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petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA People v.

6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to
the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was
to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23
case, a proceeding entirely different from filing an February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the
application for a free patent or for judicial Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. by Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that since the time
limit for filing applications for free patents and
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete
of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31
September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is
without pronouncement as to costs. also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge
denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9
Demafiles v. Comelec May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972
Case No. 91 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159 undivided interest in equal share of each.
FACTS: Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court,
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the petitioners filed the instant petition.
Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner
challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA
considering 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral
that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission Proceedings.
ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction,
2 board members in question expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention
were disqualified only when the board was acting as a is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing
provincial but not as in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide
reversed its previous decision. to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules
of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.
ISSUES: If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it
authority to reject the returns from would have so provided in the same way that it
Precinct 7. provided the extension of time to file applications for
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
reelection were disqualified or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands
board of canvassers. which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the
of canvassers to count a return. reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA
6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes
HELD: bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and fails to supply any basis for respondents contention. It
councilors of the municipality will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond
elections for local officials and shall 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA
have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the
shall have qualified is devoid of reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land
declared public land. As correctly pointed out by
The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin
in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein in the 1st day of January
which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste
Dust guard, which is the same as dust shield, is was a newly created
defined in the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of municipality.
American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as follows: A No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due
thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other to whatever cause.
material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the
back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the canvass made and proclamation
dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to should be annulled. The law states any member of a
exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and provincial board or of
waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing. municipal council who is a candidate for office in any
election, shall be incompetent
2. Burden of proof on the validity of a legal to act on the said body. Since Respondent
collection of duties upon who questions it Commission has the power to annul and
The burden is upon the importer to overcome the illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as
presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof to why it cannot order
that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be canvassing bodies to count all returns which are
decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but otherwise regular.
whether the importer was right.

3. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do not

extend their provisions; in case of doubt Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of
It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes Customs [GR 30264, 12 March 1929]
levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur
beyond the clear import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909 provides
strongly against the Government and in favor of the that the manufactures of wool, not otherwise
citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem tax, while
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes paragraph 197 provides that vehicles for use on
expressly and clearly import. In the case at bar, taking railways, and detached parts thereof, are subject to
account the purpose of the article, it is acknowledged 10% ad valorem. Dust shield are manufactured of
that in reality, it is used as a detached part of railway mixed wool and hair, and are used in railroad cabins of
vehicles. the Manila Railroad Company. The Insular Collector of
Customs decided that dust shields should be classified
4. Particular enactment must be operative over the as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided
general one in the same statute for.
Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph
197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the
statute a particular enactment and also a general one Collector of Customs and held that dust shields should
which in its most comprehensive sense would include be classified as detached parts of vehicles for use on
what is embraced in the former, the particular railways.
enactment must be operative, and the general
language are not within the provisions of the The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was
particular enactment. correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197
of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing
to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same
section of the law. It thus affirmed the appealed
Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan [GR L-21516, 29 judgment in its entirety, without special taxation of
April 1966] costs in either instance.
En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on leave
1. Nature of dust shields
Facts: Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed.
franchise (RA. 399, 18 June 1949), for an electric light, The component material of chief value is the wool.
heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran,
special the fact that one is special and the other is Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions
general creates a presumption that the special is to be established in Act 3636, as amended by CA 132 and
considered as remaining an exception to the general, the Constitution. It was also issued a certificate of
one as a general law of the land, the other as the law public convenience and necessity by the Public Service
of a particular case.(State vs. Stoll; Manila Railroad Co. Commission on 18 March 1954. On 1 October 1950,
vs. Rafferty). Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or
receipts tax of any business operated in the city. This
3. Construction must consider other provisions of ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14
the same act; and its effects December 1950), by enumerating the kinds of
Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264) specifically businesses required to pay the tax. It was further
withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May 1961) by
franchise tax. Further, the citys interpretation of the modifying the penal provision, and further by
provision would result in double taxation against the Ordinance 148, approved on 11 June 1962 by
business of the franchisee because the internal including within the coverage of taxable businesses
revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. The those engaged in the business of electric light, heat
logical construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264, that and power (sic). On 13 April 1960, Ordinance 104 was
would not nullify section 2 (j) of the same Act, is that enacted, making it unlawful for any person or firm to
the local government may only tax electric light and cut or disconnect the electrical connection of any
power utilities that are not subject to franchise taxes, consumer in the city of Butuan without his consent.
unless the franchise itself authorizes additional The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with the CFI
taxation by cities or municipalities. Agusan (Special Civil Case 152; Petition for declaratory
4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police power relief), the court declared Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and
The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting the 148 of the City of Butuan unconstitutional and ultra
disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any vires, as far as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross
consumers building with the power plant, without the sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat
consent of the consumer, except in case of fire, clear and power of Butuan Sawmill. The court also annulled
and positive danger to residents, or order of the Ordinance 104 for being unconstitutional, arbitrary,
authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power for unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the direct
the general welfare The ordinance compels the appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court.
electric company to keep supplying electric current to The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision
a company even if the latter does not pay the bills with costs against appellant City of Butuan.
thereof, and to that extent deprives the company of its 1. Taxation of franchise beyond citys taxation
property without due process. How the general power.
welfare would be promoted under the ordinance has The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of
neither been explained nor justified. The general Butuan to tax the franchised business of Butuan
welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of the Sawmill (see Section 2, Act 2264). The inclusion of the
complaining consumers against the franchise holder, franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
because the legislature has specifically lodged city of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned
jurisdiction, supervision and control over public taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of
services and their franchises in the Public Service taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the
Commission, and not in the City of Butuan. power therein granted be taken as an authority
delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise,
since its charter did not expressly nor specifically
City of Manila vs. Teotico provide any such power. It must be noted that the
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968. June 1949 while the citys charter was approved on 15
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA June 1950.
Concepcion, J.:
2. Earlier special over the latter general
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner
the later general the terms of the general broad
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
enough to include the matter provided for in the
within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
damages in the aggregate sum of jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board
P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal for the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell
certiorari by the City of Manila. inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico
suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
held liable as the incident happened on
complaint against the City which dismissed the same.
a NATIONAL highway
On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay
HELD: the decision appealed from is damages.
hereby affirmed
YES Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or
The question to be determined is if supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible
present case is governed by Section 4 of for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City
of Manila) reading: Ruling: Decision affirmed.
The city shall not be liable or held for In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that
damages or injuries to persons or "the streets aforementioned were and have been
property arising from the failure of the constantly kept in good conditionand manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted
city officer, to enforce the provisions of
that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
this chapter, or any other law or supervision.
ordinance, or from negligence of said Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the
Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers liability therein established to attach that the defective
while enforcing or attempting to enforce roads or streets belong to the province, city or
said provisions. municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of What said article requires is that the province, city or
the Philippines which provides: municipality have either "control or supervision" over
Provinces, cities and municipalities said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
shall be liable for damages for the death therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by not necessarily detract from the City's "control or
reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or
supervision. FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered
Manila maintains that the former and unlighted catch basin or manhole
provision should prevail over the latter, on P. Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was
because Republic Act 409, is a special trying to board a jeepney, causing
law, intended exclusively for the City of injuries which required him to incur
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a medical expenses.
general law, applicable to the entire Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a
Philippines. complaint for damages against the City
The CA , however, applied the Civil of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city
Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true health officer, city treasurer and chief of
that, insofar as its territorial application police.
is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in
special law and the Civil Code a general favor of Teotico and dismissing the
legislation; but, as regards the subject- amended complaint, without costs.
matter of the provisions above quoted, On appeal taken by plaintiff, this
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 decision was affirmed by the CA, except
establishes a general rule regulating the insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay
first time, on appeal, much less after liability of the City of Manila for:
the rendition of the decision of the damages or injury to persons or
appellate court, in a motion for the property Upon the other hand, Article
reconsideration thereof. 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the particular prescription making
Civil Code, it is not necessary for the provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liability therein established to attach liable for damages for the death of, or
that the defective roads or streets injury suffered by any person by reason
belong to the province, city or specifically of the defective
municipality from which responsibility is condition of roads, streets, bridges,
exacted. What said article requires is public buildings, and other-public works
that the province, city or municipality under their control or supervision.
have either control or supervision over In other words, said section 4 refers to
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos liability arising from negligence, in
Avenue were, therefore, a national general, regardless of the object
highway, this circumstance would not thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
necessarily detract from its control or liability due to defective streets, in
supervision by the City of Manila, under particular. Since the present action is
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) based upon the alleged defective
thereof provides: condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The decisive thereon.
Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers: xxxxx
xxx xxx xxx Teotico alleged in his complaint his
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing injuries were due to the defective
law to provide for the laying out, condition of a street which is under the
construction and improvement, and to supervision and control of the City. In
regulate the use of streets, avenues, its answer to the amended complaint,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, the City, in turn, alleged that the
cemeteries, and other public places; to streets aforementioned were and have
provide for lighting, cleaning, and been constantly kept in good condition
sprinkling of streets and public places; . and regularly inspected and the storm
. . the building and repair of tunnels, drains and manholes thereof covered by
sewers, and drains, and all structures in the defendant City and the officers
and under the same to provide for and concerned who have been ever
regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters vigilant and zealous in the performance
therein, . . and regulate the use, of of their respective functions and duties
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to as imposed upon them by law. Thus,
regulate the lights used on all vehicles, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
cars, and locomotives; . . Burgos Avenue was and is under its
Then, again, the determination of control and supervision.
whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is Moreover, the assertion to the effect
under the control or supervision of the that said Avenue is a national highway
City of Manila and whether the latter is was made, for the first time, in its MR of
guilty of negligence, in connection with the decision of the CA . Such assertion
the maintenance of said road, which raised, therefore, a question of fact,
were decided by the Court of Appeals in which had not been put in issue in the
the affirmative, is one of fact, and the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the
FACTS: findings of said Court thereon are not
subject to our review.
This case involves the consolidation of 2
petitions that tackle the common question of how long
the term of office of barangay chairmen and other David v. Commission on Elections
barangay officials who were elected to their respective Case No. 85
office on the second of May 1994. Petitioner in his G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of
Barangay sa Pilipinas filed before this Court on
when the barangay
December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition , under elections should be held and questions the COMELECs
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding schedule of holding such
of the barangay election scheduled on the second elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The
Monday of May 1997. On January 29, 1997, the COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the
Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding Local Government Code which mandates barangay
with petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled elections every 3 years.
on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance." Respondent Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A.
Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, 6679, should be the one followed.
dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be
held every 5 years. He also
February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution
contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of
giving due course to the petition and requiring the
the Constitution.
parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non- ISSUE:
extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also 1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.
requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to 2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the
act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also Constitution.
within a non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted HELD:
but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ two laws that the later
of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the
Accordingly, the parties filed their respective Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC
memoranda. In a separate case filed before this court had the opportunity to mention when the next
barangay election should be when it
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter
stated that the next regular election involving the
represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a
barangay office is barely 7
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a months away, the same having been scheduled in May
judicial review by certiorari to declare as 1997.
unconstitutional: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that,
prescribed the term of barangay officials to be for 3 The term of office of
years which shall begin on the regular election to be elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
held on the second Monday of May 1994. COMELEC shall be determined by law,
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the shall be three years It is not to be construed as
holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and prohibiting a 3-year term of office
other activities related thereto; for barangay officials.


1. Whether or not the term of office of barangay Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office
officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
7160(The Local Government Code of ) or 5 years as which shall be determined by law.(term of office of
prescribed by RA 6653. barangay officials)
2. Whether or not RA 7160 sec 43(c) is


1. Yes , The Court held that term of office of

barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by
RA 7160. Since RA 7160 is a newer law than RA 6653,
notwithstanding the fact that RA 7160 is a general law
since the particular provision on the term of office of
barangay officials is a specific provision which
supersedes the provision in RA 6653.

2. No, The Court held that RA 7160 sec 43(c) is

not unconstitutional. Since under Sec 8 Art X of the
Constitution the term of office of barangay officials
shall be as determined by law. There is nothing in the
Constitution or in the record of the constitutional
commission which would support the view that the
term of office of barangay officials could not be for 3

David v. COMELEC
Sec. 1 of RA 6679 provides that the term
of barangay officials who were to be
elected on the second Monday of May
1994 is 5 years

The later act RA 7160 Sec 43 (c) states

that the term of office of barangay
officials who were to be elected also on
the 2nd Monday of May 1994 is 3 years.
There being a clear inconsistency
between the two laws, the later law
fixing the term barangay officials at 3
years shall prevail.

General law does not repeal special law,

A general law on a subject does not
operate to repeal a prior special law on
the same subject, unless it clearly
appears that the legislature has
intended by the later general act to
modify or repeal the earlier special law.