Margery Roana F.

Carreon

People v. Brioso and Taeza

G.R. No. L-28482, January 30, 1971

FACTS:
Accused Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were charged with the crime of murder for killing Silvino Daria.
Prosecutions eyewitness Cecilia Bernal was a niece and neighbor of the spouses who lived only six (6) meters away
from the spouses house. She narrated that she was alarmed by the barking of dogs so she peeped through a crack
in the wall of her house. She saw accused carrying a long gun and heading towards Silvinos house. Her suspicions
awakened, she went downstairs and shielded by the fence, she witnessed appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall
of Daria's house. Two detonations followed and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife calling for help,
saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable
to speak. The wife of the victim rushed to Silvino and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano
Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later,
Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers. Both
accused interposed alibi as their defense. Both accused were convicted; hence, the automatic appeal.

ISSUES:
WON the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the
prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal? And WON Antonios affidavit which cleared Taeza is admissible?

HELD:
NO, the lower court did not as it found no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. In
fact, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal corroborates Silvinos dying declaration to his wife Susana to the effect that it
was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him.
This statement does the requirements of an ante mortem statement (dying declaration).
Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition,
and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death, considering that
he died only one hour after being shot.

Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused,
considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically
said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court
only to tell the truth should be believed.

NO, Antonios affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The said exhibit was never identified by the affiant Antonio
himself and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him.
For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
Be that as it may, not one of the other persons who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic
(Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi.

People v Cusi
G.R. No. L-20986 August 14, 1965

TOPIC: Exception to admission by conspirator

FACTS:
Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged
with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial
confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his
participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to
commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the
prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators.
Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness
would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned.
ISSUE:
WON witness Bano should be allowed to answer

HELD:
While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth
of the FACTS asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is
nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those
who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to
be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really
conspired with Puesca.
For this limited purpose, the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been
allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent
evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the
commission of the offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY

G.R. No. 74065, February 27, 1989 (170 SCRA 649 (1989))

TOPIC: EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

FACTS: Nerio Gaddi was charged with murder for the death Augusto Esguerra. Gaddi told Ernesto Guzman that he
killed his drinking partner Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised Gaddi to surrender to the
police. After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what Gaddi told him. During arraignment, Gaddi
pleaded not guilty, and trial Judge Asuncion of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City handed down a verdict of
guilt for the crime charged. Hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of Ernesto Guzman.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is competent
evidence finds support in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-62871, May 25, 1984, 129 SCRA 4311 which upHELD the trial
court's reliance on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer during custodial interrogation, but to an
ordinary farmer as the basis for conviction. The Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case find relevance in the
instant case: The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given
in evidence against him. (Sec. 29 Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify
as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance."
The Court further ruled that it found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his stature in
the community as a member of a religious movement participating in such activities as "maanita" and procession
of the Fatima and Black Rosary Besides, there was no showing at all that he was actuated by improper motives in
testifying

Leake v. Hagert

FACTS:
Allen Leake's complaint was predicated upon the alleged negligence of the defendant, Charlotte Hagert, in her
operation of a motor vehicle on October 25, 1966, wherein she negligently and carelessly drove her automobile
into the rear of the plow being towed by a tractor which Leake was operating, causing injuries to Leake and
damages to his plow and tractor. Leake's complaint included allegations of damages for hospital and doctor bills;
for permanent injuries to his chest and right arm; for pain and suffering; and for damages to his plow and tractor;
Hagert denied having been negligent and set up a counterclaim. The trial court dismissed both the complaint and
the counterclaim.
Leake filed a motion setting forth the errors of the court which includes among others, that the field notes of
Edward Gross, which contained hearsay evidence and were self-serving declarations, were erroneously admitted
into evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the field notes are correctly admitted.
HELD:
No. The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony of the fact asserted, unless
the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the
grounds of his assertion and his qualifications to make it.
2. Where a witness testifies as to what the declarant said to the witness, it is error for the trial court to admit such
evidence but it is not prejudicial error where adverse witnesses testified during the trial as to what the declarant
had said. Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P.
3. The admission into evidence of field notes which contain hearsay evidence and self-serving declarations does not
constitute prejudicial error where the appellant cross-examined concerning the details contained in the field notes
and introduced on his behalf other evidence supporting the hearsay evidence and the self-serving declarations set
forth in the field notes. Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P.

UNITED STATES vs ALBERT CHARLES ZENNI Jr.

492 F. Supp. 464 July 3, 1980

TOPIC: Hearsay

FACTS:
During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant,
government agents answered the telephone several times. The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of
bets on various sporting events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the callers
believed that the premises were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief tends to prove that they
were so used. The defendants object on the ground of hearsay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the implied assertions are hearsay.

HELD:
NO. To be hearsay, an assertion must be made. In this case, the statements made by the gamblers on the
telephone were non assertive verbal conduct. They were not made to prove that the place they were calling was a
bookmaking establishment but simply made to place bets.

The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of non-assertive verbal conduct or implied assertions.
The declarants veracity is not at ISSUE and so one of the reasons that it is so important to have an out of court
declarant available for cross examination is not present. The statement was not made to show the truth or falsity
of something, and so the veracity is not in ISSUE.

Dasmarias Garments, Inc v. Reyes 225 SCRA 622

FACTS:
APL sued Dasmarias Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a
motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the
deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written
interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction
before a private entity.
HELD:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of FACTS resting in
the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are
principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant FACTS; they are not
therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of
court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen.
etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There
is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking
of deposition after pre-trial the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from
the judgment of RTC to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court or during the
process of execution of a final and executor judgment.
CALIFORNIA VS. GREEN, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)

Petitioner, State of California, sought review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of California, which HELD that Cal.
Evid. Code 1235 (1966) was unconstitutional insofar as 1235 permitted the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements of a witness, even though the statements were subject to cross-examination at a prior hearing.

FACTS:
Respondent was charged with furnishing marihuana to a minor in violation of California law. Petitioner's principal
witness against respondent testified at the preliminary hearing and was subjected to extensive cross-examination
by respondent's counsel. At respondent's bench trial, the testimony of petitioner's witness was inconsistent with
his testimony at the prior hearing. Petitioner admitted excerpts from the witness' preliminary hearing testimony
under Cal. Evid. Code 1235 (1966), citing the truth of the matter contained in the excerpts. The state supreme
court ultimately HELD that use of the witness' prior inconsistent statements denied respondent the right of
confrontation under U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI even though the statements were subject to cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing.

HELD:
The court vacated and remanded. Admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant was
testifying as a witness and was subject to cross-examination, did not violate U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI.
State or federal evidence rules could restrict resort to prior sworn testimony where the declarant was present at
trial, but the restriction would not be as a constitutional matter.
The judgment was vacated and remanded. The court concluded that because the declarant was testifying as a
witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination, admitting his out-of-court statements did not violate
the Sixth Amendment.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO G.R. NO. 146710-15; ESTRADA VS ARROYO G.R. NO. 146738, MARCH 2 2001

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms
of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000,
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped
on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel
walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be HELD concurrently with congressional and local elections on
May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD:

No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said
that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and
less with prosecution.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE

SHANNON RICHMOND vs. FRANCISCO ANCHUELO
G.R. No. 1785 July 17, 1905
FACTS:
The defendant, who was blind, employed the plaintiff, a doctor, to treat his eyes. Plaintiff did so, without success,
and brought this action to recover for his services.
The plaintiff claimed that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a cure he was to receive 500
pesos more. The defendant claimed that if a cure was effected plaintiff was to receive 200 pesos, but if no cure was
effected he was to receive nothing.
At the trial the defendant presented a witness, Jose Pastor, and offered to prove by him that the defendant, on
returning from the plaintiff's office, had stated to the witness that the plaintiff had agreed to cure him for 200
pesos, and not to charge anything if no cure was effected. The witness did not know that the plaintiff had made
these statements; he only knew that the defendant said that the plaintiff had made them. The judge excluded this
evidence, to which HELD the defendant excepted.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the witness is admissible in evidence

HELD:
No. It will be noticed that the witness did not offer to testify to anything which the plaintiff had said, but
offered to testify to what the defendant said that the plaintiff had said. Such evidence is inadmissible as being
hearsay. The rule on Hearsay Evidence Rule states that a witness can testify only to those FACTS which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.

Ohio v. Roberts
448 U.S. 56 (1980)

TOPIC: Cross-examination

FACTS:
At Roberts preliminary hearing on charges of forgery of a check in the name of one Bernard Isaacs and of
possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Isaacs and his wife, Roberts counsel called as a witness Isaacs'
daughter, who testified that she had permitted Roberts to use her apartment for several days while she was away.
However, she refused to admit that she had given Roberts checks and the credit cards without informing him that
she did not have permission to use them.
Roberts counsel did not ask to have the witness declared hostile or to place her on cross-examination.
Roberts testified that the daughter had given him her parents' checkbook and credit cards with the understanding
that he could use them.
When the daughter failed to appear at the trial despite the State's having ISSUEd five separate subpoenas to her at
her parents' residence, the State offered in rebuttal the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony, relying on
an Ohio statute which permits the use of such testimony when the witness "cannot for any reason be produced at
the trial."
The trial court admitted the transcript into evidence after the mother has shown the reasons of their daughters
unavailability; and Roberts was convicted.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in admitting the transcript into.

HELD:
NO, the introduction in evidence at Roberts trial of the daughter's preliminary hearing testimony was
constitutionally permissible.
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires
a showing that he is unavailable.
The daughter's prior testimony at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient "indicia of reliability."
It need not be decided whether, under Green, the mere opportunity to cross-examine satisfies the Confrontation
Clause, for defense counsel tested the daughter's testimony with the equivalent of significant cross-examination.
His questioning, which was replete with leading questions, clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of
form, and comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination by challenging the daughter's veracity.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO LAQUINON
G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985 (135 SCRA 91 (1985))

DYING DECLARATION

FACTS: Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. Laquinon was impleaded based on the statement (dying declaration) of
Remonde that was revealed to Buat. The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in
evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending
death; and that the deceased was not a competent witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the deceased is a dying declaration and is considered admissible evidence.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as
an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration
fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is
extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately
after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

People vs. Sabio

FACTS:
Sabio was accused of robbery with homicide against the victim, Catalino Espina, 80 years old and owner of a sari-
sari store. The prosecution presented its witnesses, one of whom is Camilo Semilla. The latter testified as to the
fact of the declaration made by the victim stating who his perpetrator is. The trial court convicted the accused only
for homicide as intent to rob was not sufficiently proved.
Upon automatic review, the accused assigned as an error the inadmissibility of Exh A bearing the testimony of
Camilo as to the declaration of the victim. First, the victim was not aware of his impending death as he looked for
the police immediately after the incident and second, he did not die until three days thereafter.
ISSUE:
WON Exh A is inadmissible for being hearsay
HELD:
No. The arguments advanced are unavailing. The seriousness of the injury on the victims forehead which had
affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victims inability to speak until his head was raised; the
spontaneous answer of the victim that only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death; and his subsequent demise
from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known
that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible. Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does not
negative the victims feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little
time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
The mere failure of the police to confront the accused with the ante-mortem declaration the first time the latter
was arrested and incarcerated from October 5 to October 8, 1965, neither militates against the fact of its execution
considering that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.

PEOPLE vs REY SALISON Jr.

GR No. 115690 February 20, 1996

Dying declaration

FACTS:
Salison was charged for the murder of one Rolando Valmoria. During the trial, the prosecution presented seven
witnesses, a picture of the pieces of wood used by the accused, receipt of expenses incurred in the hospitalization
of the victim, a written declaration of the victim after the incident and a written agreement between the parents of
appellant and the victim. The evidence of record reveals that after the fistfight and assault on the victim,
Valmorias parents upon his request, accompanied him to the house of witness Alcoseba (purok leader). The victim
asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness
would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence. After three days, Valmoria died. At the trial,
Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she affirmed what was written in the
declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration of Valmoria is admissible as evidence as it was in the Cebuano regional
language and not accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino.

HELD:
As correctly observed by the SolGen, the records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the
admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral
form, they are not thereby rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the
declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally HELD to
be the best evidence and it must be produced. The written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the
person who reduced the victims declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the
prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. Appellants argument regarding the inadmissibility of the
declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true FACTS
and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.

People v. Majuri 96 SCRA 472

FACTS: This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm. She died at the
Brent Hospital two days later. Girlie Aling a relative of Airol Aling( respondent) stated in her affidavit that she and
Darla Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was
stabbed by her husband.
The resepondent was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was
translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because e he was
informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men.
Airol Aling was charged with parricide. It was alleged in the information that Airol was a convict serving sentence at
the penal colony for robbery with frustrated homicide. The accused signified his willingness to plead guilty.
ISSUE: Whether the crime was mitigated by the reason that the accused plead guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: No. The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because he is a quasi-recidivist.
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic investigating circumstances.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and
incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He understood
the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high school and he used to
be a checker in a stevedoring firm.

PEOPLE VS. TOLEDO, 51 PHIL. 825 (1928)

Deadmans Statute (Declaration against Interest)

FACTS:

Sisenado Holgado and Filomeno Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado was
also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house and from there to the municipal building.
Before the municipal president, Holgado made a sworn statement in which he declared that when he and Morales
fought there was nobody present.
About one month later, Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. Toledo, a worker of Holgado, was
charged with the homicide of Morales and was convicted in the lower court. It is HELD that error was committed in
not admitting the verified declaration of Holgado as the statement of a fact against penal interest.

ISSUE:

Is the sworn statement of Holgado considered hearsay? Is it admissible as evidence?

Should the accused be acquitted?

HELD:
Yes. The affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who made it was not presented in court under oath to
testify on his written statement. This is the general rule. But regarding the supporting question, the answer is
also yes. The exhibit is admissible as evidence the reason being that it is one of the accepted exceptions of the
hearsay rule. This is called the Declaration Against interest or the dead mans statute. Sec. 38 of the Rules of Court
exemplifies this rule.

In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as an exhibit) it must comply the following requisites:
1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3. That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and
4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the statement before the municipal president before he
died and that it was clearly against his interest because it had the effect of exonerating Eugenio Toledo from
liability. Declarant was also aware of this fact and knows this to be true because otherwise, he wouldnt have made
such a statement. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such
a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it
was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando
Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of
Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been
received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection
with the other proven FACTS.

2. Yes. The accused should be acquitted. Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical
procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately
acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and
there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted
to go to prison. He should be acquitted because of reasonable doubt.

[G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996]

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction for murder. Accused, still professing innocence and insisting that he
is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Fuentes seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it HELD that petitioner was positively and categorically
identified as the killer of Malaspina and points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right
lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.

ISSUE: whether or not the conviction was proper.

HELD: This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three
(3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these
witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation
with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must
not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

The admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case as the declarant is not unable to
testify. No showing that declarant is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent was made
which Section 38 of the rules contemplates.
That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioners own witness,
Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and Jonie
Fuentes are one and the same person.

PEDIGREE

PEDRO GRAVADOR vs. EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL
DISTRICT, THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

FACTS:
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental. On 15 August 1964, he was advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the
respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 according to his pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools, including his
Employees Record Card. He was advised of his separation from service effective immediately unless you can show
valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65 years of age today
On 31 August 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the
ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was an
affidavit executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in
which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901, in the
Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines because they
were the neighbors of the petitioner's parents, and they were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born;
furthermore, they were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO
GRAVADOR.
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the ISSUEs posed thereby
had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the
corresponding retirement benefits. The Court deemed it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on
the merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based, among other things, on the number
of years of service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of
December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this
Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth of the
petitioner.

HELD: NO. The court gave three cogent reasons:

As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to
his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family
tradition.
The import of the declaration of the petitioners brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way
back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem motam
by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and
meaning of Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The parties have agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who
retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA

G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991

TOPIC: Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree

FACTS:
Alegado was charged of two counts of statutory rape.
Both parties presented two common ISSUEs for the trial court's consideration, one of which is whether the
offended party was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents.
During the trial, the victim herself categorically stated in open court her birth date which showed that she was
below 12y.o. at the time she was raped.
Because the whereabouts of the victims mother was unknown, Cornelio Villarosa, grandfather of the victim, to
whom the victim was left by her mother, also testified as to the age of the victim including the fact that the victims
mother asked Cornelio to send the victim to school because she was already 7 years old at the time she was left in
his custody.

ISSUE:
WON the prosecution has failed to establish the victims age at the time she was raped.

HELD:
NO. The testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no
personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he is
told by his parents he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.
Moreover, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather,
Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence
as claimed by Alegado but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these FACTS occurred and the names of the relatives.

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997 (276 SCRA 582 (1997))

TOPIC: HEARSAY EVIDENCE

FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died
and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and
consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of
representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The
respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
were never presented for cross-examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.

HELD: The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be
admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were
being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.

Ferrer vs. De Inchausti.

G.R. No. 12993. October 28, 1918
FACTS:
Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer claim that their late mother, Rosa Viademonte, had the right to inherit from Isabel
Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the latters four other children, and as Rosas only legitimate heirs,
Rafael and Maria Angelina are entitled to receive Rosas that is, one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel. According to
them, Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte, with Rosa as their daughter. Isabel then married
Jose Joaquin de Ynchausti, father of Isabels other children. Rosa had allegedly been treated and considered as
Isabels daughter and that on one occasion, Isabel remarked that Rosas father was Ramon.
It was also alleged that one of Isabels sons, Joaquin de Inchausti dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following
manner: To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa. College records of the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were
shown to use establish filiation. The defendants, meanwhile, presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon
Viademonte Jr. stating that the Rosas true name was Rosa Robles, born of unknown parents in September 1, 1952.
Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff, Joaquin also testified that one day he was assured by his half
brother Ramon that Rosa was not his sister but a mere protge, and that on one occasion, Ramon showed him
Rosas birth certificate taken from a parochial church. A copy of said certificate was offered in evidence.
ISSUE: Are the diary accounts of Ramon Viademonte, Jr. and Joaquins testimony admissible?
HELD:
Yes. Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner which leaves no
room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and it follows that her children have no
right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is
now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible as evidence of
family tradition, for they are members of the same family and consequently the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is
the same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she
be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the
death of the husband.
Doctrine: Testimony made by a witness regarding a declaration made by someone deceased, when both the
witness and the declarant are members of the same family, is admissible as evidence of family tradition. ISSUE: Was
the daybook kept by Ramon Viademonte, Jr. inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay?
HELD: No. Section 298, No, 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)
provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as 35 evidence of
common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
Doctrine: Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, as evidence of pedigree

PEOPLE vs CEFERINO LUNGAYAN

GR No. L-64556 June 10, 1988

TOPIC: Res gestae

FACTS:
Lungayan was charged for the crime of rape against Agripina Juan, a widow. Allegedly, the crime of rape
transpired when Lungayan invited Juan to step out of her house to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in
the market stall in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 oclock in the evening. Juan
went home at around 12:00 midnight with her clothes all muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back.
When she reached home, she was confronted by her daughter as to what happened. Juan told her that she was
abused by Lungayan but she was not prepared to reveal everything and promised to tell all the details to her
daughter the following day.

The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter of what happened to her
when she returned home as part of the res gestae. On appeal, the accused contends that the prosecution failed to
establish involuntariness on the part of the victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revelation of Juan to her daughter is part of the res gestae and therefore admissible as
evidence.

HELD:
NO. In order to be categorized as part of the res gestae, the statement must not only be spontaneous. It
must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for the witness to concoct or develop her own story.
In this case, the complainant did not immediately go homw after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent
sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because
she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough
time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part
of the res gestae.
People v. Putian 74 SCRA 133
FACTS:
Guillermo Putian appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, finding him guilty
of murder. The peculiarity of this case is that no eyewitness was presented to testify on the assault which resulted
in the victim's death. The prosecution presented only two witnesses: (1) The doctor who treated the victim at the
hospital and who testified on the nature of his wound and the cause of his death and (2) the policeman who
arrested the accused and seized from him the dagger allegedly used in the stabbing and who took down the
victim's ante-mortem statement Identifying "Guirmo" Putian as his assailant.
On the other hand, the accused did not testify in his own behalf. The defense presented only one witness. He
testified that appellant Putian was in the dance hall when the victim was stabbed outside that hall. The trial court,
in convicting Putian, regarded Panimdim's ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae. Obviously, it did not
give to that statement the probative value of a dying declaration because the declarant at the time he made the
statement was not under a consciousness of an impending death.
ISSUE:
Whether the statement of the victim constitutes to res gestae.
HELD:
Yes. The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts. The trial court admitted
Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony. The Solicitor General
cites the HELD that a declaration made by a person immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his
assailant, may be considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence.
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part of the res gestae and as
proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that caused his death five days
later in the hospital.
"Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and
impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at
the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae".
Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a medical
clinic. He had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge against Putian. No motive has been
shown as to why he would frame up Putian.

PEOPLE VS. TOLENTINO, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)

Credibility of Witnesses / Principle of Res Gestae

FACTS:
Geraldine, who was lying at the porch, was asked of the identities of the person responsible for stabbing them with
the latter answering "Bong-Bong" and also mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran.
Upon reporting said incident to the authorities, Adelaida together with three (3) policemen went back to her house
and an investigation was conducted where it was discovered that the accused entered into the house by destroying
the middle portion of the wooden bars of the comfort room.
The other victims were brought to the hospital where they were pronounced dead on arrival. Geraldine who was
operated twice at the Makabali Hospital also succumbed to her untimely death.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the witness is credible.

HELD:
Yes.There being no improper motive on her part to point to accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime charged, Grace's testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.There is no evidence on record to show why
said witness would falsely implicate accused-appellant Tala who is a relative of her mother unless it is the truth.
There being no improper motive on her part to point to accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged, Grace's testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by
prosecution witness Adelaida Lingad when the latter testified that her deceased daughter Geraldine mentioned the
names of the accused-appellant Tala and accused Matawaran as the persons who stabbed her before she died.

Principle of res gestae; Trial court correctly applied the principle of res gestae.The trial court had correctly
applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2)
that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements
made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances which are all present
in the case at bar as Geraldine had named accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators in the commission of the
crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.
G.R. No. L-25504 July 31, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO NER Y FELICIANO

FACTS:
CFI found Feliciano guilty of the crime of murder And sentenced him to life imprisonment, with the corresponding
accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. As such, defendant appealed the case assailling the
veracity of Rosales' testimony upon the ground that there are several contradictions between his testimony in court
and that given by him at the preliminary investigation, in the office of the City Fiscal and between his testimony in
chief and the answer given by him on cross-examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant has been sufficiently identified as the killer.

HELD:
Affirmed. Declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or occurrence in litigation,
although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made
under circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles
of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction itself. All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the
person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make a story, or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside f rom ref erring to the
event in question or its immediate attending circumstances.

U.S. Supreme Court

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)

Sallie Hillmon (plaintiff) brought suit against her insurance company, Mutual Life (defendant), to recover on her
husbands life insurance policy. However, there was a question of whether a body found in Crooked Creek was
actually her husbands or that of another man, named Walters. In attempting to prove that Walters accompanied
Sallies husband on his trip to Crooked Creek and so could have been the body recovered, Mutual Life sought to
introduce into evidence two letters from Walters to his sister and fianc sent before Sallies husbands trip to
Crooked Creek. The letters expressed Walterss intent to accompany Sallies husband on the trip. The trial court
excluded the letters as hearsay. Mutual Life appealed.

Palmer v. Hoffman
318 U.S. 109 (1943)

TOPIC: Admissibility of business records under the hearsay exception rule

FACTS:
Hoffman and his spouse were injured at a railroad crossing.
Hoffman then brought several claims of negligence against Palmer railroad, and a wrongful death action on behalf
of his deceased wife.
The jury deliberated whether the train failed to blow a whistle, ring a bell or have a light burning in the front of a
train.
Palmer attempted to admit statements from the train engineer made in an interview two days after the accident.
Unfortunately, the engineer died before the trial.
Palmer attempted to admit the engineers statements as a business record, arguing that they were made in the
course of a routine accident report.
The trial court did not allow the statements to be admitted and found Palmer liable.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in not admitting the engineers statements as a business record.

HELD:
NO. Business records admissible under the hearsay exception rules do not include accident reports prepared for
litigation even if the reports are prepared in a routine, systematic process.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) affirmed the trial courts decision to not admit the
engineers statements.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the statements were not in a record inherent for a railroad company.
The Supreme Court was concerned that the legislature had no intention to make the business record exception so
broad in scope that any business could abuse the rule by declaring that preparation for litigation was a routine
practice of the business.
The Supreme Court did not want to expand the exception to anything outside the day-to-day routine records unless
expressly authorized by the legislature. The accident report in this case does affect the business, but the
importance the report has to the business does not negate the fact that the report was prepared in lieu of potential
litigation.

ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999 (305 SCRA 579 (1999))

TOPIC: ENTRIES MADE IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

FACTS: Petitioner Canque is a contractor who entered into 2 contracts with Socor Contruction as sub-contractor for
her projects with the government. On May 28, 1986, Socor sent a bill representing the balance of Canque for
materials delivered and services rendered by Socor under the two contracts. However, Canque refused to pay,
claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of
the items delivered and the acceptance by the government. Hence, Socor brought a suit in the RTC to recover from
the Canque. During the trial, Socor presented its bookkeeper to testify on the entries of their Book of Collectible
Accounts. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Socor. Canque however, argues that the entries in Socor's Book of
Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and,
thus, inadmissible.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts constitute competent evidence.
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the course of business. Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines
or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the FACTS therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the FACTS stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative. Under the provision (Rule 132, Section 10), the memorandum used to
refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple
reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the
witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not
be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him.

Nolan vs. Salas

FACTS:
This is an action for the recovery of a credit of 690.18 pesos assigned to the plaintiff by the Chinaman, Tan-Yngco,
or Ynga. The plaintiff in order to prove his claim introduced in evidence three different notes signed by the
defendant, making a total of 110 pesos, 6 reales and 10 cuartos, and a book, which, according to the witness Tan-
Yngco, assignor of the said credit, contained a statement of the account of the defendant The latter admitted the
authenticity of the notes above referred to.
The entries appearing in the book in question are the only proof introduced by the plaintiff as to the balance of the
credit claimed; Salvador, who kept the book in question, was dead, and the plaintiff sought to avail himself of the
provisions of section 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that the writings of a deceased person may
be read as prima facie evidence of the FACTS therein stated.
ISSUE:
WON the book is admissible
HELD:
WRITINGS OF DECEASED PERSONS; ADMISSIBILITY.The entries and other writings of a deceased person made at
or near the time of the transaction provided for in section 328 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, are not
admissible in evidence until after the authenticity of the manuscript in question has been first satisfactorily
established.
In the case at bar there is not the slightest proof upon this point; no one testified to having seen the deceased
Salvador write the entries in question. Tan-Yngco himself, who is the only witness who referred to the book where
these entries appear, did not make any positive statement to this effect.

SPOUSES AFRICA vs CALTEX

GR No. L-12986 March 31, 1966

TOPIC: Entries in official records prima facie evidence of the FACTS stated therein

FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station which started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread and burned several neighboring houses and the personal properties and effects inside
them. Reports prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Department and by Captain Tinio of the AFP were ruled out
as double hearsay by the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. It is contended that said reports were
admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of respondents and that with respect to the police report,
Zapanta was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the
opportunity to do so; and that in any event the said reports are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reports are admissible without further testimonial evidence on the contents.

HELD:
There are three requisites for admissibility under Rule 123 Sec. 35: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c)
that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the FACTS by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.

Of the three requisites, only the last need to be considered in the case. Obviously, the material FACTS
recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation.

People v. Leones 117 SCRA 382

FACTS: Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed.The complainant who had headache stayed in her room.
While there, the appellant and Elizabeth entered the room where complainant was lying down and forced her to
take three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were aspirin. Later, the appellant returned to the
complainant's room and succeeded in abusing her.
ISSUE: Whether the crime of rape was proven against the accused.
HELD: No. The circumstances of persons, time and place attendant in the commission of the crime do not build up
the case for the People. On the contrary, We find FACTS and circumstances which contradict and contravene the
theory of the prosecution, rendering it highly improbable and questionable.
Indeed, rape is a most detestable crime. It should be severely and impartially punished. Convictions for such crime
should not be sustained without clear and convincing proof of guilt. On more than one occasion, it has been
pointed out that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with
precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends on any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should
not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution in the light of the legal principles
above outlined and now well-established in Our jurisprudence and guided by a little insight into human nature, We
are persuaded and convinced that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. That
moral certainty or degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, Rules
of Court) has not been established by the prosecution. The constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed
innocent must prevail and, therefore, the accused-appellant, Joseph Leones, is entitled to an acquittal.

MANALO VS. ROBLES TRANS. CO., INC., 99 PHIL. 729 (1956)

Probative Value - Sheriffs return

FACTS:
To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal
case convicting Hernandez (Company Driver) of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to
enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied
because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in his name.
Over the objections of the Company, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision against the
company and ordered to indemnify the spouses over the death of their son (subsidiary liability).

ISSUE:
Whether in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of execution to prove the insolvency of
Hernandez, without requiring said official's appearance in court, the company was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine said sheriff.

HELD:
No. A sheriff's return is an official statement by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the FACTS stated therein. (Rule 39, section
11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the FACTS
stated in his entry.

[G.R. No. 107735. February 1, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL y ORTIZ, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: trial court found RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL guilty as charged with murder in conspiracy with Ramon Doe,
with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill. Accused appealed the case and has a different version
claiming that on that day he stayed with the victim and called out the latters companions to bring him to the
hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken
to the hospital; that Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to testify; that his
refusal coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the latter and that was why
he was charged for the death of Tonog. Further, Accused-appellant claims in this appeal that the trial court erred:
(a) in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo, and for
discrediting his contending that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting.
Further, The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet[6] prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did
not mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as the principal suspect.

ISSUE: whether or not the advance information sheet is admissible.

HELD: no. Requisites in order that entries in official records be admissible in evidence.Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the FACTS therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the FACTS by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The
public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any
information possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official
information