HW12

Peoplev.Godoy
GR.11590809,December6,1995

OFFEROFCOMPROMISE

Facts:
DannyGodoyisateacherofPalawanNationalSchool.Hewasaccusedbeforethe
RTC and was subsequently convicted for the separate crimes of Rape and
KidnappingwithSeriousIllegalDetention.Thecasewasaproductofanalleged
severalandrepeatedassaultscommittedagainstthevirtueofGodoysstudent,Mia
Taha,agirl17yearsofage.
During the time that Danny Godoy was detained, that is, prior to the
commencementofthecriminalcaseagainsthim,themotherofDannywenttoMia
and her parents to settle the case. All of them settled before the office of the
prosecutorwhere,uponpayment,Miaexecutedanaffidavitofdesistance.Danny
wasnotawareofsuchsettlement
NonethelessthecasepersistedandGodoywasmetedoutthepenaltyofdeath.The
casewenttotheSupremeCourtbyAutomaticReview.

Issue:
WhethertheofferofsettlementofGodoysmotherisanimpliedadmissionofhis
guilt

Held:
No. Danny Godoy was absolved and was acquitted. This is because he has
successfullycasteddoubtastotheguiltimputedagainsthim.TheCourtruledthat
incriminalcases,anofferofcompromiseisgenerallyadmissibleasevidenceagainst
thepartymakingit.Nocompromisewhatevermaybeenteredintoasregardsthe
penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permittedtoshowthattheofferwasnotmadeunderaconsciousnessofguilt,but
merelytoavoidtheinconvenienceofimprisonmentorforsomeotherreasonwhich
wouldjustifyaclaimbytheaccusedthattheoffertocompromisewasnotintruth
anadmissionofhisguiltoranattempttoavoidthelegalconsequenceswhichwould
ordinarilyensuetherefrom.
...appellantdidnotknow,notuntilthetrialproper,thathismotheractuallypaid
P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen
Taha,testifiedthatpresentduringthenegotiationswereherself,herhusband,Mia,
and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said
meetings.Ithasbeenheldthatwheretheaccusedwasnotpresentatthetimethe
offerformonetaryconsiderationwasmade,suchofferofcompromisewouldnotsave
thedayfortheprosecution.

CaseNo.2

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.GENERDEGUZMANySICO,
[G.R.No.117217.December2,1996]

TOPIC:Credibilityofarapevictimaswitness

FACTS:
GildaAmbraywasatthegateofasubdivisionwaitingforatricycleridetowardher
residence.
After Gilda started to walk, de Guzman mounted his tricycle, followed her and
offeredheraride,towhichsheagreed.
DeGuzmanstoppedandtoldGildatopushthetricyclebecauseallegedlyitwasnot
ingoodcondition.
Shealightedfromthetricyclethenwalkedaway,butaftershehadtakenaboutten
steps,theaccusedembracedherfrombehind,coveredhermouthandheldherneck
tightly.
Theaccusedthendraggedhertoavacantlottenmetersawayfromtheunfinished
housewhereherapedher.
TheaccusedthenwarnedGildanottotellanybody,otherwise,hewouldkillherand
allmembersofherfamily
Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home,
withoutlookingback.
WhenGildaarrivedhome,shetoldhermotherandherhusband,AquilinoFlores
Ambray,thatshewasrapedbytheaccused.
Thereafter, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to the President of the
HomeownersAssociationwhocalledthepolice.
Whenthepolicemenarrived,Gildanarratedtherapetothepolicemenandgave
themthedescriptionoftheassailant.
When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda
forthwithpointedtotheaccusedasthepersonwhorapedher.
Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Pias
HospitalandthentoanexaminationofherprivatepartsbyDr.Bernalesofthe
NBI.
Thefollowingdayshesubmittedherselftoaninvestigation.

ISSUE:
WONGildaisacrediblewitness
HELD:
A meticulous assessment of Gildas testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the
truthfulnessofherstory,whichshenarratedinacategorical,straightforwardand
candidmanner.
Furtherstrengtheninghercredibilityinrecountingherordealatthehandsofthe
accusedwasherconductimmediatelyafterthesexualassault.
Thequicknessandspontaneityofherdeedsmanifestedthenaturalreactionsofa
virtuouswomanwhohadjustundergonesexualmolestationagainstherself,and
evincednothingmorethanherinstantresolvetodenouncethebeastwhocriminally
abusedandravishedher,andtoprotectherhonor.
Theaccusedsdefenseofalibi,whichistheweakestofalldefensesforitiseasyto
concoctandfabricate,cannotprevailoverhispositiveidentificationbyGilda.

PEOPLEofthePHILIPPINESvs.ELMERYPARRAGUIRE
G.R.No.124391.July5,2000{268SCRA35(1997)}

TOPIC:OFFEROFCOMPROMISEINCRIMINALCASEOFRAPE.

FACTS: OnMarch24,1994,atabout11:00oclockintheevening,CharmelitaD.
Ruina,aninvalidandmentallyretardedwasrapedbytheaccusedintheirhomein
Surigao. The following morning, accused went back to the store owned by the
victimsmotherandapologizedforwhathedidandpromisednottodoitagain.

ISSUE:Whetherornotthepleaforforgivenessoftheaccusedistantamounttohis
admissionofguilt.

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. A plea for forgiveness may be
consideredanalogoustoanattempttocompromise,whichoffersofcompromiseby
the appellant, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt
pursuanttoSection27,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidencewhichpartlyprovides
thatIncriminalcases,exceptthoseinvolvingquasioffenses(criminalnegligence)
orthoseallowedbylawtobecompromised,anofferofcompromisedbytheaccused
maybereceivedinevidenceasanimpliedadmissionofguilt.

USVMAQUI
FACTS:
The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of a
caraballaandhercalf,andsentencedtoimprisonmentforaperiodoffiveyears,to
suffertheaccessorypenaltiesprescribedbylaw,andtopayhisshareofthecostsof
theproceedings.
Counselfortheaccusedcontendsthatthetrialcourterredingivingprobativevalue
to the testimony of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; in
acceptingproofastocertainextrajudicialadmissionsallegedtohavebeenmadeby
theaccused,includinganoffertocompromisethecasebythepaymentofasumof
money;andindecliningtoacceptastruethetestimonyoftheaccusedinhisown
behalfatthetrial.
Therecordclearlydisclosesthattheseextrajudicialstatementsweremadeinthe
courseofofferstocompromiseandthattheyweremadebytheaccusedvoluntarily,
thoughdoubtlesstheseofferstocompromiseweremadeinthehopethatifaccepted
hewouldescapeprosecution.
ISSUE:
WONofferofcompromiseisadmissibleagainsttheaccused
HELD:
Theweightbothofauthorityandreasonsustainstherulewhichadmitsevidenceof
offerstocompromise,incriminalcases,butpermitstheaccusedtoshowthatsuch
offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenienceofimprisonmentorforsomeotherreasonwhichwouldjustifyaclaim
bytheaccusedthattheoffertocompromisewasnotintruthanadmissionofhis
guiltandanattempttoavoidthelegalconsequenceswhichwouldordinarilyensue
therefrom.

HAWTHORNEvsECKERSONCo.
77F.2d844June3,1935
TOPIC:Compromisesarenotinthemselvesevidenceasadmissionsofliability.

FACTS:
TheplaintiffwasdrivingherownMarquetteautomobileandwasaccompaniedby
herpartnerinanantiquefurniturebusiness,whowassittinginthedriversseat
withher.AsthecarwasroundingacurveinthehighwayleadingfromMiddlebury
toBrandoninVermont,itcollidedwithaChevroletautomobilebelongingtothe
defendant and driven by one of its travelling salesmen. The plaintiff and her
companionwerebothinjuredandtheMarquettecarwasdamagedtotheextentof
about$125. Aftertheplaintiffhadputinhercase,thedefendantrestedwithout
introducinganyproof.Thereupon,thejuryrenderedaverdictof$4,664.51forthe
plaintiffandfromthejudgmententeredthereonthisappealwastaken.Oneofthe
errors relied on is that the court unlawfully permitted the plaintiff to prove a
settlementbythedefendantwiththeformerspartner(MissKellogg)ofherclaim
forinjuriesarisingoutoftheaccident.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotthesettlementwithMissKelloggisanadmissionofliability.

HELD:
NO.Compromisesarenotinthemselvesevidenceasadmissionsofliability,andthe
same rule applies when they are offered as proof of agency. The rule against
allowingevidenceofcompromiseisfoundeduponrecognitionofthefactthatsuch
testimonyis inherentlyharmful,forthejurywill drawconclusionstherefrom in
spiteofanythingwhichmaybesaidbythejudgeininstructingthemastothe
weighttobegiven suchevidence. Settlementshavealwaysbeenlookedonwith
favor,andcourtshavedeemeditagainstpublicpolicytosubjectapersonwhohas
compromisedaclaimtothehazardofhavingasettlementprovedinasubsequent
lawsuit by another person asserting a cause of action arising out of the same
transaction.

G.R.No.L30423November7,1979
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,vs.RAMIROALEGREy
CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y
ARCILLAS,andJESUSMEDALLAyCUDILLAN,defendantsappellants
FACTS:ThiscasearosefromthedeathofAdelinaSajoyMaravilla,whosebodywas
foundinherbathroominsideherhouse.AccordingtotheNecropsyReport,shedied
ofasphyxiabymanualstrangulation.AppellantRamiroAlegre,whowasthenliving
withrelativesinoneoftherentedroomsonthegroundfloorofthevictim'shouse,
was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection
with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence
implicatinghiminthecrime.
MelecioCudillanwasapprehendedinTaclobanCity,Leyte,intheactofpawninga
bracelet,oneofthepiecesofjewelrytakenfromthevictim.Inexplaininghowhe
cameintopossessionofthestolenpiecesofjewelry,headmittedhisparticipationin
thekillingandrobberyofAdlinaSajo.Thisappearsinhisextrajudicialconfession
beforethepoliceauthoritiesofTaclobanCity.WhenbroughttoMetroManilaand
while he was insidethe Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again
executed an extrajudicial confession. An Information for Robbery with Homicide
wasfiledbytheSpecialCounselofPasayCityagainstdefendants.Whenarraigned,
MarioComayas,MelecioCudillan,JesusMedallaandRamiroAlegreenteredaplea
ofnotguilty.Theprosecutionpresentednine(9)witnesses.Noneofthem,however,
testifiedontheactualcommissionofthecrime.Therecitaloffactscontainedinthe
decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial
confessions of Melecio Cudillan. The only evidence, therefore, presented by the
prosecutiontoprovetheguiltofappellantsarethetestimoniesofSgt.MarianoIsla
andHernandoCarillo.However,duringthetrial,MelecioCudillanrepudiatedboth
theTaclobanCityandPasayCityswornstatementsastheproductofcompulsion
and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was
investigatedbythepolice.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial
confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein
appellants;inconcludingfromthealleged"Silence"ofappellantswhenallegedly
pointedtobyMelecioCudillanas"hiscompanions"inthecommissionofthecrime,
anadmissionofguilt;andingivingundueweightandcredencetothetestimonyof
aninmateofthePasayCityJailthatappellantsadmittedtohimtheirparticipation
inthecrime.
ISSUE:Whetherthesilenceoftheaccusedadmitstheirguiltorcommissionofthe
crimeinthecase.
HELD:No. Weholdthatthebetterruleisthatthesilenceofanaccusedunder
custody,orhisfailuretodenystatementsbyanotherimplicatinghiminacrime,
especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his
participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence
drawnfromhissilenceorfailuretodenythestatementwouldappearincompatible
withtherightofanaccusedagainstselfincrimination.
Therightorprivilegeofapersonaccusedofacrimeagainstselfincriminationisa
fundamentalright.Itisapersonalrightofgreatimportanceandisgivenabsolutely
and unequivocably. This privilege against selfincrimination guaranteed by the
Constitutionprotects,therefore,theright ofapersontoremainsilentunlesshe
choosestospeakintheunfetteredexerciseofhisownwill,andtosuffernopenalty
forsuchsilence.
Identifyingtherightofanaccusedtoremainsilentwithrighttoprivacy,thisCourt,
in Pascual explained that the privilege against selfincrimination "enables the
citizentocreateazoneofprivacywhichgovernmentmaynotforcetosurrenderto
itsdetriment."
Wehold,therefore,thatitwaserrorforthetrialcourttodrawfromappellants'
silencewhileunderpolicecustody,inthefaceoftheincriminatorystatementsof
MelecioCudillan,theconclusionthattheaforesaidappellantshadtacitlyadmitted
theirguilt.Wehold,further,thatinviewoftheinadmissibilityoftheextrajudicial
confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining
evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and
HernandoCarillo,isinsufficienttosustainthejudgmentofconviction.

Caseno.7.Peoplevs.Raquel,265SCRA248(1996)

Extrajudicialconfession;ResInterAliosActaRule
FACTS:

AgapitoGambalanwaskilledbyheavilyarmedmeninsidetheirhouse.Whenhis
wife (JulietGambalan)shoutedforhelp,themenranawaybutshedidnotseen
theirfaces.Thepolicecameandfoundoneoftheperpetratorsofthecrimewounded
andlyingatabout8metersfromthevictimshouse.HewasidentifiedasAmado
Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and
ValerianoRaquelweretheperpetratorsofthecrime.

Uponarraignmentthereafter,alltheaccusedpleadednotguilty.Whiletrialwasin
progress,however,andbeforehecouldgivehistestimony,accusedAmadoPonce
escapedfromjail.Upontheotherhand,appellantsreliedonalibiastheirdefense
andpresentedwitnessestosupporttheiralibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them
accordingly.

ISSUE:

Whether thetrial court erred inconvicting theappellants ofthe crimecharged,

despiteabsenceofevidencepositivelyimplicatingthemastheperpetratorsofthe
crime?

HELD:

Yes,theprosecutionfailedtoestablishbeyondreasonabledoubttherealidentities
oftheperpetratorsof,muchlesstheparticipationofhereinappellantsin,thecrime
charged.

Theloneeyewitness,JulietGambalan,wasnotabletoidentifytheassailantsofher
husbandasbasefromhistestimonies.

Athoroughreviewoftherecordsofthiscasereadilyrevealedthattheidentification
ofhereinappellantsastheculpritswasbasedchieflyontheextrajudicialstatement
ofaccusedAmadoPoncepointingtothemashiscoperpetratorsofthecrime. As
earlierstated,thesaidaccusedescapedfromjailbeforehecouldtestifyincourtand
hehasbeenatlargesincethen.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a coaccused may not be
utilizedagainstthelatter,unlessthesearerepeatedinopencourt.Iftheaccused
never had the opportunity to crossexamine his coaccused on the latters
extrajudicialstatements,itiselementarythatthesamearehearsayasagainstsaid
accused.Thatisexactlythesituation,andthedisadvantagedplightofappellants,
inthecaseatbar.

Theresinteraliosruleordainsthattherightsofapartycannotbeprejudicedbyan
act,declaration,oromissionofanother.Anextrajudicialconfessionisbindingonly
upontheconfessantandisnotadmissibleagainsthiscoaccused. Thereasonfor
theruleisthat,onaprincipleofgoodfaithandmutualconvenience,amansown
actsarebindinguponhim,andareevidenceagainsthim. Soarehisconductand
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust,thatamanshouldbeboundbytheactsofmereunauthorizedstrangers;and
ifapartyoughtnottobeboundbytheactsofstrangers,neitheroughttheiractsor
conductbeusedasevidenceagainsthim.

This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was

madeinviolationoftheconstitutionalrightsofaccusedAmadoPonce.Extrajudicial
statementsmadeduringcustodialinvestigationwithouttheassistanceofcounsel
areinadmissibleandcannotbeconsideredintheadjudicationofthecase.Whilethe
righttocounselmaybewaived,suchwaivermustbemadewiththeassistanceof
counsel.Theserights,bothconstitutionalandstatutoryinsourceandfoundation,
wereneverobserved.

8.Peoplevscabrera
G.R.No.L37398June28,1974

THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO
VILLANUEVA,defendantappellant.

Evidence;Admissionbyconspirator

Facts:thecourtfindstheaccusedCabreraguiltyofthecrimeofRobberyHoldup
withHomicideandsentencedtolifeimprisonment.Accusedshallbeentitledtofull
creditforthepreventiveimprisonmenttheyhavealreadyundergoneinaccordance
with Rep. Act 6127. Accused Rosario Cabrera did not appeal. Only defendant
ConradoVillanueva'sappealisbeforeUs.

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant
Villanueva was the extrajudicial confession of his coaccused Rosario Cabrera
whichwasreadintotherecordoverthecontinuingobjectionofappellant'scounsel
(p.10,tsn.,May18,1972).Appellantreiteratedhisobjectionwhenthesaidextra
judicialconfessionwasbeingofferedinevidence(p.12,tsn.,September7,1972)."
(Id.)

issue:wonvillanuevaisguiltyascharged.

ruling: no. Acquitted. The statement was not made during the existence of the
allegedconspiracybetweenherandappellant,butaftersaidsupposedconspiracy
hadalreadyceasedandwhenshewasalreadyinthehandsoftheauthorities.For
thisreasonalone,Section27ofRule130cannotbeavailedof.Saidprovisionreads:
"Admissionbyconspirator.Theactordeclarationofaconspiratorrelatingtothe
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."

9.PeoplevYatco

CaseNo.10

THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES vs. CENONSERRANOaliasPIPING,ET

AL.
DOMINGOCADIANG,SANTIAGOYUMULandFILEMONCENZON
G.R.No.L7973April27,1959

TOPIC:Admissionbyconspirator

FACTS:
Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago
Yumul,FilemonCenzonandAnastacioReyesthengatheredatthesalaofthehouse
ofthefirstinthebarrioofPotrero,Bacolor,Pampanga,thatPabloNavarrohad
beenincludingandpromptingpeopletocallonSenatorPabloAngelesDavidand
testifyontheMaliwalumassacre,andforthatreasonhemanifestedtothemhis
desireandplantodoawaywithNavarro.
Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo
Cadiang,SantiagoYumul,FilemonCenzonandAnastacioReyeswerechargedwith
illegaldetentionwithmurderforthedeathofPabloNavarroinaninformationfiled
bytheprovincialfiscalofPampanga.
Uponmotionoftheassistantprovincialfiscal,theCourtorderedthedischargeof
AnastacioReyesfromtheinformationtotestifyaswitnessfortheprosecution.
Cenonet.al.contendedthatinorderthatthetestimonyofaconspiratormaybe
admissibleinevidenceagainsthiscoconspirator,itmustappearandbeshownby
evidenceotherthantheadmissionitselfthattheconspiracyactuallyexistedand
thatthepersonwhoistobeboundbytheadmissionwasaprivytotheconspiracy.
Andasthereisnothingbutthelonetestimonyofprosecutionwitness Anastacio
Reyes,acoconspirator,thetrialcourterredinfindingthatconspiracyhasbeen
established and in convicting them based upon the lone testimony of their co
conspirator.
ISSUE:
WONthetrialcourterredinfindingthatconspiracyhasbeenestablishedandin
convictingtheappellantsbaseduponthelonetestimonyoftheircoconspirator.

HELD:
Thecontentiondoesnotmeritseriousconsideration,becausetherulethat"Theact
ordeclarationofaconspiratorrelatingtotheconspiracyandduringitsexistence,
maybegiveninevidenceagainstthecoconspiratoraftertheconspiracyisshownby
evidenceotherthansuchactordeclaration,"appliesonlytoextrajudicialactsor
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the
defendanthastheopportunitytocrossexaminethedeclarant.
Andwhilethetestimonyofaccomplicesorconfederatesincrimeisalwayssubjectto
gravesuspicion,"comingasitdoesfromapollutedsource,"andshouldbereceived
with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and
competent.

A12C11.THEUNITEDSTATESv.JUANDELACRUZ,ET.AL.
G.R.No.4740.November18,1908.{12Phil.87(1908)}

TOPIC:DYINGDECLARATION

FACTS: OnOctober30,1907,aband,composedofnotlessthanfivepersonsand
armed entered the town of Jaen where they demanded money and took some
properties from someoftheresidents ofthat town. Ashort time thereafter,the
Constabulary forces surprised and attacked the band, killing one Dizon and
woundinganothermemberoftheband.Theappellantswereconvictedofthecrime
ofroboencuadrilla(robberyinanarmedband).TimoteoDizon,afewhoursbefore
hisdeath,whereinheconfessedhisguiltoftherobberyonthenightinquestion,
and stated that the appellants were members of the band.

ISSUE:WhetherornottheantemortemstatementofDizonmaybeadmittedasa
dyingdeclaration.

RULING: TheCourtruledinthenegative.Section15ofGeneralOrders,No.58,
provides that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled to be
confrontedbyandtocrossexaminethewitnessesagainsthim;andwhilethereare
someapparentexceptionstothisruleinregardtohearsaytestimony,thedying
declarationunderconsiderationcannotbesaidtofallunderanyofthesesocalled
exceptions.Dyingdeclarationsoraffirmations,madenotunderthesanctionofan
oathbutofasolemnsenseofimpendingdeath,aresometimesacceptedasevidence,
though made extrajudicially and without crossexamination, the declarant not
beingregardedasawitnesswhomthedefendantisentitledtomeetfacetoface;but
the admission of such declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutionsforhomicideormurder,andmustproceedfromtheverypersonalleged
tohavebeenkilled.Manifestly,therefore,theantemortemstatementinthiscaseis
notadmissibleasa"dyingdeclaration."Library

12.Gardinervs.Magsalin
Facts:
Petitioner,asActingProvincialFiscalofPampanga,filedaninformationagainst
thesaidCatalinoFernandezandthehereinrespondentschargingthemwithhaving
conspiredtogethertokill,andthattheydidkill,oneGaudencioVivar,withevident
premeditation.
UponarraignmentCatalinoFernandezpleadedguiltyandhisfivecoaccused,not
guilty.At thetrial ofthe latter, theformerwas calledby thefiscal as his first
witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for the
defense,therespondent judgedidnotpermitthewitnessCatalinoFernandez to
testifyagainsthiscoaccused,onthegroundthathebeingaconspirator,hisactor
declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the conspiracy is
shownbyevidenceotherthansuchactordeclaration,undersection12,rule123of
theRulesofCourt.AnMRwasdenied.Hence,apetitionformandamus.
Issue:
WONtheadmissionisinadmissibleagainsthiscoaccused

Held:
No. It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule.The testimony of a
conspiratorisadmissibleinevidencetoprovetheconspiracy.Section12ofrule123
referstoanextrajudicialdeclarationofaconspiratornottohistestimonybyway
ofdirectevidence.
The evidence adduced in court by the coconspirators as witnesses are not
declarationsofconspirators,butdirecttestimonytothefactstowhichtheytestify.
"Thereis no rulerequiringthe prosecution toestablisha conspiracyinorder to
permit a witness to testify what one or all of several accused persons did; and
evidenceadducedbycoconspiratorsaswitnesses,whichisdirect evidenceofthe
factstowhichtheytestify,isnotwithintherulerequiringaconspiracytobeshown
asaprerequisitetoitsadmissibility.

13.ELADIOALPUERTOvsJOSEPEREZPASTOR
GRNo.L12794October14,1918

TOPIC:Executionofprivatedocument

FACTS:
The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the
contentioninthecaseformerlybelongedtoJuanLlenos,andboththeinterested
partiesinthisactionclaimtitledunder,theplaintiffaspartyinpossessionundera
contractofsalewithpactoderetro,andthedefendantaspurchaseratapublicsale
under an execution directed against Llenos. Alpuerto asks the court to make a
declarationagainstPastortotheeffectthattheplaintiffistheownerthereofinfull
andabsolutedominion.Thedefendantdeniestherightoftheplaintifftotherelief
sought and asserts that the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have
acquired titlewassimulatedorfictitiousandthatthesupposedconveyancewas
effectedforthepurposeofdefraudingthedefendantascreditorofLlenos.

ISSUE:
WhetherornotArticle1227prohibitstheintroductionofthetestimonyofattesting
witnesses or other persons who may be present when a private document is
executed.

HELD:
NO.Article1227oftheCivilCodedoesnotoperatetoprohibittheintroductionof
evidencetoshowthataninstrumentwasexecutedasaprivatedocumentonthe
date shown on its face. On the contrary, such evidence is admissible; and the
instrumentwillbegiveneffectfromthetrueandprovendateofitsexecution,as
against those who signed it and their privies, with all the force of a public
instrument.TheeffectofArticle1227istocreateapresumption,whennoevidence
otherthantherecitalsofthedocumentitselfisadducedtoshowthetruedateofits
execution.

Inotherwords,therecitalofaprivatedocumentastothedateofitsexecutionis
not accepted as legal proof; and if the date is not proved by other competent
evidence,theinstrumentcanhaveeffectonlyfromthedateoftheactsspecifiedin
Article1227.

14. THE CITY OF MANILA, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO,

DefendantAppellant.
FACTS: Thisisanactiontorecoverthepossessionofthetwolotsdescribeinthe
complaint. At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the
dismissalofthecaseuponthegroundthattheplaintiffhadfailedtoestablishthe
allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court, to which
rulingthedefendantdulyexcepted.Thequestionthusraisedputsinissuethetrial
courtsfindingthattheplaintiffwasentitledtotheownershipandpossessionofthe
landinquestion.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The witness Modesto
ReyesandLorenzodelRosariosaidnothingastotheownershipoftheland.They
simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence
introduced by theplaintiff. Ofthesedocuments the most importantofall is the
petitionpresentedbyLorenzodelRosariotothe"mayorofthecityofmanila"and
theletterwrittenbyhim.Ontheotherhand,thetwopublicinstrumentsexecuted
betweenthedefendantandTelesforaApostolyPerea,alsointroducedinevidence
bytheplaintiff,showthatthedefendantwasinpossessionofthelandunderagood
titleandwiththestatusofowneroftheland.
ISSUE:Whetherthetestimonialandoralevidencepresentedaresufficienttoprove
thegroundoftheplaintiff.
HELD: No. From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the
plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land in question, neither the
testimonyofthewitnessespresentedbytheplaintiffnorthedocumentaryevidence
introducedshowthatthecityofManilaistheowneroftheland,orthatithasa
right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents
introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been
executedin1900,tendedtosupportthecontentionsofthedefendantratherthan
thoseoftheplaintiff.Furthermore,theplaintiffitselfadmitsinthecomplaintthat
thedefendantspossessionofthelandinCalleBarcelonawasrecorded.
Inviewoftheforegoing,weholdthatthedefendanthadaperfectrighttoaskfor
thedismissalofthecaseonthegroundthattheplaintiffhadfailedtoestablishthe
allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to
dismiss.

Caseno.15.Peoplevs.Compil,244SCRA135(1995)

Extrajudicialconfession;CircumstantialEvidence

G.R.No.95028.May15,1995.*
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
MARLOCOMPILYLITABAN,accusedappellant.

FACTS:

Onthebeliefthatthecasefortheprosecutiondepends inthemainonhisown
extrajudicialconfessionwhichheclaimsisinadmissible,accusedMarloCompily
Litabanfiledademurrertoevidenceinsteadofpresentingevidenceinhisbehalf.
Thetrialcourthoweverdeniedhisdemurrer,admittedhisextrajudicialconfession,
andfoundhimguiltyofrobberywithhomicide.

ISSUE:

Whetherhisextrajudicialconfessionwhichwasextractedwithouttheassistanceof
counselisadmissibleinevidenceagainsttheaccused.

HELD:

ExtrajudicialConfessions;Thearrivalofalawyerpriortotheactualsigningofthe
uncounseledconfessiondoesnotcuretheinherentdefectofsuchconfession,asthe
operativeactiswhenthepoliceinvestigationisnolongerageneralinquiryintoan
unsolvedcrimebuthasbeguntofocusonaparticularsuspectwhohasbeentaken
intocustodyandnotwhenthesuspectsignshissupposedextrajudicialconfession.
Inthecaseatbench,itisevidentthataccusedappellantwasimmediatelysubjected
toaninterrogationuponhisarrestinthehouseofReyLopezinTayabas,Quezon.
He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further
questioned.AndwhileontheirwaytoManila,thearrestingagentsagainelicited
incriminatinginformation.Inallthreeinstances,heconfessedtothecommissionof
thecrimeandadmittedhisparticipationtherein.Inallthoseinstances,hewasnot
assistedbycounsel.ThebelatedarrivaloftheCLAOlawyerthefollowingdayeven
ifpriortotheactualsigningoftheuncounseledconfessiondoesnotcurethedefect
fortheinvestigatorswere already able toextract incriminatorystatements from
accusedappellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigationisnolongerageneralinquiryintoanunsolvedcrimebuthasbegunto
focusonaparticularsuspectwhohasbeentakenintocustodybythepolicetocarry
outaprocessofinterrogationthatlendsitselftoelicitingincriminatorystatements,
andnotthesigningbythesuspectofhissupposedextrajudicialconfession.While
theextrajudicialconfessionofaccusedappellantissoconvincingthatitmentions
detailswhichcouldnothavebeenmerelyconcocted,andjibeswiththeotherpieces
of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence
becauseofitsimplicitconstitutionalinfirmity.

Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; There can be a conviction based on

circumstantial evidencewhenthecircumstances provenformanunbrokenchain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the
perpetratorofthecrime.Wehaverepeatedlyruledthattheguiltoftheaccused
maybeestablishedthroughcircumstantialevidenceprovidedthat:(1)thereismore
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. And there can be a conviction based on
circumstantial evidencewhenthecircumstances provenformanunbrokenchain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the
perpetratorofthecrime.

Searches and Seizures; Arrests; An accused is estopped from questioning the

absenceofawarrantifhefailedtomoveforthequashingoftheinformationbefore
thetrialcourt.Whileitmaybetruethatthearrest,searchandseizureweremade
without the benefit of a warrant, accusedappellant is now estopped from
questioningthisdefect after failingtomoveforthe quashingof the information
beforethetrialcourt.Thusanyirregularityattendanttohisarrestwascuredwhen
hevoluntarilysubmittedhimselftothejurisdictionofthetrialcourtbyenteringa
pleaofnotguiltyandbyparticipatinginthetrial.

Conspiracy;Directproofisnotessentialtoproveconspiracyassuchfactmaybe
inferredfromtheactsoftheaccusedduringandafterthecommissionofthecrime
which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.
Likewisedevoidofmeritisthecontentionofaccusedappellantthatgrantingthat
hehadparticipatedinthecommissionofthecrime,heshouldbeconsideredonlyas
anaccomplice.Disregardinghisextrajudicialconfessionandbyreasonofhisfailure
toadduceevidenceinhisbehalf,theCourtisleftwithnootherrecoursebutto
consideronlytheevidenceoftheprosecutionwhichshowsthattheperpetratorsof
the crime actedin concert. For, direct proof is not essential toprove conspiracy
whichmaybeinferredfromtheactsoftheaccusedduringandafterthecommission
of thecrimewhich point to a joint purpose,concert of action andcommunity of
interest.Thuscircumstantialevidenceissufficienttoproveconspiracy.Andwhere
conspiracyexists,theactofoneistheactofall,andeachistobeheldinthesame
degreeofliabilityastheothers.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in finding accused

appellantMARLOCOMPILyLITABANguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofrobbery
withhomicide.

16.Peoplevs.Wongchuenming

FIRSTDIVISION
[G.R.Nos.11280111.April12,1996]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. WONG CHUEN

MING,AUWINGCHEUNG,TANSOITEE,LIMCHANFATT,CHINKOKWEE,
CHINKINYONG,YAPBOONAH,CHINKONGSONG,CHINKINFAH,CHAI
MINHUWA,andLIMNYUKSUN,accused.WONGCHUENMINGandAUWING
CHEUNG,accusedappellants.
SYLLABUS

Facts: rtc found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Accused appealed and argued that they were
deprivedoftheirrighttocounselanddueprocesswhentheirpreviouscounselsalso
represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not welltaken. In
additionto,thecourterredinadmittingtheevidencenotwithstandingviolationof
theirmirandarights.

Issue:whetherornottheguiltofaccusedappellantswasprovenbeyondreasonable
doubt

Ruling: no, acquitted. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION; VIOLATION THEREOF RENDERS THE EVIDENCE
OBTAINEDINADMISSIBLE.Attheoutset,theCourtholdsthatthesignaturesof
accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing shabu, are
inadmissibleinevidence.Acarefulstudyoftherecordsrevealsthataccusedwere
neverinformedoftheirfundamentalrightsduringtheentiretimethattheywere
underinvestigation.Specifically,accusedwerenotinformedoftheirMirandarights
i.e.thattheyhadtherighttoremainsilentandtocounselandanystatementthey
might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their
signaturesontheboxesofAlpenCerealswhiletheywereattheNAIAandagain,on
the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By
affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags,
accusedineffectmadeatacitadmissionofthecrimechargedformerepossessionof
shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an
uncounselledextrajudicialconfessionwhichisnotsanctionedbytheBillofRights
(Section12[1][3],ArticleIII,1987Constitution).Theyare,therefore,inadmissible
as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their
constitutionalrightsisinadmissibleagainstthem.

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.ALEGRE
G.R.No.L30423 November7,1979

PROBATIVEVALUEOFEXTRAJUDICIALCONFESSIONOFANACCUSED

Facts:

ThiscasearosefromthedeathofAdelinaSajoyMaravilla,Spinster,57yearsold,
whosebodywasfoundinherbathroominsideherhouseattheMaravillacompound,
IgnacioStreet,PasayCity,intheearlymorningofJuly26,1966.
AccordingtotheNecropsyReport,shediedofasphyxiabymanualstrangulation,
andthetimeofherdeathwasplacedbetweeneighteentotwentytwohoursbefore
12:30p.m.ofJuly26,1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. No
witnesssawthecommissionofthecrime.

MelecioCudillanwasapprehendedinTaclobanCity,Leyte,intheactofpawninga
bracelet,oneofthepiecesofjewelrytakenfromthevictim.Inexplaininghowhe
cameintopossessionofthestolenpiecesofjewelry,headmittedhisparticipationin
thekillingandrobberyofAdlinaSajo.Thisappearsinhisextrajudicialconfession
beforethepoliceauthoritiesofTaclobanCityonJuly29,1966.Inthisstatement,
MelecioCudillanimplicatedacertain"Esok",JesusMedalla,MarioCudillan,one
"Danny"Fernandez,andone"Rammy,".
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters,MelecioCudillanagainexecutedanextrajudicialconfession.Inthis
secondstatement,henarratedindetailtheparticipationinthecommissionofthe
crimeofJesusMedalla,"Celso"Fernandez,"Rami"and"Mario."Accordingtosaid
statement,thedeclarantwentnearthecellwithintheOfficeoftheInvestigation
Section,SecretServiceDivision,andIdentifiedRamiroAlegre,JesusMedallaand
MarioComayasasthepersonshereferredtoasJesusMedalla,"Rami"and"Mario"
inhisdeclaration.Onthebasisoftheaforementionedextrajudicialconfessionof
Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the
SpecialCounselofPasayCityagainstCelsoFernandez,alias"Esok,"JesusMedalla
y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio
CudillanyArcillas,andoneJohnDoe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus
MedallaandRamiroAlegreenteredapleaofnotguilty.Theprosecutionpresented
nine(9)witnesses.Noneofthem,however,testifiedontheactualcommissionofthe
crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based
principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. The
detailsoftheplanningandtheexecutionofthecrimeweretakenfromthe"Pasay
Sworn Statement" The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to
provetheguiltofappellantsarethetestimoniesofSgt.MarianoIslaandHernando
Carillo.

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the
three (3) appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and
homicidecommittedintheresidenceofthedeceased

However,duringthetrial,MelecioCudillanrepudiatedboththeTaclobanCityand
PasayCityswornstatementsastheproductofcompulsionandduress.Heclaimed
that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police.
AppellantsJesusMedallaandMarioComayasdeniedanyinvolvementinthecrime.
Theytestifiedthatatthetimeoftheincidentinquestion,theywereattendingthe
internmentofthedeceasedchildofCiriacoAbobote.AccordingtoJesusMedalla,he
andhiscompanionslefttheMaravillacompoundat10:00o'clockinthemorningof
July25,1966toattendtheinternment.'Theyleftthecemeteryatabout5:00o'clock
intheafternoonandproceededdirectlytohishouseatLeverizaStreetwherehe
stayedthewholenight.MarioComayasconfirmedthatheandJesusMedallawere
atthehouseofCiriacoAboboteinthemorningofJuly25,1966,untilafter5:00
o'clockintheafternoonwhenhereturnedtothebakerywherehewasemployedto
resumehiswork.

AppellantRamiroAlegredidnottestifybutpresentedthree(3)witnessestosupport
hisdefense.Thus,UrbanoVillanuevatestifiedthatRamiroAlegrebeganworking
attheconstructionasawelderonJuly13,1966,andthatfrom7:00o'clockinthe
morningto4:00o'clockintheafternoon,Alegreworkedintheprojectandthathe
knewthisbecauseheistheforemanandtimekeeperintheproject.HeIdentified
theTimeRecordofRamiroAlegre.RodolfoVillanuevaandRomeoOrigenestestified
thatfrom7:00o'clockinthemorningupto4:00o'clockintheafternoonofJuly25,
1966,appellantRamiroAlegrewasattheSheratonHotel constructionatRoxas
Boulevard.TheirtestimonyisconfirmedbytheTimeRecordofRamiroAlegre.

Issue:
WhethertheextrajudicialconfessionsofMelecioCudillanisadmissible
Held:
No.TheextrajudicialconfessionsofMelecioCudillan,onthebasisofwhichthetrial
court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in
question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against
appellantsRamiroAlegreandJesusMedalla,undertheprincipleof"resinteralios
actaalterinocerenondebet"therebeingnoindependentevidenceofconspiracy.
Asageneralrule,theextrajudicialdeclarationofanaccused,althoughdeliberately
made,isnotadmissibleanddoesnothaveprobativevalueagainsthiscoaccused.
Itismerelyhearsayevidenceasfarastheotheraccusedareconcerned.Whilethere
arerecognizedexceptionstothisrule,thefactsandcircumstancesattendantinthe
caseatbardonotbringitwithinthepurviewofsuchexceptions.Theonlyevidence,
therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit
admissionsand/orfailuretodenytheirimplicationsofthecrimemadebyMelecio
Cudillan,and/ortheirpurportedverbalconfessionstoHernandoCarillo,aninmate
ofthePasayCityjail.

CaseNo.18

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.YIPWAIMING
[G.R.No.120959.November14,1996]

TOPIC:Confessions

FACTS:
YipWaiMingandvictimLamPoChun,bothHongkongnationals,cametoManila
onvacationonJuly10,1993.
Thetwowereengagedtobemarried.
HardlyadayhadpassedwhenLamPoChunwasbrutallybeatenupandstrangled
todeathintheirhotelroom.
Onthedayofthekilling,July11,1993,YipWaiMing,wastouringMetroManila
withFilipinowelcomerswhileLamPoChunwasleftinthehotelroomallegedly
becauseshehadaheadacheandwasnotfeelingwellenoughtodothesights.
Fortheslaying,anInformationwaslodgedagainstYipWaiMing
Duringthetrial,YipWaiMingstatedthatfivepoliceofficersatthepolicestation
beathimup.
Theyaskedhimtoundress,forcedhimtoliedownonabench,satonhisstomach,
placedahandkerchiefoverhisface,andpouredwaterandbeeroverhisface.
Whenhecouldnolongerbearthepain,headmittedthecrimecharged,participated
inareenactment,andsignedanextrajudicialstatement.
Allthewhile,hewasnotinformedofhisrighttoremainsilentnordidhehave
counselofhischoicetoassisthiminconfessingthecrime.
ISSUE:
WONYipWaiMingsconfessionisadmissibleinevidence.

HELD:
NO.ThecustodialinterrogationofaccusedappellantwasviolativeofSection12,
ArticleIIIoftheConstitution.
TheConstitutionprovidesthat(3)Anyconfessionoradmissionobtainedinviolation
ofthissectionorSection17hereofshallbeinadmissibleagainsthim.Section17,
ArticleIIIprovides:Nopersonshallbecompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.
Anyconfession,includingareenactmentwithoutadmonitionoftherighttosilence
and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in
evidence

A12C19.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.HECTORMAQUEDA
G.R.No.112983,March22,1995{242SCRA565(1995)}

TOPIC:ADMISSIBILITYofSINUMPAANGSALAYSAY

FACTS:OnAugust27,1991,BritisherHoraceWilliamBarker,aconsultantofthe
WorldBank,andhisFilipinowife,TeresitaMendoza,inthesanctityoftheirown
home in Benguet, was brutally slain and badly battered with lead pipes on the
occasionofarobberyrespectively. Twohouseholdhelpersofthevictimsidentified
Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers.
MaquedawasarrestedinGuinyangan,Quezon.HewastakentoCalauag,Quezon
wherehesignedaSinumpaangSalaysaywhereinhenarratedhisparticipationin
thecrime.AccordingtoSPO3Molleno,heinformedMaquedaofhisconstitutional
rightsbeforehesignedsuchdocument.AfterwardshewasbroughttotheBenguet
ProvincialJail.Whilehewasunderdetention,MaquedafiledaMotiontoGrant
Bail.Hestatedthereinthat"heiswillingandvolunteeringtobeaStatewitnessin
theaboveentitledcase,itappearingthatheistheleastguiltyamongtheaccusedin
thiscase."

ISSUE:WhetherornottheSinumpaangSalaysayexecutedandsignedbyMaqueda
isadmissibleasevidence.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is
inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right
tocounsel.Second,hecannotbecompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.Atthe
time of theconfession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no
longerhadtherighttoremainsilentandtocounselbuthehadtherighttorefuseto
be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal.Andyet,despitehisknowingfullywellthatacasehadalreadybeenfiledin
court,hestillconfessedwhenhedidnothavetodoso.
The contention of thetrial courtthat the accused is not entitled to such rights
anymorebecausetheinformationhasbeenfiledandawarrantofarresthasbeen
issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and
tocounselandtobeinformedthereofunderSection12(1)oftheBillofRightsare
notconfinedtothatperiodpriortothefilingofacriminalcomplaintorinformation
but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commissionofanoffense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra
judicialadmissionisinadmissibleasevidence.

20.Parkerv.Randolph
Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder
committedduringthecommissionofarobbery.Noneoftherespondentstookthe
witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been
freelyandvoluntarilygiven,wereadmittedintoevidencethroughpoliceofficers'
testimony.RespondentPickens'writtenconfessionwasalsoadmittedintoevidence
overhisobjectionthatithadbeenobtainedinviolationofhisrightsunderMiranda
v.Arizona,384U.S.436.Thetrialcourtinstructedthejurythateachconfession
couldbeusedonlyagainstthedefendantwhogaveitandcouldnotbeconsideredas
evidenceofacodefendant'sguilt.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that
admissionofrespondents'confessionsdidnotviolatetheruleofBrutonv.United
States,391U.S.123,whichheldthatadefendant'srightsundertheConfrontation
ClauseoftheSixthAmendmentwereviolatedbytheadmission,atajointtrial,of
the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. Respondents
subsequentlyobtainedwritsofhabeascorpusinaFederalDistrictCourt,which
heldthatrespondents'rightsunderBrutonhadbeenviolated,andthatintroduction
of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights
underMiranda.TheCourtofAppealsaffirmed.

21.PEOPLEvsJOSUEMOLAS
GRNos.9743739February5,1993

TOPIC:Dyingdeclaration

FACTS:
Molaswasfoundguiltyofthemurdersoftwowomenandaneightyearoldboy.
Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The evidence for the
prosecution established that Molas and one of the victim were sweethearts and
engagedtobemarried. IntheeveningofFebruary2,1983,BernardoRasonable
whocamefromhisfarmfoundhissonAbelardoatthedoorwayofhishouseand
bathedinhisownblood.Hecarriedhissonintothehouseandplacedhimontopof
atable.Abelardoaskedforhotwaterwhichhisfatherquicklyfetched,afterwhich
AbelardoinformedhisfatherthatMolaswasthepersonwhonotonlyinflictedhis
injuriesbutalsostabbedhissisterandmother.Abelardoexpiredthenextday.

Molastestifyingasthelonewitnessinhisownbehalf,spunadifferenttale. The
trial court viewed with disbelief Molas testimony because it was riddled with
inconsistencies. The RTC then rendered judgment finding Molas guilty of three
countsofmurder.

ISSUE:
WhetherornotthedyingdeclarationofAbelardoisadmissibleinevidence.

HELD:
YES. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (2) that at the time it was
made,thedeclarantwasunderaconsciousnessofimpendingdeath;(3)thathewas
acompetentwitness;and(4)thathisdeclarationisofferedinevidenceinacriminal
caseforhomicide,murderorparricideinwhichthedeclarantisthevictim.Allof
thesecircumstanceswerepresentwhenAbelardomadehisdyingdeclaration.

22.G.R.No.L12858January22,1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiffappellee, vs. SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant
appellant.
FACTS:SantiagoPineda,thedefendant,isaregisteredpharmacistoflongstanding
and the owner of a drug store. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses,
presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson. Under the
supervisionofPineda,theprescriptionwaspreparedandreturnedtoSantos.Under
thebeliefthathehadpurchasedthepotassiumchloratewhichhehadaskedfor,put
twoofthepackagesinwaterthedosestotwoofhissickhorses.Anotherpackage
wasmixedwithwaterforanotherhorse,butwasnotused.Thetwohorses,towhich
hadbeengiventhepreparation,diedshortlyafterwards.Santos,thereupon,took
thethreeremainingpackagestotheBureauofScienceforexamination.Drs.Pea
and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages
containednotpotassiumchloratebutbariumchlorate.AttheinstanceofSantos,
thetwochemistsalsowenttothedrugstoreofthedefendantandboughtpotassium
chlorate,whichwhenanalyzedwasfoundtobebariumchlorate.
ISSUE:Whethertheaccusedisguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt.
HELD:Yes. Theprofessionofpharmacy,ithasbeensaidagainandagain,isone
demandingcareandskill.Theresponsibilityofthedruggisttousecarehasbeen
variouslyqualifiedas"ordinarycare,""careofaspecialhighdegree,""thehighest
degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first conservative
expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest
practicabledegreeofprudence,thoughtfulness,andvigilance,andmostexactand
reliablesafeguardsconsistentwiththereasonableconductofthebusiness,inorder
thathumanlifemaynotbeconstantlybeexposedtothedangerflowingfromthe
substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." The "skill" required of a
druggist is denominated as "high" or"ample." Inother words,the carerequired
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspondwiththesuperiorknowledgeofthebusinesswhichthelawdemands.
Underoneconception,anditshouldnotbeforgottenthatthecaseweconsiderare
civilinnature,thequestionofnegligenceorignoranceisirrelevant.Thedruggistis
responsibleasanabsoluteguarantorofwhathesells.Undertheotherconception,
inwhichtheproofofnegligenceisconsideredasmaterial,whereacustomercalls
uponadruggistforaharmlessremedy,deliveryofapoisonousdrugbymistakeby
thedruggistisprimafacienegligence,placingtheburdenonhimtoshowthatthe
mistakewasunderthecircumstancesconsistentwiththeexerciseofduecare.(See
Knoefelvs.Atkins,supra,)
Incivilcases,thedruggistismadeliableforanyinjuryapproximatelyresulting
fromhisnegligence.Inviewofthetremendousanimminentdangertothepublic
fromthecarelesssaleofpoisonsandmedicines,wedonotdeemittoorigidaruleto
hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another
whetheritbethroughnegligenceormistake.
Caseno.23.Peoplevs.Irang,64Phil.285(1937)
SimilarActsasEvidence

Sec.34.Similaractsasevidence.Evidencethatonedidordidnotdoacertain
thingatonetimeisnotadmissibletoprovethathedidordidnotdothesameora
similarthingatanothertime;butitmaybereceivedtoproveaspecificintentor
knowledge,identity,plan,system,scheme,habit,customorusage,andthelike.

Reasonfortherule

Itisclearthatevidenceofothercrimescompelsthedefendanttomeetchargesof
whichtheindictmentgiveshimnoinformation,confuseshiminhisdefense,raises
a variety of issue, and thus diverts the attention of the court from the charge
immediatelybeforeit.Therulemaybesaidtobeanapplicationoftheprinciplethat
theevidencemustbeconfinedtothepointinissueinthecaseontrial.Inother
words,evidenceofcollateraloffensesmustnotbereceivedassubstantiveevidence
oftheoffensesontrial.

Applicability

Sec.34isthesecondbranchoftheruleofresinteraliosacta(Rule130,Sec.28)and
appliestobothcivilandcriminalcases.

FACTS:

Afterbargingintoherhome,amanorderedMaximinianaVicentetobringouther
moneyandjewelry.Assheturnedovertheitems,shelookedattheman'sfaceand
sawthathehadpockmarksandascaronhislefteyelid.Irangwasidentifiedby
Maximianafromapolicelineupandwascharged.Duringthetrial,Maximianas
neighbor,JuanadelaCruz,testifiedthatonthenightinquestion,herhousewas
assaultedbymalefactors.delaCruznoticedthatoneofthemhadpockmarksanda
scaronthelefteyelid.SheidentifiedthatmantobeIrang.

HELD:

ThetestimonyofJuanadelaCruzindirectlycorroboratesMaximinianastestimony
that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and
demandeddeliveryofhermoneyandjewelry.Whileevidenceofanothercrimeis,as
a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwiserelevant,aswhereittendstoidentifydefendantastheperpetratorofthe
robberycharged,ortendstoshowhispresenceatthesceneorinthevicinityofthe
crimeatthetimecharged,orwhenitisevidenceofacircumstanceconnectedwith
thecrime.

24.Peoplevssoliman

ENBANC

G.R.No.L9723June28,1957

THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO
PALINYPAZaliasPOLONIO,defendantsappellants.

Facts:Appellantswerechargedwithmurderandsentencedtodeath.Theconviction
is mainly predicated on the testimony of one eyewitness supported by some
circumstantialevidence.Theychallengedthecredibilityofthewitnessandclaimed
thatwhenthiswitnesswasmadetoidentifyaccusedSolimanhepointedtoaccused
Palinandwhenhewasaskedtoidentifythelatter,hepointedtotheformer.Andhe
alsocommittedamistakeindesignatingthenicknamesofthetwoaccused.

Issue:whetherornottheconvictionwasproper.

Ruling:yes.While it is truethat at the startofhis testimony this witness was

confusedinidentifyingtheaccusedbytheirnames,however,whenhewasaskedby
thecourtimmediatelythereaftertoputhishandsoneachofthem,hewasableto
identifythemcorrectly.Thecourtthenmadethefollowingobservation:

Witnessidentifiedbothaccused.Atthetimewhenhepointedtotheaccusedhe
apparently made a mistake may be due to the fact that the accused were both
seatedtogetherandwhenhepointedtotheaccusedhemighthavebeenoutofbig
senseofdirection.(pp.23,t.s.n.,Lloren.)

TheCourtfoundthetestimonyofBalaktawworthyofcredencenotonlybecauseit
isinpartcorroboratedbythetestimonyofappellantSolimanhimselfwhoadmitted
havinginflictedthewoundsthatcausedthedeathofthevictim,(althoughbywayof
selfdefense)butalsobecauseitissupportedbythenatureofthewoundsasfound
byDr.Larainhisautopsy.
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDSvs.CLEMENTEBABIERA,etal.
G.R.No.28871September19,1928
DYINGDECLARATION
FACTS:
ThisisanappealtakenbyClementeBabiera,JustoBabieraandDomingaBores
fromthejudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilofindingthemguiltyofthe
crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices. The
antecedentfactsareasfollows:
Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with the right of
repurchase, and that, having failed to repurchase them within the period
stipulated,thetitletheretowasconsolidated,inthepurchaser,wholeasedthemto
SeverinoHaro,thelattertakingpossessionofthem.JustoBabieraresortedtoevery
lawful means to regain possession of said parcels of land, first by anaccion
publiciana, which failed, and then by an action for the recovery of possession.
SeverinoHaropaidtheexpensesofBasilioCoprerosinordertocarryonthesuits.
Such interested intervention on Severino Haro's part without doubt must have
vexedJustoBabiera,forinthemonthofMay1927,hewentwithhiscopartneron
shares,RosendoPaycol,towhereFerminBruces,SeverinoHaro'scopartner,was
plowing,andaskedtotellhismastertogoandplowhimself.Lateron,Clemente
Babiera,JustoBabiera'sson,accompaniedbyhiscopartnerRosendoPaycol,seeing
that Fermin Bruces went on working the land, told him that if he continued
plowing, Clemente would pull out someone's intestines. Justo Babiera and
Clemente Babiera must have borne Severino Haro deep resentment, doubtless
believingthatitwasduetohimthattheycouldnotrecovertheirtwoparcelsof
land.
OnAugust21,1927,SeverinoHaro,wenttovisithislandinthebarrioofBita,
accompaniedbythreepeople.SeverinoHarowasnotabletoreturntotownuntil
almost7o'clockintheevening.Asitwasalreadydark,heandhiscompanionshad
tomakeuseofatorchmadeoutofsplitbambootolightthemontheirway.On
Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house, Clemente Babiera
suddenlysprangfromthecogongrass,wentafterSeverinoHaroandstruckhim
with his bolo in the back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him
SeverinoHaroreceivedanotherboloblowintheforeheadneartherighteyebrow.In
tryingtodefendhimselfwithhishandhewaswoundedbetweentheindexfinger
andthethumb.Hethentriedtograsphisassailantbutdidnotsucceedandhefell
to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino
Haro's stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the
sceneandheldbothkneesofthewoundedman.PedroTauro,Severinoscompanion,
wishedtocomenearinordertohelpSeverinoHaro,butClementeBabieraraised
hisbolointheairandkeptonbrandishingittowarneverybodyoff.SeverinoHaro
wasrushedtothehospitalandmadeaswornstatementbeforethedeputyfiscal,
relatingtheoccurrenceandmentioningthepersonswhowerepresent.Thissworn
statementwasratifiedbyhimbeforethesamedeputyfiscalonthe27thofthesaid
monthandyearwhenhehadgivenupallhopeofrecovery.

ISSUE:
Whetherthestatementofthevictimisanantemortemdeclarationandadmissible
asevidence
HELD:
Yes. Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as anante
mortemdeclaration,inasmuchasthereisnothingtoshowthatatthetimehemade
it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death,
nevertheless,havingratifieditscontentsaweeklaterwhenhewasneardeathasa
result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he
madeantemortem"A statement made under circumstances which would not
renderitadmissibleasadyingdeclarationbecomesadmissibleassuch,itisheld,if
approvedorrepeatedbythedeclarantafterhehadabandonedallhopeofrecovery."
(30CorpusJuris,257.)

CaseNo.26

THE UNITED STATES vs. PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and

CATALINOMERCADO
G.R.No.L8332November13,1913

TOPIC:Impeachmentofwitnesscredibility

FACTS:
Mercado et.al. were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First
InstanceoftheProvinceofBulacan.
Allegedly,thesaidaccusedwillfullyandcriminally,withoutlegitimateauthority
therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro
Mercado,preventthelatterfromrenderingaidtoMariaR.Mateoinorderthat
SantiagoMercadomight athispleasuremaltreatthesaidMariaR.Mateo,ina
violationoflaw.
Duringthetrial,Mr.RicardoGonzalezLloret,attorneyfortheprivateprosecutor,
askedaquestiontothewitnessforthedefense:Howmanytimeshaveyoubeen
convictedofassaultuponotherpersons?
Tothisquestion,thedefendantTomasMercadoobjectedonthegroundthatthe
question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by
sayingthathewishestodemonstratethathehasapugnaciousdisposition.Ihave
hadoccasiontodefendhiminvariouscausesforassault.
UponthequestionandtheobjectionJudgeBarrettoruledthat"thecharacterofthe
witnesshasanintimaterelationormayhaveastrongrelationwiththefactsbeing
investigatedinthepresentcause.Theobjectionisoverruled."

ISSUE:
WONthetrialcourterredinoverrulingtheobjectionoftheaccusedtotheprivate
prosecutor'squestionreferringtothecharacterofthewitness.

HELD:
YES.
Generallyspeaking,awitnesscannotbeimpeachedbythepartyagainstwhomhe
hasbeencalled,exceptbyshowing(a)thathehasmadecontradictorystatements:
or(b)byshowingthathisgeneralreputationforthetruth,honesty,orintegrityis
bad.
Thequestiontowhichthedefendantobjectedneitherattemptedtoshowthatthe
witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for
truth,honesty,orintegritywasbad.
Whileyoucannotimpeachthecredibilityofawitness,exceptbyshowingthathe
has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth,
honesty,orintegrityisbad,yet,nevertheless,youmayshowbyanexaminationof
thewitnesshimselforfromtherecordofthejudgment,thathehasbeenconvicted
ofahighcrime.
Inthepresentcase,theotheroffensetowhichthequestionaboverelatedwasnota
highcrime,asthattermisgenerallyused,andweassumethatthephrase"high
crime,"asusedinsection342,isusedinitsordinarysignification.
Theobjectionwasproperlyinterposedandshouldhavebeensustained.

A12C27.THEUNITEDSTATESvs.RAMONAR.EVANGELISTA
G.R.No.L8132March25,1913{24Phil.453(1913)}

TOPIC:EXTRAJUDICIALCONFESSION

FACTS:Theappellant,RamonaR.Evangelista,wasconvictedintheCourtofFirst
InstanceofManilaofthecrimeofarsonwhichtranspiredonJune2,1912.The
accusedappearedatthesceneofthefireonthemorningofJune3,andDetective
Perceival,whohadbeendetailedtomakeaninvestigationofthefire,afterafew
minutesconversationwithher,senthertothepolicestationincompanywiththe
witnessJoseBello.Sheremainedatthepolicestationalldayuntilabout8o'clock
thatevening,whensheconfessedtohavingstartedthefire,assigningasherreason
thatshewasheavilyindebtandtheonlywayshecouldseetogetoutofdebtwasto
raise her insurance and then set fire to the place. Perceival testified that the
appellantgaveherconfessionindetail.Itisnotdeniedthatthisconfessionwas
made.But counsel assigns as error on this appeal that it shouldnot have been
admittedbecauseitwasinvoluntarybyreasonofforce,intimidation,etc.,usedin
extortingit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by the accused is

conclusiveenoughtoproveherguilt.

RULING: TheCourtruledintheaffirmative.Theconfessionoftheaccusedand
other circumstantial evidence are conclusive of her guilt. The Court had the
formidable arrayof circumstantial evidence tending strongly to showintent and
motiveofthedefendantforsettingfiretothehouse;thefactthatthefireoriginated
inthelivingquartersoftheaccused;thatitwas,bythetestimonyoftheactingchief
of the fire department and his assistant, of incendiary origin; and finally, the
extrajudicialconfessionoftheaccusedherselfthatshestartedthefire.Itisalso
worthy of credence that Detective Perceival testified that immediately upon her
confessionofguilthesentforthechiefofthesecretservice;thatwhilethechiefwas
therethethenattorneyofthedefendantalsocamein;thatheaskedherinthe
presenceofthesetwogentlemenifanythinghadbeendonetoherand,ifso,totell
themaboutit;andfinallythatherattorneyhimselfaskedherthisquestionandshe
replied,"no;thathe(thedetective)hadtreatedherasthoughhewasherson."

28.Baldridgev.Matthews
Facts:
Inanactionforcriminalconversation(adulteryinthePhilippines,Iguess),the
defendant was found guilty. Over the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff
presentedaclerkatthehoteltrystwherethedefendantstayedovernightandhave
sexualintercoursewiththeplaintiffswife.
Accordingtotheclerk,theroomwasnotpaidforinadvanceandthatitwasthe
uniformpracticeofthehoteltorequirepaymentinadvanceforlodgingwhenthe
registrantwaswithoutluggage.Theappellantarguesthatthetestimonyinrespect
ofthehotel'spracticewasinadmissiblesinceevidenceastohowanactwasdoneon
other occasions is irrelevant for the purpose of showing what was done on a
particularoccasion.
Issue:
WONthetestimonyoftheclerkisinadmissible
Held:
No. Insocontending,thedefendantfailstoreflectaccuratelytherationaleofthe
pertinentprinciplesinvolved.Theprobativevalueofaperson'shabitorcustom,as
showing what was done on a particular occasion, is not open to doubt: see 1
WigmoreonEvidence(ThirdEdition),92,p.519etseq.Whetherevidenceofsuch
usageorhabitisadmissibletoshowwhatoccurredinaspecificinstancedependson
the"invariableregularity"oftheusageorhabit.Tobeadmissibletheusagemust
have"sufficientregularitytomakeitprobablethatitwouldbecarriedoutinevery
instance or in most instances": Wigmore, loc. cit. supra. In the present case, it
seemsclearthattheclerk'stestimonyastothehotel'susageissuchastocome
withinthecompassoftheWigmoredefinition.
Thecasescitedbythedefendantinthisconnectionarenotapposite.Noneofthem
involvedusageorhabitevenremotelyapproachingfixedregularity.
Ourexaminationoftherecordconvincesusthatthecasewastriedandsubmitted
bythelearnedtrialjudgecapablyandwithutmostfairnesstobothsidesandthat
theappellanthasnothingofwhichjustlytocomplain.
Judgmentaffirmed.

29.MICHELSONvsUNITEDSTATES
335US469December20,1948

TOPIC:Characterwitness

FACTS:
In 1947, Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent. The
GovernmentprovedalargepaymentbyMichelsontotheagentforthepurposeof
influencing his official action. As a witness on his own behalf, the defendant
admitted passing the money but claimed it was done in response tothe agents
demands,threats,solicitationandinducementsthatamountedtoentrapment.On
direct examination of defendant, his own counsel brought out that he had been
convictedofamisdemeanorhavingtodowithtradingincounterfeitwatchdials.
Oncrossexamination,itappearedthatheansweredNotothequestionwhether
he had been arrested or summoned for any offense. The defendant called five
witnesses to prove that he enjoyed a good reputation. The defendantpetitioner
challengestherightoftheprosecutiontocrossexaminehischaracterwitnesses.
TheCourtofAppealsheldthatitwaspermissible.

ISSUE:
Whetherornotthecrossexaminationofthecharacterwitnessesisproper.

HELD:
Courts that follow the commonlaw tradition almost unanimously have come to
disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendants evil
character to establish a probability of his guilt. But this line of inquiry firmly
denied to the State is opened to the defendant because character is relevant in
resolvingprobabilitiesofguilt. Hemayintroduceaffirmativetestimonythatthe
generalestimateofhischaracterissofavorablethatthejurymayinferthathe
would not be likely to commit the offense charged. What commonly is called
characterevidenceisonlysuchwhencharacterisemployedasasynonymfor
reputation.Thewitnessmaynottestifyaboutdefendantsspecificactsorcourses
of conduct or his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental and
moral traits; nor can he testify that his own acquaintance, observation and
knowledge of defendant leads to his own independent opinion that defendant
possessesagoodgeneralorspecificcharacter,inconsistentwithcommissionofacts
charged. The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of
defendantbutonlyastotheshadowhisdailylifehascastinhisneighborhood.

30.G.R.No.L29832March25,1929
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDS,PlaintiffAppellee,vs.CANUTO
ASINAS,ETAL.,defendants
FACTS: Asinasbrotherswerechargedwiththecrimeofparricideoftheirfather
AnicetoAsinas.Baseduponthesameallegedfacts,anotherinformationwasalso
filedbythefiscalagainstFelipeCredoandLeonOgachochargingthemwiththe
crimeofmurder.OnmotionofthefiscalthedefendantOgachointhemurdercase
wasdischarged,sothathecouldbeusedasawitnessfortheGovernment.Ontheir
motion,Asinasbrothersweregrantedaseparatetrialbothofwhomenteredaplea
ofnotguilty,asdidFelipeCredo.AsaresultoftheirseparatetrialbothCanutoand
EugenioAsinaswerefoundguiltyofparricideasallegedintheinformation.Inits
analysis oftheevidence, thetrial court saidthat thetestimony oftheprincipal
witness of prosecution, Leon Ogacho, is corroborated by the following facts and
circumstances.
ISSUE:Whetherthetestimoniesofthewitnessespresentedcanjustifytheguiltof
theaccused.
HELD:No. Itiselementarylawthatadefendantinacriminalactioncannotbe
convicted on the evidence of the accomplice only, and that to sustain such a
conviction,theremustbeotherevidencecorroboratingwiththeaccomplice,which
tendstoshowtheguiltofthedefendant.Itmaybewelldoubtedwhetheranyoneof
the six facts or circumstances relied upon by the lower court, as corroborating
evidence,arelegallysufficientforthatpurpose.
Uponthequestionofinadmissibilityofevidencetothecommissionofothercrimes
astendingtoprovetheguiltofthedefendantsofthecrimeinquestion,RulingCase
Law(vol.10sec.109),says:
Thegeneralruleisthattheevidenceisnotadmissiblewhichshows,ortendsto
show, that the accused in the criminal case has committed a crime wholly
independentoftheoffenseforwhichheisontrial.Itisnotcompetenttoprovethat
hecommittedothercrimesofalikenatureforthepurposeofshowingthathewould
likely commit the crime charged in the indictment. A man may be a notorious
criminal,butthisfactmaynotbeshowntoinfluenceajuryinpassinguponthe
questionofhisguiltorinnocencefortheparticularoffenseforwhichheisontrial.
Topermitproofofothercrimeswouldnaturallypredisposethemindsofthejurors
againstthedefendant.Onewhocommitsonecrimemaybemorelikelytocommit
another;yet,logically,onecrimedoesnotproveanother,nortendtoproveanother,
unlessthereisarelationbetweenthemthatproofofonetendstoprovetheother.
Unlesssucharelationexists,itisillegalandmanifestlyunfairtorequireaman,
who,ischargedwithspecificcrimeintheindictment,toprepareadefenseagainst
othercrimesthatthestatemayproveagainsthim,butwhicharenotchargedinthe
indictment. The general rule, should, therefore, be strictly enforced in all cases
whereapplicable.
That is good law, and the only theory upon which the testimony of Visitacion
Golondrina,NazarioOpinion,andCiriloMercaderisadmissiblethattherelationas
tothematteraboutwhichtheytestifiedtendstoprovethecommissionofthecrime
inthemannerinwhichitwascommitted,andunlessthereissucharelation,their
evidenceisillegalandmanifestlyunfairtothedefendants.Asstatedweverymuch
doubtthetruthofthetestimonyofthosewitnesses,andwehaveaseriousdoubt
abouttheadmissibilityoftheirevidenceforanypurpose.Asto(f)inwhichthe
lowercourtsaysthedefendantswerecoldandindifferentanddidnotaidorassist
intheinvestigation,thatfindingisnotsustainedbytherecord.Hence,inthefinal
analysis,theevidenceoftheaccompliceOgachoisnotcorroboratedinamanner
whichtendstoprovetheguiltofthedefendants.

Caseno.31.Nicolasvs.Enriquez,97Phil.286(1955)

EvidenceofSimilarActs

[No.L8371.June30,1955]
NlCANORP.NlCOLASasProvincialFiscalofRizal,petitioner,

vs.

HON.JUANP.ENRIQUEZ,asPresidingJudgeofBranchIIoftheCourtofFirst
Instance of Rizal, JIMMY WILLIAM NELSON and PRESCILLA FONTANOSA,
respondents.
FACTS:

AcriminalcaseforconcubinagefiledintheCFIbyCorazonVizcarraagainstthe
defendantJimmyWilliamNelsonandhiscodefendantPriscillaFontanosa.

Thecourtruledouttestimonyofthreeprosecutionwitnessestendingtoshowthata
boynamedPaulWilliamNelson,wasthesonofbothdefendants.

Thesaidtestimonywasobjectedtoasimmaterial,buttheobjectionwassustained
onthegroundthatinquiryintothepaternityofanaturalchildisforbiddenexcept
inactionsforforcibleacknowledgment.

Contendingthatpriorsexualrelationsbetweenthedefendantswereadmissibleto
show"propensity"tocommittheoffensechargedordispositiontomaintainsuch
relationsevenafterthemarriageofoneofthedefendantstothecomplainant,the
prosecutionbroughtthepresentactionformandamustocompelthetrialcourtto
admitthepreferredevidence.

ISSUE:

Whethertheevidenceofprevioussexualrelationsbetweendefendantsdonebefore
complainant'smarriageisadmissibleinevidence.

HELD:

NO.Thewritprayedforis,therefore,denied.

EVIDENCE; CONCUBINAGE; PRIOR SEXUAL RELATIONS DONE BEFORE

COMPLAINANT'SMARRIAGE.Wheretheprevioussexualrelationssoughttobe
proved were far removed in point of time the illicit act now complained of, and
having,.moreovertakenplacewhentherewasasyetnolegalimpedimenttothe
same,theyfurnishnorationalbasisfortheinferencethattheywouldbecontinued
aftercomplainant'smarriagetooneofthedefendanthadcreatedsuchimpediment
andmadecontinuanceofsexualrelationsbetweendefendantsacrime.

ID.;ID.;IMMATERIALANDIRRELEVANT;MANDAMUSDOESNOTLIE.The
evidenceofprevioussexualrelationsbetweendefendantsdonebeforecomplainant's
marriagetooneofthem,beingimmaterialandirrelevant,thetrialcourtcannotbe
compelled to admit it regardless of whether or not the new Civil Code permits
investigationorinquiryintothepaternityofanaturalchildexceptinactionsfor
forcibleacknowledgement.

32.Peoplevs.Steele

CourtofAppealsofMichigan.
PEOPLEv.STEELE.

Facts:AppellantSteeleappealsfromajudgmententeredafterajuryfoundhim
guiltyofassaultwithafirearmandpossessionofafirearmbyafelon. Thejury
also found that in the commission of the assault, appellant personally used a
firearm.Appellantcontendsthat(1)hewasdeniedhisrighttoajurytrialanddue
processoflawwhenthecourtrefusedtoinstructthejuryonthelesserincluded
offenseofbrandishingafirearm,(2)hisconvictionsmustbereversedbecausehe
wasdeniedhisrighttoconfrontandcrossexaminethemainprosecutionwitness
Williamsregardingtheconductunderlyingthatconviction,andbypreventinghim
fromdoingso,thetrialcourtviolatedhisSixthAmendmentrighttoconfrontation
andcrossexamination.and(3)thecourtabuseditsdiscretioninimposingthehigh
termsforassaultwithafirearmandforusingafirearm.

Issue:whetherornottheconvictionwasproper.

Ruling:yes,affirmed.Weagreethatappellantshouldhavebeenallowedtocross
examineWilliamsattrialonthatsubject. However,weconcludetheerrorwas
harmless.Thecourtconcluded,unlessthedefendantcanshowthattheprohibited
crossexaminationwouldhaveproducedasignificantlydifferentimpressionof[the
witnesses']credibility[citation],thetrialcourt'sexerciseofitsdiscretioninthis
regarddoesnotviolatetheSixthAmendment.

Further,underCalifornialaw,ajudgmentshouldnotbesetasideunless,after
examiningtheentirecause,anerrorhasresultedinamiscarriageofjustice. (Cal.
Const.,art.VI,13.)9 InPeoplev.Watson(1956)46Cal.2d818,836,299P.2d
243,theapplicabletestfordeterminingtheexistenceofamiscarriageofjusticewas
statedasfollows:Thatamiscarriageofjusticeshouldbedeclaredonlywhenthe
court, afteranexaminationoftheentirecause,includingtheevidence, isofthe
opinionthatitisreasonablyprobablethataresultmorefavorabletotheappealing
partywouldhavebeenreachedintheabsenceoftheerror.
BecausethejurywasinformedofWilliams's20yearcareerasaprostituteandher
priorconvictionforvoluntarymanslaughter,andbecauseofappellant'stestimony
regardingtheshotgunthathehadWilliamscoveredatthetimeheaskedforhis
moneyback,itisnotreasonablyprobablethataresultmorefavorabletoappellant
would have been reached if Williams's single conviction for providing false
informationtoapeaceofficerhadbeenpresentedtothejury. Therefore,thetrial
court'serrorwasharmlessanddoesnotrequirereversal.