ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on
April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Petitioner Orlando filed an annulment of their marriage on
the ground that, threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant.

Respondent Lilia answered and alleged that, petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that
petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.

Issue: WON force, intimidation or undue influence is present in this case to annul the marriage.

Held: NO.

We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when
Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando
solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether
bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against
him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present
case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending
with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment
ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit:
the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening
presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province
of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, she alleged that the respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador
B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge answered that the couples knew that they did not have a marriage license.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. He
was also informed that Orobio cannot come over to the sala of the respondent judge but he acceded to the
request that it will be solemnize in Nabua.
Respondent judge was assured that the marriage license will be given to him the day after the
marriage but the couples failed to submit.

Issue: WON the marriage of petitioner and her late husband is void.
Held: YES.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion
but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.

Navarro v. Domagtoy

Facts: Respondent judge in this case solemnize marriage in two instances. First, solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Second, he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
 It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda
and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not
returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano
Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The
judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located
40 to 50 km away.

Issue: WON the marriages solemnize were void.

Held: YES.

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the
spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it
should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

Sy vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old. Their union
was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February
14, 1978,respectively.

After some time, Fernando left their conjugaldwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his fathers residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.

The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to
her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she
started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was
granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the
first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony.

Held: The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony,
there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.

Alcantara vs. Alcantara

Facts: Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that
on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila
City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain
Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage
ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona
to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void
and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children; that Restituto only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
Restituto.

Issue: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

Held: Yes.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the parties reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the
probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.

Nial vs. Bayadog

Facts: Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

Issue: Whether or not Pepito and Norma living together as husband and wife for at least five years
exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Held: In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
De Castro v De Castro

Facts: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

Held: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not
have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the
affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Republic v Dayot

Facts: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

Issue: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit
in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

Held:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Abbas vs Abbas

Facts: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas a Pakistani was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother
of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines. He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as
the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged
marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license,
based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that
there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
Held: Yes.
Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage
license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification enjoyed
probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able
to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a
valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

Enrico vs Medinaceli
Facts: The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004,
Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued
that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for
at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only
upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

Issue: Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio
and Lolita.
Held: NO.
Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on
August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does
not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

Carlos v Sandoval

Facts:
Ablaza v Republic

Facts: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed
out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Held: Yes.

The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on
December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and its records returned to
RTC for further proceedings.

Aurelio vs Aurelio

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were
married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo
Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present
prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that
her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged
among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial
support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his
working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife.
His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in
the maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly
and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair,
depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She
was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot
delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-
indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their
relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life
led to the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner

principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article
36 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void.

Held: Marriage is null and void.

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same
as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a
nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied
with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the
petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Republic vs CA and Dequintos

Facts: Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, the couple were not blessed with a
child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.

Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground.
He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments
with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time
gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his
remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.

As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline
personality disorder that was no longer treatable.

Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with
different men and abandoning the conjugal home.

Issue: Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.

Held: No. Marriage remains valid.

Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital

obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage
based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not sufficiently
established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do
household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no
other witness to corroborate these allegations.

Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support
this claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Even the
testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not
explain the root cause as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or
omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder. What was established was that Catalina was
childish and immature.

Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an
expert assessment.
From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal
to perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown
that such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.