreas growing economic depen-
dence on China for the next few decades, reinforce the argument that as far as
the bilateral economic relationship is concerned, China is becoming more
important for South Korea than the other way around. After all, Chinas rise

33. G. John Ikenberry, American Hegemony and East Asian Order, Australian Journal of
International Affairs 58:3 (September 2004), p. 355.
34. Korea International Trade Association, Statistics&Reports 2011, <http://www.kita.org/>.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  721

has thus far been a blessing, rather than a threat, for South Koreas economic
growth and prosperity.
From a strategic point of view, growing SinoROK economic interdepen-
dence also discourages Seouls leadership from employing a balancing strategy
against China. To be sure, economic interdependence alone does not warrant
cooperative political relations between economic partners.35 Nonetheless, it
can reduce policymakers incentives for opportunistic, crisis-provoking be-
haviors associated with military options. What is important to stress here is
Seouls belief that Beijings vital interests now lie in the stability of the Korean
Peninsula, since it is critical for Chinas persistent economic growth, which,
in turn, is pivotal for the Chinese Communist Partys regime legitimacy.36
Seouls belief along this line drives its leaders to favor an engagement strategy
over a counterbalancing one. Although Seoul understands that economic ties
with China do not automatically lead to political cooperation with Beijing,
which holds the principle of separation between politics and economy, it
nonetheless believes that deepening economic ties will gradually raise the
costs of non-cooperation in many other areas (e.g. social and cultural ex-
changes) that ultimately involve political considerations. In this sense, Seouls
engagement rather than balancing toward China is intended to cultivate
Beijings cooperation by tying Chinese national interests to the stability of
the Korean Peninsula.37
Finally, Seouls need for Beijings cooperation in containing the North
Korean threat is another factor that explains South Koreas absence of bal-
ancing behavior against China. Given the negative externalities that North
Koreas sudden collapse would create (e.g. massive refugee inows, regional
insecurity, disappearance of the buffer zone against liberal democratic regimes),
China truly favors North Koreas survival.38 Hence, Beijing has long provided
economic aid (especially fuel and food) and necessary political support to
Pyongyang. Indeed, despite some doubts regarding its effectiveness,39 the July

35. See e.g. Paul Papayounou and Scott Kastner, Sleeping with the Potential Enemy: Assessing
the US Policy of Engagement with China, Security Studies 9:12 (Autumn/Winter 1999/2000), pp.
164195.
36. Min-hyung Kim, Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Koreas
Strategic Choice, Journal of Strategic Studies, May 2015, p. 2, doi:10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433.
37. Cha, Engaging China, p. 79.
38. Kim, Why Provoke? p. 14.
39. See e.g. Jaewoo Choo, Mirroring North Koreas Growing Economic Dependence on China:
Political Ramications, Asian Survey 48:2 (March/April 2008), pp. 343372.
722  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

1961 Friendship Treaty between China and North Korea, which included an
automatic-intervention clause in the event of the other partys being attacked,
is still intact. What is worth stressing here is that given growing Chinese anxiety
over the Obama administrations US pivot (or rebalancing) to Asia, which
was announced in the fall of 2011and perceived by Chinese elites as a US
attempt to contain Chinas reemergence as a regional hegemon,40 Beijing now
needs Pyongyangs survival not only as a strategic buffer in Northeast Asia but
also as an important bargaining chip in its strategic competition with the US.41
Under these circumstances, South Koreas hard balancing against China can
generate strengthened Northern ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, casting
Seoul, instead of Pyongyang, as the primary threat to peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula. After all, Seouls engagementas opposed to balancing
behavior toward China is designed to avoid the unnecessary tightening of
counterbalancing coalitions between Beijing and Pyongyang as well as to deter
Beijing from supporting North Korean provocations and elicit Beijings oppo-
sition to North Koreas acts of aggression on the Korean Peninsula.

SOUTH KOREAS BEHAVIOR TOWARD CHINA AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

South Koreas distinct behavior toward China in the postCold War world is
not easily explained by the prevailing concepts of international relations
theory and thus has important implications for its proper application in East
Asia. First of all, South Koreas behavior can be fully understood only when
the US role in East Asian security is also taken into account. Since World
War II, the US has played a key balancing role in East Asia through the US-
centered hub-and-spoke system. Thanks to US security commitments to the
region as well as the Korean Peninsula, South Korea has been able to engage
China and deepen its economic ties with Beijing without excessive fear for its
own security. This is also true for Japan and some other East Asian countries
which have pursued a similar engagement strategy in the face of Chinas rise,
although there are variations in their responses and perceptions of a China

40. Bonnie S. Glaser, Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, April 2012, p. 22, <http://csis.org/publication/pivot-asia-prepare-
unintended-consequences>, accessed February 12, 2014.
41. Simon Shen, The Hidden Face of Comradeship: Popular Chinese Consensus on the DPRK
and Its Implications for Beijings Policy, Journal of Contemporary China 21:75 (May 2012), p. 429.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  723

threat. Hence, the assumption of anarchy as a perpetual feature of the inter-

national system42 does not fully capture the regional security environment.
Rather than a typical anarchy, where self-help is a principle of behavior of all
states, East Asias regional system may be better described as a hegemonic
hub-and-spoke system, where states behave with a certain degree of trust on
the basis of multiple US-centered bilateral alliances and frequently interact in
various multilateral institutional frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum, APEC, and ASEAN3.
Second, South Koreas behavior toward China illustrates that the dichot-
omy between security and economy is unhelpful in explaining state behavior
in the current international system. As a matter of fact, the dichotomy as
a research strategy has much to do with the division of labor with which the
elds of international security and international political economy in political
science have developed since World War II. While there is no doubt that the
approach generated important insights for state behaviors during the Cold
War period, it seems inappropriate to account for contemporary interna-
tional relations, where economically interdependent states compete strongly
for prosperity as well as survival, with no excessive fear of military conicts
with their key economic partners. Indeed, it is counterproductive to assume
that, for South Korea, security is always a more important goal than eco-
nomic prosperity. In most cases, South Korea in peacetime weighs the goals
of security and economic prosperity quite equally and balances these two
imperatives on an issue-specic basis. South Koreas behavior toward China
since the end of the Cold War, therefore, can only be understood when its
security imperative is effectively combined with its economic-prosperity goal.
The main driving forces of South Koreas behavior toward China are both
economic prosperity and security. These two goals are nearly inseparable for
South Korea, which is strategically positioned in the middle of the worlds
great powers such as the US, China, Russia, and Japan. This is why South
Korea has pursued an engagement strategy with China while often simulta-
neously reinforcing the USROK alliance. The USROK alliance is crucial
for South Koreas security, and the ever-growing Chinese market is indispens-
able for South Koreas economic growth and prosperity. What this implies
for international relations theory is that, despite some positive developments in

42. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison Wesley, 1979);
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
724  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

recent years, more substantial and systematic efforts should be made to x the
false division43 in the international relations eld through a dynamic linkage
between low politics (economic affairs) and high politics (security affairs).
Third, South Koreas behavior certies that the neorealist assumption of
the state as a unitary actor, which conveniently separates domestic politics
from international politics, is problematic. The fact that the leadership
changes in South Korea brought about its behavioral shifts toward Beijing
as well as toward Washington demonstrates that domestic politics does mat-
ter in explaining states behaviors in the international system. For example,
the Roh Moo-hyun governments tilt toward Beijing reects South Koreans
positive view of China as well as anti-American sentiment prevalent in South
Korean society during Rohs tenure. In contrast, the Lee Myung-bak govern-
ments policy of strengthening USROK alliance mirrors South Koreans
growing concerns about a more assertive China and Beijings proNorth
Korean stance toward Pyongyangs provocations, combined with the waning
of anti-American sentiment in South Korean society. To be sure, it may
sometimes be necessary that we separate domestic and international politics
as a strategy of research, since no scholar can study everything at the same
time. However, it should not deter researchers from making an effort to
explain state behavior through the understanding of the complex interactions
between domestic and international politics. Indeed, similarly positioned
states in the international system often behave differently, and in many cases
the variations in those states behavior are effectively explained by looking at
their domestic politics. Hence, the unitary-actor assumptionespecially in
the case of Waltzian neorealism, which claims that it is not possible to
understand world politics simply by looking inside of states44needs to
be relaxed for a convincing analysis of contemporary international relations.
As Jonathan Kirshner contends, it is not possible to understand world
politics simply by looking outside of states.45
Fourth, South Koreas shifting behavior toward China over time also has
theoretical implications for the enduring debate on the relationship between

43. This refers to the tendency of treating security and political economy as separate spheres of
study in the eld of international relations; see James A. Caporaso, False Division: Security Studies
and Global Political Economy, Mershon International Studies Review 39:1 (April 1995), pp. 117122.
44. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 65.
45. Jonathan Kirshner, The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of
China, European Journal of International Relations 18:1 (March 2012), p. 56.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  725

economic interdependence and political conict.46 While the literature on

interdependence and peace or conict is quite rich, no consensus exists on
their relationship. For example, liberals have long argued that by raising the
costs of conict, economic interdependence promotes cooperative political
relations and brings about peace and stability.47 Their main claim is that,
above all, the gains from trade through heightened economic interdepen-
dence reduce the incentives for territorial conquest.48 Realists, on the other
hand, argue that the uneven (non-proportional) division of benets from
trade49 and the unequal distribution of capabilities in the interdependent
world50 tend to produce political conicts between economic partners. They
also point to states asymmetrical trade and investment relationships as
a source of political discord, since a powerful state often manipulates the
terms of economic exchange.51 Meanwhile, several studies contend that eco-
nomic interdependence has no signicant impact on political relationships
between states. These studies separate the low politics of trade from the high
politics of political relations and assert that the pacic benets of economic
ties are not observed in political disputes where vital national interests are at
stake.52
What the South Korean case (i.e. South Koreas behavior toward China
over time) illustrates here is the important role that the missing intervening
variable of leadership change and its threat perception53 plays in explaining
the relationship between interdependence and peace or conict. This omission

46. Edward D. Manseld and Brian M. Pollins (eds.), Economic Interdependence and Interna-
tional Conict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2003).
47. Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
48. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World (New York: Free Press, 1986).
49. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1980).
50. Kenneth N. Waltz, Globalization and Governance, PS: Political Science and Politics 32:4
(December 1999), pp. 693700.
51. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds.), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977).
52. Barry Buzan, Economic Structure and International Security: the Limits of the Liberal
Case, International Organization 38:4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597624; Erik Gartzke, The Classical
Liberals Were Just Lucky: A Few Thoughts about Interdependence and Peace, in Economic
Interdependence and International Conict, pp. 96110.
53. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
726  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

in the literature on interdependence and peace or conict is a serious aw since

economic interdependence has different meanings for different states, depend-
ing on their leaders particular threat perceptions. For instance, the existing
literature cannot satisfactorily explain why state A displays diverging behavior
toward state B over time, despite little difference in their levels of economic
interdependence (e.g., South Koreas behaviors toward North Korea over
time). Only when the variable of leadership and its threat perception is also
taken into account can the link between economic interdependence and peace
or conict be more fully explained.

CONCLUSION

Like the Lee government, the current Park Geun-hye administration has
pursued a hedging strategy toward Beijing since its inception in 2013. Given
South Koreas growing economic dependence on China as well as the inten-
sifying SinoUS strategic competition for the sphere of inuence on the
Korean Peninsula, Seouls hedging strategy toward China is likely to continue
for the time being. However, the Park governments hedging strategy is
distinct from that of the Lee government. While the Lee governments
strategy of consolidating the USROK alliance was seen as a reversal of the
pro-China policy under his predecessors progressive governments, the Park
government has made great efforts to further strengthen its strategic partner-
ship with Beijing without weakening the USROK alliance. In other words,
the Park government has strived to strike a balance in its relations with the
US and China.54
The Park governments more balanced hedging behavior toward China
(compared to the Lee governments US-leaning hedging behavior) has been
observed in the following instances. First, in an Oval Ofce meeting with
Obama in May 2013, Park strongly emphasized Chinas leverage over North
Korea and the critical role that Beijing could play in her governments new
policy of trustpolitik.55 Second, at a summit meeting in Beijing on June 27,
2013, Park and Chinas new president, Xi Jinping, together condemned

54. Kim, South Koreas China Policy, p. 63.

55. The policy of trustpolitik aims to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conict into
a zone of peace by rebuilding trust between Pyongyang and Seoul. For a more detailed account, see
Geun-hye Park, A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang, Foreign
Affairs 90:5 (September/October 2011), pp. 1318.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  727

North Koreas nuclear weapons program as a serious threat to stability in

East Asia, agreeing to make joint efforts to end it.56 Third, during Xis visit to
Seoul before Pyongyang (and also before Kim Jong-uns visit to Beijing) on
July 45, 2014, both Xi and Park reemphasized a shared goal of a denuclear-
ized Korean Peninsula. They agreed to nish negotiations on a bilateral free
trade agreement by the end of 201457 (it was eventually concluded in Novem-
ber). Fourth, Seoul and Beijing have largely taken a joint stance against US
efforts to increase Japans security role in East Asia. Although the US inten-
tion here is to share the defense burden for Asian security with Japan, and
Japan is South Koreas quasi security ally,58 Seoul does not trust Tokyo. In
fact, China and South Korea share distrust of and animosity toward Japan.
Hence, both countries have expressed their shared concerns about the current
Abe administrations turn to right-wing foreign policy on such issues as
Japans earlier acknowledgement of its war crimes, the Japanese militarys
mobilization of comfort women (sex slaves), the revision of Japans history
books, and territorial disputes over Daioyu/Senkaku (between China and
Japan) and Dokdo/Takeshima (between South Korea and Japan). Under these
circumstances, US support for Japans right to collective self-defense through
a reinterpretation of its 1947 pacist constitution,59 along with the Abe admin-
istrations increase of Japans military spending since 201460 and the creation of
a Japanese version of the US National Security Council, which the Japanese
Parliament (Diet) approved on November 27, 2013,61 has heightened Seouls as

56. Sang-hun Choe, China and South Korea Reafrm Efforts Aimed at North, New York
Times, June 27, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/world/asia/china-and-south-korea-
reafrm-efforts-to-end-north-koreas-nuclear-threat.html>, accessed May 2, 2014.
57. Yonhap News Agency, Xis Visit to Seoul Marks New Milestone for Ties: China FM, July
5, 2014, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/07/05/95/0401000000AEN201407050
01500315F.html>, accessed July 6, 2014.
58. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
59. Martin Fackler and David E. Sanger, Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China,
New York Times, July 1, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japan-moves-to-
permit-greater-use-of-its-military.html>, accessed July 2, 2014.
60. Justin McCurry, Japan Plans Largest Ever Defence Budget to Counter Chinas Reach, The
Guardian, August 31, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/31/japan-plans-largest-
ever-defence-budget-to-counter-chinas-reach>, accessed September 1, 2015.
61. Ayako Mie, Diet Passes Bill to Create National Security Council, Japan Times, November
27, 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/27/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-passes-
bill-to-create-national-security-council/>, accessed May 29, 2014.
728  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

well as Beijings anxiety about Japans rearmament.62 Given that to many

South Koreans Japans rearmament still poses a much bigger security threat
than Chinas military buildup, Seouls perception of a Japan threat (rather
than a China threat) is another factor that is likely to drive the Park admin-
istrations hedging (as opposed to hard balancing or containment) strategy
toward Beijing.
But predicting the future of South Koreas behavior toward China de-
mands our keen attention to not just South Koreas recent leadership change
but also its structural constraints. As mentioned earlier, the US hegemonic
position in East Asia through the US-centered hub-and-spoke system is a key
structural variable in explaining South Koreas contemporary behavior. While
the variable of leadership change and its threat perception explains South
Koreas behavioral shift toward China over time, the variable of US security
commitments through its bilateral alliances with East Asian partners accounts
for why it is possible for Seoul to pursue an engagement strategy toward
Beijing in the rst place with less fear of the consequences of deepening ties
with its former adversary. So long as the USROK alliance remains secure
and US-centered bilateral security alliances are rmly in place, therefore,
South Korea will feel less pressure to balance against China. Rather, Seoul
will seek to expand and deepen its economic ties with Beijing, recognizing
that its future economic relations are increasingly tied to China rather than to
the US. This is not to imply that South Korea is not fearful of China63 or that
Seoul believes that a more powerful and dominant China contributes to
regional stability in East Asia.64 Seoul does fear Chinas growing power, but
what determines its behavior toward China is its leaderships perceptions of
Beijings intentions as well as the regional strategic environment against
which Seoul evaluates the best course of actions to maximize its national
interests.
An important question to ask here regards South Koreas strategic choice
in the growing SinoUS rivalry in East Asia. That is, to what extent can South
Korea get away with special benets from both powers (i.e. security benets
from Washington and economic gains from Beijing)? For example, the Obama
administration has recently announced its plan to deploy an advanced regional

62. Kim, South Koreas China Policy, pp. 6768.

63. Kang, Between Balancing and Bandwagoning.
64. David Kang, Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytical Frameworks, International
Security 27:4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5785.
 KIM / SOUTH KOREAS CHINA STRATEGY  729

ballistic missile defense system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), in South Korea, to counter North Koreas increasing missile and
nuclear threats. And it has encouraged the Park Geun-hye government to
participate in the US-led Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP), which excludes
China, and has pressured Seoul not to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). The Xi Jinping government, on the other hand, has
encouraged the Park government to join the AIIB in order to have more say in
international development projects than it would with the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank, which are largely under the inuence of the US and
Japan. It has also warned that South Koreas decision to allow the THHAD on
the Korean Peninsula would impair SinoROK relations.65 While Seoul is
currently considering participation in the THAAD and the TPP, it pays keen
attention to Chinas concerns about them. Although Seoul recently pledged to
be an AIIB founding member, that decision came only after other US allies
such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy announced their decisions to
join. All of this illustrates that while the Park governments balanced-hedging
strategy may be a smart choice for South Korea, which is in absolute need of
a strong partnership with both the US and China for security and economy,
the effective implementation of that strategy is a daunting task. South Koreas
growing economic dependence on China can make Seoul vulnerable to Bei-
jings pressure, whereas US commitment to South Koreas security can be
affected by how Seoul manages its China policy as well as Seouls contribution
to the overall US strategy for the region.
As Cha notes, until the early 1990s, the ChinaSouth Korea axis had been
one of the most neglected variables in explaining the East Asian strategic
environment.66 With the improvement of bilateral relations after normaliza-
tion and the substantial increase of trade and investment ties between the two
countries in the wake of Chinas rise, however, this axis has quickly become
a key variable in tackling strategic issues in the region.67 The nuclear crises on
the Korean Peninsula provoked by North Korea further increased the impor-
tance of the SeoulBeijing axis. As described earlier, Seoul often shared the
same policy responses with Beijing to North Korean provocations, sometimes
aggravating Washington. In addition, during the G. W. Bush administration,

65. Kim, South Koreas China Policy, pp. 6669.

66. Cha, Engaging China, p. 74.
67. Chung, Between Ally and Partner.
730  ASIAN SURVEY 56:4

Seoul and Beijing worked closely together to bring Washington as well as

Pyongyang to the negotiation table of the Six-Party Talks. Hence, future
studies of East Asian security should pay more attention to this sort of over-
looked relation to fully grasp evolving regional security dynamics.
Finally, South Koreas behavior and vacillating SinoROK as well as
USROK relations in the postCold War world defy straightforward appli-
cation of international relations theory and thus shed important light on its
renement. Above all, to provide a compelling account of state behaviors in
East Asia, several major neorealist assumptions of international politics (in
particular, anarchy as a common and perpetual feature of the international
system, states as unitary actors, and security over economic welfare as an
ultimate goal of every state at all times) need to be rethought, with more
attention to the domestic politics of the state in question and the specic
context in which the state is strategically positioned. Likewise, the liberal
thesis of the causal linkage between economic interdependence and peace
seems incomplete and thus needs to be rened further by adding some key
domestic (and intervening) variables. While this article sought to make a small
contribution to this relatively new research area by linking a domestic-
leadership variable to structural variables of strategic environment such as
economic interdependence, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system, and the
North Korean threat, further research is necessary to systematically explore
the conditions under which economic interdependence leads to balancing,
bandwagoning, or some other types of behaviors of states. Another area that
the limited scope of this article was unable to fully examine and thus future
research can explore is a more systematic analysis of the specic ways in which
domestic variables interact with key structural variablese.g. the conditions
under which the former take precedence over the latter or vice versain
generating the strategic behaviors of weaker powers (e.g. South Korea) posi-
tioned between the two dominant powers in the region (i.e. the US and
China).