Saudi Arabia cuts off Qatar

The kingdom is raising tensions with its immediate neighbours as well as with
Iran and Yemen

Print edition | Middle East and Africa

Jun 10th 2017

TRIBAL feuding among the Al Thanis, Al Khalifas, Al Sabahs and Al Sauds

has been the norm for centuries. From their beginnings in Nejd, the barren
interior of the Arabian peninsula, they sparred for the best coastal spots from
which to launch pirate raids into the Gulf. But even at the height of acrimony,
they always observed unwritten rules of refuge and hospitality. When the
tribes became states five decades ago, their people still travelled, lived and
intermarried across lines in the sand. Their sheikhs might withdraw their
ambassadors when tempers flared, but even when King Salman of Saudi
Arabia went to war in Yemen in 2015, he let more than a million Yemenis in
his kingdom stay.

For Gulf Arabs, the expulsion of Qataris by Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia ordered on June 5th is more shocking than
a declaration of war. It has torn up their code of conduct. With two weeks
notice to leave, Saudi husbands fear they might forfeit their livelihoods if they
follow their Qatari wives. The queues at Qatars only land border, with Saudi
Arabia, already tail back for miles. The dunes have become barriers,
preventing the entry of people and goods, including much of Qatars food
supply. Short-haul tourism has collapsed. The UAE has criminalised any
expression of sympathy for Qatar, tweets included. Diplomatic ties have been
severed, and air, land and sea links closed by the three neighbours, as well as
by Egypt and Yemen.

Protruding like a sore thumb from the Arabian peninsula, tiny Qatar has long
bugged its neighbours. But the explanations offered for the sudden,
unprecedented closure seem inadequate. Only a fortnight beforehand, the
Qatari emir had stood smiling alongside those who have now banished him. In
a show of unity, they feted Donald Trump, the American president, in Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia blames Qatars involvement in terrorism, which to those
recalling the role Saudi jihadists played on 9/11 sounds rich. Qatars ties to
Iran, too, irk Saudi clerics and kings, particularly the joint and expanding
development of South Pars, the worlds largest gasfield. But Kuwait and
Oman are on similarly good terms with the Islamic Republic, and Dubai, one
of the UAEs seven emirates, provided the biggest back door into Iran when
the world imposed sanctions on it.

The pretensions of Qatars ruling Al Thani family to global grandeur have also
vexed other rulers. The statelet has sought significance by offering a sanctuary
to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab worlds foremost Islamist movement.
Diplomats found in Qatar a place in which to talk to Islamists, including
Yousef Qaradawi, the Brotherhoods favourite preacher; Khaled Meshal, until
recently the leader of Hamas, the militant Palestinian group; Abbassi Madani
from Algeria; and several of the Talibans leaders. A media empire led by Al
Jazeera, a satellite TV channel, has for decades helped Qatar find a mass
audience. It offered a platform to dissidents from across the region (except
Qatar), giving voice to popular anger which erupted in the Arab spring of
2011. It then goaded revolutionaries to take up arms, and endorsed Islamists
who stood in elections. Qatar bankrolled their campaigns and filled their
coffers when they took power.

The Arabian peninsula is not big enough, however, to realise all its rulers
ambitions. Rivalries have grown as each struggles to create global shipping
hubs, airlines, media arms, expeditionary forces and financial districts. A
generation ago the Gulf was led by consensus-builders, whose prime concern
was stability. But petrodollars, vast arsenals and Mr Trumps blessing risk
turning their descendants into vainglorious autocrats with talents for
inflaming, not compromising. Saudi Arabias young deputy crown prince and
de facto ruler, Muhammad bin Salman, it is said, likes to be called Alexander
[the Great]. Their intelligence agents run amok, spreading dirt on each other,
true or false. One of the triggers offered for the latest showdown is the
revelation in Qatari-owned media of e-mails purportedly hacked from the
account of the UAEs ambassador in Washington, Yousef Otaiba.

For now, the Al Thanis have the means to withstand the pressure. The
sheikhdom is the worlds biggest supplier of liquefied natural gas. Mr Trump
might celebrate Qatars come-uppance in tweets, but he must still consider the
roughly 10,000 soldiers stationed there at al-Udeid, Americas largest air base
in the Middle East (though the Emiratis would prefer he move it their way).
Egypt, which has also severed ties, knows that Qatar may retaliate by
expelling its workers if it hinders Qatari exports through the Suez canal. Even
the UAE worries that Qatar might shut off the gas pipeline supplying its
domestic market.

But things can get much nastier. After Saudi Arabia closed Qatars only land
border, Iran offered to make up the shortfall. If Qatar drifts further into Irans
orbit, Gulf officials warn that more punitive, economic measures could
follow. An attack, claimed by Islamic State, on Tehrans parliament on June
7th has heightened the tension: Iran is blaming Saudi Arabia, though without
evidence.

There will be few winners. Airline embargoes harm tourism across all Gulf
states, in the eyes of foreigners who cannot tell one sheikhdom from other,
just when they are trying to diversify their economies. Investors already
unnerved by Yemens protracted war have further cause to fear Arabian
instability. Mr Trumps recent proposal for an Arab NATO looks aborted.
Plans for the Gulf Co-operation Council to forge a common foreign and
economic policy lie in tatters. If only the world had a superpower focused
more on diplomacy and less on selling weapons.
 Who is to blame for the Conservatives polling slump?
A late surge in the polls for the Labour Party means Britains general election

next week suddenly looks interesting

Graphic detail

Jun 2nd 2017

by THE DATA TEAM

THIS was not meant to happen. When Theresa May, Britains prime minister,

called a snap general election on April 18th she was sure that her Conservative

Party would secure a much larger majority, which she said was needed to

strengthen her hand in negotiations with the European Union about Brexit. In

poll after poll, the Conservatives had a comfortable lead of some 20 points, as

Mrs May endlessly repeated her message of strong and stable government.

Their lead over Labour soared to 50 points among older voters. The poor, and

even the very poor, flocked to them as the UK Independence Party imploded.

UKIP, whose reason for existence vanished when last Junes Brexit vote went

its way, had drawn supporters from both Labour and the Conservatives in the

general election in 2015. But its post-Brexit demise seemed to benefit the

Conservatives more.
But after the manifestos were launched in mid-May, the Conservatives were

quickly forced into an embarrassing climbdown on their signature policy on

social care, which would have required more elderly people to dip into their

housing wealth. Their poll lead shrank. A subsequent, disastrous television

interview by Mrs May narrowed that lead even more. Strong and stable

suddenly looked weak and wobbly.

The biggest movement in the polls has been among the young, whose support

for Labour has soared. The question is whether they will turn out in higher

numbers than they usually do. One pollster, YouGov, now predicts a hung

parliament, in which no party has an overall majority. That would have

seemed risible just a few weeks ago.

It is still probable that Mrs May will secure a majority on June 8th. But it is

not the sure thing that it seemed at the beginning of the campaign. For the

Conservatives, a boring and predictable election has suddenly become all too

interesting.
America and climate change

The flaws in Donald Trumps decision to pull out of the

Paris accord

A clue: in spurning the global climate deal, America stands shoulder to

shoulder with Syria and Nicaragua

AFTER announcing on June 1st that America will abandon the Paris climate
agreement, Donald Trump can at least claim to have honoured a campaign
promise. Then again, as he also pledged to reinstate torture, eliminate the
national debt in eight years and hail Irans supreme leader with Hey baby!,
that isnt saying much. And the presidents decision to withdraw from the
accord is similarly unconscionable and fatuous. A repudiation of his
predecessors main climate policy, it was opposed by most of Mr Trumps
advisers, most large American firms and two-thirds of Americans. Mr Trump
has dealt a severe blow to Americas interests and standing.

More hot air than a flue-gas stack

The Republicans who had been arguing to leave Paris, including Scott Pruitt,
who disputes that people cause climate change and heads Mr Trumps
Environmental Protection Agency, consider this as merely consistent with
George W. Bushs decision to exit the Kyoto protocol in 2001. Yet Mr Bush,
though misguided, at least had an economic argument. Kyoto imposed binding
greenhouse-gas emissions cuts on rich countries but not on fast-growing
developing ones, such as China, which overtook America to become the
worlds biggest polluter only six years later.
The Paris accord is different. All its signatorieswhich is to say, every
country except Syria, Nicaragua and now Americahave undertaken to
reduce emissions against business-as-usual targets. By withdrawing, Mr
Trump has signalled that America will neither honour its agreements nor
moderate its pollution, even as governments take measures to do so in much
poorer countries, such as India, whose emissions per head are a tenth the size
of Americas. That is unconscionable.

The fatuous part is for Mr Trump to claim that his decision is designed to
invigorate American coal mining. There is no reason to expect that it will.
Miners are struggling mainly because cheap and plentiful natural gas is taking
coals markets. Even if Mr Trump truly believes that climate-change policy is
to blame, he had no need to withdraw from Paris, because Americas
commitmenta 26-28% cut in its 2005 level of emissions by 2025was so
modest. America is almost halfway to meeting that target even before
adopting many of the environmental strictures Barack Obama had envisaged.
Had Mr Trump elected to stay in Paris, but still dismantled those putative
curbs on burning coal, America might have met its target anyway. And even if
it had not, it would have lost nothing but facewhich is why Rex Tillerson,
who was the boss of Exxon, an oil giant, before he became secretary of state,
argued for staying in.

Why did Mr Trump ignore him? Perhaps because, at the G7 meeting in Sicily
last month, he sensed his fellow leaders disliked him, even as they urged him
not to withdraw. Or maybe because he wanted to divert attention from the
scandals plaguing his White House. Those are just guesses. Yet Mr Trump has
made such a mockery of diplomacy and policymaking that the world is readier
to believe them than his ostensible reason for withdrawing from one of the
most successful international accords of recent years.

The tragedy, as so often with Mr Trump, is that if he were only more like the
pragmatic problem-solver he claims to be, he could have done some real good.
Climate policy, a jerry-rigged system of subsidies and compromises, in
America and everywhere, needs an overhaul. A growing number of
Republicans want a revenue-neutral carbon tax. As this newspaper has long
argued, that would not only be a better way of curbing pollution but also boost
growth. A truly businesslike president would have explored such solutions. Mr
Trump has instead chosen to abuse the health of the planet, the patience of
Americas allies and the intelligence of his supporters.
Britain suffers its third deadly terrorist attack in as
many months

The attack on London Bridge marks a return to crude, low-tech assaults

THE attack in London on June 3rd, which left seven people dead and 48
injured, was the third deadly terrorist incident in Britain in less than three
months. At about 10pm a van was driven at speed into pedestrians on London
Bridge, before three men got out and began stabbing people around Borough
Market, just south of the Thames. The men, who one witness said had shouted
This is for Allah, were shot dead by police.

Although the three suspects wore what looked like suicide-bombers vests,
they turned out to be fake. Knives and a large van were the only murder
weapons involved. Police believe that no other attackers were involved.

The crude attack bears some similarities to the assault on March 22nd in
which Khalid Masood, a 52-year-old British convert to Islam, mowed down
pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, killing four, before getting out to stab a
policeman to death. In that attack the target was the Houses of Parliament.
This time it appears that the terrorists honed in on people drinking in bars.

The simplicity of the latest assault is in contrast to the attack on May 22nd at
the Manchester Arena, in which a relatively sophisticated bomb was used to
kill 22 people and injure more than 100. The perpetrator of that attack, Salman
Abedi, a 22-year-old British Muslim, may have undergone training in Libya.
Britains run of attacks demonstrates the dual nature of the terrorist threat. On
the one hand are complex plots such as the Manchester attack, which have the
potential to kill many but whose multiple strands give the security services a
better chance of disrupting them. On the other are low-tech attacks like the
latest one, which tend to have fewer casualties (in large part because of
Britains strict gun laws) but are harder to anticipate and prevent.

The arrest of 12 men in the Barking area of east London in the aftermath of
the attack does not at this point suggest that there was network behind the
perpetrators, as police believe there was behind Abedi. It is almost certain that
the identity of the three men is known, although not yet whether, as is likely,
they had appeared previously on the radar screen of the security services.
One of them is believed to have been a married man and a father of two
children. The arrests are likely to be part of a normal information-gathering
operation involving raids of the perpetrators homes and interviews under
caution of anyone who might have been close to them. The fact that the
terrorist-threat level, which was briefly raised to critical after the
Manchester attack, has remained at severe, the next rung down, indicates
that investigators are not looking for accomplices who may be planning a
follow-up attack.

What is worrying the security services most is the possibility that low-tech
simple attacks of the kind that have now struck London twice in just over two
months may be attracting imitators. This was one of the suggestions made by
the prime minister, Theresa May, in her response to the horror of Saturday
night. Terrorism, she said, breeds terrorism. She also went on to say that
there was too much tolerance of Islamist extremism. In particular, she
demanded that more pressure be put on internet firms such as Google and
Facebook to be made accountable for material they publish that may aid
terrorism.

Quite what she has in mind is not clear. Mrs May used the odd expression that
enough is enough as if any level of political violence were acceptable. It
seems probable that after the general election on Thursday, a major review of
counter-terrorism policies will be an urgent priority. Among the measures
likely to be recommended are: longer prison sentences for terrorist offences;
the issuing of many more Tpims (terrorism prevention and investigation
measures) to tag and curfew some suspects; more use of powers to confiscate
passports; a beefing up the Prevent anti-radicalisation strategy; and even
more resources for the security service (MI5) and counter-terrorism police.
James Mattis tries to reassure Asian allies about Donald
Trump
At the Shangri-La Dialogue, the defence secretary was placed in an
unenviable position

DONALD TRUMPS America still stands by allies in Asia and Europe, and I
can give you absolute optimism about this issue, the Secretary of Defence,
James Mattis, told an audience of generals, diplomats and security types at the
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3rd. His words were stirring, and
just what the gathering longed to hear. Perhaps no member of the Trump
administration has as much worldwide credibility as Mr Mattis, a former four-
star Marine general with no political background, revered by his peers as a
ferocious yet learned warrior monk. But deep down the room did not
believe him.

Mr Mattis is a distinguished man in an unenviable position. His mission here

in Singapore is to reassure allies and warn foes that America remains the
ultimate guarantor of the rules-based international order that has brought years
of nearly uninterrupted peace and prosperity to Asia. But if he does that job
too well and insists that Americas global role is unchanged, who will think
that he really speaks for President Donald Trump?

For all its high-tech staging (to ask a question, members of the audience must
scan their ID badges on their microphone) the Shangri-La Dialogue has a
distinctly pre-modern feel. It could be a conference in 19th-century Vienna, or
perhaps the set of a James Bond film from the Connery era. Vietnamese
generals stride past Australian admirals in tropical whites; a giant of a Fijian
officer waits near a waif-like Saudi delegate, his gold-edged robe denoting
princely rank. The tectonic energies unleashed by a rising China, a wavering
West and an anxious Asia rumble beneath every meeting.

American defence secretaries are big news at the Shangri-La. Lexington is

travelling with Mr Mattis this week on his official military plane, and even an
inward-looking America puts on quite the show. The head of the Pentagon
travels the world aboard a doomsday plane, a windowless, radiation-shielded
military version of a Boeing 747, filled with the secure communications kit to
run a nuclear war from aloft.

As soon as the giant plane landed in Singapore and we zipped into the city in a
fast motorcade, Mr Mattis was straight into bilateral meetings with prime
ministers and ministers of defence, all broadly wanting to ask the same two
questions. One, how does Trumps America see its national security interests
in Asiaa question which in June 2017 essentially involves ranking two
issues: the urgent threat of North Korea developing a nuclear missile capable
of hitting America versus the long-term challenge of a China seemingly intent
on becoming a regional hegemon, including by building air bases on contested
reefs in the South China Sea? Two, when weighing its interests and values in
foreign policy, how much weight does Trumps America attach to values?

Mr Mattis used his formal speech to offer a carefully crafted answer to the
first question. The short version of his reply is that America takes North Korea
very seriously indeed and wants China to do more to rein in the regime there,
but will not trade help in that sphere for concessions in the South China Sea
that mock international law and the principle that all countries have equal
rights regardless of size. The former general noted sharply that the North
Korea regime has a long record of murder of diplomats, of kidnapping,
killing of sailors and criminal activity. Its attempts to develop nuclear
intercontinental ballistic missiles are a clear and present danger, Mr Mattis
added. The Trump administration believes that China will come to see North
Korea as a liability not an asset, and hopes to see Chinas words opposing a
nuclear North Korea matched by actions.

At the same time, Mr Mattis did not soft-pedal his views on Chinese
behaviour in the South China Sea. Accusing China of showing contempt for
the interests of its neighbours, the defence secretary growled that America
opposes countries militarising artificial islands and enforcing excessive
maritime claims unsupported by international law. We cannot and will not
accept unilateral, coercive changes to the status quo.

Speak to American officials, and they insist that it is a false choice to suppose
that Chinese co-operation over North Korea can only be bought with
concessions in the South China Sea. To simplify, they suggest that this binary
choice must be broadened to take in a wide range of other security interests,
such as terrorism or global nuclear non-proliferation. They hint that American
resolve in the South China Sea, perhaps involving increased freedom of
navigation passages by warships and over-flights by airplanes, may
demonstrate that as North Koreas nuclear programme grows more dangerous,
Americas appetite for risk will grow in lockstep.
In his public speech on June 3rd, Mr Mattis probably did as good a job as he
could of answering that first question about interests. He was limited in what
he could do when it came to the second query, about values.

There was something almost heartbreaking about the questions posed by the
audience to the defence secretary, a lean man with a craggy face, the cropped
silver hair of a Marine, and a laconic speaking-style. An Australian delegate
noted Mr Trumps dismissive comments about NATO, and his withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a big trade pact, and from the Paris climate
accord. Should the region worry that it is seeing the destruction of the rules-
based order, the Australian asked. A member of the Japanese parliament
wondered aloud whether America still shares common values with its allies,
or just security interests.

This being a blog rather than a newspaper article, readers may indulge the
author for quoting Mr Mattiss replies at some length. The defence secretary is
not a dissident within the Trump administration. He is a loyal servant of a
democratically elected president. But in his defence of the post-war order, he
was trying to tell his Asian audience that some principles and instincts are so
deeply rooted in the American spirit that they can survive the swings and
counter-swings of electoral politics.

This, then, is my transcript of Mr Mattiss unscripted remarks, replying to

those questions about the rules-based order. Hear, here, an old-fashioned
public servant wrestling with the duty of serving a very different sort of
president, but one who won an election promising an America First foreign
policy.
Mr Mattis said: Obviously, we have a new President in Washington, DC,
were all aware of that, and theres going to be fresh approaches taken. But
look at Mr Trumps first foreign trip to the Middle East, he went on, and the
presidents call on Arab allies and international organisations to work together
on countering terrorism and bringing stability to the Middle East. Later in his
reply, he argued that Mr Trump had visited Brussels to demonstrate that he
stands by NATO allies 100%. He further noted that Mr Trump had sent him
to Tokyo and to Seoul on his first foreign trip as defence secretary, to make
clear Americas commitment to its allies in Asia.

The middle passage of his reply was the interesting part. He said: I think we
have been engaging the world for a long time. Historically, the Americans
have been reluctant to see themselves in that role. We were quite happy
keeping between our two oceans, we were happy to stay there, but the 20th
century took us out of that. At the same time we recognised, especially the
Greatest Generation we called them, coming home from world war two, what
a crummy world if we all retreat inside our own borders. How many people
deprived of good lives during the Depression, how many tens of millions of
people killed in world war two? Like it or not, we are part of the world. That
carries through, for all of the frustrations that are felt in America right now
with the sense that at times we have carried an inordinate burden. And that is
still very deeply rooted in the American psyche, that engagement with the
world. To quote a British observer of us from some years ago: bear with us,
once we have exhausted all possible alternatives, we Americans will do the
right thing.

For all those anxious to see America remain a guarantor of democratic values
in Asia, this is a hard moment. For it is the democratic process itself that
forces men such as Mr Mattis to twist himself in knots, and to try to convince
allies that America stands by certain unvarying principles, even though his
commander-in-chief won office by vowing to tear down the status quo. You
see, China can murmur to Asian governments now: democracies are unstable
and inconstant.

Here at the Shangri-La Dialogue, delegates do not hide their relief that
America has a principled, clever man as defence secretary. But the Pentagon
cannot and should not be the final arbiter of how America balances values and
interests in national security and foreign policy. That, ultimately, is the job of
the president. And here among the Asian military and security establishment,
that thought is not reassuring at all.