Paragon or Devil: Alexander

Hamilton and Vigorous

Government
Nicholas R. Satin

Alexander Hamiltons America

Adams State University
Spring 2017
Dr. Carol Berkin
Dr. Joseph Murphy
 In Federalist No. 1, Alexander Hamilton commences the defense of the

Constitution and the reasons for New York to ratify it, proclaiming the vigor of

government is essential to the security of liberty.1 But what does Hamilton mean

by vigor of government? To his defenders, he referred to, among other aspects,

efficient government and rule of law, and a stable, successful, hardy nation. To his

detractors, he is a cancer who aborted the glory that could be America by using the

auspices of vigorous government to become the so-called American Bonaparte.

Which is it? Alexander Hamilton was many things, but a chameleon was not among

them; a paragon cannot be a devil, nor a devil a paragon.

The late Forrest McDonald has written Hamilton was primarily

concernedwith the distribution of power on the vertical axis, not the horizontal.2

By vertical and horizontal McDonald refers to a hierarchy of sovereignty with

each entity preeminent within its own field. Using the pyramid of British

government to elaborate, McDonald explains Hamilton was an admirer of this

British system: the power of Crown in Parliament was absolute at the top of the

pyramid, but so was that of each part of the system on its own level, down to the

lowly justiceships of the peace.3 It was the dearth of a similar structure in America

that contributed to Congresss shortcomings in prosecuting the Revolutionary War.

Hamilton believed narrow and niggardly provincialism of [Congressional]

1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 1, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed01.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).
2 Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (W. W. Norton & Company,

1982), 38.
3 Ibid., 61.

1
constituents, the state governments, lacking checks and controlsand an effective

separation of powers hindered the American cause throughout the duration of the

conflict. The only method of restraining this unbridled state power was a vast

increase in the powers of Congress.4

This vast increase of federal power a vigorous government did not

occasion abolition of the state governments. As Hamiltons preference for the British

hierarchy revealed, Hamilton proposed a concept of divided sovereigntythe idea

that each level of government in America was sovereign, but only in regard to the

objects entrusted to it.5 At the apex would stand the national government to stall

the aristocracy of state pretensions.6 However, each sovereign, according to

Hamilton, would own the requisite power(s) to meet the obligations of its

sovereignty.7

Biographer Ron Chernow comparably echoes McDonald. Hamilton scoffed at

notions a vigorous national government necessarily entailed a zero-sum game

with the states. Hamilton conveyed the general government will at all times stand

ready to check the usurpations of the state governments and these will have the

same dispositions towards the general government.8 In other words, the national

government will check the states, and the states will check the national

government. Chernow insightfully recognizes that Hamilton was as quick to

4 Ibid., 38.
5 Ibid., 109.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 205.
8 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (Penguin Books, 2004), 256.

2
applaud checks on powers as those powers themselves, as he continued his lifelong

effort to balance freedom and order.9 Likewise, he acknowledges Hamiltons faith

in a sovereign national government with the requisite power to serve its role, citing

the esteemed Bernard Bailyn, who specified:

The Constitution, in creating a [vigorous] [national] governmentdid not betray the Revolution,
with its radical hopes for greater political freedom than had been known before. Quite the
contrary, it fulfilled those radical aspirations, by creating the power necessary to guarantee
both the nations survival and the preservation of the people and the states rights.10

Paul Light has reflected similarly. Hamilton saw the delicate balance

between a government strong enough to protect a fragile nation against foreign and

domestic threats, yet not strong enough to oppress the nation.11 Striking this

precarious balance, the vigorous national government would have the authority to

tap the genius of the people, eliminate duplication and overlap between the

states, and guard against illicit trade, collect taxes, build armies and assure the

tranquility, commerce, revenue, and liberty for every part.12 A proponent of

governmental transparency, Hamilton queried what sort of vigorous government

can simultaneously respect the people yet protect them, as the two are not always

synonymous. His answer was a government that has the ability to detect and

punish national miscarriage or misfortune.13

9 Ibid., 259.
10 Ibid., 252.
11 Paul C. Light, Federalist No. 1: How Would Publius Define Good Government

Today, Public Administration Review 71, Supplement to Volume 71: The Federalist
Papers Revised for Twenty-First Century Reality (December 2011): S8.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., S12.

3
 Clarifying this tableau of Alexander Hamilton, Michael Federici advises that

Hamilton did not plea for centralized power in any form.14 And this, for Federici,

is the crux of Hamiltons position. One of his objections to the government under

the Articles of Confederation, Federici inscribes, was that it concentrated power in

one branch.15 Vigorous government cannot exist if it is not adequately separated,

balancedchecked and part of the rule of law and subject to judicial review.16 As

such, the national government would be constrained, by itself, the states, and the

Constitution, according to Hamiltons definition.17 Again reinforcing obligatory

requisite power(s), Hamilton talked about joining the states into a tighter political

form and equipping the national government with sufficient power to defend and

develop the nation.18 Hamilton demarcated a vigorous government as one with

sufficient power to meet the challenges of the new nation what he called thinking

continentally.19

While Hamiltons admirers paint an image of complementarity and balance,

the critics counter Hamilton was protagonist for something nefarious and

destructive to humble Americans when he wrote of vigorous government. One of

the most recent proprietors of this angle is William Hogeland, who sees in Hamilton

the essential relationship between the concentration of national wealth and the

14 Michael Federici, The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton (The Johns

Hopkins University Press, 2012), 185.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 189.

4
obstruction of democracy through military force.20 Hogeland posits a corrupt, all-

pervasive national government resulted from Hamiltons machinations (and to a

substantial extent his mentor Robert Morriss, asserting Hamiltons rise resulted

directly from Morriss openly corrupt efforts of the 1780s).21 Hogeland even alleges

Hamilton was developing an urgent desire for authoritarian government, whose

well-funded debt, supported by nationally enforced taxes, would increase the wealth

of the richest class of Americans and yoke that class to national purpose. 22

Hogeland closes his diatribe with Hamiltons supposed end-game: an executive

branch run by him, strong enough to do anything it deemed in the national

interest.23

Hogeland is only one of the more recent detractors of Hamilton. Aaron N.

Colemen has admirably displayed the history of anti-Hamilton vitriol that has

existed in the historiography. Richard Kohn castigated Hamiltons intent of

vigorous government, in assurance it was designed to suppress dissent and

intimidate the population.24 Stanley Kurtz was of a like mind, delegating to

Hamilton the powers of a military dictator.25Alexander DeConde claimed Hamilton

20 William Hogeland, Inventing Alexander Hamilton: The Troubling Embrace of

the Founder of American Finance, Boston Review,
http://bostonreview.net/hogeland-inventing-alexander-hamilton (accessed April 1,
2017).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Found in Aaron N. Colemen, A Second Bournaparty? A Reexamination of

Alexander Hamilton During the Franco-American Crisis, 1796-1801, Journal of the

Early Republic 28, 2 (Summer, 2008): 184.
25 Ibid.

5
and other High Federalists viewed the military as a political instrument for

maintaining power.26 Succinctly, Hamiltons disparagers emphasize a militancy

that should be apparent in Hamiltons writings and actions. Ken Owen has tersely

summed up this locus by specifically calling him anti-democratic and through

insinuation, a conspirator and thug who was convinced of his own superiority.27

In order to document which side is right or at least more right it is

instructive to ruminate on Hamiltons contributions to The Federalist. His

assistance to the series represented the climax of a brilliant mind singularly focused

and dedicated to a cause he zealously believed in. If his attitude on the nature of

what constitutes a vigorous government can be discerned anywhere, it would be

within these essays.

To help with this discernment, it is useful to follow the outline presented by

McDonald (regardless of ones perspective in this debate), dissecting a

representative quantity of Hamiltons essays within each tier. McDonald indicates

The Federalist unfolds over five sections, four of which are especially applicable to

the purpose here. Section 1, Numbers 2 through 14 were designed to show the

importance of union to the political prosperity of America. Section 2, Numbers 15

through 22 pointed out the inadequacy of the existing confederationfor the

purposes of union. Section 3, Numbers 23 through 36 examine the need for a more

26Ibid.
27Ken Owen, Historians and Hamilton: Founders Chic and the Cult of
Personality, The Junto, https://earlyamericanists.com/2016/04/21/historians-and-
hamilton-founders-chic-and-the-cult-of-personality/ (accessed April 1, 2017).

6
robust constitution affirming an independent, but complimentary national

government. Section 5, Numbers 52 to the concluding remarks in 85, analyzes the

(potential) national government branch by branch.28

Because only representative Federalist essays are considered, it is solely

possible to extract a mere portion of characteristics Hamilton considered part of a

vigorous government. That said, collectively the samples considered portray a

government necessary to offset human nature and act complimentarily to the

states. Obliquely, complementarity also denotes a check on state power. The

overarching purpose, then, of this vigorous national government is chiefly to

preserve permanency and fortune for the citizenry within all states by staving off

turmoil that is larger than one component part i.e., a solitary state. As Hamilton

argues, a confederacy, which lacks a vigorous national government by definition,

is insufficient to respond to intrastate problems or events. In practice, a Chief

Executive would helm the ship of State, adhering to rule of law and military

limitations, and owning compassion and benevolence.

Section 1
In Federalist No. 6, Alexander Hamilton directs focus to harm from wholly

disunited or partially [confederated] states. Hamilton warns under such

arrangements the states would degenerate into subdivisions who would

frequently and violently compete with one another. Those who think otherwise

are Utopian in belief, for Man is by nature ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.

28McDonald, 107-108.

7
All the utopian need do is look to history to witness the folly of their thinking.

Additionally, the verity nations have warred for economic purposes strongly implies

it is only a matter of when, not if, the states will eventually break out in violence,

for all thirteen possess thirteen different and often competing economic interests

and needs, resulting in the national dignity and credit plummeting.29

Hamilton continues with Dangers from Dissensions Between the States in

No. 7. Matters such as territorial disputes also contribute to the likelihood of

intrastate violence. America contains vast tract[s] of unsettled territory, some of

which still reckon discordant and undecided claims between the states. If the

Union were to be rejected, these competing claims would not only increase, but

would exacerbate in intensity. At time of writing, some of these claims had been

resolved by amicably ceding the land for Congress to dispose of, whereas rejection

of the Constitution would reopen them. For evidence, Hamilton offers the dispute

between Connecticut and Pennsylvania that, while submitted before the federal

government willingly, saw Connecticut demonstrate strong indications of

dissatisfaction with the verdict.30

Developing the economic rivalries from No. 6 further, Hamilton reasons less

favorably circumstanced states would be desirous of escaping from the

disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more

29 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 6, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed06.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).
30 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 7, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed07.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).

8
fortunate neighbors. This would cause them to endeavor a system of commercial

policy peculiar to itself. Put simply, the interests of ones home state will take

precedence over every other state, ultimately rendering some tributary to the

more affluent and successful. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be

taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? asks Hamilton.31

Most important of all, what check(s) would exist on the states? If

unrestrained by any additional checks it is quite probable laws in violation of

private contracts would be, if not commonplace, nevertheless possible. Approval of

the Constitution maintains checks and balance between the national and state

governments.32

Conclusion

From these essays, it is seen by vigor of government, Hamilton referred to a

national government to which the states cooperatively rally behind, subordinating

each of their individual needs as appropriate for the betterment of all, defined as an

absence of intrastate strain escalating into violence. And most significant, a

vigorous federal government establishes checks and balance between it and state

governments.

Section 2
In Federalist No. 15, Alexander Hamilton shifts attention to communicating

the "insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union.''

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.

9
Hamilton assents that all classes of men find problems in the Articles of

Confederation, problems that have America on the brink of national humiliation.

Hamilton enumerates ways by which this humiliation has occurred:

Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of

imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain
without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge.
Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a
foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been
surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not
less than of our rights.
Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the
navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it.
Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem
to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of
importance to national wealth?
Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign
encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat
with us.
Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of
national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is
much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at
market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public
confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which
have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind.
Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind
which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest
limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity
of money.33

Hamilton laments, while there is consensus the intrinsic flaws of the Articles

of Confederation have crippled America, there remains strenuous opposition to a

remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. Americans

are not willing to make the necessary sacrifices to ensure the stability and

33Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed15.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).

10
prosperity of the United States. Americans desire to see the United States achieve

stability and prosperity, but not if it requires subordinating their state for the

common welfare. Americans clamor for an augmentation of federal authority,

without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete

independence in the members. Americans want to have it all, without accepting

they face an either/or proposition.34

The recommended Constitution would rectify Americas humiliation. It would

engage each failure of the Articles by ensuring a vibrant national government can

meet the requirements of a nation and draw Americans out beyond their stately

provincialism. Accordingly, it befuddles Hamilton there should still be found men

who object to the new Constitution. He negates the standard conviction the states

would cast aside their parochialism when the moment demanded it for the sake of

common interest. This betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human

conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of

civil power. For why is government established at all? Because the passions of

men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.35

Federalist No. 21 features the most important of those defects which have

hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves.

Hamilton, of course, refers to the utter impotence of the national government under

the Articles. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.

11
obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions. Federally, the United

States is completely beholden unto the states. Hamilton forecasts a scenario like the

one tendered in No. 6: were a state to trample upon the liberties of the people, the

national government would be powerless to confront it. There is no check on state

initiative under the current arrangement.36

Conclusion

It can be added that by vigorous government Hamilton intended a firm

alliance of disparate sovereignties (in the American case, the states), who are both

checked and balanced by a national government with the ability to withstand

humiliation. Implied in such an arrangement is a complimentary national

government to the various sovereignties comprising it. A vigorous national

government has the power and authority to act as the moment necessitates

within its purviews. The arrangement of the Articles of Confederation created the

opposite: a national government that had to request approval from the states; a

national government that was weaker than the parts which made it up.

Consequently, such a confederation was inappropriate and undesired as a means of

ensuring strength, confidence, and affluence, not merely for one state, but all states.

The ideal, which Hamilton suggested ratification of the Constitution would

inaugurate, was a national government that was complimentary to the states and

served as a check on provincial domination.

36Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed21.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).

12
 Section 3
Beginning in Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton no longer hints a

vigorous national government is one acting in compliment to the states; rather, he

tackles this idea directly. In fact, Hamilton specifically delineates in what fashion a

vigorous national government compliments states:

The common defense of the members;

The preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as
external attacks;
The regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States;
The superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with
foreign countries.37

Hamilton inquires, for instance, who will ensure the safety of the Whole.

Would South Carolina ensure Rhode Island is protected? Would Massachusetts

defend Georgia? Hamilton remarks such a thing is not likely to happen, nor is it

appropriate. Satisfactorily, it is the responsibility of an authority to which all

members cooperate with to ensure the Whole is upheld.38

Federalist No. 28 returns to the fear of a despotic state. In a single state, if

the persons entrusted with supreme power become usurpers, Hamilton warns, the

different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct

government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens in such

a condition would rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system,

without resource. The usurpers, clothed in the forms of legal authority, can too

37 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 23, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed23.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).
38 Ibid.

13
often crush the opposition in embryo. A vigorous national government prevents

this possibility. If leaders of a state overreach or directly affront the people of the

state, they can turn toward the national government for aid.39

Conclusion

In this sampling from Section 3, it becomes clear a vigorous national

government is one that ensures the defense of all citizens. It operates in concert

with the states, but as required, the national government can operate

independently of the states within its preset domains. A vigorous national

government does not seek to coopt what rightfully belongs to the states, but to

confirm the peaceful cooperation among them and the wider world. Ergo,

complimentary national and state governments certify an equilibrium between both

as well as the citizenry to the betterment of all.

Section 5
It being established Alexander Hamilton favored checks on state and

national power, with each working within discrete spheres of authority, and

enjoying the power to act on their respective authority, it remains to be seen what

such a government looked like for Hamilton. As the critics have pushed for a

militaristic tyrant, it is best to examine The Federalists musings on the executive

branch.

39Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 28, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed28.asp (accessed March 16, 2017).

14
 In No. 67, Hamilton unambiguously professes a vigorous government leads

neither to monarchy nor tyranny. Moreover, vigorous government cannot abrogate

rule of law. Rejecting such accusations, Hamilton pens, The first of these two

clauses,40 it is clear, only provides a mode for appointingofficers, whose

appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and

which SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW [emphasis Hamilton].41 In brief, the

President of the United States is legally constrained from violating the sovereignty

of other governmental entities, even within the national government. To Hamilton,

an executive, even a President, respects sovereignty in a vigorous government.

Dispelling the military slant, in No. 74 Hamilton rebuffs any pretensions of

an American Bonaparte. The President of the United States is to be commander-

in-chief [of Americas military] WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of

the United States [emphasis again Hamiltons].42 It is entirely self-evident to

Hamilton, the Chief Executive of a vigorous government can only activate or use

military might when the situation obliges it, and only in service to the country.

Such power in an individual is imperative as the direction of war most peculiarly

demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.43

40 From Article II of the Constitution.

41 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 67, The Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed67.asp (accessed April 1, 2017).
42 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74, The Avalon Project,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed74.asp (accessed April 1, 2017).

43 Ibid.

15
The single hand can act with swiftness and boldness in an emergency without

being mired in deliberation.

A Chief Executive is correspondingly compassionate, for he wields the power

to pardon out of humanity (and good policy). Compassion is warranted and

concomitant to the station because the criminal code of every country partakes of

so much necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptionsjustice

would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.44

Conclusion

Contrary to Hamiltons decriers, the picture of a vigorous governments

Chief Executive that emerges in the final portion of The Federalist is one

constrained by rule of law, yet also of temperament, as it is understood one ascends

to the role in full knowledge of the legal constraints. In the same vein, a vigorous

government concedes the Chief Executive military power for emergent situations

only, again in understanding he acts for the common defense of the country and

relinquishes that power upon the situations termination. Last, the position compels

a compassionate, benign leader someone people can turn for help.

The vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty

The examples studied exhibit a portion of what Alexander Hamilton meant

when he wrote about vigorous government. He did not appeal to a ubiquitous

national government with tentacles in all aspects of life that invalidated state

44 Ibid.

16
sovereignty. Reasonably, he spoke for a national government that compensated for

human nature and complimented the states. Complementarity also signified a

check on state power. The accurate purpose of this vigorous national government

is to preserve permanency and fortune for the citizenry within all states. It would

do so by thwarting conflict and turmoil that is larger than one state. A confederacy,

under which the United States found itself prior to the Constitution, precludes a

vigorous national government and would thus be insufficient to respond to

intrastate problems or events. Spearheading a government like this is a Chief

Executive, who acceded to rule of law and martial restraints, and acted out of

consideration and sympathy for the populace.

Alexander Hamilton has had many cavilers and many enemies in his lifetime

and after. These individuals, however, must contend with a body of evidence

contained within the most famous and momentous of Hamiltons writings, The

Federalist, and the onus is upon them to prove Hamilton lied about what he wrote

or abandoned such thoughts subsequently.

17
 Bibliography
Primary Sources
Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist No. 1. The Avalon Project.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed01.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 6. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed06.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 7. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed07.asp (accessed March 14, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 15. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed15.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 21. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed21.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 23. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed23.asp (accessed March 15, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 28. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed28.asp (accessed March 16, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 67. The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed67.asp (accessed April 1, 2017).

----- Federalist No. 74, The Avalon Project.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed74.asp (accessed April 1, 2017).

Articles
Colemen, Aaron N. A Second Bournaparty? A Reexamination of Alexander
Hamilton During the Franco-American Crisis, 1796-1801. Journal of the Early
Republic 28, 2 (Summer, 2008): 183-214.

Light, Paul C. Federalist No. 1: How Would Publius Define Good Government
Today. Public Administration Review 71, Supplement to Volume 71: The Federalist
Papers Revised for Twenty-First Century Reality (December 2011): S7-S14.

18
Books
Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. Penguin Books. 2004.

McDonald, Forrest. Alexander Hamilton: A Biography. W. W. Norton & Company.

1982.

Federici, Michael. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. The Johns

Hopkins University Press. 2012.

Websites
Hogeland, William. Inventing Alexander Hamilton: The Troubling Embrace of the
Founder of American Finance. Boston Review. http://bostonreview.net/hogeland-
inventing-alexander-hamilton (accessed April 1, 2017).

Owen, Ken. Historians and Hamilton: Founders Chic and the Cult of Personality.
The Junto. https://earlyamericanists.com/2016/04/21/historians-and-hamilton-
founders-chic-and-the-cult-of-personality/ (accessed April 1, 2017).

19